Abstract
I argue for developing a unified moral framework for assessing human and nonhuman subjects research. At present, our standards for human subjects research involve treating humans with respect, compassion, and justice, whereas our ethical standards for nonhuman subjects research merely involve (half-heartedly) aspiring to replace, reduce, and confine our use of nonhuman animals. This creates an unacceptable double standard and leads to pseudo-problems, for example regarding how to treat human-nonhuman chimeras. I discuss general features that a more integrated moral framework might have, assess the pros and cons of this kind of this framework, and suggest that the pros decisively outweigh the cons.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
For general discussion of the ethics of human subjects research, see Resnik, 2018.
- 5.
For an open letter signed by many bioethicists, including me, see here: https://www.1daysooner.org/us-open-letter
- 6.
The UK permitted small COVID-19 challenge trials to proceed in October 2020, but even this approval occurred nearly a year after vaccines were ready for testing (Callaway, 2020).
- 7.
For general discussion of the three Rs, see Russell et al., 1959.
- 8.
For discussion of the idea of ‘necessity’ in nonhuman subjects research, see Ferrari, 2019.
- 9.
- 10.
For example, see this page from the United States Food and Drug Administration website: https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-regulatory-science/animal-rule-information
- 11.
For discussion of these issues, see Hyun, 2016.
- 12.
For more on alternatives to animal use in education, see Van Der Valk et al., 1999.
- 13.
This back-of-the-envelope estimate is based on the assumptions that a typical human has about 86 billion neurons and can live for about 79Â years, whereas a typical mouse has about 70 million neurons and can live for about 2Â years. But these assumptions should be questioned as well, particularly questions about nonhuman lifespans.
- 14.
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- 17.
For general discussion of anthropomorphism, see should Daston & Mitman, 2005.
- 18.
Thanks to Carolyn Neuhaus and Brendan Parent for helpful feedback on the penultimate draft of this chapter, and thanks to Erick Valdés and Juan Alberto Lecaros for all their hard and great work editing this chapter and book.
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Sebo, J. (2023). Integrating Human and Nonhuman Research Ethics. In: Valdés, E., Lecaros, J.A. (eds) Handbook of Bioethical Decisions. Volume I. Collaborative Bioethics, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29451-8_36
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