Formal Verification of a Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Messaging System

• ABSTRACT:
  
  Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications is a "connected vehicles" standard that will likely be mandated in the U.S. within the coming decade. V2V, in which automobiles broadcast to one another, promises improved safety by providing collision warnings, but it also poses a security risk. At the heart of V2V is the communication messag- ing system, specified in SAE J2735 using the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) data-description language. Motivated by numerous previ- ous ASN.1 related vulnerabilities, we present the formal verification of an ASN.1 encode/decode pair. We describe how we generate the imple- mentation in C using our ASN.1 compiler. We define self-consistency for encode/decode pairs that approximates functional correctness without requiring a formal specification of ASN.1. We then verify self-consistency and memory safety using symbolic simulation via the Software Analysis Workbench.

• BIBTEX:
  

  @inproceedings{tullsen:cav18,
    author    = {Mark Tullsen and
                 Lee Pike and
                 Nathan Collins and
                 Aaron Tomb},
    title     = {Formal Verification of a Vehicle-to-Vehicle {(V2V)} Messaging System},
    booktitle = {Computer Aided Verification - 30th International Conference, {CAV}},
    year      = {2018},
    publisher = {Springer},
    note      = {Available at \url{https://leepike.github.io/pub_pages/cav18.html}.}
  }

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