The following is an excerpt from the recent Department of Defense
release of the February 18, 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance
that was leaked to The New York Times. Readers can see the excerpts
that the Times published on March 8, 1992 overlaid on the excised
portions of the Pentagon release.
It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will re-
emerge from the Eurasian heartland for many years to come. Even in the highly unlikely
event that some future leadership in the former Soviet Union adopted strategic aims of
recovering the lost empire or otherwise threatened global interests, the loss of Warsaw Pact
allies and the subsequent and continuing dissolution of military capability would make any
hope of success require several years or more of strategic and doctrinal re-orientation and
force regeneration and redeployment, which in turn could only happen after a lengthy
political realignment and re-orientation to authoritarian and aggressive political and
economic control. Furthermore, any such political upheaval in or among the states of the
former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or localized hostilities, rather
than a concerted strategic effort to marshal capabilities for external expansionism -- the
ability to project power beyond their borders.
There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop
strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy
must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.
But because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power
dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at
lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces
should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge. . . .
With the demise of a global military threat to U.S. interests, regional military threats,
including possible conflicts arising in and from the territory of the former Soviet Union, will
be of primary concern to the U.S. in the future. These threats are likely to arise in regions
critical to the security of the U.S. and its allies, including Europe, East Asia, the Middle East
and Southwest Asia, and the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important
interests at stake in Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In both cases, the U.
S. will be concerned with preventing the domination of key regions by a hostile power. . . .
The former Soviet state achieved global reach and power by consolidating control over the
resources in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. The best means of assuring that no
hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet
Union is to support its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) in their efforts to
become peaceful democracies with market-based economies. A democratic partnership
with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome for the United
States. At the same time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will
fail, with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on regenerating aggressive
military power could emerge in Russia, or that similiar regimes in other successor
republics could lead to spreading conflict within the former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe.
For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other
republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian
production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons
inventory, maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage
of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries.
NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment
in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary
instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and
participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of
European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security
arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated
command structure.
However, the U.S. must keep in mind the long history of conflict between the states of
Eastern Europe, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe
and those of the former Soviet Union. . . .
The most promising avenues for anchoring the east-central Europeans into the West
and for stabilizing their democratic institutions is their participation in Western
political and economic organizations. East-central European membership in the
(European Community) at the earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO liaison. . . .
The U.S. could also consider extending to the east-central European states security
commitments analogous to those we have extended to Persian Gulf states.
Should there be a re-emergence of a threat from the Soviet Union's successor state,
we should plan to defend against such a threat in Eastern Europe, should there be an
alliance decision to do so.
. . . Defense of Korea will likely remain one of the most demanding major regional
contingencies. . . . Asia is home to the world's greatest concentration of traditional
Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies decidedly at variance
with our own and those of our friends and allies.
To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we
must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This will
enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a
balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant
outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil. We
also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S.
nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As
demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent
a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to
the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a strong role through
enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security.
We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian
subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan,
adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We should discourage Indian
hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With
regard to Pakistan, a constructive U.S.-Pakistani military relationship will be an important
element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in Southwest Asia and
Central Asia. We should therefore endeavor to rebuild our military relationship given
acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns.
Cuba's growing domestic crisis holds out the prospect for positive change, but over the
near term, Cuba's tenuous internal situation is likely to generate new challenges to U.S.
policy. Consequently, our programs must provide capabilities to meet a variety of Cuban
contingencies which could include an attempted repetition of the Mariel boatlift, a military
provocation against the U.S. or an American ally, or political instability and internal conflict
in Cuba.
