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Cooperation, Anarchy, and The Prisoner's Dilemma

The document discusses cooperation between states and the conditions needed for sustained cooperation. It examines the prisoner's dilemma concept and Robert Axelrod's findings that cooperation is possible if the future interactions between states is long enough and neither state defects first. Specifically, Axelrod found the "tit-for-tat" strategy of cooperating initially and then reciprocating the other state's actions is optimal. Leader-specific punishment is presented as a way to promote cooperation by targeting sanctions at individual leaders rather than entire states. Cooperation is predicted to be greater between democracies compared to non-democratic states under this framework.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
76 views3 pages

Cooperation, Anarchy, and The Prisoner's Dilemma

The document discusses cooperation between states and the conditions needed for sustained cooperation. It examines the prisoner's dilemma concept and Robert Axelrod's findings that cooperation is possible if the future interactions between states is long enough and neither state defects first. Specifically, Axelrod found the "tit-for-tat" strategy of cooperating initially and then reciprocating the other state's actions is optimal. Leader-specific punishment is presented as a way to promote cooperation by targeting sanctions at individual leaders rather than entire states. Cooperation is predicted to be greater between democracies compared to non-democratic states under this framework.

Uploaded by

utopiayet7
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© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Cooperation, Anarchy, and the Prisoners Dilemma Why shouldnt states cooperate in an anarchic international system?

m? Theres no way to reinforce the agreement

Conditions for Cooperation in an Anarchic World A long shadow of the future (repeatedly acting with other states) Be nice (being willing to cooperate the first time) Be provocable (if someone cheats, they deserve punishment) Be forgiving (if someone cheats, you should be able to forgive them)

Axelrods Key Results Cooperation is possible even in a world of egoists If the shadow of the future is long enough, theres no best strategy independent of the other player Tit-for-tat is optimal strategy for sustained cooperation

What does Cooperation Look Like International trade Foreign Aid Alliances

We Have No Quarrel with the People The United States have no quarrel with the ________ people Iraqi- Bush/Prime Minister Blair

Yugoslavian- Clinton Libyan- Reagan Palestinian- Prime Minister Sharon

Leader Specific Punishments Basing cooperation on the behavior of leaders instead of states provides a mechanism that can promote interstate cooperation

Logic Behind Leader Specific Punishment Cooperation benefits population If a leader defects, benefits from cooperation stop accruing to the population If population removes the leader, the benefits from cooperation can be restored

General Predictions Greater cooperation among democracies Non-democratic leaders are more likely to cheat Greater change in international cooperation

Evidence Patterns of trade altered by leadership change Economic sanctions more likely to end after leadership change Alliances are more likely to change after leadership change

Specific Predictions Democracies have greater trade flows Leadership turnover reduces trade in dictatorships Democracies are less likely to have poor trade relations If relations are poor, leadership turnover in dictatorships is more likely to restore good trade relations

Whats the Catch The leaders who are most likely to be punished for cheating are the least likely to cheat while the leaders that are most likely to cheat are the leaders that are the least likely to be punished for cheating

US Foreign Policy and LSP Iraq and Economic Sanctions Egypt and trade relations

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