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geoffw0geoffw0
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Swift: Move query logic into .qlls.
1 parent 522c9d6 commit cbfa7e7

6 files changed

Lines changed: 344 additions & 319 deletions

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‎swift/ql/lib/codeql/swift/security/SqlInjectionQuery.qll‎

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/**
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* Provides a taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about database
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* queries built from user-controlled sources (that is, SQL injection
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* vulnerabilities).
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*/
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import swift
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.DataFlow
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.TaintTracking
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.FlowSources
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/**
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* A `DataFlow::Node` that is a sink for a SQL string to be executed.
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*/
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abstract class SqlSink extends DataFlow::Node { }
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/**
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* A sink for the sqlite3 C API.
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*/
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class CApiSqlSink extends SqlSink {
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CApiSqlSink() {
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// `sqlite3_exec` and variants of `sqlite3_prepare`.
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exists(CallExpr call |
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call.getStaticTarget()
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.(FreeFunctionDecl)
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.hasName([
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"sqlite3_exec(_:_:_:_:_:)", "sqlite3_prepare(_:_:_:_:_:)",
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"sqlite3_prepare_v2(_:_:_:_:_:)", "sqlite3_prepare_v3(_:_:_:_:_:_:)",
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"sqlite3_prepare16(_:_:_:_:_:)", "sqlite3_prepare16_v2(_:_:_:_:_:)",
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"sqlite3_prepare16_v3(_:_:_:_:_:_:)"
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]) and
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call.getArgument(1).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A sink for the SQLite.swift library.
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*/
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class SQLiteSwiftSqlSink extends SqlSink {
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SQLiteSwiftSqlSink() {
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// Variants of `Connection.execute`, `connection.prepare` and `connection.scalar`.
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exists(CallExpr call |
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call.getStaticTarget()
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.(MethodDecl)
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.hasQualifiedName("Connection",
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["execute(_:)", "prepare(_:_:)", "run(_:_:)", "scalar(_:_:)"]) and
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call.getArgument(0).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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)
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or
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// String argument to the `Statement` constructor.
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exists(CallExpr call |
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call.getStaticTarget().(MethodDecl).hasQualifiedName("Statement", "init(_:_:)") and
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call.getArgument(1).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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)
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}
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}
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/** A sink for the GRDB library. */
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class GrdbSqlSink extends SqlSink {
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GrdbSqlSink() {
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exists(CallExpr call, MethodDecl method |
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call.getStaticTarget() = method and
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call.getArgument(0).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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|
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method
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.hasQualifiedName("Database",
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[
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"allStatements(sql:arguments:)", "cachedStatement(sql:)",
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"internalCachedStatement(sql:)", "execute(sql:arguments:)", "makeStatement(sql:)",
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"makeStatement(sql:prepFlags:)"
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])
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or
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method
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.hasQualifiedName("SQLRequest",
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[
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"init(stringLiteral:)", "init(unicodeScalarLiteral:)",
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"init(extendedGraphemeClusterLiteral:)", "init(stringInterpolation:)",
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"init(sql:arguments:adapter:cached:)"
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])
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or
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method
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.hasQualifiedName("SQL",
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[
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"init(stringLiteral:)", "init(unicodeScalarLiteral:)",
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"init(extendedGraphemeClusterLiteral:)", "init(stringInterpolation:)",
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"init(sql:arguments:)", "append(sql:arguments:)"
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])
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or
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method
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.hasQualifiedName("TableDefinition", ["column(sql:)", "check(sql:)", "constraint(sql:)"])
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or
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method.hasQualifiedName("TableAlteration", "addColumn(sql:)")
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or
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method
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.hasQualifiedName("ColumnDefinition",
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["check(sql:)", "defaults(sql:)", "generatedAs(sql:_:)"])
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or
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method
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.hasQualifiedName("TableRecord",
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[
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"select(sql:arguments:)", "select(sql:arguments:as:)", "filter(sql:arguments:)",
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"order(sql:arguments:)"
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])
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or
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method.hasQualifiedName("StatementCache", "statement(_:)")
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)
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or
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exists(CallExpr call, MethodDecl method |
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call.getStaticTarget() = method and
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call.getArgument(1).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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|
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method
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.hasQualifiedName(["Row", "DatabaseValueConvertible"],
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[
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"fetchCursor(_:sql:arguments:adapter:)", "fetchAll(_:sql:arguments:adapter:)",
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"fetchSet(_:sql:arguments:adapter:)", "fetchOne(_:sql:arguments:adapter:)"
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])
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or
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method.hasQualifiedName("SQLStatementCursor", "init(database:sql:arguments:prepFlags:)")
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)
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or
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exists(CallExpr call, MethodDecl method |
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call.getStaticTarget() = method and
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call.getArgument(3).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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|
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method
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.hasQualifiedName("CommonTableExpression", "init(recursive:named:columns:sql:arguments:)")
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A taint configuration for tainted data that reaches a SQL sink.
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*/
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class SqlInjectionConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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SqlInjectionConfig() { this = "SqlInjectionConfig" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof FlowSource }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof SqlSink }
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}

‎swift/ql/lib/codeql/swift/security/UnsafeJsEvalQuery.qll‎

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/**
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* Provides a taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about javascript
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* evaluation vulnerabilities.
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*/
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import swift
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.DataFlow
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.TaintTracking
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.FlowSources
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/**
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* A source of untrusted, user-controlled data.
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*/
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class Source = FlowSource;
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/**
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* A sink that evaluates a string of JavaScript code.
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*/
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abstract class Sink extends DataFlow::Node { }
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class WKWebView extends Sink {
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WKWebView() {
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any(CallExpr ce |
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ce.getStaticTarget()
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.(MethodDecl)
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.hasQualifiedName("WKWebView",
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[
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"evaluateJavaScript(_:)", "evaluateJavaScript(_:completionHandler:)",
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"evaluateJavaScript(_:in:in:completionHandler:)",
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"evaluateJavaScript(_:in:contentWorld:)",
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"callAsyncJavaScript(_:arguments:in:in:completionHandler:)",
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"callAsyncJavaScript(_:arguments:in:contentWorld:)"
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])
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).getArgument(0).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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}
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}
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class WKUserContentController extends Sink {
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WKUserContentController() {
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any(CallExpr ce |
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ce.getStaticTarget()
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.(MethodDecl)
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.hasQualifiedName("WKUserContentController", "addUserScript(_:)")
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).getArgument(0).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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}
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}
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class UIWebView extends Sink {
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UIWebView() {
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any(CallExpr ce |
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ce.getStaticTarget()
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.(MethodDecl)
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.hasQualifiedName(["UIWebView", "WebView"], "stringByEvaluatingJavaScript(from:)")
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).getArgument(0).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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}
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}
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class JSContext extends Sink {
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JSContext() {
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any(CallExpr ce |
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ce.getStaticTarget()
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.(MethodDecl)
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.hasQualifiedName("JSContext", ["evaluateScript(_:)", "evaluateScript(_:withSourceURL:)"])
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).getArgument(0).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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}
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}
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class JSEvaluateScript extends Sink {
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JSEvaluateScript() {
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any(CallExpr ce |
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ce.getStaticTarget().(FreeFunctionDecl).hasName("JSEvaluateScript(_:_:_:_:_:_:)")
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).getArgument(1).getExpr() = this.asExpr()
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}
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}
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/**
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* A taint configuration from taint sources to sinks for this query.
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*/
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class UnsafeJsEvalConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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UnsafeJsEvalConfig() { this = "UnsafeJsEvalConfig" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof Source }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof Sink }
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// TODO: convert to new taint flow models
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override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node nodeFrom, DataFlow::Node nodeTo) {
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exists(Argument arg |
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arg =
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any(CallExpr ce |
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ce.getStaticTarget().(MethodDecl).hasQualifiedName("String", "init(decoding:as:)")
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).getArgument(0)
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or
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arg =
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any(CallExpr ce |
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ce.getStaticTarget()
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.(FreeFunctionDecl)
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.hasName([
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"JSStringCreateWithUTF8CString(_:)", "JSStringCreateWithCharacters(_:_:)",
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"JSStringRetain(_:)"
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])
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).getArgument(0)
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|
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nodeFrom.asExpr() = arg.getExpr() and
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nodeTo.asExpr() = arg.getApplyExpr()
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)
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or
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exists(CallExpr ce, Expr self, AbstractClosureExpr closure |
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ce.getStaticTarget()
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.getName()
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.matches(["withContiguousStorageIfAvailable(%)", "withUnsafeBufferPointer(%)"]) and
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self = ce.getQualifier() and
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ce.getArgument(0).getExpr() = closure
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|
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nodeFrom.asExpr() = self and
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nodeTo.(DataFlow::ParameterNode).getParameter() = closure.getParam(0)
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)
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or
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exists(MemberRefExpr e, Expr self, VarDecl member |
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self.getType().getName().matches(["Unsafe%Buffer%", "Unsafe%Pointer%"]) and
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member.getName() = "baseAddress"
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|
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e.getBase() = self and
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e.getMember() = member and
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nodeFrom.asExpr() = self and
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nodeTo.asExpr() = e
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)
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}
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}

‎swift/ql/lib/codeql/swift/security/UnsafeWebViewFetchQuery.qll‎

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/**
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* Provides a taint-tracking configuration for reasoning about unsafe
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* webview fetch vulnerabilities.
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*/
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import swift
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.DataFlow
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.TaintTracking
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import codeql.swift.dataflow.FlowSources
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/**
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* A sink that is a candidate result for this query, such as certain arguments
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* to `UIWebView.loadHTMLString`.
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*/
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class Sink extends DataFlow::Node {
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Expr baseUrl;
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Sink() {
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exists(
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MethodDecl funcDecl, CallExpr call, string className, string funcName, int arg, int baseArg
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|
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// arguments to method calls...
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(
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// `loadHTMLString`
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className = ["UIWebView", "WKWebView"] and
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funcName = "loadHTMLString(_:baseURL:)" and
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arg = 0 and
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baseArg = 1
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or
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// `UIWebView.load`
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className = "UIWebView" and
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funcName = "load(_:mimeType:textEncodingName:baseURL:)" and
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arg = 0 and
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baseArg = 3
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or
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// `WKWebView.load`
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className = "WKWebView" and
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funcName = "load(_:mimeType:characterEncodingName:baseURL:)" and
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arg = 0 and
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baseArg = 3
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) and
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call.getStaticTarget() = funcDecl and
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// match up `funcName`, `paramName`, `arg`, `node`.
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funcDecl.hasQualifiedName(className, funcName) and
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call.getArgument(arg).getExpr() = this.asExpr() and
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// match up `baseURLArg`
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call.getArgument(baseArg).getExpr() = baseUrl
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)
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}
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/**
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* Gets the `baseURL` argument associated with this sink.
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*/
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Expr getBaseUrl() { result = baseUrl }
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}
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/**
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* A taint configuration from taint sources to sinks (and `baseURL` arguments)
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* for this query.
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*/
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class UnsafeWebViewFetchConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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UnsafeWebViewFetchConfig() { this = "UnsafeWebViewFetchConfig" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) { node instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) {
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node instanceof Sink or
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node.asExpr() = any(Sink s).getBaseUrl()
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}
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}

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