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**Global Catholicism in the age of mass migration and the rise of populism:
comparative analyses, based on recent *World Values Survey* and *European
Social Survey* data**

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Abstract:

For a number of years now, some leading economists became interested in studying global comparative opinion data from the *World Values Survey* (Alesina, Algan et al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 2015). The interest of the economics profession in the relationship between religion and economic growth certainly is a factor contributing to the rise of the present methodological approach, also employed in this study (McCleary and Barro, 2006). Following Hayek, 1998 we think that values like hard work - which brings success-, competition, which is the essence of a free market economy together with the private ownership of business, play an overwhelming role in twenty-first century capitalism and cannot be overlooked in empirical global value research. While Islam has been studied abundantly in this context in recent years, empirical, *World Values Survey* based evidence on Catholicism is more scattered.

Independent from one's religious affiliation, it is certain that current global developments, characterized by mass migration and the rise of populism in the industrialized West, culminating in the recent presidential election victory of Mr. Donald Trump in the United States of America, suggest to take a closer look again at the values held by global adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, which is the religious organization, which still commands the largest following among the citizens of Western democracies.

Without pretending to be a prophet, the Roman Catholic Church could emerge as an actor which will be at the center of global events news in the weeks and months to come, making necessary a detached and empirical analysis of the opinions and attitudes of its global rank and file. The current Pope of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis I, will be already 80 years on December 17, 2016. How much of his agenda of a more decentralized Church is still unfinished? The Pope's 80th birthday could be a watershed in the current Papacy, since nowadays all Roman Catholic bishops resign from office at the age of 80, and even the electors in the College of Cardinals, electing a new Pope, must nowadays be under age 80.

Like Pope Francis I, the new Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, is a "progressive Catholic" who shares with the current Pope the values of social inclusion and openness for refugees. In the United States, the values of Roman Catholic immigrants have recently become the subject of heated and divisive controversies. During the election campaign of Mr. Donald Trump, he repeatedly used very strong insults against the majority Roman Catholic 12 million Mexican immigrants describing them as "rapists" and "thieves", indicating that he firmly thinks that they fundamentally differ in their basic societal values from mainstream American society.

Our data are from two sets of such reliable and regularly repeated global opinion surveys: The *World Values Survey* (WVS) and the *European Social Survey* (ESS). Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIII), and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix. In each comparison, we evaluated the democratic civil society commitment of the overall population and of the practicing Roman Catholics, i.e. those Catholics who attend Sunday Mass regularly, the so-called *dominicanos*.

Our main population-weighted global research results rather caution us against the view that the Catholic global rank and file will follow the Church's substantially weakened leadership in endorsing a liberal asylum and migration policy. 13.40% of Roman Catholic *dominicanos* reject neighbors of a different religion; 19.60% are openly anti-Semitic as defined by the admittedly limited and restrictive *World Values Survey* item about rejecting to have a Jewish neighbor (six decades after the Second Vatican Council), and 48.05% are for a tough migration policy. *Dominicanos* constitute only 45% of the population-weighted total of Roman Catholics on earth. The top 10 Catholic superpowers are the Catholic communities of Mexico; Brazil; Philippines; United States; Italy; Poland; Colombia; Nigeria; India; and Peru (in descending order of size) which in between them share more than 70% of global *dominicanos*. Cross-checking with recent surveys of global anti-Semitism (ADL-100), it emerges that the political cultures of the Catholic superpowers Poland; Colombia and Peru are still plagued by a rate of more than 30% of anti-Semitism each.

The American sociologist Ronald Inglehart is right in emphasizing the close connection between the religious factor and the level of a country's socio-economic development. The overwhelming strength of still existing Catholic activism is to be found in the global South, while the developed countries are strongly affected by secularization. The Catholic communities in Singapore; Malaysia; El Salvador; United States; and Poland are most connected to the Church irrespective of the levels of the GDP per capita. Judging from their Church attendance rates, they best withered the storms of secularization, while the Catholic communities in the three post-communist countries Moldova; Albania; and Latvia; as well as the Catholic communities in Uruguay and Finland have the lowest Church attendance rates irrespective of their GDP per capita.

Based on *European Social Survey*-based criteria that include pro-immigration attitudes, Euro-multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural experience, and the rejection of right-wing culturalism, it is fair to suggest that in not a single European country, practicing Catholics were more liberal in their attitudes towards immigration than overall society. Only in Germany, there was

any relevant active Catholic support for liberal attitudes, as measured by our index, while opposition to them was especially strong in Ireland, Slovenia and Austria.

The global country-based evidence based on the *World Values Survey* also indicates that only in a limited number of countries, Catholic *dominantes* are at the forefront of a democratic, open society, based on such factor analytical criteria, well compatible with the theoretical literature as:

1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley, 1999)
2. Democracy movement (Huntington, 1993)
3. Climate of personal non-violence (APA, 1993)
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995)
5. Happiness, good health (Post, 2005)
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington, 2000)
7. Accepting the market economy (Elzinga, 1999; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; Hayek, 2012; Novak, 1991)
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson, 2009)
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset, 1959)
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al., 1999)
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and Marsh, 1990)

On these scales, and weighted by the *Eigenvalues* of these factors, the best performing Roman Catholic *dominantes* communities were to be found in Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Australia; Germany; and the United States, while the worst performances were recorded in South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Belarus; and Peru. We also document the vital difference ratios between the active Catholic and overall society. Only the active Catholic publics in the Ukraine; Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Chile; Lebanon; Germany; Colombia; Brazil; Mexico; Ecuador; Rwanda; United States; Poland; and the Philippines were more committed to the goals of an overall democratic civil society than the general populations of these countries, while in several countries, most dramatically in South Africa, Spain and Peru, active Catholic publics had to be considered as less supportive of a democratic civil society than the general publics of their countries.

Our overall assessment, however, produces not only pessimistic results. One of our hypotheses is that the Roman Catholic Second Vatican Council and its commitment to inter-religious tolerance in many ways paved the way for the high degree of societal tolerance in predominantly Catholic Western countries over many decades, irrespective of the fact whether Catholics in those countries live a secular or a more religious life. The empirical analysis of global tolerance, based on *promax* factor analysis, using the three most salient xenophobia items

from the WVS data base (rejection of neighbors of a different race, immigrants and foreign workers, people of a different religion) explains 63,502 % of total variance and is based on 191620 representative global citizens, reaffirming the prevalence of tolerance in many predominantly Catholic countries. Best performers were: Argentina; Andorra; Sweden; Canada; and New Zealand; worst performances: Libya; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; and India. These findings are also supported by a kind of “UNDP Index” of the civic culture of global society by international comparison with the existing data, selecting the WVS items on the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence. Sweden, Norway and Andorra are the countries best combining the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence, while the three worst placed nations on earth are Mali, Bahrein and Yemen. All Muslim countries in our 77 countries and territories with full data which were under investigation here were below the global average; and the best placed Muslim country is post-Soviet Kazakhstan; and the best placed Arab country is Qatar. Considering this evidence, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was right to say at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2015, that Muslims need to adapt their religious discourse to the present and eliminate elements of their rhetoric that could foster violence. Precisely the Second Vatican Council provided the Roman Catholic Church with the theoretical tools to leave behind the centuries of anti-Semitism and intolerance which are too well-known in history.

We also found that at lower levels of socio-economic development, active Roman Catholicism indeed is a countervailing force of humanizing societies, but it fails to influence developments at higher “stages of development”. We finally show the different indicators for the major denominational groups in the United States of America. By far, Judaism is at the forefront of the positive value developments, our work and its indicators attempt to capture. Unfortunately, Roman Catholicism in the United States still lags behind Judaism and Protestantism concerning its value development of its rank and file, but still, the overall value development indicator is higher than that of the average of United States society.

At the end of this essay, we emphasize that progressive Catholicism would be well advised to come to terms with the real challenge which Islamist terrorism poses for humanity. Naiveté will not be sufficient to confront the situation of the two trains of extremism in the West now about to collide, about which Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt was speaking recently to the European Parliament: xenophobic racism and Islamist anti-Semitism and extremism.

JEL Classification Numbers: C43, F5, Z12, D73

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and International Political Economy; Z12 – Religion; D73 - Bureaucracy;
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

Introduction

Independent from one's religious affiliation, it is certain that current global developments, characterized by mass migration and the rise of populism in the industrialized West, culminating in the recent presidential election victory of Mr. Donald Trump in the United States of America, suggest to take a closer look again at the values held by global adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, which is the religious organization, which still commands the largest following among the citizens of Western democracies, and which, by its self-definition (John Paul II, 1994), should be a religious congregation committed to the ideals of neighborly love to the needy, openness for the weakest and human understanding. The current leadership of the Roman Catholic Church, headed by Pope Francis I, takes an especially liberal and conciliatory view of migration and refugee issues (Kasper, 2015; Scanone, 2016), which is in stark contrast to the restrictive attitudes taken by populist politicians like Mr. Donald Trump in America or the current Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban in Europe. Do Roman Catholics, practicing their faith, today follow the advice of their Church leaders on issues of migration and xenophobia, and is the Roman Catholic Church really a remaining bastion of the democratic center in the West?

There is of course a vast literature on the Roman Catholic Church and its history over the ages (Brustein, 2003; Hastings, 1991; Koschorke et al., 2007; Michael, 2008; Perreau-Saussine, 2012; Phayer, 2000, 2001), and also on the legacy of Pope John Paul II (Bernstein and Politi, 1996; Fischer and Klenicki, 1987, 1995; Kupczak, 2000; Weigel, 2001), who was very influential in pioneering especially the Judeo-Christian dialogue, and under whose Papacy the Vatican opened diplomatic relations with the State of Israel in 1993.¹

In this essay, we would like to reflect then in a detached and empirical way on the role of the active, global Catholics in the formation of global values, using advanced methods of comparative social science research. We are not interested here in the question, which asylum and migration policies are correct, or which path should be followed in this respect by the developed, rich, Western democracies. We are only interested in what the active Roman Catholics – in comparison with overall society –, think about the most pressing issues of our time, including migration. So, the question resembles the old question: *how many divisions, the Pope has?* by the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin.² The present essay is thus well within a large and growing tradition to study “*real existing*” Catholicism in an empirical social scientific framework (Fox et al., 2004; Jelen

¹ http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Bilateral/Pages/Israel-Vatican_Diplomatic_Relations.aspx

² On the words used by Joseph Stalin, see Tausch, 2011

and Wilcox, 1998; O'Collins, 2008; Philpott and Shah, 2011; Reese, 1996; Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997; Sandier and Sandier, 2004; Shelledy, 2004; Valuer, 1971). Global secularization trends notwithstanding, the Roman Church still commands not only the fellowship of more than 1.2 billion global citizens,³ but it also continues to be a highly significant actor in international relations. Today, important studies on the Church do not exclude the Roman Catholic Papacy (Gillis, 2016), nor the overall role of the Roman Catholic Church in international relations (Napolitano, 2015).

Needless to say, that in view of the current global migration and political processes, which suggest a sharp polarization in the Western countries on the issues of migration, such solid social scientific information is ever more necessary. Our interest to study active global Roman Catholicism also has another background, lamentably often overlooked in Western countries: today, Christianity is the most persecuted religion, world-wide.⁴ While empirical studies on global Islam abound, especially after 9/11, there is a real dearth of sociological, value-oriented surveys on global Catholicism or Christianity in general. And yet, around 100 million Christians, above all in several Muslim countries, are persecuted and each month, 322 Christians are killed for their faith; 214 Churches and Christian properties are destroyed, and also each month, 772 forms of violence are committed against Christians, such as beatings, abductions, rapes, arrests and forced marriages.⁵ The ten lamentable record holders where these persecutions take place are North Korea, Iraq, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Libya.

There are also more immediate and pressing current world affairs reasons suggesting that it is time to write such an analysis:

- The current Pope of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis I, will be already 80 years on December 17, 2016. How much of his agenda of a more decentralized Church is still unfinished? How do the values of compassion, tolerance, social and also ecological justice, which are so much championed by this current Latin American Pope, also reflect themselves in the opinions of those Catholics who celebrate, as mandated by the Church, each Sunday the Roman Catholic Church Service, the

³ <http://www.nationmaster.com/>; <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/>;
<http://www.pewforum.org/2013/02/13/the-global-catholic-population/>;
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-21443313>

⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/dying-for-christianity-millions-at-risk-amid-rise-in-persecution-across-the-globe>

⁵ <https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/>

Eucharist (John Paul II, 1994)?⁶ And how are these values reflected in the thinking of the active Roman Catholics in general? Without pretending to be a prophet, the Pope's 80th birthday could be a watershed in the current Papacy, since nowadays all Roman Catholic bishops resign from office at the age of 80, and even the electors in the College of Cardinals, electing a new Pope, must nowadays be under age 80.

- Like Pope Francis I, the new Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, is a “progressive Catholic” who shares with the current Pope the values of social inclusion and openness for refugees.⁷ As the Italian newspaper “*La Stampa*” correctly emphasized, this former Socialist Prime Minister of Portugal said after his meeting with Pope Francis I on December 6, 2013 that for him, Guterres, the Catholic Church has always been a very important voice in the defense of refugees’ and migrants’ rights.⁸ With a representative of moderate liberation theology at the helm in the Vatican and a like-minded Portuguese Roman Catholic Social Democrat in charge at the U.N. headquarters in New York, even a new axis of progressive Catholicism in international relations could develop, also as a counterweight to the tendencies towards populism and xenophobia in the Western world, especially since Mr. Donald Trump’s ascendancy to the White House in Washington.
- In the United States, the values of Roman Catholic immigrants have recently become the subject of heated and divisive controversies. During the election campaign of Mr. Donald Trump, he repeatedly used very strong insults against the majority Roman Catholic 12 million Mexican immigrants describing them as “*rapists*” and “*thieves*”, indicating that he firmly thinks that they fundamentally differ in their basic societal values from mainstream American society.⁹ But really how different the values of the mainly Catholic Mexican population are from the general population in the United States?

⁶ In difference to some other Christian denominations, participation in the Sunday Church service is obligatory for Roman Catholics, see especially

http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p2s2c1a3.htm

⁷ <http://www.lastampa.it/2016/10/07/vaticaninsider/eng/the-vatican/refugees-the-holy-see-gains-a-new-ally-at-the-un-rl517eB5LSGkyA109xa9KI/pagina.html>

⁸ <http://www.lastampa.it/2016/10/07/vaticaninsider/eng/the-vatican/refugees-the-holy-see-gains-a-new-ally-at-the-un-rl517eB5LSGkyA109xa9KI/pagina.html>

⁹ See especially: <http://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/donald-trump> and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/9-outrageous-things-donald-trump-has-said-about-latinos_us_55e483a1e4b0c818f618904b

In our article, we share the realist hypothesis of an important contemporary Jewish thinker, Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, about two trains of extremism in the West now about to collide. What is to be understood by this?

Speaking to the European Parliament [...], Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt said that Jews in Europe feel as if they are standing on a train track with two "trains coming at each other with ever increasing speed." "One train is the train of radical Islam and Islamic terrorism... The other train is the anti-Semitism of old Europe, the extreme right," Goldschmidt said [...] the recent terror wave has made the public realize there is an "existential problem for the very fabric of Europe." A [...] unit should be created to protect the outer borders of the EU to "rein in the waves of millions of immigrants ... flooding Europe and threatening the future character of the European continent," he said. In order to do so, Goldschmidt highlighted the need to "integrate them into the European value system." Making an explicit effort to distance himself from anti-Islamic rhetoric common among Europe's far-right parties, Goldschmidt emphasized that "Islam is not our enemy. The moderate Muslims are the victims of radical Islam like we Jews are and every other European is." ¹⁰

Where do global and where do European Roman Catholics really stand in this context regardless of what the Church officially pronounces in its *magisterium*?
¹¹

Background

The systematic social scientific study of global values and opinions, used in this essay, has of course a long and fruitful history in the social sciences (Norris and Inglehart, 2011; furthermore, on global value change Aleman and Woods, 2015; Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Ciftci, 2010; Davidov et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and Norris, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013; Schwartz, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). Such studies are made possible by the availability of systematic and comparative opinion surveys over time under the auspices of leading representatives of the social science research community, featuring the global/and or the European populations with a fairly constant questionnaire for several decades now. The original data are made freely available to the global scientific publics and render themselves for systematic, multivariate analysis of opinion structures on the basis of the original anonymous interview data. ¹² Our data are from two sets of such reliable and regularly repeated global opinion

¹⁰ <http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/1.745507>

¹¹ The body of official declarations, like Papal ex cathedra pronouncements, Papal Encyclicals, but also Episcopal Letters by Bishops *et cetera*

¹² <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp> and <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

surveys: The *World Values Survey* (WVS) and the *European Social Survey* (ESS).

The *World Values Survey* (WVS), which was started in 1981, consists of nationally representative surveys using a common questionnaire conducted in approximately 100 countries, which make up some 90 percent of the world's population. The WVS has become the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever conducted. As of the time of writing this article, it includes interviews with almost 400,000 respondents. The countries included in the WVS project comprise practically all of the world's major cultural zones.

Representative data from the *European Social Survey* (ESS) for 2014 are available from Austria; Belgium; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Slovenia; Sweden; and Switzerland, and are based on more than 28,000 representative interviews in these countries. Earlier ESS data also included many more additional countries, including the Ukraine and Israel. As such, the ESS is the largest and freely available social science multivariate data base on the opinions of Europeans.

For a number of years now, also some leading economists became interested in studying global comparative opinion data from the *World Values Survey* (Alesina, Algan et al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 2015). The interest of the economics profession in the relationship between religion and economic growth certainly was a factor contributing to the rise of the present methodological approach, also employed in this study (McCleary and Barro, 2006).

In the present article, we feature on Roman Catholicism in the framework of the “*civic culture*” of their respective societies (Almond and Verba, 2015) and the role played by Catholicism in it (Inglehart, 1998; Silver and Dowley, 2000). Studies on Muslim opinions were a growing focus of research since the 1990s, especially since the terror attacks of 9/11 in New York City. At that time, it is said that the then Secretary of Defense of the Bush administration, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, exclaimed in despair that *we don't have Gallup opinion survey data to know what actually Arab publics think about these attacks.*¹³ Compared to

¹³ Dalia Mogahed from the Gallup poll organization said in this context: “*And after 9-11, our [Gallup] CEO Jim Clifton just looked around realized that no one really knew what was on the minds of a billion Muslims. He was watching a press conference where Donald Rumsfeld was asked how do Muslims feel about these attacks? And Donald Rumsfeld's response was “Well, I don't know, it's not like you can take a Gallup poll.” And it was sort of this that sparked the need to take that mission that Gallup started 70 years ago to the entire world. Because at no time is it more important to help people to be heard, to actually get the views of ordinary people to leaders, than now when there is so much confusion and*

the now existing veritable flood of high quality survey-based studies on Muslim communities around the globe, the available comparable opinion-survey based evidence on global Catholicism is rather scarce (Tausch, 2011, Tausch and Moaddel, 2009).

An important starting point in the choice of the values under study here is that ever since the end of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union there were scholars in the West who thought that now the definitive hour of the triumph of democracy and the market economy has arrived (Fukuyama, 2006). Many saw with justification the positive role played by the Roman Catholic Church in the victory of democracy and the market economy in Eastern Europe in the time period between 1989 and 1991 (Novak, 1984, 1991; Weigel, 2010).

In this context one must also consider that centuries of Roman Catholic warnings about human rights, the Enlightenment and “modernism” to the contrary (Tausch, 2011), there is now a solid tradition of Roman Catholic thinking in favor of democracy ever since the writings of the influential French theologian Jacques Maritain (1882 – 1973) (Maritain, 1936, Brackley, 2004) and the Jewish philosopher Henri Louis Bergson (1859 – 1941) (Bergson 1935). Of course, Bergson formally was not a Roman Catholic, but he felt very close to Roman Catholicism during his later years, and died as a Jew during the Vichy Government’s persecution of Jews in France in 1941. His *“Two Sources of Morale and Religion”* even proved to be an important inspiration for Poppers *“Open Society and its Enemies”* (Popper, 2012). He provided Catholicism with the most consistent philosophical reasoning in favor of a democratic open society ever to have been authored.

This pre-WWII liberal democratic Catholicism came to bear its full fruits in the trajectory of the Christian democratic parties in Europe and in Latin America after the Second World War, which were so instrumental in the postwar period in countries like Germany and Italy, and which also played a major role in the democratization of the countries of Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring, 2003; Whitehead, 1996). The interesting research question already voiced by Lipset, 1959 (see also Moyser, 2005) about the affinity of the Judeo-Christian heritage to democracy is now of course open to further empirical investigations. Without question, towering figures of Western democratic political leadership after 1945, like the German Konrad Adenauer, the Chilean Eduardo Frei Montalva, the Italian Alcide de Gasperi and the Frenchman Charles de Gaulle were deeply motivated by the idea of a combination of Christian values and democracy.

misunderstanding”; see <http://www.virtualmosque.com/society/domestic-affairs/an-exclusive-virtualmosque-interview-with-dalia-mogahed/>

Nevertheless, Catholic authoritarian and anti-Semitic traditions (Brustein, 2003; Gruemmer, 1997), positioned against democracy, are too well known in history, and still plagued many countries, especially in Europe, for much of the 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century (Conway, 2008; Laqueur, 1997; Phayer, 2000; Pollard, 2007; Ward, 2013). Then, just how thin is the ice that now separates global contemporary Catholic publics from the temptations of a re-emergence of Catholic authoritarianism (Pollard, 2007)? After all, regimes, where Catholics played a prominent role, such as Croatia or Slovakia in World War II, were not only “*clerical fascist*” dictatorships, but they were also allied with Hitler’s Germany and played a terrible and active role in the *Shoah* (Goldhagen, 2007; Hoppenbrouwers, 2004; Phayer, 2000). Or is Roman Catholicism today a real stable bulwark of democracy and the market economy? And is democratic Roman Catholicism, symbolized by such personalities as Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer, not only at the cradle of the process of European integration (Nelsen and Guth, 2003), but has the “*Open Society*” (Popper, 2012) now finally triumphed over its enemies in the minds and hearts of the global Catholics, including a permanent resistance to the temptations of a return to Roman Catholic authoritarianism?

The analysis of our comparative data makes the rethinking of the entire tradition of empirical comparative value research in the direction of the classical political science research on the “*civic culture*” of countries and even entire global cultures necessary and useful. Here, one encounters the full legacy of twentieth-century modern political scientist Gabriel Abraham Almond (1911–2002): with his deep understanding of the normative aspects of human society he perhaps came closest to capturing the dilemmas of Western and non-Western, non-Muslim and Muslim contemporary societies of today, as they emerge from the empirical data. He did so especially by pointing out the many adverse trends in the civic culture in leading Western democracies themselves, brought about by the current contemporary erosion of social capital, a declining civic engagement, and civic trust (Almond, 1996). As causes of this contemporary decline in civic engagement, Almond cites in reference to the work of the political scientist Robert D. Putnam the weakening of the family (Putnam, 1993). A second major factor that Almond cites is the transformation of leisure by the electronic media. This tidal wave of value decay has begun to affect the Catholic Communities in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania as well.

The civic culture approach presupposes that a political culture congruent with a stable democracy involves a high degree of consensus concerning the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the content of public policy (for a survey of the relevant literature, see Tausch, 2016a).

Inglehart by contrast developed an interpretation of global value change that rests on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change.

It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to some 20 key *World Values Survey* variables. The two Inglehart dimensions are: (1) the traditional/secular-rational dimension and (2) the survival/self-expression dimension. These two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important variables. For Inglehart and Baker, 2000, all of the preindustrial societies show relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend to emphasize male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority, and the importance of family life, and are relatively authoritarian; and most of them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015).

Inglehart, therefore, predicted a more or less generalized global increase in human security in parallel with the gradual waning of the religious phenomenon in the majority of countries across the globe. Inglehart spells out what tendencies are brought about by the waning of the religious element in advanced Western democracies: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life, etc. When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there isn't "*enough to go around*," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who may take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable - indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may even be positively valued because it is seen as interesting and stimulating. In advanced industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisines; they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening. Recalculating results from different waves of the *World Values Survey* data, Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015 however claim to have discovered a large-scale implosion of the self-expression values, deemed by Inglehart and his followers to be so vital for the future of democracy in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008. Arguing in the framework of Inglehart's theory, Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015 would imply that now setbacks in the further development of an open society in leading Western countries could happen more frequently.

Sociologists, working with the unique comparative and longitudinal opinion survey data from the *World Values Survey* have discovered that there are pretty constant and long-term patterns of change in the direction of secularization, which also affect the predominantly Roman Catholic countries (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Inglehart and his associates firmly believe that the ability of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to tell

people how to live their lives is declining steadily.¹⁴ This opinion was shared among others also by the late Jesuit father and professor of sociology at Innsbruck University, Julius Morel (1927-2003; Morel, 1972, 1977, 1986, 1997, 1998, 2003).

For Inglehart, such phenomena as bribery, corruption, tax evasion, cheating the state to get government benefits for which one wouldn't be entitled, but also the countervailing healthy activism of citizens in volunteer organizations, already described by Etzioni, 1998, hardly exist, while the rich database of the *World Values Survey* provides ample evidence about these phenomena and their occurrence in world societies. The economics profession, that is, mathematical, quantitative economics, already began to make large-scale use of the *World Values Survey* data, integrating the WVS country level results into international economic growth accounting (Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Barro and McCleary, 2003, 2006). Thus, the art of "*growth accounting*" received a new and important input (Barro, 1991, 1998, 2004; 2012; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1993; Guiso et al., 2003). Following Hayek, 1998 we think that values like hard work - which brings success-, competition, which is the essence of a free market economy together with the private ownership of business, play an overwhelming role in twenty-first century capitalism and cannot be overlooked in empirical global value research.

As already highlighted above, the issue of immigration now polarizes more and more opinions in the developed Western democracies. This sharp polarization in Germany and other European countries about the future of immigration policy gathered pace especially since Chancellor Angela Merkel's policy of invitation and welcoming refugees in late summer, 2015 (Carrera et al., 2015; Park, 2015; Sengupta, 2015; Tausch, 2015; 2016).¹⁵ Also in other Western countries, there seems to be a strong backlash against liberal immigration policy. Prominent examples would be the case of the United States and Australia (Albertson and Gadarian, 2016; Fry, 2016; Giroux, 2016; Hogan and Haltiner, 2015; Hollifield et al., 2014; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Oates and Moe, 2016; Wright, 2015). For the first time since 1945, the chance is real that far-right wing parties and candidates could gain power at the ballot boxes in many Western countries. Asylum and migration greatly polarize the political landscape everywhere.

¹⁴ http://ur.umich.edu/0405/Apr11_05/11.shtml

¹⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en;
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/07/angela-merkel-defends-german-immigration-policy-elections-afd>; <http://www.ibtimes.com/germany-wants-christian-migrants-not-muslims-angela-merkels-party-wants-refugees-2413054>;
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/17/refugees-did-not-bring-terrorism-to-germany-says-angela-merkel>

The current global leadership of the Roman Catholic Church by contrast seems to take a completely liberal position on the issues of asylum and immigration,¹⁶ which might also reflect the fact that the overwhelming majority of Roman Catholics and candidates for the priesthood now live in the global South and East and not in the secularized global North, and that an increasing share of the faithful in the rich countries and also increasingly among the clergy themselves have a so-called “*immigration background*”. Some figures recently released by the Vatican Press Office¹⁷ dramatically highlight this view:

- The number of Catholic priests, diocesan and religious, from 2005 to 2014 increased by 9.381 from 406,411 to 415,792. However, this increase was not homogeneous. In Africa and Asia, there was an increase of 32.6 per cent and 27.1 per cent respectively, whereas in Europe the number declined by 8 per cent, and in Oceania by 1.7 per cent.
- Candidates for the priesthood, diocesan and religious, passed from 114,439 in 2005 to 116,939 in 2014. Africa, Asia and Oceania had a growth rate of 21, 14 and 7.2 per cent respectively, while in Europe there was a decline of 17.5 per cent and in America, especially due to a negative tendency in Latin America, there was a decrease of 7.9 per cent.
- The strongest increase in seminarians was in Africa (+30.9%), and Asia (+29.4%), while Europe and the Americas registered a decrease in their numbers of 21.7% and 1.9% respectively.

From a purely organizational sociological perspective (Burrell and Morgan, 1985), it is even very beneficial for Roman Catholic Church leaders to be on the side of immigrants, since immigrants from the global Catholic East and South now not only fill the benches of the otherwise more and more empty churches of Northern congregations, but also of the theological academies and seminars. In a way, Roman Catholic liberalism *vis-à-vis* mass immigration might be even a convenient counter-weight to the otherwise unhalted tendencies of secularization in the rich countries (Norris and Inglehart, 2011, 2015).

The recent PEW Study on Global Catholicism made these tendencies clearer still: the days of the European Church and Catholic Europe are definitively over.¹⁸ In 1910, Catholics comprised about half (48%) of all Christians and 17% of the world’s total population. A century later, Catholics still comprise about half (50%) of Christians worldwide and 16% of the total global population. In 1910, Europe was home to about two-thirds of all global Roman Catholics, and nearly

¹⁶ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/refugees-keep-streaming-into-europe-as-crisis-continues-unabated/2015/09/06/8a330572-5345-11e5-b225-90edbd49f362_story.html

¹⁷ <https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2016/03/05/160305b.html>

¹⁸ <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/02/13/the-global-catholic-population/>

nine-in-ten lived either in Europe (65%) or Latin America (24%). By 2010, by contrast, only about a quarter of all Catholics (24%) lived in Europe. The largest share (39%) lived in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Pope Francis' ¹⁹ open and liberal positions on the European refugee crisis (Berryman, 2016; de Maio et al., 2016; Schmidt, 2015; Wills, 2016) are clear and to be seen in the framework of the current Pontiff's overall commitment to a moderate non-Marxist and non-violent version of Latin American Liberation Theology (Müller et al., 2000; Petrella, 2004). As it is well-known,

Pope Francis criticized the “self interests” prompting European Union leaders to enforce stringent immigration policies that shut out desperate refugees during his acceptance speech for the Charlemagne Prize—an award to promote European unification [...]

“I dream of a Europe where being a migrant is not a crime, but a summons to a greater commitment on behalf of the dignity of every human being,” Francis said. “I dream of a Europe that promotes and protects the rights of everyone, without neglecting its duties toward all. I dream of a Europe of which it will not be said that its commitment to human rights was its last utopia.”

The clash with the majority of the world's right-wing politicians, often speaking about “Christian Europe” or a “Christian West” could not be greater. Victor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister and the most vociferous critic of Chancellor Angela Merkel's “open door” refugee policy, went on the record of saying ²⁰ that Europe is in the grip of madness over immigration and refugees, and argued that he was defending European Christianity against a Muslim influx. “Everything which is now taking place before our eyes threatens to have explosive consequences for the whole of Europe,” Orbán wrote in Germany's *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. His argument is simply that “Europe's response [to the global refugee crisis] is madness. We must acknowledge that the European Union's misguided immigration policy is responsible for this situation.” ²¹ He added: “Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims,” he said. “This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity.” And here, the true clash of world views of the Pope also with Republican President Elect Donald Trump could not be sharper: Pope Francis was even questioning Trump's “Christianity”,

¹⁹ <https://thinkprogress.org/in-powerful-speech-pope-francis-condemns-eu-leaders-efforts-to-shut-out-refugees-c990c573a25e#.wvhfpdato>.

²⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-orban-europe-response-madness>

²¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-orban-europe-response-madness>

rebuking him on his views on Islam and violence, and Donald Trump called the Pope's remarks as "*disgraceful*".²²

Considering the current polarization in Europe on immigration policy (Tausch, 2016a and 2016b) it is entirely conceivable that the old structure of the European political party systems, dominated for decades by Christian democratic, social democratic, liberal, and green parties has ultimately been transformed into a structure dominated by a sharp polarization between pro- and anti-immigration parties. Migration policy variables play a major role in our empirical analyses of the *European Social Survey* data. It is entirely feasible that the empirical data will show that Roman Catholic rank and file active Church members are as deeply divided on the issues of immigration as the rest of society.

Data and methods

So, this essay firmly shares the established methodology of *World Values Survey* - based comparative opinion research (Davidov et al., 2008; Inglehart, 2006; Norris and Inglehart, 2015; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). We should re-iterate that our methodological approach is within a more general framework to study Roman Catholicism with the methodology of comparative and opinion-survey based political science (Basanez and Inglehart, 2016; Brenner, 2016; Gryzmala-Busse, 2015, 2016; Hanson, 2014; Knippenberg, 2015; Manuel et al., 2006; Norris and Inglehart, 2015).

We are of course well aware of many past valuable attempts to arrive at theologically and social scientifically well-founded comparisons of global religions and civilizations in the growing international scientific tradition of ecumenical religious studies (Juergensmeyer, 2000, 2011, 2013, Küng, 1997, 2002, Lenoir and Tardan-Masquelier, 1997; Lenoir, 2008, Röhrich, 2004, 2010; Sacks, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2014). However, our methodology of evaluating the opinions of global publics from the *World Values Survey* and *European Social Survey* data on the beliefs of the adherents of different global religions is based on recent advances in mathematical statistical factor analysis (Basilevsky, 2009; Cattell, 2012; Hedges and Olkin, 2014; Kline, 2014; McDonald, 2014; Mulaik, 2009; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014; Thompson, 2004). Such studies are based on existing comparative opinion survey data, which allow to project the underlying structures of the relationships between the variables.

²² <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/18/donald-trump-pope-francis-christian-wall-mexico-border> and <http://time.com/4436759/pope-francis-trump-radical-islam/>

Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIII), ²³ available at many academic research centers around the world, and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix (Abdi, 2003; Browne, 2001; Dunlap and York, 2008; Kim, 2010). The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called *promax* rotation of factors (Basanez et al., 2014; Braithwaite and Law, 1985; Browne, 2001; Fabrigar et al., 1999; Minkov, 2014; Suhr, 2012; Yesilada and Noordijk, 2010), which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research.²⁴ Since both our data and the statistical methods used are available around the globe, any researcher can repeat our research exercise with the available open data and should be able to reproduce the same results as we did.

In each comparison, based on the national factor scores for each of the factors, resulting from our research (for surveys of the factor analytical method see Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014, furthermore Clauß and Ebner, 1970; Dien et al., 2011; Dziuban and Shirkey, 1974; Finch, 2006; Gorsuch, 1983; Hotelling, 1933; Jolliffe, 2002; Kieffer, 1998; McLeod et al., 2001; Rummel, 1970; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) we evaluated the democratic civil society commitment of the overall population and of the practicing Roman Catholics, i.e. those Catholics who attend Sunday Mass regularly, the so-called *dominicanes*.

Due to too small country sample sizes for the weekly religious service attenders of most other major global denominations (i.e. like Buddhists, Hindus, Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, *et cetera*), for whom weekly religious service attendance is not as strictly prescribed as for the Roman Catholics, we used also figures for monthly religious service attendances (called by us the *mensuantes*) at a later stage of our comparisons. We also introduced a category of people who at least sometimes still attend religious services over the years (called by us the more *seculars*), and the members of a religious denomination, who were really never attending religious services at all (called here the *completely distant*). For all analyzed groups and sub-groups, a minimum sample of at least 30 respondents per country had to be available in the original data sets to attempt reasonable predictions for the general or sectoral publics to be analyzed, thus keeping in line with standard traditions of empirical opinion survey research (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).

²³ <https://www-01.ibm.com/software/at/analytics/spss/>

²⁴ Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But for example, in attempting to understand the recent pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it would be ridiculous to assume that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and anti-European Union attitudes.

In our study using the *European Social Survey* data we hoped to arrive at an index of nation-wide European voter liberalism, based on factor analysis, and we compared this liberalism of practicing Roman Catholics with that of the overall European population. Norris and Inglehart, 2016, in their study on the problems under scrutiny here, use similar variables, but their methodological approach was different. The ESS-dimensions used in our research endeavor were the following:

- Allowing immigration from poorer countries inside and outside Europe
- Allowing immigration of different race or the same race
- Allowing immigration of Gypsies, Jews, Muslims
- Attitudes on anti-discrimination policy
- Attitudes on European integration
- Attitudes on gays and lesbians
- Attitudes on racism
- Contact with people of a different race
- Effects of immigration on the countries' culture, crime situation, economy
- Position on the left/right political spectrum
- Religiosity

Our analysis of the *World Values Survey* data works with the following scales and data:

- Attitudes on democracy
- Attitudes on gender equality
- Background data like age, gender, state of health, feeling of happiness, feeling of security
- Confidence in economic and political institutions
- Global citizenship
- Interest in politics
- Positions on the market economy, like competition, inequality, private enterprise
- What is important in life
- What is justifiable and what is not justifiable
- Work ethics
- Xenophobia

The roll-out of the data, freely downloaded from the WVS website, was: *G:\Analyses 2016\WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_spss_v2015_04_18.sav*. Again, we took great care in assuring that the variable names reflect the highest numerical values in the questionnaire and thus they might differ from the original variable label in the WVS.

In the following, we shortly present our main research results, which rather caution us against the view that the Catholic global rank and file will follow the Church's substantially weakened leadership in endorsing a liberal asylum and migration policy.

Result 1: Roman Catholic dominicantes and the Open Society: 13.40% reject neighbors of a different religion; 19,60% are openly anti-Semitic, and 48.05% are for a tough migration policy

We have made our full results in our Appendix. In this article, we concentrate here on the most salient results and on key trends and tendencies, as they emerge from the results. In presenting our results, we best should remind our readers first that already Almond, 1948, emphasizing the possible contribution of Christian democracy to the future of an open society (Popper, 2012), was well aware of the challenge of democracy (Almond, 1948; Burns, 1990; Corrin, 2002; Coughlin, 2003; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; Philpott, 2004; Sigmund, 1987).


According to our results, the “real existing” global Catholicism, which emerges from our data²⁵ and our distillation of the available surveys today can best be described by the following main tendencies:

- WVS data cover 937,2 million Catholics, 84% of the global Roman Catholic population. *Dominicantes* constitute only 45% of the population-weighted total of Roman Catholics on earth.
- The top 10 Catholic superpowers are the Catholic communities of Mexico; Brazil; Philippines; United States; Italy; Poland; Colombia; Nigeria; India; and Peru (in descending order of size) which in between them share more than 70% of global *dominicantes*. Cross-checking with recent surveys of global anti-Semitism (Tausch, 2015), it emerges that the political cultures of the Catholic superpowers Poland; Colombia and Peru are plagued by a rate of more than 30% of anti-Semitism each.
- Catholicism in the Arab world i.e. in Algeria; Comoros; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Morocco; Palestinian Territories; Sudan; Syria; Tunisia; Yemen amounts to 8,7 million Catholics. Catholic samples from the *World Values Survey* are too small to draw any reliable conclusions for the multivariate analysis undertaken here.

²⁵ <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc1.html>


- Inglehart is right in emphasizing the close connection between the religious factor and the level of a country's socio-economic development. The overwhelming strength of still existing Catholic activism is to be found in the global South, while the developed countries are strongly affected by secularization (Map 1a and Map 1b and Graph 1; GDP per capita figures are from Tausch & Heshmati, 2013):

Map 1a: *Dominicantes* in % of all Catholics – the percentages




Highest: Nigeria; Tanzania; El Salvador; Ghana; Zimbabwe
 Lowest: Finland; Sweden; Netherlands; France; Latvia

Graph 1: GDP per capita and Catholic religious service attendance rate



The Catholic communities in Singapore; Malaysia; El Salvador; United States; and Poland are most connected to the Church irrespective of the levels of the GDP per capita. Judging from their Church attendance rates, they best withered the storms of secularization, while the Catholic communities in the three post-communist countries Moldova; Albania; and Latvia; as well as the Catholic communities in Uruguay and Finland have the lowest Church attendance rates irrespective of their GDP per capita.

Map 1b: Where the Catholic Church withered the trends of secularization and where it did not: *dominantes* in % of all Catholics – the residuals from Graph 1



Highest: Singapore; Malaysia; El Salvador; United States; Poland
 Lowest: Moldova; Albania; Latvia; Uruguay; Finland

- The strategic importance of the ten Catholic practicing communities with still more than 10 million regular weekly religious service attenders living in Mexico; Brazil; Philippines; United States; Italy; Poland; Colombia; Nigeria; India; and Peru, and making up 70% of global active Catholicism cannot be underestimated under any circumstances. Support for a free and democratic society in global Catholicism depends increasingly on the support for a free and democratic society received among these strategic Catholic communities (see Table 1): they will decide the future of global Catholicism.

Table 1: Where the *dominicanos* live

	absolute number <i>dominicanos</i>	share of global practicing catholics in %
Mexico	66,6322	15,7795
Brazil	57,5966	13,6397
Philippines	43,1010	10,2069
United States	29,7903	7,0548

Italy	20,4711	4,8478
Poland	20,2008	4,7838
Colombia	18,5117	4,3838
Nigeria	16,2945	3,8588
India	13,4169	3,1773
Peru	11,9398	2,8275
Spain	9,5514	2,2619
Tanzania	9,2615	2,1933
Uganda	8,9191	2,1122
Venezuela	8,3378	1,9745
Argentina	8,2407	1,9515
Guatemala	7,3158	1,7325
Ecuador	5,7805	1,3689
Germany	5,7327	1,3576
France	5,3399	1,2646
Indonesia	4,9516	1,1726
El Salvador	4,5662	1,0814
Dominican Rep.	4,0195	0,9519
Canada	3,8557	0,9131
Viet Nam	3,6607	0,8669
Rwanda	3,4800	0,8241
Chile	2,9977	0,7099
Zambia	2,4078	0,5702
Ghana	2,2443	0,5315
Ukraine	2,0303	0,4808
South Korea	1,9478	0,4613
Great Britain	1,8621	0,4410
South Africa	1,8358	0,4347
Slovakia	1,7108	0,4051
Puerto Rico	1,5786	0,3738
Burkina Faso	1,2576	0,2978
Australia	1,2102	0,2866
Lebanon	1,0677	0,2528
Zimbabwe	1,0474	0,2480
Hungary	1,0356	0,2452
Croatia	1,0325	0,2445
Romania	0,9900	0,2344
Switzerland	0,7806	0,1849
Czech Rep.	0,6616	0,1567
Malaysia	0,5880	0,1392
Netherlands	0,5244	0,1242
Lithuania	0,4675	0,1107
Slovenia	0,4236	0,1003

Uruguay	0,3936	0,0932
Belarus	0,3152	0,0746
Bosnia	0,2533	0,0600
Singapore	0,1200	0,0284
Japan	0,1130	0,0268
New Zealand	0,1042	0,0247
Serbia and Montenegro	0,1039	0,0246
Taiwan	0,0758	0,0179
Latvia	0,0563	0,0133
Albania	0,0470	0,0111
Sweden	0,0134	0,0032
Moldova	0,0045	0,0011
Estonia	0,0013	0,0003
Finland	0,0002	0,0001
	422,2716	100,0000

- **Rejecting Jewish neighbors is 19,60%** of all *dominicanos* in Albania; Argentina; Belarus; Bosnia; Canada; Chile; Czech Rep.; India; Japan; Mexico; Moldova; Nigeria; Slovakia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Uganda; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Zimbabwe which represent 41.77 % of all the *dominicanos* in the WVS project. Catholic anti-Semitism (Jikeli and Allouche-Benayoun, 2012; Kertzer, 2007; Michael, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2013; von Bieberstein, 1977; Wistrich, 2010; for further comparative studies on the subject of anti-Semitism see Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 2014; Bauer, 1993; Bea, 1966; Lebl, 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Mansur, 2015; Tausch, 2014; Tibi, 2007, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Wippermann, 1983; Wistrich, 2004, 2007, 2010) as manifested in the rejection of even a Jewish neighbor is thus a continuing problem, which also affects more than a fifth of the key active Catholic communities in Nigeria and Mexico (Table 2). Cross-checking the recent ADL figures on global anti-Semitism with the *World Values Survey* data (see Tausch, 2014), we arrive at the stunning overall conclusion that some of the following countries with a rate of more than 30% *dominicanos* also have more than 30% anti-Semites: Lebanon; Malaysia; South-Korea; Indonesia; Poland; Dominican Republic; Colombia; South Africa; Ukraine; Peru; Belarus; Guatemala; Romania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Venezuela. Of course, the ADL data, as they were published, do not allow a real cross-reference with religious service attendance rates, but they indicate a certain danger that the widely existing anti-Semitism in these countries also affects Catholic publics, the clergy, and possibly even the bishops or Cardinals from those countries. So, policymakers, political strategists, think tanks, diplomats, journalists, and future conclave watchers should be alerted about this constellation

Table 2: Catholic anti-Semitism according to *World Values Survey* data

	% <i>dominicanos</i> rejecting Jewish neighbors
South Korea	40%
South Africa	38%
Slovakia	37%
Nigeria	35%
Bosnia	30%
Venezuela	30%
Spain	27%
Uganda	24%
Albania	24%
Mexico	23%
Zimbabwe	17%
Czech Rep.	14%
Uruguay	13%
Chile	13%
Belarus	12%
India	8%
Canada	7%
United States	6%
Argentina	6%

- **Population-weighted results for key opinions of global *dominicanos* are: rejecting people of a different religion: 13,40 % of all *dominicanos*** based on surveys in covering 91.94 % of all *dominicanos* who were respondents of the WVS in Albania; Argentina; Australia; Belarus; Bosnia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Croatia; Ecuador; El Salvador; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Ghana; Great Britain; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Italy; Latvia; Lebanon; Malaysia; Mexico; Moldova; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Rwanda; Serbia and Montenegro; Singapore; Slovenia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Ukraine; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
- **For strict limits + prevent people from coming in migration policy: 48,05 % of all *dominicanos*** in Albania; Argentina; Australia; Belarus; Bosnia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Canada; Chile; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Dominican Rep.; Estonia; Finland; Germany; Ghana; Guatemala; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Malaysia;

Mexico; Moldova; New Zealand; Nigeria; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Puerto Rico; Romania; Rwanda; Serbia and Montenegro; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Tanzania; Uganda; Ukraine; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Zambia; and Zimbabwe which represent 91.08 % of all *dominicanos* in the WVS project.

Result 2: European Catholics are not the forefront of European tolerance. Evidence, based on the *European Social Survey*

Our Appendix Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Appendix Graphs 1-8 now portray the results of our first factor analytical investigation. Our first factor analytical model, based on *European Social Survey* data, explains 59.41% of the total variance. It combines background variables about education and religiosity or a secular life style with variables of trust and attitudes on migration. The trust variables also contain items on European integration and European institutions.

Our Appendix data (Appendix Table 2) show the factor loadings after the *promax* rotation of principal components, which explain the underlying correlation matrix between the variables. We show how we interpret the results in terms of the processes “trust”, “xenophobia”, “secularism”, and “European anti-racism”. We also document the strong correlation between these dimensions (Appendix Table 3). They all correspond to the theoretical expectations, confirming the close relationship between the pro-immigration sentiments, Euro-multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural experience and the rejection of right-wing culturalism. It should be emphasized that – as closely interrelated these factors are – they correspond to different dimensions.

The factors (loadings of more than 10% variance in common) are now the following:

Anti-immigration

0,879	Allow only few or no immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
0,862	Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries in Europe
0,858	Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
0,829	Allow no Muslims to come and live in country
0,803	Allow only few or no immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority
0,779	Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country
0,767	Allow no Jewish people to come and live in country
-0,587	Immigration good for country's economy
-0,562	Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants

secularism

0,864	How often pray apart at religious services (never)
-0,854	How religious are you
0,837	How often attend religious services apart from special occasions (never)
-0,387	Disagree: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish

Euro-multiculturalism

0,725	Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants
0,695	Immigration good for country's economy
0,634	Immigrants make country's crime problems better
0,617	European Union: European unification must go further
0,528	Different race or ethnic group: contact good
-0,483	Allow only few or no immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
-0,459	Allow no Muslims to come and live in country
-0,447	Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
-0,446	Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries in Europe
-0,433	Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country
-0,389	Allow only few or no immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority
0,352	Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country
-0,347	Allow no Jewish people to come and live in country

reject racism

0,748	Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born less intelligent
0,698	Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born harder working
-0,479	Disagree: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish
-0,419	Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country
-0,412	Allow no Muslims to come and live in country
0,408	Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country
-0,332	Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
0,323	Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants
0,322	Cultures: all equal
-0,319	Allow only few or no immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority

no personal multicultural experience

0,723	Different race or ethnic group: no close friends
-0,710	Different race or ethnic group: frequent contact
-0,561	Different race or ethnic group: contact good
0,401	Allow no Muslims to come and live in country
-0,375	Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country
0,360	Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country
-0,323	Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants

right-wing culturalism

0,616	Placement on left right scale (right)
-0,591	Cultures: all equal
0,349	Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country

Judging from the correlations between the factors, “secularism” does not play a major role in determining trust, xenophobia, and European anti-racism mainly because European Churches and religious denominations, just like overall society, are deeply split on the issues under scrutiny here. Secularism, defined by a high factor loading with never participating in religious services, not being religious, and agreeing that gays and lesbians are free to live life as they wish, diminishes anti-immigration sentiment to the tune of a factor loading of only -0,112; it only slightly reduces racism (0,157) and is only slightly negatively related to the lack of personal multicultural experience (-0,104) (see Appendix Table 8).

But based on criteria that include pro-immigration attitudes, Euro-multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural experience, and the rejection of right-wing culturalism, it is fair to suggest that the following Catholic *dominantes* political cultures are the most-liberal and the most anti-

liberal to be encountered in Europe (see Table 3, here below). The Index of voter liberalism is an *Eigenvalue*-weighted combination of the five factor analytical dimensions:

- Pro-immigration
- Euro-multiculturalism
- reject racism
- personal multicultural experience
- no right-wing culturalism

Table 3: Voter Liberalism in Europe

Country	Voter Liberalism Index - total population	Voter Liberalism Index - Catholic <i>dominicales</i>	Voter Liberalism of Roman Catholic <i>dominicales</i> compared to the total population
Belgium	-1,6669	-2,3102	-0,6433
Austria	-1,7220	-2,7882	-1,0662
Poland	-1,3291	-2,4404	-1,1112
France	-0,5685	-1,8634	-1,2949
Germany	3,0722	1,6273	-1,4449
Ireland	-2,0655	-4,0909	-2,0254
Switzerland	0,0201	-2,5012	-2,5214
Slovenia	0,2321	-3,6861	-3,9182

In not a single European country, practicing Catholics were more liberal in their attitudes than overall society. Only in Germany, there was any relevant active Catholic support for liberal attitudes, as measured by our index, while opposition to them was especially strong in Ireland, Slovenia and Austria. In other words, active Catholic publics in Europe could be open to the “populist virus” just as their fellow Roman Catholics in the November 8, 2016 election in the United States of America.

Table 4: Liberal Catholicism in Europe

Country	Voter Liberalism Index - Catholic <i>dominicales</i>
Germany	1,6273
France	-1,8634
Belgium	-2,3102
Poland	-2,4404
Switzerland	-2,5012

Austria	-2,7882
Slovenia	-3,6861
Ireland	-4,0909

The factor scores for the Index components are:

Table 5: European general publics

Country	Pro-immigration	Euro-multiculturalism	reject racism	personal multicultural experience	no right-wing culturalism	Voter Liberalism Index
Austria	-1,236	-0,595	-0,166	-0,109	0,385	-1,722
Belgium	-1,534	-0,162	-0,085	0,051	0,064	-1,667
France	-0,892	0,014	-0,011	0,099	0,222	-0,568
Germany	2,753	0,101	0,002	0,057	0,159	3,072
Ireland	-1,700	-0,021	-0,177	-0,031	-0,137	-2,065
Poland	-1,023	0,461	-0,203	-0,765	0,201	-1,329
Slovenia	-0,219	0,046	-0,202	0,027	0,580	0,232
Switzerland	0,111	0,030	-0,344	0,123	0,100	0,020

Table 6: European Catholic *dominantes*

Country	Pro-immigration	Euro-multiculturalism	reject racism	personal multicultural experience	no right-wing culturalism	Voter Liberalism Index
Austria	-1,967	-0,616	-0,125	-0,424	0,343	-2,788
Belgium	-1,406	0,021	-0,312	-0,724	0,111	-2,310
France	-1,046	-0,232	-0,354	-0,139	-0,093	-1,863
Germany	2,065	0,104	-0,159	-0,328	-0,054	1,627
Ireland	-2,864	-0,181	-0,480	-0,338	-0,227	-4,091
Poland	-1,655	0,279	-0,288	-0,926	0,150	-2,440
Slovenia	-2,690	-0,122	-0,644	-0,388	0,158	-3,686
Switzerland	-1,373	-0,073	-0,561	-0,592	0,098	-2,501

Reasons of space do not permit us to debate here some more results about the factors of tolerance in different European countries, presented in this work's appendix tables (Appendix Graph 1 to Appendix Graph 8). The interested public will perhaps find the country to country results above and in the Appendix Tables as a useful tool to compare the commitment of the Catholic *dominantes*

and the general populations for an open and tolerant immigration policy in the European countries for which we have data available.

Result 3: The global evidence based on the *World Values Survey* indicate that only in a limited number of countries, Catholic dominicantes are at the forefront of a democratic, open society

Our somewhat pessimistic European analysis in many ways is reflected also in our global analysis. Appendix Tables 4 to 10 as well as the choropleth maps Appendix Map 7 to 41 highlight the results. Limited publication space dictates that we highlight here only the most salient results.

Our analysis of the *World Values Survey* data derived the following factor analytical scales, well compatible with a large social scientific literature:

1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley, 1999)
2. Democracy movement (Huntington, 1993)
3. Climate of personal non-violence (APA, 1993)
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995)
5. Happiness, good health (Post, 2005)
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington, 2000)
7. Accepting the market economy (Elzinga, 1999; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; Hayek, 2012; Novak, 1991)
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson, 2009)
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset, 1959)
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al., 1999)
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and Marsh, 1990)

We mention here briefly the salient factor loadings, explaining 10% or more of a variable:

The violent and lawless society

0,796 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
0,765 Justifiable: Stealing property
0,760 Justifiable: claiming government benefits
0,732 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
0,560 Justifiable: Violence against other people
0,451 Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife

Democracy movement

Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression. 0,753

Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,738
 Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,704
 Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 0,493
 Importance of democracy 0,493
 Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,448

Climate of personal violence

Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,846
 Justifiable: Parents beating children 0,795
 Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,786
 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,604
 Justifiable: Stealing property 0,587

Lack of trust in institutions

No confidence: The Government 0,776
 No confidence: The Police 0,717
 No confidence: The Press 0,715
 No confidence: The United Nations 0,637

Unhappiness, poor health

State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,771
 Feeling of unhappiness 0,716
 Age 0,440
 I don't see myself as a world citizen 0,405
 Insecurity in neighborhood 0,364

Redistributive religious fundamentalism

Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 0,687
 not important in life: Religion -0,596
 Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,460
 Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 0,389

Rejecting the market economy

Competition [good or] harmful 0,760
 Hard work does not bring success 0,733
 [Private vs] state ownership of business 0,353

Feminism

Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,717

University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 0,682
Gender (female) 0,555

Distance to politics

No interest in politics 0,849
not important in life: Politics 0,837

Nihilism

not important in life: Friends 0,690
not important in life: Leisure time 0,669
not important in life: Work 0,495
not important in life: Family 0,478

Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics


Supporting larger income differences -0,677
not important in life: Work 0,467
not important in life: Religion 0,400
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,395

Our Index construction was based on the following weighting of our factor scores:

- | | |
|--|-------------------------|
| 1. The non-violent and law-abiding society
lawless society -4,263] | [The violent and |
| 2. Democracy movement | 2,574 |
| 3. Climate of personal non-violence
violence -2,260] | [Climate of personal |
| 4. Trust in institutions
institutions -1,929] | [Lack of trust in |
| 5. Happiness, good health
health -1,864] | [Unhappiness, poor |
| 6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism
religious fundamentalism -1,554] | [Redistributive |
| 7. Accepting the market economy
economy -1,434] | [Rejecting the market |
| 8. Feminism | 1,245 |
| 9. Involvement in politics
1,197] | [Distance to politics - |
| 10. Optimism and engagement | [Nihilism -1,141] |
| 11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics
mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics -1,075] | [Welfare |

This yielded the Appendix Maps 7-41, based on the factor scores, documented in our statistical appendix, as well as the following summarizing maps with a brief synopsis of the main results (Map 2 to 4, here below):


Map 2: Overall Civil Society Index



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Sweden; Trinidad and Tobago; Australia; Japan; Netherlands
Worst: India; South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Russia


Map 3: Overall Catholic Civil Society Index



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Australia; Germany; United States
Worst: South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Belarus; Peru

Map 4: Catholicism – Light-house of the world or democratic deficits? (Data from Map 2 and 3 compared)



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Ukraine; Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Chile; Lebanon
Worst: South Africa; Spain; Peru; Belarus; Slovenia

In our text Table 7, we also now mention the vital difference ratios between the active Catholic Communities and overall society. So, what is the main result of our comparative research endeavor, based on the World Values Survey data? Only the active Catholic publics in the Ukraine; Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Chile; Lebanon; Germany; Colombia; Brazil; Mexico; Ecuador; Rwanda; United States; Poland; and the Philippines were more committed to the goals of an overall democratic civil society than the respective overall country population, while in several countries, most dramatically in South Africa, Spain and Peru, active Catholic publics had to be considered as less supportive of a democratic civil society than the general publics of their countries:

Table 7: The successful and less successful Catholic Civil Societies on a global scale

Country/region	Overall Civil Society Index - <i>Dominicantes</i>	Overall Civil Society Index	Catholicism - Light House of Civil Society?
Ukraine	-1,005	-3,06	2,055
Ghana	6,808	4,76	2,048
Trinidad and Tobago	7,783	5,751	2,032
Chile	2,596	1,312	1,284
Lebanon	-4,381	-5,183	0,801
Germany	5,004	4,274	0,730
Colombia	1,327	0,631	0,696
Brazil	2,419	1,752	0,667
Mexico	-0,728	-0,947	0,220
Ecuador	1,061	0,945	0,116
Rwanda	0,511	0,402	0,109
United States	3,294	3,197	0,097
Poland	2,89	2,802	0,088
Philippines	-5,763	-5,774	0,011
Singapore	-1,621	-1,482	-0,139
Australia	5,325	5,487	-0,162
Argentina	0,006	0,342	-0,336
Nigeria	-0,334	0,042	-0,375
Zimbabwe	1,402	1,789	-0,387
South Korea	1,421	1,906	-0,485
Slovenia	0,067	0,73	-0,663
Belarus	-3,46	-2,711	-0,749
Peru	-1,829	-0,931	-0,898

Spain	2,159	3,197	-1,039
South Africa	-10,733	-9,691	-1,042

Box 1 and Box 2 highlight the results in the form of a checklist for international political and denominational decision makers:

Box 1: Value Development

Surplus/Deficit of practicing Catholics vis-à-vis total society: a well-meant advice for the Roman Catholic bishops: where Catholicism indeed was the salt of the earth

The non-violent and law-abiding society:
Germany; Chile; Spain

Democracy movement: Ukraine; Lebanon; Nigeria

Climate of personal non-violence: Trinidad and Tobago; Lebanon; Ukraine

Trust in institutions: Chile; Germany; Belarus

Happiness and good health: Ghana; United States; Ukraine

No redistributive religious fundamentalism: Ghana; Rwanda; Zimbabwe

Accepting the market economy: Australia; Ukraine; Spain

Feminism: Belarus; Trinidad and Tobago; Nigeria

Involvement in politics: Belarus; Ukraine; Germany

Optimism and engagement: Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; South Korea

No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics: Australia; United States; Ukraine

Box 2: A checklist of weaknesses of Open Society values of Roman Catholic dominicantes vis-à-vis the rest of society

Argentina: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Optimism and engagement; Democracy movement; Happiness, good health; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; Accepting the market economy

Australia: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Democracy movement; Optimism and engagement; Trust in institutions; Happiness, good health; Climate of personal non-violence

Belarus: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; Democracy movement; Climate of personal non-violence; Optimism and engagement

Brazil: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Democracy movement; Happiness, good health; Optimism and engagement

Chile: Happiness, good health; No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Optimism and engagement; Climate of personal non-violence

Colombia: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Democracy movement; Happiness, good health

Ecuador: Happiness, good health; Democracy movement; No redistributive religious fundamentalism; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; Optimism and engagement; Accepting the market economy

Germany: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; Optimism and engagement; Democracy movement; Feminism

Ghana: no deficits

Lebanon: Involvement in politics; No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; The non-violent and law-abiding society

Mexico: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; Climate of personal non-violence; Optimism and engagement; Democracy movement

Nigeria: Climate of personal non-violence; The non-violent and law-abiding society; Involvement in politics; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; Optimism and engagement; No redistributive religious fundamentalism

Peru: Climate of personal non-violence; No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Democracy movement; The non-violent and law-abiding society; Accepting the market economy; Happiness, good health

Philippines: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Climate of personal non-violence; Accepting the market economy; Democracy movement; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; Involvement in politics

Poland: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; Democracy movement; Accepting the market economy

Rwanda: Democracy movement; The non-violent and law-abiding society; Climate of personal non-violence

Singapore: Democracy movement; Feminism; No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; Trust in institutions

Slovenia: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health;

Trust in institutions; Democracy movement

South Africa: The non-violent and law-abiding society; Climate of personal non-violence; No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Accepting the market economy; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; Optimism and engagement; Democracy movement; Happiness, good health

South Korea: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Democracy movement; Climate of personal non-violence; The non-violent and law-abiding society; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics

Spain: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; Democracy movement; Optimism and

engagement; Climate of personal non-violence

Trinidad and Tobago: No redistributive religious fundamentalism; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; Accepting the market economy

Ukraine: Optimism and engagement; Trust in institutions; No redistributive religious fundamentalism

United States: The non-violent and law-abiding society; Democracy movement; Climate of personal non-violence

Zimbabwe: Climate of personal non-violence; No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; Optimism and engagement; Democracy movement; Accepting the market economy; The non-violent and law-abiding society; Feminism

Result 4: What the world can learn from the Vatican Council (1958 – 1963): the legacy of Post Vatican II tolerance by global comparison

Our overall assessment, however, produces not only pessimistic results. One of our hypotheses is that the Roman Catholic Second Vatican Council and its commitment to inter-religious tolerance (see Bea, 1966; Connelly, 2012; D’Costa, 2014; Heschel, 1966; Kimelman, 2004; Valkenberg and Cirelli, 2016) in many ways paved the way for the high degree of societal tolerance in predominantly Catholic Western countries over many decades, irrespective of the fact whether Catholics in those countries live a secular or a more religious life. Let us recall here the declaration “*Nostra aetate*” of the Second Vatican Council, which has become the main pillar of the evolving Catholic global interreligious dialogue, honored, among others by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.²⁶

“*Nostra aetate*” indeed explicitly praises²⁷ the spiritual values of Hinduism and Buddhism, and adds:

Likewise, other religions found everywhere try to counter the restlessness of the human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing "ways," comprising teachings, rules of life, and sacred rites. The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. She regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men. The Church, therefore, exhorts her sons, that through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions”

With particular emphasis, *Nostra Aetate* also mentions Muslims and Islam, and stresses what it calls the *the bond that spiritually ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham's stock: Since the spiritual patrimony common to Christians and Jews is thus so great, this sacred synod wants to foster and recommend that mutual understanding and respect which is the fruit, above all, of biblical and theological studies as well as of fraternal dialogues. Furthermore, in her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel's spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone.*

²⁶ <http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/ecumenical-and-interreligious/index.cfm>

²⁷ http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html

[...] No foundation therefore remains for any theory or practice that leads to discrimination between man and man or people and people, so far as their human dignity and the rights flowing from it are concerned.

The Church reprove, as foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination against men or harassment of them because of their race, color, condition of life, or religion. On the contrary, following in the footsteps of the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, this sacred synod ardently implores the Christian faithful to "maintain good fellowship among the nations" (1 Peter 2:12), and, if possible, to live for their part in peace with all men, so that they may truly be sons of the Father who is in heaven.


The empirical analysis of global tolerance, based on *promax* factor analysis, using the three most salient xenophobia items from the WVS data base, comes to the following results (Table 8 and Map 5, further results see our data appendix). Our model explains 63,502 % of total variance and is based on 191620 representative global citizens, reaffirming the prevalence of tolerance in many predominantly Catholic countries:

Table 8: Global tolerance, xenophobia and racism

	Xenophobia and racism
Neighbors: People of a different race	0,817
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	0,778
Neighbors: People of a different religion	0,795

The factor scores are to be found in Appendix Table 5, which yield the following Map:

Map 5: Factor scores for xenophobia and racism (national averages)



Best: Argentina; Andorra; Sweden; Canada; New Zealand

Worst: Libya; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; India

Today, predominantly Catholic countries are among the best placed countries in the world in avoiding rejecting people of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers and people of a different religion as neighbors. Here, Pope Francis' home country Argentina is even the best practice of the entire globe in this context. According to the global denominations, we are presented with the following results:

Table 9: Xenophobia and racism in the world system according to religious denomination

Religious denomination	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Shia	0,600	2670	1,131
Hindu	0,534	5422	1,187
Armenian Apostolic Church	0,448	1033	1,077
Muslim	0,296	43623	1,130
Buddhist	0,257	6635	1,078
Orthodox	-0,019	24266	0,979
Protestant	-0,197	14338	0,844
No religious denomination	-0,223	33658	0,830
Roman Catholic	-0,257	34462	0,823

In the next round of answers to our research question, we also constructed a kind of “UNDP Index” of the civic culture of global society by international comparison with the existing data,²⁸ selecting the WVS items on the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence. Our index weights the variables equally. According to the UNDP Index methodology, for each country the worst value of a given variable is subtracted from the observed country value of a given variable. This resulting number is then divided by the difference between the best and the worst value among the entire group of countries of the variable in question, yielding component indices ranging from 0 (worst performance) to 1 (best performance). The resulting overall index – in our case the Index of a Democratic Civil Society – is nothing but the average of the six chosen components:²⁹

- Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
- accepting neighbors: People of a different religion
- men do not make better political leaders than women do
- University is equally important for a boy and for a girl
- democracy: religious authorities should not interpret the laws.
- unjustifiable: For a man to beat his wife

²⁸ WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_MULTIVAR_spss_v2015_04_20.sav

²⁹ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>


In constructing the index, we took particular care to select variables with a maximum country coverage in the vast *World Values Survey* data base in order to achieve not only a substantial depth of the index, but also a very wide geographical coverage across nations and cultures. The original WVS items were used in the following fashion in the construction of the UNDP type of indicator. The detailed research results are to be seen in our statistical appendix, and it suffices here to recall the Index methodology in Table 10 and our overall results in Map 6:

Table 10: Towards a UNDP type of Index of the global democratic civil society

Country/region	maximum	minimum	worst value	best value
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0,900	0,360	0,360	0,900
neighbors: People of a different religion	0,570	0,010	0,570	0,010
men make better political leaders than women do	3,430	1,500	1,500	3,430
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	3,700	2,300	2,300	3,700
Democracy: religious authorities should interpret the laws.	7,830	1,800	7,830	1,800
justifiable: For a man to beat his wife	4,820	1,160	4,820	1,160

The country results for this procedure are the following: Sweden, Norway and Andorra are the countries best combining the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence, while the three worst placed nations on earth are Mali, Bahrein and Yemen. All Muslim countries in our 77 countries and territories with full data which were under investigation here were below the global average; and the best placed Muslim country is post-Soviet Kazakhstan; and the best placed Arab country is Qatar. While some Arab countries might perform, here and there, in a rather surprising and positive fashion, it is especially the combination of the six dimensions, where the Arab world really fails:

Map 6: UNDP-type Index of a democratic civil society



Best: Sweden, Norway, Andorra, Netherlands, Switzerland

Worst: Mali, Bahrain, Yemen, India, Algeria

Considering the evidence which emerges from the data, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi ³⁰ was right to say at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2015, that

[...] Muslims need to adapt their religious discourse to the present and eliminate elements of their rhetoric that could foster violence. “Islam is a tolerant religion, but this wasn’t always clear to the rest of the world during the last 20 or 30 years,” Sisi said during a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “The terrible terrorist attacks and this terrible image of Muslims led us to think that we must stop and think and change the religious discourse and remove from it things that have led to violence and extremism.”

“There can be no religious discourse which is in conflict with its environment and with the world,” Sisi continued. “And therefore, we Muslims need to modify this religious discourse. And this has nothing to do with conviction and with religious beliefs, because those are immutable. But we need a new discourse that will be adapted to a new world and which will remove some of the misconceptions.”

[...] Speaking to a group of Muslim clerics at al-Azhar University in Cairo earlier this month, Sisi struck a similar tone, saying Islam needed a “religious revolution” and calling on clerics to take the lead. “We are in need of a religious revolution. You imams are responsible before Allah,” he said. “The entire world is waiting for your word ... because the Islamic world is being torn, it is being destroyed, it is being lost ... by our own hands.”

In response to these comments, rare for a Muslim head of state, some have speculated that Sisi may be aiming to reform Islam as a sort of “Muslim Martin Luther.” ³¹

Precisely the Second Vatican Council provided the Roman Catholic Church with the theoretical tools to leave behind the centuries of anti-Semitism and intolerance which are too well-known in history (Jikeli and Allouche-Benayoun, 2012; Kertzer, 2007; Michael, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2013; von Bieberstein, 1977; Wistrich, 2010; see also Bauer, 1993; Wistrich, 2004, 2007, 2010).

Reasons of space do not permit us to debate here some more results about the trajectories of tolerance of different world religious cultures and their presumed correlates, presented in this work’s appendix tables.

³⁰ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/sisi-calls-religious-reforms-extremists-160629181523576.html> and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/sisi-muslims-adapt_n_6508808.html

³¹ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/sisi-muslims-adapt_n_6508808.html

Appendix Table 10 compares the population-unweighted tolerance indicators (factor scores) for the different global numerically major denominations according to levels of religious service attendance rates. Appendix Tables 11 to 14 highlight the correlations between the indicators, presented in this work, with overall social and political country indicators and highlight the close correlations between them in the direction of confirming the relationship between value development and an open society. The graph series in Appendix Graph 9 underlines the trajectories of “modernization”, and human security, measured by the GDP per capita (natural logarithm) and the factor scores achieved in our research endeavor. We show that most often, value development is a curve-linear function of development. In each graph, it is clearly visible whether at different stages of socio-economic development, practicing Roman Catholics achieve higher or lower country factor scores in their value development curves than general populations and Muslim populations.

Conclusions and policy perspectives

We have reached the end of our empirical journey to the worlds of Roman Catholicism around the globe. Our main population-weighted global research results rather caution us against the view that the Catholic global rank and file will follow the Church’s substantially weakened leadership in endorsing a liberal asylum and migration policy. 13.40% of Roman Catholic *dominicanos* reject neighbors of a different religion; 19,60% are openly anti-Semitic as defined by the admittedly limited and restrictive *World Values Survey* item about rejecting to have a Jewish neighbor (six decades after the Second Vatican Council), and 48.05% are for a tough migration policy. *Dominicanos* constitute only 45% of the population-weighted total of Roman Catholics on earth. The top 10 Catholic superpowers are the Catholic communities of Mexico; Brazil; Philippines; United States; Italy; Poland; Colombia; Nigeria; India; and Peru (in descending order of size) which in between them share more than 70% of global *dominicanos*. We emphasize in this essay that the American sociologist Ronald Inglehart is right in underlining the close connection between the religious factor and the level of a country’s socio-economic development.

Based on *European Social Survey*-based criteria that include pro-immigration attitudes, Euro-multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural experience, and the rejection of right-wing culturalism, it is fair to suggest that in not a single European country, practicing Catholics were more liberal in their attitudes towards immigration than overall society.

The global country-based evidence based on the *World Values Survey* also indicates that only in a limited number of countries, Catholic *dominicanos* are at the forefront of a democratic, open society, based on eleven factor analytical


criteria, well compatible with the theoretical literature. The best performing Roman Catholic *dominicanos* communities were to be found in Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Australia; Germany; and the United States, while the worst performances were recorded in South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Belarus; and Peru. We also document the vital difference ratios between the active Catholic and overall society. Only the active Catholic publics in the Ukraine; Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Chile; Lebanon; Germany; Colombia; Brazil; Mexico; Ecuador; Rwanda; United States; Poland; and the Philippines were more committed to the goals of an overall democratic civil society than the general populations of these countries, while in several countries, most dramatically in South Africa, Spain and Peru, active Catholic publics had to be considered as less supportive of a democratic civil society than the general publics of their countries.

Our overall assessment, underlined the importance of the Roman Catholic Second Vatican Council and its commitment to inter-religious tolerance reaffirming the prevalence of tolerance in many predominantly Catholic countries, such as Argentina; Andorra; Sweden; Canada; and New Zealand. Considering the poor performance of predominantly Muslim countries combining the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence, we concluded that Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was right to say that Muslims need to adapt their religious discourse to the present and eliminate elements of their rhetoric that could foster violence. Precisely the Second Vatican Council provided the Roman Catholic Church with the theoretical tools to leave behind the centuries of anti-Semitism and intolerance which are too well-known in history.

In Graph 4 below, we now summarize the trajectories of global value development, as they emerge from our data: at lower levels of socio-economic development, active Roman Catholicism indeed is a countervailing force of humanizing societies, but it fails to influence developments at higher “stages of development”:

Graph 4: value development in global society, as predicted by our data and GDP per capita³²

³² For the GDP per capita data, see Tausch & Heshmati, 2013.



In Table 13, below, we also show the different indicators for the major denominational groups in the United States of America. By far, Judaism is at the forefront of the positive value developments, our work and its indicators attempt to capture. Unfortunately, Roman Catholicism in the United States still lags behind Judaism and Protestantism concerning its value development of its rank and file, but still, the overall value development indicator is higher than that of the average of United States society.

Table 13: Values in the United States of America by denomination

	Jewish	Protestant	Roman Catholic	Total	Other	No religious denomination
The non-violent and law-abiding society	1,032	2,393	0,487	0,880	0,995	-0,058
Democracy movement	1,056	0,019	-0,162	-0,089	-0,713	0,091
Climate of personal non-violence	0,430	0,378	0,441	0,310	0,491	0,100
Trust in institutions	-0,152	-0,593	-0,182	-0,492	-0,682	-0,580
Happiness, good health	0,605	0,069	0,168	0,117	0,065	0,102
No redistributive religious fundamentalism	1,933	1,325	1,103	1,304	0,546	1,771
Accepting the market economy	0,450	0,902	0,480	0,421	0,515	-0,005
Feminism	0,978	0,589	0,763	0,669	0,680	0,633
Involvement in politics	0,895	0,674	0,392	0,346	0,273	0,095
Optimism and engagement	0,083	0,081	0,051	0,005	0,123	-0,158
No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics	-0,038	-0,094	-0,059	-0,178	-0,062	-0,384
Overall Value Development Index	7,273	5,741	3,481	3,294	2,231	1,608

At the end of this essay, we would like to emphasize as well that progressive Catholicism – both in the Vatican and in the general secretariat of the United Nations - would be well advised to come to terms with the real challenge which Islamist terrorism poses for humanity. Let us document this with a lengthier quotation from Pope Francis I and what we feel is his very deficient explanation of terrorism which in no way considers the ideological trajectory of Islamism from the days of Sayid Qutb (Qutb and David, 2006; Qutb, 1990, 2000; Qutb et al., 1979):

Pope Francis surprised reporters on a flight from Krakow to the Vatican late Sunday when he blamed the “god of money” for extremist violence in Europe and the Middle East, saying that a ruthless global economy leads disenfranchised people to violence.

“Terrorism grows when there is no other option, and as long as the world economy has at its center the god of money and not the person,” the pope told reporters, according to the Wall Street Journal. “This is fundamental terrorism, against all humanity.”

The pope was responding to a journalist’s question about whether there is a link between Islam and terrorism, particularly focusing on the fatal attack on a priest by Muslim extremists in France last week.

“I ask myself how many young people that we Europeans have left devoid of ideals, who do not have work. Then they turn to drugs and alcohol or enlist in [the Islamic State, or ISIS],” he said, Reuters reports.

The pope said that no religion has a monopoly on violence, the Wall Street Journal notes:

His own experience in interreligious dialogue had shown him that Muslims seek “peace and encounter,” he said. “It is not right and it is not just to say that Islam is terroristic.” And he said no religion had a monopoly on violent members.

“If I speak of Islamic violence, I should speak of Catholic violence. Not all Muslims are violent, not all Catholics are violent,” Pope Francis said, dismissing Islamic State as a “small fundamentalist group” not representative of Islam as a whole.

“In almost all religions there is always a small group of fundamentalists,” even in the Catholic Church, the pope said, though not necessarily physically violent. “One can kill with the tongue as well as the knife.”

The remarks followed similar comments made last Wednesday, when Pope Francis argued that the current Middle East conflicts are wars over economic and political interests—not religion or so-called “Islamic terrorism.”

“There is war for money,” he said on Wednesday, according to the Wall Street Journal. “There is war for natural resources. There is war for the domination of peoples. Some might think I am speaking of religious war. No. All religions want peace; it is other people who want war.”³³

Naiveté will not be sufficient to confront the situation of the two trains of extremism in the West now about to collide, about which Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt was speaking recently to the European Parliament. Islamist anti-Semitism and extremism is a new form and a continuation of the hatred and radicalism which culminated in the *Shoah*, and Roman Catholics should be aware of it and should defend democracy against the new radicalisms, threatening the West.

³³ <https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/pope-francis-capitalism-is-terrorism-against-all-of-humanity>

Appendix Table 1: The Evidence emerging from the *European Social Survey*. Eigenvalues and percentages of explained variance

Component	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
Anti-immigration	6,495	28,241	28,241
secularism	2,373	10,320	38,560
Euro-multiculturalism	1,336	5,808	44,368
reject racism	1,264	5,497	49,865
no personal multicultural experience	1,192	5,181	55,047
right-wing culturalism	1,004	4,364	59,411

Appendix Table 2: Factor analytical model of European right wing extremism – the factor loadings


	Anti-immigration	secularism	Euro-multiculturalism	reject racism	no personal multicultural experience	right-wing culturalism
Placement on left right scale (right)	0,255	-0,154	-0,076	-0,086	0,198	0,616
Disagree: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	0,307	-0,387	-0,192	-0,479	0,294	-0,269
European Union: European unification must go further	-0,292	0,047	0,617	0,150	-0,072	0,036
Allow only few or no immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	0,803	-0,061	-0,389	-0,185	0,206	0,012
Allow only few or no immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	0,879	-0,090	-0,483	-0,319	0,312	0,056
Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries in Europe	0,862	-0,058	-0,446	-0,285	0,263	0,060
Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0,858	-0,067	-0,447	-0,332	0,299	0,078
Immigration good for country's economy	-0,587	-0,003	0,695	0,240	-0,234	0,033
Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants	-0,562	0,045	0,725	0,323	-0,323	0,018

How religious are you	0,063	-0,854	0,048	-0,077	0,042	0,020
How often attend religious services apart from special occasions (never)	-0,062	0,837	-0,019	0,119	-0,093	0,011
How often pray apart at religious services (never)	-0,060	0,864	-0,006	0,087	-0,029	0,000
Immigrants make country's crime problems better	-0,283	-0,053	0,634	0,105	-0,087	-0,232
Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country	-0,218	0,056	0,352	<i>0,408</i>	-0,375	0,349
Different race or ethnic group: no close friends	0,211	0,026	-0,189	-0,065	0,723	0,123
Different race or ethnic group: frequent contact	-0,216	0,138	0,018	0,163	-0,710	0,081
Different race or ethnic group: contact good	-0,223	-0,038	0,528	0,193	-0,561	0,031
Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born less intelligent	-0,238	0,028	0,179	0,748	-0,124	-0,025
Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born harder working	-0,207	0,102	0,126	0,698	-0,083	-0,151
Cultures: all equal	-0,110	-0,038	0,300	0,322	-0,048	-0,591
Allow no Jewish people to come and live in country	0,767	-0,059	-0,347	-0,287	0,274	-0,044
Allow no Muslims to come and live in country	0,829	-0,119	<i>-0,459</i>	<i>-0,412</i>	<i>0,401</i>	0,074
Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country	0,779	-0,105	<i>-0,433</i>	<i>-0,419</i>	0,360	0,138


Appendix Table 3: Factor analytical model of European right wing extremism – the correlation between the factors

Component	Anti-immigration	secularism	Euro-multiculturalism	reject racism	no personal multicultural experience	right-wing culturalism
Anti-immigration	1,000	-0,112	-0,504	-0,371	0,357	0,041
secularism	-0,112	1,000	-0,022	0,157	-0,104	0,053
Euro-multiculturalism	-0,504	-0,022	1,000	0,342	-0,314	-0,013
reject racism	-0,371	0,157	0,342	1,000	-0,296	0,042
no personal multicultural experience	0,357	-0,104	-0,314	-0,296	1,000	-0,088
right-wing culturalism	0,041	0,053	-0,013	0,042	-0,088	1,000


Appendix Graph 1: voter liberalism and its components in Austria




Appendix Graph 2: voter liberalism and its components in Belgium




Appendix Graph 3: voter liberalism and its components in France




Appendix Graph 4: voter liberalism and its components in Germany




Appendix Graph 5: voter liberalism and its components in Ireland




Appendix Graph 6: voter liberalism and its components in Poland



Appendix Graph 7: voter liberalism and its components in Slovenia



Appendix Graph 8: voter liberalism and its components in Switzerland



Appendix Table 4: The global frame of reference based on the *World Values Survey*: Eigenvalues and percentages of explained variance

	Factor	Eigenvalue	% of Variance explained	Cumulative %
The violent and lawless society	1,000	4,263	10,931	10,931
Democracy movement	2,000	2,574	6,601	17,532
Climate of personal violence	3,000	2,260	5,794	23,326
Lack of trust in institutions	4,000	1,929	4,947	28,273
Unhappiness, poor health	5,000	1,864	4,779	33,052
Redistributive religious fundamentalism	6,000	1,554	3,986	37,037
Rejecting the market economy	7,000	1,434	3,676	40,714
Feminism	8,000	1,245	3,193	43,907
Distance to politics	9,000	1,197	3,070	46,977
Nihilism	10,000	1,141	2,926	49,904
Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics	11,000	1,075	2,756	52,660
[The tolerance and security of the elderly	12,000	1,049	2,690	55,350]

Appendix Table 5: The global model – factor loadings

	The violent and lawless society	Democracy movement	Climate of personal violence	Lack of trust in institutions	Unhappiness, poor health	Redistributive religious fundamentalism	Rejecting the market economy
not important in life: Family	0,096	-0,031	0,057	-0,002	0,000	-0,287	0,245
not important in life: Friends	0,105	-0,056	-0,029	0,085	0,128	-0,023	0,034
not important in life: Leisure time	-0,021	-0,079	0,091	0,024	0,154	0,088	0,025
not important in life: Politics	-0,015	0,009	-0,049	0,148	0,035	-0,088	0,067
not important in life: Work	-0,023	-0,038	0,065	-0,001	0,165	-0,191	0,314
not important in life: Religion	0,051	0,199	-0,094	0,007	0,034	-0,596	0,265
Feeling of unhappiness	-0,029	0,045	0,038	0,153	0,716	0,000	0,043
State of health (bad) (subjective)	0,049	0,000	-0,086	0,043	0,771	0,033	0,093
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0,014	0,075	-0,113	0,013	0,057	-0,009	-0,120
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language	0,153	-0,179	-0,009	0,015	0,026	0,175	0,011
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do	0,043	0,105	-0,156	0,047	-0,054	-0,302	0,046
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl	-0,129	0,195	-0,147	0,077	0,014	-0,219	-0,114
No interest in politics	0,018	-0,042	-0,051	0,108	0,043	0,019	0,027
Supporting larger income differences	0,003	-0,084	0,066	-0,026	-0,119	0,010	-0,023
[Private vs] state ownership of business	0,070	0,073	-0,056	-0,047	0,181	0,281	0,353
Competition [good or] harmful	0,200	-0,134	0,095	-0,047	-0,006	0,060	0,760
Hard work does not bring success	0,133	-0,068	0,072	0,027	0,026	-0,066	0,733
No confidence: The Press	-0,046	0,047	-0,038	0,715	0,082	-0,100	-0,035
No confidence: The Police	0,081	0,000	-0,035	0,717	0,093	-0,009	0,019
No confidence: The Government	0,030	0,030	-0,060	0,776	0,101	-0,095	-0,031
No confidence: The United Nations	-0,089	-0,061	0,095	0,637	0,140	0,090	0,007
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	0,028	0,493	-0,094	-0,018	0,085	0,389	0,178
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.	0,146	-0,002	0,139	-0,037	-0,030	0,687	0,093

Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.	-0,189	0,738	-0,139	0,040	0,053	-0,020	-0,155
Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.	-0,128	0,753	-0,106	0,020	0,035	0,026	-0,045
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.	-0,075	0,704	-0,211	-0,036	-0,029	-0,055	-0,044
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal	0,088	0,448	-0,036	-0,061	0,068	0,460	0,197
Importance of democracy	-0,153	0,493	-0,186	-0,060	-0,010	-0,091	-0,208
Justifiable: claiming government benefits	0,760	-0,101	0,229	-0,019	-0,014	0,083	0,143
Justifiable: Stealing property	0,765	-0,209	0,587	-0,036	-0,055	0,096	0,228
Justifiable: Parents beating children	0,212	-0,112	0,795	-0,011	-0,051	0,111	-0,003
Justifiable: Violence against other people	0,560	-0,181	0,786	-0,006	-0,048	0,023	0,179
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	0,796	-0,097	0,300	0,022	-0,024	0,039	0,166
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	0,732	-0,195	0,604	-0,027	-0,056	0,068	0,211
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife	0,451	-0,172	0,846	-0,019	-0,023	0,111	0,134
I don't see myself as a world citizen	-0,106	0,016	0,104	0,178	0,405	-0,150	0,059
Insecurity in neighborhood	0,150	-0,047	-0,047	0,161	0,364	0,080	-0,052
Gender (female)	-0,040	-0,097	-0,017	-0,062	0,095	0,303	0,061
Age	-0,113	0,062	-0,146	-0,071	0,440	-0,069	0,080

Appendix Table 5 (continued)

	Feminism	Distance to politics	Nihilism	Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics
not important in life: Family	-0,147	-0,028	0,478	0,212
not important in life: Friends	0,047	0,129	0,690	-0,025
not important in life: Leisure time	-0,091	0,080	0,669	0,068
not important in life: Politics	0,065	0,837	0,236	0,125
not important in life: Work	0,005	0,092	0,495	<i>0,467</i>
not important in life: Religion	0,072	0,155	0,216	<i>0,400</i>
Feeling of unhappiness	-0,082	0,044	0,139	0,084
State of health (bad) (subjective)	0,074	0,005	0,201	0,135
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0,146	0,052	-0,080	-0,127
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language	-0,250	-0,024	0,136	0,070
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do	0,717	0,039	0,023	0,079
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl	0,682	0,055	-0,085	-0,071
No interest in politics	0,103	0,849	0,019	0,021
Supporting larger income differences	-0,045	-0,029	-0,001	-0,677
[Private vs] state ownership of business	-0,006	0,014	0,024	-0,309
Competition [good or] harmful	-0,002	0,011	0,118	0,102
Hard work does not bring success	-0,037	0,034	0,053	0,084
No confidence: The Press	0,069	0,133	0,038	-0,012
No confidence: The Police	0,062	0,105	0,042	-0,020
No confidence: The Government	0,074	0,129	0,014	0,018
No confidence: The United Nations	-0,127	0,072	0,033	0,041
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	-0,125	0,057	0,027	0,235
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.	-0,215	-0,001	0,039	0,034
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.	0,071	-0,004	-0,102	-0,040

Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.	0,024	-0,006	-0,073	0,080
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.	0,255	0,014	-0,060	0,093
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal	-0,138	0,089	0,006	0,395
Importance of democracy	0,143	-0,145	-0,142	-0,269
Justifiable: claiming government benefits	-0,069	0,023	0,061	0,034
Justifiable: Stealing property	-0,100	-0,062	0,102	0,082
Justifiable: Parents beating children	-0,108	-0,020	0,002	-0,057
Justifiable: Violence against other people	-0,118	-0,068	0,087	0,066
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	-0,031	0,023	0,057	0,069
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	-0,104	-0,044	0,102	0,078
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife	-0,189	-0,079	0,064	0,057
I don't see myself as a world citizen	-0,123	0,174	0,041	0,128
Insecurity in neighborhood	0,120	0,034	0,074	-0,045
Gender (female)	0,555	0,160	0,051	0,078
Age	0,087	-0,208	0,218	0,193

Appendix Table 6: Correlation matrix of components at the global level. Correlations greater than or equal to ± 0.100

Component	The violent and lawless society	democracy movement	climate of personal violence	lack of trust in institutions	unhappiness, poor health	redistributive religious fundamentalism	rejecting the market economy	feminism	distance to politics	nihilism
democracy movement	-0,139									
climate of personal violence	0,405	-0,225								
lack of trust in institutions										
unhappiness, poor health				0,138						
redistributive religious fundamentalism										
rejecting the market economy	0,236		0,125							
feminism			-0,201			-0,120				
distance to politics				0,161						
nihilism	0,105				0,198	-0,100	0,261		0,101	
welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics		0,120			0,103		0,324	-0,101	0,108	0,295

Appendix Table 7: The overall development of civil society on a global scale – factor scores

	Overall Civil Society Index	The non- violent and law-abiding society	Democracy movement	Climate of personal non-violence	Trust in institutions	Happiness, good health	No redistributive religious fundamentalism	Accepting the market economy
Sweden	7,047	0,163	1,741	0,704	0,457	0,429	2,001	-0,080
Trinidad and Tobago	5,751	1,802	-0,199	0,166	-0,559	0,524	0,568	1,169
Australia	5,487	1,104	0,908	0,872	-0,121	0,304	1,810	0,158
Japan	5,466	1,479	0,383	1,245	0,403	-0,443	1,689	-0,032
Netherlands	5,216	1,878	1,219	0,839	-0,075	-0,109	1,860	-0,726
Ghana	4,760	1,918	-0,586	-0,476	0,724	1,094	-0,271	1,041
Germany	4,274	1,583	1,551	0,504	0,286	-0,108	1,480	-0,535
Uzbekistan	4,250	0,561	1,106	-0,059	3,009	0,681	-0,698	0,388
Qatar	3,749	1,775	-1,095	-0,149	1,738	1,267	-1,121	0,032
Cyprus	3,500	1,295	0,493	0,929	-0,419	0,080	0,528	0,014
Uruguay	3,496	0,632	0,712	1,024	0,140	0,017	1,016	-0,578
Spain	3,197	0,606	1,545	1,217	-0,415	0,049	0,917	-0,357
United States	3,197	0,837	-0,105	0,292	-0,490	0,110	1,300	0,418
Romania	2,920	1,685	1,026	1,081	-0,757	-0,714	0,263	0,464
Poland	2,802	0,574	1,012	1,086	-0,622	-0,084	0,485	-0,458
Taiwan	2,745	0,446	1,552	-0,269	-0,151	0,295	0,759	0,229
Georgia	2,562	2,544	-0,350	0,876	-0,768	-1,114	0,153	0,337
Thailand	2,523	0,490	0,310	0,989	0,298	0,388	-0,519	-0,240
Turkey	2,121	1,819	0,692	1,001	0,367	-0,004	-0,920	-0,280
South Korea	1,906	-0,190	0,175	1,222	0,377	-0,328	0,484	-0,074
Armenia	1,852	1,377	0,607	0,984	-0,657	-0,579	-0,246	0,288
Zimbabwe	1,789	0,554	-0,284	-1,172	0,094	0,393	0,021	0,782

Brazil	1,752	0,314	0,110	0,389	-0,734	0,119	0,356	0,382
Tunisia	1,656	2,181	0,369	-0,134	-1,449	0,033	-0,538	0,893
China	1,514	-0,177	1,264	-0,442	1,632	0,047	1,001	-0,452
Chile	1,312	-0,335	1,179	1,587	0,006	-0,556	0,168	-0,332
Estonia	1,157	-0,197	1,538	1,077	0,398	-0,952	0,707	-0,498
Malaysia	1,029	-0,709	0,043	0,082	1,027	0,793	-1,104	0,352
Ecuador	0,945	-0,890	-0,625	1,127	-0,153	0,597	-0,466	0,410
Slovenia	0,730	0,545	1,027	0,745	-1,054	-0,206	1,237	-0,405
Colombia	0,631	-0,538	-0,506	0,740	-0,345	0,587	0,092	0,091
Rwanda	0,402	2,179	-0,507	-2,507	0,456	1,056	-0,172	0,109
Argentina	0,342	-0,406	0,576	0,945	-0,793	-0,174	0,564	-0,350
Morocco	0,249	1,168	1,003	0,032	-0,332	0,423	-1,076	0,071
Jordan	0,199	2,463	-0,761	0,156	-0,202	-0,132	-1,047	0,233
Libya	0,079	1,138	-0,607	-0,363	-1,206	0,518	-0,896	0,862
Nigeria	0,042	0,616	-1,068	-0,853	-0,177	1,123	-0,707	0,325
Total	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
Yemen	-0,205	2,300	0,585	-1,019	-1,615	-0,148	-1,357	1,130
Azerbaijan	-0,301	2,801	-0,338	0,331	0,231	-0,627	0,007	-0,814
Kazakhstan	-0,367	-0,669	0,948	0,254	0,697	-0,458	-0,025	-0,704
Kuwait	-0,840	-0,423	-0,956	-0,264	0,223	0,861	-0,730	0,199
Peru	-0,931	-1,640	-0,185	0,980	-0,990	-0,359	0,198	0,416
Mexico	-0,947	-3,110	-0,442	1,012	-0,796	0,656	-0,037	0,538
Kyrgyzstan	-0,958	-1,065	-0,963	0,594	0,499	0,070	-0,269	0,016
Pakistan	-1,223	1,273	0,302	0,654	-1,108	0,613	-1,738	-0,149
Singapore	-1,482	-0,266	-1,019	-1,241	1,140	0,267	0,195	-0,383
Hong Kong	-1,876	-2,016	0,031	0,181	0,643	-0,467	0,807	-0,351
Belarus	-2,711	-0,558	-0,006	0,536	-0,023	-1,414	0,551	-0,361
Palestinian Occupied Territories	-2,997	0,724	-1,245	-0,618	-0,962	-0,611	-0,736	0,589

Ukraine	-3,060	-0,630	1,269	0,733	-0,653	-1,526	-0,159	-0,730
Iraq	-3,306	1,105	-0,373	-0,728	-0,794	-0,934	-1,119	0,543
Egypt	-3,878	1,458	0,809	-1,111	-1,273	-3,046	-1,525	0,836
Algeria	-4,422	-2,077	-0,133	-0,866	-0,705	-0,202	-0,413	0,261
Bahrain	-4,426	0,912	-3,032	-0,221	0,989	-0,143	0,405	-1,580
Russia	-4,609	-1,455	0,750	0,676	-0,658	-1,301	0,188	-0,804
Lebanon	-5,183	-1,664	-1,416	-0,551	-1,107	-0,171	0,111	-0,172
Philippines	-5,774	-4,228	-0,695	-1,229	0,965	0,182	-1,184	0,109
South Africa	-9,691	-5,075	-0,757	-2,445	0,186	0,438	-0,961	-0,826
India	-10,498	-4,656	-2,702	-1,989	0,798	0,404	-0,093	-0,489

Appendix Table 7: (continued)

	Overall Civil Society Index	Feminism	Involvement in politics	Optimism and engagement	No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics
Sweden	7,047	0,958	0,503	0,309	-0,138
Trinidad and Tobago	5,751	1,070	0,004	0,190	1,015
Australia	5,487	0,708	0,053	0,060	-0,368
Japan	5,466	0,155	0,824	0,002	-0,240
Netherlands	5,216	0,669	0,381	-0,252	-0,467
Ghana	4,760	-0,155	0,033	0,408	1,031
Germany	4,274	0,350	0,273	-0,290	-0,819
Uzbekistan	4,250	-0,542	0,006	0,130	-0,332
Qatar	3,749	-0,526	0,505	0,643	0,681
Cyprus	3,500	0,528	-0,131	0,467	-0,283
Uruguay	3,496	0,862	-0,373	0,139	-0,094
Spain	3,197	0,514	-0,594	0,168	-0,453
United States	3,197	0,668	0,342	0,002	-0,177
Romania	2,920	0,329	-0,437	-0,257	0,236
Poland	2,802	0,396	-0,111	0,140	0,386

Taiwan	2,745	0,312	-0,553	0,157	-0,031
Georgia	2,562	0,120	-0,114	0,476	0,403
Thailand	2,523	0,050	0,879	-0,231	0,110
Turkey	2,121	-0,380	0,086	0,192	-0,453
South Korea	1,906	0,114	0,016	0,040	0,071
Armenia	1,852	0,023	-0,321	0,096	0,280
Zimbabwe	1,789	0,242	0,012	0,263	0,885
Brazil	1,752	0,701	-0,173	0,074	0,214
Tunisia	1,656	-0,585	-0,127	0,467	0,547
China	1,514	-0,202	0,006	-0,304	-0,858
Chile	1,312	0,484	-0,659	0,141	-0,370
Estonia	1,157	0,248	-0,381	-0,015	-0,767
Malaysia	1,029	-0,328	0,147	0,253	0,473
Ecuador	0,945	0,546	-0,101	0,140	0,362
Slovenia	0,730	0,509	-0,658	-0,075	-0,935
Colombia	0,631	0,715	-0,582	0,015	0,363
Rwanda	0,402	-0,100	0,257	0,238	-0,610
Argentina	0,342	0,523	-0,295	-0,086	-0,162
Morocco	0,249	-0,322	-0,463	-0,182	-0,072
Jordan	0,199	-0,816	-0,390	0,131	0,565
Libya	0,079	-0,768	0,237	0,538	0,625
Nigeria	0,042	-0,455	0,181	0,533	0,523
Total	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
Yemen	-0,205	-0,904	0,076	0,074	0,673
Azerbaijan	-0,301	-0,597	-0,808	-0,286	-0,201
Kazakhstan	-0,367	-0,074	-0,143	0,007	-0,201
Kuwait	-0,840	-0,945	0,521	0,215	0,461
Peru	-0,931	0,789	-0,285	-0,333	0,480
Mexico	-0,947	0,691	-0,235	0,285	0,491
Kyrgyzstan	-0,958	-0,082	0,332	-0,242	0,151

Pakistan	-1,223	-0,697	-0,233	-0,349	0,209
Singapore	-1,482	0,088	-0,057	0,036	-0,241
Hong Kong	-1,876	0,122	-0,211	-0,268	-0,345
Belarus	-2,711	-0,098	-0,363	-0,319	-0,657
Palestinian Occupied Territories	-2,997	-0,726	0,144	0,065	0,381
Ukraine	-3,060	0,104	-0,465	-0,203	-0,799
Iraq	-3,306	-0,727	-0,204	-0,134	0,061
Egypt	-3,878	-0,644	0,569	0,027	0,022
Algeria	-4,422	-0,691	-0,139	0,069	0,474
Bahrain	-4,426	-0,868	0,655	-1,284	-0,258
Russia	-4,609	-0,159	-0,515	-0,416	-0,916
Lebanon	-5,183	-0,211	0,216	-0,169	-0,048
Philippines	-5,774	-0,198	0,506	-0,344	0,341
South Africa	-9,691	-0,137	0,158	-0,188	-0,084
India	-10,498	-0,759	0,283	-0,940	-0,354

Appendix Table 8: The contribution of Catholic *Dominicantes* to global civil society – factor scores

Country/region	Overall Catholic Civil Society Index	The non-violent and law-abiding society	Democracy movement	Climate of personal non-violence	Trust in institutions	Happiness, good health	No redistributive religious fundamentalism	Accepting the market economy
Trinidad and Tobago	7,783	2,333	-0,177	0,682	-0,151	0,637	0,199	1,083
Ghana	6,808	2,173	-0,555	-0,328	1,031	1,528	-0,094	1,140
Australia	5,325	1,706	0,283	0,857	-0,361	0,224	0,834	0,652
Germany	5,004	2,894	1,361	0,698	1,014	-1,048	0,533	-0,288
United States	3,294	0,235	-0,445	0,157	-0,086	0,450	0,850	0,562
Poland	2,890	1,121	0,878	1,156	-0,564	-0,315	0,006	-0,507
Chile	2,596	0,879	1,442	1,524	1,104	-1,344	-0,449	-0,274
Brazil	2,419	0,707	-0,148	0,699	-0,367	-0,056	-0,082	0,610
Spain	2,159	1,338	0,655	1,194	-0,071	-0,655	-0,195	0,049
South Korea	1,421	-0,361	-0,248	1,115	0,797	-0,300	-0,061	-0,030
Zimbabwe	1,402	0,474	-0,476	-1,499	0,276	0,444	0,082	0,730
Colombia	1,327	0,105	-0,816	0,802	-0,112	0,502	-0,127	0,112
Ecuador	1,061	-0,508	-0,874	1,192	0,125	0,363	-0,596	0,387
Rwanda	0,511	2,079	-0,737	-2,523	0,470	1,218	-0,110	0,161
Slovenia	0,067	0,624	0,844	0,979	-1,250	-0,610	0,136	-0,271
Argentina	0,006	0,034	0,296	1,108	-0,516	-0,306	-0,009	-0,371
Nigeria	-0,334	-0,333	-0,684	-1,425	0,340	1,437	-0,719	0,397
Mexico	-0,728	-2,971	-0,469	0,983	-0,616	0,590	-0,352	0,608
Ukraine	-1,005	-0,059	1,927	1,228	-1,333	-1,197	-0,365	-0,251
Singapore	-1,621	-0,060	-1,553	-1,130	1,080	0,174	0,112	-0,318
Peru	-1,829	-2,014	-0,490	0,687	-0,779	-0,452	0,013	0,344
Belarus	-3,460	-0,338	-0,741	0,487	0,694	-2,113	-0,768	-0,333
Lebanon	-4,381	-1,670	-0,799	-0,053	-1,012	-0,270	-0,173	-0,042
Philippines	-5,763	-4,172	-0,727	-1,342	1,058	0,258	-1,314	0,053

South Africa	-10,733	-5,941	-0,868	-2,886	0,696	0,432	-1,143	-0,917
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Appendix Table 8: (continued)

Country/region	Overall Catholic Civil Society Index	Feminism	Involvement in politics	Optimism and engagement	No welfare mentality, acceptance of the Calvinist work ethics
Trinidad and Tobago	7,783	1,391	0,288	0,567	0,931
Ghana	6,808	-0,053	0,086	0,683	1,198
Australia	5,325	0,779	0,331	-0,136	0,157
Germany	5,004	0,334	0,646	-0,378	-0,761
United States	3,294	0,760	0,597	0,071	0,143
Poland	2,890	0,493	-0,011	0,148	0,486
Chile	2,596	0,530	-0,481	-0,001	-0,332
Brazil	2,419	0,876	-0,078	0,031	0,226
Spain	2,159	0,532	-0,404	0,043	-0,327
South Korea	1,421	0,146	0,125	0,171	0,065
Zimbabwe	1,402	0,222	0,223	0,173	0,753
Colombia	1,327	0,825	-0,506	0,103	0,438
Ecuador	1,061	0,607	-0,021	0,100	0,288
Rwanda	0,511	-0,008	0,284	0,286	-0,609
Slovenia	0,067	0,699	-0,488	0,051	-0,647
Argentina	0,006	0,550	-0,256	-0,307	-0,219
Nigeria	-0,334	-0,213	0,014	0,469	0,382
Mexico	-0,728	0,837	-0,153	0,273	0,544
Ukraine	-1,005	0,170	-0,004	-0,612	-0,508
Singapore	-1,621	-0,035	0,237	0,082	-0,210
Peru	-1,829	0,918	-0,277	-0,326	0,547
Belarus	-3,460	0,355	0,144	-0,335	-0,513
Lebanon	-4,381	-0,148	-0,041	-0,118	-0,056

Philippines	-5,763	-0,079	0,503	-0,333	0,334
South Africa	-10,733	0,036	0,227	-0,239	-0,131

Appendix Table 9: factor scores for the global Muslim communities

Country/region	Overall Value Development Index	The non-violent and law-abiding society	Democracy movement	Climate of personal non-violence	Trust in institutions	Happiness, good health	No redistributive religious fundamentalism	Accepting the market economy	Feminism	Involvement in politics	Optimism and engagement	No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics
Uzbekistan	4,4448	0,5897	1,1005	-0,0750	3,0913	0,7470	-0,7118	0,4354	-0,5687	0,0061	0,1501	-0,3200
Trinidad and Tobago	3,5438	1,4006	-0,2184	0,1107	-0,8181	0,2823	0,7298	0,8917	0,8342	-0,2126	-0,1598	0,7033
Cyprus	3,0322	1,2133	-0,0671	0,5499	0,5317	0,3606	0,4672	-0,0711	0,2306	-0,2466	0,5158	-0,4522
Ghana	3,0148	0,8065	-0,5589	-0,7661	1,1679	1,0465	-0,5219	0,7999	-0,4202	0,0187	0,6082	0,8342
Turkey	2,1656	1,8680	0,6841	0,9976	0,3960	-0,0034	-0,9346	-0,2724	-0,3843	0,0748	0,1893	-0,4494
Tunisia	1,6557	2,1814	0,3686	-0,1338	-1,4493	0,0330	-0,5377	0,8926	-0,5851	-0,1275	0,4667	0,5467
Malaysia	0,8868	-0,7099	0,0029	0,0450	1,1204	0,8449	-1,3641	0,3405	-0,4103	0,2712	0,2611	0,4851
Germany	0,8106	1,3972	0,4572	-0,4141	-0,1588	0,5370	0,9637	-0,3274	-0,3500	-0,3318	-0,4286	-0,5338
Kazakhstan	0,7581	-0,4280	1,0511	0,2239	0,9059	-0,1179	-0,1207	-0,5189	-0,1421	-0,1456	0,1260	-0,0755
Morocco	0,1958	1,1655	0,9888	0,0225	-0,3510	0,4186	-1,0713	0,0751	-0,3278	-0,4619	-0,1906	-0,0720
Nigeria	0,0844	1,2375	-1,1892	-0,4317	-0,3953	1,1105	-0,9758	0,2235	-0,7021	0,2867	0,4868	0,4335
Jordan	0,0745	2,4231	-0,7803	0,1422	-0,2189	-0,1198	-1,0527	0,2305	-0,8358	-0,4029	0,1269	0,5622
Libya	0,0475	1,0995	-0,6165	-0,3388	-1,2184	0,5143	-0,8998	0,8685	-0,7671	0,2465	0,5382	0,6213
Rwanda	-0,0813	1,6592	-1,1284	-2,4547	0,5257	0,7122	-0,2302	0,4797	0,0338	0,3543	0,3963	-0,4293
Yemen	-0,2053	2,3001	0,5847	-1,0192	-1,6148	-0,1480	-1,3566	1,1301	-0,9041	0,0756	0,0742	0,6728
Azerbaijan	-0,2785	2,8039	-0,3700	0,3397	0,2371	-0,6097	-0,0066	-0,7896	-0,6031	-0,8018	-0,2769	-0,2013
Total	-0,3311	0,7046	-0,2166	-0,0833	-0,0143	0,1481	-0,7341	0,1698	-0,5173	-0,0326	0,0799	0,1644
Kyrgyzstan	-0,6871	-0,9541	-0,9637	0,6675	0,5604	0,1388	-0,3077	0,0350	-0,0998	0,3400	-0,2579	0,1543
Pakistan	-1,2295	1,2799	0,2958	0,6577	-1,1099	0,6134	-1,7426	-0,1506	-0,6982	-0,2323	-0,3487	0,2061
Singapore	-1,5741	-0,5476	-0,8864	-1,2478	1,1517	0,6181	-0,3741	-0,1418	0,0616	-0,1852	0,0901	-0,1128
Palestinian Occupied Territories	-2,9809	0,7371	-1,2443	-0,6022	-0,9635	-0,6209	-0,7360	0,5887	-0,7265	0,1425	0,0597	0,3844
Iraq	-3,3331	1,0915	-0,3896	-0,7300	-0,7979	-0,9315	-1,1138	0,5387	-0,7297	-0,1999	-0,1338	0,0629

Algeria	-4,4092	-2,0870	-0,1291	-0,8719	-0,7023	-0,2015	-0,4112	0,2649	-0,6954	-0,1320	0,0747	0,4816
South Africa	-6,7246	-3,9332	-1,0075	-1,4029	0,0146	0,7886	-0,9986	0,0137	0,2626	-0,8064	0,0494	0,2952
Lebanon	-7,0308	-2,2564	-1,9024	-0,9477	-0,8255	-0,2253	-0,0429	-0,4131	-0,2808	0,2389	-0,2756	-0,0999
Russia	-8,2049	-2,5526	-1,2311	-0,9286	-0,3026	-0,6068	-0,1567	-0,5965	-0,1536	-0,3835	-0,6129	-0,6800
Philippines	-9,5032	-5,8083	-0,8314	-1,9553	0,8459	0,0670	-1,4667	-0,1284	-0,8214	0,4789	-0,2953	0,4118
India	-10,1415	-4,6626	-2,5096	-2,6408	0,8269	0,5849	-0,1558	-0,5227	-0,8900	0,5430	-0,6064	-0,1086

Appendix Table 10: Factor scores for the unweighted *World Values Survey* averages of the different global denominations, according to their religious activity rate, measured by their participation in religious service attendance (completely distant: never attending services; secular: less than once a month; mensuantes: once a month or more often)

Religious denomination		The non-violent and law-abiding society	Democracy movement	Climate of personal non-violence	Trust in institutions	No redistributive religious fundamentalism	Accepting the market economy	Feminism	Involvement in politics	Optimism and engagement	No welfare mentality, acceptance of the Calvinist work ethics	Overall Value Development Index
Protestant	Completely distant	0,8216	0,3146	0,0723	-0,3778	1,5001	0,2080	0,4006	0,2321	-0,2086	-0,2071	2,7557
Protestant	Secular	0,6591	0,1088	-0,1631	0,0045	0,4030	0,4197	0,2211	0,1116	0,0863	0,2284	2,0796
Roman Catholic	Completely distant	0,1898	0,8615	0,8228	-0,5876	1,0565	-0,0743	0,5240	-0,4825	0,0700	-0,3094	2,0708
Protestant	Mensuantes	0,9164	-0,5013	-0,5927	0,1993	-0,1167	0,5765	0,1942	0,0909	0,2537	0,5423	1,5626
Buddhist	Mensuantes	0,3965	-0,1199	0,2891	0,8412	-0,3793	-0,1896	-0,0192	0,5346	-0,0411	0,0033	1,3156
Buddhist	Secular	0,1188	0,1320	0,1288	0,4433	0,2877	-0,0992	0,0983	0,2762	-0,0954	-0,0430	1,2475
Roman Catholic	Secular	-0,4022	0,4008	0,4918	-0,2884	0,4719	0,0282	0,4410	-0,1657	-0,0042	-0,0838	0,8893
Orthodox	Mensuantes	0,6350	0,0505	0,5433	-0,1851	-0,2520	0,0043	0,2121	-0,1408	-0,0163	-0,0586	0,7926
Orthodox	Secular	0,1816	0,8073	0,7468	-0,4324	0,2297	-0,2678	0,1721	-0,3751	-0,0353	-0,3453	0,6815
Muslim	Completely distant	0,9186	0,2173	0,1201	0,1583	-0,5078	0,0627	-0,1956	-0,2920	0,0369	0,0113	0,5297
Muslim	Secular	0,5293	-0,1306	-0,0551	0,6380	-0,6268	-0,0358	-0,2947	-0,1691	0,0081	-0,0392	-0,1759

Orthodox	Completely distant	-0,1935	1,0998	0,7357	-0,2805	0,7032	-0,6171	-0,2423	-0,4239	-0,3381	-0,7158	-0,2725
Roman Catholic	Mensuanes	-0,7511	-0,3283	-0,1024	0,0598	-0,2255	0,1798	0,3791	0,0445	0,0677	0,1768	-0,4995
Buddhist	Completely distant	-0,6973	0,1705	-0,4728	0,3562	0,6702	-0,1610	0,1664	-0,1351	-0,1476	-0,3344	-0,5848
Muslim	Mensuanes	0,5172	-0,5407	-0,2742	-0,0693	-0,7004	0,2701	-0,7544	0,1830	0,1347	0,2855	-0,9485
Hindu	Mensuanes	-2,9289	-1,6872	-1,1449	0,7792	-0,2541	0,0011	-0,3482	0,1764	-0,5727	-0,1833	-6,1626
Hindu	Completely distant	-3,3066	-1,0029	-1,9986	0,3357	0,2541	-0,7745	-0,5103	-0,0287	-0,5287	-0,2789	-7,8395
Hindu	Secular	-3,8632	-2,3223	-1,6013	0,9044	-0,0294	-0,5283	-0,5677	0,1786	-0,6355	-0,1161	-8,5808

Appendix Table 11: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of Roman Catholic Sunday Church attendance rates

	<i>Dominicantes in %</i>	R^2
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%)	0,7825	61,2309
Human development index (HDI) value 2004	-0,7686	59,0812
tertiary enrollment	-0,7437	55,3085
Combined Failed States Index	0,7137	50,9318
female survival probability of surviving to age 65 female	-0,6848	46,8903
Life Expectancy (years)	-0,6755	45,6255
closing educational gender gap	-0,6679	44,6027
Happy life years	-0,6329	40,0561
Global tolerance index	-0,6327	40,0278
ESI-Index Environment Sustainability Index (Yale Columbia)	-0,6276	39,3925
Civil and Political Liberties violations	0,6227	38,7809
Rule of law	-0,6182	38,2129
Democracy measure	-0,6141	37,7170
closing of global gender gap overall score 2009	-0,5994	35,9314
Corruption avoidance measure	-0,5621	31,5998
Life Satisfaction (0-10)	-0,5611	31,4782
comparative price levels (US=1.00)	-0,5344	28,5628
overall 35 development index	-0,5276	27,8387

Appendix Table 12: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of the development of overall civil society

	Overall Civil Society Index	R²
overall 35 development index	-0,5276	27,8387
gender empowerment index value	0,5154	26,5589
social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO)	0,4640	21,5258
Combined Failed States Index	-0,4396	19,3211
Happy life years	0,4249	18,0528
Global tolerance index	0,4188	17,5358
per capita world class universities	0,4128	17,0370
Muslim population share per total population	-0,4023	16,1838
Life Satisfaction (0-10)	0,3738	13,9741
Rule of law	0,3714	13,7902
Corruption avoidance measure	0,3622	13,1161
comparative price levels (US=1.00)	0,3601	12,9676
Life Expectancy (years)	0,3598	12,9462
Human development index (HDI) value 2004	0,3439	11,8288
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	0,3205	10,2729

Appendix Table 13: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of the development of Catholic civil society (*dominantes*)

	Catholic Overall Civil Society Index	R²
overall 35 development index	-0,5276	27,8387
social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO)	0,4640	21,5258
gender empowerment index value	0,4393	19,2954
Tertiary emigration rate	0,4153	17,2495

Rule of law	0,4036	16,2858
Muslim population share per total population	-0,4023	16,1838
unemployment rate	-0,3851	14,8274
Global tolerance index	0,3705	13,7250
Combined Failed States Index	-0,3490	12,1791
Happy life years	0,3367	11,3378
Life Satisfaction (0-10)	0,3278	10,7469

Appendix Table 14: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of the relative advance of Roman Catholic civil society (*dominicanes*) in comparison to overall society

	Catholicism Light House of Civil Society?	R²
Tertiary emigration rate	0,6521	42,5193
overall 35 development index	-0,5276	27,8387
social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO)	0,4640	21,5258
Muslim population share per total population	-0,4023	16,1838
years of membership in EMU, 2010	-0,3448	11,8875

Appendix Table 15: Global tolerance, xenophobia and racism

	Xenophobia and racism
Neighbors: People of a different race	0,817
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	0,778

63,502 % of total variance explained


191620 individuals around the globe

Country/region	Xenophobia and racism	N	Std. Deviation
Argentina	-0,575	2032	0,300
Andorra	-0,567	1003	0,389
Sweden	-0,566	2209	0,385
Canada	-0,556	2097	0,405
New Zealand	-0,540	841	0,397
Trinidad and Tobago	-0,540	2001	0,384
Uruguay	-0,534	2000	0,450
Norway	-0,533	1025	0,423
Brazil	-0,516	2986	0,479
Colombia	-0,495	1512	0,488
Australia	-0,478	2898	0,530
Switzerland	-0,471	1241	0,574
Spain	-0,467	2389	0,534
Great Britain	-0,436	1041	0,517
United States	-0,428	3474	0,558
Chile	-0,423	2000	0,632
Peru	-0,385	2710	0,652
Netherlands	-0,375	2952	0,629
Poland	-0,364	1966	0,716
Zimbabwe	-0,350	1499	0,647
Croatia	-0,338	1196	0,672
Germany	-0,313	6125	0,740
Burkina Faso	-0,299	1534	0,776
Taiwan	-0,291	2465	0,702
Mexico	-0,285	3560	0,780
Italy	-0,284	1012	0,827
Finland	-0,265	1014	0,840



China	-0,251	4291	0,785
Uzbekistan	-0,215	1500	0,795
Ukraine	-0,201	5311	0,845
Albania	-0,199	999	0,821
Hungary	-0,188	996	0,794
Slovenia	-0,179	3113	0,911
Latvia	-0,161	1200	0,789
Ethiopia	-0,159	1500	0,938
Pakistan	-0,137	3200	0,726
Kazakhstan	-0,129	1502	0,790
Venezuela	-0,122	1200	0,967
Bulgaria	-0,115	2073	0,927
Philippines	-0,100	1200	0,901
Moldova	-0,095	2030	0,881
Serbia and Montenegro	-0,067	1220	0,957
Hong Kong	-0,055	1000	1,001
South Africa	-0,052	6458	0,828
Singapore	-0,049	1969	0,795
Rwanda	-0,014	3034	1,116
Bosnia	-0,010	800	1,005
Russia	0,007	4519	0,945
Morocco	0,012	2368	0,940
Qatar	0,015	1060	0,753
Tunisia	0,033	1205	1,005
Cyprus	0,038	2025	0,994
Romania	0,039	4518	1,052
Ghana	0,053	3086	1,019
Estonia	0,071	2554	1,012
Mali	0,084	1534	1,084
Georgia	0,107	4710	1,052
Belarus	0,119	1535	1,007
Nigeria	0,167	3781	1,064
Zambia	0,216	1500	0,998
France	0,222	1001	1,150
Algeria	0,254	2482	1,040
Japan	0,289	2443	1,131
Iran	0,302	5195	1,079
Kyrgyzstan	0,315	1500	1,144
Iraq	0,328	1200	1,003
Bahrain	0,344	1200	0,944
Turkey	0,401	6352	1,222
Ecuador	0,403	1202	1,296
Indonesia	0,421	3002	1,239



South Korea	0,437	2400	1,209
Viet Nam	0,454	1495	1,318
Armenia	0,472	1100	1,082
Malaysia	0,479	2500	0,959
Lebanon	0,495	1200	1,081
Thailand	0,503	2708	1,135
Saudi Arabia	0,509	1502	1,147
Yemen	0,518	1000	1,130
Jordan	0,562	3623	1,154
India	0,687	5583	1,190
Bangladesh	0,712	3025	1,266
Palestinian Occupied Territories	0,747	1000	1,243
Azerbaijan	0,747	1002	1,198
Libya	1,092	2131	1,187



Appendix Graph 9: value development in global society, as predicted by our data and GDP per capita³⁴







³⁴ For the GDP per capita data, see Tausch & Heshmati, 2013.











Appendix Table 16: UNDP-type Index of a democratic civil society


Country/region	Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	accept neighbours: People of a different religion	men do not make better political leaders than women do	University is equally important for a boy and a girl	Democracy: no priority for religious authorities to interpret the laws.	not justifiable: For a man to beat his wife	UNDP-type Index of a democratic civil society
Sweden	1,000	0,964	0,943	0,907	0,990	0,959	0,961
Norway	0,778	0,964	1,000	1,000	0,954	0,975	0,945
Andorra	0,963	0,982	0,845	0,736	1,000	0,997	0,921
Netherlands	0,926	0,964	0,855	0,793	0,914	0,970	0,904
Switzerland	0,852	0,946	0,876	0,807	0,955	0,921	0,893
Canada	0,852	0,982	0,793	0,764	0,801	1,000	0,865
New Zealand	0,833	1,000	0,772	0,700	0,915	0,962	0,864
Finland	0,907	0,839	0,834	0,764	0,856	0,970	0,862
France	0,944	0,554	0,881	0,964	0,823	0,967	0,856
Australia	0,852	0,964	0,736	0,686	0,877	0,959	0,846
Great Britain	0,926	0,982	0,741	0,664	0,713	0,956	0,830
Germany	0,759	0,839	0,839	0,693	0,945	0,850	0,821
Trinidad and Tobago	0,870	0,964	0,736	0,793	0,670	0,883	0,819
Spain	0,704	0,946	0,824	0,664	0,758	0,932	0,805

United States	0,722	0,964	0,736	0,686	0,779	0,907	0,799
Uruguay	0,778	0,946	0,777	0,600	0,726	0,880	0,785
Slovenia	0,741	0,750	0,663	0,614	0,877	0,896	0,757
Colombia	0,722	0,875	0,658	0,593	0,541	0,964	0,726
Poland	0,870	0,875	0,497	0,457	0,658	0,970	0,721
Brazil	0,537	0,929	0,668	0,621	0,655	0,913	0,721
Chile	0,741	0,911	0,617	0,471	0,624	0,951	0,719
Taiwan	0,704	0,929	0,585	0,471	0,741	0,869	0,717
Cyprus	0,630	0,696	0,663	0,700	0,710	0,893	0,715
Argentina	0,500	0,982	0,674	0,579	0,599	0,954	0,715
Hungary	0,296	0,911	0,575	0,693	0,756	0,978	0,702
Peru	0,593	0,839	0,731	0,471	0,589	0,801	0,671
Estonia	0,722	0,625	0,435	0,564	0,740	0,923	0,668
Bulgaria	0,259	0,732	0,440	0,593	0,844	0,836	0,617
Mexico	0,519	0,750	0,642	0,414	0,574	0,795	0,616
Zimbabwe	0,630	0,893	0,435	0,579	0,597	0,552	0,614
Ecuador	0,593	0,446	0,731	0,514	0,537	0,861	0,614
Japan	0,481	0,429	0,544	0,379	0,912	0,915	0,610
Romania	0,519	0,643	0,440	0,536	0,584	0,910	0,605
Russia	0,593	0,750	0,378	0,343	0,706	0,844	0,602
China	0,389	0,804	0,482	0,429	0,741	0,765	0,602
Singapore	0,463	0,821	0,528	0,464	0,640	0,645	0,594
Global Sample	0,574	0,661	0,482	0,471	0,584	0,773	0,591
Ethiopia	0,000	0,750	0,808	0,721	0,363	0,888	0,588

Moldova	0,611	0,643	0,399	0,429	0,642	0,792	0,586
Kazakhstan	0,444	0,804	0,342	0,493	0,635	0,675	0,566
Ukraine	0,444	0,732	0,399	0,343	0,615	0,825	0,560
Belarus	0,519	0,696	0,295	0,350	0,652	0,833	0,558
South Korea	0,241	0,500	0,487	0,421	0,771	0,877	0,550
Georgia	0,500	0,446	0,254	0,464	0,602	0,997	0,544
Hong Kong	0,056	0,714	0,601	0,400	0,700	0,787	0,543
Serbia and Montenegro	0,519	0,768	0,591	0,629	0,637	0,003	0,525
Ghana	0,593	0,607	0,176	0,479	0,577	0,694	0,521
South Africa	0,537	0,821	0,503	0,564	0,260	0,440	0,521
Turkey	0,519	0,393	0,358	0,457	0,453	0,915	0,516
Qatar	0,759	0,804	0,031	0,364	0,313	0,811	0,514
Thailand	0,463	0,482	0,487	0,386	0,529	0,727	0,512
Burkina Faso	0,611	0,804	0,363	0,271	0,667	0,328	0,507
Indonesia	0,444	0,393	0,404	0,500	0,294	0,948	0,497
Azerbaijan	0,500	0,393	0,275	0,279	0,687	0,811	0,491
Kyrgyzstan	0,463	0,411	0,399	0,307	0,607	0,735	0,487
Uzbekistan	0,833	0,750	0,124	0,100	0,451	0,617	0,479
Rwanda	0,444	0,661	0,497	0,321	0,534	0,402	0,477
Tunisia	0,352	0,482	0,171	0,493	0,549	0,746	0,466
Iran	0,481	0,500	0,295	0,171	0,418	0,828	0,449
Lebanon	0,204	0,411	0,415	0,421	0,647	0,571	0,445
Pakistan	0,315	0,768	0,342	0,300	0,053	0,885	0,444
Malaysia	0,704	0,536	0,311	0,171	0,340	0,596	0,443


Jordan	0,685	0,357	0,057	0,393	0,224	0,896	0,435
Viet Nam	0,389	0,411	0,451	0,450	0,000	0,874	0,429
Morocco	0,500	0,518	0,285	0,329	0,285	0,653	0,428
Zambia	0,407	0,554	0,497	0,514	0,469	0,128	0,428
Philippines	0,389	0,732	0,394	0,243	0,363	0,377	0,416
Armenia	0,278	0,000	0,238	0,293	0,730	0,888	0,405
Nigeria	0,500	0,518	0,155	0,207	0,441	0,604	0,404
Occupied Palestinian Territories	0,630	0,125	0,104	0,429	0,431	0,661	0,397
Libya	0,815	0,054	0,114	0,314	0,330	0,749	0,396
Iraq	0,815	0,411	0,000	0,207	0,300	0,549	0,380
Algeria	0,407	0,357	0,207	0,350	0,453	0,432	0,368
India	0,407	0,214	0,415	0,186	0,551	0,355	0,355
Yemen	0,815	0,071	0,052	0,150	0,234	0,702	0,337
Bahrain	0,019	0,429	0,275	0,000	0,506	0,740	0,328
Mali	0,444	0,589	0,161	0,007	0,371	0,000	0,262

Appendix Map 1: Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people



Best: New Zealand, Argentina, Great Britain, Canada, Andorra
Worst: Ethiopia, Bahrain, Hong Kong, Lebanon, South Korea


Appendix Map 2: accept neighbors: People of a different religion



Best: New Zealand, Argentina, Great Britain, Canada, Andorra


Worst: Armenia, Libya, Yemen, Occupied Palestinian Territories, India

Appendix Map 3: men do not make better political leaders than women do



Best: Norway, Sweden, France, Switzerland, Netherlands
Worst: Iraq, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan, Occupied Palestinian Territories

Appendix Map 4: University is equally important for a boy and a girl




source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-with-excel.html

Best: Norway, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago


Worst: Bahrain, Mali, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Iran

Appendix Map 5: Democracy: no priority for religious authorities to interpret the laws



Best: Andorra, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Germany
Worst: Viet Nam, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen, South Africa


Appendix Map 6: not justifiable: For a man to beat his wife



source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-with-excel.html

Best: Canada, Georgia, Andorra, Hungary, Norway
Worst: Mali, Serbia and Montenegro, Zambia, Burkina Faso, India


Appendix Map 7: The non-violent and law-abiding society



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Azerbaijan; Georgia; Jordan; Yemen; Tunisia
Worst: South Africa; India; Philippines; Mexico; Algeria

Appendix Map 8: Democracy movement




source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Sweden; Taiwan; Germany; Spain; Estonia

Worst: Bahrain; India; Lebanon; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Qatar


Appendix Map 9: Climate of personal non-violence



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


Best: Chile; Japan; Korea, South; Spain; Ecuador
Worst: Rwanda; South Africa; India; Singapore; Philippines

Appendix Map 10: Trust in institutions



Best: Uzbekistan; Qatar; China; Singapore; Malaysia
Worst: Yemen; Tunisia; Egypt; Libya; Pakistan


Appendix Map 11: Happiness, good health



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Qatar; Nigeria; Ghana; Rwanda; Kuwait
Worst: Egypt; Ukraine; Belarus; Russia; Georgia


Appendix Map 12: no redistributive religious fundamentalism



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Sweden; Netherlands; Australia; Japan; Germany
Worst: Pakistan; Egypt; Yemen; Philippines; Qatar


Appendix Map 13: Accepting the market economy



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Yemen; Ghana; Tunisia; Libya
Worst: Bahrain; South Africa; Azerbaijan; Russia; Ukraine


Appendix Map 14: Feminism



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Sweden; Uruguay; Peru; Colombia
Worst: Kuwait; Yemen; Bahrain; Jordan; Libya


Appendix Map 15: Involvement in politics



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Thailand; Japan; Bahrain; Egypt; Kuwait
Worst: Azerbaijan; Chile; Slovenia; Spain; Colombia


Appendix Map 16: Optimism and engagement



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Qatar; Libya; Nigeria; Georgia; Cyprus
Worst: Bahrain; India; Russia; Pakistan; Philippines


Appendix Map 17: No welfare mentality, acceptance of the Calvinist work ethics



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Qatar; Yemen
Worst: Slovenia; Russia; China; Germany; Ukraine

Appendix Map 18: Catholic The non-violent and law-abiding society




Best: Germany; Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Rwanda; Australia
Worst: South Africa; Philippines; Mexico; Peru; Lebanon

Appendix Map 19: Catholic Democracy movement




Best: Ukraine; Chile; Germany; Poland; Slovenia
Worst: Singapore; Ecuador; South Africa; Colombia; Lebanon

Appendix Map 20: Catholic Climate of personal non-violence



Best: Chile; Ukraine; Spain; Ecuador; Poland
Worst: South Africa; Rwanda; Zimbabwe; Nigeria; Philippines


Appendix Map 21: Catholic Trust in institutions



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


Best: Chile; Singapore; Philippines; Ghana; Germany
Worst: Ukraine; Slovenia; Lebanon; Peru; Mexico

Appendix Map 22: Catholic Happiness, good health



Best: Ghana; Nigeria; Rwanda; Trinidad and Tobago; Mexico
Worst: Belarus; Chile; Ukraine; Germany; Spain


Appendix Map 23: Catholic No redistributive religious fundamentalism



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: United States; Australia; Germany; Trinidad and Tobago; Slovenia
Worst: Philippines; South Africa; Belarus; Nigeria; Ecuador

Appendix Map 24: Catholic Accepting the market economy




source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Australia; Brazil

Worst: South Africa; Poland; Argentina; Belarus; Singapore


Appendix Map 25: Catholic Feminism



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Peru; Brazil; Mexico; Colombia
Worst: Nigeria; Lebanon; Philippines; Ghana; Singapore


Appendix Map 26: Catholic Involvement in politics



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


Best: Germany; United States; Philippines; Australia; Trinidad and Tobago
Worst: Colombia; Slovenia; Chile; Spain; Peru

Appendix Map 27: Catholic Optimism and engagement



Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Nigeria; Rwanda; Mexico
Worst: Ukraine; Germany; Belarus; Philippines; Peru


Appendix Map 28: Catholic No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Peru; Mexico
Worst: Germany; Slovenia; Rwanda; Belarus; Ukraine


Appendix Map 29: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? The non-violent and law-abiding society



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Germany; Chile; Spain; Colombia; Australia
Worst: Nigeria; South Africa; United States; Peru; Korea, South


Appendix Map 30: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Democracy movement



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Ukraine; Lebanon; Nigeria; Chile; Ghana
Worst: Spain; Belarus; Australia; Singapore; Korea, South


Appendix Map 31: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Climate of personal non-violence



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Lebanon; Ukraine; Brazil; Slovenia
Worst: Nigeria; South Africa; Zimbabwe; Peru; United States


Appendix Map 32: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Trust in institutions




source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Chile; Germany; Belarus; Nigeria; South Africa
Worst: Ukraine; Australia; Slovenia; Singapore; Rwanda


Appendix Map 33: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Happiness, good health



Best: Ghana; United States; Ukraine; Nigeria; Rwanda
Worst: Germany; Chile; Spain; Belarus; Slovenia




Appendix Map 35: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Accepting the market economy



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


Best: Australia; Ukraine; Spain; Germany; Brazil
Worst: South Africa; Trinidad and Tobago; Peru; Philippines; Zimbabwe

Appendix Map 36: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Feminism



Best: Belarus; Trinidad and Tobago; Nigeria; Slovenia; Brazil
Worst: Singapore; Zimbabwe; Germany; Spain; Argentina


Appendix Map 37: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Involvement in politics



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


Best: Belarus; Ukraine; Germany; Singapore; Trinidad and Tobago
Worst: Lebanon; Nigeria; Philippines; Peru; Rwanda

Appendix Map 38: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? Optimism and engagement



Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Korea, South; Slovenia; Colombia
Worst: Ukraine; Argentina; Australia; Chile; Spain


Appendix Map 39: Catholic „dominantes“ best practicing community? No welfare mentality, acceptance of the Calvinist work ethics



Best: Australia; United States; Ukraine; Slovenia; Ghana

Worst: Nigeria; Zimbabwe; Trinidad and Tobago; Ecuador; Argentina

Appendix Map 40: Muslim Overall Value Development Index



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


Best: Uzbekistan; Trinidad and Tobago; Cyprus; Ghana; Turkey
Worst: India; Philippines; Russia; Lebanon; South Africa




Table 17: rejecting Muslim neighbors among Catholic *dominicanos*

	% rejecting Muslim neighbors	N =
Slovakia	51,000	147
Czech Rep.	45,100	51
South Korea	36,300	193
Philippines	28,900	1171
Germany	28,600	91
Nigeria	28,300	654
South Africa	26,700	210
Albania	23,500	119
Spain	18,200	954
Global dominicanos	17,900	9185
Mexico	17,900	1295
Zimbabwe	16,700	132
Peru	16,600	567
Uganda	15,600	282
India	14,900	87
Bosnia	13,100	84
Tanzania	13,000	292
Canada	12,400	443
United States	8,700	332
Chile	8,400	514
Argentina	7,100	411
Guatemala	6,800	397
Switzerland	4,800	314
Brazil	0,000	398


Graph 10: The factor scores of our model for global Catholicism, comparing the completely distant Catholics, the secular Catholics and the *mensuantes*



Graph 11: The factor scores of our model for global Muslims, comparing the completely distant Muslims, the secular Muslims and the *mensuantes*



Graph 12: US Catholic values and overall US values



Graph 13: Value development in Germany




Table 18: International comparisons of dominicantes, overall societies and Muslim communities

		Overall Civil Society Index
Trinidad and Tobago	dominicanos	7,783
Ghana	dominicanos	6,808
Trinidad and Tobago	overall society	5,751
Germany	dominicanos	5,004
Ghana	overall society	4,76
Germany	overall society	4,274
Trinidad and Tobago	Muslims	3,5438
Ghana	Muslims	3,0148
Germany	Muslims	0,8106
Rwanda	dominicanos	0,511
Rwanda	overall society	0,402
Nigeria	Muslims	0,0844
Nigeria	overall society	0,042
Rwanda	Muslims	-0,0813
Nigeria	dominicanos	-0,334
Singapore	overall society	-1,482
Singapore	Muslims	-1,5741
Singapore	dominicanos	-1,621
Lebanon	dominicanos	-4,381
Lebanon	overall society	-5,183
Philippines	dominicanos	-5,763
Philippines	overall society	-5,774
South Africa	Muslims	-6,7246
Lebanon	Muslims	-7,0308
Philippines	Muslims	-9,5032
South Africa	overall society	-9,691
South Africa	dominicanos	-10,733

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